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. The district court correctly reasoned that the finding of the state court jury of "recklessness" by the Diocese and the Archdiocese, for purpose of awarding punitive damages, is a separate and distinct issue from insurance coverage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 1417, 1417-19",
"parenthetical": "recklessness reflects degree of culpability -- such as an unreasonable' but slight risk of extreme harm -- rather than likelihood of occurrence",
"sentence": "See Diocese, 858 F.Supp. at 1417-19 (recklessness reflects degree of culpability — such as an unreasonable' but slight risk of extreme harm — rather than likelihood of occurrence); but cf. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Minn.1977) (suggesting in dicta that a reckless act may not constitute an occurrence)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "260 N.W.2d 450, 452-53",
"parenthetical": "suggesting in dicta that a reckless act may not constitute an occurrence",
"sentence": "See Diocese, 858 F.Supp. at 1417-19 (recklessness reflects degree of culpability — such as an unreasonable' but slight risk of extreme harm — rather than likelihood of occurrence); but cf. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Minn.1977) (suggesting in dicta that a reckless act may not constitute an occurrence)."
} | 9,047,391 | a |
In addition, even if Plaintiffs' marks were properly classified as "laudatory" and therefore merely "descriptive," their strength is nonetheless increased by Plaintiffs' significant commercial success. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 F.3d 1081, 1081",
"parenthetical": "\"A suggestive or descriptive mark, which is coneep-tually weak, can have its overall strength as a mark bolstered by its commercial success.\"",
"sentence": "See M2 Software, 421 F.3d at 1081 (“A suggestive or descriptive mark, which is coneep-tually weak, can have its overall strength as a mark bolstered by its commercial success.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Entrepreneur Media v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir.2002) (“We recognize, however, that although a suggestive or descriptive mark is inherently a weak mark, it may be strengthened by such factors as extensive advertising, length of exclusive use, public recognition ....”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 1135, 1144",
"parenthetical": "\"We recognize, however, that although a suggestive or descriptive mark is inherently a weak mark, it may be strengthened by such factors as extensive advertising, length of exclusive use, public recognition ....\"",
"sentence": "See M2 Software, 421 F.3d at 1081 (“A suggestive or descriptive mark, which is coneep-tually weak, can have its overall strength as a mark bolstered by its commercial success.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Entrepreneur Media v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir.2002) (“We recognize, however, that although a suggestive or descriptive mark is inherently a weak mark, it may be strengthened by such factors as extensive advertising, length of exclusive use, public recognition ....”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,715,366 | a |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "107 Cal. App. 467, 480",
"parenthetical": "finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | 3,680,034 | a |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "131 Conn. 238, 238-39",
"parenthetical": "finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "71 S.D. 544, 548-49",
"parenthetical": "finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85",
"parenthetical": "finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12",
"parenthetical": "finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | 3,680,034 | b |
First, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was some debris from the first accident still blocking the roadway, while there was not in the cases finding no proximate cause. Second, in the cases finding proximate cause, there generally was only a short time gap between the first accident and the follow-on accident, while in the cases finding no proximate cause there was a substantial time lapse between them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them",
"sentence": "Compare Sawdey v. Producers’ Milk Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 480, 290 P. 684 (1930) (finding that a 3-minute gap between accidents did not eliminate proximate-cause question); and Anderson, 131 Conn. at 238-39 (finding that a gap of 2 to 4 minutes between accidents did not ehminate proximate-cause question); and Krumvieda v. Hammond, 71 S.D. 544, 548-49, 27 N.W.2d 583 (1947) (finding that 2 minutes lapsed time between the first and second accidents did not take proximate-cause issue away from jury consideration) with Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 484-85, 173 S.E. 443 (1934) (finding that the first accident was not proximate cause of the second accident occurring 20 minutes later when the damaged vehicle was on the roadway with fights on); and Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill. App. 2d 407, 411-12, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (finding that a gap of 3 to 10 minutes between accidents was an important factor in finding no proximate-cause relationship between them)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision",
"sentence": "But see Johnson, 200 Minn. 428 (finding that 1-hour gap did not ehminate proximate-cause relationship when disabled vehicles continued to block the roadway at the time of the second collision)."
} | 3,680,034 | a |
That plaintiff may disagree with her supervision's decisions regarding her applications for promotions is irrelevant. Such business decisions are solely within an employer's discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1108, 1116",
"parenthetical": "\"[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer's reasons\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp. 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | 9,431,816 | b |
That plaintiff may disagree with her supervision's decisions regarding her applications for promotions is irrelevant. Such business decisions are solely within an employer's discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 816, 825",
"parenthetical": "\"[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' non-discriminatory business decisions\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp. 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | 9,431,816 | b |
That plaintiff may disagree with her supervision's decisions regarding her applications for promotions is irrelevant. Such business decisions are solely within an employer's discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' non-discriminatory business decisions\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp. 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | 9,431,816 | b |
That plaintiff may disagree with her supervision's decisions regarding her applications for promotions is irrelevant. Such business decisions are solely within an employer's discretion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp. 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' non-discriminatory business decisions\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | 9,431,816 | a |
That plaintiff may disagree with her supervision's decisions regarding her applications for promotions is irrelevant. Such business decisions are solely within an employer's discretion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp. 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' non-discriminatory business decisions\"",
"sentence": "Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F.Supp. 381, 388 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[a]n employer may exercise business judgment in making personnel decisions as long as they are not discriminatory”); see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988) (“[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment generally is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons”); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991) (“[cjourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality — of employers’ non-discriminatory business decisions”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992)."
} | 9,431,816 | a |
For all of these reasons, the Government's motion for summary judgment must very largely be granted. However, the motion may not be granted in full because the Court, upon its in camera review of the disputed documents, has discovered a few minor instances where disclosure is required. As discussed above, under the exception for official disclosure, the Government waives the right to withhold information if: (1) "the information requested [is] as specific as the information previously released"; (2) "the information requested [matches] the information previously disclosed"; and (3) "the information requested [was] already ... made public through an official and documented disclosure." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp.2d 545, 559",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Congressional publication of classified CIA information does not bind the CIA",
"sentence": "Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F.Supp.2d 545, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (holding that a Congressional publication of classified CIA information does not bind the CIA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 F.3d 772, 774",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not deem 'official' a disclosure made by someone other than the agency from which the information is being sought\"",
"sentence": "See also Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C.Cir.1999) (“[W]e do not deem ‘official’ a disclosure made by someone other than the agency from which the information is being sought”)."
} | 4,068,094 | a |
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has found that Rule 16's good-cause standard governs a party's ability to amend his complaint after the district court has entered a scheduling order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "986 F.Supp. 959, 980",
"parenthetical": "describing \"two-step analysis\" required under Rules 15 and 16 when a motion to amend the pleadings and join additional parties is filed after the scheduling order deadline",
"sentence": "Id. at 1419 (“[Bjecause Sosa’s motion to amend was filed after the scheduling order’s deadline, she must first demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b) before we will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).”); see also Dilmar Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C.1997) (describing “two-step analysis” required under Rules 15 and 16 when a motion to amend the pleadings and join additional parties is filed after the scheduling order deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party's delay may be excused.\"",
"sentence": "Sosa v. Airprint Sys., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 n. 2 (1998) (“[Wjhen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party’s delay may be excused.”). It is only after the court addresses whether the proposed amendment may be granted under Rule 16 that the court is to determine whether it is proper under Rule 15."
} | 9,290,631 | b |
Evaluating this statute is a daunting task, made all the more complicated in this case as the parties have raised a myriad of issues ranging from the legal status of the financing agreements to the propriety of Pritzker's efforts to prime the article 1425 pump. We address these issues sequentially, for the most part subjecting the district court's determinations to plenary review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 462, 472",
"parenthetical": "holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 225, 239-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | 7,415,269 | a |
Evaluating this statute is a daunting task, made all the more complicated in this case as the parties have raised a myriad of issues ranging from the legal status of the financing agreements to the propriety of Pritzker's efforts to prime the article 1425 pump. We address these issues sequentially, for the most part subjecting the district court's determinations to plenary review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 462, 472",
"parenthetical": "holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | 7,415,269 | b |
Evaluating this statute is a daunting task, made all the more complicated in this case as the parties have raised a myriad of issues ranging from the legal status of the financing agreements to the propriety of Pritzker's efforts to prime the article 1425 pump. We address these issues sequentially, for the most part subjecting the district court's determinations to plenary review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 462, 472",
"parenthetical": "holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are purely legal in nature, and, thus, engender de novo review); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (holding that “courts of appeals [must] review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo ”)."
} | 7,415,269 | b |
The BIA refused to reopen Kech-ichian's case because it held that even if her son were potentially subject to persecution in Armenia, that would not entitle her to relief. This circuit has not considered a parent's claim of psychological harm based solely on a child's potential persecution, but the BIA has foreclosed such claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 278",
"parenthetical": "\"[Allowing an applicant to obtain asylum or withholding of removal through persecution to his child would require granting relief outside the statutory ... scheme established by Congress.\"",
"sentence": "In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 278 (B.I.A.2007) (“[Allowing an applicant to obtain asylum or withholding of removal through persecution to his child would require granting relief outside the statutory ... scheme established by Congress.”); see also Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir.2007) (refusing to recognize a claim based on a child’s potential persecution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 F.3d 505, 513",
"parenthetical": "refusing to recognize a claim based on a child's potential persecution",
"sentence": "In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 278 (B.I.A.2007) (“[Allowing an applicant to obtain asylum or withholding of removal through persecution to his child would require granting relief outside the statutory ... scheme established by Congress.”); see also Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir.2007) (refusing to recognize a claim based on a child’s potential persecution)."
} | 4,079,058 | a |
Second, as the BIA reasonably determined, Zhang failed to establish a material change in country conditions, since the time of his hearing. Indeed, State Department reports in the record for 2000 (submitted with Zhang's original application) and 2010 (submitted with his motion to reopen) showed that country conditions had not materially changed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "451 F.3d 292, 294",
"parenthetical": "considering whether evidence in support of reopening demonstrated a change since the hearing below",
"sentence": "See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)(“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (considering whether evidence in support of reopening demonstrated a change since the hearing below)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.\"",
"sentence": "See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)(“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (considering whether evidence in support of reopening demonstrated a change since the hearing below)."
} | 3,595,444 | b |
Okeayainneh and Adentran concede we have previously held that the district court is not required to make a contemporaneous record of its ends-of-justice findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 900, 901",
"parenthetical": "\"Contemporaneity is not required ... and a subsequent articulation suffices.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir.1981) (“While a court generally should make the findings required by section 3161(h)(8)(A) at the time it grants the continuance, the Speedy Trial Act does not require the court to make a contemporaneous record.”); see also United States v. Stackhouse, 183 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (“Contemporaneity is not required ... and a subsequent articulation suffices.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1090, 1095",
"parenthetical": "\"While a court generally should make the findings required by section 3161(h",
"sentence": "See United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir.1981) (“While a court generally should make the findings required by section 3161(h)(8)(A) at the time it grants the continuance, the Speedy Trial Act does not require the court to make a contemporaneous record.”); see also United States v. Stackhouse, 183 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (“Contemporaneity is not required ... and a subsequent articulation suffices.”)."
} | 4,315,424 | b |
Decisions setting aside (as constitutionally invalid) restrictions upon use of the courts, based upon the ability of a party to pay, have occurred principally in criminal cases. The principle has been applied to protect the fundamental rights of some indigents in civil cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515-516",
"parenthetical": "statute unconstitutionally denied divorce to the spouse of an incurably insane person, unless the plaintiff could prove ability to support the insane person",
"sentence": "See e.g. Coonce v. Coonce, 356 Mass. 690, 693-695 (proceedings in forma pauperis in divorce); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 376-379; Morganti v. Morganti, 99 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515-516 (statute unconstitutionally denied divorce to the spouse of an incurably insane person, unless the plaintiff could prove ability to support the insane person); Harrington v. Harrington, 269 Atl. 2d (Maine) 310, 314-316 (statutory bond in repossession proceedings); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d (N.Y.) 1045, 1048-1059 (costs in divorce proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "225 Ga. 88, 90",
"parenthetical": "indigent required to furnish bond as condition of presenting defense to eviction",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 90 (indigent required to furnish bond as condition of presenting defense to eviction), app. dism. 401 U. S. 144, 153."
} | 294,554 | a |
Decisions setting aside (as constitutionally invalid) restrictions upon use of the courts, based upon the ability of a party to pay, have occurred principally in criminal cases. The principle has been applied to protect the fundamental rights of some indigents in civil cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515-516",
"parenthetical": "statute unconstitutionally denied divorce to the spouse of an incurably insane person, unless the plaintiff could prove ability to support the insane person",
"sentence": "See e.g. Coonce v. Coonce, 356 Mass. 690, 693-695 (proceedings in forma pauperis in divorce); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 376-379; Morganti v. Morganti, 99 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515-516 (statute unconstitutionally denied divorce to the spouse of an incurably insane person, unless the plaintiff could prove ability to support the insane person); Harrington v. Harrington, 269 Atl. 2d (Maine) 310, 314-316 (statutory bond in repossession proceedings); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d (N.Y.) 1045, 1048-1059 (costs in divorce proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "401 U. S. 144, 153",
"parenthetical": "indigent required to furnish bond as condition of presenting defense to eviction",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 90 (indigent required to furnish bond as condition of presenting defense to eviction), app. dism. 401 U. S. 144, 153."
} | 294,554 | a |
Bryant's advertisements posed just such a danger. The exclusion in SS 4.11 of political advertising, and of Bryant's advertisements in particular, is therefore reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding regulations barring \"[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities\" on military base and authorizing commander to exclude \"publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 831 & n. 2, 839-40, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (upholding regulations barring “[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities” on military base and authorizing commander to exclude “publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation”); cf. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299-300, 304, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (plurality) (transit system’s ban on “political advertising” held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to “blare of political propaganda” and create “lurking doubts about favoritism”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 299, 299-300, 304",
"parenthetical": "transit system's ban on \"political advertising\" held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to \"blare of political propaganda\" and create \"lurking doubts about favoritism\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 831 & n. 2, 839-40, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (upholding regulations barring “[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities” on military base and authorizing commander to exclude “publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation”); cf. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299-300, 304, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (plurality) (transit system’s ban on “political advertising” held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to “blare of political propaganda” and create “lurking doubts about favoritism”)."
} | 4,030,405 | a |
Bryant's advertisements posed just such a danger. The exclusion in SS 4.11 of political advertising, and of Bryant's advertisements in particular, is therefore reasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "transit system's ban on \"political advertising\" held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to \"blare of political propaganda\" and create \"lurking doubts about favoritism\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 831 & n. 2, 839-40, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (upholding regulations barring “[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities” on military base and authorizing commander to exclude “publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation”); cf. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299-300, 304, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (plurality) (transit system’s ban on “political advertising” held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to “blare of political propaganda” and create “lurking doubts about favoritism”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding regulations barring \"[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities\" on military base and authorizing commander to exclude \"publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 831 & n. 2, 839-40, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (upholding regulations barring “[d]emonstrations, ... political speeches and similar activities” on military base and authorizing commander to exclude “publication [that] presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at [the] installation”); cf. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299-300, 304, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (plurality) (transit system’s ban on “political advertising” held reasonable because political advertisements could subject riders to “blare of political propaganda” and create “lurking doubts about favoritism”)."
} | 4,030,405 | b |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "785 F.2d 835, 841-42",
"parenthetical": "holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 888, 888-89",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or's extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | a |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "785 F.2d 835, 841-42",
"parenthetical": "holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 742, 745",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | a |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 888, 888-89",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or's extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34",
"parenthetical": "denying defendant's motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said \"You'd stay if you weren't a sissy. If you were a man, you'd stay.\"",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | b |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 742, 745",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34",
"parenthetical": "denying defendant's motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said \"You'd stay if you weren't a sissy. If you were a man, you'd stay.\"",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | b |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 888, 888-89",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or's extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862",
"parenthetical": "denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company's president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | b |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862",
"parenthetical": "denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company's president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 742, 745",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | a |
We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 888, 888-89",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or's extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 742, 745",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer",
"sentence": "See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (holding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion, harassed over the next two weeks, and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 928-34 (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff quit within hours of beginning his job, after his employer subjected him to three racial insults, did not ask plaintiff to quit, and said “You’d stay if you weren’t a sissy. If you were a man, you’d stay.”); Robson v. Eva’s Super Market, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 859-60, 862 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (denying summary judgment to defendant, when the evidence showed frequent incidents of sexual harassment over a two-month period, despite the fact that the company’s president called the plaintiff to ask her to return to work); see also Goss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (upholding finding of constructive discharge when plaintiff was subjected to four incidents of harassment over a nine-month period, including (1) a meeting in which plaintiff cried because of her superi- or’s extensive questions about her intention to have a career and a family and (2) a choice between a job transfer and resignation); cf. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.Supp. 742, 745 (C.D.Cal.1986) (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff produced evidence that showed only that he was transferred to a new position with less responsibility, that he stated that his working conditions were satisfactory, and that he resigned in order to take a job with another employer)."
} | 1,736,348 | a |
We do not address Curten's argument that he timely exercised his right of rescission under the Truth in Lending Act be cause Curten did not assert a rescission claim in his complaint and did not otherwise present this argument to the district court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "626 F.3d 1014, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"These arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and because they were never argued before the district court, we deem them waived.\"",
"sentence": "See Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.2010) (“These arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and because they were never argued before the district court, we deem them waived.”); see also Baccei v. United States, 632 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.2011) (“[This Court] will not reframe an appeal to review what would be in effect a different case than the one decided by the district court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "632 F.3d 1140, 1149",
"parenthetical": "\"[This Court] will not reframe an appeal to review what would be in effect a different case than the one decided by the district court.\"",
"sentence": "See Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.2010) (“These arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and because they were never argued before the district court, we deem them waived.”); see also Baccei v. United States, 632 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.2011) (“[This Court] will not reframe an appeal to review what would be in effect a different case than the one decided by the district court.”)."
} | 4,366,605 | a |
Nevertheless, defendant Waller undoubtedly felt obligated to inform the public about issues surrounding the nolle prosequi of Hobbs's case. The court can discern no principled reason why the protection afforded the defendant in Ware should not extend to defendant Waller here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "693 N.E.2d 385, 390",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 F.Supp.2d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutors' defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | 4,287,508 | b |
Nevertheless, defendant Waller undoubtedly felt obligated to inform the public about issues surrounding the nolle prosequi of Hobbs's case. The court can discern no principled reason why the protection afforded the defendant in Ware should not extend to defendant Waller here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 F.Supp.2d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutors' defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | 4,287,508 | a |
Nevertheless, defendant Waller undoubtedly felt obligated to inform the public about issues surrounding the nolle prosequi of Hobbs's case. The court can discern no principled reason why the protection afforded the defendant in Ware should not extend to defendant Waller here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 F.Supp.2d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutors' defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson I, 328 F.Supp.2d at 902 (holding that prosecutors’ defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged); see also Golden v. Mullen, 693 N.E.2d 385, 390, 295 Ill.App.3d 865, 230 Ill.Dec. 256 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) (“[W]e hold that the absolute privilege which attaches to defamatory statements made by an attorney incidental to a pending legal proceeding also applies to post-litigation defamatory statements made by an attorney to the client he or she represented in such proceeding.”)."
} | 4,287,508 | a |
It is beyond peradventure that officials who willfully, intentionally or recklessly keep an inmate in prison past the date he was ordered released are liable under section 1983 for infringing upon the inmate's personal liberty protected by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "761 F.2d 175, 178-79",
"parenthetical": "complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Muel ler, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969) (inmate’s allegations that superintendent of prison kept him confined past term of his sentence was actionable under section 1983); Speaks v. McGregor, 355 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (W.D.Va.1973) (holding fugitive past allowable time period under state law is actionable under section 1983); see also Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178-79 (4th Cir.1985) (complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "415 F.2d 354, 355",
"parenthetical": "inmate's allegations that superintendent of prison kept him confined past term of his sentence was actionable under section 1983",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Muel ler, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969) (inmate’s allegations that superintendent of prison kept him confined past term of his sentence was actionable under section 1983); Speaks v. McGregor, 355 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (W.D.Va.1973) (holding fugitive past allowable time period under state law is actionable under section 1983); see also Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178-79 (4th Cir.1985) (complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983)."
} | 7,392,995 | b |
It is beyond peradventure that officials who willfully, intentionally or recklessly keep an inmate in prison past the date he was ordered released are liable under section 1983 for infringing upon the inmate's personal liberty protected by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "761 F.2d 175, 178-79",
"parenthetical": "complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Muel ler, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969) (inmate’s allegations that superintendent of prison kept him confined past term of his sentence was actionable under section 1983); Speaks v. McGregor, 355 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (W.D.Va.1973) (holding fugitive past allowable time period under state law is actionable under section 1983); see also Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178-79 (4th Cir.1985) (complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-32",
"parenthetical": "holding fugitive past allowable time period under state law is actionable under section 1983",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Muel ler, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969) (inmate’s allegations that superintendent of prison kept him confined past term of his sentence was actionable under section 1983); Speaks v. McGregor, 355 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (W.D.Va.1973) (holding fugitive past allowable time period under state law is actionable under section 1983); see also Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178-79 (4th Cir.1985) (complaint alleging officials knew arrestee was innocent but detained him until the right man was found stated cause of action under section 1983)."
} | 7,392,995 | b |
Substantial evidence supports the IJ's finding that Anguiano failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 F.3d 1044, 1051-52",
"parenthetical": "concluding the evidence did not indicate a particularized threat of torture to petitioner",
"sentence": "See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.2010) (denying relief under CAT where only “general evidence of violence and crime” was presented); see also Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2008) (concluding the evidence did not indicate a particularized threat of torture to petitioner). Thus, petitioner’s claim for relief under CAT fails."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "600 F.3d 1148, 1152",
"parenthetical": "denying relief under CAT where only \"general evidence of violence and crime\" was presented",
"sentence": "See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.2010) (denying relief under CAT where only “general evidence of violence and crime” was presented); see also Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2008) (concluding the evidence did not indicate a particularized threat of torture to petitioner). Thus, petitioner’s claim for relief under CAT fails."
} | 4,365,701 | b |
We also will assume, again without deciding, that the judicial defendants and the administrator defendants are not immune from suit. Further, we assume, without deciding, that at least one of the plaintiffs had standing to bring this suit at the time the initial complaint was filed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).\"",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 F.3d 45, 58",
"parenthetical": "standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | 7,309,912 | b |
We also will assume, again without deciding, that the judicial defendants and the administrator defendants are not immune from suit. Further, we assume, without deciding, that at least one of the plaintiffs had standing to bring this suit at the time the initial complaint was filed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 F.3d 45, 58",
"parenthetical": "standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).\"",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | 7,309,912 | a |
We also will assume, again without deciding, that the judicial defendants and the administrator defendants are not immune from suit. Further, we assume, without deciding, that at least one of the plaintiffs had standing to bring this suit at the time the initial complaint was filed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 F.3d 45, 58",
"parenthetical": "standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).\"",
"sentence": "See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2003) (standing is based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc, v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”)."
} | 7,309,912 | a |
The Department's argument that keeping its designed sight lines clear is purely a discretionary duty, and that its immunity is therefore not waived by the Texas Tort Claims Act, is therefore not supportable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "718 S.W.2d 919, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "efficient maintenance includes trimming vegetation on right-of-way so it will not impair motorists' views as they approach intersections",
"sentence": "See Hamric, 718 S.W.2d at 919-20 (efficient maintenance includes trimming vegetation on right-of-way so it will not impair motorists’ views as they approach intersections); see also Olson, 980 S.W.2d at 896 (untrimmed shrubbery invading right-of-way and partially obscuring line of sight from stop position)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "980 S.W.2d 896, 896",
"parenthetical": "untrimmed shrubbery invading right-of-way and partially obscuring line of sight from stop position",
"sentence": "See Hamric, 718 S.W.2d at 919-20 (efficient maintenance includes trimming vegetation on right-of-way so it will not impair motorists’ views as they approach intersections); see also Olson, 980 S.W.2d at 896 (untrimmed shrubbery invading right-of-way and partially obscuring line of sight from stop position)."
} | 8,933,939 | a |
First, they suggest that they can respond to this evidence simply by claiming that a jury might choose to disregard it or might find it unpersuasive. That is not true. [Ijnstead, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."); Curl v. Int'l Bus. Machs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "517 F.2d 212, 214",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, 'Credibility,' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 586, 586",
"parenthetical": "\"When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | 2,180,311 | a |
First, they suggest that they can respond to this evidence simply by claiming that a jury might choose to disregard it or might find it unpersuasive. That is not true. [Ijnstead, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."); Curl v. Int'l Bus. Machs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "517 F.2d 212, 214",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, 'Credibility,' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | 2,180,311 | a |
First, they suggest that they can respond to this evidence simply by claiming that a jury might choose to disregard it or might find it unpersuasive. That is not true. [Ijnstead, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."); Curl v. Int'l Bus. Machs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 586, 586",
"parenthetical": "\"When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | 2,180,311 | a |
First, they suggest that they can respond to this evidence simply by claiming that a jury might choose to disregard it or might find it unpersuasive. That is not true. [Ijnstead, the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."); Curl v. Int'l Bus. Machs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c",
"sentence": "Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and ... the opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”) (quotation omitted); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019, 1024 (E.D.Va.1997) (“[A] copyright plaintiff cannot base her opposition to summary judgment entirely on the hope that a fact finder will disbelieve the persons who have submitted affidavits on issues of access.”); cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted)."
} | 2,180,311 | a |
. Decisions from other circuits also evince a trend toward allowing eyewitness expert testimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 321, 340-42",
"parenthetical": "finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "450 F.3d 1117, 1125",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert's report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,\" but noting that \"an expert's testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror's experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert's relevance prong is addressed\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | 4,192,996 | a |
. Decisions from other circuits also evince a trend toward allowing eyewitness expert testimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 321, 340-42",
"parenthetical": "finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "725 F.3d 437, 449",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | 4,192,996 | a |
. Decisions from other circuits also evince a trend toward allowing eyewitness expert testimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 532, 534-35",
"parenthetical": "recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony\" and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "450 F.3d 1117, 1125",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert's report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,\" but noting that \"an expert's testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror's experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert's relevance prong is addressed\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | 4,192,996 | a |
. Decisions from other circuits also evince a trend toward allowing eyewitness expert testimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 532, 534-35",
"parenthetical": "recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony\" and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "725 F.3d 437, 449",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | 4,192,996 | a |
. Decisions from other circuits also evince a trend toward allowing eyewitness expert testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "725 F.3d 437, 449",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "450 F.3d 1117, 1125",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert's report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,\" but noting that \"an expert's testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror's experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert's relevance prong is addressed\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973) (affirming refusal to admit testimony of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness identification), United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1974) (same), United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976) (same), and United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982), with United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir.2006) (reversible error to exclude expert testimony explaining problems inherent in stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications, finding that \"expert testimony was the only method of imparting confidence in erroneous identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340-42 (3d Cir.2001) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification and rejecting government's argument that the jury did not need an expert be aware of such factors); United States v, Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir.1993) (recognizing a \"trend in recent years to allow such testimony” and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving \"cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming district court’s exclusion testimony from eyewitness identification expert where expert’s report was deemed \"woefully inadequate,” but noting that \"an expert’s testimony describing how certain factors, falling outside a typical juror’s experience, may affect a eyewitness's identification is the very type of scientific knowledge to which Daubert’s relevance prong is addressed”); but see United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir.2013) (“[W]e agree with the government that, in the typical case, the effects of sleep deprivation, like problems with eyewitness identifications, are readily comprehended by jurors and do not require an expert for their explanation.”)."
} | 4,192,996 | b |
Therefore, in determining whether the pleadings meet the requirements of the demand rule, we apply the law of the District of Columbia where NAMA was incorporated. Nevertheless, we may look to the law of other jurisdictions in interpreting comparable laws or rules, absent definitive authority in this jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that local court rules are to be given same meaning as the comparable federal rule",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. United States, 819 A.2d 963, 965 (D.C.2003) (looking to interpretations of similar statutory language by another jurisdiction for guidance); see also Pritchett v. Stillwell, 604 A.2d 886, 888 n. 2 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted) (noting that local court rules are to be given same meaning as the comparable federal rule)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "819 A.2d 963, 965",
"parenthetical": "looking to interpretations of similar statutory language by another jurisdiction for guidance",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. United States, 819 A.2d 963, 965 (D.C.2003) (looking to interpretations of similar statutory language by another jurisdiction for guidance); see also Pritchett v. Stillwell, 604 A.2d 886, 888 n. 2 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted) (noting that local court rules are to be given same meaning as the comparable federal rule)."
} | 8,447,681 | b |
Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones's prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones's narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)'s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person's past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "905 F.2d 871, 875",
"parenthetical": "holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness)."
} | 3,815,588 | a |
Cases where a court determined that a client substantially failed to fulfill an obligation owed to counsel involved situations where the attorney would suffer immense financial hardship or exposure to sanctions for ethical violations, or a significant conflict of interest existed between attorney and client. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that denying counsel's motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client's requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations",
"sentence": "See also Whiting, 187 F.3d 317 (holding that denying counsel’s motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client’s requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel would suffer undue hardship if motion to withdraw was not granted because client failed to pay over $120,000 in legal fees, yet expected continued representation by counsel",
"sentence": "See Franke, 207 Md.App. 679, 55 A.3d 713 (holding that counsel would suffer undue hardship if motion to withdraw was not granted because client failed to pay over $120,000 in legal fees, yet expected continued representation by counsel); Fidelity, 310 F.3d 537 (reversing an order denying appellant’s motion to withdraw because client failed to pay over $470,000 in legal fees and expenses)."
} | 4,360,596 | b |
Cases where a court determined that a client substantially failed to fulfill an obligation owed to counsel involved situations where the attorney would suffer immense financial hardship or exposure to sanctions for ethical violations, or a significant conflict of interest existed between attorney and client. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel would suffer undue hardship if motion to withdraw was not granted because client failed to pay over $120,000 in legal fees, yet expected continued representation by counsel",
"sentence": "See Franke, 207 Md.App. 679, 55 A.3d 713 (holding that counsel would suffer undue hardship if motion to withdraw was not granted because client failed to pay over $120,000 in legal fees, yet expected continued representation by counsel); Fidelity, 310 F.3d 537 (reversing an order denying appellant’s motion to withdraw because client failed to pay over $470,000 in legal fees and expenses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that denying counsel's motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client's requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations",
"sentence": "See also Whiting, 187 F.3d 317 (holding that denying counsel’s motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client’s requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations)."
} | 4,360,596 | a |
Cases where a court determined that a client substantially failed to fulfill an obligation owed to counsel involved situations where the attorney would suffer immense financial hardship or exposure to sanctions for ethical violations, or a significant conflict of interest existed between attorney and client. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing an order denying appellant's motion to withdraw because client failed to pay over $470,000 in legal fees and expenses",
"sentence": "See Franke, 207 Md.App. 679, 55 A.3d 713 (holding that counsel would suffer undue hardship if motion to withdraw was not granted because client failed to pay over $120,000 in legal fees, yet expected continued representation by counsel); Fidelity, 310 F.3d 537 (reversing an order denying appellant’s motion to withdraw because client failed to pay over $470,000 in legal fees and expenses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that denying counsel's motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client's requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations",
"sentence": "See also Whiting, 187 F.3d 317 (holding that denying counsel’s motion to withdraw would result in undue hardship because continued representation while honoring client’s requests would force counsel to violate ethical obligations)."
} | 4,360,596 | a |
The government cannot "possess" a statement as defined in the Jencks Act apart from the writing or recording in which it is memorialized. Further, to be producible under the Jencks Act, a "statement" (i.e. the transcript or recording thereof) must be "in the possession of the United States." 18 U.S.C. SS 3500(b). If the government has not requested and received a transcript from a court reporter, then obviously the transcript or statement is not "in the possession of the United States." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.2d 18, 20",
"parenthetical": "\"The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.1966) (“The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial”); see also United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1991) (untranseribed testimony at detention hearing not “in possession” of government); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265,1271 (5th Cir.1977) (presentence report under control of probation officer is not “in possession of the United States” for purposes of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 733, 738",
"parenthetical": "untranseribed testimony at detention hearing not \"in possession\" of government",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.1966) (“The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial”); see also United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1991) (untranseribed testimony at detention hearing not “in possession” of government); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265,1271 (5th Cir.1977) (presentence report under control of probation officer is not “in possession of the United States” for purposes of the Act)."
} | 3,614,766 | a |
The government cannot "possess" a statement as defined in the Jencks Act apart from the writing or recording in which it is memorialized. Further, to be producible under the Jencks Act, a "statement" (i.e. the transcript or recording thereof) must be "in the possession of the United States." 18 U.S.C. SS 3500(b). If the government has not requested and received a transcript from a court reporter, then obviously the transcript or statement is not "in the possession of the United States." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.2d 18, 20",
"parenthetical": "\"The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.1966) (“The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial”); see also United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1991) (untranseribed testimony at detention hearing not “in possession” of government); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265,1271 (5th Cir.1977) (presentence report under control of probation officer is not “in possession of the United States” for purposes of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 F.2d 1265, 1271",
"parenthetical": "presentence report under control of probation officer is not \"in possession of the United States\" for purposes of the Act",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.1966) (“The government has no obligation to transcribe stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a related trial”); see also United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1991) (untranseribed testimony at detention hearing not “in possession” of government); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265,1271 (5th Cir.1977) (presentence report under control of probation officer is not “in possession of the United States” for purposes of the Act)."
} | 3,614,766 | a |
Section 18-8-806 has been construed as criminalizing certain threats as viewed from an objective, reasonable person's perspective. After Watts, and prior to Black, courts construing other criminal statutes proscribing certain types of threats almost uniformly applied an objective standard (from either the speaker's or the recipient's perspective) to determine whether a statement was a true threat. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "973 P.2d 1225, 1231, 1233",
"parenthetical": "threat cognizable under SS 18-9-111, criminalizing harassment by stalking, assessed under \"an objective 'reasonable person' standard\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1231, 1233 (Colo.1999) (threat cognizable under § 18-9-111, criminalizing harassment by stalking, assessed under \"an objective 'reasonable person' standard\"); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553-56 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 556-57 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "438 F.2d 13, 15",
"parenthetical": "in prosecution for threatening the President, the prosecution must prove a present intent to do injury if the threat is communicated to someone other than the President",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.1971) (en banc) (in prosecution for threatening the President, the prosecution must prove a present intent to do injury if the threat is communicated to someone other than the President)."
} | 8,364,376 | a |
Lower federal courts have recognized that the statute codified the prior adequacy standard. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "538 F. 2d 67, 67",
"parenthetical": "\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient' means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy' \"",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers' assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under SS 1341",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | 6,187,887 | a |
Lower federal courts have recognized that the statute codified the prior adequacy standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers' assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under SS 1341",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F. 2d 463, 466-467",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by SS 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief\"",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | 6,187,887 | b |
Lower federal courts have recognized that the statute codified the prior adequacy standard. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "595 F. 2d 323, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it\"",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers' assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under SS 1341",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | 6,187,887 | a |
Lower federal courts have recognized that the statute codified the prior adequacy standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers' assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under SS 1341",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F. 2d 882, 884",
"parenthetical": "federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if \"an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected\"",
"sentence": "See Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d, at 67 (\"the decisions indicate that 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means no more than the prior equity standard of 'adequacy’ ”); Dillon v. Montana, 634 F. 2d 463, 466-467 (CA9 1980) (recognizing that Congress gave explicit sanction to pre-existing equity practice and stating that \"[t]he remedial certainty contemplated by § 1341 is that a state forum be empowered to consider claims that a tax is unlawful and to issue adequate relief”); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323, 325 (CA5 1979) (“Since the 1937 statute was intended as a codification of judicial practice prior to its passage, both the Supreme Court and this court have found it useful to draw on the background of pre-1937 decisions in interpreting the purposes and policies which underlie it”); Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F. 2d 882, 884 (CA5 1958) (federal court has no jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act if “an adequate remedy is provided for the recovery back if improperly collected”); see also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 631 F. 2d 426 (CA6 1980) (state remedy limited to seeking upward revision of other taxpayers’ assessments did not bar federal-court jurisdiction under § 1341), cert.. denied, post, p. 959; Alnoa G."
} | 6,187,887 | b |
For example, the Eighth Circuit found that the Spearman court "specifically explained that the plaintiffs fault-based retaliatory discharge claim-was not embodied in the Illinois statutory workers' compensation scheme, but rather derived from the state's common law." Thus, the action arose under the state's workers' compensation laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "206 F.3d 1060, 1060",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the [cause] of action at issue in Spearman ... [is] so different from Alabama's retaliatory discharge statute, [that case has] little persuasive force here.\"",
"sentence": "See Suder, 116 F.3d at 1352 (“[Spearman ], however, is distinguishable. In Spearman, the court was careful to point out that the Illinois law of retaliatory discharge had its genesis, not in any statutory workers’ compensation scheme, but rather in the general tort law of the state.”); see also Reed, 206 F.3d at 1060 (“Because the [cause] of action at issue in Spearman ... [is] so different from Alabama’s retaliatory discharge statute, [that case has] little persuasive force here.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 F.3d 1352, 1352",
"parenthetical": "\"[Spearman ], however, is distinguishable. In Spearman, the court was careful to point out that the Illinois law of retaliatory discharge had its genesis, not in any statutory workers' compensation scheme, but rather in the general tort law of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Suder, 116 F.3d at 1352 (“[Spearman ], however, is distinguishable. In Spearman, the court was careful to point out that the Illinois law of retaliatory discharge had its genesis, not in any statutory workers’ compensation scheme, but rather in the general tort law of the state.”); see also Reed, 206 F.3d at 1060 (“Because the [cause] of action at issue in Spearman ... [is] so different from Alabama’s retaliatory discharge statute, [that case has] little persuasive force here.”)."
} | 9,057,574 | b |
. In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 F.3d 948, 948-49",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 339, 339-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | 3,751,810 | a |
. In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 818, 822",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 339, 339-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | 3,751,810 | a |
. In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 577, 583",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 339, 339-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | 3,751,810 | a |
. In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 339, 339-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act",
"sentence": "See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act)."
} | 3,751,810 | b |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "792 F.2d 932, 937",
"parenthetical": "alien's trip abroad is temporary only if he has a \"continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the entirety of his visit\"",
"sentence": "See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that “[t]he relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately, but the intent to return to the United States within a relatively short period”); see also Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir.1986) (alien’s trip abroad is temporary only if he has a “continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the entirety of his visit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1512, 1514",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately, but the intent to return to the United States within a relatively short period\"",
"sentence": "See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that “[t]he relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately, but the intent to return to the United States within a relatively short period”); see also Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir.1986) (alien’s trip abroad is temporary only if he has a “continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the entirety of his visit”)."
} | 3,684,424 | b |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "136 B.R. 59, 61",
"parenthetical": "factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of \"(1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | a |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1992 WL 22191, at *3",
"parenthetical": "promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court's knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | a |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8",
"parenthetical": "promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court's knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | a |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1989 WL 129479, at *1",
"parenthetical": "court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | b |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2",
"parenthetical": "court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | a |
Section 157(d) does not define the term "cause." District courts in this circuit have considered a number of factors in evaluating cause: whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 992, 999",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 B.R. 293, 296",
"parenthetical": "uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (factors include whether action is core or non-core and issues of “(1) judicial economy, (2) uniform bankruptcy administration, (3) reduction of forum shopping, (4) economical use of debtors’ and creditors[’] resources, (5) expediting the bankruptcy process, and (6) the presence of a jury demand”); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., No. 2:91-79, 1992 WL 22191, at *3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1277, at *8 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 1992) (promotion of uniformity in bankruptcy administration, judicial economy, and the Bankruptcy Court’s knowledge of the facts warranted denying motion to withdraw reference); In re Mountain View Coach Line, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5385, 1989 WL 129479, at *1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12698, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,1989) (court should consider whether matter is core or non-core and issues of judicial economy); In re Wedtech Corp., 94 B.R. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (uniformity, forum shopping, efficiency, and jury trial considerations all are relevant); see also Holland America Ins. Co. v. Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir.1985) (“The district court should consider the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.”); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01[2][e], at 3-64."
} | 11,938,863 | b |
The court is also aware that survey evidence can be used in FDCPA cases to show how readers unburdened by a legal education or other experience or education in business and legal matters might interpret collection notices. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 F.3d 1057, 1060",
"parenthetical": "explaining that survey evidence under the FDCPA would be useful only if it included some benchmark measure comparing the understanding of lawful notices, since one would expect some level of confusion among unsophisticated consumers even of perfectly lawful notices",
"sentence": "See Durkin, 406 F.3d at 419, 422-23 (affirming summary judgment for defense after finding that district court properly rejected survey evidence as irrelevant and unreliable); Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948; Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.2000); see also Johnson v. Revenue Management Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that survey evidence under the FDCPA would be useful only if it included some benchmark measure comparing the understanding of lawful notices, since one would expect some level of confusion among unsophisticated consumers even of perfectly lawful notices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 419, 419, 422-23",
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment for defense after finding that district court properly rejected survey evidence as irrelevant and unreliable",
"sentence": "See Durkin, 406 F.3d at 419, 422-23 (affirming summary judgment for defense after finding that district court properly rejected survey evidence as irrelevant and unreliable); Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948; Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.2000); see also Johnson v. Revenue Management Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that survey evidence under the FDCPA would be useful only if it included some benchmark measure comparing the understanding of lawful notices, since one would expect some level of confusion among unsophisticated consumers even of perfectly lawful notices)."
} | 8,447,619 | b |
Related cases have also generated two appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. One appeal dealt with the question of whether or not the identities of various confidential informants should be disclosed to Plaintiffs for use in this and related civil litigation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming Judge Ur-bom's refusal to require the government to disclose the names of confidential informants and to produce unredacted search warrant affidavit for civil-litigation purposes",
"sentence": "United States v. Jones Oil Co., 60 F.3d 831, 1995 WL 408251 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming Judge Ur-bom’s refusal to require the government to disclose the names of confidential informants and to produce unredacted search warrant affidavit for civil-litigation purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 F.Supp. 749, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "adopting Judge Urbom's decision and holding that the government should not be compelled to disclose identities of confidential informants described but not named in search warrant affidavit",
"sentence": "See also Jones I, 869 F.Supp. at 749-50 (adopting Judge Urbom’s decision and holding that the government should not be compelled to disclose identities of confidential informants described but not named in search warrant affidavit)."
} | 7,842,159 | a |
Related cases have also generated two appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. One appeal dealt with the question of whether or not the identities of various confidential informants should be disclosed to Plaintiffs for use in this and related civil litigation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming Judge Ur-bom's refusal to require the government to disclose the names of confidential informants and to produce unredacted search warrant affidavit for civil-litigation purposes",
"sentence": "United States v. Jones Oil Co., 60 F.3d 831, 1995 WL 408251 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming Judge Ur-bom’s refusal to require the government to disclose the names of confidential informants and to produce unredacted search warrant affidavit for civil-litigation purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 F.Supp. 749, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "adopting Judge Urbom's decision and holding that the government should not be compelled to disclose identities of confidential informants described but not named in search warrant affidavit",
"sentence": "See also Jones I, 869 F.Supp. at 749-50 (adopting Judge Urbom’s decision and holding that the government should not be compelled to disclose identities of confidential informants described but not named in search warrant affidavit)."
} | 7,842,159 | a |
(Trial Tr. 197, July 7, 2004.) This line of inquiry improper, as it was beyond the scope of anything Turbe testified about. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of uncharged crimes was improper on rebuttal, since none of the defendants made any general denial of wrongdoing which might have justified rebuttal in the form of evidence of uncharged crimes",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that rebuttal testimony is improper when it “does not rebut anything said by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that evidence of uncharged crimes was improper on rebuttal, since none of the defendants made any general denial of wrongdoing which might have justified rebuttal in the form of evidence of uncharged crimes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 675, 681",
"parenthetical": "noting that rebuttal testimony is improper when it \"does not rebut anything said by the defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that rebuttal testimony is improper when it “does not rebut anything said by the defendant.”); see also United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that evidence of uncharged crimes was improper on rebuttal, since none of the defendants made any general denial of wrongdoing which might have justified rebuttal in the form of evidence of uncharged crimes)."
} | 4,021,501 | b |
On the merits, Espinosa is entitled to no relief as a matter of law since neither the trial court nor his defense attorney had an obligation to inform him that state convictions could be used to enhance subsequent federal sentences. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "criminal defendant not entitled to eviden-tiary hearing based upon allegation that his counsel misadvised him as to potential for enhanced penalties for defendant's future criminal behavior",
"sentence": "See Ford v. State, 753 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (stating that: “neither the defense attorney nor the trial court is duty-bound to anticipate the defendant’s recidivism and warn him of the sentence-enhancing consequences his plea may have for any future crimes he commits, and we conclude that Ford is not entitled to an evidential hearing on the matter.”); see also Rhodes v. State, 701 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (criminal defendant not entitled to eviden-tiary hearing based upon allegation that his counsel misadvised him as to potential for enhanced penalties for defendant’s future criminal behavior)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 So.2d 595, 596",
"parenthetical": "stating that: \"neither the defense attorney nor the trial court is duty-bound to anticipate the defendant's recidivism and warn him of the sentence-enhancing consequences his plea may have for any future crimes he commits, and we conclude that Ford is not entitled to an evidential hearing on the matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Ford v. State, 753 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (stating that: “neither the defense attorney nor the trial court is duty-bound to anticipate the defendant’s recidivism and warn him of the sentence-enhancing consequences his plea may have for any future crimes he commits, and we conclude that Ford is not entitled to an evidential hearing on the matter.”); see also Rhodes v. State, 701 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (criminal defendant not entitled to eviden-tiary hearing based upon allegation that his counsel misadvised him as to potential for enhanced penalties for defendant’s future criminal behavior)."
} | 11,097,999 | b |
I concur in the result to reverse. Under Alabama law, an alternating award of custody is not ipso facto improper in every circumstance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment specifying child's \"visitation\" with each parent for six months each year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hughston v. Ivey, 479 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (affirming custody judgment placing preschool child with each parent for alternating six-month periods); Emmons v. Emmons, 450 So.2d 148, 148-49 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) (affirming judgment alternating custody of three-year-old child between parents every six weeks); cf. Darby v. Sherrer, 689 So.2d 875 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (affirming judgment specifying child’s “visitation” with each parent for six months each year); see generally Comment Note, “Split,” “Divided,” or “Alternate” Custody of Children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 So.2d 1277, 1279",
"parenthetical": "affirming custody judgment placing preschool child with each parent for alternating six-month periods",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hughston v. Ivey, 479 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (affirming custody judgment placing preschool child with each parent for alternating six-month periods); Emmons v. Emmons, 450 So.2d 148, 148-49 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) (affirming judgment alternating custody of three-year-old child between parents every six weeks); cf. Darby v. Sherrer, 689 So.2d 875 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (affirming judgment specifying child’s “visitation” with each parent for six months each year); see generally Comment Note, “Split,” “Divided,” or “Alternate” Custody of Children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963)."
} | 9,011,094 | b |
I concur in the result to reverse. Under Alabama law, an alternating award of custody is not ipso facto improper in every circumstance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment specifying child's \"visitation\" with each parent for six months each year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hughston v. Ivey, 479 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (affirming custody judgment placing preschool child with each parent for alternating six-month periods); Emmons v. Emmons, 450 So.2d 148, 148-49 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) (affirming judgment alternating custody of three-year-old child between parents every six weeks); cf. Darby v. Sherrer, 689 So.2d 875 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (affirming judgment specifying child’s “visitation” with each parent for six months each year); see generally Comment Note, “Split,” “Divided,” or “Alternate” Custody of Children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 So.2d 148, 148-49",
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment alternating custody of three-year-old child between parents every six weeks",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hughston v. Ivey, 479 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (affirming custody judgment placing preschool child with each parent for alternating six-month periods); Emmons v. Emmons, 450 So.2d 148, 148-49 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) (affirming judgment alternating custody of three-year-old child between parents every six weeks); cf. Darby v. Sherrer, 689 So.2d 875 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (affirming judgment specifying child’s “visitation” with each parent for six months each year); see generally Comment Note, “Split,” “Divided,” or “Alternate” Custody of Children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963)."
} | 9,011,094 | b |
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 968, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 251, 264",
"parenthetical": "indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | 9,507,442 | a |
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 251, 264",
"parenthetical": "indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | 9,507,442 | b |
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 251, 264",
"parenthetical": "indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | 9,507,442 | b |
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 251, 264",
"parenthetical": "indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing the existence of “purely jurisdictional elements”)."
} | 9,507,442 | a |
. While the Utah Code does not define the term "medical condition," other state courts addressing this issue have concluded that the term "medical" encompasses both mental and physical health. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical\" purposes",
"sentence": "State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 809 n. 9 (1987) (explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical” purposes); cf. Madere v. State, 2000-KA-00347-SCT ¶ 40 (Miss.2001), 794 So.2d 200 (holding that the term \"medical,” as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the term \"medical,\" as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health",
"sentence": "State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 809 n. 9 (1987) (explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical” purposes); cf. Madere v. State, 2000-KA-00347-SCT ¶ 40 (Miss.2001), 794 So.2d 200 (holding that the term \"medical,” as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health)."
} | 8,206,694 | a |
. While the Utah Code does not define the term "medical condition," other state courts addressing this issue have concluded that the term "medical" encompasses both mental and physical health. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical\" purposes",
"sentence": "State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 809 n. 9 (1987) (explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical” purposes); cf. Madere v. State, 2000-KA-00347-SCT ¶ 40 (Miss.2001), 794 So.2d 200 (holding that the term \"medical,” as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the term \"medical,\" as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health",
"sentence": "State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 809 n. 9 (1987) (explaining that a psychologist treating a patient for well-established psychological problems constitutes treating the patient for \"medical” purposes); cf. Madere v. State, 2000-KA-00347-SCT ¶ 40 (Miss.2001), 794 So.2d 200 (holding that the term \"medical,” as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health)."
} | 8,206,694 | a |
(Tr., Doc. 77:7, fines 11-17.). Based on the clear evidence, I find that no connection existed between the gay pride speech and any disruptions that may have resulted at Ponce de Leon in September 2007. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1072",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"other than the involvement of articles of clothing, little evidence has been presented to explain the nexus between a racial incident and the threat of a disruption relating to issues of sexuality.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1072 (D.Minn.2001) (finding that “other than the involvement of articles of clothing, little evidence has been presented to explain the nexus between a racial incident and the threat of a disruption relating to issues of sexuality.”); cf. Blackwell, supra, 363 F.2d at 754 (upholding ban on speech because “the reprehensible conduct ... was so inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "363 F.2d 754, 754",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on speech because \"the reprehensible conduct ... was so inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1072 (D.Minn.2001) (finding that “other than the involvement of articles of clothing, little evidence has been presented to explain the nexus between a racial incident and the threat of a disruption relating to issues of sexuality.”); cf. Blackwell, supra, 363 F.2d at 754 (upholding ban on speech because “the reprehensible conduct ... was so inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable.”)."
} | 5,857,368 | a |
Credibility findings demand even greater deference. When applying this standard of review, we necessarily incorporate an understanding of the appropriate burden of proof in the district court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 883, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the \"clear and convincing\" burden of proof",
"sentence": "See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the “clear and convincing” burden of proof); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established a fact); EEOC v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1984) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s factual conclusion that a party had sustained its burden of proving that a statutory provision applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "581 F.3d 970, 976",
"parenthetical": "reviewing for clear error the district court's finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established a fact",
"sentence": "See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the “clear and convincing” burden of proof); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established a fact); EEOC v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1984) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s factual conclusion that a party had sustained its burden of proving that a statutory provision applied)."
} | 4,050,357 | a |
Credibility findings demand even greater deference. When applying this standard of review, we necessarily incorporate an understanding of the appropriate burden of proof in the district court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 883, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the \"clear and convincing\" burden of proof",
"sentence": "See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the “clear and convincing” burden of proof); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established a fact); EEOC v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1984) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s factual conclusion that a party had sustained its burden of proving that a statutory provision applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "736 F.2d 510, 513",
"parenthetical": "reviewing for clear error the district court's factual conclusion that a party had sustained its burden of proving that a statutory provision applied",
"sentence": "See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error, but that the finding must be judged in view of the “clear and convincing” burden of proof); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established a fact); EEOC v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1984) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s factual conclusion that a party had sustained its burden of proving that a statutory provision applied)."
} | 4,050,357 | a |
However, given Walsh's testimony that he did not know when it first occurred to him that he should repay the money and the testimony of Senator Tson-gas and Frank Daly that they knew of no formal trip cancellation being communicated, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Walsh did not know in September 1984 that his retention of the funds was wrongful. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the embezzlement count as a matter of law on statute of limitations grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 716, 716",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he determination of when willfulness manifests itself is a factual issue which must be determined by the jury\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sams, 865 F.2d at 716 (“[t]he determination of when willfulness manifests itself is a factual issue which must be determined by the jury”); cf. United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531, 532 (9th Cir.1973) (in a tax case of which willfulness is an essential element, the statute of limitations begins to run when the failure to pay became willful, not when the taxes were assessed)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "484 F.2d 531, 532",
"parenthetical": "in a tax case of which willfulness is an essential element, the statute of limitations begins to run when the failure to pay became willful, not when the taxes were assessed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sams, 865 F.2d at 716 (“[t]he determination of when willfulness manifests itself is a factual issue which must be determined by the jury”); cf. United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531, 532 (9th Cir.1973) (in a tax case of which willfulness is an essential element, the statute of limitations begins to run when the failure to pay became willful, not when the taxes were assessed)."
} | 1,138,347 | a |
Ponzo spends no time explaining how he suffered prejudice. And although the second question may have suggested that Costello was somehow involved in marijuana trafficking, the query went unanswered, plus the court told the jury that lawyers' questions are not evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 387, 394",
"parenthetical": "noting that demonstrating prejudice is \"more difficult\" when questions go unanswered",
"sentence": "See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 485 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding no prejudice where witness did not answer the challenged question and the court instructed the jury that lawyers’ statements are not evidence); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 394 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that demonstrating prejudice is “more difficult” when questions go unanswered). So we cannot say that the complained-of errors rise to the level of plain error."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 456, 485",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudice where witness did not answer the challenged question and the court instructed the jury that lawyers' statements are not evidence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 485 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding no prejudice where witness did not answer the challenged question and the court instructed the jury that lawyers’ statements are not evidence); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 394 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that demonstrating prejudice is “more difficult” when questions go unanswered). So we cannot say that the complained-of errors rise to the level of plain error."
} | 12,277,118 | b |
Young did not speak as a private citizen. In Flora, we concluded that the plaintiff plausibly established that he spoke as a citizen (and not as the county's chief public defender) by alleging that, among other things, when his speech " 'up the chain of command'" failed to produce results, he took drastic measures by filing a funding lawsuit against the county and by reporting that thousands of delinquency adjudications and consent decrees had not been expunged as the state supreme court had ordered. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.3d 242, 242",
"parenthetical": "concluding that borough manager did not speak as citizen when relaying complaints about mayor's harassment and intimidation to borough council president pursuant to official duties as borough manager",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hill, 455 F.3d at 242 (concluding that borough manager did not speak as citizen when relaying complaints about mayor’s harassment and intimidation to borough council president pursuant to official duties as borough manager)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "776 F.3d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "who evidently had accused Young himself of misconduct and was one of Young's own subordinates",
"sentence": "Flora, 776 F.3d at 180. In contrast, it was part of Young’s ordinary job duties as a lieutenant in the Irvington Police Department to file an Internal Affairs complaint stating that, inter alia, Chief of Police Chase showed favoritism to another police officer (who evidently had accused Young himself of misconduct and was one of Young’s own subordinates) because of a sexual relationship between the Chief of Police and the officer’s sister."
} | 5,756,269 | b |
"[T]his case is not one in which review under ORS 34.010 to ORS 34.102 was unavailable had it been timely filed, or a case in which another specific statutory or a common-law remedy exists for which there is jurisdiction over the cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | 5,416,287 | a |
"[T]his case is not one in which review under ORS 34.010 to ORS 34.102 was unavailable had it been timely filed, or a case in which another specific statutory or a common-law remedy exists for which there is jurisdiction over the cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim",
"sentence": "See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable)."
} | 5,416,287 | b |
Subsets and Splits