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Finally, Hartley argues that we should remand the case for new postcon-viction proceedings because postconviction counsel (Morrow and Malnick) failed to adequately investigate the case and to obtain a mental health expert. Hartley concedes that this Court has held, and, in fact, "all courts" have held, that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "698 So.2d 247, 248",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]laims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief.\"",
"sentence": "See Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla.1996) (“[C]laims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief.”); see also Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1203 (Fla.2005) (“Under Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 So.2d 1190, 1203",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.\"",
"sentence": "See Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla.1996) (“[C]laims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief.”); see also Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1203 (Fla.2005) (“Under Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.”)."
} | 8,362,414 | a |
First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | 11,184,370 | a |
First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "421 S.E.2d 210, 213",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | 11,184,370 | a |
First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "172 S.E.2d 788, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | 11,184,370 | b |
First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "172 S.E.2d 788, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "421 S.E.2d 210, 213",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive)."
} | 11,184,370 | a |
See Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, par. 126.5.4, at 126-64 (2d ed. 1984). If the power involves acts of "independent significance", whose effect on the trust is "incidental and collateral", such acts are also deemed to be beyond the decedent's control. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "power to bear or adopt children involves act of \"independent significance\", whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was \"incidental and collateral\"",
"sentence": "See Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (power to bear or adopt children involves act of “independent significance”, whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was “incidental and collateral”); see also Estate of Tully v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 596, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406 (1976) (“In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.\"",
"sentence": "See Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (power to bear or adopt children involves act of “independent significance”, whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was “incidental and collateral”); see also Estate of Tully v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 596, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406 (1976) (“In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.”)."
} | 6,084,476 | a |
See Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, par. 126.5.4, at 126-64 (2d ed. 1984). If the power involves acts of "independent significance", whose effect on the trust is "incidental and collateral", such acts are also deemed to be beyond the decedent's control. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 1401, 1406",
"parenthetical": "\"In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.\"",
"sentence": "See Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (power to bear or adopt children involves act of “independent significance”, whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was “incidental and collateral”); see also Estate of Tully v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 596, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406 (1976) (“In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "power to bear or adopt children involves act of \"independent significance\", whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was \"incidental and collateral\"",
"sentence": "See Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (power to bear or adopt children involves act of “independent significance”, whose effect on a trust that included after-born and after-adopted children was “incidental and collateral”); see also Estate of Tully v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 596, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406 (1976) (“In reality, a man might divorce his wife, but to assume that he would fight through an entire divorce process merely to alter employee death benefits approaches the absurd.”)."
} | 6,084,476 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner's rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | a |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner's rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner's rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner's rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 756, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a state trial court judge's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter\"",
"sentence": "But see Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that “a state trial court judge’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter”) (citations omitted); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (7th Cir.1983); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S.Ct. 106, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.1976, cert. denied sub nom., Davis v. Greer, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir.1987)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner's rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 756, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a state trial court judge's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter\"",
"sentence": "But see Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that “a state trial court judge’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter”) (citations omitted); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (7th Cir.1983); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S.Ct. 106, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.1976, cert. denied sub nom., Davis v. Greer, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir.1987)."
} | 7,394,296 | a |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 756, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a state trial court judge's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter\"",
"sentence": "But see Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that “a state trial court judge’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter”) (citations omitted); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (7th Cir.1983); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S.Ct. 106, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.1976, cert. denied sub nom., Davis v. Greer, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir.1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | 7,394,296 | b |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 756, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a state trial court judge's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter\"",
"sentence": "But see Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that “a state trial court judge’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter”) (citations omitted); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (7th Cir.1983); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S.Ct. 106, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.1976, cert. denied sub nom., Davis v. Greer, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir.1987)."
} | 7,394,296 | a |
Additionally, circuits other than the First Circuit have ruled clearly that federal due process requires a lesser included offense instruction in non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.",
"sentence": "Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987) (If habe-as petitioner was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction under state law, state trial court violated petitioner’s rights in refusing to give it, and habeas writ should issue); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir.1984) (The Beck “principle is not limited to capital cases_”); see also United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1987) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given [in narcotics possession case] if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”) (quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 [1982]); Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3053, 69 L.Ed.2d 421 (1981) (Lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter is not required by due process if the evidence does not support it.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 756, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a state trial court judge's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter\"",
"sentence": "But see Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that “a state trial court judge’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter”) (citations omitted); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (7th Cir.1983); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S.Ct. 106, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.1976, cert. denied sub nom., Davis v. Greer, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir.1987)."
} | 7,394,296 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Because Dr. Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Morgan relied on this report, they were permitted to testify about it as a basis for their opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert's opinion",
"sentence": "See State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995) (psychiatrist who did not personally examine the defendant was permitted to render an opinion based on reports prepared by others who examined the defendant but did not testify at trial); see also Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 473 S.E.2d 793 (1996) (in medical malpractice case, plaintiffs experts properly permitted to testify concerning their opinions which were based in part on hearsay statements contained in plaintiffs medical records and on deposition testimony by medical professionals in a separate action); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (plaintiffs treating physician permitted to render opinion concerning plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries where physician relied on tests and a report issued by a non-testifying neuropsychologist); Howie v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App.1986) (plaintiffs psychologist permitted to render expert opinion even though opinion was based in part on inadmissible hearsay gathered from plaintiff and her family given the information was not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, as one of the bases of the expert’s opinion)."
} | 193,241 | a |
The district court properly concluded that Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") were Miller's exclusive remedies for claims of discrimination in federal employment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "64 F.3d 1421, 1424",
"parenthetical": "Title VII's exclusivity regarding discrimination on the basis of sex also applies to discrimination on the basis of gender",
"sentence": "See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir.1985) (Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1995) (Title VII’s exclusivity regarding discrimination on the basis of sex also applies to discrimination on the basis of gender); Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1364 n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (“To the extent that plaintiffs Bivens claims are founded in actions proscribed by Title VII, they may not be maintained because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "752 F.2d 410, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability",
"sentence": "See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir.1985) (Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1995) (Title VII’s exclusivity regarding discrimination on the basis of sex also applies to discrimination on the basis of gender); Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1364 n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (“To the extent that plaintiffs Bivens claims are founded in actions proscribed by Title VII, they may not be maintained because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.”)."
} | 4,349,292 | b |
The district court properly concluded that Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") were Miller's exclusive remedies for claims of discrimination in federal employment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "752 F.2d 410, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability",
"sentence": "See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir.1985) (Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1995) (Title VII’s exclusivity regarding discrimination on the basis of sex also applies to discrimination on the basis of gender); Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1364 n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (“To the extent that plaintiffs Bivens claims are founded in actions proscribed by Title VII, they may not be maintained because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent that plaintiffs Bivens claims are founded in actions proscribed by Title VII, they may not be maintained because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.\"",
"sentence": "See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir.1985) (Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of sex, and the RA is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of disability); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1995) (Title VII’s exclusivity regarding discrimination on the basis of sex also applies to discrimination on the basis of gender); Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1364 n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (“To the extent that plaintiffs Bivens claims are founded in actions proscribed by Title VII, they may not be maintained because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.”)."
} | 4,349,292 | a |
Some observations are made salient even on this limited record. Indisputably, TSI acted jointly with the deputy sheriff, a governmental employee, to divest plaintiffs of their interest in their home. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 942, 942",
"parenthetical": "private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a \"state actor\" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 (private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a “state actor” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Kennedy v. Widdowson, 804 F.Supp. 737, 740 (D.Md.1992) (private defendant’s joint participation with police officers in removing property from plaintiffs’ home made him a state actor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "804 F.Supp. 737, 740",
"parenthetical": "private defendant's joint participation with police officers in removing property from plaintiffs' home made him a state actor",
"sentence": "See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 (private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a “state actor” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Kennedy v. Widdowson, 804 F.Supp. 737, 740 (D.Md.1992) (private defendant’s joint participation with police officers in removing property from plaintiffs’ home made him a state actor)."
} | 1,286,313 | a |
Applying the test set forth in Lopez and Amaya-Ruiz, we reject Doody's argument for two reasons. First, the detectives' statements did not constitute a "promise" because they "did not offer any benefit' to the defendant in exchange for information." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "174 Ariz. 138, 138",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim's mother did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "137 Ariz. 80, 87",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that suspect's confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | 806,851 | b |
Applying the test set forth in Lopez and Amaya-Ruiz, we reject Doody's argument for two reasons. First, the detectives' statements did not constitute a "promise" because they "did not offer any benefit' to the defendant in exchange for information." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 1085, 1085",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim's mother did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "137 Ariz. 80, 87",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that suspect's confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | 806,851 | b |
Applying the test set forth in Lopez and Amaya-Ruiz, we reject Doody's argument for two reasons. First, the detectives' statements did not constitute a "promise" because they "did not offer any benefit' to the defendant in exchange for information." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "174 Ariz. 138, 138",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim's mother did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 P.2d 58, 65",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that suspect's confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | 806,851 | b |
Applying the test set forth in Lopez and Amaya-Ruiz, we reject Doody's argument for two reasons. First, the detectives' statements did not constitute a "promise" because they "did not offer any benefit' to the defendant in exchange for information." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 P.2d 58, 65",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that suspect's confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 1085, 1085",
"parenthetical": "statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim's mother did not constitute a promise",
"sentence": "State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 87, 669 P.2d 58, 65 (1983) (statement by officer that suspect’s confession would not be admissible in court did not constitute a promise); see Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution."
} | 806,851 | a |
It is well settled that a fact-finder may rely on inconsistencies to support an adverse credibility determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 1228, 1235",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"inconsistencies ... adequately support the [administrative law judge's (\"ALJ\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that “inconsistencies ... adequately support the [administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) ] adverse credibility finding”); see also United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir.2011) (observing that the district court “based its credibility determination on inconsistencies in [a witness’] testimony”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "648 F.3d 820, 829",
"parenthetical": "observing that the district court \"based its credibility determination on inconsistencies in [a witness'] testimony\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that “inconsistencies ... adequately support the [administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) ] adverse credibility finding”); see also United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir.2011) (observing that the district court “based its credibility determination on inconsistencies in [a witness’] testimony”)."
} | 4,050,357 | a |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | b |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "828 P.2d 618, 620-21",
"parenthetical": "holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | a |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | a |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | b |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | a |
Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 So.2d 1074, 1076",
"parenthetical": "holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of' felony-murder, the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3146, 69 L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault)."
} | 12,263,004 | b |
The analysis in the preceding section disposes of the need to address defendant Davis' qualified immunity defense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 769, 771",
"parenthetical": "\"If the plaintiff here has failed to state a SS 1983 claim, Johnson's qualified immunity defense becomes moot.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 1318, 1320",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | 7,653,852 | a |
The analysis in the preceding section disposes of the need to address defendant Davis' qualified immunity defense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 769, 771",
"parenthetical": "\"If the plaintiff here has failed to state a SS 1983 claim, Johnson's qualified immunity defense becomes moot.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | 7,653,852 | a |
The analysis in the preceding section disposes of the need to address defendant Davis' qualified immunity defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 769, 771",
"parenthetical": "\"If the plaintiff here has failed to state a SS 1983 claim, Johnson's qualified immunity defense becomes moot.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | 7,653,852 | b |
The analysis in the preceding section disposes of the need to address defendant Davis' qualified immunity defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 769, 771",
"parenthetical": "\"If the plaintiff here has failed to state a SS 1983 claim, Johnson's qualified immunity defense becomes moot.\"",
"sentence": "Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)); Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1987) (“If the plaintiff here has failed to state a § 1983 claim, Johnson’s qualified immunity defense becomes moot.”); see Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (“Because we find no Bivens remedy under the circumstances of this case, we need not address the qualified immunity issue.”); Sheldon H."
} | 7,653,852 | b |
The record shows that Officers Patton and Stevenson believed they were on the lookout for a fleeing suspect who had just been involved in a robbery. Although there is no evidence in this record that a robbery had in fact occurred, Officer Lewis had broadcast that he thought a robbery had occurred or was about to occur. It was this information to which Officers Patton and Stevenson were reacting. Whether Officer Lewis was reasonably justified in his belief concerning a possible robbery suspect has no bearing on whether his fellow officers were entitled to rely upon his representation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 N.E.2d 660, 663",
"parenthetical": "holding that where police officers act in good faith reliance on a radio dispatch that a crime has been committed, there is no need to show that the source of the dispatcher's information is rehable",
"sentence": "See Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind.1983) (holding that where police officers act in good faith reliance on a radio dispatch that a crime has been committed, there is no need to show that the source of the dispatcher’s information is rehable); see also Russell v. State, 519 N.E.2d 549, 551-52 (Ind.1988) (finding investigatory stop warranted where the officer heard a radio dispatch that a possible robbery had been committed and the defendant matched the description relayed in the dispatch)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 N.E.2d 549, 551-52",
"parenthetical": "finding investigatory stop warranted where the officer heard a radio dispatch that a possible robbery had been committed and the defendant matched the description relayed in the dispatch",
"sentence": "See Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind.1983) (holding that where police officers act in good faith reliance on a radio dispatch that a crime has been committed, there is no need to show that the source of the dispatcher’s information is rehable); see also Russell v. State, 519 N.E.2d 549, 551-52 (Ind.1988) (finding investigatory stop warranted where the officer heard a radio dispatch that a possible robbery had been committed and the defendant matched the description relayed in the dispatch)."
} | 11,413,939 | a |
The ALJ considered further the fact that plaintiff did not take regular prescription pain medication, or over-the-counter preparations for her alleged disabling pain. Plaintiff reports she cannot afford such medications because she has limited financial resources, no health insurance since being unemployed, and that pain medications do not work well. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "784 F.2d 335, 337",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he ALJ must consider a claimant's allegation that he has not sought medical treatment or used medications because of a lack of finances.\"",
"sentence": "Dover v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he ALJ must consider a claimant’s allegation that he has not sought medical treatment or used medications because of a lack of finances.”); see also Hutsell v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 751 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (“It is for the ALJ in the first instance to determine a claimant’s real motivation for failing to follow prescribed treatment or seek medical attention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is for the ALJ in the first instance to determine a claimant's real motivation for failing to follow prescribed treatment or seek medical attention.\"",
"sentence": "Dover v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he ALJ must consider a claimant’s allegation that he has not sought medical treatment or used medications because of a lack of finances.”); see also Hutsell v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 751 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (“It is for the ALJ in the first instance to determine a claimant’s real motivation for failing to follow prescribed treatment or seek medical attention.”)."
} | 9,031,641 | a |
[P 15] We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Erica had available a remedy as speedy and adequate as the one under the Protection of Domestic Abuse chapter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "626 S.W.2d 223, 226",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 N.W.2d 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | 10,599,939 | b |
[P 15] We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Erica had available a remedy as speedy and adequate as the one under the Protection of Domestic Abuse chapter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 N.W.2d 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | 10,599,939 | b |
[P 15] We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Erica had available a remedy as speedy and adequate as the one under the Protection of Domestic Abuse chapter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "526 A.2d 429, 433",
"parenthetical": "\"[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 N.W.2d 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.\"",
"sentence": "See Range, 1996 SD 48 at ¶ 8, 547 N.W.2d at 176 (“Judges must exercise broad authority to fashion necessary safeguards for the unpredictable insecurities victims of domestic abuse often face.”) (noting the flexibility afforded the judiciary in fashioning relief under SDCL 25-10-5(6)); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo.1982) (en banc) (noting that “[e]xisting remedies ... have proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in preventing further abuse”); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 363 Pa.Super. 448, 526 A.2d 429, 433 (1987) (“[D]omestic violence and spousal' and child abuse are serious and widespread societal problems which are effectively beyond reach, absent such legislation.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 367 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed.2d 105 (1985))."
} | 10,599,939 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Conn. App. 115, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Md. App. 282, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | a |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one's ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
We recognize that, because it is an illegal substance, it may be that many jurors may have no firsthand knowledge regarding the effects of marijuana on one's ability to perceive and to relate events. At the same time, we cannot blink at the reality that, despite its illegality, because of its widespread use, many people know of the potential effects of marijuana, either through personal experience or through the experience of family members or friends. The ability to draw inferences about the impairing effects of marijuana, like alcohol, however, is based upon common knowledge, experience and common sense, not necessarily on personal experience. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Cal. 4th 792, 839",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual's ability to observe and recall accurately\"",
"sentence": "State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 121, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 653, 577 A.2d 1036 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S. Ct. 756, 112 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1991) (“[c]onsumption of alcohol or drugs obviously can impair an individual’s ability to observe and recall accurately”); see also People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 839, 831 P.2d 249, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007, 113 S. Ct. 1651, 123 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993) (“[t]o say . . . that the memory of some of the witnesses may have been affected by drugs is to say no more than the common knowledge that ingestion of drugs affects perception”); Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282, 289, 511 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 308 Md. 238, 517 A.2d 1121 (1986) (“[i]t is common knowledge that the quantity of alcohol and/or drugs consumed will affect one’s ability to see, to hear, and, generally, to perceive what is occurring”). The unfortunate prevalence of marijuana use, coupled with the substantial effort to educate all segments of the public regarding its dangers, underscores the reality that the likely effects of smoking five marijuana cigarettes in a short period of time before an incident are within the ken of the average juror."
} | 831,926 | b |
Subsets and Splits