context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators' response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | 3,834,700 | b |
Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators' response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | 3,834,700 | b |
Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 F.3d 51, 51",
"parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators' response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | 3,834,700 | a |
Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 981, 989",
"parenthetical": "\"Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators' response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | 3,834,700 | a |
Under these circumstances, Dr. Tan's decision to per form the initial examination of plaintiffs bowel condition in his cell does not evince the requisite state of mind required for an Eighth Amendment violation. For these same reasons, the circumstances of the examination do not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 F.3d 189, 189",
"parenthetical": "defendant police officer's conduct in secretly videotaping unclothed female volunteer for a police training video \"shocks the conscience\" and was \"unjustifiable by any governmental interest\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F.Supp.2d 289, 298 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on right to privacy in medical condition); but see Poe, 282 F.3d at 189 (defendant police officer’s conduct in secretly videotaping unclothed female volunteer for a police training video “shocks the conscience” and was “unjustifiable by any governmental interest”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 F.Supp.2d 289, 298",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on right to privacy in medical condition",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F.Supp.2d 289, 298 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on right to privacy in medical condition); but see Poe, 282 F.3d at 189 (defendant police officer’s conduct in secretly videotaping unclothed female volunteer for a police training video “shocks the conscience” and was “unjustifiable by any governmental interest”)."
} | 9,067,580 | b |
This review process, not surprisingly, is exclusive. See 8 U.S.C. SSSS 1252(b)(9) and (d)(1). Thus, other courts who have confronted this issue have reached the same conclusion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 F.3d 200, 200-201",
"parenthetical": "holding that an AAO eligibility determination is \"final\" and ripe for district court review if removal proceedings have not been initiated, but noting that judicial review is barred in cases where removal proceedings have begun",
"sentence": "See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir.1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking where removal proceedings had begun because denials of status adjustment may be reviewed by immigration judges); cf. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200-201 (holding that an AAO eligibility determination is “final” and ripe for district court review if removal proceedings have not been initiated, but noting that judicial review is barred in cases where removal proceedings have begun)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 288, 293",
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction lacking where removal proceedings had begun because denials of status adjustment may be reviewed by immigration judges",
"sentence": "See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir.1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking where removal proceedings had begun because denials of status adjustment may be reviewed by immigration judges); cf. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200-201 (holding that an AAO eligibility determination is “final” and ripe for district court review if removal proceedings have not been initiated, but noting that judicial review is barred in cases where removal proceedings have begun)."
} | 4,194,079 | b |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "action against union for breach of duty of fair representation",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | b |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in SS 10(b",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "action against union for breach of duty of fair representation",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | b |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1191, 1191-94",
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | b |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in SS 10(b",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1191, 1191-94",
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | b |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | a |
Because the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act is identical to the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and because the federal policies and interests articulated in DelCostello are present in hybrid actions under the Railway Labor Act, six circuit courts have ruled that the six-month statute of limitations in SS 10(b) of the Na tional Labor Relations Act also controls duty of fair representation claims and hybrid actions brought under the Railway Labor Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in SS 10(b",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union",
"sentence": "See Ranieri v. United Transp. Union, 743 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.) (hybrid suit) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.) (hybrid suit), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco, 732 F.2d at 1191-94 (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.1984) (hybrid suit, but statute of limitations ruling only on breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union); see also Triplett v. Local 308, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 763 F.2d 625 (4th Cir.1985) (holding DelCostello governs a hybrid suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, but refusing to apply it retroactively); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984) (hybrid suit holding a federal statute of limitations applies, but not choosing between six-month limitations period in § 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act and two-year period in Railway Labor Act)."
} | 1,516,399 | b |
With regard to the disciplinary-sanction, this Court does not hesitate to disbar attorneys who continue to engage in the practice of law while suspended. Given these deficiencies in the record and the referee's report, there is an insufficient basis for this Court to disbar D'Ambrosio. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that disbarment is an extreme measure of discipline and should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards",
"sentence": "See Fla. Bar v. Rayman, 238 So.2d 594 (Fla.1970) (holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment); see also Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So.2d 1002 (Fla.2004) (stating that disbarment is an extreme measure of discipline and should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment",
"sentence": "See Fla. Bar v. Rayman, 238 So.2d 594 (Fla.1970) (holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment); see also Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So.2d 1002 (Fla.2004) (stating that disbarment is an extreme measure of discipline and should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards)."
} | 8,345,853 | b |
The Court of Appeals held that the failure to include this provision was fatal because in Maryland the order must strictly comply with the statutory provisions. The court commented: "[t]he language is unequivocal, leaving no room to doubt that the legislature intended that the wiretap order conform scrupulously to the mandate of the statute." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | 7,356,366 | b |
The Court of Appeals held that the failure to include this provision was fatal because in Maryland the order must strictly comply with the statutory provisions. The court commented: "[t]he language is unequivocal, leaving no room to doubt that the legislature intended that the wiretap order conform scrupulously to the mandate of the statute." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | 7,356,366 | b |
The Court of Appeals held that the failure to include this provision was fatal because in Maryland the order must strictly comply with the statutory provisions. The court commented: "[t]he language is unequivocal, leaving no room to doubt that the legislature intended that the wiretap order conform scrupulously to the mandate of the statute." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 A.2d 86, 95",
"parenthetical": "Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | 7,356,366 | a |
The Court of Appeals held that the failure to include this provision was fatal because in Maryland the order must strictly comply with the statutory provisions. The court commented: "[t]he language is unequivocal, leaving no room to doubt that the legislature intended that the wiretap order conform scrupulously to the mandate of the statute." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 A.2d 86, 95",
"parenthetical": "Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard",
"sentence": "See also State v. Siegel, App., 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (Title III sets up a strict procedure that must be followed); Poore v. State, 39 Md.App. 44, 384 A.2d 103, 106 (1978) (same); cf. Spease v. State, App., 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975) (post order compliance judged by more lenient substantial compliance standard)."
} | 7,356,366 | a |
While B-S Steel disputes the appellees' claim that it only made a single purchase of 18.9 tons after April 3, 2001, the latest that it alleges making purchases is August 2001. B-S Steel has offered no basis for concluding that these purchases should be deemed reasonably contemporaneous with those made by B-S Steel's competitors after December 2001. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "359 F.2d 351, 357",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC's determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where \"the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved\"",
"sentence": "But see Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.1966) (concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC’s determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where “the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 904, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.2d 269, 272",
"parenthetical": "sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim",
"sentence": "See England v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.1974) (sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir.1958) (seven-month period between pork sales not contemporaneous); Maier-Schule GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.Supp. 984, 989 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (no § 2(a) violation where plaintiff failed to show it made purchases in same year alleged violation occurred)."
} | 31,363 | b |
While B-S Steel disputes the appellees' claim that it only made a single purchase of 18.9 tons after April 3, 2001, the latest that it alleges making purchases is August 2001. B-S Steel has offered no basis for concluding that these purchases should be deemed reasonably contemporaneous with those made by B-S Steel's competitors after December 2001. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC's determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where \"the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved\"",
"sentence": "But see Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.1966) (concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC’s determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where “the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 904, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.2d 269, 272",
"parenthetical": "sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim",
"sentence": "See England v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.1974) (sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir.1958) (seven-month period between pork sales not contemporaneous); Maier-Schule GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.Supp. 984, 989 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (no § 2(a) violation where plaintiff failed to show it made purchases in same year alleged violation occurred)."
} | 31,363 | b |
While B-S Steel disputes the appellees' claim that it only made a single purchase of 18.9 tons after April 3, 2001, the latest that it alleges making purchases is August 2001. B-S Steel has offered no basis for concluding that these purchases should be deemed reasonably contemporaneous with those made by B-S Steel's competitors after December 2001. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC's determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where \"the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved\"",
"sentence": "But see Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.1966) (concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC’s determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where “the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 904, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.2d 269, 272",
"parenthetical": "sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim",
"sentence": "See England v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.1974) (sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir.1958) (seven-month period between pork sales not contemporaneous); Maier-Schule GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.Supp. 984, 989 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (no § 2(a) violation where plaintiff failed to show it made purchases in same year alleged violation occurred)."
} | 31,363 | b |
While B-S Steel disputes the appellees' claim that it only made a single purchase of 18.9 tons after April 3, 2001, the latest that it alleges making purchases is August 2001. B-S Steel has offered no basis for concluding that these purchases should be deemed reasonably contemporaneous with those made by B-S Steel's competitors after December 2001. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.2d 269, 272",
"parenthetical": "sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim",
"sentence": "See England v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.1974) (sixteen-month time span between promotional allowances for new or relocated car dealerships defeated Robinson-Patman Act claim); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir.1958) (seven-month period between pork sales not contemporaneous); Maier-Schule GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.Supp. 984, 989 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (no § 2(a) violation where plaintiff failed to show it made purchases in same year alleged violation occurred)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC's determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where \"the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved\"",
"sentence": "But see Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 357 (9th Cir.1966) (concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting FTC’s determination that sales over a number of years occurred during the same time period where “the sales are of a single, fairly standardized item, widely sold in the area, and recur frequently during the years involved”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 904, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968)."
} | 31,363 | a |
Where the parties have had the benefit of a hearing on the issue, but the trial court's analysis of the Barker factors is lacking, this Court has found it appropriate to perform a de novo review of the defendant's speedy-trial claim. On the other hand, where the record lacks sufficient evidence to support a proper de novo review, the more appropriate course is to remand to the circuit court to conduct a Barker analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "608 So.2d 1129, 1134",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding to the trial court for a Barker analysis where the record did not establish the actual reasons for the delays in the defendant's trial",
"sentence": "See McGee v. State, 608 So.2d 1129,1134 (Miss.1992) (reversing and remanding to the trial court for a Barker analysis where the record did not establish the actual reasons for the delays in the defendant’s trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "577 So.2d 840, 844",
"parenthetical": "reversing defendant's conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel, remanding for a new trial, and directing the trial court on remand to conduct a Barker analysis, where the record on appeal did not allow this Court to determine the cause of the delay in the defendant's previous trial",
"sentence": "See also Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840, 844 (Miss.1991) (reversing defendant’s conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel, remanding for a new trial, and directing the trial court on remand to conduct a Barker analysis, where the record on appeal did not allow this Court to determine the cause of the delay in the defendant’s previous trial)."
} | 6,929,273 | a |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | b |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | a |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | a |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | a |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | b |
.Because the Court GRANTS Provident's summary judgment on Fleischer's counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court also GRANTS Provident's motion with respect to Provident's bad faith claim and claim for punitive damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.\"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... \"",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal.4th 1, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 390, 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.1995) (\"It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage ... under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”); see also Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (\"[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due.... ”)."
} | 335,972 | a |
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there may be circumstances justifying equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2562, 2562",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e therefore join the Courts of Appeals in holding that SS 2244(d",
"sentence": "See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562, (“[W]e therefore join the Courts of Appeals in holding that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling.”); see also McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1931 (reaffirming that equitable tolling of AED-PA’s limitations period is appropriate in certain circumstances)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 1931, 1931",
"parenthetical": "reaffirming that equitable tolling of AED-PA's limitations period is appropriate in certain circumstances",
"sentence": "See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562, (“[W]e therefore join the Courts of Appeals in holding that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling.”); see also McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1931 (reaffirming that equitable tolling of AED-PA’s limitations period is appropriate in certain circumstances)."
} | 4,221,844 | a |
"If [a] motion [to transfer venue] is based on the location of records and documents, the [defendant] must show with particularity the location, difficulty of transportation, and the importance of such record." At best, therefore, the factor is neutral. See id.; see also In re Triton Limited See. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "724 F.Supp. 264, 266",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer to a district where defendant's documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690",
"parenthetical": "\"Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis\"",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | 3,803,654 | b |
"If [a] motion [to transfer venue] is based on the location of records and documents, the [defendant] must show with particularity the location, difficulty of transportation, and the importance of such record." At best, therefore, the factor is neutral. See id.; see also In re Triton Limited See. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "724 F.Supp. 264, 266",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer to a district where defendant's documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.Supp. 154, 165",
"parenthetical": "\"As for defendants' argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country\"",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | 3,803,654 | b |
"If [a] motion [to transfer venue] is based on the location of records and documents, the [defendant] must show with particularity the location, difficulty of transportation, and the importance of such record." At best, therefore, the factor is neutral. See id.; see also In re Triton Limited See. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "724 F.Supp. 264, 266",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer to a district where defendant's documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "594 F.Supp. 706, 710",
"parenthetical": "observing that the location of documents is not an important factor \"unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking\"",
"sentence": "Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 690 (E.D.Tex.1999) (“Defendants ... fail to show that these documents are so voluminous that they would be difficult to transport. Therefore, the Court does not consider this as an important factor in the transfer analysis”); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 154, 165 (N.D.Ill.1985) (“As for defendants’ argument concerning the location of relevant documents, we do not believe that this is a compelling factor, given the ready availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively shipped around the country”); Meh-L-Wood Corp. v. SWS Indus., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 706, 710 (N.D.Ill.1984) (observing that the location of documents is not an important factor “unless documents are so voluminous that their transport is a major undertaking”); cf. Arrow Elec., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying transfer to a district where defendant’s documents were located because doing so would merely shift the transportation burden from defendant to plaintiff)."
} | 3,803,654 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 N.J.Super. 172, 183",
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 N.J.Super. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 N.J.Super. 438, 440",
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 N.J.Super. 579, 582",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | 686,970 | b |
Given the seemingly novel nature of Newman's theory of recovery, we find that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for the court not to require Newman to demonstrate legal grounds supporting his claim of a right to relief against Dean. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability",
"sentence": "Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-81,173 A.2d 1 (1961) (discussing power of court to require proof of liability); Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 183, 624 A.2d 85 (App.Div.1993) (a successful plaintiff seeking a default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits to show entitlement to the relief demanded); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57, 63-64, 422 A.2d 101 (App.Div.1980) (vacating default judgment when plaintiff, seeking to revoke his acceptance of a car, had presented no proof that he had contracted with the manufacturer or that the distributor was an agent of the manufacturer); Williams v. Page, 160 N.J.Super. 354, 369, 389 A.2d 1012 (App. Div.1978) (trial judge had discretion to require proof of liability); Metric Investment, Inc. v. Patterson, 98 N.J.Super. 130, 133, 236 A.2d 187 (Law Div.1967) (the entry of default does, not necessarily obviate the obligation of plaintiff to furnish proof on the issue of liability), affd 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted",
"sentence": "Cf. also Prickett v. Allard, 126 N.J.Super. 438, 440, 315 A.2d 51 (App.Div.) (denying default judgment to foreclose a tax sale certificate on grounds of failure to state a claim when plaintiffs complaint on its face demonstrated that the action was barred by the statute of limitations), aff'd o.b., 66 N.J. 6, 326 A.2d 688 (1974); In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 730 (Ch.Div.1977), mod. 163 N.J.Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the court may, sua sponte, refuse to enter judgment for plaintiff if the complaint on its face fails to state a cause of action as to which relief can be granted)."
} | 686,970 | a |
In this appeal, we must analyze the special referee's actions in conjunction with his order of sale. Although the referee acted as his own selling officer, he was still bound by the limits of his written decree of sale. When the public has been informed through the order and the advertisements, the rules of the foreclosure sale are set. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | 223,331 | b |
In this appeal, we must analyze the special referee's actions in conjunction with his order of sale. Although the referee acted as his own selling officer, he was still bound by the limits of his written decree of sale. When the public has been informed through the order and the advertisements, the rules of the foreclosure sale are set. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | 223,331 | b |
In this appeal, we must analyze the special referee's actions in conjunction with his order of sale. Although the referee acted as his own selling officer, he was still bound by the limits of his written decree of sale. When the public has been informed through the order and the advertisements, the rules of the foreclosure sale are set. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | 223,331 | b |
In this appeal, we must analyze the special referee's actions in conjunction with his order of sale. Although the referee acted as his own selling officer, he was still bound by the limits of his written decree of sale. When the public has been informed through the order and the advertisements, the rules of the foreclosure sale are set. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 194 S.E. 15 (1937) (recognizing the legal principle that an order of sale is a public document, and all bidders, as well as other persons, are charged with notice of its terms); Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936); see also Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Brooks, 304 S.C. 506, 405 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the purchaser should principally rely on, and is on notice of, the terms provided in the foreclosure decree)."
} | 223,331 | b |
Subsets and Splits