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Nor does the legislative history suggest that the General Assembly intended to create a new and separate offense. We conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for heat of passion to be an affirmative defense to the offense of first-degree assault. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "830 P.2d 1085, 1088",
"parenthetical": "stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault",
"sentence": "See People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo.App.1991) (stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault); see also People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Colo.1989) (rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "768 P.2d 1235, 1239",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo.App.1991) (stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault); see also People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Colo.1989) (rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense)."
} | 10,365,288 | a |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 836, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 389, 399",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | a |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 836, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | a |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 836, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | a |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 389, 399",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | a |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | b |
Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself.\"",
"sentence": "See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”)."
} | 9,096,898 | a |
Under the circumstances alleged here, it takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quid pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "833 F.2d 1414, 1414",
"parenthetical": "quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from employee's refusal to submit to sexual advances",
"sentence": "See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.1993) (“If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any farther showing of why the employer should be responsible for the supervisor’s conduct.”) (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.1992) (“[T]he employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands [must have] resulted in a tangible job detriment.”) (quoting Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414 (quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from employee’s refusal to submit to sexual advances); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649 (no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where “the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]”); but see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir.1994) (“[A] supervisor’s intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 503, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] supervisor's intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.\"",
"sentence": "See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.1993) (“If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any farther showing of why the employer should be responsible for the supervisor’s conduct.”) (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.1992) (“[T]he employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands [must have] resulted in a tangible job detriment.”) (quoting Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414 (quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from employee’s refusal to submit to sexual advances); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649 (no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where “the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]”); but see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir.1994) (“[A] supervisor’s intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.”)."
} | 5,868,413 | a |
Under the circumstances alleged here, it takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quid pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 503, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] supervisor's intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.\"",
"sentence": "See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.1993) (“If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any farther showing of why the employer should be responsible for the supervisor’s conduct.”) (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.1992) (“[T]he employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands [must have] resulted in a tangible job detriment.”) (quoting Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414 (quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from employee’s refusal to submit to sexual advances); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649 (no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where “the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]”); but see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir.1994) (“[A] supervisor’s intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 649, 649",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where \"the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]\"",
"sentence": "See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.1993) (“If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any farther showing of why the employer should be responsible for the supervisor’s conduct.”) (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.1992) (“[T]he employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands [must have] resulted in a tangible job detriment.”) (quoting Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414 (quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from employee’s refusal to submit to sexual advances); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649 (no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where “the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]”); but see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir.1994) (“[A] supervisor’s intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.”)."
} | 5,868,413 | b |
The statistical evidence thus shows some disparity. A sufficient disparity may constitute a "pattern or practice" of discrimination and may support a finding of intentional discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that \"any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.Supp. 1126, 1143",
"parenthetical": "\"While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the 'mere fact of a difference in treatment.'\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | 940,498 | a |
The statistical evidence thus shows some disparity. A sufficient disparity may constitute a "pattern or practice" of discrimination and may support a finding of intentional discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that \"any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.Supp. 1126, 1143",
"parenthetical": "\"While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the 'mere fact of a difference in treatment.'\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | 940,498 | a |
The statistical evidence thus shows some disparity. A sufficient disparity may constitute a "pattern or practice" of discrimination and may support a finding of intentional discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that \"any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.Supp. 1126, 1143",
"parenthetical": "\"While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the 'mere fact of a difference in treatment.'\"",
"sentence": "See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991)."
} | 940,498 | a |
According to the opinion, the shortcoming here -- the absence of an adequate basis to award costs -- is the court's and not the candidate's. But, the candidate was the moving party requesting litigation costs and has already had two opportunities to identify the basis for that request. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "807 A.2d 837, 837",
"parenthetical": "applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. SS 4351(a",
"sentence": "See Bowser, 807 A.2d at 837 (applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 4351(a); Section 4351(a) states that court \"may” assess costs and counsel fees in favor of prevailing party in child support case); cf. Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 859 (1986) (applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees",
"sentence": "See Bowser, 807 A.2d at 837 (applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 4351(a); Section 4351(a) states that court \"may” assess costs and counsel fees in favor of prevailing party in child support case); cf. Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 859 (1986) (applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees)."
} | 4,200,771 | a |
According to the opinion, the shortcoming here -- the absence of an adequate basis to award costs -- is the court's and not the candidate's. But, the candidate was the moving party requesting litigation costs and has already had two opportunities to identify the basis for that request. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "515 A.2d 855, 859",
"parenthetical": "applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees",
"sentence": "See Bowser, 807 A.2d at 837 (applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 4351(a); Section 4351(a) states that court \"may” assess costs and counsel fees in favor of prevailing party in child support case); cf. Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 859 (1986) (applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "807 A.2d 837, 837",
"parenthetical": "applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. SS 4351(a",
"sentence": "See Bowser, 807 A.2d at 837 (applicant failed to establish entitlement to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 4351(a); Section 4351(a) states that court \"may” assess costs and counsel fees in favor of prevailing party in child support case); cf. Jones v. Muir, 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 859 (1986) (applicant for counsel fees from common fund has burden of proving his/her entitlement to those fees)."
} | 4,200,771 | b |
Moreover, Angelina's statements to investigating officers in the days following Bryan's death did not waive her privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the later criminal proceeding against Torre or with respect to the instant civil proceeding. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when a witness's previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 F.2d 613, 623",
"parenthetical": "holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because \"[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | 6,049,402 | b |
Moreover, Angelina's statements to investigating officers in the days following Bryan's death did not waive her privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the later criminal proceeding against Torre or with respect to the instant civil proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 F.2d 613, 623",
"parenthetical": "holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because \"[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when a witness's previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | 6,049,402 | a |
Moreover, Angelina's statements to investigating officers in the days following Bryan's death did not waive her privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the later criminal proceeding against Torre or with respect to the instant civil proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 F.2d 613, 623",
"parenthetical": "holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because \"[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when a witness's previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him",
"sentence": "See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357 — 59, 43 S.Ct. 562, 67 L.Ed. 1023 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him)."
} | 6,049,402 | a |
There is nothing wrong with the abstract legal basis of Resco's theory of standing. It is well settled in the Third Circuit that "express assignments of antitrust claims from a direct purchaser to an indirect purchaser are permissible and do not run afoul of Illinois Brick's standing requirements." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 438, 438-440",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.\"",
"sentence": "In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (holding that “any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.”)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 70 Fed.R.Serv.3d 664, 2008 WL 1946848 (E.D.Pa.2008) (“this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.\"",
"sentence": "In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (holding that “any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.”)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 70 Fed.R.Serv.3d 664, 2008 WL 1946848 (E.D.Pa.2008) (“this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.”)."
} | 4,327,754 | a |
There is nothing wrong with the abstract legal basis of Resco's theory of standing. It is well settled in the Third Circuit that "express assignments of antitrust claims from a direct purchaser to an indirect purchaser are permissible and do not run afoul of Illinois Brick's standing requirements." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.\"",
"sentence": "In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (holding that “any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.”)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 70 Fed.R.Serv.3d 664, 2008 WL 1946848 (E.D.Pa.2008) (“this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 438, 438-440",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.\"",
"sentence": "In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (holding that “any assignment of antitrust claims, as a matter of federal common law, must be an express assignment ... [because] an express assignment ... entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.”)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 70 Fed.R.Serv.3d 664, 2008 WL 1946848 (E.D.Pa.2008) (“this circuit has long recognized that antitrust claims can be assigned.... Indeed, numerous courts have certified litigation classes in which the named plaintiffs were operating under an assignment.”)."
} | 4,327,754 | b |
Consequently, not only was acceptance of the clause a condition of employment, it was a condition of being considered for employment. A prospective employee such as Hernandez thus has no meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 Cal.4th 114, 114",
"parenthetical": "holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it \"was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... \"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because \"job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement's terms -- they [had to] take the contract or leave it\"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | 4,335,365 | b |
Consequently, not only was acceptance of the clause a condition of employment, it was a condition of being considered for employment. A prospective employee such as Hernandez thus has no meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because \"job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement's terms -- they [had to] take the contract or leave it\"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it \"was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... \"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | 4,335,365 | a |
Consequently, not only was acceptance of the clause a condition of employment, it was a condition of being considered for employment. A prospective employee such as Hernandez thus has no meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because \"job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement's terms -- they [had to] take the contract or leave it\"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it \"was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... \"",
"sentence": "See Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d at 893 (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because “job applicants [were] not permitted to modify the agreement’s terms — they [had to] take the contract or leave it”); see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (holding that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it “was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate ... ”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 663, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 (2004) (“We next consider the ‘absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’"
} | 4,335,365 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 N.H. 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 N.H. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 A.2d 259, 262",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 N.H. 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 N.H. 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 N.H. 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "118 N.H. 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 N.H. 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "385 A.2d 834, 834",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 A.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 N.H. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 A.2d 259, 262",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 A.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 A.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 A.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "118 N.H. 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "385 A.2d 834, 834",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 A.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 N.H. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "118 N.H. 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "385 A.2d 834, 834",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 N.H. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 A.2d 259, 262",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "118 N.H. 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | 2,302,649 | a |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "385 A.2d 834, 834",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 A.2d 259, 262",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "118 N.H. 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant's appearance. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "385 A.2d 834, 834",
"parenthetical": "stating that the accuracy of the victim's description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant's moustache, \"of which there was strong evidence\"",
"sentence": "But cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. at 220, 385 A.2d at 834 (stating that the accuracy of the victim’s description was diminished by his failure to mention the defendant’s moustache, “of which there was strong evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's finding that the identification was reliable where \"[t]he inconsistency between the defendant's appearance and the victim's description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate, despite the fact that they varied in detail); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 459 A.2d 259, 262, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the identification was reliable where “[t]he inconsistency between the defendant’s appearance and the victim’s description of him was limited to the absence of a moustache and a discrepancy in hair length”)."
} | 2,302,649 | b |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "69 T.C. 750, 756",
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA\"",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | a |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "69 T.C. 750, 756",
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA\"",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | b |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA\"",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | b |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA\"",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | a |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | b |
The Trustee has not challenged the validity of the IRA and has made arguments that assume the IRA is a legitimate IRA. See Kartzman Cert. PP 2, 4 & 5. Thus, this Court will treat the funds in question as a valid IRA because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the IRA has not been validly created. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created",
"sentence": "See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756, 1978 WL 3296 (1978) (stating “the parties assume, and we have no reason to doubt their assumption, that the taxpayers met all the requirements of section 408(a) [of the Internal Code] and validly created an IRA”), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Michel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (1989) (tax court analyzed whether an IRA was created where the petitioners argued that a valid IRA was never created)."
} | 6,105,964 | a |
Our view that larceny may be proved by evidence that the property owner lacked the mental capacity to consent is in harmony with most of the cases from other jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted similar statutes that do not include lack of consent as an element of the crime. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant's actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 (2003) (concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant’s actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 So. 2d 673, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft\"",
"sentence": "See Gainer v. State, 553 So. 2d 673, 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft”); Calonico, 256 Conn, at 153 (holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victim’s intent); People v. Cain, 238 Mich. App. 95,128-129 (1999) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (holding that jury may consider victim’s mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victim’s knowledge and consent)."
} | 4,145,058 | b |
Our view that larceny may be proved by evidence that the property owner lacked the mental capacity to consent is in harmony with most of the cases from other jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted similar statutes that do not include lack of consent as an element of the crime. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant's actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 (2003) (concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant’s actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 Mich. App. 95, 128-129",
"parenthetical": "affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking",
"sentence": "See Gainer v. State, 553 So. 2d 673, 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft”); Calonico, 256 Conn, at 153 (holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victim’s intent); People v. Cain, 238 Mich. App. 95,128-129 (1999) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (holding that jury may consider victim’s mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victim’s knowledge and consent)."
} | 4,145,058 | b |
Our view that larceny may be proved by evidence that the property owner lacked the mental capacity to consent is in harmony with most of the cases from other jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted similar statutes that do not include lack of consent as an element of the crime. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "225 A.D.2d 380, 380-381",
"parenthetical": "holding that jury may consider victim's mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victim's knowledge and consent",
"sentence": "See Gainer v. State, 553 So. 2d 673, 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft”); Calonico, 256 Conn, at 153 (holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victim’s intent); People v. Cain, 238 Mich. App. 95,128-129 (1999) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (holding that jury may consider victim’s mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victim’s knowledge and consent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant's actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 (2003) (concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant’s actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult)."
} | 4,145,058 | a |
We recognize that an insurance policy may provide contractual, .first-priority, dollar-for-dollar subrogation rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 S.W.3d 558, 563-64",
"parenthetical": "limiting intervenor insurer's recovery from third party sued by insured to contractual provisions of insurance policy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex.2007) (holding subrogation clause that granted insurer a right of. recovery against “any and .all” third-party settlements authorized insurer to recoup first-priority, dollar-for-dollar recovery from plaintiffs settlement); Hartnett, 870 S.W.2d at 167, (construing similar policy language similarly); see also Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E & P, Inc., 455 S.W.3d 558, 563-64 (Tex.2014) (limiting intervenor insurer’s recovery from third party sued by insured to contractual provisions of insurance policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "234 S.W.3d 642, 648",
"parenthetical": "holding subrogation clause that granted insurer a right of. recovery against \"any and .all\" third-party settlements authorized insurer to recoup first-priority, dollar-for-dollar recovery from plaintiffs settlement",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex.2007) (holding subrogation clause that granted insurer a right of. recovery against “any and .all” third-party settlements authorized insurer to recoup first-priority, dollar-for-dollar recovery from plaintiffs settlement); Hartnett, 870 S.W.2d at 167, (construing similar policy language similarly); see also Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E & P, Inc., 455 S.W.3d 558, 563-64 (Tex.2014) (limiting intervenor insurer’s recovery from third party sued by insured to contractual provisions of insurance policy)."
} | 6,767,865 | b |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "729 F.2d 831, 833",
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | b |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | a |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | b |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "729 F.2d 831, 833",
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | a |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "394 U.S. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | a |
Zuckman also seeks restitution on behalf of himself and the general public for their purchases of Monster Energy drinks. See Compl. at 11; Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 13. Restitution claims, like claims for statutory damages or attorney fees, generally cannot be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....\"",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated\" to establish jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (holding that the “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated” to establish jurisdiction); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Separate and distinct claims, regardless of whether they share a community of interest or originate in a single transaction or event, may not be aggregated....”). However, there is an exception to this rule in cases where “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest,” Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335, 89 S.Ct. 1053, such as when claimants seek disgorgement of money obtained through unlawful trade practices."
} | 3,832,571 | b |
Paul H. Existing explanations of the merger doctrine offer little guidance in more selectively describing the underlying felonies that merge." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental",
"sentence": "See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir.1994)(Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1991)(Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental). In Montana v. Egelhoff, the court cautioned that not every “rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a fundamental principle of justice.” 116 S.Ct. at 2021."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause",
"sentence": "See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir.1994)(Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1991)(Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental). In Montana v. Egelhoff, the court cautioned that not every “rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a fundamental principle of justice.” 116 S.Ct. at 2021."
} | 11,818,259 | b |
Paul H. Existing explanations of the merger doctrine offer little guidance in more selectively describing the underlying felonies that merge." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 S.Ct. 2021, 2021",
"parenthetical": "Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental",
"sentence": "See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir.1994)(Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1991)(Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental). In Montana v. Egelhoff, the court cautioned that not every “rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a fundamental principle of justice.” 116 S.Ct. at 2021."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause",
"sentence": "See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir.1994)(Right of self defense is not a fundamental constitutional right within the due process clause); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1991)(Before a defendant may prevail on a claim that a state offense offends due process it must be shown that the legislative practice offends a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental). In Montana v. Egelhoff, the court cautioned that not every “rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a fundamental principle of justice.” 116 S.Ct. at 2021."
} | 11,818,259 | b |
The BIA determined that Petitioner's negative factors -- the fraud and misrepresentation contained in Petitioner's application -- outweighed the credible testimony from some of Petitioner's witnesses and the possibility of hardship should Petitioner be removed. The BIA concluded that Petitioner's longstanding history of intentionally misleading the immigration courts was so egregious that they easily outweighed the positive factors. Because the BIA's decision to deny Petitioner's adjustment of status application was discretionary and not based on statutory construction, we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA's findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 743, 748",
"parenthetical": "stating that since Petitioner's \"claim relies on contesting ... factual determinations rather than on statutory construction or a constitutional claim, we are without jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination denying her asylum.\"",
"sentence": "Johns v. Holder, 678 F.3d, 404, 406 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that arguments that challenge “the Board’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence [are] matters that the statute commits to the Attorney General’s ‘sole discretion’ ”); see also Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.2006) (stating that since Petitioner’s “claim relies on contesting ... factual determinations rather than on statutory construction or a constitutional claim, we are without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination denying her asylum.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "678 F.3d 404, 406",
"parenthetical": "noting that arguments that challenge \"the Board's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence [are] matters that the statute commits to the Attorney General's 'sole discretion' \"",
"sentence": "Johns v. Holder, 678 F.3d, 404, 406 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that arguments that challenge “the Board’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence [are] matters that the statute commits to the Attorney General’s ‘sole discretion’ ”); see also Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.2006) (stating that since Petitioner’s “claim relies on contesting ... factual determinations rather than on statutory construction or a constitutional claim, we are without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination denying her asylum.”)."
} | 5,901,433 | b |
The specification undoubtedly enables the invention in the latter form, as it clearly describes how to make and use such strips with Type 2 aluminum, and there is no question that the resulting strips are well-wetted. However, as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.2d 736, 736-37",
"parenthetical": "\"Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.\"",
"sentence": "Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561. That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Norilsk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.”); see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37 (“Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 1561, 1561",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.\"",
"sentence": "Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561. That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Norilsk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.”); see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37 (“Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.”)."
} | 781,005 | b |
The specification undoubtedly enables the invention in the latter form, as it clearly describes how to make and use such strips with Type 2 aluminum, and there is no question that the resulting strips are well-wetted. However, as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.2d 736, 736-37",
"parenthetical": "\"Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.\"",
"sentence": "Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561. That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Norilsk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.”); see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37 (“Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 1361, 1366",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.\"",
"sentence": "Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561. That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Norilsk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“[A] specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.”); see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37 (“Enablement is not precluded by some experimentation, such as routine screening.”)."
} | 781,005 | b |
Both Rule 11 and Rule 26 treat signed papers as certifying that the pleading is not offered for any improper purpose, such as to harass, that the claims and contentions therein have a basis in existing law, and that the contentions have evidentiary support. Thus, actions that violate Rule 11(b) also violate the provisions of Rule 26(g), and sanctions imposed pursuant to either rule are reviewed under identical abuse of discretion standards'. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 1135, 1137",
"parenthetical": "courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 P.2d 919, 922-23",
"parenthetical": "although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | 370,039 | a |
Both Rule 11 and Rule 26 treat signed papers as certifying that the pleading is not offered for any improper purpose, such as to harass, that the claims and contentions therein have a basis in existing law, and that the contentions have evidentiary support. Thus, actions that violate Rule 11(b) also violate the provisions of Rule 26(g), and sanctions imposed pursuant to either rule are reviewed under identical abuse of discretion standards'. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "855 F.2d 1009, 1015",
"parenthetical": "in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 P.2d 919, 922-23",
"parenthetical": "although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | 370,039 | a |
Both Rule 11 and Rule 26 treat signed papers as certifying that the pleading is not offered for any improper purpose, such as to harass, that the claims and contentions therein have a basis in existing law, and that the contentions have evidentiary support. Thus, actions that violate Rule 11(b) also violate the provisions of Rule 26(g), and sanctions imposed pursuant to either rule are reviewed under identical abuse of discretion standards'. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 P.2d 1139, 1146",
"parenthetical": "since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be \"interposed for any improper purpose,\" same standard of review applies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 P.2d 919, 922-23",
"parenthetical": "although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law to Rule 26(g)); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as Rule 11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be “interposed for any improper purpose,” same standard of review applies); see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g))."
} | 370,039 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 554, 556",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 Pa. 303, 311",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 Pa. 303, 311",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 A.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 Pa. 303, 311",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 Pa. 123, 125",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 Pa. 303, 311",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "247 A.2d 467, 468",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 554, 556",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "362 A.2d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 A.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "362 A.2d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "362 A.2d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 Pa. 123, 125",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "362 A.2d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' 'character for truth.' \"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "247 A.2d 467, 468",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 554, 556",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "369 Pa. 72, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "369 Pa. 72, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 A.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 Pa. 123, 125",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "369 Pa. 72, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "247 A.2d 467, 468",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "369 Pa. 72, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 554, 556",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 A.2d 425, 429",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 A.2d 425, 429",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 A.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 Pa. 123, 125",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 A.2d 425, 429",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "247 A.2d 467, 468",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 A.2d 425, 429",
"parenthetical": "\"A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | 625,217 | b |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 A.2d 609, 612",
"parenthetical": "credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 554, 556",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 A.2d 609, 612",
"parenthetical": "credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 A.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 A.2d 609, 612",
"parenthetical": "credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "432 Pa. 123, 125",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances under which Janice Steckel left her employment at the Holiday Inn, when Steckel's credibility was at issue. We disagree. It is well settled that the scope of cross examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 A.2d 609, 612",
"parenthetical": "credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) (“Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) (“A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility^]”); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa.Superior Ct. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradict ed only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "247 A.2d 467, 468",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973) , and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements)."
} | 625,217 | a |
In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "holding that the choice of law question was \"made easy\" by the party's contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply",
"sentence": "Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (holding that the choice of law question was “made easy” by the party’s contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "345 U.S. 588, 588-89",
"parenthetical": "\"Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.\"",
"sentence": "See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary."
} | 4,149,933 | b |
In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "holding that the choice of law question was \"made easy\" by the party's contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply",
"sentence": "Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (holding that the choice of law question was “made easy” by the party’s contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.\"",
"sentence": "See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary."
} | 4,149,933 | b |
We note that two of the primary cases Polite cites in support of its position dictate that whether the witness repudiates the statement or disavows its accuracy is important, if not critical, to its admittance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy",
"sentence": "See Pickett v. United States, 822 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C.2003) (stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge “may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... ”); see also State v. Alvarado, 89 Wash.App. 548, 949 P.2d 831, 835-36 (1998) (stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "822 A.2d 404, 406",
"parenthetical": "stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge \"may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... \"",
"sentence": "See Pickett v. United States, 822 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C.2003) (stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge “may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... ”); see also State v. Alvarado, 89 Wash.App. 548, 949 P.2d 831, 835-36 (1998) (stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy)."
} | 7,011,167 | b |
We note that two of the primary cases Polite cites in support of its position dictate that whether the witness repudiates the statement or disavows its accuracy is important, if not critical, to its admittance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "822 A.2d 404, 406",
"parenthetical": "stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge \"may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... \"",
"sentence": "See Pickett v. United States, 822 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C.2003) (stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge “may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... ”); see also State v. Alvarado, 89 Wash.App. 548, 949 P.2d 831, 835-36 (1998) (stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "949 P.2d 831, 835-36",
"parenthetical": "stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy",
"sentence": "See Pickett v. United States, 822 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C.2003) (stating that the court should adhere to the rule that the witness must confirm the accuracy of the recorded statement, but interpreting this to mean that unless the witness expressly repudiated the statement at trial, the trial judge “may consider all of the circumstances in finding the requisite confirmation, including the demeanor of the witness in court .... ”); see also State v. Alvarado, 89 Wash.App. 548, 949 P.2d 831, 835-36 (1998) (stating that when examining the totality of circumstances, the court should look at four indications of reliability, the first being whether the witness disavows accuracy)."
} | 7,011,167 | a |
Section 652E of the Second Restatement of Torts provides that one of the elements of false light publicity is that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or reckless disregard for whether the statement was true. Section 652E has been adopted by the Kansas courts. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "221 Kan. 297, 303",
"parenthetical": "recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 652E",
"sentence": "Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 303, 559 P.2d 334, 339 (1977) (recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983) (recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, adopted in 1977). Of course it is absurd for Stephan to allege there could be no evidence of his knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statements; he and Tomson know better than anyone else whether he sexually harassed her."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second",
"sentence": "Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 303, 559 P.2d 334, 339 (1977) (recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983) (recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, adopted in 1977). Of course it is absurd for Stephan to allege there could be no evidence of his knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statements; he and Tomson know better than anyone else whether he sexually harassed her."
} | 7,402,010 | a |
Section 652E of the Second Restatement of Torts provides that one of the elements of false light publicity is that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or reckless disregard for whether the statement was true. Section 652E has been adopted by the Kansas courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second",
"sentence": "Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 303, 559 P.2d 334, 339 (1977) (recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983) (recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, adopted in 1977). Of course it is absurd for Stephan to allege there could be no evidence of his knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statements; he and Tomson know better than anyone else whether he sexually harassed her."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "559 P.2d 334, 339",
"parenthetical": "recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 652E",
"sentence": "Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 303, 559 P.2d 334, 339 (1977) (recognizing tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); see also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983) (recognizing that Kansas Supreme Court would accept the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, adopted in 1977). Of course it is absurd for Stephan to allege there could be no evidence of his knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statements; he and Tomson know better than anyone else whether he sexually harassed her."
} | 7,402,010 | b |
No consensus exists among our sister Courts of Appeals as to what quantum of deference, if any, should be accorded to these opinions. After Mead, several Courts of Appeals affirmatively rejected application of Chevron deference to unpublished BIA decisions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 1255, 1258",
"parenthetical": "stating that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of Appeals precedent does not receive Chevron deference",
"sentence": "See Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2008) (stating that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of Appeals precedent does not receive Chevron deference); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not “promulgated under [the agency’s] authority to make rules carrying the force of law”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir.2006) (opining that an unpublished BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does not receive Chevron deference)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 683, 689-690",
"parenthetical": "according Chevron deference to BIA's streamlined adoption of IJ decision",
"sentence": "But see Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689-690 (7th Cir.2006) (according Chevron deference to BIA’s streamlined adoption of IJ decision)."
} | 3,787,926 | a |
No consensus exists among our sister Courts of Appeals as to what quantum of deference, if any, should be accorded to these opinions. After Mead, several Courts of Appeals affirmatively rejected application of Chevron deference to unpublished BIA decisions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 683, 689-690",
"parenthetical": "according Chevron deference to BIA's streamlined adoption of IJ decision",
"sentence": "But see Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689-690 (7th Cir.2006) (according Chevron deference to BIA’s streamlined adoption of IJ decision)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 55, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not \"promulgated under [the agency's] authority to make rules carrying the force of law\"",
"sentence": "See Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2008) (stating that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of Appeals precedent does not receive Chevron deference); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not “promulgated under [the agency’s] authority to make rules carrying the force of law”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir.2006) (opining that an unpublished BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does not receive Chevron deference)."
} | 3,787,926 | b |
No consensus exists among our sister Courts of Appeals as to what quantum of deference, if any, should be accorded to these opinions. After Mead, several Courts of Appeals affirmatively rejected application of Chevron deference to unpublished BIA decisions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14",
"parenthetical": "opining that an unpublished BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does not receive Chevron deference",
"sentence": "See Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2008) (stating that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of Appeals precedent does not receive Chevron deference); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not “promulgated under [the agency’s] authority to make rules carrying the force of law”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir.2006) (opining that an unpublished BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does not receive Chevron deference)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 683, 689-690",
"parenthetical": "according Chevron deference to BIA's streamlined adoption of IJ decision",
"sentence": "But see Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689-690 (7th Cir.2006) (according Chevron deference to BIA’s streamlined adoption of IJ decision)."
} | 3,787,926 | a |
Unlike Rule 803(24), which contemplates the presence of corroborating circumstances as just one factor a court may consider in determining whether a statement has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," Rule 804(b)(3) expressly requires the exclusion of out-of-court statements offered to exculpate the accused unless there are corroborating circumstances that "clearly indicate" the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, for the same reasons we determined that Goble's confession and O'Toole's statements were insufficiently corroborated under Rule 803(24), see Part II.C, supra, (the lack of physical evidence and eyewitness testimony tying the declarants to the crime, O'Toole's later recantation of his statements, the dates of most of the statements are largely unknown in relation to the discovery of the victim's body, and the fact that the statements themselves did not contain specific facts that only the perpetrator would have known), we also hold that Hall failed to show that sufficient corroborating circumstances existed that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of these statements under Rule 804(b)(3). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1516, 1516-17",
"parenthetical": "applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked \"trustworthiness\" under Rule 804(b)(3) and \"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness\" under 804(b)(5",
"sentence": "See Moore, 936 F.2d at 1516-17 (applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked “trustworthiness” under Rule 804(b)(3) and “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under 804(b)(5)); see also, United States v. Groce, 999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant made conflicting statements and later recanted the version most favorable to the defendant); Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1346-47 (concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b",
"sentence": "See Moore, 936 F.2d at 1516-17 (applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked “trustworthiness” under Rule 804(b)(3) and “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under 804(b)(5)); see also, United States v. Groce, 999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant made conflicting statements and later recanted the version most favorable to the defendant); Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1346-47 (concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime)."
} | 11,781,406 | a |
Unlike Rule 803(24), which contemplates the presence of corroborating circumstances as just one factor a court may consider in determining whether a statement has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," Rule 804(b)(3) expressly requires the exclusion of out-of-court statements offered to exculpate the accused unless there are corroborating circumstances that "clearly indicate" the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, for the same reasons we determined that Goble's confession and O'Toole's statements were insufficiently corroborated under Rule 803(24), see Part II.C, supra, (the lack of physical evidence and eyewitness testimony tying the declarants to the crime, O'Toole's later recantation of his statements, the dates of most of the statements are largely unknown in relation to the discovery of the victim's body, and the fact that the statements themselves did not contain specific facts that only the perpetrator would have known), we also hold that Hall failed to show that sufficient corroborating circumstances existed that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of these statements under Rule 804(b)(3). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1346, 1346-47",
"parenthetical": "concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime",
"sentence": "See Moore, 936 F.2d at 1516-17 (applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked “trustworthiness” under Rule 804(b)(3) and “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under 804(b)(5)); see also, United States v. Groce, 999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant made conflicting statements and later recanted the version most favorable to the defendant); Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1346-47 (concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1516, 1516-17",
"parenthetical": "applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked \"trustworthiness\" under Rule 804(b)(3) and \"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness\" under 804(b)(5",
"sentence": "See Moore, 936 F.2d at 1516-17 (applying the same reasoning in de termining that a statement lacked “trustworthiness” under Rule 804(b)(3) and “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under 804(b)(5)); see also, United States v. Groce, 999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant made conflicting statements and later recanted the version most favorable to the defendant); Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1346-47 (concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime)."
} | 11,781,406 | b |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 S.E.2d 281, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "defendant entitled to \"defense of habitation\" instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | a |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 S.E.2d 281, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "defendant entitled to \"defense of habitation\" instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | a |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | a |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | a |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 N.W.2d 909, 913",
"parenthetical": "question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | b |
Proof that the victim did not cross the threshold would not be fatal to MeCuiston's defense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but \"defense of habitation\" requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 N.W.2d 909, 913",
"parenthetical": "question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door",
"sentence": "See Miller, 148 S.E.2d at 281-82 (defendant entitled to “defense of habitation” instruction although victim, who had ripped screen out of screen door, made no actual entry into house); State v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 20 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1945) (question whether defendant was acting in defense of habitation was for jury, although facts did not indicate victim had gotten past the front door); cf. State v. Roberson, 90 N.C.App. 219, 368 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1988) (assailant must actually enter dwelling for self-defense to apply, but “defense of habitation” requires only that there be an attempted forceful entrance), pet. for rev. denied (N.C. June 6, 1988). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on self-defense was not harmless and requires a new trial."
} | 10,629,435 | b |
Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators' response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "420 U.S. 308, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51 (“[Plaintiffs] argument is misguided insofar as it implies that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”); DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2009), affd, 623 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 162835, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1809 (Feb. 28, 2011); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”); see also Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Under Tinker, it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student’s private intentions, that are relevant.”)."
} | 3,834,700 | b |
Subsets and Splits