clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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partially destroyed the cascaded high frequency gas centrifuges. The early version of Stuxnet targeted the S7-
417 PLCs and modified its valve settings. Closing the valves at certain points in time would lead to an increase
of pressure that could damage the equipment. The later version of the threat focused on the S7-315 PLCs,
manipulating the spinning frequency of the rotating motors. By speeding the centrifuges up and slowing them
down repeatedly, the output quality could be spoiled and the centrifuges themselves could be damaged. The
payload would only become active if the fingerprint in the found PLC setup matched a given configuration setup.
This minimized the collateral damage at other facilities and showed that the attackers had in-depth knowledge
of the targeted uranium enrichment facilities. To avoid detection by personnel monitoring the human machine
interface (HMI) of the plant, the threat recorded measurement readings during normal operation and played
those back in a loop.
Night Dragon
Operation Night Dragon, which was uncovered in 2010, is a typical example of global oil companies being
targeted, but this time not with the aim of disruption in mind. The attacks started in late 2009 and were directed
at finding project details and financial information about oil and gas field exploration and bids.
The attackers started by compromising public facing Web servers through SQL injection and installing Web
shells on them. Once they had control over the server they used common hacking tools to harvest local
Page 11
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
passwords, dump password hashes, sniff authentication messages and exploit internal active directory
configuration. This allowed them to move on to other internal computers using the gathered passwords. In
addition, spear phishing messages were used to compromise additional computers. The attackers did not use
any zero-day vulnerabilities during their attacks. Rather they used publicly available tools for each individual job.
On compromised computers a common Backdoor.Trojan was installed that communicated back to the
C&C server, allowing remote access to the computer. This allowed the attacker to find and extract valuable
information.
Shamoon/Disttrack
In August 2012 an extremely destructive cyberattack hit an estimated 30,000 computers at one of the largest oil
producers of the world in Saudi Arabia. The W32.Disttrack malware used in this attack, also known as Shamoon,
consists of three components: a dropper, a wiper and a reporter module.
The dropper component is responsible for creating all the required files on the system, registering a service
called
TrkSvr
in order to start itself with Windows. It also attempts to copy itself to accessible network shares
and execute itself remotely if successfully copied.
The wiper component is only activated when a hardcoded configuration date has been passed. This enables a
coordinated,
time bomb
scenario. The module then drops a legitimate and digitally signed device driver that
provides low level disk access from user space. The malware collects file names and starts overwriting them
with a JPEG image or 192KB blocks of random data. At the end Disttrack finishes the computer off by wiping the
master boot record with the same data.
The reporter component is responsible for sending back a HTTP GET request to the C&C server. It reports the
domain name, IP address and number of files overwritten.
By acquiring user credentials and gaining access to the domain controller the attackers were able to push the
malware on to many systems before they triggered the destructive payload. Disttrack
s secondary goal may have
been to steal valuable information from infected computers, but the main intent was to render the computers
unusable by wiping the operating system and master boot record, causing disruption and downtime at the
targeted company. Although wiping is also frequently used to destroy evidence of the attack and make forensics
more difficult. The malware does not contain any payload against ICS, like Stuxnet does for PLCs, and is not as
sophisticated. According to the company, no computer related with the production or distribution of oil was
affected, since the operational network is separated and specially protected.
One group that claimed responsibility for the attack posted on Pastebin that it was an anti-oppression hacker
group. The attack was prompted by disappointment with some of the regimes in the Middle East, the group said.
True or not, this shows that it is not necessarily only state-sponsored attackers who are carrying out disruptive
attacks. Sabotage attacks usually fall into the orbit of hacktivists, who seek attention rather than profit. Some
sources reported that the attackers had help from insiders, which would explain the so far unclear infection
vector.
Soon after this attack became known, a Qatari gas company was attacked in a similar way.
Page 12
SPEAR PHISHING ATTACKS
IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
A spear phishing
attack consists
of an email with
either a malicious
attachment or a
link to a malicious
website.
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Spear phishing attacks in the energy sector
Spear phishing is, along with watering hole attacks, one of the most common attack vectors used to
attack companies. The attacks are simple to carry out. They often follow the same pattern, starting with a
reconnaissance phase to gather all publicly available information. This is followed by the incursion phase of
breaking in and compromising computers. After that comes the discovery phase, where the attacker gathers
passwords and maps the internal network. The final stage is capture and exfiltration, where the valuable
information is copied and sent back to the attacker. The last phase may also involve a disruption attack if the
goal is sabotage. For a more detailed analysis of the attack phases, see Appendix C.
A spear phishing attack consists of an email with either a malicious attachment or a link to a malicious website.
Such emails are sent in bulk to a handful of key users. These waves are often repeated till enough people fall for
the bait and compromise their computers. For analysis on the social engineering themes used, attack details and
attachment types used, see Appendix A.
New Year
s campaign
Some of the spear phishing campaigns are smaller in scale and are focused on specific targets. For example, on
January 1, 2013 a global energy research company was targeted.
A wave of spear phishing emails were sent from two Freemailer accounts to 291 individuals at the targeted
company. All receiving email addresses started with a letter between G and R, covering half of the alphabet.
Whether there was a second wave of emails using the other half of the alphabet or whether the attackers only
got their hands on part of the address book remains unknown.
All emails had either the subject line
2013,Obama QE4! Merry Christmas !
or
2013,Obama QE4!
. It is
common to see spear phishing attacks take place around holidays, as people are receiving more emails during
these times and are less likely to perform due diligence while opening them. All of the emails contained the same
Trojan.Dropper disguised as an attachment with the filename AVP.dll.
The malware itself drops a malicious Downloader
clbcatq.dll

partially destroyed the cascaded high frequency gas centrifuges. The early version of Stuxnet targeted the S7-

417 PLCs and modified its valve settings. Closing the valves at certain points in time would lead to an increase

of pressure that could damage the equipment. The later version of the threat focused on the S7-315 PLCs,

manipulating the spinning frequency of the rotating motors. By speeding the centrifuges up and slowing them

down repeatedly, the output quality could be spoiled and the centrifuges themselves could be damaged. The

payload would only become active if the fingerprint in the found PLC setup matched a given configuration setup.

This minimized the collateral damage at other facilities and showed that the attackers had in-depth knowledge

of the targeted uranium enrichment facilities. To avoid detection by personnel monitoring the human machine

interface (HMI) of the plant, the threat recorded measurement readings during normal operation and played

those back in a loop.

Night Dragon

Operation Night Dragon, which was uncovered in 2010, is a typical example of global oil companies being

targeted, but this time not with the aim of disruption in mind. The attacks started in late 2009 and were directed

at finding project details and financial information about oil and gas field exploration and bids.

The attackers started by compromising public facing Web servers through SQL injection and installing Web

shells on them. Once they had control over the server they used common hacking tools to harvest local

Page 11

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

passwords, dump password hashes, sniff authentication messages and exploit internal active directory

configuration. This allowed them to move on to other internal computers using the gathered passwords. In

addition, spear phishing messages were used to compromise additional computers. The attackers did not use

any zero-day vulnerabilities during their attacks. Rather they used publicly available tools for each individual job.

On compromised computers a common Backdoor.Trojan was installed that communicated back to the

C&C server, allowing remote access to the computer. This allowed the attacker to find and extract valuable

information.

Shamoon/Disttrack

In August 2012 an extremely destructive cyberattack hit an estimated 30,000 computers at one of the largest oil

producers of the world in Saudi Arabia. The W32.Disttrack malware used in this attack, also known as Shamoon,

consists of three components: a dropper, a wiper and a reporter module.

The dropper component is responsible for creating all the required files on the system, registering a service

called

TrkSvr

in order to start itself with Windows. It also attempts to copy itself to accessible network shares

and execute itself remotely if successfully copied.

The wiper component is only activated when a hardcoded configuration date has been passed. This enables a

coordinated,

time bomb

scenario. The module then drops a legitimate and digitally signed device driver that

provides low level disk access from user space. The malware collects file names and starts overwriting them

with a JPEG image or 192KB blocks of random data. At the end Disttrack finishes the computer off by wiping the

master boot record with the same data.

The reporter component is responsible for sending back a HTTP GET request to the C&C server. It reports the

domain name, IP address and number of files overwritten.

By acquiring user credentials and gaining access to the domain controller the attackers were able to push the

malware on to many systems before they triggered the destructive payload. Disttrack

s secondary goal may have

been to steal valuable information from infected computers, but the main intent was to render the computers

unusable by wiping the operating system and master boot record, causing disruption and downtime at the

targeted company. Although wiping is also frequently used to destroy evidence of the attack and make forensics

more difficult. The malware does not contain any payload against ICS, like Stuxnet does for PLCs, and is not as

sophisticated. According to the company, no computer related with the production or distribution of oil was

affected, since the operational network is separated and specially protected.

One group that claimed responsibility for the attack posted on Pastebin that it was an anti-oppression hacker

group. The attack was prompted by disappointment with some of the regimes in the Middle East, the group said.

True or not, this shows that it is not necessarily only state-sponsored attackers who are carrying out disruptive

attacks. Sabotage attacks usually fall into the orbit of hacktivists, who seek attention rather than profit. Some

sources reported that the attackers had help from insiders, which would explain the so far unclear infection

vector.

Soon after this attack became known, a Qatari gas company was attacked in a similar way.

Page 12

SPEAR PHISHING ATTACKS

IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

A spear phishing

attack consists

of an email with

either a malicious

attachment or a

link to a malicious

website.

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Spear phishing attacks in the energy sector

Spear phishing is, along with watering hole attacks, one of the most common attack vectors used to

attack companies. The attacks are simple to carry out. They often follow the same pattern, starting with a

reconnaissance phase to gather all publicly available information. This is followed by the incursion phase of

breaking in and compromising computers. After that comes the discovery phase, where the attacker gathers

passwords and maps the internal network. The final stage is capture and exfiltration, where the valuable

information is copied and sent back to the attacker. The last phase may also involve a disruption attack if the

goal is sabotage. For a more detailed analysis of the attack phases, see Appendix C.

A spear phishing attack consists of an email with either a malicious attachment or a link to a malicious website.

Such emails are sent in bulk to a handful of key users. These waves are often repeated till enough people fall for

the bait and compromise their computers. For analysis on the social engineering themes used, attack details and

attachment types used, see Appendix A.

New Year

s campaign

Some of the spear phishing campaigns are smaller in scale and are focused on specific targets. For example, on

January 1, 2013 a global energy research company was targeted.

A wave of spear phishing emails were sent from two Freemailer accounts to 291 individuals at the targeted

company. All receiving email addresses started with a letter between G and R, covering half of the alphabet.

Whether there was a second wave of emails using the other half of the alphabet or whether the attackers only

got their hands on part of the address book remains unknown.

All emails had either the subject line

2013,Obama QE4! Merry Christmas !

or

2013,Obama QE4!

. It is

common to see spear phishing attacks take place around holidays, as people are receiving more emails during

these times and are less likely to perform due diligence while opening them. All of the emails contained the same

Trojan.Dropper disguised as an attachment with the filename AVP.dll.

The malware itself drops a malicious Downloader

clbcatq.dll