clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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secure the network and its endpoint on multiple levels. There have
already been proof of concept attacks that demonstrate how smart meters could be manipulated to send
back false information or report incorrect billing IDs, leading to power theft.
In addition to the issue of securing these devices, smart grids will produce a huge amount of data which,
depending on regulations, will need to be kept for audits. Some of this data may be sensitive and could raise
privacy concerns if not properly protected. This could easily grow to petabytes of data that needs to be safely
stored and managed.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the challenges associated with smart grids and smart meters.
Symantec has created a dedicated whitepaper for this topic: How to protect critical infrastructure, mitigate fraud
and guarantee privacy. As a member of the CRISALIS project, Symantec is following these developments closely
and is helping to secure critical infrastructure together with partners from academia and different industry
sectors.
Page 8
HISTORY OF DISCOVERED ATTACKS
There have
been numerous
cyberattacks
against the energy
sector over the
past few years.
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
History of discovered attacks
There have been numerous cyberattacks against the energy sector over the past few years. Not all of them were
the work of sophisticated attackers; some incidents were just collateral damage caused by malware infections or
bad configuration issues. These incidents highlight the fact that such attacks can happen and that they can have
real life consequences.
2013
In 2013 part of the Austrian and German power grid nearly broke down after a control command was
accidentally misdirected. It is believed that a status request command packet, which was broadcast from a
German gas company as a test for their newly installed network branch, found its way into the systems of the
Austrian energy power control and monitoring network. Once there, the message generated thousands of reply
messages, which generated even more data packages, which in turn flooded the control network. To stop this
self-inflicted DDoS attack, part of the monitoring and control network had to be isolated and disconnected.
Fortunately the situation was resolved without any power outages.
2008
In 2008, Tom Donahue, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official told a meeting of utility company
representatives that cyberattacks had taken out power equipment in multiple cities outside the United States.
In some cases the attacker tried to extort money from the energy companies, threatening them with further
blackouts.
2003
In 2003 the safety monitoring system of the Ohio nuclear power plant apparently went offline for several hours
due to a Slammer worm infection. Fortunately the power plant was already offline due to maintenance and the
installed secondary backup monitoring system was unaffected by the worm. Nevertheless the incident raised
safety concerns.
At the beginning of 2003 a marine terminal in Venezuela was targeted by a sabotage attack. Details of this attack
are scarce and vague, but it seems that during a strike an attacking group managed to get access to the SCADA
network of the oil tanker loading machinery and overwrote programmable logic controllers (PLCs) with an empty
program module. This halted machinery, preventing oil tankers from loading for eight hour till the unaffected
backup code was reinstalled on the PLCs. The attack was not too sophisticated as it was easily spotted. A small
modification of the PLC code instead would probably have gone unnoticed for a long time.
2001
In 2001 an attack took place against California
s power distribution center, which controls the flow of electricity
across California. Due to apparently poor security configuration, the attacker was able to compromise two Web
servers that were part of a developer network and penetrate further from there. Fortunately the attackers were
stopped before they managed to attack any systems which were tied into the transmission grid for the Western
United States.
2000
According to Russian officials, the largest natural gas extraction company in the country was successfully
attacked in 2000. The attackers used a Trojan to gain access to the control for the gas pipelines. Through this
switchboard, the flow for individual gas pipelines could have been modified, which would easily have caused
widespread disruption.
Page 10
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Aside from these incidents, there have also been a number of more serious and well-documented targeted
attacks against the energy sector:
Stuxnet
The Stuxnet incident and its relatives Duqu, Flamer and Gauss are some of the most talked-about cases of
targeted attacks. As far as we know today, the Stuxnet operation began in November 2005 with the registration
of the command and control (C&C) servers used in the attacks. The first recorded appearance of what we now
call Stuxnet version 0.5 was in November 2007. Since then, a handful of different versions have been found and
analyzed. Stuxnet 1.x is based on what is now known as the
tilded
platform; whereas Stuxnet 0.5 is based
on the Flamer framework. The code segments and programming style differ, which indicates that two different
programming teams were most likely responsible for the different branches of Stuxnet. Thorough investigation
into the mechanism and functions of this threat started in July 2010. Stuxnet is the first known autonomous
threat to target and sabotage industrial control systems to such an extent.
Stuxnet is a sophisticated piece of malware, which uses seven vulnerabilities to spread and infect its targets.
The most notable vulnerability is the Microsoft Windows Shortcut
LNK/PIF
Files Automatic File Execution
Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568), which allows it to auto-execute on USB drives. Spreading through infected
portable media drives allowed it to also infect networks isolated by air gaps that are unreachable from the
Internet. This was most likely the first infection vector used by Stuxnet. In addition, it is able to infect Step7
project files, which are used to control Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). This allowed the worm to infect
computers whenever the engineer exchanged the project files. Besides this, it also spread through network
shares, a printer spooler vulnerability, an old Windows RPC (remote procedure calls) vulnerability and a known
password in the WinCC database. In the end, Stuxnet propagated further than its authors probably intended. We
have monitored more than 40,000 infected IP addresses in 155 countries. Many of those systems are most likely
just collateral damage and were not intended to be infected by the attackers. For example multiple computers at
Chevron were infected by Stuxnet, without any damage being done.
Part of the malware code was signed with stolen digital certificates making it harder to detect by security tools.
To hide its activity even further, Stuxnet executed slightly different infection routines depending on the security
software installed on the target. On the USB drive itself, the malware would hide its own files and even delete
itself from it after three successful propagations. Tricks like these, to make the detection of the malware more
difficult, are now frequently used in modern targeted attacks.
Stuxnet
s payload focused on PLCs, which are used to control different industrial components. The target of the
Stuxnet operation is believed to be a uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The sabotage payload disrupted and

secure the network and its endpoint on multiple levels. There have

already been proof of concept attacks that demonstrate how smart meters could be manipulated to send

back false information or report incorrect billing IDs, leading to power theft.

In addition to the issue of securing these devices, smart grids will produce a huge amount of data which,

depending on regulations, will need to be kept for audits. Some of this data may be sensitive and could raise

privacy concerns if not properly protected. This could easily grow to petabytes of data that needs to be safely

stored and managed.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the challenges associated with smart grids and smart meters.

Symantec has created a dedicated whitepaper for this topic: How to protect critical infrastructure, mitigate fraud

and guarantee privacy. As a member of the CRISALIS project, Symantec is following these developments closely

and is helping to secure critical infrastructure together with partners from academia and different industry

sectors.

Page 8

HISTORY OF DISCOVERED ATTACKS

There have

been numerous

cyberattacks

against the energy

sector over the

past few years.

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

History of discovered attacks

There have been numerous cyberattacks against the energy sector over the past few years. Not all of them were

the work of sophisticated attackers; some incidents were just collateral damage caused by malware infections or

bad configuration issues. These incidents highlight the fact that such attacks can happen and that they can have

real life consequences.

2013

In 2013 part of the Austrian and German power grid nearly broke down after a control command was

accidentally misdirected. It is believed that a status request command packet, which was broadcast from a

German gas company as a test for their newly installed network branch, found its way into the systems of the

Austrian energy power control and monitoring network. Once there, the message generated thousands of reply

messages, which generated even more data packages, which in turn flooded the control network. To stop this

self-inflicted DDoS attack, part of the monitoring and control network had to be isolated and disconnected.

Fortunately the situation was resolved without any power outages.

2008

In 2008, Tom Donahue, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official told a meeting of utility company

representatives that cyberattacks had taken out power equipment in multiple cities outside the United States.

In some cases the attacker tried to extort money from the energy companies, threatening them with further

blackouts.

2003

In 2003 the safety monitoring system of the Ohio nuclear power plant apparently went offline for several hours

due to a Slammer worm infection. Fortunately the power plant was already offline due to maintenance and the

installed secondary backup monitoring system was unaffected by the worm. Nevertheless the incident raised

safety concerns.

At the beginning of 2003 a marine terminal in Venezuela was targeted by a sabotage attack. Details of this attack

are scarce and vague, but it seems that during a strike an attacking group managed to get access to the SCADA

network of the oil tanker loading machinery and overwrote programmable logic controllers (PLCs) with an empty

program module. This halted machinery, preventing oil tankers from loading for eight hour till the unaffected

backup code was reinstalled on the PLCs. The attack was not too sophisticated as it was easily spotted. A small

modification of the PLC code instead would probably have gone unnoticed for a long time.

2001

In 2001 an attack took place against California

s power distribution center, which controls the flow of electricity

across California. Due to apparently poor security configuration, the attacker was able to compromise two Web

servers that were part of a developer network and penetrate further from there. Fortunately the attackers were

stopped before they managed to attack any systems which were tied into the transmission grid for the Western

United States.

2000

According to Russian officials, the largest natural gas extraction company in the country was successfully

attacked in 2000. The attackers used a Trojan to gain access to the control for the gas pipelines. Through this

switchboard, the flow for individual gas pipelines could have been modified, which would easily have caused

widespread disruption.

Page 10

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Aside from these incidents, there have also been a number of more serious and well-documented targeted

attacks against the energy sector:

Stuxnet

The Stuxnet incident and its relatives Duqu, Flamer and Gauss are some of the most talked-about cases of

targeted attacks. As far as we know today, the Stuxnet operation began in November 2005 with the registration

of the command and control (C&C) servers used in the attacks. The first recorded appearance of what we now

call Stuxnet version 0.5 was in November 2007. Since then, a handful of different versions have been found and

analyzed. Stuxnet 1.x is based on what is now known as the

tilded

platform; whereas Stuxnet 0.5 is based

on the Flamer framework. The code segments and programming style differ, which indicates that two different

programming teams were most likely responsible for the different branches of Stuxnet. Thorough investigation

into the mechanism and functions of this threat started in July 2010. Stuxnet is the first known autonomous

threat to target and sabotage industrial control systems to such an extent.

Stuxnet is a sophisticated piece of malware, which uses seven vulnerabilities to spread and infect its targets.

The most notable vulnerability is the Microsoft Windows Shortcut

LNK/PIF

Files Automatic File Execution

Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568), which allows it to auto-execute on USB drives. Spreading through infected

portable media drives allowed it to also infect networks isolated by air gaps that are unreachable from the

Internet. This was most likely the first infection vector used by Stuxnet. In addition, it is able to infect Step7

project files, which are used to control Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). This allowed the worm to infect

computers whenever the engineer exchanged the project files. Besides this, it also spread through network

shares, a printer spooler vulnerability, an old Windows RPC (remote procedure calls) vulnerability and a known

password in the WinCC database. In the end, Stuxnet propagated further than its authors probably intended. We

have monitored more than 40,000 infected IP addresses in 155 countries. Many of those systems are most likely

just collateral damage and were not intended to be infected by the attackers. For example multiple computers at

Chevron were infected by Stuxnet, without any damage being done.

Part of the malware code was signed with stolen digital certificates making it harder to detect by security tools.

To hide its activity even further, Stuxnet executed slightly different infection routines depending on the security

software installed on the target. On the USB drive itself, the malware would hide its own files and even delete

itself from it after three successful propagations. Tricks like these, to make the detection of the malware more

difficult, are now frequently used in modern targeted attacks.

Stuxnet

s payload focused on PLCs, which are used to control different industrial components. The target of the

Stuxnet operation is believed to be a uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The sabotage payload disrupted and