clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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into a newly created
wuauclt
directory, posing
as Windows update and taking advantage of the DLL search order hijack weakness in order to load the malicious
code in Windows. The same family of dropper has been used in previous targeted attacks against other sectors,
indicating that a group with multiple interests is behind the attacks. The back door provided full access to the
compromised computers.
A week later, on January 7, 2013, the group attacked the same company again. Seventy emails were sent to
58 individuals using either
2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule
or
Re: 2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule
as a
subject line. In this wave, the attackers used a similar AVP.dll to the one used before. In some of the emails, an
additional CHM file with an old exploit was used in an effort to maximize the chances of a successful infection.
After this second wave, the attack ceased. It is unknown if the attackers successfully retrieved the information
they were seeking, if they installed other back door Trojans or gained passwords that allowed them to directly
access the computers, or if they have given up on the target.
Greek oil campaign
A global oil company, with offices around the world, had been under continuous attack for some time, but in
September 2012 we noticed an upsurge in activity, with 34 times more suspicious emails than on average. This
provided a clear indication that something suspicious was going on. At the end of this wave of emails, a hotel
chain, a rental car company and two financial institutions were also targeted by the same attacker. This may
have been an attempt to find further information that could be used in a future social engineering attack against
the oil company.
In total, 136 email accounts at the oil company were targeted. A regional sales manager in Greece received
Page 14
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
412 emails over the
12 month period,
with 155 different
attachments. A HR
person in the same
country received
the second largest
amount of emails with
90 in total. Seventeen
other people were
targeted between 70
and 90 times, many in
the same region. The
rest of the targeted
people received less
than five emails each,
in what seems to have Figure 1. Number of emails targeting the company per day
been an undirected
spraying in the hope
that at least some would fall for the bait. Clearly the one person that received the highest volume of emails was
deemed to be of high value to the attackers. Possible explanations for the attack could be that a competitor
wanted to know more about some upcoming deal or details on the oil field exploration, but this would be highly
speculative.
The spear phishing emails came from 234 spoofed addresses. They were made to appear to be linked to the
company in relation to the subject and attachment chosen. Many of the emails came from the same country as
the main targeted sales manager.
The emails all contained malicious attachments. None of them linked to third party sites for drive-by downloads.
Of the attachments, 1,588 had a .exe extension. Of those, 842 had a .pdf.exe extension. The malware chosen
was a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan Backdoor.Darkmoon and, in some minor cases, Trojan droppers that would
download additional malware. The attackers did not use any zero-day exploits to drop a payload.
The social engineering messages concentrated mainly around the following two themes:
E-books and newspapers:
E-Book.pdf.exe
BusinessWeek.pdf.exe
Financial Times E-Paper.pdf.exe
The Economist Print Edition.pdf.exe
The NY Times In Print.pdf.exe
Free desktop tools:
Babylon9 - Greek.exe
Google Desktop Translator.exe
SMS Free Sender Desktop.exe
BBC iPlayer.exe
Sticky Notes Desktop.exe
Once installed, the back door would create a registry run key in order to restart with Windows and connect to
one of three C&C servers located in Greece. The last C&C server has been used since 2010 in similar attacks
against other companies. Other sub-domains at the same free host and DNS service have been used by other
groups to spread malware in the past.
updates.zyns.com
amazoaws.dyndns-office.com
msupdate.3utilities.com
Page 15
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
The chosen names of the C&C server domains imitates legitimate services in a bid to be overlooked by the system
administrators when checking their logs.
The back door provides full remote access to the compromised computers, allowing for extraction of any data. It is
unknown if the attackers succeeded in their goal and if valuable information has been extracted. The attacks did not
completely disappear, but the email volume decreased significantly to only a few emails per week afterwards.
Motivation and origin
As with all targeted attacks, there are many different groups of attackers operating in this field. These attacks cannot
be attributed to only one group or geographical region. We have seen individuals, competitors, hacktivist groups
and possible state sponsored agents carrying out attacks against energy companies. Some of the attacks have been
purely opportunistic, seeking any valuable information available. Other campaigns look like they were planned over a
lengthy period and carried out methodically with a clear goal in mind.
The attackers tend to go after valuable information, including maps of new gas fields or research on efficient
photovoltaic generators. This information can be of great value to competitors or nations that want to make progress
in the same field. Another motivation for attackers is to profit from the information stolen by blackmailing the
company.
The same information can be used to carry out sabotage attacks designed to disrupt ICSs, as the energy sector is
also a primary target for sabotage attacks which will not generate direct profit for the attacker. A competitor might
be interested in generating bad press and bad customer experience for a rival company, in order to win some new
clients.
For example, in January 2013 a group claiming to be related to Anonymous posted access details for what they said

into a newly created

wuauclt

directory, posing

as Windows update and taking advantage of the DLL search order hijack weakness in order to load the malicious

code in Windows. The same family of dropper has been used in previous targeted attacks against other sectors,

indicating that a group with multiple interests is behind the attacks. The back door provided full access to the

compromised computers.

A week later, on January 7, 2013, the group attacked the same company again. Seventy emails were sent to

58 individuals using either

2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule

or

Re: 2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule

as a

subject line. In this wave, the attackers used a similar AVP.dll to the one used before. In some of the emails, an

additional CHM file with an old exploit was used in an effort to maximize the chances of a successful infection.

After this second wave, the attack ceased. It is unknown if the attackers successfully retrieved the information

they were seeking, if they installed other back door Trojans or gained passwords that allowed them to directly

access the computers, or if they have given up on the target.

Greek oil campaign

A global oil company, with offices around the world, had been under continuous attack for some time, but in

September 2012 we noticed an upsurge in activity, with 34 times more suspicious emails than on average. This

provided a clear indication that something suspicious was going on. At the end of this wave of emails, a hotel

chain, a rental car company and two financial institutions were also targeted by the same attacker. This may

have been an attempt to find further information that could be used in a future social engineering attack against

the oil company.

In total, 136 email accounts at the oil company were targeted. A regional sales manager in Greece received

Page 14

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

412 emails over the

12 month period,

with 155 different

attachments. A HR

person in the same

country received

the second largest

amount of emails with

90 in total. Seventeen

other people were

targeted between 70

and 90 times, many in

the same region. The

rest of the targeted

people received less

than five emails each,

in what seems to have Figure 1. Number of emails targeting the company per day

been an undirected

spraying in the hope

that at least some would fall for the bait. Clearly the one person that received the highest volume of emails was

deemed to be of high value to the attackers. Possible explanations for the attack could be that a competitor

wanted to know more about some upcoming deal or details on the oil field exploration, but this would be highly

speculative.

The spear phishing emails came from 234 spoofed addresses. They were made to appear to be linked to the

company in relation to the subject and attachment chosen. Many of the emails came from the same country as

the main targeted sales manager.

The emails all contained malicious attachments. None of them linked to third party sites for drive-by downloads.

Of the attachments, 1,588 had a .exe extension. Of those, 842 had a .pdf.exe extension. The malware chosen

was a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan Backdoor.Darkmoon and, in some minor cases, Trojan droppers that would

download additional malware. The attackers did not use any zero-day exploits to drop a payload.

The social engineering messages concentrated mainly around the following two themes:

E-books and newspapers:

E-Book.pdf.exe

BusinessWeek.pdf.exe

Financial Times E-Paper.pdf.exe

The Economist Print Edition.pdf.exe

The NY Times In Print.pdf.exe

Free desktop tools:

Babylon9 - Greek.exe

Google Desktop Translator.exe

SMS Free Sender Desktop.exe

BBC iPlayer.exe

Sticky Notes Desktop.exe

Once installed, the back door would create a registry run key in order to restart with Windows and connect to

one of three C&C servers located in Greece. The last C&C server has been used since 2010 in similar attacks

against other companies. Other sub-domains at the same free host and DNS service have been used by other

groups to spread malware in the past.

updates.zyns.com

amazoaws.dyndns-office.com

msupdate.3utilities.com

Page 15

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

The chosen names of the C&C server domains imitates legitimate services in a bid to be overlooked by the system

administrators when checking their logs.

The back door provides full remote access to the compromised computers, allowing for extraction of any data. It is

unknown if the attackers succeeded in their goal and if valuable information has been extracted. The attacks did not

completely disappear, but the email volume decreased significantly to only a few emails per week afterwards.

Motivation and origin

As with all targeted attacks, there are many different groups of attackers operating in this field. These attacks cannot

be attributed to only one group or geographical region. We have seen individuals, competitors, hacktivist groups

and possible state sponsored agents carrying out attacks against energy companies. Some of the attacks have been

purely opportunistic, seeking any valuable information available. Other campaigns look like they were planned over a

lengthy period and carried out methodically with a clear goal in mind.

The attackers tend to go after valuable information, including maps of new gas fields or research on efficient

photovoltaic generators. This information can be of great value to competitors or nations that want to make progress

in the same field. Another motivation for attackers is to profit from the information stolen by blackmailing the

company.

The same information can be used to carry out sabotage attacks designed to disrupt ICSs, as the energy sector is

also a primary target for sabotage attacks which will not generate direct profit for the attacker. A competitor might

be interested in generating bad press and bad customer experience for a rival company, in order to win some new

clients.

For example, in January 2013 a group claiming to be related to Anonymous posted access details for what they said