clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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has a high potential for critical disruption through sabotage attacks. Any interruption to the power grid would
cause substantial chaos and cascading effects resulting in financial loss.
In the past there have been quite a few attacks that included targets in the energy sector. Some of these were
more focused, like Stuxnet, Duqu, Shamoon/Disttrack and Night Dragon. Others saw power companies targeted
among many other sectors, such as Hidden Lynx, Nitro, Flamer, Net Traveler and Elderwood to name a few.
One of the biggest examples, and a game changer for many organizations, was Stuxnet. This targeted sabotage
attack, which is believed to have been aimed against uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, made clear what
could be done through cyberattacks.
It is also clear that the energy sector is not exempt from the generic attacks that every company faces, such
as ransomware that locks PCs or financial Trojans that attempt to steal passwords and credit card details. For
example, such a case happened in May 2013, when a small fuel distribution company in North Carolina fell
victim to a cyberheist that transferred US$800,000 from the company
s bank account. Such threats spread
broadly and might impact any person, regardless of their employer. These attackers aim at infecting as many
computers as possible in order to maximize their chances of profits. These attacks can include nonspecific data
breaches where employee or customer records get stolen, as happened to the US Department of Energy in July
2013.
For this paper we focused on email data from targeted attacks between July 2012 and June 2013. Even though
watering holes are becoming more frequently used in targeted attacks, it is unfortunately quite difficult to
reliably map these to individual campaigns. A blocked drive-by download attempt does not give any indication
if it was a targeted attack or just general noise. In quite a few cases we see the same common malware, like
Poison Ivy, being used by generic attackers and by targeted attacks. In such cases the sole difference between a
sophisticated targeted attack and a generic one lies in the person commanding the malware.
Page 5
EXPOSED SYSTEMS:
ONLINE AND OFFLINE
Experts predict
that billions of
smart meters
and sensors
will be installed
worldwide over the
next ten years.
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Exposed systems: Online and offline
Historically most industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
were in separated networks not connected to the Internet or any other network. Unfortunately this security
through segregation approach does not fully protect against cyberattacks. In reality, networks are rarely
completely isolated. Often some configuration updates are periodically installed or log files are transferred. If
systems are not directly connected, the method of choice for these types of interactions is usually through a USB
stick or a non-permanent modem connection, which provides a way into the restricted networks. This allows
malware to spread into such isolated networks as demonstrated many times by threats such as Stuxnet.
If networks are truly segregated, this would mean that there would be no software updates installed, leaving
old vulnerabilities open. There are also issues around processes. For example, the revocation lists for digital
certificates are seldom updated and therefore certificates which are no longer valid cannot be checked properly
and would still be accepted.
With the increasing desire for connectivity now reaching industrial plants, many operators have started to
connect their ICS to the Internet. New adapters can bridge to older technology which was never intended to be
controlled over the Internet, allowing it to be connected easily. This allows for efficient centralized monitoring
and, to some extent, remote control of equipment.
Depending on the type of machinery controlled through the human-machine interface (HMI) of the ICS, not all
modifications are possible. Some systems are physically connected in a pure read-only mode for monitoring.
And even if they are fully connected, some turbines have physical limitations or emergency systems based on
physical effects that cannot be overridden by the digital controller. Thus, not all Hollywood scenarios of open
flood gates or turbines that fly through the air are possible. However, sabotage attacks that damage equipment
are definitely possible, as has already been demonstrated. In the future, more systems are going to implement
the failsafe switches in software, opening up the vector for malware attacks.
An additional source of concern is that some countries have started to open the energy market for smaller
private contributors. This means that almost anyone can use mini power plants like water, wind or photovoltaic
sites to feed energy back into the power grid. Often these operators do not have a full IT staff supporting
the facilities at hand, which might lead to more vulnerable installations. Furthermore they may deploy new
technology which might be untested and contain some unknown vulnerabilities. While these smaller sites make
up only a small portion of the grid, new decentralized power input feeds are a challenge for the balance of the
power grid as well and need to be carefully monitored. Small outages or changes can have a domino effect for
the whole power grid.
To increase the exposure of energy firms even further, sites like SHODAN, which is essentially a search engine
for devices, enable anyone to easily find exposed controllers on the Internet. Of course not all of the industrial
control systems connected to the Internet are critical systems or even real ones. Some researchers have started
to create honey pot systems in order to study the attackers, which have apparently already attracted attackers
like the Comment Crew/APT1 group, who have broken into these decoy systems.
Page 7
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
Smart grid: A new potential avenue of attack
Smart grids and smart metering are
bringing significant change to
the world
s power systems.
Experts predict that
billions of smart meters
and sensors will be
installed worldwide
over the next ten
years. They enable
utility companies
to measure energy
consumption at a
more granular
level, creating
better flow
patterns and
enabling
different
prices for
consumption
based on
the time of day and
location. This development
brings new opportunities, as well
as new challenges.
As with any connected infrastructure, it is important to

has a high potential for critical disruption through sabotage attacks. Any interruption to the power grid would

cause substantial chaos and cascading effects resulting in financial loss.

In the past there have been quite a few attacks that included targets in the energy sector. Some of these were

more focused, like Stuxnet, Duqu, Shamoon/Disttrack and Night Dragon. Others saw power companies targeted

among many other sectors, such as Hidden Lynx, Nitro, Flamer, Net Traveler and Elderwood to name a few.

One of the biggest examples, and a game changer for many organizations, was Stuxnet. This targeted sabotage

attack, which is believed to have been aimed against uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, made clear what

could be done through cyberattacks.

It is also clear that the energy sector is not exempt from the generic attacks that every company faces, such

as ransomware that locks PCs or financial Trojans that attempt to steal passwords and credit card details. For

example, such a case happened in May 2013, when a small fuel distribution company in North Carolina fell

victim to a cyberheist that transferred US$800,000 from the company

s bank account. Such threats spread

broadly and might impact any person, regardless of their employer. These attackers aim at infecting as many

computers as possible in order to maximize their chances of profits. These attacks can include nonspecific data

breaches where employee or customer records get stolen, as happened to the US Department of Energy in July

2013.

For this paper we focused on email data from targeted attacks between July 2012 and June 2013. Even though

watering holes are becoming more frequently used in targeted attacks, it is unfortunately quite difficult to

reliably map these to individual campaigns. A blocked drive-by download attempt does not give any indication

if it was a targeted attack or just general noise. In quite a few cases we see the same common malware, like

Poison Ivy, being used by generic attackers and by targeted attacks. In such cases the sole difference between a

sophisticated targeted attack and a generic one lies in the person commanding the malware.

Page 5

EXPOSED SYSTEMS:

ONLINE AND OFFLINE

Experts predict

that billions of

smart meters

and sensors

will be installed

worldwide over the

next ten years.

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Exposed systems: Online and offline

Historically most industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems

were in separated networks not connected to the Internet or any other network. Unfortunately this security

through segregation approach does not fully protect against cyberattacks. In reality, networks are rarely

completely isolated. Often some configuration updates are periodically installed or log files are transferred. If

systems are not directly connected, the method of choice for these types of interactions is usually through a USB

stick or a non-permanent modem connection, which provides a way into the restricted networks. This allows

malware to spread into such isolated networks as demonstrated many times by threats such as Stuxnet.

If networks are truly segregated, this would mean that there would be no software updates installed, leaving

old vulnerabilities open. There are also issues around processes. For example, the revocation lists for digital

certificates are seldom updated and therefore certificates which are no longer valid cannot be checked properly

and would still be accepted.

With the increasing desire for connectivity now reaching industrial plants, many operators have started to

connect their ICS to the Internet. New adapters can bridge to older technology which was never intended to be

controlled over the Internet, allowing it to be connected easily. This allows for efficient centralized monitoring

and, to some extent, remote control of equipment.

Depending on the type of machinery controlled through the human-machine interface (HMI) of the ICS, not all

modifications are possible. Some systems are physically connected in a pure read-only mode for monitoring.

And even if they are fully connected, some turbines have physical limitations or emergency systems based on

physical effects that cannot be overridden by the digital controller. Thus, not all Hollywood scenarios of open

flood gates or turbines that fly through the air are possible. However, sabotage attacks that damage equipment

are definitely possible, as has already been demonstrated. In the future, more systems are going to implement

the failsafe switches in software, opening up the vector for malware attacks.

An additional source of concern is that some countries have started to open the energy market for smaller

private contributors. This means that almost anyone can use mini power plants like water, wind or photovoltaic

sites to feed energy back into the power grid. Often these operators do not have a full IT staff supporting

the facilities at hand, which might lead to more vulnerable installations. Furthermore they may deploy new

technology which might be untested and contain some unknown vulnerabilities. While these smaller sites make

up only a small portion of the grid, new decentralized power input feeds are a challenge for the balance of the

power grid as well and need to be carefully monitored. Small outages or changes can have a domino effect for

the whole power grid.

To increase the exposure of energy firms even further, sites like SHODAN, which is essentially a search engine

for devices, enable anyone to easily find exposed controllers on the Internet. Of course not all of the industrial

control systems connected to the Internet are critical systems or even real ones. Some researchers have started

to create honey pot systems in order to study the attackers, which have apparently already attracted attackers

like the Comment Crew/APT1 group, who have broken into these decoy systems.

Page 7

Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector

Smart grid: A new potential avenue of attack

Smart grids and smart metering are

bringing significant change to

the world

s power systems.

Experts predict that

billions of smart meters

and sensors will be

installed worldwide

over the next ten

years. They enable

utility companies

to measure energy

consumption at a

more granular

level, creating

better flow

patterns and

enabling

different

prices for

consumption

based on

the time of day and

location. This development

brings new opportunities, as well

as new challenges.

As with any connected infrastructure, it is important to