clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
8
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
USENIX Association
fore the OS, and injects itself into OS processes as they start. faddeha.com hamas.sytes.net dreems.no-ip.ca
The RCS samples we examined also had the ability to propa-
Hosts sample that Same IP SameIP1
gate to other devices, including into inactive VMWare virtual talks to C&C
machines by modifying the disk image, onto USB flash drives,
CVE-2013-0422
and onto Windows Mobile phones. We did not observe similar Used by sample
that talks to C&C
capabilities in the FinSpy samples we examined. Journalist A,
H.R. activist B njq8
Journalist F
Exploitation of captured data: When Ahmed Mansoor re-
ceived the RCS document, he opened it, infecting his computer njRAT VB Packer upload.bz
(Figure 5). Ahmed subsequently noted several suspicious ac- storge.myftp.org
cesses to his GMail account using IMAP. Even after he changed
his password, the accesses continued. While corresponding
with Ahmed on his compromised account, an author of this pa-
per discovered that the attackers had installed an application-
specific password [56] in Ahmed
s GMail account, a secondary Relative of SpyNet
political detainee D
password that they apparently used to access his account even
after he changed his main password. The suspicious accesses Journalist C
stopped after removal of the application-specific password.
Two weeks after this correspondence with Ahmed, one of us
(Author in Figure 5) received a targeted e-mail with a link to H.R. activist E
a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- SameIP1
shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT. The e-mail was sent from the UAE
timezone (as well as of other countries) and contained the terms sn.all-google.com DarkComet Appin CVE 2012-0158
veryimportant
and
wikileaks
, just like in the e-mail re-
ceived by Ahmed.
The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author used Figure 6: Another part of the ecosystem of UAE surveil-
owner.no-ip.biz for its C&C, one of the domains men- lance attacks.
tioned in a report published by Norman about a year-long cam-
paign of cyberattacks on Israeli and Palestinian targets carried
out by a group that Norman was unable to identify [57]. Three Off-the-shelf RATs. We found a file that VirusTotal had
months after Author was targeted, Ahmed received an e-mail downloaded from faddeha.com, which appeared to be a re-
containing an attachment with Xtreme RAT that talked to the mote access toolkit known as SpyNet, available for general pur-
same C&C server (Figure 5), suggesting that the attackers who chase for 50 Euros [60]. The SpyNet sample communicated
infected Ahmed with RCS may have provided a list of interest- with the C&C hamas.sytes.net.
ing e-mail addresses to another group for further targeting. SpyNet Packing: We found another instance of the first
stage of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit on VirusTotal. The exploit
Possible consequences: Shortly after he was targeted, downloaded a second stage, which in turn downloaded a sam-
Ahmed says he was physically assaulted twice by an attacker ple of SpyNet from maile-s.com. This sample of SpyNet
who appeared able to track Ahmed
s location [58]. He also re- communicated with the same C&C hamas.sytes.net.
ports that his car was stolen, a large sum of money disappeared The sample was packed using ASProtect [61]. When run, the
from his bank account, and his passport was confiscated [59]. sample unpacks a compiled Visual Basic project that loads, via
He believes these consequences are part of a government in- the RunPE method [62], an executable packed with UPX [63].
timidation campaign against him, but we did not uncover any Finally, this executable unpacks SpyNet. SpyNet
s GUI only
direct links to his infection. (Interestingly, spyware subse- offers an option to pack with UPX, suggesting that the attack-
quently sent to others has used bait content about Ahmed.) ers specially added the other layers of packing. In some cases,
Further attacks: In October 2012, UAE Journalist A and the Visual Basic project bears the name NoWayTech, which
Human Rights activist B (per Figure 6) forwarded us suspi- appears to be an underground RunPE tool, while others are
cious e-mails they had received that contained a Word docu- named SpyVisual, which we have been unable to trace to any
ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit public underground tools, and thus also may reflect customiza-
(Figure 5). The attachment contained an embedded Flash file tion by the attacker. The SpyVisual projects contain the string
that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4, loading c:\Users\Zain\AppData\Local\Temp\OLE1EmbedStrm.wav,
shell code to download a second stage from faddeha.com. which we used as the fingerprint VB Packer in Figure 6.
We were unable to obtain the second stage or the ultimate pay- Cedar Key attack: The same VB Packer was used in an
load, as the website was unavailable at the time of testing. attack on Relative of political detainee D and H.R. activist
However, the exploit kit appears indicative of Hacking Team E in Figure 6. These individuals received e-mails containing a
involvement. A page on faddeha.com found in Google
s link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat-
cache contained an embedded .jar with the same applet class ing YouTube. Loading the page greeted the target with
Video
(WebEnhancer) as those observed in other .jar files that we loading please wait . . .
The page redirected to a YouTube
found to contain RCS. video a few seconds later, but first loaded a Java exploit [64]
9
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
519
known vulnerability with no patch at the time that the e-mails servers to develop indicators (fingerprints) for how the servers
were sent. Oracle released a patch 12 hours after activists began respond to certain types of requests. We then scanned the full
receiving these links. Internet IPv4 address space (
) for these, along with prob-
The cedarkeyrv.com domain is associated with an RV ing results found by past scans. In many cases we do not release
park in Cedar Key, Florida. The website
s hosting company the full details of our fingerprints to avoid compromising what
told us that the site had apparently suffered a compromise, but may be legitimate investigations.
did not have further details.
The exploit used in the attack appears to have been origi-
5.1 FinSpy
nally posted by a Kuwaiti user, njq8, on an Arabic-language
exploit sharing site [65]. We contacted njq8, who told us Identifying and linking servers: We developed a number
that he had obtained the exploit elsewhere and modified it of fingerprints for identifying FinSpy servers using HTTP-
prior to posting. The attack downloaded an instance of based probing as well as FinSpy
s custom TLV-based proto-
SpyNet from isteeler.com (which from our inspection did col. We leveraged quirks such as specific non-compliance
not appear to have any legitimate content), which used the with RFC 2616, responses to certain types of invalid data,
C&C storge.myftp.org. This same C&C occurred in an- and the presence of signatures such as the bizarre
Hallo

8

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

USENIX Association

fore the OS, and injects itself into OS processes as they start. faddeha.com hamas.sytes.net dreems.no-ip.ca

The RCS samples we examined also had the ability to propa-

Hosts sample that Same IP SameIP1

gate to other devices, including into inactive VMWare virtual talks to C&C

machines by modifying the disk image, onto USB flash drives,

CVE-2013-0422

and onto Windows Mobile phones. We did not observe similar Used by sample

that talks to C&C

capabilities in the FinSpy samples we examined. Journalist A,

H.R. activist B njq8

Journalist F

Exploitation of captured data: When Ahmed Mansoor re-

ceived the RCS document, he opened it, infecting his computer njRAT VB Packer upload.bz

(Figure 5). Ahmed subsequently noted several suspicious ac- storge.myftp.org

cesses to his GMail account using IMAP. Even after he changed

his password, the accesses continued. While corresponding

with Ahmed on his compromised account, an author of this pa-

per discovered that the attackers had installed an application-

specific password [56] in Ahmed

s GMail account, a secondary Relative of SpyNet

political detainee D

password that they apparently used to access his account even

after he changed his main password. The suspicious accesses Journalist C

stopped after removal of the application-specific password.

Two weeks after this correspondence with Ahmed, one of us

(Author in Figure 5) received a targeted e-mail with a link to H.R. activist E

a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- SameIP1

shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT. The e-mail was sent from the UAE

timezone (as well as of other countries) and contained the terms sn.all-google.com DarkComet Appin CVE 2012-0158

veryimportant

and

wikileaks

, just like in the e-mail re-

ceived by Ahmed.

The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author used Figure 6: Another part of the ecosystem of UAE surveil-

owner.no-ip.biz for its C&C, one of the domains men- lance attacks.

tioned in a report published by Norman about a year-long cam-

paign of cyberattacks on Israeli and Palestinian targets carried

out by a group that Norman was unable to identify [57]. Three Off-the-shelf RATs. We found a file that VirusTotal had

months after Author was targeted, Ahmed received an e-mail downloaded from faddeha.com, which appeared to be a re-

containing an attachment with Xtreme RAT that talked to the mote access toolkit known as SpyNet, available for general pur-

same C&C server (Figure 5), suggesting that the attackers who chase for 50 Euros [60]. The SpyNet sample communicated

infected Ahmed with RCS may have provided a list of interest- with the C&C hamas.sytes.net.

ing e-mail addresses to another group for further targeting. SpyNet Packing: We found another instance of the first

stage of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit on VirusTotal. The exploit

Possible consequences: Shortly after he was targeted, downloaded a second stage, which in turn downloaded a sam-

Ahmed says he was physically assaulted twice by an attacker ple of SpyNet from maile-s.com. This sample of SpyNet

who appeared able to track Ahmed

s location [58]. He also re- communicated with the same C&C hamas.sytes.net.

ports that his car was stolen, a large sum of money disappeared The sample was packed using ASProtect [61]. When run, the

from his bank account, and his passport was confiscated [59]. sample unpacks a compiled Visual Basic project that loads, via

He believes these consequences are part of a government in- the RunPE method [62], an executable packed with UPX [63].

timidation campaign against him, but we did not uncover any Finally, this executable unpacks SpyNet. SpyNet

s GUI only

direct links to his infection. (Interestingly, spyware subse- offers an option to pack with UPX, suggesting that the attack-

quently sent to others has used bait content about Ahmed.) ers specially added the other layers of packing. In some cases,

Further attacks: In October 2012, UAE Journalist A and the Visual Basic project bears the name NoWayTech, which

Human Rights activist B (per Figure 6) forwarded us suspi- appears to be an underground RunPE tool, while others are

cious e-mails they had received that contained a Word docu- named SpyVisual, which we have been unable to trace to any

ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit public underground tools, and thus also may reflect customiza-

(Figure 5). The attachment contained an embedded Flash file tion by the attacker. The SpyVisual projects contain the string

that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4, loading c:\Users\Zain\AppData\Local\Temp\OLE1EmbedStrm.wav,

shell code to download a second stage from faddeha.com. which we used as the fingerprint VB Packer in Figure 6.

We were unable to obtain the second stage or the ultimate pay- Cedar Key attack: The same VB Packer was used in an

load, as the website was unavailable at the time of testing. attack on Relative of political detainee D and H.R. activist

However, the exploit kit appears indicative of Hacking Team E in Figure 6. These individuals received e-mails containing a

involvement. A page on faddeha.com found in Google

s link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat-

cache contained an embedded .jar with the same applet class ing YouTube. Loading the page greeted the target with

Video

(WebEnhancer) as those observed in other .jar files that we loading please wait . . .

The page redirected to a YouTube

found to contain RCS. video a few seconds later, but first loaded a Java exploit [64]

9

USENIX Association

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

519

known vulnerability with no patch at the time that the e-mails servers to develop indicators (fingerprints) for how the servers

were sent. Oracle released a patch 12 hours after activists began respond to certain types of requests. We then scanned the full

receiving these links. Internet IPv4 address space (

) for these, along with prob-

The cedarkeyrv.com domain is associated with an RV ing results found by past scans. In many cases we do not release

park in Cedar Key, Florida. The website

s hosting company the full details of our fingerprints to avoid compromising what

told us that the site had apparently suffered a compromise, but may be legitimate investigations.

did not have further details.

The exploit used in the attack appears to have been origi-

5.1 FinSpy

nally posted by a Kuwaiti user, njq8, on an Arabic-language

exploit sharing site [65]. We contacted njq8, who told us Identifying and linking servers: We developed a number

that he had obtained the exploit elsewhere and modified it of fingerprints for identifying FinSpy servers using HTTP-

prior to posting. The attack downloaded an instance of based probing as well as FinSpy

s custom TLV-based proto-

SpyNet from isteeler.com (which from our inspection did col. We leveraged quirks such as specific non-compliance

not appear to have any legitimate content), which used the with RFC 2616, responses to certain types of invalid data,

C&C storge.myftp.org. This same C&C occurred in an- and the presence of signatures such as the bizarre

Hallo