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23rd USENIX Security Symposium |
USENIX Association |
fore the OS, and injects itself into OS processes as they start. faddeha.com hamas.sytes.net dreems.no-ip.ca |
The RCS samples we examined also had the ability to propa- |
Hosts sample that Same IP SameIP1 |
gate to other devices, including into inactive VMWare virtual talks to C&C |
machines by modifying the disk image, onto USB flash drives, |
CVE-2013-0422 |
and onto Windows Mobile phones. We did not observe similar Used by sample |
that talks to C&C |
capabilities in the FinSpy samples we examined. Journalist A, |
H.R. activist B njq8 |
Journalist F |
Exploitation of captured data: When Ahmed Mansoor re- |
ceived the RCS document, he opened it, infecting his computer njRAT VB Packer upload.bz |
(Figure 5). Ahmed subsequently noted several suspicious ac- storge.myftp.org |
cesses to his GMail account using IMAP. Even after he changed |
his password, the accesses continued. While corresponding |
with Ahmed on his compromised account, an author of this pa- |
per discovered that the attackers had installed an application- |
specific password [56] in Ahmed |
s GMail account, a secondary Relative of SpyNet |
political detainee D |
password that they apparently used to access his account even |
after he changed his main password. The suspicious accesses Journalist C |
stopped after removal of the application-specific password. |
Two weeks after this correspondence with Ahmed, one of us |
(Author in Figure 5) received a targeted e-mail with a link to H.R. activist E |
a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- SameIP1 |
shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT. The e-mail was sent from the UAE |
timezone (as well as of other countries) and contained the terms sn.all-google.com DarkComet Appin CVE 2012-0158 |
veryimportant |
and |
wikileaks |
, just like in the e-mail re- |
ceived by Ahmed. |
The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author used Figure 6: Another part of the ecosystem of UAE surveil- |
owner.no-ip.biz for its C&C, one of the domains men- lance attacks. |
tioned in a report published by Norman about a year-long cam- |
paign of cyberattacks on Israeli and Palestinian targets carried |
out by a group that Norman was unable to identify [57]. Three Off-the-shelf RATs. We found a file that VirusTotal had |
months after Author was targeted, Ahmed received an e-mail downloaded from faddeha.com, which appeared to be a re- |
containing an attachment with Xtreme RAT that talked to the mote access toolkit known as SpyNet, available for general pur- |
same C&C server (Figure 5), suggesting that the attackers who chase for 50 Euros [60]. The SpyNet sample communicated |
infected Ahmed with RCS may have provided a list of interest- with the C&C hamas.sytes.net. |
ing e-mail addresses to another group for further targeting. SpyNet Packing: We found another instance of the first |
stage of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit on VirusTotal. The exploit |
Possible consequences: Shortly after he was targeted, downloaded a second stage, which in turn downloaded a sam- |
Ahmed says he was physically assaulted twice by an attacker ple of SpyNet from maile-s.com. This sample of SpyNet |
who appeared able to track Ahmed |
s location [58]. He also re- communicated with the same C&C hamas.sytes.net. |
ports that his car was stolen, a large sum of money disappeared The sample was packed using ASProtect [61]. When run, the |
from his bank account, and his passport was confiscated [59]. sample unpacks a compiled Visual Basic project that loads, via |
He believes these consequences are part of a government in- the RunPE method [62], an executable packed with UPX [63]. |
timidation campaign against him, but we did not uncover any Finally, this executable unpacks SpyNet. SpyNet |
s GUI only |
direct links to his infection. (Interestingly, spyware subse- offers an option to pack with UPX, suggesting that the attack- |
quently sent to others has used bait content about Ahmed.) ers specially added the other layers of packing. In some cases, |
Further attacks: In October 2012, UAE Journalist A and the Visual Basic project bears the name NoWayTech, which |
Human Rights activist B (per Figure 6) forwarded us suspi- appears to be an underground RunPE tool, while others are |
cious e-mails they had received that contained a Word docu- named SpyVisual, which we have been unable to trace to any |
ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit public underground tools, and thus also may reflect customiza- |
(Figure 5). The attachment contained an embedded Flash file tion by the attacker. The SpyVisual projects contain the string |
that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4, loading c:\Users\Zain\AppData\Local\Temp\OLE1EmbedStrm.wav, |
shell code to download a second stage from faddeha.com. which we used as the fingerprint VB Packer in Figure 6. |
We were unable to obtain the second stage or the ultimate pay- Cedar Key attack: The same VB Packer was used in an |
load, as the website was unavailable at the time of testing. attack on Relative of political detainee D and H.R. activist |
However, the exploit kit appears indicative of Hacking Team E in Figure 6. These individuals received e-mails containing a |
involvement. A page on faddeha.com found in Google |
s link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat- |
cache contained an embedded .jar with the same applet class ing YouTube. Loading the page greeted the target with |
Video |
(WebEnhancer) as those observed in other .jar files that we loading please wait . . . |
The page redirected to a YouTube |
found to contain RCS. video a few seconds later, but first loaded a Java exploit [64] |
9 |
USENIX Association |
23rd USENIX Security Symposium |
519 |
known vulnerability with no patch at the time that the e-mails servers to develop indicators (fingerprints) for how the servers |
were sent. Oracle released a patch 12 hours after activists began respond to certain types of requests. We then scanned the full |
receiving these links. Internet IPv4 address space ( |
) for these, along with prob- |
The cedarkeyrv.com domain is associated with an RV ing results found by past scans. In many cases we do not release |
park in Cedar Key, Florida. The website |
s hosting company the full details of our fingerprints to avoid compromising what |
told us that the site had apparently suffered a compromise, but may be legitimate investigations. |
did not have further details. |
The exploit used in the attack appears to have been origi- |
5.1 FinSpy |
nally posted by a Kuwaiti user, njq8, on an Arabic-language |
exploit sharing site [65]. We contacted njq8, who told us Identifying and linking servers: We developed a number |
that he had obtained the exploit elsewhere and modified it of fingerprints for identifying FinSpy servers using HTTP- |
prior to posting. The attack downloaded an instance of based probing as well as FinSpy |
s custom TLV-based proto- |
SpyNet from isteeler.com (which from our inspection did col. We leveraged quirks such as specific non-compliance |
not appear to have any legitimate content), which used the with RFC 2616, responses to certain types of invalid data, |
C&C storge.myftp.org. This same C&C occurred in an- and the presence of signatures such as the bizarre |
Hallo |
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