clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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samples and campaigns we observed again increased, includ-
ing the recent targeting of NGO workers per Figure 3. We are
aware of only a negligible number of cases of the opposition
using similar RATs against Syrian Government supporters, al-
though evidence exists of other kinds of electronic attacks by
third parties.
Real world consequences. The logistics and activities of
Syria
s numerous opposition groups are intentionally concealed
from public view to protect both their efficacy, and the lives of
people participating in them. Nevertheless, Syrian opposition
members are generally familiar with stories off digital compro- Figure 4: The fake Skype program distracts the victim
mises of high-profile figures, including those entrusted with the with the promise of encrypted communications while in-
most sensitive roles, as well as rank-and-file members. Com- fecting their machine with DarkComet.
promise of operational security poses a documented threat to
life both for victims of electronic compromise, and to family
members and associates.
The Syrian conflict is ongoing, making it difficult to assem-
7
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
517
ble comprehensive evidence of linkages between government UAE Gov't HackingTeam 3-Stage
Exploit Kit
actors and malware campaigns. Moreover, many individuals owner.no-ip.biz
whose identities have been compromised are in prison or oth-
erwise disappeared, and thus unable to relate the evidence pre- CVE-2010-3333
sented to them during interrogation. Still, strong circumstantial
evidence links the use of RATs, phishing, and government ac-

wikileaks
Xtreme RAT
tivity, which we briefly summarize here: (1) many Syrians have RCS
veryimportant
recounted to journalists and the authors how interrogators con-
fronted them with material from their computers. For example:
The policeman told me,
Do you remember when
you were talking to your friend and you told him
you had something wrong [sic] and paid a lot of Author
money? At that time we were taking information ar-24.com Communicated
via E-Mail
from your laptop.
[41]
(2) Syrian activists have supplied cases to international journal-
ists [41], where arrests are quickly followed by the social me- Ahmed
Laptop
infected
dia accounts of detained individuals seeding malware to contact E-Mail account
lists (Figure 3). (3) Finally, despite the notoriety of the attack compromised
campaigns, including mention of C&C IPs in international me-
dia [45], the Syrian government has made no public statements
about these campaigns nor acted to shut down the servers. Figure 5: Part of the ecosystem of UAE surveillance at-
Beyond the ongoing challenges of attribution, these malware tacks.
campaigns have a tangible impact on the Syrian opposition, and
generally align with the interests of the Syrian government
s from ar-24.com, which in turn downloaded spyware from
propaganda operations. The case of Abdul Razzaq Tlass, a ar-24.com. We denote this combination as the 3-Stage Ex-
leader in the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative of the potential ploit Kit in Figure 5.
uses of such campaigns. In 2012 a string of videos emerged The C&C server also ran on ar-24.com. When we ob-
showing Tlass sexting and engaged in lewd activity in front of tained the sample in July 2012, ar-24.com resolved to an
a webcam [49]. While he denied the videos, the harm to his rep- IP address on Linode, a hosting provider. Three months later, it
utation was substantial and he was eventually replaced [50]. resolved to a UAE address belonging to the Royal Group [52],
an organization linked to the UAE government; it is chaired by
Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al-Nayhan, a member of the UAE
4.3 UAE
ruling family and a son of the founder of the UAE.
While the UAE has experienced no recent uprising or politi- Identification as RCS: We identified strings in memory
cal unrest, it has nevertheless cracked down on its opposition, that matched those in a Symantec analysis [53] of RCS (also
concurrent with the Arab Spring. known as DaVinci or Crisis), a product of the Italian com-
The first attacks we observed in the UAE involved a pany Hacking Team [54]. We also located a structurally sim-
government-grade
lawful interception
trojan known as Re- ilar Word document via VirusTotal. The document used the
mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- same exploit and attempted to download a second stage from
ing Team. The associated C&C server indicated direct UAE rcs-demo.hackingteam.it, which was unavailable at
government involvement. Over time, we stopped receiving the time of testing.
RCS samples from UAE targets, and instead observed a shift Analysis of capabilities: RCS has a suite of functionality
to the use of off-the-shelf RATs, and possible involvement of largely similar to FinSpy. One difference was in the vectors
cyber-mercenary groups. However, poor attacker operational used to install the spyware. We located additional samples (see
security allowed us to link most observed attacks together.
5), some of which were embedded in a .jar file that installs
an OS-appropriate version of RCS (Windows or OSX), option-
RCS. UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor (per Figure 5), impris- ally using an exploit. If embedded as an applet, and no exploit
oned from April to November 2011 after signing an online pro- is present, Java displays a security warning and asks the user
democracy petition [51], received an e-mail purportedly from whether they authorize the installation. We also saw instances
Arabic Wikileaks
in July 2012. He opened the associated at- of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit where the first stage contained a
tachment,
veryimportant.doc,
and saw what he described as Flash exploit; in some cases, we could obtain all stages and
scrambled letters
. He forwarded us the e-mail for investiga- confirm that these installed RCS. Some samples were packed
tion. with the MPress packer [55], and some Windows samples were
The attachment exploited CVE-2010-3333, an RTF pars- obfuscated to look like the PuTTY SSH client.
ing vulnerability in Microsoft Office. The document did not Another difference is in persistence. For example, the RCS
contain any bait content, and part of the malformed RTF sample sent to Ahmed adds a Run registry key, whereas the
that triggered the exploit was displayed in the document. FinSpy samples used in Bahrain overwrite the hard disk
s boot
The exploit loaded shellcode that downloaded a second stage sector to modify the boot process; the spyware is loaded be-

samples and campaigns we observed again increased, includ-

ing the recent targeting of NGO workers per Figure 3. We are

aware of only a negligible number of cases of the opposition

using similar RATs against Syrian Government supporters, al-

though evidence exists of other kinds of electronic attacks by

third parties.

Real world consequences. The logistics and activities of

Syria

s numerous opposition groups are intentionally concealed

from public view to protect both their efficacy, and the lives of

people participating in them. Nevertheless, Syrian opposition

members are generally familiar with stories off digital compro- Figure 4: The fake Skype program distracts the victim

mises of high-profile figures, including those entrusted with the with the promise of encrypted communications while in-

most sensitive roles, as well as rank-and-file members. Com- fecting their machine with DarkComet.

promise of operational security poses a documented threat to

life both for victims of electronic compromise, and to family

members and associates.

The Syrian conflict is ongoing, making it difficult to assem-

7

USENIX Association

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

517

ble comprehensive evidence of linkages between government UAE Gov't HackingTeam 3-Stage

Exploit Kit

actors and malware campaigns. Moreover, many individuals owner.no-ip.biz

whose identities have been compromised are in prison or oth-

erwise disappeared, and thus unable to relate the evidence pre- CVE-2010-3333

sented to them during interrogation. Still, strong circumstantial

evidence links the use of RATs, phishing, and government ac-

wikileaks

Xtreme RAT

tivity, which we briefly summarize here: (1) many Syrians have RCS

veryimportant

recounted to journalists and the authors how interrogators con-

fronted them with material from their computers. For example:

The policeman told me,

Do you remember when

you were talking to your friend and you told him

you had something wrong [sic] and paid a lot of Author

money? At that time we were taking information ar-24.com Communicated

via E-Mail

from your laptop.

[41]

(2) Syrian activists have supplied cases to international journal-

ists [41], where arrests are quickly followed by the social me- Ahmed

Laptop

infected

dia accounts of detained individuals seeding malware to contact E-Mail account

lists (Figure 3). (3) Finally, despite the notoriety of the attack compromised

campaigns, including mention of C&C IPs in international me-

dia [45], the Syrian government has made no public statements

about these campaigns nor acted to shut down the servers. Figure 5: Part of the ecosystem of UAE surveillance at-

Beyond the ongoing challenges of attribution, these malware tacks.

campaigns have a tangible impact on the Syrian opposition, and

generally align with the interests of the Syrian government

s from ar-24.com, which in turn downloaded spyware from

propaganda operations. The case of Abdul Razzaq Tlass, a ar-24.com. We denote this combination as the 3-Stage Ex-

leader in the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative of the potential ploit Kit in Figure 5.

uses of such campaigns. In 2012 a string of videos emerged The C&C server also ran on ar-24.com. When we ob-

showing Tlass sexting and engaged in lewd activity in front of tained the sample in July 2012, ar-24.com resolved to an

a webcam [49]. While he denied the videos, the harm to his rep- IP address on Linode, a hosting provider. Three months later, it

utation was substantial and he was eventually replaced [50]. resolved to a UAE address belonging to the Royal Group [52],

an organization linked to the UAE government; it is chaired by

Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al-Nayhan, a member of the UAE

4.3 UAE

ruling family and a son of the founder of the UAE.

While the UAE has experienced no recent uprising or politi- Identification as RCS: We identified strings in memory

cal unrest, it has nevertheless cracked down on its opposition, that matched those in a Symantec analysis [53] of RCS (also

concurrent with the Arab Spring. known as DaVinci or Crisis), a product of the Italian com-

The first attacks we observed in the UAE involved a pany Hacking Team [54]. We also located a structurally sim-

government-grade

lawful interception

trojan known as Re- ilar Word document via VirusTotal. The document used the

mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- same exploit and attempted to download a second stage from

ing Team. The associated C&C server indicated direct UAE rcs-demo.hackingteam.it, which was unavailable at

government involvement. Over time, we stopped receiving the time of testing.

RCS samples from UAE targets, and instead observed a shift Analysis of capabilities: RCS has a suite of functionality

to the use of off-the-shelf RATs, and possible involvement of largely similar to FinSpy. One difference was in the vectors

cyber-mercenary groups. However, poor attacker operational used to install the spyware. We located additional samples (see

security allowed us to link most observed attacks together.

5), some of which were embedded in a .jar file that installs

an OS-appropriate version of RCS (Windows or OSX), option-

RCS. UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor (per Figure 5), impris- ally using an exploit. If embedded as an applet, and no exploit

oned from April to November 2011 after signing an online pro- is present, Java displays a security warning and asks the user

democracy petition [51], received an e-mail purportedly from whether they authorize the installation. We also saw instances

Arabic Wikileaks

in July 2012. He opened the associated at- of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit where the first stage contained a

tachment,

veryimportant.doc,

and saw what he described as Flash exploit; in some cases, we could obtain all stages and

scrambled letters

. He forwarded us the e-mail for investiga- confirm that these installed RCS. Some samples were packed

tion. with the MPress packer [55], and some Windows samples were

The attachment exploited CVE-2010-3333, an RTF pars- obfuscated to look like the PuTTY SSH client.

ing vulnerability in Microsoft Office. The document did not Another difference is in persistence. For example, the RCS

contain any bait content, and part of the malformed RTF sample sent to Ahmed adds a Run registry key, whereas the

that triggered the exploit was displayed in the document. FinSpy samples used in Bahrain overwrite the hard disk

s boot

The exploit loaded shellcode that downloaded a second stage sector to modify the boot process; the spyware is loaded be-