clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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s account to seed mal-
bers of the opposition know that some hacking is taking place. ware (
Aleppo Plan
) via (say) Skype messages to Victim(s)
As summarized in Table 3, the attacks often include fake or ma- Bn . In the cases of Opp. Member C and NGO Worker
liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or D (here, actual victims, not abstract), targeting was by e-mail
movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons). The from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in-
seeding techniques and bait files suggest a good understanding dicating a potential compromise. One domain remains active,
of the opposition
s needs, fears and behavior, coupled with ba- hosting a website of the Salafist Al-Nusra front [46], while the
sic familiarity with off-the-shelf RATs. In some cases attacks other appears dormant. Opp. Member C received a malicious
occur in a context that points to a more direct connection to file as an e-mail attachment, while NGO Worker D was sent a
one of the belligerents: the Syrian opposition has regularly ob- shortened link (url[.]no/Uu5) to a download from a directory
served that detainees
accounts begin seeding malware shortly of Mrconstrucciones[.]net,7 a site that may have been com-
after their arrest by government forces [41]. promised. Both attacks resulted in an Xtreme RAT infection.
Researchers and security professionals have already profiled Interestingly, in the case of the fake Skype encryption
many of these RATs, including DarkComet [42, 43], Black- the deception extended to a YouTube video from
IT Se-
shades Remote Controller [38], Xtreme RAT [44], njRAT [26], curity Lab
[47] demonstrating the program
s purported ca-
and ShadowTech [36]. Some are available for purchase by any- pabilities, as well as a website promoting the tool, skype-
one, in contrast to
government only
FinSpy and RCS. For ex- encryption.sytes.net. The attackers also constructed a ba-
ample, Xtreme RAT retails for e350, while a version of Black- sic, faux GUI for their
Encryption
program (see Figure 4).
shades lists for e40. Others, like DarkComet, are free. We The fake GUI has a number of non-functional buttons like
have also observed cracked versions of these RATs on Arabic- crypt
and
DeCrypt,
which generate fake prompts. While dis-
language hacker forums, making them available with little ef- tracted by this meaningless interaction, the victim
s machine is
fort and no payment trail. While the RATs are cheaper and less infected with DarkComet 3.3 [32, 33].
Anecdotally, campaign volume appears to track significant
6 YahooMail and the iPhone mail client automatically load these re-
mote images, especially in e-mails spoofed from trusted senders. 7 Obfuscated to avoid accidental clicks on active malware URLs.
6
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
USENIX Association
Type Features Examples (RATs)
Security tools Executable files presented as a
tool
often accompanied by justifica-
Skype Encryption
(DC) [32, 33],
Facebook Security
(cus-
tions or statements of its value in the targeted seeding, for example on tom) [34], Anti-hacker (DC) [35], Fake Freegate VPN (ST) [36]
a social media site, at the download location, or in videos
Ideologically or A document or PE as download or attachment with accompanying en-
Names of individuals wanted by the Regime,
(DC)
Aleppo
movement-relevant couragement to open or act on the material, often masquerading as [uprising] Plan
(DC) [37], important video (BS) [38],
Hama
files legitimate PDF documents or inadvertently leaked regime programs. Rebels Council
document (DC) [39],
wanted persons
Frequent use of RLO to disguise true extension (such as .exe or database frontend (custom), movement relevant video (njRAT),
.scr) file about the Free Syrian Army (Xtreme RAT)
Miscellaneous tools Tools pretending to offer functionality relevant to the opposition, such hack facebook pro v6.9 (DC) [40]
as a fake tool claiming to
mass report
regime pages on Facebook
Table 3: Campaigns and RATs employed in Syrian surveillance. BS = Blackshades, DC = DarkComet, ST = Shad-
owTech.

Skype
SY Malware tn1.linkpc.net skype-encription Encryption
Xtreme Rat Mrconstrucciones.net Url.no
Actors .sytes.net
[email protected] [email protected]
216.6.0.28 fsa.zip
Dark Comet
SY Gov't Account seeds

Aleppo Plan
E-Mail E-Mail
Victim A Credentials
Arrested
gained

Aleppo Plan
Victim(s) Bn Clicks Opp. Member C NGO Worker D
file Account seeds

Aleppo Plan
Figure 3: A sample from the ecosystem of Syrian malware campaigns.
events in the ongoing conflict. For example, campaigns dwin-
dled and then rebounded within hours after Syria
s 2012 Inter-
net shutdown [48]. Similarly, activity observed by the authors
also dwindled prior to expectation of US-led military action
against Syrian government targets in September 2013. Once
this option appeared to be off the table, the volume of new

s account to seed mal-

bers of the opposition know that some hacking is taking place. ware (

Aleppo Plan

) via (say) Skype messages to Victim(s)

As summarized in Table 3, the attacks often include fake or ma- Bn . In the cases of Opp. Member C and NGO Worker

liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or D (here, actual victims, not abstract), targeting was by e-mail

movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons). The from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in-

seeding techniques and bait files suggest a good understanding dicating a potential compromise. One domain remains active,

of the opposition

s needs, fears and behavior, coupled with ba- hosting a website of the Salafist Al-Nusra front [46], while the

sic familiarity with off-the-shelf RATs. In some cases attacks other appears dormant. Opp. Member C received a malicious

occur in a context that points to a more direct connection to file as an e-mail attachment, while NGO Worker D was sent a

one of the belligerents: the Syrian opposition has regularly ob- shortened link (url[.]no/Uu5) to a download from a directory

served that detainees

accounts begin seeding malware shortly of Mrconstrucciones[.]net,7 a site that may have been com-

after their arrest by government forces [41]. promised. Both attacks resulted in an Xtreme RAT infection.

Researchers and security professionals have already profiled Interestingly, in the case of the fake Skype encryption

many of these RATs, including DarkComet [42, 43], Black- the deception extended to a YouTube video from

IT Se-

shades Remote Controller [38], Xtreme RAT [44], njRAT [26], curity Lab

[47] demonstrating the program

s purported ca-

and ShadowTech [36]. Some are available for purchase by any- pabilities, as well as a website promoting the tool, skype-

one, in contrast to

government only

FinSpy and RCS. For ex- encryption.sytes.net. The attackers also constructed a ba-

ample, Xtreme RAT retails for e350, while a version of Black- sic, faux GUI for their

Encryption

program (see Figure 4).

shades lists for e40. Others, like DarkComet, are free. We The fake GUI has a number of non-functional buttons like

have also observed cracked versions of these RATs on Arabic- crypt

and

DeCrypt,

which generate fake prompts. While dis-

language hacker forums, making them available with little ef- tracted by this meaningless interaction, the victim

s machine is

fort and no payment trail. While the RATs are cheaper and less infected with DarkComet 3.3 [32, 33].

Anecdotally, campaign volume appears to track significant

6 YahooMail and the iPhone mail client automatically load these re-

mote images, especially in e-mails spoofed from trusted senders. 7 Obfuscated to avoid accidental clicks on active malware URLs.

6

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

USENIX Association

Type Features Examples (RATs)

Security tools Executable files presented as a

tool

often accompanied by justifica-

Skype Encryption

(DC) [32, 33],

Facebook Security

(cus-

tions or statements of its value in the targeted seeding, for example on tom) [34], Anti-hacker (DC) [35], Fake Freegate VPN (ST) [36]

a social media site, at the download location, or in videos

Ideologically or A document or PE as download or attachment with accompanying en-

Names of individuals wanted by the Regime,

(DC)

Aleppo

movement-relevant couragement to open or act on the material, often masquerading as [uprising] Plan

(DC) [37], important video (BS) [38],

Hama

files legitimate PDF documents or inadvertently leaked regime programs. Rebels Council

document (DC) [39],

wanted persons

Frequent use of RLO to disguise true extension (such as .exe or database frontend (custom), movement relevant video (njRAT),

.scr) file about the Free Syrian Army (Xtreme RAT)

Miscellaneous tools Tools pretending to offer functionality relevant to the opposition, such hack facebook pro v6.9 (DC) [40]

as a fake tool claiming to

mass report

regime pages on Facebook

Table 3: Campaigns and RATs employed in Syrian surveillance. BS = Blackshades, DC = DarkComet, ST = Shad-

owTech.

Skype

SY Malware tn1.linkpc.net skype-encription Encryption

Xtreme Rat Mrconstrucciones.net Url.no

Actors .sytes.net

[email protected] [email protected]

216.6.0.28 fsa.zip

Dark Comet

SY Gov't Account seeds

Aleppo Plan

E-Mail E-Mail

Victim A Credentials

Arrested

gained

Aleppo Plan

Victim(s) Bn Clicks Opp. Member C NGO Worker D

file Account seeds

Aleppo Plan

Figure 3: A sample from the ecosystem of Syrian malware campaigns.

events in the ongoing conflict. For example, campaigns dwin-

dled and then rebounded within hours after Syria

s 2012 Inter-

net shutdown [48]. Similarly, activity observed by the authors

also dwindled prior to expectation of US-led military action

against Syrian government targets in September 2013. Once

this option appeared to be off the table, the volume of new