clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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We searched sources including Shodan, 5 Internet Census
about Omani poetry, which talked to a C&C in the UK. (3) 7
service probes [73], and Critical.IO scanning data [68] for the
IP addresses belonging to Maroc Telecom. Moroccan journal-
observed distinctive HTTP behavior. We searched for the dis-
ists at Mamfakinch.com were previously targeted by RCS in
tinctive SSL certificates in two Internet Census service probes,
2012 [77]. (4) Overall, servers in 8 countries with governments
and SSL certificate scans from ZMap [74]. We also contacted a
deemed
authoritarian regimes
[69]: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
team at TU Munich [75], who applied our fingerprints to their
Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, Uzbekistan.
SSL scanning data. Across all of these sources, we obtained
Link to Hacking Team: All active servers match-
31,345 indicator hits reflecting 555 IP addresses in 48 coun-
ing one of our signatures also responded peculiarly when
tries.
queried with particular ill-formed HTTP requests, respond-
One SSL certificate returned by 175 of the servers was issued
ing with
HTTP1/1 400 Bad request
(should be
/CN=RCS Certification Authority /O=HT srl,
apparently

HTTP/1.1
) and a body of
Detected error: HTTP
referring to the name of the spyware and the company. Servers
code 400
. Googling for this response yielded a GitHub
for 5 of our FSBSpy samples and 2 of our RCS samples re-
project em-http-server [78], a Ruby-based webserver.
sponded with this type of certificate.
The project
s author is listed as Alberto Ornaghi, a software
Some servers returned these certificates in chains that in-
architect at Hacking Team. We suspect that the Hacking Team
cluded another distinctive certificate. We found 175 distinct IP
C&C server code may incorporate code from this project.
addresses (including the C&C
s for 5 of our FSBSpy samples
Links between servers: We identified many cases where
and 2 of our RCS samples) responded with this second type of
several servers hosted by different providers, and in different
certificate.
countries, returned identical SSL certificates matching our fin-
We devised two more indicators: one that matched 125 IP
gerprints. We also observed 30 active servers used a global
addresses, including 7 of our FSBSpy samples
C&C
s, and
IPID. Only one active server had neither a global IPID nor
one that matched 2 IP addresses, in Italy and Kazakhstan.
Server locations: On 11/4/13 we probed all of the IP ad- 8 19 of the 42 Linode servers were hosted in the USA, so the two
dresses that we collected, finding 166 active addresses match- patterns of prevalence are mostly distinct.
11
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
521
an SSL certificate matching our fingerprints. We assessed ing 11 cases in which they appeared to be used in countries
whether servers returning SSL certificates were forwarding to governed by
authoritarian regimes.
the servers with global IPIDs by inducing bursts of traffic at the We aim with this work to inspire additional research efforts
former and monitoring the IPID at the latter. For 11 servers, addressing the difficult problem of how to adequately protect
we found that the server
s activity correlated to bursts sent to individuals with very limited resources facing very powerful
other servers We grouped servers by the SSL certificates they adversaries. Open questions include robust, practical detection
returned, and found that each group forwarded to only a sin- of targeted attacks designed to exfiltrate data from a victim
gle server, except for one case where a group forwarded to two computer, as well as detection of and defense against novel at-
different IPs (both in Morocco). We also found two groups tack vectors, like tampering with Internet connections to insert
that forwarded to the same address. There was a 1:1 mapping malware.
between the remaining 8 addresses and groups. We refer to a The task is highly challenging, but the potential stakes are
group along with the server(s) it forwards to as a server group. likewise very high. An opposition member, reflecting on gov-
We identified several server groups that may be associated with ernment hacking in Libya, speculated as to why some users
victims or operators in a certain country. Some of these suggest would execute files even while recognizing them as potentially
possible further investigation: malicious [2]:
If we were vulnerable we couldn
t care less . . .
Turkey: We identified a group containing 20 servers in 9 we were desperate to get our voices out . . . it was a matter of
countries. Two RCS and 5 FSBSpy samples from VirusTo- life or death . . . it was just vital to get this information out.
tal communicated with various servers in the group. The RCS
samples also communicated with domains with lapsed registra-
Acknowledgment
tions, so we registered them to observe incoming traffic. We ex-
clusively received RCS traffic from Turkish IP addresses. (RCS This work was supported by the National Science Foundation
traffic is identifiable based on a distinctive user agent and URL under grants 1223717 and 1237265, and by a Citizen Lab Fel-
in POST requests.) A sample of FSBSpy apparently installed lowship. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom-
from an exploit on a Turkish server talked to one of the servers mendations expressed in this material are those of the authors
in this group.[79] and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.
We also found server groups containing servers in Uzbek- The authors would like to thank the following individuals
istan and Kazakhstan; we found FSBSpy samples on Virus- for their help in various aspects of our analysis: Bernhard Am-
Total uploaded from these countries that communicated with man, Collin D. Anderson, Brandon Dixon, Zakir Durumeric,
servers in these groups. Eva Galperin, Claudio Guarnieri, Drew Hintz, Ralph Holz,
In the above cases, save Turkey, the country we have identi- Shane Huntley, Andrew Lyons, Mark Schloesser, and Nicholas
fied is classified as an
authoritarian regime,
and may be using Weaver.

We searched sources including Shodan, 5 Internet Census

about Omani poetry, which talked to a C&C in the UK. (3) 7

service probes [73], and Critical.IO scanning data [68] for the

IP addresses belonging to Maroc Telecom. Moroccan journal-

observed distinctive HTTP behavior. We searched for the dis-

ists at Mamfakinch.com were previously targeted by RCS in

tinctive SSL certificates in two Internet Census service probes,

2012 [77]. (4) Overall, servers in 8 countries with governments

and SSL certificate scans from ZMap [74]. We also contacted a

deemed

authoritarian regimes

[69]: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

team at TU Munich [75], who applied our fingerprints to their

Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, Uzbekistan.

SSL scanning data. Across all of these sources, we obtained

Link to Hacking Team: All active servers match-

31,345 indicator hits reflecting 555 IP addresses in 48 coun-

ing one of our signatures also responded peculiarly when

tries.

queried with particular ill-formed HTTP requests, respond-

One SSL certificate returned by 175 of the servers was issued

ing with

HTTP1/1 400 Bad request

(should be

/CN=RCS Certification Authority /O=HT srl,

apparently

HTTP/1.1

) and a body of

Detected error: HTTP

referring to the name of the spyware and the company. Servers

code 400

. Googling for this response yielded a GitHub

for 5 of our FSBSpy samples and 2 of our RCS samples re-

project em-http-server [78], a Ruby-based webserver.

sponded with this type of certificate.

The project

s author is listed as Alberto Ornaghi, a software

Some servers returned these certificates in chains that in-

architect at Hacking Team. We suspect that the Hacking Team

cluded another distinctive certificate. We found 175 distinct IP

C&C server code may incorporate code from this project.

addresses (including the C&C

s for 5 of our FSBSpy samples

Links between servers: We identified many cases where

and 2 of our RCS samples) responded with this second type of

several servers hosted by different providers, and in different

certificate.

countries, returned identical SSL certificates matching our fin-

We devised two more indicators: one that matched 125 IP

gerprints. We also observed 30 active servers used a global

addresses, including 7 of our FSBSpy samples

C&C

s, and

IPID. Only one active server had neither a global IPID nor

one that matched 2 IP addresses, in Italy and Kazakhstan.

Server locations: On 11/4/13 we probed all of the IP ad- 8 19 of the 42 Linode servers were hosted in the USA, so the two

dresses that we collected, finding 166 active addresses match- patterns of prevalence are mostly distinct.

11

USENIX Association

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

521

an SSL certificate matching our fingerprints. We assessed ing 11 cases in which they appeared to be used in countries

whether servers returning SSL certificates were forwarding to governed by

authoritarian regimes.

the servers with global IPIDs by inducing bursts of traffic at the We aim with this work to inspire additional research efforts

former and monitoring the IPID at the latter. For 11 servers, addressing the difficult problem of how to adequately protect

we found that the server

s activity correlated to bursts sent to individuals with very limited resources facing very powerful

other servers We grouped servers by the SSL certificates they adversaries. Open questions include robust, practical detection

returned, and found that each group forwarded to only a sin- of targeted attacks designed to exfiltrate data from a victim

gle server, except for one case where a group forwarded to two computer, as well as detection of and defense against novel at-

different IPs (both in Morocco). We also found two groups tack vectors, like tampering with Internet connections to insert

that forwarded to the same address. There was a 1:1 mapping malware.

between the remaining 8 addresses and groups. We refer to a The task is highly challenging, but the potential stakes are

group along with the server(s) it forwards to as a server group. likewise very high. An opposition member, reflecting on gov-

We identified several server groups that may be associated with ernment hacking in Libya, speculated as to why some users

victims or operators in a certain country. Some of these suggest would execute files even while recognizing them as potentially

possible further investigation: malicious [2]:

If we were vulnerable we couldn

t care less . . .

Turkey: We identified a group containing 20 servers in 9 we were desperate to get our voices out . . . it was a matter of

countries. Two RCS and 5 FSBSpy samples from VirusTo- life or death . . . it was just vital to get this information out.

tal communicated with various servers in the group. The RCS

samples also communicated with domains with lapsed registra-

Acknowledgment

tions, so we registered them to observe incoming traffic. We ex-

clusively received RCS traffic from Turkish IP addresses. (RCS This work was supported by the National Science Foundation

traffic is identifiable based on a distinctive user agent and URL under grants 1223717 and 1237265, and by a Citizen Lab Fel-

in POST requests.) A sample of FSBSpy apparently installed lowship. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom-

from an exploit on a Turkish server talked to one of the servers mendations expressed in this material are those of the authors

in this group.[79] and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.

We also found server groups containing servers in Uzbek- The authors would like to thank the following individuals

istan and Kazakhstan; we found FSBSpy samples on Virus- for their help in various aspects of our analysis: Bernhard Am-

Total uploaded from these countries that communicated with man, Collin D. Anderson, Brandon Dixon, Zakir Durumeric,

servers in these groups. Eva Galperin, Claudio Guarnieri, Drew Hintz, Ralph Holz,

In the above cases, save Turkey, the country we have identi- Shane Huntley, Andrew Lyons, Mark Schloesser, and Nicholas

fied is classified as an

authoritarian regime,

and may be using Weaver.