clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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been masked by using proxies or botnets that are located across the globe. Neither NATO
nor European Commission experts were able to find any proof of official Russian
government participation. Further, the Russian government denounced Estonia
s claims and
refused to participate in any type of investigation (Bright 2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber
War' 2008; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).
Debilitating Effect at a Low Cost
The effects of the cyber attacks were magnified as Estonia is one of the most internet-savvy
states in the European Union (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). The Estonian
government has pursued a paperless society, or e-government, and web-based banking.
Slowing down, or halting, banking services and newspaper outlets that rely on advertising
revenue strains the economy. This happens not only through a direct loss in revenue, but also
with a reduction in productivity, lost efficiency, diverting resources, escalating frustration,
and lost consumer and investor confidence. Estonia also uses the internet to elect
parliamentary officials, file their taxes and, via mobile phone, shop or pay for parking. In
some cases, website administrators simply blocked access from foreign states. While this
was effective in curbing the attacks, it completely cut off banking services to Estonians
outside of the country, vital to Estonian business people abroad. Spam emails inundated
government officials
inboxes, halting online communication from the Parliament
s email
server. Officials closed off large portions of their network to keep more vital areas online. A
government briefing site was given high priority while the president
s website was sacrificed.
The 10 largest swarms of data requests by the hackers absorbed 90 megabits per second for
up to 10 hours each, straining Estonia
s networks. It was
equivalent to downloading the
entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 hours
(Landler and Markoff
2007). The cyber attacks on Estonia came close to shutting down the country
s digital
infrastructure. While these may seem more of a disruption than a collapse, the effects radiate
out into society (Bright 2007; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
The month-long campaign caused companies to put resources into alternative infrastructure,
such as going back to traditional mail, relying on telephones, fax, and libraries, and reenforcing alternative methods of payment. As well as the cost of material infrastructure,
these type of cyber attacks cause a loss in productivity. This includes paying more people to
staff bank tellers, increased traffic on the streets, and long lines at retail outlets. Newspaper
outlets, telephone companies, and product distributors, have grown accustomed to using
online tools, and now rely heavily on them. While this might be a boon for some industries,
the whole restructuring process weakens the nation in the short term. The cyber attacks are
comparable to the damage caused to industry (beyond tangible infrastructure) by flooding or
blizzards. It places a nation in a state of flux, and leaves it more vulnerable to a traditional
attack.
DDoS attacks offer an enemy country an effective low cost assault with high deniability. The
majority of attacks on Estonia were DDoS, clogging its servers, switches, and routers.
Analysis from Arbor Networks revealed thousands of bots were used against Estonia from
locations as diverse as the US, Vietnam, Peru, and China. The cost to a state wanting to
establish botnets is minimal, requiring only one person, an internet connection, and a basic
computer. While the information for conducting such attacks can be found online, it is more
likely someone with expertise, such as non-government hacker groups, would be involved in
securing the rental of a botnet. This still keeps the number at a minimum, and hackers can
find alternative ways to fund the rental of servers with high bandwidth, such as credit card
theft (Waterman 2007; The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).
Deniability
Determining the source of DDoS attacks is a difficult task, as they can be conducted with
proxies or botnets. Even if an IP address is obtained, there is no certainty that that was the
true source of the attack and not one link in a chain of computers or simply a compromised
computer being used unbeknownst to the owner. Message boards and chat rooms located on
Russian websites served as a meeting place for attackers, a place to coordinate their time of
attack, discuss targets, and recruit others. Because these individuals can be scattered across
the globe, it is difficult to assign a group identity to them. The web host may not be aware
that plans are being laid on their website, or they may not realise the scope of such plans.
These discussions can appear as a childish prank, overshadowing the serious repercussions of
the actions taking place, with no individual feeling responsible to put a stop to it.
The Estonia cyber attacks raised debate as to whether they were sponsored by the Russian
government. Some believed the attacks were too sophisticated to be the work of individuals
or even organised crime. Others believed the attacks were endorsed and guided by the
Russian government, but thought they were not directly involved
using online operatives
and media warfare as mentioned in IO. Russia has been accused in the past of sponsoring
web brigades
- cyber attack teams - that conduct PSYOPS, disinformation, spamming, and
cyber bullying, such as revealing an enemy
s personal details (Polyanskaya 2006). From the
perspective of officials from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the
Pentagon
s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the attacks were not conducted by
sophisticated means, nor were they state-sponsored. The attackers used commercially
available off-the-shelf computers and scripts that are readily available on the internet
(Waterman 2007). Data from the Arbor Networks Active Threat Level Analysis System
(ATLAS) indicated that the attacks were conducted by multiple distributed botnets which
appeared to have been acting independently (Kerner 2007). Even if the attacks were traced to
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Russian government computers there was no certainty that those computers had not been
taken over by remote hackers. It would also seem foolish for the Russian government to use
its own computers for such an attack, especially when it has the expertise to mask its identity,
unless doing so was masking its identity (knowing that you know I know). Johannes Ullrich,
chief research officer of the Bethesda, stated:
Attributing a distributed denial-of-service
attack like this to a government is hard. It may as well be a group of bot herders showing
patriotism, kind of like what we had with Web defacements during the US-China spy-plane
crisis [in 2001]
(Brenner 2007).
As evidence of the Estonia case continued to be examined, the consensus was that the

been masked by using proxies or botnets that are located across the globe. Neither NATO

nor European Commission experts were able to find any proof of official Russian

government participation. Further, the Russian government denounced Estonia

s claims and

refused to participate in any type of investigation (Bright 2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber

War' 2008; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).

Debilitating Effect at a Low Cost

The effects of the cyber attacks were magnified as Estonia is one of the most internet-savvy

states in the European Union (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). The Estonian

government has pursued a paperless society, or e-government, and web-based banking.

Slowing down, or halting, banking services and newspaper outlets that rely on advertising

revenue strains the economy. This happens not only through a direct loss in revenue, but also

with a reduction in productivity, lost efficiency, diverting resources, escalating frustration,

and lost consumer and investor confidence. Estonia also uses the internet to elect

parliamentary officials, file their taxes and, via mobile phone, shop or pay for parking. In

some cases, website administrators simply blocked access from foreign states. While this

was effective in curbing the attacks, it completely cut off banking services to Estonians

outside of the country, vital to Estonian business people abroad. Spam emails inundated

government officials

inboxes, halting online communication from the Parliament

s email

server. Officials closed off large portions of their network to keep more vital areas online. A

government briefing site was given high priority while the president

s website was sacrificed.

The 10 largest swarms of data requests by the hackers absorbed 90 megabits per second for

up to 10 hours each, straining Estonia

s networks. It was

equivalent to downloading the

entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 hours

(Landler and Markoff

2007). The cyber attacks on Estonia came close to shutting down the country

s digital

infrastructure. While these may seem more of a disruption than a collapse, the effects radiate

out into society (Bright 2007; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

The month-long campaign caused companies to put resources into alternative infrastructure,

such as going back to traditional mail, relying on telephones, fax, and libraries, and reenforcing alternative methods of payment. As well as the cost of material infrastructure,

these type of cyber attacks cause a loss in productivity. This includes paying more people to

staff bank tellers, increased traffic on the streets, and long lines at retail outlets. Newspaper

outlets, telephone companies, and product distributors, have grown accustomed to using

online tools, and now rely heavily on them. While this might be a boon for some industries,

the whole restructuring process weakens the nation in the short term. The cyber attacks are

comparable to the damage caused to industry (beyond tangible infrastructure) by flooding or

blizzards. It places a nation in a state of flux, and leaves it more vulnerable to a traditional

attack.

DDoS attacks offer an enemy country an effective low cost assault with high deniability. The

majority of attacks on Estonia were DDoS, clogging its servers, switches, and routers.

Analysis from Arbor Networks revealed thousands of bots were used against Estonia from

locations as diverse as the US, Vietnam, Peru, and China. The cost to a state wanting to

establish botnets is minimal, requiring only one person, an internet connection, and a basic

computer. While the information for conducting such attacks can be found online, it is more

likely someone with expertise, such as non-government hacker groups, would be involved in

securing the rental of a botnet. This still keeps the number at a minimum, and hackers can

find alternative ways to fund the rental of servers with high bandwidth, such as credit card

theft (Waterman 2007; The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).

Deniability

Determining the source of DDoS attacks is a difficult task, as they can be conducted with

proxies or botnets. Even if an IP address is obtained, there is no certainty that that was the

true source of the attack and not one link in a chain of computers or simply a compromised

computer being used unbeknownst to the owner. Message boards and chat rooms located on

Russian websites served as a meeting place for attackers, a place to coordinate their time of

attack, discuss targets, and recruit others. Because these individuals can be scattered across

the globe, it is difficult to assign a group identity to them. The web host may not be aware

that plans are being laid on their website, or they may not realise the scope of such plans.

These discussions can appear as a childish prank, overshadowing the serious repercussions of

the actions taking place, with no individual feeling responsible to put a stop to it.

The Estonia cyber attacks raised debate as to whether they were sponsored by the Russian

government. Some believed the attacks were too sophisticated to be the work of individuals

or even organised crime. Others believed the attacks were endorsed and guided by the

Russian government, but thought they were not directly involved

using online operatives

and media warfare as mentioned in IO. Russia has been accused in the past of sponsoring

web brigades

- cyber attack teams - that conduct PSYOPS, disinformation, spamming, and

cyber bullying, such as revealing an enemy

s personal details (Polyanskaya 2006). From the

perspective of officials from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the

Pentagon

s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the attacks were not conducted by

sophisticated means, nor were they state-sponsored. The attackers used commercially

available off-the-shelf computers and scripts that are readily available on the internet

(Waterman 2007). Data from the Arbor Networks Active Threat Level Analysis System

(ATLAS) indicated that the attacks were conducted by multiple distributed botnets which

appeared to have been acting independently (Kerner 2007). Even if the attacks were traced to

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Russian government computers there was no certainty that those computers had not been

taken over by remote hackers. It would also seem foolish for the Russian government to use

its own computers for such an attack, especially when it has the expertise to mask its identity,

unless doing so was masking its identity (knowing that you know I know). Johannes Ullrich,

chief research officer of the Bethesda, stated:

Attributing a distributed denial-of-service

attack like this to a government is hard. It may as well be a group of bot herders showing

patriotism, kind of like what we had with Web defacements during the US-China spy-plane

crisis [in 2001]

(Brenner 2007).

As evidence of the Estonia case continued to be examined, the consensus was that the