clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Leyden 2007, Tkacik 2007, Almeida
2006). Sensitive but non-classified data continues to be harvested; items such as emails and
the
names and other personal information on more than 1,500 employees
(Onley and Wait
2006). Attacks from Chinese ISPs have forced entire networks to be taken offline or
replaced. In 2005 alone,
the Pentagon logged more than 79,000 attempted intrusions
(Reid
2007). Cyber reconnaissance and attacks from Chinese IP addresses had become so frequent
and aggressive that US President George W. Bush raised the subject to Chinese President Hu
Jintao at the APEC summit in 2007.
The difficulty of attribution in cyber attacks, such as proxies, botnets, non-state-sponsored
hackers, and a lack of legal framework to pursue them, means these attacks may not have
come from China; however the accusations alone are evidence that China will want to
develop a cyber warfare capability. China now has the world
s largest internet population, so
in terms of volume, China has the most targets to defend. Chinese officials have stated that
they are the victim of
massive and shocking losses of state and military secrets via the
Internet
(Leyden 2007). Foreign states wishing to use cyber warfare against the US may
recognise the focus being placed on China and use Chinese computers to conduct their own
reconnaissance and attacks by using botnets or proxies based there. Further, denouncements
by the US may indicate that retaliatory responses are in the works and that the US will use
allegations of Chinese incursions to bolster support for increasing US cyber warfare
capability, thereby putting China further behind in military competitiveness. Damage to
China
s soft power, particular in relation to ICT, may affect China
s economy by making
investors cautious and export controls/legal bureaucracy more stringent. PSYOPS campaigns
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
and media warfare, of the type outlined by the US Information Operations Roadmap
(discussed above), may help China regain its lost credibility. These are elements of cyber
warfare, but viewed as less offensive than reconnaissance and direct cyber3 attack.
Non-US Foreign Allegations
The US is not alone in accusing China of using cyber warfare. In 2007 and 2008, China was
publicly accused of hacking into government facilities by officials in Australia, France,
Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the UK (Basu 2008; Goodin 2008;
Ha 2008; Leyden 2007; Marquand 2007). The number of countries under Chinese attack
could be far greater as some may not know that they are under attack, may not wish to reveal
their weakness due to a loss of soft power and consumer confidence, or they do not wish to
upset China as a valuable trading partner. Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the
German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany
s domestic intelligence
agency) stated that
across the world the PRC is intensively gathering political, military,
corporate-strategic and scientific information in order to bridge their technological gaps as
quickly as possible
(Tkacik 2007).
Unlike HUMINT, cyber warfare provides a lack of definitive attribution, makes distance
nearly irrelevant, allows for the mass accumulation of data in a short span of time, and at a
small cost in comparison to traditional espionage or military activities. Cyber attacks, such as
an incident that shut down the UK House of Commons, may only be small scale test runs,
probing, or reconnaissance blunders, meaning that the true scope of cyber attack has yet to be
seen (Norton-Taylor 2007). Cyber reconnaissance appears to be the most beneficial tool of
cyber warfare. Beyond finding exploitation points in the military for future attack, the
commercial sector allows China the opportunity to skip generations of research and
development efforts, levelling the playing field in science and technology, and by association
boosting economic and military might. Chinese hackers have even gone after British
parliamentiary files on human rights issues, showing a potential interest in relation to soft
power, globalization, international condemnation, and the legal apparatus. As Unrestricted
Warfare has shown, there are no boundaries in relation to such military operations.
4. Case Studies: Estonia, Georgia and Chanology
The 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia and Project Chanology are examples of
large-scale cyber attacks. The Estonian attacks were the first to show how cyber attack
against a state provides a debilitating effect at a low cost, a lack of attribution, a lack of legal
framework in defence, world-wide attention, and may point to a new arm of traditional
attack. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was even more sophisticated and intense
than the Estonian case, showing the maturation of the process. Project Chanology reveals
how the collective masses can use online tools to emerge as a powerful force without a
central leadership. This can be harnessed by military power through the tactics described in
IO (Information Operations, see above). And as a matter of internal security, Chanologystyle movements must be carefully observed as they pose a non-traditional threat. Estonia
and Chanology are an emerging expression of warfare that is fuelled by new powers afforded
by the internet, but spills over into the real world, not only through financial loss and media
coverage (soft power), but also in the form of volatile protests, disruption, mob mentality, and
the capability of drawing governments and militaries into unwanted actions.
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Estonia
In 2007, the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era war memorial and bronze statue in
Tallinn, stating that the memorial symbolised Soviet occupation. The Russian government
condemned the relocation, claiming it was a tribute to those who fought in World War II.
The relocation sparked protests which resulted in 150 injuries, one death, and a month-long
cyber war campaign. Estonian websites including parliament, banks, ministries, schools, and
newspaper outlets were attacked with DDoS attacks and web page defacements. Some
websites also redirected users to images of Soviet soldiers and quotations from Martin Luther
King about resisting evil. Hackers who hit the ruling Reform Party's website left a fake
message that the Estonian prime minister and his government were asking for Russian
forgiveness and promising to return the statue to its original site (The Cyber Raiders Hitting
Estonia 2007).
These attacks garnered world-wide attention. The Russian government was directly accused
by media outlets and the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Russia had the motive and
the means for such an attack. However, there was no direct evidence to suggest that the
attacks were state-sponsored. There was evidence that some of the IP addresses used in the
attacks belonged to Russian government officials, and instructions on how to carry out cyber
warfare did circulate on Russian websites. However, the source of DDoS attacks could have

of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Leyden 2007, Tkacik 2007, Almeida

2006). Sensitive but non-classified data continues to be harvested; items such as emails and

the

names and other personal information on more than 1,500 employees

(Onley and Wait

2006). Attacks from Chinese ISPs have forced entire networks to be taken offline or

replaced. In 2005 alone,

the Pentagon logged more than 79,000 attempted intrusions

(Reid

2007). Cyber reconnaissance and attacks from Chinese IP addresses had become so frequent

and aggressive that US President George W. Bush raised the subject to Chinese President Hu

Jintao at the APEC summit in 2007.

The difficulty of attribution in cyber attacks, such as proxies, botnets, non-state-sponsored

hackers, and a lack of legal framework to pursue them, means these attacks may not have

come from China; however the accusations alone are evidence that China will want to

develop a cyber warfare capability. China now has the world

s largest internet population, so

in terms of volume, China has the most targets to defend. Chinese officials have stated that

they are the victim of

massive and shocking losses of state and military secrets via the

Internet

(Leyden 2007). Foreign states wishing to use cyber warfare against the US may

recognise the focus being placed on China and use Chinese computers to conduct their own

reconnaissance and attacks by using botnets or proxies based there. Further, denouncements

by the US may indicate that retaliatory responses are in the works and that the US will use

allegations of Chinese incursions to bolster support for increasing US cyber warfare

capability, thereby putting China further behind in military competitiveness. Damage to

China

s soft power, particular in relation to ICT, may affect China

s economy by making

investors cautious and export controls/legal bureaucracy more stringent. PSYOPS campaigns

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

and media warfare, of the type outlined by the US Information Operations Roadmap

(discussed above), may help China regain its lost credibility. These are elements of cyber

warfare, but viewed as less offensive than reconnaissance and direct cyber3 attack.

Non-US Foreign Allegations

The US is not alone in accusing China of using cyber warfare. In 2007 and 2008, China was

publicly accused of hacking into government facilities by officials in Australia, France,

Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the UK (Basu 2008; Goodin 2008;

Ha 2008; Leyden 2007; Marquand 2007). The number of countries under Chinese attack

could be far greater as some may not know that they are under attack, may not wish to reveal

their weakness due to a loss of soft power and consumer confidence, or they do not wish to

upset China as a valuable trading partner. Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the

German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany

s domestic intelligence

agency) stated that

across the world the PRC is intensively gathering political, military,

corporate-strategic and scientific information in order to bridge their technological gaps as

quickly as possible

(Tkacik 2007).

Unlike HUMINT, cyber warfare provides a lack of definitive attribution, makes distance

nearly irrelevant, allows for the mass accumulation of data in a short span of time, and at a

small cost in comparison to traditional espionage or military activities. Cyber attacks, such as

an incident that shut down the UK House of Commons, may only be small scale test runs,

probing, or reconnaissance blunders, meaning that the true scope of cyber attack has yet to be

seen (Norton-Taylor 2007). Cyber reconnaissance appears to be the most beneficial tool of

cyber warfare. Beyond finding exploitation points in the military for future attack, the

commercial sector allows China the opportunity to skip generations of research and

development efforts, levelling the playing field in science and technology, and by association

boosting economic and military might. Chinese hackers have even gone after British

parliamentiary files on human rights issues, showing a potential interest in relation to soft

power, globalization, international condemnation, and the legal apparatus. As Unrestricted

Warfare has shown, there are no boundaries in relation to such military operations.

4. Case Studies: Estonia, Georgia and Chanology

The 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia and Project Chanology are examples of

large-scale cyber attacks. The Estonian attacks were the first to show how cyber attack

against a state provides a debilitating effect at a low cost, a lack of attribution, a lack of legal

framework in defence, world-wide attention, and may point to a new arm of traditional

attack. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was even more sophisticated and intense

than the Estonian case, showing the maturation of the process. Project Chanology reveals

how the collective masses can use online tools to emerge as a powerful force without a

central leadership. This can be harnessed by military power through the tactics described in

IO (Information Operations, see above). And as a matter of internal security, Chanologystyle movements must be carefully observed as they pose a non-traditional threat. Estonia

and Chanology are an emerging expression of warfare that is fuelled by new powers afforded

by the internet, but spills over into the real world, not only through financial loss and media

coverage (soft power), but also in the form of volatile protests, disruption, mob mentality, and

the capability of drawing governments and militaries into unwanted actions.

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Estonia

In 2007, the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era war memorial and bronze statue in

Tallinn, stating that the memorial symbolised Soviet occupation. The Russian government

condemned the relocation, claiming it was a tribute to those who fought in World War II.

The relocation sparked protests which resulted in 150 injuries, one death, and a month-long

cyber war campaign. Estonian websites including parliament, banks, ministries, schools, and

newspaper outlets were attacked with DDoS attacks and web page defacements. Some

websites also redirected users to images of Soviet soldiers and quotations from Martin Luther

King about resisting evil. Hackers who hit the ruling Reform Party's website left a fake

message that the Estonian prime minister and his government were asking for Russian

forgiveness and promising to return the statue to its original site (The Cyber Raiders Hitting

Estonia 2007).

These attacks garnered world-wide attention. The Russian government was directly accused

by media outlets and the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Russia had the motive and

the means for such an attack. However, there was no direct evidence to suggest that the

attacks were state-sponsored. There was evidence that some of the IP addresses used in the

attacks belonged to Russian government officials, and instructions on how to carry out cyber

warfare did circulate on Russian websites. However, the source of DDoS attacks could have