clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
have come from across the globe and identifying and prosecting those responsible has proven
difficult (Greenberg 2007; Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas 2001).
These hackers have been able to steal classified data, such as naval codes, information on
missile guidance systems, personnel performance reports, weapons development, and
descriptions of the movement of equipment and personnel. Jonathan (
c0mrade
) James
downloaded $1.7 million worth of software used to control the International Space Station
life support. Dutch teenagers stole information on the Patriot rocket launching system, and
the Navy
s Tomahawk cruise missile, and tried to sell it to Iraqi officials during the Gulf War
Iraq thought it was a hoax and declined (Miklaszewski 1999). Hackers have
commandeered US commercial, educational, and military computers and used them in attacks
against other nations, including Taiwan. Hackers can cause an immense amount of damage
to a state, stealing information, deleting and changing files, transferring capital, and
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
destroying programs or entire networks (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from
Overseas 2001; Christensen 1999; Qian and Wang 1999).
In 2001 and 2002 Gary (
Solo
) McKinnon probed US Army, Navy, Air Force, Department
of Defence, and NASA computers causing $700,000 worth of damage, taking down a
network of 2,000 computers, accessing classified data, deleting and re-writing files. He
accomplished this on his own from his home in London using commercially available
software and a dial up connection. McKinnon claims he was searching for proof that the US
is hiding information about UFOs and an anti-gravity propulsion system. This illustrates the
relative ease with which intrusions can take place, the difficulty of determining whether or
not it is a state-sponsored action, and a lack of legal framework for timely response. With
such attacks occurring so frequently to vital industries, the US, with the largest military
budget in the world, has inevitably developed a means to defend against them, which by
association means they have also developed the means to conduct cyber reconnaissance and
cyber attacks itself. China, too, is the subject of frequent attacks, albeit less publicized, and it
will want to remain competitive with US military capabilities (Boyd 2008; Bruno 2008).
Titan Rain
A coordinated series of attacks against US installations are strong indicators that China is
developing a cyber warfare capability. The attacks which ran from 2003 to 2006 were
designated
Titan Rain
. They targeted US defence and aerospace installations, Sandia
National Laboratories, Lockheed Martin, Redstone Arsenal, the Department of Defense, and
NASA, gathering sensitive military data. The United Kingdom also reported being attacked
by the Titan Rain hackers. Much of the data stolen was not classified; however it was not
meant for public or foreign consumption, nor was it meant for unlicensed use. For example,
the US military
s classified data is typically not connected to the broader internet, but
sensitive information such as logistics support for the armed forces is. This can provide
valuable insight into field tested experience, as well as expose possible weaknesses to an
adversary (Brenner 2007; Espiner 2005).
In addition to the unauthorized gathering, the US is concerned that enough of this data could
be used to piece together a larger picture, one that would be considered classified. Among
the information gathered were
a stockpile of aerospace documents with hundreds of detailed
schematics about propulsion systems, solar panelling and fuel tanks for the Mars
Reconnaissance Orbiter . . . specs for the aviation-mission-planning system for Army
helicopters, as well as Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air
Force
(Thornburgh 2005). Although the majority of data appears to have been benign, its
massive quantity may one day prove to include items that the US deems classified at a later
date. These attacks could be a staging ground, testing US defences, for future operations of a
more serious nature.
Titan Rain demonstrated how China could use cyber warfare as an asymmetric tactic (Norton
Taylor 2007). Apparently, a team of hackers, estimated to number between 6 to 30, would
take control of US defence computers, copy everything on the hard drive within 30 minutes,
and send that data to zombie computers in South Korea, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, where it was
subsequently routed to computers in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The ability to
route the data makes it difficult to prove the attacker
s identity. While it is believed China
was responsible, there is no certainty that the data was not further routed to another location.
Additionally, those computers may have been under remote control by a separate
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
government, or the hackers may not have been state-sponsored. The attacks themselves were
not particularly sophisticated, requiring only minimal training with commercially available
products. The instructions on how to conduct such attacks are widely available on the
internet itself (Delio 2001). But attempts to identify the attackers would require the
burdensome task of sending covert agents to physically identify the source.
By using the virtual world, hackers are able to traverse great distances without leaving their
station. On the night of November 1, 2004, Titan Rain members scanned, broke into, and
retrieved data from defence installations in Arizona, Virginia, California, and Alabama (in
that order) all within a period of six hours. Once attackers gain control of US computers,
through methods such as Trojans, they can not only shut down the system, they can also
conduct attacks using those computers. This could be used to raise condemnation of the US,
as it would appear the US is attacking other states (Graham 2005; Thornburgh 2005). While
proof is non-existent, some US officials believe that the PLA was responsible (Norton-Taylor
2007). Chinese military doctrine repeatedly discusses
the importance of penetrating an
adversary's military logistics and personnel networks. Furthermore, the multiple intrusions
into what nuisance and criminal hackers would regard as boring, mundane networks-networks that do not offer the treasure trove of credit card numbers, bank accounts, and
identity data that criminal hackers typically seek-- suggest a military purpose
(Tkacik 2007).
Further Evidence of Build-up
Attacks under the code name Titan Rain have ceased. However, OSINT suggests that cyber
attacks from China persist. From 2005 to 2007, the US State Department, Bureau of Industry
and Security, DoD, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Homeland
Security, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and defence-related think
tanks had intrusions from Chinese ISPs (China
s Proliferation Practices and the Development

have come from across the globe and identifying and prosecting those responsible has proven

difficult (Greenberg 2007; Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas 2001).

These hackers have been able to steal classified data, such as naval codes, information on

missile guidance systems, personnel performance reports, weapons development, and

descriptions of the movement of equipment and personnel. Jonathan (

c0mrade

) James

downloaded $1.7 million worth of software used to control the International Space Station

life support. Dutch teenagers stole information on the Patriot rocket launching system, and

the Navy

s Tomahawk cruise missile, and tried to sell it to Iraqi officials during the Gulf War

Iraq thought it was a hoax and declined (Miklaszewski 1999). Hackers have

commandeered US commercial, educational, and military computers and used them in attacks

against other nations, including Taiwan. Hackers can cause an immense amount of damage

to a state, stealing information, deleting and changing files, transferring capital, and

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

destroying programs or entire networks (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from

Overseas 2001; Christensen 1999; Qian and Wang 1999).

In 2001 and 2002 Gary (

Solo

) McKinnon probed US Army, Navy, Air Force, Department

of Defence, and NASA computers causing $700,000 worth of damage, taking down a

network of 2,000 computers, accessing classified data, deleting and re-writing files. He

accomplished this on his own from his home in London using commercially available

software and a dial up connection. McKinnon claims he was searching for proof that the US

is hiding information about UFOs and an anti-gravity propulsion system. This illustrates the

relative ease with which intrusions can take place, the difficulty of determining whether or

not it is a state-sponsored action, and a lack of legal framework for timely response. With

such attacks occurring so frequently to vital industries, the US, with the largest military

budget in the world, has inevitably developed a means to defend against them, which by

association means they have also developed the means to conduct cyber reconnaissance and

cyber attacks itself. China, too, is the subject of frequent attacks, albeit less publicized, and it

will want to remain competitive with US military capabilities (Boyd 2008; Bruno 2008).

Titan Rain

A coordinated series of attacks against US installations are strong indicators that China is

developing a cyber warfare capability. The attacks which ran from 2003 to 2006 were

designated

Titan Rain

. They targeted US defence and aerospace installations, Sandia

National Laboratories, Lockheed Martin, Redstone Arsenal, the Department of Defense, and

NASA, gathering sensitive military data. The United Kingdom also reported being attacked

by the Titan Rain hackers. Much of the data stolen was not classified; however it was not

meant for public or foreign consumption, nor was it meant for unlicensed use. For example,

the US military

s classified data is typically not connected to the broader internet, but

sensitive information such as logistics support for the armed forces is. This can provide

valuable insight into field tested experience, as well as expose possible weaknesses to an

adversary (Brenner 2007; Espiner 2005).

In addition to the unauthorized gathering, the US is concerned that enough of this data could

be used to piece together a larger picture, one that would be considered classified. Among

the information gathered were

a stockpile of aerospace documents with hundreds of detailed

schematics about propulsion systems, solar panelling and fuel tanks for the Mars

Reconnaissance Orbiter . . . specs for the aviation-mission-planning system for Army

helicopters, as well as Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air

Force

(Thornburgh 2005). Although the majority of data appears to have been benign, its

massive quantity may one day prove to include items that the US deems classified at a later

date. These attacks could be a staging ground, testing US defences, for future operations of a

more serious nature.

Titan Rain demonstrated how China could use cyber warfare as an asymmetric tactic (Norton

Taylor 2007). Apparently, a team of hackers, estimated to number between 6 to 30, would

take control of US defence computers, copy everything on the hard drive within 30 minutes,

and send that data to zombie computers in South Korea, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, where it was

subsequently routed to computers in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The ability to

route the data makes it difficult to prove the attacker

s identity. While it is believed China

was responsible, there is no certainty that the data was not further routed to another location.

Additionally, those computers may have been under remote control by a separate

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

government, or the hackers may not have been state-sponsored. The attacks themselves were

not particularly sophisticated, requiring only minimal training with commercially available

products. The instructions on how to conduct such attacks are widely available on the

internet itself (Delio 2001). But attempts to identify the attackers would require the

burdensome task of sending covert agents to physically identify the source.

By using the virtual world, hackers are able to traverse great distances without leaving their

station. On the night of November 1, 2004, Titan Rain members scanned, broke into, and

retrieved data from defence installations in Arizona, Virginia, California, and Alabama (in

that order) all within a period of six hours. Once attackers gain control of US computers,

through methods such as Trojans, they can not only shut down the system, they can also

conduct attacks using those computers. This could be used to raise condemnation of the US,

as it would appear the US is attacking other states (Graham 2005; Thornburgh 2005). While

proof is non-existent, some US officials believe that the PLA was responsible (Norton-Taylor

2007). Chinese military doctrine repeatedly discusses

the importance of penetrating an

adversary's military logistics and personnel networks. Furthermore, the multiple intrusions

into what nuisance and criminal hackers would regard as boring, mundane networks-networks that do not offer the treasure trove of credit card numbers, bank accounts, and

identity data that criminal hackers typically seek-- suggest a military purpose

(Tkacik 2007).

Further Evidence of Build-up

Attacks under the code name Titan Rain have ceased. However, OSINT suggests that cyber

attacks from China persist. From 2005 to 2007, the US State Department, Bureau of Industry

and Security, DoD, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Homeland

Security, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and defence-related think

tanks had intrusions from Chinese ISPs (China

s Proliferation Practices and the Development