clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Russian government was not directly involved. It appeared to have been
hacktavists
simply a mass number of individuals upset over the relocation of the statue. Plans for the
attacks were posted on internet forums, message boards, and chat groups prior to the attacks,
including detailed instructions on how to send disruptive messages and which Estonian
websites to use as targets. The discussion of proposed attacks had become so popular that it
was indexed by Google, causing a Google search for the topic to return these incendiary
websites at the top of its search results, bringing them to the attention of even more people.
Despite being aware of these discussions prior to the attacks, Estonia could do little to stop
them. Estonian officials could not identify the individuals discussing attacks, as online (not
real) names were used, and obtaining IP addresses would involve going after the website
administrator and foreign ISP
a task with which mega-corporations such as the MPAA and
RIAA have difficulty, despite their massive funding and even when going after domestic IP
addresses. Further, there is no certainty that an individual participating in the discussion will
act on his or her comments, there were mass numbers of people involved (each with a
different IP address, ISP, and host state to deal with), and there is no solid legal apparatus in
place to deal with such an undertaking. Nonetheless, there was a growing and visible threat.
Estonian officials may have been better off devoting their resources to plant online
operatives. These operatives could have placed well thought out comments to try and sway
the crowd. Rather than spending all resources on physical prevention, some resources could
be used to train operatives in PSYOPS, mob mentality, propaganda, and logical deterrents
such as subtly mentioning flaws in their arguments, or the consequences of participating in
such an attack. In order to be effective this would also require an in-depth understanding of
internet subcultures (List of Internet Phenomena 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008;
Slashdot Trolling Phenomenon 2008). Subtle techniques, such as self-deprecating humour,
can sway the crowd
s emotions and train of thought (Landler and Markoff 2007). Russian
government involvement may have been as an instigator, knowingly or not, as
there [were]
anti-Estonian sentiments, fuelled by Russian state propaganda, and the sentiments were
voiced in articles, blogs, forums and the press
(The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).
This could be a type of outsourcing of activity that provides a low cost attack with high
deniability. Once in the hands of an unwitting mob, the tools necessary are readily available
and the means are simple, thereby coordinating a massive data request simultaneously. On an
individual level it takes very little effort, yet as a combined whole it has devastating effect
with emergent sophistication. This small individual role, may also cause participants to feel
less responsible (Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008).
Legality
In addition to the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyber attack, a lack of legal
framework to deal with such an attack makes it exceedingly problematic. Only one person
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
has been charged and convicted in connection with the Estonian attacks. Dmitri
Galushkevich was fined 17,500 kroons for attacking the Reform Party website. Galushkevich
admitted to his assault on the site, and he is believed to have acted alone. Several leads in
identifying other potential participants in the Estonian attacks relied on Russian cooperation.
Estonia made a formal investigation assistance request under a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT) between the states. Moscow appeared as though it would help, but after a
delay in action, it ultimately refused to cooperate, stating that the proposed investigation was
not covered by the MLAT. Further, the Head of the Russian Military Forecasting Centre
stated that the attacks against Estonia had not violated any international agreements because
no such agreements exist (Alo 2007; Sobrale 2007). A pro-Kremlin youth movement called
The Commissar of the Nashi, claimed responsibility for some of the attacks
however, the
group is located within Moldova and Transnistria which are beyond the jurisdiction of
Interpol and no MLAT applies. This severely hampers the investigation as pursuing all-EU
arrest warrants for these suspects would be largely a symbolic gesture (Commissar of Nashi
2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007).
International Publicity
Regardless of whether the attacks were state-sponsored, the Estonian incident brought cyber
warfare to the attention of the global community. The case was studied intensively by many
countries and military planners, since it was believed to have been state-sponsored and a
modern example of a large-scale attack. Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the European Commission, and organisations from the US and Israel were
dispatched to offer assistance and collect first hand analysis of the event. The implications
are far reaching:
For NATO, the attack may lead to a discussion of whether it needs to
modify its commitment to collective defense, enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty
(Landler and Markoff 2007). There is no precedence for an attack of this type. If a
state
s communications centre is attacked by a missile, it is considered an act of war. But
what is the response to a cyber attack on that same installation, with the same debilitating
effect? The Estonian attacks have encouraged the development of a NATO Cybernetic
Defence Centre in Estonia. This is an extension of Estonia
s 1996 push for the expansion of
computer and network infrastructure in Estonia, nicknamed the Tiger
s Leap (Bright 2007; A
Cyber-Riot 2007; Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement 2007).
Georgia
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia appeared to mirror the
Estonian attacks, hinting that cyber warfare may become a standard addition to traditional
warfare, whether that be state-sponsored or not. Hours after fighting broke out,
Russian
hackers had established a site, StopGeorgia.ru, where visitors could view a list of Georgian
websites being targeted, showing which sites had been successfully brought down, and
download a simple program that enabled their own computer to join the attack
(Waterman
2008). The attacks included DDoS attacks from six different botnets against government and
news websites, webpage defacements, spamming, the distribution of Georgian officials
email addresses, and distribution of a list of Georgian websites with known security flaws.
The level of sophistication and intensity of the Georgian attacks surpassed that of the
Estonian attacks, showing that capability is increasing. Russian-based hackers tried to halt
the Georgian hacker community from responding, by taking down the two highest-profile
Georgian hacker sites, hacker.ge and warez.ge, in their initial assault (Waterman 2008).
However, Georgian hackers did respond, going after Russian news sites, and in some cases,
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Russian government was not directly involved. It appeared to have been

hacktavists

simply a mass number of individuals upset over the relocation of the statue. Plans for the

attacks were posted on internet forums, message boards, and chat groups prior to the attacks,

including detailed instructions on how to send disruptive messages and which Estonian

websites to use as targets. The discussion of proposed attacks had become so popular that it

was indexed by Google, causing a Google search for the topic to return these incendiary

websites at the top of its search results, bringing them to the attention of even more people.

Despite being aware of these discussions prior to the attacks, Estonia could do little to stop

them. Estonian officials could not identify the individuals discussing attacks, as online (not

real) names were used, and obtaining IP addresses would involve going after the website

administrator and foreign ISP

a task with which mega-corporations such as the MPAA and

RIAA have difficulty, despite their massive funding and even when going after domestic IP

addresses. Further, there is no certainty that an individual participating in the discussion will

act on his or her comments, there were mass numbers of people involved (each with a

different IP address, ISP, and host state to deal with), and there is no solid legal apparatus in

place to deal with such an undertaking. Nonetheless, there was a growing and visible threat.

Estonian officials may have been better off devoting their resources to plant online

operatives. These operatives could have placed well thought out comments to try and sway

the crowd. Rather than spending all resources on physical prevention, some resources could

be used to train operatives in PSYOPS, mob mentality, propaganda, and logical deterrents

such as subtly mentioning flaws in their arguments, or the consequences of participating in

such an attack. In order to be effective this would also require an in-depth understanding of

internet subcultures (List of Internet Phenomena 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008;

Slashdot Trolling Phenomenon 2008). Subtle techniques, such as self-deprecating humour,

can sway the crowd

s emotions and train of thought (Landler and Markoff 2007). Russian

government involvement may have been as an instigator, knowingly or not, as

there [were]

anti-Estonian sentiments, fuelled by Russian state propaganda, and the sentiments were

voiced in articles, blogs, forums and the press

(The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).

This could be a type of outsourcing of activity that provides a low cost attack with high

deniability. Once in the hands of an unwitting mob, the tools necessary are readily available

and the means are simple, thereby coordinating a massive data request simultaneously. On an

individual level it takes very little effort, yet as a combined whole it has devastating effect

with emergent sophistication. This small individual role, may also cause participants to feel

less responsible (Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008).

Legality

In addition to the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyber attack, a lack of legal

framework to deal with such an attack makes it exceedingly problematic. Only one person

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

has been charged and convicted in connection with the Estonian attacks. Dmitri

Galushkevich was fined 17,500 kroons for attacking the Reform Party website. Galushkevich

admitted to his assault on the site, and he is believed to have acted alone. Several leads in

identifying other potential participants in the Estonian attacks relied on Russian cooperation.

Estonia made a formal investigation assistance request under a Mutual Legal Assistance

Treaty (MLAT) between the states. Moscow appeared as though it would help, but after a

delay in action, it ultimately refused to cooperate, stating that the proposed investigation was

not covered by the MLAT. Further, the Head of the Russian Military Forecasting Centre

stated that the attacks against Estonia had not violated any international agreements because

no such agreements exist (Alo 2007; Sobrale 2007). A pro-Kremlin youth movement called

The Commissar of the Nashi, claimed responsibility for some of the attacks

however, the

group is located within Moldova and Transnistria which are beyond the jurisdiction of

Interpol and no MLAT applies. This severely hampers the investigation as pursuing all-EU

arrest warrants for these suspects would be largely a symbolic gesture (Commissar of Nashi

2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007).

International Publicity

Regardless of whether the attacks were state-sponsored, the Estonian incident brought cyber

warfare to the attention of the global community. The case was studied intensively by many

countries and military planners, since it was believed to have been state-sponsored and a

modern example of a large-scale attack. Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), the European Commission, and organisations from the US and Israel were

dispatched to offer assistance and collect first hand analysis of the event. The implications

are far reaching:

For NATO, the attack may lead to a discussion of whether it needs to

modify its commitment to collective defense, enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic

Treaty

(Landler and Markoff 2007). There is no precedence for an attack of this type. If a

state

s communications centre is attacked by a missile, it is considered an act of war. But

what is the response to a cyber attack on that same installation, with the same debilitating

effect? The Estonian attacks have encouraged the development of a NATO Cybernetic

Defence Centre in Estonia. This is an extension of Estonia

s 1996 push for the expansion of

computer and network infrastructure in Estonia, nicknamed the Tiger

s Leap (Bright 2007; A

Cyber-Riot 2007; Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement 2007).

Georgia

The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia appeared to mirror the

Estonian attacks, hinting that cyber warfare may become a standard addition to traditional

warfare, whether that be state-sponsored or not. Hours after fighting broke out,

Russian

hackers had established a site, StopGeorgia.ru, where visitors could view a list of Georgian

websites being targeted, showing which sites had been successfully brought down, and

download a simple program that enabled their own computer to join the attack

(Waterman

2008). The attacks included DDoS attacks from six different botnets against government and

news websites, webpage defacements, spamming, the distribution of Georgian officials

email addresses, and distribution of a list of Georgian websites with known security flaws.

The level of sophistication and intensity of the Georgian attacks surpassed that of the

Estonian attacks, showing that capability is increasing. Russian-based hackers tried to halt

the Georgian hacker community from responding, by taking down the two highest-profile

Georgian hacker sites, hacker.ge and warez.ge, in their initial assault (Waterman 2008).

However, Georgian hackers did respond, going after Russian news sites, and in some cases,

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80