CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetBrowserWindowCount(int* window_count) {
*window_count = static_cast<int>(BrowserList::size());
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetBrowserWindowCount(int* window_count) {
*window_count = static_cast<int>(BrowserList::size());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
ShelfAutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
ShelfVisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (!Shell::Get()->session_controller()->IsActiveUserSessionStarted())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
if (visibility_state != SHELF_AUTO_HIDE)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
if (shelf_->auto_hide_lock())
return state_.auto_hide_state;
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingAppList() && !IsHomeLauncherEnabledInTabletMode())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->ShouldShowShelf()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingMenu())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingOverflowBubble())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->IsActive() ||
(shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->IsActive())) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (!HasVisibleWindow())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (IsDraggingWindowFromTopOrCaptionArea())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (Shell::Get()->overview_controller() &&
Shell::Get()->overview_controller()->IsSelecting()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_APPLIST_IN_PROGRESS)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_COMPLETE_IN_PROGRESS ||
gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_CANCEL_IN_PROGRESS) {
return gesture_drag_auto_hide_state_;
}
if (in_mouse_drag_)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
gfx::Rect shelf_region = GetVisibleShelfBounds();
if (shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->IsMessageBubbleShown() &&
IsVisible()) {
ShelfAlignment alignment = shelf_->alignment();
shelf_region.Inset(
alignment == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
shelf_->IsHorizontalAlignment() ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
alignment == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
0);
}
gfx::Point cursor_position_in_screen =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetCursorScreenPoint();
if (shelf_region.Contains(cursor_position_in_screen) &&
!IsTabletModeEnabled()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if ((state_.auto_hide_state == SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN ||
mouse_over_shelf_when_auto_hide_timer_started_) &&
GetAutoHideShowShelfRegionInScreen().Contains(
cursor_position_in_screen)) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
|
ShelfAutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
ShelfVisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (!Shell::Get()->session_controller()->IsActiveUserSessionStarted())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
if (visibility_state != SHELF_AUTO_HIDE)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
if (shelf_->auto_hide_lock())
return state_.auto_hide_state;
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingAppList() && !IsHomeLauncherEnabledInTabletMode())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->ShouldShowShelf()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingMenu())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->IsShowingOverflowBubble())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shelf_widget_->IsActive() ||
(shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->IsActive())) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (!HasVisibleWindow())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (IsDraggingWindowFromTopOrCaptionArea())
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (Shell::Get()->overview_controller() &&
Shell::Get()->overview_controller()->IsSelecting()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_APPLIST_IN_PROGRESS)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_COMPLETE_IN_PROGRESS ||
gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_CANCEL_IN_PROGRESS) {
return gesture_drag_auto_hide_state_;
}
if (in_mouse_drag_)
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
gfx::Rect shelf_region = GetVisibleShelfBounds();
if (shelf_widget_->status_area_widget() &&
shelf_widget_->status_area_widget()->IsMessageBubbleShown() &&
IsVisible()) {
ShelfAlignment alignment = shelf_->alignment();
shelf_region.Inset(
alignment == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
shelf_->IsHorizontalAlignment() ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
alignment == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT ? -kNotificationBubbleGapHeight : 0,
0);
}
gfx::Point cursor_position_in_screen =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetCursorScreenPoint();
if (shelf_region.Contains(cursor_position_in_screen) &&
!IsTabletModeEnabled()) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
if ((state_.auto_hide_state == SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN ||
mouse_over_shelf_when_auto_hide_timer_started_) &&
GetAutoHideShowShelfRegionInScreen().Contains(
cursor_position_in_screen)) {
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
}
return SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1743
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
AwContents::GetMessagePortMessageFilter() {
if (message_port_message_filter_.get() == nullptr) {
message_port_message_filter_ =
new AwMessagePortMessageFilter(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID());
web_contents_->GetRenderProcessHost()->AddFilter(
message_port_message_filter_.get());
}
return message_port_message_filter_;
}
|
AwContents::GetMessagePortMessageFilter() {
if (message_port_message_filter_.get() == nullptr) {
message_port_message_filter_ =
new AwMessagePortMessageFilter(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID());
web_contents_->GetRenderProcessHost()->AddFilter(
message_port_message_filter_.get());
}
return message_port_message_filter_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
|
0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
| null |
void ldb_dn_extended_filter(struct ldb_dn *dn, const char * const *accept_list)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<dn->ext_comp_num; i++) {
if (!ldb_attr_in_list(accept_list, dn->ext_components[i].name)) {
memmove(&dn->ext_components[i],
&dn->ext_components[i+1],
(dn->ext_comp_num-(i+1))*sizeof(dn->ext_components[0]));
dn->ext_comp_num--;
i--;
}
}
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_linearized);
}
|
void ldb_dn_extended_filter(struct ldb_dn *dn, const char * const *accept_list)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<dn->ext_comp_num; i++) {
if (!ldb_attr_in_list(accept_list, dn->ext_components[i].name)) {
memmove(&dn->ext_components[i],
&dn->ext_components[i+1],
(dn->ext_comp_num-(i+1))*sizeof(dn->ext_components[0]));
dn->ext_comp_num--;
i--;
}
}
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_linearized);
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7513/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_inc(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
}
|
void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_inc(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
struct file *filp)
{
int ret;
struct iattr newattrs;
/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
if (length < 0)
return -EINVAL;
newattrs.ia_size = length;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
if (filp) {
newattrs.ia_file = filp;
newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
}
/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
ret = should_remove_suid(dentry);
if (ret)
newattrs.ia_valid |= ret | ATTR_FORCE;
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
struct file *filp)
{
int ret;
struct iattr newattrs;
/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
if (length < 0)
return -EINVAL;
newattrs.ia_size = length;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
if (filp) {
newattrs.ia_file = filp;
newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
}
/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
ret = should_remove_suid(dentry);
if (ret)
newattrs.ia_valid |= ret | ATTR_FORCE;
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6309
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6309/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=acacbfa7565c78d2273c0b2a2e5e803f44afefeb
|
acacbfa7565c78d2273c0b2a2e5e803f44afefeb
| null |
int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s)
{
return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK);
}
|
int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s)
{
return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5790/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997
|
88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997
|
Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
|
void HTMLFormElement::InvalidateDefaultButtonStyle() const {
for (const auto& control : ListedElements()) {
if (!control->IsFormControlElement())
continue;
if (ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton()) {
ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->PseudoStateChanged(
CSSSelector::kPseudoDefault);
}
}
}
|
void HTMLFormElement::InvalidateDefaultButtonStyle() const {
for (const auto& control : ListedElements()) {
if (!control->IsFormControlElement())
continue;
if (ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton()) {
ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->PseudoStateChanged(
CSSSelector::kPseudoDefault);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8658
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8658/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
|
ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
|
brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
static void brcmf_update_vht_cap(struct ieee80211_supported_band *band,
u32 bw_cap[2], u32 nchain, u32 txstreams,
u32 txbf_bfe_cap, u32 txbf_bfr_cap)
{
__le16 mcs_map;
/* not allowed in 2.4G band */
if (band->band == NL80211_BAND_2GHZ)
return;
band->vht_cap.vht_supported = true;
/* 80MHz is mandatory */
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_80;
if (bw_cap[band->band] & WLC_BW_160MHZ_BIT) {
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SUPP_CHAN_WIDTH_160MHZ;
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_160;
}
/* all support 256-QAM */
mcs_map = brcmf_get_mcs_map(nchain, IEEE80211_VHT_MCS_SUPPORT_0_9);
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.rx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.tx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
/* Beamforming support information */
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if ((txbf_bfe_cap || txbf_bfr_cap) && (txstreams > 1)) {
band->vht_cap.cap |=
(2 << IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_BEAMFORMEE_STS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |= ((txstreams - 1) <<
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SOUNDING_DIMENSIONS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |=
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_VHT_LINK_ADAPTATION_VHT_MRQ_MFB;
}
}
|
static void brcmf_update_vht_cap(struct ieee80211_supported_band *band,
u32 bw_cap[2], u32 nchain, u32 txstreams,
u32 txbf_bfe_cap, u32 txbf_bfr_cap)
{
__le16 mcs_map;
/* not allowed in 2.4G band */
if (band->band == NL80211_BAND_2GHZ)
return;
band->vht_cap.vht_supported = true;
/* 80MHz is mandatory */
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_80;
if (bw_cap[band->band] & WLC_BW_160MHZ_BIT) {
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SUPP_CHAN_WIDTH_160MHZ;
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_160;
}
/* all support 256-QAM */
mcs_map = brcmf_get_mcs_map(nchain, IEEE80211_VHT_MCS_SUPPORT_0_9);
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.rx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.tx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
/* Beamforming support information */
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if ((txbf_bfe_cap || txbf_bfr_cap) && (txstreams > 1)) {
band->vht_cap.cap |=
(2 << IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_BEAMFORMEE_STS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |= ((txstreams - 1) <<
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SOUNDING_DIMENSIONS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |=
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_VHT_LINK_ADAPTATION_VHT_MRQ_MFB;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
void reds_on_client_semi_seamless_migrate_complete(RedClient *client)
{
MainChannelClient *mcc;
spice_info("%p", client);
mcc = red_client_get_main(client);
main_channel_push_init(mcc, red_dispatcher_count(),
reds->mouse_mode, reds->is_client_mouse_allowed,
reds_get_mm_time() - MM_TIME_DELTA,
red_dispatcher_qxl_ram_size());
reds_link_mig_target_channels(client);
main_channel_migrate_dst_complete(mcc);
}
|
void reds_on_client_semi_seamless_migrate_complete(RedClient *client)
{
MainChannelClient *mcc;
spice_info("%p", client);
mcc = red_client_get_main(client);
main_channel_push_init(mcc, red_dispatcher_count(),
reds->mouse_mode, reds->is_client_mouse_allowed,
reds_get_mm_time() - MM_TIME_DELTA,
red_dispatcher_qxl_ram_size());
reds_link_mig_target_channels(client);
main_channel_migrate_dst_complete(mcc);
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
nautilus_directory_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
/* Arbitrary order (kept alphabetical). */
deep_count_cancel (directory);
directory_count_cancel (directory);
file_info_cancel (directory);
file_list_cancel (directory);
link_info_cancel (directory);
mime_list_cancel (directory);
new_files_cancel (directory);
extension_info_cancel (directory);
thumbnail_cancel (directory);
mount_cancel (directory);
filesystem_info_cancel (directory);
/* We aren't waiting for anything any more. */
if (waiting_directories != NULL)
{
g_hash_table_remove (waiting_directories, directory);
}
/* Check if any directories should wake up. */
async_job_wake_up ();
}
|
nautilus_directory_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
/* Arbitrary order (kept alphabetical). */
deep_count_cancel (directory);
directory_count_cancel (directory);
file_info_cancel (directory);
file_list_cancel (directory);
link_info_cancel (directory);
mime_list_cancel (directory);
new_files_cancel (directory);
extension_info_cancel (directory);
thumbnail_cancel (directory);
mount_cancel (directory);
filesystem_info_cancel (directory);
/* We aren't waiting for anything any more. */
if (waiting_directories != NULL)
{
g_hash_table_remove (waiting_directories, directory);
}
/* Check if any directories should wake up. */
async_job_wake_up ();
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1300/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b3ae5db129f88dae153880e84bdabea8ce2ca89b
|
b3ae5db129f88dae153880e84bdabea8ce2ca89b
|
chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
CrosLibrary* CrosLibrary::Get() {
return g_cros_library.Pointer();
}
|
CrosLibrary* CrosLibrary::Get() {
return g_cros_library.Pointer();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
Add a setDebugDirtyRegion() feature to the client.
Calling remoting.clientSession.setDebugDirtyRegion(true) enables
rendering of each frame's dirty region with an purple, translucent
overlay.
Currently the dirty region is re-rendered immediately for each frame,
with no linger nor fade-out behaviour.
BUG=427659
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/932013002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#317496}
|
void ChromotingInstance::FetchSecretFromString(
const std::string& shared_secret,
bool pairing_supported,
const protocol::SecretFetchedCallback& secret_fetched_callback) {
secret_fetched_callback.Run(shared_secret);
}
|
void ChromotingInstance::FetchSecretFromString(
const std::string& shared_secret,
bool pairing_supported,
const protocol::SecretFetchedCallback& secret_fetched_callback) {
secret_fetched_callback.Run(shared_secret);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9843
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9843/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/madler/zlib/commit/d1d577490c15a0c6862473d7576352a9f18ef811
|
d1d577490c15a0c6862473d7576352a9f18ef811
|
Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
|
const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
{
#ifdef DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE
if (crc_table_empty)
make_crc_table();
#endif /* DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE */
return (const z_crc_t FAR *)crc_table;
}
|
const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
{
#ifdef DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE
if (crc_table_empty)
make_crc_table();
#endif /* DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE */
return (const z_crc_t FAR *)crc_table;
}
|
C
|
zlib
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274
|
4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274
|
cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t cdc_ncm_show_min_tx_pkt(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", ctx->min_tx_pkt);
}
|
static ssize_t cdc_ncm_show_min_tx_pkt(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", ctx->min_tx_pkt);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
|
static int _pmcraid_io_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd, int reslen, int ioasc)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd = cmd->scsi_cmd;
int rc = 0;
scsi_set_resid(scsi_cmd, reslen);
pmcraid_info("response(%d) CDB[0] = %x ioasc:result: %x:%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle) >> 2,
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0],
ioasc, scsi_cmd->result);
if (PMCRAID_IOASC_SENSE_KEY(ioasc) != 0)
rc = pmcraid_error_handler(cmd);
if (rc == 0) {
scsi_dma_unmap(scsi_cmd);
scsi_cmd->scsi_done(scsi_cmd);
}
return rc;
}
|
static int _pmcraid_io_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd, int reslen, int ioasc)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd = cmd->scsi_cmd;
int rc = 0;
scsi_set_resid(scsi_cmd, reslen);
pmcraid_info("response(%d) CDB[0] = %x ioasc:result: %x:%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle) >> 2,
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0],
ioasc, scsi_cmd->result);
if (PMCRAID_IOASC_SENSE_KEY(ioasc) != 0)
rc = pmcraid_error_handler(cmd);
if (rc == 0) {
scsi_dma_unmap(scsi_cmd);
scsi_cmd->scsi_done(scsi_cmd);
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static void cgm_dbus_disconnect(void)
{
if (cgroup_manager) {
dbus_connection_flush(cgroup_manager->connection);
dbus_connection_close(cgroup_manager->connection);
nih_free(cgroup_manager);
}
cgroup_manager = NULL;
cgm_unlock();
}
|
static void cgm_dbus_disconnect(void)
{
if (cgroup_manager) {
dbus_connection_flush(cgroup_manager->connection);
dbus_connection_close(cgroup_manager->connection);
nih_free(cgroup_manager);
}
cgroup_manager = NULL;
cgm_unlock();
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7375/
|
CWE-611
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
|
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg, const xmlChar * val)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL,
XML_FROM_PARSER, error, XML_ERR_FATAL,
NULL, 0, (const char *) val, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, msg,
val);
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
|
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg, const xmlChar * val)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL,
XML_FROM_PARSER, error, XML_ERR_FATAL,
NULL, 0, (const char *) val, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, msg,
val);
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8884/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/5d66894d2313e3f3469f19066e149e08ff076698
|
5d66894d2313e3f3469f19066e149e08ff076698
|
Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder.
|
jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
|
jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3062
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3062/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/689e59b7ffed34eba6159dcc78e87133862e3746
|
689e59b7ffed34eba6159dcc78e87133862e3746
|
mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_read_default(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int64_t total_size = 0;
MOVAtom a;
int i;
if (atom.size < 0)
atom.size = INT64_MAX;
while (total_size + 8 <= atom.size && !url_feof(pb)) {
int (*parse)(MOVContext*, AVIOContext*, MOVAtom) = NULL;
a.size = atom.size;
a.type=0;
if (atom.size >= 8) {
a.size = avio_rb32(pb);
a.type = avio_rl32(pb);
if (atom.type != MKTAG('r','o','o','t') &&
atom.type != MKTAG('m','o','o','v'))
{
if (a.type == MKTAG('t','r','a','k') || a.type == MKTAG('m','d','a','t'))
{
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Broken file, trak/mdat not at top-level\n");
avio_skip(pb, -8);
return 0;
}
}
total_size += 8;
if (a.size == 1) { /* 64 bit extended size */
a.size = avio_rb64(pb) - 8;
total_size += 8;
}
}
av_dlog(c->fc, "type: %08x '%.4s' parent:'%.4s' sz: %"PRId64" %"PRId64" %"PRId64"\n",
a.type, (char*)&a.type, (char*)&atom.type, a.size, total_size, atom.size);
if (a.size == 0) {
a.size = atom.size - total_size + 8;
}
a.size -= 8;
if (a.size < 0)
break;
a.size = FFMIN(a.size, atom.size - total_size);
for (i = 0; mov_default_parse_table[i].type; i++)
if (mov_default_parse_table[i].type == a.type) {
parse = mov_default_parse_table[i].parse;
break;
}
if (!parse && (atom.type == MKTAG('u','d','t','a') ||
atom.type == MKTAG('i','l','s','t')))
parse = mov_read_udta_string;
if (!parse) { /* skip leaf atoms data */
avio_skip(pb, a.size);
} else {
int64_t start_pos = avio_tell(pb);
int64_t left;
int err = parse(c, pb, a);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (c->found_moov && c->found_mdat &&
((!pb->seekable || c->fc->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_IGNIDX) ||
start_pos + a.size == avio_size(pb))) {
if (!pb->seekable || c->fc->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_IGNIDX)
c->next_root_atom = start_pos + a.size;
return 0;
}
left = a.size - avio_tell(pb) + start_pos;
if (left > 0) /* skip garbage at atom end */
avio_skip(pb, left);
}
total_size += a.size;
}
if (total_size < atom.size && atom.size < 0x7ffff)
avio_skip(pb, atom.size - total_size);
return 0;
}
|
static int mov_read_default(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int64_t total_size = 0;
MOVAtom a;
int i;
if (atom.size < 0)
atom.size = INT64_MAX;
while (total_size + 8 <= atom.size && !url_feof(pb)) {
int (*parse)(MOVContext*, AVIOContext*, MOVAtom) = NULL;
a.size = atom.size;
a.type=0;
if (atom.size >= 8) {
a.size = avio_rb32(pb);
a.type = avio_rl32(pb);
if (atom.type != MKTAG('r','o','o','t') &&
atom.type != MKTAG('m','o','o','v'))
{
if (a.type == MKTAG('t','r','a','k') || a.type == MKTAG('m','d','a','t'))
{
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Broken file, trak/mdat not at top-level\n");
avio_skip(pb, -8);
return 0;
}
}
total_size += 8;
if (a.size == 1) { /* 64 bit extended size */
a.size = avio_rb64(pb) - 8;
total_size += 8;
}
}
av_dlog(c->fc, "type: %08x '%.4s' parent:'%.4s' sz: %"PRId64" %"PRId64" %"PRId64"\n",
a.type, (char*)&a.type, (char*)&atom.type, a.size, total_size, atom.size);
if (a.size == 0) {
a.size = atom.size - total_size + 8;
}
a.size -= 8;
if (a.size < 0)
break;
a.size = FFMIN(a.size, atom.size - total_size);
for (i = 0; mov_default_parse_table[i].type; i++)
if (mov_default_parse_table[i].type == a.type) {
parse = mov_default_parse_table[i].parse;
break;
}
if (!parse && (atom.type == MKTAG('u','d','t','a') ||
atom.type == MKTAG('i','l','s','t')))
parse = mov_read_udta_string;
if (!parse) { /* skip leaf atoms data */
avio_skip(pb, a.size);
} else {
int64_t start_pos = avio_tell(pb);
int64_t left;
int err = parse(c, pb, a);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (c->found_moov && c->found_mdat &&
((!pb->seekable || c->fc->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_IGNIDX) ||
start_pos + a.size == avio_size(pb))) {
if (!pb->seekable || c->fc->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_IGNIDX)
c->next_root_atom = start_pos + a.size;
return 0;
}
left = a.size - avio_tell(pb) + start_pos;
if (left > 0) /* skip garbage at atom end */
avio_skip(pb, left);
}
total_size += a.size;
}
if (total_size < atom.size && atom.size < 0x7ffff)
avio_skip(pb, atom.size - total_size);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1615/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UpdateMouseLockRegion() {
RECT window_rect =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->DIPToScreenRectInWindow(window_, window_->GetBoundsInScreen())
.ToRECT();
::ClipCursor(&window_rect);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UpdateMouseLockRegion() {
RECT window_rect =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->DIPToScreenRectInWindow(window_, window_->GetBoundsInScreen())
.ToRECT();
::ClipCursor(&window_rect);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static int iwbmp_write_bmp_v45header_fields(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx)
{
iw_byte header[124];
unsigned int intent_bmp_style;
iw_zeromem(header,sizeof(header));
if(wctx->uses_bitfields) {
iw_set_ui32le(&header[40],wctx->bf_mask[0]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[44],wctx->bf_mask[1]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[48],wctx->bf_mask[2]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[52],wctx->bf_mask[3]);
}
if(wctx->csdescr.cstype==IW_CSTYPE_SRGB && !wctx->no_cslabel)
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_SRGB);
else
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_DEVICE_RGB);
switch(wctx->img->rendering_intent) {
case IW_INTENT_PERCEPTUAL: intent_bmp_style = 4; break;
case IW_INTENT_RELATIVE: intent_bmp_style = 2; break;
case IW_INTENT_SATURATION: intent_bmp_style = 1; break;
case IW_INTENT_ABSOLUTE: intent_bmp_style = 8; break;
default: intent_bmp_style = 4;
}
iw_set_ui32le(&header[108],intent_bmp_style);
iwbmp_write(wctx,&header[40],124-40);
return 1;
}
|
static int iwbmp_write_bmp_v45header_fields(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx)
{
iw_byte header[124];
unsigned int intent_bmp_style;
iw_zeromem(header,sizeof(header));
if(wctx->uses_bitfields) {
iw_set_ui32le(&header[40],wctx->bf_mask[0]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[44],wctx->bf_mask[1]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[48],wctx->bf_mask[2]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[52],wctx->bf_mask[3]);
}
if(wctx->csdescr.cstype==IW_CSTYPE_SRGB && !wctx->no_cslabel)
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_SRGB);
else
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_DEVICE_RGB);
switch(wctx->img->rendering_intent) {
case IW_INTENT_PERCEPTUAL: intent_bmp_style = 4; break;
case IW_INTENT_RELATIVE: intent_bmp_style = 2; break;
case IW_INTENT_SATURATION: intent_bmp_style = 1; break;
case IW_INTENT_ABSOLUTE: intent_bmp_style = 8; break;
default: intent_bmp_style = 4;
}
iw_set_ui32le(&header[108],intent_bmp_style);
iwbmp_write(wctx,&header[40],124-40);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6348
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6348/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4c03b862b12f980456f9de92db6d508a4999b788
|
4c03b862b12f980456f9de92db6d508a4999b788
|
irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __u32 hash( const char* name)
{
__u32 h = 0;
__u32 g;
while(*name) {
h = (h<<4) + *name++;
if ((g = (h & 0xf0000000)))
h ^=g>>24;
h &=~g;
}
return h;
}
|
static __u32 hash( const char* name)
{
__u32 h = 0;
__u32 g;
while(*name) {
h = (h<<4) + *name++;
if ((g = (h & 0xf0000000)))
h ^=g>>24;
h &=~g;
}
return h;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6085/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
|
void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDoomAll() {
InitCache();
disk_cache::Entry *entry1, *entry2;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("first", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("second", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(4, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
disk_cache::Entry *entry3, *entry4;
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, OpenEntry("third", &entry3));
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry3), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry4), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
entry3->Doom(); // The entry should be already doomed, but this must work.
entry3->Close();
entry4->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
}
|
void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDoomAll() {
InitCache();
disk_cache::Entry *entry1, *entry2;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("first", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("second", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(4, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
disk_cache::Entry *entry3, *entry4;
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, OpenEntry("third", &entry3));
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry3), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry4), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
entry3->Doom(); // The entry should be already doomed, but this must work.
entry3->Close();
entry4->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1428
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1428/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=weechat.git;a=commit;h=c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
|
c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
| null |
hook_completion (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *completion_item,
const char *description,
t_hook_callback_completion *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_completion *new_hook_completion;
int priority;
const char *ptr_completion_item;
if (!completion_item || !completion_item[0]
|| strchr (completion_item, ' ') || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_completion = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_completion));
if (!new_hook_completion)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (completion_item, &priority, &ptr_completion_item);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_COMPLETION, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_completion;
new_hook_completion->callback = callback;
new_hook_completion->completion_item = strdup ((ptr_completion_item) ?
ptr_completion_item : completion_item);
new_hook_completion->description = strdup ((description) ?
description : "");
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
|
hook_completion (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *completion_item,
const char *description,
t_hook_callback_completion *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_completion *new_hook_completion;
int priority;
const char *ptr_completion_item;
if (!completion_item || !completion_item[0]
|| strchr (completion_item, ' ') || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_completion = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_completion));
if (!new_hook_completion)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (completion_item, &priority, &ptr_completion_item);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_COMPLETION, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_completion;
new_hook_completion->callback = callback;
new_hook_completion->completion_item = strdup ((ptr_completion_item) ?
ptr_completion_item : completion_item);
new_hook_completion->description = strdup ((description) ?
description : "");
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebPluginProxy::OnPaint(const gfx::Rect& damaged_rect) {
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(page_url_);
Paint(damaged_rect);
bool allow_buffer_flipping;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allow_buffer_flipping = delegate_->AllowBufferFlipping();
#else
allow_buffer_flipping = true;
#endif
Send(new PluginHostMsg_InvalidateRect(route_id_,
damaged_rect,
allow_buffer_flipping));
}
|
void WebPluginProxy::OnPaint(const gfx::Rect& damaged_rect) {
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(page_url_);
Paint(damaged_rect);
bool allow_buffer_flipping;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allow_buffer_flipping = delegate_->AllowBufferFlipping();
#else
allow_buffer_flipping = true;
#endif
Send(new PluginHostMsg_InvalidateRect(route_id_,
damaged_rect,
allow_buffer_flipping));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
void BaseAudioContext::PerformCleanupOnMainThread() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
GraphAutoLocker locker(this);
if (is_resolving_resume_promises_) {
for (auto& resolver : resume_resolvers_) {
if (context_state_ == kClosed) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Cannot resume a context that has been closed"));
} else {
SetContextState(kRunning);
resolver->Resolve();
}
}
resume_resolvers_.clear();
is_resolving_resume_promises_ = false;
}
if (active_source_nodes_.size()) {
for (AudioNode* node : active_source_nodes_) {
if (node->Handler().GetNodeType() ==
AudioHandler::kNodeTypeAudioBufferSource) {
AudioBufferSourceNode* source_node =
static_cast<AudioBufferSourceNode*>(node);
source_node->GetAudioBufferSourceHandler().HandleStoppableSourceNode();
}
}
Vector<AudioHandler*> finished_handlers;
{
MutexLocker lock(finished_source_handlers_mutex_);
finished_source_handlers_.swap(finished_handlers);
}
unsigned remove_count = 0;
Vector<bool> removables;
removables.resize(active_source_nodes_.size());
for (AudioHandler* handler : finished_handlers) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < active_source_nodes_.size(); ++i) {
if (handler == &active_source_nodes_[i]->Handler()) {
handler->BreakConnectionWithLock();
removables[i] = true;
remove_count++;
break;
}
}
}
if (remove_count > 0) {
HeapVector<Member<AudioNode>> actives;
DCHECK_GE(active_source_nodes_.size(), remove_count);
size_t initial_capacity =
std::min(active_source_nodes_.size() - remove_count,
active_source_nodes_.size());
actives.ReserveInitialCapacity(initial_capacity);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < removables.size(); ++i) {
if (!removables[i])
actives.push_back(active_source_nodes_[i]);
}
active_source_nodes_.swap(actives);
}
}
has_posted_cleanup_task_ = false;
}
|
void BaseAudioContext::PerformCleanupOnMainThread() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
GraphAutoLocker locker(this);
if (is_resolving_resume_promises_) {
for (auto& resolver : resume_resolvers_) {
if (context_state_ == kClosed) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Cannot resume a context that has been closed"));
} else {
SetContextState(kRunning);
resolver->Resolve();
}
}
resume_resolvers_.clear();
is_resolving_resume_promises_ = false;
}
if (active_source_nodes_.size()) {
for (AudioNode* node : active_source_nodes_) {
if (node->Handler().GetNodeType() ==
AudioHandler::kNodeTypeAudioBufferSource) {
AudioBufferSourceNode* source_node =
static_cast<AudioBufferSourceNode*>(node);
source_node->GetAudioBufferSourceHandler().HandleStoppableSourceNode();
}
}
Vector<AudioHandler*> finished_handlers;
{
MutexLocker lock(finished_source_handlers_mutex_);
finished_source_handlers_.swap(finished_handlers);
}
unsigned remove_count = 0;
Vector<bool> removables;
removables.resize(active_source_nodes_.size());
for (AudioHandler* handler : finished_handlers) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < active_source_nodes_.size(); ++i) {
if (handler == &active_source_nodes_[i]->Handler()) {
handler->BreakConnectionWithLock();
removables[i] = true;
remove_count++;
break;
}
}
}
if (remove_count > 0) {
HeapVector<Member<AudioNode>> actives;
DCHECK_GE(active_source_nodes_.size(), remove_count);
size_t initial_capacity =
std::min(active_source_nodes_.size() - remove_count,
active_source_nodes_.size());
actives.ReserveInitialCapacity(initial_capacity);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < removables.size(); ++i) {
if (!removables[i])
actives.push_back(active_source_nodes_[i]);
}
active_source_nodes_.swap(actives);
}
}
has_posted_cleanup_task_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2237/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
static int parse_exthdrs(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void **ext_hdrs)
{
const char *p = (char *) hdr;
int len = skb->len;
len -= sizeof(*hdr);
p += sizeof(*hdr);
while (len > 0) {
const struct sadb_ext *ehdr = (const struct sadb_ext *) p;
uint16_t ext_type;
int ext_len;
ext_len = ehdr->sadb_ext_len;
ext_len *= sizeof(uint64_t);
ext_type = ehdr->sadb_ext_type;
if (ext_len < sizeof(uint64_t) ||
ext_len > len ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_RESERVED)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_type <= SADB_EXT_MAX) {
int min = (int) sadb_ext_min_len[ext_type];
if (ext_len < min)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_hdrs[ext_type-1] != NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY ||
ext_type == SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA) {
if (verify_address_len(p))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ext_type == SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX) {
if (verify_sec_ctx_len(p))
return -EINVAL;
}
ext_hdrs[ext_type-1] = (void *) p;
}
p += ext_len;
len -= ext_len;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int parse_exthdrs(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void **ext_hdrs)
{
const char *p = (char *) hdr;
int len = skb->len;
len -= sizeof(*hdr);
p += sizeof(*hdr);
while (len > 0) {
const struct sadb_ext *ehdr = (const struct sadb_ext *) p;
uint16_t ext_type;
int ext_len;
ext_len = ehdr->sadb_ext_len;
ext_len *= sizeof(uint64_t);
ext_type = ehdr->sadb_ext_type;
if (ext_len < sizeof(uint64_t) ||
ext_len > len ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_RESERVED)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_type <= SADB_EXT_MAX) {
int min = (int) sadb_ext_min_len[ext_type];
if (ext_len < min)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_hdrs[ext_type-1] != NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST ||
ext_type == SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY ||
ext_type == SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA) {
if (verify_address_len(p))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ext_type == SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX) {
if (verify_sec_ctx_len(p))
return -EINVAL;
}
ext_hdrs[ext_type-1] = (void *) p;
}
p += ext_len;
len -= ext_len;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static int commit_match(struct commit *commit, struct rev_info *opt)
{
int retval;
const char *encoding;
const char *message;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (!opt->grep_filter.pattern_list && !opt->grep_filter.header_list)
return 1;
/* Prepend "fake" headers as needed */
if (opt->grep_filter.use_reflog_filter) {
strbuf_addstr(&buf, "reflog ");
get_reflog_message(&buf, opt->reflog_info);
strbuf_addch(&buf, '\n');
}
/*
* We grep in the user's output encoding, under the assumption that it
* is the encoding they are most likely to write their grep pattern
* for. In addition, it means we will match the "notes" encoding below,
* so we will not end up with a buffer that has two different encodings
* in it.
*/
encoding = get_log_output_encoding();
message = logmsg_reencode(commit, NULL, encoding);
/* Copy the commit to temporary if we are using "fake" headers */
if (buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
if (opt->grep_filter.header_list && opt->mailmap) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\nauthor ", opt->mailmap);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\ncommitter ", opt->mailmap);
}
/* Append "fake" message parts as needed */
if (opt->show_notes) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
format_display_notes(commit->object.oid.hash, &buf, encoding, 1);
}
/*
* Find either in the original commit message, or in the temporary.
* Note that we cast away the constness of "message" here. It is
* const because it may come from the cached commit buffer. That's OK,
* because we know that it is modifiable heap memory, and that while
* grep_buffer may modify it for speed, it will restore any
* changes before returning.
*/
if (buf.len)
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter, buf.buf, buf.len);
else
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter,
(char *)message, strlen(message));
strbuf_release(&buf);
unuse_commit_buffer(commit, message);
return opt->invert_grep ? !retval : retval;
}
|
static int commit_match(struct commit *commit, struct rev_info *opt)
{
int retval;
const char *encoding;
const char *message;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (!opt->grep_filter.pattern_list && !opt->grep_filter.header_list)
return 1;
/* Prepend "fake" headers as needed */
if (opt->grep_filter.use_reflog_filter) {
strbuf_addstr(&buf, "reflog ");
get_reflog_message(&buf, opt->reflog_info);
strbuf_addch(&buf, '\n');
}
/*
* We grep in the user's output encoding, under the assumption that it
* is the encoding they are most likely to write their grep pattern
* for. In addition, it means we will match the "notes" encoding below,
* so we will not end up with a buffer that has two different encodings
* in it.
*/
encoding = get_log_output_encoding();
message = logmsg_reencode(commit, NULL, encoding);
/* Copy the commit to temporary if we are using "fake" headers */
if (buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
if (opt->grep_filter.header_list && opt->mailmap) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\nauthor ", opt->mailmap);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\ncommitter ", opt->mailmap);
}
/* Append "fake" message parts as needed */
if (opt->show_notes) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
format_display_notes(commit->object.oid.hash, &buf, encoding, 1);
}
/*
* Find either in the original commit message, or in the temporary.
* Note that we cast away the constness of "message" here. It is
* const because it may come from the cached commit buffer. That's OK,
* because we know that it is modifiable heap memory, and that while
* grep_buffer may modify it for speed, it will restore any
* changes before returning.
*/
if (buf.len)
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter, buf.buf, buf.len);
else
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter,
(char *)message, strlen(message));
strbuf_release(&buf);
unuse_commit_buffer(commit, message);
return opt->invert_grep ? !retval : retval;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
void SplashOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashOutImageData imgMaskData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashBitmap *maskBitmap;
Splash *maskSplash;
SplashColor maskColor;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgMaskData.imgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth,
maskColorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
maskColorMap->getBits());
imgMaskData.imgStr->reset();
imgMaskData.colorMap = maskColorMap;
imgMaskData.maskColors = NULL;
imgMaskData.colorMode = splashModeMono8;
imgMaskData.width = maskWidth;
imgMaskData.height = maskHeight;
imgMaskData.y = 0;
n = 1 << maskColorMap->getBits();
imgMaskData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
maskColorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgMaskData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
maskBitmap = new SplashBitmap(bitmap->getWidth(), bitmap->getHeight(),
1, splashModeMono8, gFalse);
maskSplash = new Splash(maskBitmap, vectorAntialias);
maskColor[0] = 0;
maskSplash->clear(maskColor);
maskSplash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgMaskData, splashModeMono8, gFalse,
maskWidth, maskHeight, mat);
delete imgMaskData.imgStr;
maskStr->close();
gfree(imgMaskData.lookup);
delete maskSplash;
splash->setSoftMask(maskBitmap);
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = NULL;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
splash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgData, srcMode, gFalse, width, height, mat);
splash->setSoftMask(NULL);
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
|
void SplashOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashOutImageData imgMaskData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashBitmap *maskBitmap;
Splash *maskSplash;
SplashColor maskColor;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgMaskData.imgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth,
maskColorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
maskColorMap->getBits());
imgMaskData.imgStr->reset();
imgMaskData.colorMap = maskColorMap;
imgMaskData.maskColors = NULL;
imgMaskData.colorMode = splashModeMono8;
imgMaskData.width = maskWidth;
imgMaskData.height = maskHeight;
imgMaskData.y = 0;
n = 1 << maskColorMap->getBits();
imgMaskData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
maskColorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgMaskData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
maskBitmap = new SplashBitmap(bitmap->getWidth(), bitmap->getHeight(),
1, splashModeMono8, gFalse);
maskSplash = new Splash(maskBitmap, vectorAntialias);
maskColor[0] = 0;
maskSplash->clear(maskColor);
maskSplash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgMaskData, splashModeMono8, gFalse,
maskWidth, maskHeight, mat);
delete imgMaskData.imgStr;
maskStr->close();
gfree(imgMaskData.lookup);
delete maskSplash;
splash->setSoftMask(maskBitmap);
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = NULL;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(3 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
splash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgData, srcMode, gFalse, width, height, mat);
splash->setSoftMask(NULL);
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 1 |
CVE-2018-8897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8897/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
math_error(regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_XF);
}
|
do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
math_error(regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_XF);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tg3_stop_block(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned long ofs, u32 enable_bit, int silent)
{
unsigned int i;
u32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
switch (ofs) {
case RCVLSC_MODE:
case DMAC_MODE:
case MBFREE_MODE:
case BUFMGR_MODE:
case MEMARB_MODE:
/* We can't enable/disable these bits of the
* 5705/5750, just say success.
*/
return 0;
default:
break;
}
}
val = tr32(ofs);
val &= ~enable_bit;
tw32_f(ofs, val);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_WAIT_CNT; i++) {
udelay(100);
val = tr32(ofs);
if ((val & enable_bit) == 0)
break;
}
if (i == MAX_WAIT_CNT && !silent) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"tg3_stop_block timed out, ofs=%lx enable_bit=%x\n",
ofs, enable_bit);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int tg3_stop_block(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned long ofs, u32 enable_bit, int silent)
{
unsigned int i;
u32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
switch (ofs) {
case RCVLSC_MODE:
case DMAC_MODE:
case MBFREE_MODE:
case BUFMGR_MODE:
case MEMARB_MODE:
/* We can't enable/disable these bits of the
* 5705/5750, just say success.
*/
return 0;
default:
break;
}
}
val = tr32(ofs);
val &= ~enable_bit;
tw32_f(ofs, val);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_WAIT_CNT; i++) {
udelay(100);
val = tr32(ofs);
if ((val & enable_bit) == 0)
break;
}
if (i == MAX_WAIT_CNT && !silent) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"tg3_stop_block timed out, ofs=%lx enable_bit=%x\n",
ofs, enable_bit);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnShowFullscreenWidget(int route_id) {
if (!is_swapped_out_)
delegate_->ShowCreatedFullscreenWidget(route_id);
Send(new ViewMsg_Move_ACK(route_id));
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnShowFullscreenWidget(int route_id) {
if (!is_swapped_out_)
delegate_->ShowCreatedFullscreenWidget(route_id);
Send(new ViewMsg_Move_ACK(route_id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CreateShaderHelper(GLenum type, GLuint client_id) {
if (GetShaderInfo(client_id)) {
return false;
}
GLuint service_id = glCreateShader(type);
if (service_id != 0) {
CreateShaderInfo(client_id, service_id, type);
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CreateShaderHelper(GLenum type, GLuint client_id) {
if (GetShaderInfo(client_id)) {
return false;
}
GLuint service_id = glCreateShader(type);
if (service_id != 0) {
CreateShaderInfo(client_id, service_id, type);
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1249
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1249/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3f71619ec516f553c69a08bf373dcde14e86d08f
|
3f71619ec516f553c69a08bf373dcde14e86d08f
|
Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
|
ZeroSuggestProvider* ZeroSuggestProvider::Create(
AutocompleteProviderClient* client,
HistoryURLProvider* history_url_provider,
AutocompleteProviderListener* listener) {
return new ZeroSuggestProvider(client, history_url_provider, listener);
}
|
ZeroSuggestProvider* ZeroSuggestProvider::Create(
AutocompleteProviderClient* client,
HistoryURLProvider* history_url_provider,
AutocompleteProviderListener* listener) {
return new ZeroSuggestProvider(client, history_url_provider, listener);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18241
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
static int create_discard_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc;
int err = 0, i;
if (SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info) {
dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
dcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct discard_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dcc)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->entry_list);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PLIST_NUM; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->pend_list[i]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->wait_list);
mutex_init(&dcc->cmd_lock);
atomic_set(&dcc->issued_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->issing_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt, 0);
dcc->nr_discards = 0;
dcc->max_discards = MAIN_SEGS(sbi) << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg;
dcc->undiscard_blks = 0;
dcc->root = RB_ROOT;
init_waitqueue_head(&dcc->discard_wait_queue);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = dcc;
init_thread:
dcc->f2fs_issue_discard = kthread_run(issue_discard_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_discard-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard);
kfree(dcc);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
|
static int create_discard_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc;
int err = 0, i;
if (SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info) {
dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
dcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct discard_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dcc)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->entry_list);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PLIST_NUM; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->pend_list[i]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->wait_list);
mutex_init(&dcc->cmd_lock);
atomic_set(&dcc->issued_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->issing_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt, 0);
dcc->nr_discards = 0;
dcc->max_discards = MAIN_SEGS(sbi) << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg;
dcc->undiscard_blks = 0;
dcc->root = RB_ROOT;
init_waitqueue_head(&dcc->discard_wait_queue);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = dcc;
init_thread:
dcc->f2fs_issue_discard = kthread_run(issue_discard_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_discard-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard);
kfree(dcc);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network::mojom::NetworkService* network_service) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService))
return;
PrefService* local_state;
if (g_browser_process) {
DCHECK(g_browser_process->local_state());
local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
} else {
DCHECK(chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state());
local_state = chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state();
}
if (!data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::GetInstance())
data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::CreateInstance(local_state);
if (!SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()) {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
SystemNetworkContextManager::CreateInstance(local_state);
}
SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()->OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network_service);
}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network::mojom::NetworkService* network_service) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService))
return;
PrefService* local_state;
if (g_browser_process) {
DCHECK(g_browser_process->local_state());
local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
} else {
DCHECK(chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state());
local_state = chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state();
}
if (!data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::GetInstance())
data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::CreateInstance(local_state);
if (!SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()) {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
SystemNetworkContextManager::CreateInstance(local_state);
}
SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()->OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network_service);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0146/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=11b128f4062dd7f89b14abc8877ff20d41b28be9
|
11b128f4062dd7f89b14abc8877ff20d41b28be9
| null |
static coroutine_fn int qcow2_co_writev(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t sector_num,
int remaining_sectors,
QEMUIOVector *qiov)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int index_in_cluster;
int ret;
int cur_nr_sectors; /* number of sectors in current iteration */
uint64_t cluster_offset;
QEMUIOVector hd_qiov;
uint64_t bytes_done = 0;
uint8_t *cluster_data = NULL;
QCowL2Meta *l2meta = NULL;
trace_qcow2_writev_start_req(qemu_coroutine_self(), sector_num,
remaining_sectors);
qemu_iovec_init(&hd_qiov, qiov->niov);
s->cluster_cache_offset = -1; /* disable compressed cache */
qemu_co_mutex_lock(&s->lock);
while (remaining_sectors != 0) {
l2meta = NULL;
trace_qcow2_writev_start_part(qemu_coroutine_self());
index_in_cluster = sector_num & (s->cluster_sectors - 1);
cur_nr_sectors = remaining_sectors;
if (s->crypt_method &&
cur_nr_sectors >
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_sectors - index_in_cluster) {
cur_nr_sectors =
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_sectors - index_in_cluster;
}
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_offset(bs, sector_num << 9,
&cur_nr_sectors, &cluster_offset, &l2meta);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
assert((cluster_offset & 511) == 0);
qemu_iovec_reset(&hd_qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&hd_qiov, qiov, bytes_done,
cur_nr_sectors * 512);
if (s->crypt_method) {
if (!cluster_data) {
cluster_data = qemu_blockalign(bs, QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS *
s->cluster_size);
}
assert(hd_qiov.size <=
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_size);
qemu_iovec_to_buf(&hd_qiov, 0, cluster_data, hd_qiov.size);
qcow2_encrypt_sectors(s, sector_num, cluster_data,
cluster_data, cur_nr_sectors, 1, &s->aes_encrypt_key);
qemu_iovec_reset(&hd_qiov);
qemu_iovec_add(&hd_qiov, cluster_data,
cur_nr_sectors * 512);
}
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0,
cluster_offset + index_in_cluster * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
cur_nr_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
qemu_co_mutex_unlock(&s->lock);
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_WRITE_AIO);
trace_qcow2_writev_data(qemu_coroutine_self(),
(cluster_offset >> 9) + index_in_cluster);
ret = bdrv_co_writev(bs->file,
(cluster_offset >> 9) + index_in_cluster,
cur_nr_sectors, &hd_qiov);
qemu_co_mutex_lock(&s->lock);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
while (l2meta != NULL) {
QCowL2Meta *next;
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_link_l2(bs, l2meta);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* Take the request off the list of running requests */
if (l2meta->nb_clusters != 0) {
QLIST_REMOVE(l2meta, next_in_flight);
}
qemu_co_queue_restart_all(&l2meta->dependent_requests);
next = l2meta->next;
g_free(l2meta);
l2meta = next;
}
remaining_sectors -= cur_nr_sectors;
sector_num += cur_nr_sectors;
bytes_done += cur_nr_sectors * 512;
trace_qcow2_writev_done_part(qemu_coroutine_self(), cur_nr_sectors);
}
ret = 0;
fail:
qemu_co_mutex_unlock(&s->lock);
while (l2meta != NULL) {
QCowL2Meta *next;
if (l2meta->nb_clusters != 0) {
QLIST_REMOVE(l2meta, next_in_flight);
}
qemu_co_queue_restart_all(&l2meta->dependent_requests);
next = l2meta->next;
g_free(l2meta);
l2meta = next;
}
qemu_iovec_destroy(&hd_qiov);
qemu_vfree(cluster_data);
trace_qcow2_writev_done_req(qemu_coroutine_self(), ret);
return ret;
}
|
static coroutine_fn int qcow2_co_writev(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t sector_num,
int remaining_sectors,
QEMUIOVector *qiov)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int index_in_cluster;
int ret;
int cur_nr_sectors; /* number of sectors in current iteration */
uint64_t cluster_offset;
QEMUIOVector hd_qiov;
uint64_t bytes_done = 0;
uint8_t *cluster_data = NULL;
QCowL2Meta *l2meta = NULL;
trace_qcow2_writev_start_req(qemu_coroutine_self(), sector_num,
remaining_sectors);
qemu_iovec_init(&hd_qiov, qiov->niov);
s->cluster_cache_offset = -1; /* disable compressed cache */
qemu_co_mutex_lock(&s->lock);
while (remaining_sectors != 0) {
l2meta = NULL;
trace_qcow2_writev_start_part(qemu_coroutine_self());
index_in_cluster = sector_num & (s->cluster_sectors - 1);
cur_nr_sectors = remaining_sectors;
if (s->crypt_method &&
cur_nr_sectors >
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_sectors - index_in_cluster) {
cur_nr_sectors =
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_sectors - index_in_cluster;
}
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_offset(bs, sector_num << 9,
&cur_nr_sectors, &cluster_offset, &l2meta);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
assert((cluster_offset & 511) == 0);
qemu_iovec_reset(&hd_qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&hd_qiov, qiov, bytes_done,
cur_nr_sectors * 512);
if (s->crypt_method) {
if (!cluster_data) {
cluster_data = qemu_blockalign(bs, QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS *
s->cluster_size);
}
assert(hd_qiov.size <=
QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_size);
qemu_iovec_to_buf(&hd_qiov, 0, cluster_data, hd_qiov.size);
qcow2_encrypt_sectors(s, sector_num, cluster_data,
cluster_data, cur_nr_sectors, 1, &s->aes_encrypt_key);
qemu_iovec_reset(&hd_qiov);
qemu_iovec_add(&hd_qiov, cluster_data,
cur_nr_sectors * 512);
}
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0,
cluster_offset + index_in_cluster * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
cur_nr_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
qemu_co_mutex_unlock(&s->lock);
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_WRITE_AIO);
trace_qcow2_writev_data(qemu_coroutine_self(),
(cluster_offset >> 9) + index_in_cluster);
ret = bdrv_co_writev(bs->file,
(cluster_offset >> 9) + index_in_cluster,
cur_nr_sectors, &hd_qiov);
qemu_co_mutex_lock(&s->lock);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
while (l2meta != NULL) {
QCowL2Meta *next;
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_link_l2(bs, l2meta);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* Take the request off the list of running requests */
if (l2meta->nb_clusters != 0) {
QLIST_REMOVE(l2meta, next_in_flight);
}
qemu_co_queue_restart_all(&l2meta->dependent_requests);
next = l2meta->next;
g_free(l2meta);
l2meta = next;
}
remaining_sectors -= cur_nr_sectors;
sector_num += cur_nr_sectors;
bytes_done += cur_nr_sectors * 512;
trace_qcow2_writev_done_part(qemu_coroutine_self(), cur_nr_sectors);
}
ret = 0;
fail:
qemu_co_mutex_unlock(&s->lock);
while (l2meta != NULL) {
QCowL2Meta *next;
if (l2meta->nb_clusters != 0) {
QLIST_REMOVE(l2meta, next_in_flight);
}
qemu_co_queue_restart_all(&l2meta->dependent_requests);
next = l2meta->next;
g_free(l2meta);
l2meta = next;
}
qemu_iovec_destroy(&hd_qiov);
qemu_vfree(cluster_data);
trace_qcow2_writev_done_req(qemu_coroutine_self(), ret);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver::OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver(
AutomationProvider* provider,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
int count)
: automation_(provider->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
collection_(
g_browser_process->notification_ui_manager()->balloon_collection()),
count_(count) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_NOTIFY_BALLOON_CONNECTED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
collection_->set_on_collection_changed_callback(
base::Bind(&OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver::CheckBalloonCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
CheckBalloonCount();
}
|
OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver::OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver(
AutomationProvider* provider,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
int count)
: automation_(provider->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
collection_(
g_browser_process->notification_ui_manager()->balloon_collection()),
count_(count) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_NOTIFY_BALLOON_CONNECTED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
collection_->set_on_collection_changed_callback(
base::Bind(&OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver::CheckBalloonCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
CheckBalloonCount();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType ReadRectangle(Image *image,PICTRectangle *rectangle)
{
rectangle->top=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->left=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->bottom=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->right=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((rectangle->left > rectangle->right) ||
(rectangle->top > rectangle->bottom))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadRectangle(Image *image,PICTRectangle *rectangle)
{
rectangle->top=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->left=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->bottom=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->right=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((rectangle->left > rectangle->right) ||
(rectangle->top > rectangle->bottom))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4565/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664
|
8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664
|
net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit tcp_illinois_unregister(void)
{
tcp_unregister_congestion_control(&tcp_illinois);
}
|
static void __exit tcp_illinois_unregister(void)
{
tcp_unregister_congestion_control(&tcp_illinois);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RootWindow::ReleaseMouseMoves() {
if (should_hold_mouse_moves_) {
--mouse_move_hold_count_;
DCHECK_GE(mouse_move_hold_count_, 0);
if (!mouse_move_hold_count_)
DispatchHeldMouseMove();
}
}
|
void RootWindow::ReleaseMouseMoves() {
if (should_hold_mouse_moves_) {
--mouse_move_hold_count_;
DCHECK_GE(mouse_move_hold_count_, 0);
if (!mouse_move_hold_count_)
DispatchHeldMouseMove();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10166/
|
CWE-191
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/60bfb401ad5a4a8ae995dcd36372fe15c71e1a35
|
60bfb401ad5a4a8ae995dcd36372fe15c71e1a35
|
Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to [email protected].
|
static inline int getPixelOverflowPalette(gdImagePtr im, const int x, const int y, const int bgColor)
{
if (gdImageBoundsSafe(im, x, y)) {
const int c = im->pixels[y][x];
if (c == im->transparent) {
return bgColor == -1 ? gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127) : bgColor;
}
return colorIndex2RGBA(c);
} else {
return bgColor;
}
}
|
static inline int getPixelOverflowPalette(gdImagePtr im, const int x, const int y, const int bgColor)
{
if (gdImageBoundsSafe(im, x, y)) {
const int c = im->pixels[y][x];
if (c == im->transparent) {
return bgColor == -1 ? gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127) : bgColor;
}
return colorIndex2RGBA(c);
} else {
return bgColor;
}
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3de7fc7dbb642ed034afa1c1fed70a748a60f35
|
e3de7fc7dbb642ed034afa1c1fed70a748a60f35
|
Add missing null-check in OverscrollControllerAndroid::Animate()
Without it, there's a crash when running with
disable-overscroll-edge-effect switch.
BUG=501472
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1195453003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#334897}
|
void OverscrollControllerAndroid::OnFrameMetadataUpdated(
const cc::CompositorFrameMetadata& frame_metadata) {
if (!refresh_effect_ && !glow_effect_)
return;
const float scale_factor =
frame_metadata.page_scale_factor * frame_metadata.device_scale_factor;
gfx::SizeF viewport_size =
gfx::ScaleSize(frame_metadata.scrollable_viewport_size, scale_factor);
gfx::SizeF content_size =
gfx::ScaleSize(frame_metadata.root_layer_size, scale_factor);
gfx::Vector2dF content_scroll_offset =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(frame_metadata.root_scroll_offset, scale_factor);
if (refresh_effect_) {
refresh_effect_->OnFrameUpdated(content_scroll_offset,
frame_metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden);
}
if (glow_effect_) {
glow_effect_->OnFrameUpdated(viewport_size, content_size,
content_scroll_offset);
}
}
|
void OverscrollControllerAndroid::OnFrameMetadataUpdated(
const cc::CompositorFrameMetadata& frame_metadata) {
if (!refresh_effect_ && !glow_effect_)
return;
const float scale_factor =
frame_metadata.page_scale_factor * frame_metadata.device_scale_factor;
gfx::SizeF viewport_size =
gfx::ScaleSize(frame_metadata.scrollable_viewport_size, scale_factor);
gfx::SizeF content_size =
gfx::ScaleSize(frame_metadata.root_layer_size, scale_factor);
gfx::Vector2dF content_scroll_offset =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(frame_metadata.root_scroll_offset, scale_factor);
if (refresh_effect_) {
refresh_effect_->OnFrameUpdated(content_scroll_offset,
frame_metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden);
}
if (glow_effect_) {
glow_effect_->OnFrameUpdated(viewport_size, content_size,
content_scroll_offset);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
update_info_linux_lvm2_lv (Device *device)
{
const gchar *lv_name;
const gchar *vg_name;
const gchar *uuid;
gchar *lv_uuid;
gchar *vg_uuid;
gboolean is_lv;
is_lv = FALSE;
lv_uuid = NULL;
vg_uuid = NULL;
lv_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_LV_NAME");
vg_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_VG_NAME");
if (lv_name == NULL || vg_name == NULL)
goto out;
uuid = g_udev_device_get_sysfs_attr (device->priv->d, "dm/uuid");
if (uuid == NULL || !g_str_has_prefix (uuid, "LVM-"))
goto out;
vg_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4);
if (vg_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
lv_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4 + 32);
if (lv_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
is_lv = TRUE;
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_name (device, lv_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_uuid (device, lv_uuid);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_name (device, vg_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_uuid (device, vg_uuid);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
device_set_device_is_partition (device, FALSE);
out:
device_set_device_is_linux_lvm2_lv (device, is_lv);
g_free (vg_uuid);
g_free (lv_uuid);
return TRUE;
}
|
update_info_linux_lvm2_lv (Device *device)
{
const gchar *lv_name;
const gchar *vg_name;
const gchar *uuid;
gchar *lv_uuid;
gchar *vg_uuid;
gboolean is_lv;
is_lv = FALSE;
lv_uuid = NULL;
vg_uuid = NULL;
lv_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_LV_NAME");
vg_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_VG_NAME");
if (lv_name == NULL || vg_name == NULL)
goto out;
uuid = g_udev_device_get_sysfs_attr (device->priv->d, "dm/uuid");
if (uuid == NULL || !g_str_has_prefix (uuid, "LVM-"))
goto out;
vg_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4);
if (vg_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
lv_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4 + 32);
if (lv_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
is_lv = TRUE;
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_name (device, lv_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_uuid (device, lv_uuid);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_name (device, vg_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_uuid (device, vg_uuid);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
device_set_device_is_partition (device, FALSE);
out:
device_set_device_is_linux_lvm2_lv (device, is_lv);
g_free (vg_uuid);
g_free (lv_uuid);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
{
vmcs_writel(field, vmcs_readl(field) | mask);
}
|
static void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
{
vmcs_writel(field, vmcs_readl(field) | mask);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2862/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/92afc45a43336c468720a3143e7f2adfa882fa78
|
92afc45a43336c468720a3143e7f2adfa882fa78
|
Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NotifyRefreshNetwork() {
ash::NetworkObserver* observer = tray_->network_observer();
chromeos::NetworkLibrary* crosnet =
chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
if (observer) {
ash::NetworkIconInfo info;
info.image = network_icon_->GetIconAndText(&info.description);
info.tray_icon_visible =
ShouldShowNetworkIconInTray(crosnet->connected_network());
observer->OnNetworkRefresh(info);
}
const Network* connected_network = crosnet->connected_network();
if (accessibility::IsSpokenFeedbackEnabled()) {
bool speak = false;
if (connected_network_ != connected_network) {
speak = true;
} else if (connected_network) {
if ((Network::IsConnectedState(state_) &&
!connected_network->connected()) ||
(Network::IsConnectingState(state_) &&
!connected_network->connecting()) ||
(Network::IsDisconnectedState(state_) &&
!connected_network->disconnected())) {
speak = true;
}
}
if (speak) {
AccessibilitySpeak(connected_network);
}
}
connected_network_ = connected_network;
if (connected_network) {
state_ = connected_network->state();
} else {
state_ = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
|
void NotifyRefreshNetwork() {
ash::NetworkObserver* observer = tray_->network_observer();
chromeos::NetworkLibrary* crosnet =
chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
if (observer) {
ash::NetworkIconInfo info;
info.image = network_icon_->GetIconAndText(&info.description);
info.tray_icon_visible =
ShouldShowNetworkIconInTray(crosnet->connected_network());
observer->OnNetworkRefresh(info);
}
const Network* connected_network = crosnet->connected_network();
if (accessibility::IsSpokenFeedbackEnabled()) {
bool speak = false;
if (connected_network_ != connected_network) {
speak = true;
} else if (connected_network) {
if ((Network::IsConnectedState(state_) &&
!connected_network->connected()) ||
(Network::IsConnectingState(state_) &&
!connected_network->connecting()) ||
(Network::IsDisconnectedState(state_) &&
!connected_network->disconnected())) {
speak = true;
}
}
if (speak) {
AccessibilitySpeak(connected_network);
}
}
connected_network_ = connected_network;
if (connected_network) {
state_ = connected_network->state();
} else {
state_ = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static int skt_read(int fd, void *p, size_t len)
{
int read;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timespec ts;
FNLOG();
ts_log("skt_read recv", len, NULL);
if ((read = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL))) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return read;
}
|
static int skt_read(int fd, void *p, size_t len)
{
int read;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timespec ts;
FNLOG();
ts_log("skt_read recv", len, NULL);
if ((read = recv(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return read;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
tracing_buffers_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *poll_table)
{
struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = filp->private_data;
struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
return trace_poll(iter, filp, poll_table);
}
|
tracing_buffers_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *poll_table)
{
struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = filp->private_data;
struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
return trace_poll(iter, filp, poll_table);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
TextTrack* HTMLMediaElement::addTextTrack(const AtomicString& kind,
const AtomicString& label,
const AtomicString& language,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
TextTrack* textTrack = TextTrack::create(kind, label, language);
textTrack->setReadinessState(TextTrack::Loaded);
textTracks()->append(textTrack);
textTrack->setMode(TextTrack::hiddenKeyword());
return textTrack;
}
|
TextTrack* HTMLMediaElement::addTextTrack(const AtomicString& kind,
const AtomicString& label,
const AtomicString& language,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
TextTrack* textTrack = TextTrack::create(kind, label, language);
textTrack->setReadinessState(TextTrack::Loaded);
textTracks()->append(textTrack);
textTrack->setMode(TextTrack::hiddenKeyword());
return textTrack;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod1MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod();
}
|
static void OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod1MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4611
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4611/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93
|
0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93
|
perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
if (cpuhw->n_limited)
freeze_limited_counters(cpuhw, mfspr(SPRN_PMC5),
mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
perf_read_regs(regs);
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_events; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
if (!event->hw.idx || is_limited_pmc(event->hw.idx))
continue;
val = read_pmc(event->hw.idx);
if ((int)val < 0) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
}
}
/*
* In case we didn't find and reset the event that caused
* the interrupt, scan all events and reset any that are
* negative, to avoid getting continual interrupts.
* Any that we processed in the previous loop will not be negative.
*/
if (!found) {
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
if (is_limited_pmc(i + 1))
continue;
val = read_pmc(i + 1);
if (pmc_overflow(val))
write_pmc(i + 1, 0);
}
}
/*
* Reset MMCR0 to its normal value. This will set PMXE and
* clear FC (freeze counters) and PMAO (perf mon alert occurred)
* and thus allow interrupts to occur again.
* XXX might want to use MSR.PM to keep the events frozen until
* we get back out of this interrupt.
*/
write_mmcr0(cpuhw, cpuhw->mmcr[0]);
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
}
|
static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
if (cpuhw->n_limited)
freeze_limited_counters(cpuhw, mfspr(SPRN_PMC5),
mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
perf_read_regs(regs);
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_events; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
if (!event->hw.idx || is_limited_pmc(event->hw.idx))
continue;
val = read_pmc(event->hw.idx);
if ((int)val < 0) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
}
}
/*
* In case we didn't find and reset the event that caused
* the interrupt, scan all events and reset any that are
* negative, to avoid getting continual interrupts.
* Any that we processed in the previous loop will not be negative.
*/
if (!found) {
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
if (is_limited_pmc(i + 1))
continue;
val = read_pmc(i + 1);
if ((int)val < 0)
write_pmc(i + 1, 0);
}
}
/*
* Reset MMCR0 to its normal value. This will set PMXE and
* clear FC (freeze counters) and PMAO (perf mon alert occurred)
* and thus allow interrupts to occur again.
* XXX might want to use MSR.PM to keep the events frozen until
* we get back out of this interrupt.
*/
write_mmcr0(cpuhw, cpuhw->mmcr[0]);
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-3183
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3183/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/e427c41257957b57036d5a549b260b6185d1dd73
|
e427c41257957b57036d5a549b260b6185d1dd73
|
Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int uniq_field_values(void *d, const char *key, const char *val)
{
apr_array_header_t *values;
char *start;
char *e;
char **strpp;
int i;
values = (apr_array_header_t *)d;
e = apr_pstrdup(values->pool, val);
do {
/* Find a non-empty fieldname */
while (*e == ',' || apr_isspace(*e)) {
++e;
}
if (*e == '\0') {
break;
}
start = e;
while (*e != '\0' && *e != ',' && !apr_isspace(*e)) {
++e;
}
if (*e != '\0') {
*e++ = '\0';
}
/* Now add it to values if it isn't already represented.
* Could be replaced by a ap_array_strcasecmp() if we had one.
*/
for (i = 0, strpp = (char **) values->elts; i < values->nelts;
++i, ++strpp) {
if (*strpp && strcasecmp(*strpp, start) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (i == values->nelts) { /* if not found */
*(char **)apr_array_push(values) = start;
}
} while (*e != '\0');
return 1;
}
|
static int uniq_field_values(void *d, const char *key, const char *val)
{
apr_array_header_t *values;
char *start;
char *e;
char **strpp;
int i;
values = (apr_array_header_t *)d;
e = apr_pstrdup(values->pool, val);
do {
/* Find a non-empty fieldname */
while (*e == ',' || apr_isspace(*e)) {
++e;
}
if (*e == '\0') {
break;
}
start = e;
while (*e != '\0' && *e != ',' && !apr_isspace(*e)) {
++e;
}
if (*e != '\0') {
*e++ = '\0';
}
/* Now add it to values if it isn't already represented.
* Could be replaced by a ap_array_strcasecmp() if we had one.
*/
for (i = 0, strpp = (char **) values->elts; i < values->nelts;
++i, ++strpp) {
if (*strpp && strcasecmp(*strpp, start) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (i == values->nelts) { /* if not found */
*(char **)apr_array_push(values) = start;
}
} while (*e != '\0');
return 1;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8629
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8629/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/df17a1224a3406f57477bcd372c61e04c0e5a5bb
|
df17a1224a3406f57477bcd372c61e04c0e5a5bb
|
Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629]
In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with
a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes.
CVE-2015-8629:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string
without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible
for an attacker with permission to modify the database.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8341 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
bool_t xdr_krb5_key_data_nocontents(XDR *xdrs, krb5_key_data *objp)
{
/*
* Note that this function intentionally DOES NOT tranfer key
* length or contents! xdr_krb5_key_data in adb_xdr.c does, but
* that is only for use within the server-side library.
*/
unsigned int tmp;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE)
memset(objp, 0, sizeof(krb5_key_data));
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_ver)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_ui_2(xdrs, &objp->key_data_kvno)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_type[0])) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (objp->key_data_ver > 1) {
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_type[1])) {
return (FALSE);
}
}
/*
* kadm5_get_principal on the server side allocates and returns
* key contents when asked. Even though this function refuses to
* transmit that data, it still has to *free* the data at the
* appropriate time to avoid a memory leak.
*/
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_FREE) {
tmp = (unsigned int) objp->key_data_length[0];
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &objp->key_data_contents[0],
&tmp, ~0))
return FALSE;
tmp = (unsigned int) objp->key_data_length[1];
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &objp->key_data_contents[1],
&tmp, ~0))
return FALSE;
}
return (TRUE);
}
|
bool_t xdr_krb5_key_data_nocontents(XDR *xdrs, krb5_key_data *objp)
{
/*
* Note that this function intentionally DOES NOT tranfer key
* length or contents! xdr_krb5_key_data in adb_xdr.c does, but
* that is only for use within the server-side library.
*/
unsigned int tmp;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE)
memset(objp, 0, sizeof(krb5_key_data));
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_ver)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_ui_2(xdrs, &objp->key_data_kvno)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_type[0])) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (objp->key_data_ver > 1) {
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &objp->key_data_type[1])) {
return (FALSE);
}
}
/*
* kadm5_get_principal on the server side allocates and returns
* key contents when asked. Even though this function refuses to
* transmit that data, it still has to *free* the data at the
* appropriate time to avoid a memory leak.
*/
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_FREE) {
tmp = (unsigned int) objp->key_data_length[0];
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &objp->key_data_contents[0],
&tmp, ~0))
return FALSE;
tmp = (unsigned int) objp->key_data_length[1];
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &objp->key_data_contents[1],
&tmp, ~0))
return FALSE;
}
return (TRUE);
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18222/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void hns_gmac_get_link_status(void *mac_drv, u32 *link_stat)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
*link_stat = dsaf_get_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_AN_NEG_STATE_REG,
GMAC_AN_NEG_STAT_RX_SYNC_OK_B);
}
|
static void hns_gmac_get_link_status(void *mac_drv, u32 *link_stat)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
*link_stat = dsaf_get_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_AN_NEG_STATE_REG,
GMAC_AN_NEG_STAT_RX_SYNC_OK_B);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2889/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f8cdab6fda192d15e45a3e9682b1eec427870c5
|
7f8cdab6fda192d15e45a3e9682b1eec427870c5
|
[views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView(bool frameless)
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL),
is_frameless_(frameless) {
}
|
ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __net_init udp4_proc_init_net(struct net *net)
{
return udp_proc_register(net, &udp4_seq_afinfo);
}
|
static int __net_init udp4_proc_init_net(struct net *net)
{
return udp_proc_register(net, &udp4_seq_afinfo);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void reflectedClassAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectedClassAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void reflectedClassAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectedClassAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11596
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11596/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
fix jsvGetString regression
|
bool jsvIsUndefined(const JsVar *v) { return v==0; }
|
bool jsvIsUndefined(const JsVar *v) { return v==0; }
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
pgp_read_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (blob->data != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if (blob->info == NULL)
return blob->status;
if (blob->info->get_fn) { /* readable, top-level DO */
u8 buffer[2048];
size_t buf_len = sizeof(buffer);
int r = SC_SUCCESS;
/* buffer length for certificate */
if (blob->id == DO_CERT && priv->max_cert_size > 0) {
buf_len = MIN(priv->max_cert_size, sizeof(buffer));
}
/* buffer length for Gnuk pubkey */
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK &&
(blob->id == DO_AUTH ||
blob->id == DO_SIGN ||
blob->id == DO_ENCR ||
blob->id == DO_AUTH_SYM ||
blob->id == DO_SIGN_SYM ||
blob->id == DO_ENCR_SYM)) {
buf_len = MAXLEN_RESP_PUBKEY_GNUK;
}
r = blob->info->get_fn(card, blob->id, buffer, buf_len);
if (r < 0) { /* an error occurred */
blob->status = r;
return r;
}
return pgp_set_blob(blob, buffer, r);
}
else { /* un-readable DO or part of a constructed DO */
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
}
|
pgp_read_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (blob->data != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if (blob->info == NULL)
return blob->status;
if (blob->info->get_fn) { /* readable, top-level DO */
u8 buffer[2048];
size_t buf_len = sizeof(buffer);
int r = SC_SUCCESS;
/* buffer length for certificate */
if (blob->id == DO_CERT && priv->max_cert_size > 0) {
buf_len = MIN(priv->max_cert_size, sizeof(buffer));
}
/* buffer length for Gnuk pubkey */
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK &&
(blob->id == DO_AUTH ||
blob->id == DO_SIGN ||
blob->id == DO_ENCR ||
blob->id == DO_AUTH_SYM ||
blob->id == DO_SIGN_SYM ||
blob->id == DO_ENCR_SYM)) {
buf_len = MAXLEN_RESP_PUBKEY_GNUK;
}
r = blob->info->get_fn(card, blob->id, buffer, buf_len);
if (r < 0) { /* an error occurred */
blob->status = r;
return r;
}
return pgp_set_blob(blob, buffer, r);
}
else { /* un-readable DO or part of a constructed DO */
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
void SimulateGestureScrollSequence(WebContents* web_contents,
const gfx::Point& point,
const gfx::Vector2dF& delta) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget());
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_begin(
blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollBegin,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers, ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_begin.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_x_hint = delta.x();
scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_y_hint = delta.y();
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_begin);
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_update(
blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers, ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_update.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.delta_x = delta.x();
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.delta_y = delta.y();
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.velocity_x = 0;
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.velocity_y = 0;
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_update);
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_end(blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollEnd,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_end.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_end);
}
|
void SimulateGestureScrollSequence(WebContents* web_contents,
const gfx::Point& point,
const gfx::Vector2dF& delta) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget());
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_begin(
blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollBegin,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers, ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_begin.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_x_hint = delta.x();
scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_y_hint = delta.y();
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_begin);
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_update(
blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers, ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_update.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.delta_x = delta.x();
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.delta_y = delta.y();
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.velocity_x = 0;
scroll_update.data.scroll_update.velocity_y = 0;
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_update);
blink::WebGestureEvent scroll_end(blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollEnd,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
ui::EventTimeForNow(),
blink::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad);
scroll_end.SetPositionInWidget(gfx::PointF(point));
widget_host->ForwardGestureEvent(scroll_end);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
static void *jffs2_acl_to_medium(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
{
struct jffs2_acl_header *header;
struct jffs2_acl_entry *entry;
void *e;
size_t i;
*size = jffs2_acl_size(acl->a_count);
header = kmalloc(sizeof(*header) + acl->a_count * sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
header->a_version = cpu_to_je32(JFFS2_ACL_VERSION);
e = header + 1;
for (i=0; i < acl->a_count; i++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
entry = e;
entry->e_tag = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_tag);
entry->e_perm = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return header;
fail:
kfree(header);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
|
static void *jffs2_acl_to_medium(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
{
struct jffs2_acl_header *header;
struct jffs2_acl_entry *entry;
void *e;
size_t i;
*size = jffs2_acl_size(acl->a_count);
header = kmalloc(sizeof(*header) + acl->a_count * sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
header->a_version = cpu_to_je32(JFFS2_ACL_VERSION);
e = header + 1;
for (i=0; i < acl->a_count; i++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
entry = e;
entry->e_tag = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_tag);
entry->e_perm = cpu_to_je16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_je32(
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
e += sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return header;
fail:
kfree(header);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterf(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterf: unknown texture");
} else {
texture_manager()->SetParameter(info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(param));
glTexParameterf(target, pname, param);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterf(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterf: unknown texture");
} else {
texture_manager()->SetParameter(info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(param));
glTexParameterf(target, pname, param);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18222/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int hns_gmac_adjust_link(void *mac_drv, enum mac_speed speed,
u32 full_duplex)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_REG,
GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_B, !!full_duplex);
switch (speed) {
case MAC_SPEED_10:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x6);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_100:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x7);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_1000:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x8);
break;
default:
dev_err(drv->dev,
"hns_gmac_adjust_link fail, speed%d mac%d\n",
speed, drv->mac_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int hns_gmac_adjust_link(void *mac_drv, enum mac_speed speed,
u32 full_duplex)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_REG,
GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_B, !!full_duplex);
switch (speed) {
case MAC_SPEED_10:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x6);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_100:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x7);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_1000:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x8);
break;
default:
dev_err(drv->dev,
"hns_gmac_adjust_link fail, speed%d mac%d\n",
speed, drv->mac_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLSelectElement::anonymousIndexedSetterRemove(unsigned index, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
remove(index);
return true;
}
|
bool HTMLSelectElement::anonymousIndexedSetterRemove(unsigned index, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
remove(index);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6490/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
|
1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
| null |
hwaddr virtio_queue_get_ring_addr(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n)
{
return vdev->vq[n].vring.desc;
}
|
hwaddr virtio_queue_get_ring_addr(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n)
{
return vdev->vq[n].vring.desc;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1788
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1788/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4924b37ee01f71ae19c94a8934b80eeb2f677932
|
4924b37ee01f71ae19c94a8934b80eeb2f677932
|
bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
|
int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
int ret = 0;
bn_check_top(y);
bn_check_top(x);
bn_check_top(p);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
/* reduce x and y mod p */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy(b, p))
goto err;
while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
}
do {
if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(v))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(b));
} else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
break;
else {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(a));
}
} while (1);
if (!BN_copy(r, u))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
int ret = 0;
bn_check_top(y);
bn_check_top(x);
bn_check_top(p);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
/* reduce x and y mod p */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy(b, p))
goto err;
while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
}
do {
if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(v))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(b));
} else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
break;
else {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(a));
}
} while (1);
if (!BN_copy(r, u))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6540/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
|
2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
|
ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ip_vs_edit_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u)
{
struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched, *old_sched;
struct ip_vs_pe *pe = NULL, *old_pe = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Lookup the scheduler, by 'u->sched_name'
*/
sched = ip_vs_scheduler_get(u->sched_name);
if (sched == NULL) {
pr_info("Scheduler module ip_vs_%s not found\n", u->sched_name);
return -ENOENT;
}
old_sched = sched;
if (u->pe_name && *u->pe_name) {
pe = ip_vs_pe_getbyname(u->pe_name);
if (pe == NULL) {
pr_info("persistence engine module ip_vs_pe_%s "
"not found\n", u->pe_name);
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
old_pe = pe;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
if (u->af == AF_INET6 && (u->netmask < 1 || u->netmask > 128)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
#endif
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
/*
* Wait until all other svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
/*
* Set the flags and timeout value
*/
svc->flags = u->flags | IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED;
svc->timeout = u->timeout * HZ;
svc->netmask = u->netmask;
old_sched = svc->scheduler;
if (sched != old_sched) {
/*
* Unbind the old scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(svc))) {
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Bind the new scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, sched))) {
/*
* If ip_vs_bind_scheduler fails, restore the old
* scheduler.
* The main reason of failure is out of memory.
*
* The question is if the old scheduler can be
* restored all the time. TODO: if it cannot be
* restored some time, we must delete the service,
* otherwise the system may crash.
*/
ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, old_sched);
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
old_pe = svc->pe;
if (pe != old_pe) {
ip_vs_unbind_pe(svc);
ip_vs_bind_pe(svc, pe);
}
out_unlock:
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
out:
ip_vs_scheduler_put(old_sched);
ip_vs_pe_put(old_pe);
return ret;
}
|
ip_vs_edit_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u)
{
struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched, *old_sched;
struct ip_vs_pe *pe = NULL, *old_pe = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Lookup the scheduler, by 'u->sched_name'
*/
sched = ip_vs_scheduler_get(u->sched_name);
if (sched == NULL) {
pr_info("Scheduler module ip_vs_%s not found\n", u->sched_name);
return -ENOENT;
}
old_sched = sched;
if (u->pe_name && *u->pe_name) {
pe = ip_vs_pe_getbyname(u->pe_name);
if (pe == NULL) {
pr_info("persistence engine module ip_vs_pe_%s "
"not found\n", u->pe_name);
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
old_pe = pe;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
if (u->af == AF_INET6 && (u->netmask < 1 || u->netmask > 128)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
#endif
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
/*
* Wait until all other svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
/*
* Set the flags and timeout value
*/
svc->flags = u->flags | IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED;
svc->timeout = u->timeout * HZ;
svc->netmask = u->netmask;
old_sched = svc->scheduler;
if (sched != old_sched) {
/*
* Unbind the old scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(svc))) {
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Bind the new scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, sched))) {
/*
* If ip_vs_bind_scheduler fails, restore the old
* scheduler.
* The main reason of failure is out of memory.
*
* The question is if the old scheduler can be
* restored all the time. TODO: if it cannot be
* restored some time, we must delete the service,
* otherwise the system may crash.
*/
ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, old_sched);
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
old_pe = svc->pe;
if (pe != old_pe) {
ip_vs_unbind_pe(svc);
ip_vs_bind_pe(svc, pe);
}
out_unlock:
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
out:
ip_vs_scheduler_put(old_sched);
ip_vs_pe_put(old_pe);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5321/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void release_one_tty(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tty_struct *tty =
container_of(work, struct tty_struct, hangup_work);
struct tty_driver *driver = tty->driver;
if (tty->ops->cleanup)
tty->ops->cleanup(tty);
tty->magic = 0;
tty_driver_kref_put(driver);
module_put(driver->owner);
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
list_del_init(&tty->tty_files);
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
put_pid(tty->session);
free_tty_struct(tty);
}
|
static void release_one_tty(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tty_struct *tty =
container_of(work, struct tty_struct, hangup_work);
struct tty_driver *driver = tty->driver;
if (tty->ops->cleanup)
tty->ops->cleanup(tty);
tty->magic = 0;
tty_driver_kref_put(driver);
module_put(driver->owner);
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
list_del_init(&tty->tty_files);
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
put_pid(tty->session);
free_tty_struct(tty);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderViewHostImpl::SuddenTerminationAllowed() const {
return sudden_termination_allowed_ ||
GetProcess()->SuddenTerminationAllowed();
}
|
bool RenderViewHostImpl::SuddenTerminationAllowed() const {
return sudden_termination_allowed_ ||
GetProcess()->SuddenTerminationAllowed();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0496/
|
CWE-22
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freedink/dfarc.git/commit/?id=40cc957f52e772f45125126439ba9333cf2d2998
|
40cc957f52e772f45125126439ba9333cf2d2998
| null |
int Tar::ReadHeaders( void )
{
FILE *in;
TarHeader lHeader;
TarRecord lRecord;
unsigned int iBegData = 0;
char buf_header[512];
in = fopen(mFilePath.fn_str(), "rb");
if(in == NULL)
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: File '%s' not found! Cannot read data."), mFilePath.c_str());
return 1;
}
wxString lDmodDizPath;
mmDmodDescription = _T("");
mInstalledDmodDirectory = _T("");
int total_read = 0;
while (true)
{
memset(&lHeader, 0, sizeof(TarHeader));
memset(&lRecord, 0, sizeof(TarRecord));
fread((char*)&lHeader.Name, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mode, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Size, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mtime, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Chksum, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkflag, 1, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkname, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Magic, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devmajor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devminor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Padding, 167, 1, in);
total_read += 512;
if(!VerifyChecksum(&lHeader))
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: This .dmod file has an invalid checksum! Cannot read file."));
return 1;
}
strncpy(lRecord.Name, lHeader.Name, 100);
if (strcmp(lHeader.Name, "\xFF") == 0)
continue;
sscanf((const char*)&lHeader.Size, "%o", &lRecord.iFileSize);
lRecord.iFilePosBegin = total_read;
if(strcmp(lHeader.Name, "") == 0)
{
break;
}
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
if (mInstalledDmodDirectory.Length() == 0)
{
// Security: ensure the D-Mod directory is non-empty
wxString firstDir = GetFirstDir(lPath);
if (firstDir.IsSameAs("", true) || firstDir.IsSameAs("..", true) || firstDir.IsSameAs("dink", true))
{
wxLogError(_("Error: invalid D-Mod directory. Stopping."));
return 1;
}
mInstalledDmodDirectory = firstDir;
lDmodDizPath = mInstalledDmodDirectory + _T("dmod.diz");
lDmodDizPath.LowerCase();
}
}
else
{
int remaining = lRecord.iFileSize;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
while (remaining > 0)
{
if (feof(in))
break; // TODO: error, unexpected end of file
int nb_read = fread(buf, 1, (remaining > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : remaining, in);
remaining -= nb_read;
}
}
total_read += lRecord.iFileSize;
TarRecords.push_back(lRecord);
int padding_size = (512 - (total_read % 512)) % 512;
fread(buf_header, 1, padding_size, in);
total_read += padding_size;
}
|
int Tar::ReadHeaders( void )
{
FILE *in;
TarHeader lHeader;
TarRecord lRecord;
unsigned int iBegData = 0;
char buf_header[512];
in = fopen(mFilePath.fn_str(), "rb");
if(in == NULL)
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: File '%s' not found! Cannot read data."), mFilePath.c_str());
return 1;
}
wxString lDmodDizPath;
mmDmodDescription = _T("");
mInstalledDmodDirectory = _T("");
int total_read = 0;
while (true)
{
memset(&lHeader, 0, sizeof(TarHeader));
memset(&lRecord, 0, sizeof(TarRecord));
fread((char*)&lHeader.Name, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mode, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Size, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mtime, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Chksum, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkflag, 1, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkname, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Magic, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devmajor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devminor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Padding, 167, 1, in);
total_read += 512;
if(!VerifyChecksum(&lHeader))
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: This .dmod file has an invalid checksum! Cannot read file."));
return 1;
}
strncpy(lRecord.Name, lHeader.Name, 100);
if (strcmp(lHeader.Name, "\xFF") == 0)
continue;
sscanf((const char*)&lHeader.Size, "%o", &lRecord.iFileSize);
lRecord.iFilePosBegin = total_read;
if(strcmp(lHeader.Name, "") == 0)
{
break;
}
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
if (mInstalledDmodDirectory.Length() == 0)
{
mInstalledDmodDirectory = lPath.SubString( 0, lPath.Find( '/' ) );
lDmodDizPath = mInstalledDmodDirectory + _T("dmod.diz");
lDmodDizPath.LowerCase();
}
}
else
{
int remaining = lRecord.iFileSize;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
while (remaining > 0)
{
if (feof(in))
break; // TODO: error, unexpected end of file
int nb_read = fread(buf, 1, (remaining > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : remaining, in);
remaining -= nb_read;
}
}
total_read += lRecord.iFileSize;
TarRecords.push_back(lRecord);
int padding_size = (512 - (total_read % 512)) % 512;
fread(buf_header, 1, padding_size, in);
total_read += padding_size;
}
|
CPP
|
savannah
| 1 |
CVE-2010-4651
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4651/
|
CWE-22
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=685a78b6052f4df6eac6d625a545cfb54a6ac0e1
|
685a78b6052f4df6eac6d625a545cfb54a6ac0e1
| null |
create_backup (char const *to, struct stat *to_st, int *to_errno,
bool leave_original, bool remember_backup)
{
struct stat tmp_st;
int tmp_errno;
/* When the input to patch modifies the same file more than once, patch only
backs up the initial version of each file.
To figure out which files have already been backed up, patch remembers the
files that replace the original files. Files not known already are backed
up; files already known have already been backed up before, and are
skipped.
When a patch deletes a file, this leaves patch without such a "sentinel"
file. In that case, patch remembers the *backup file* instead; when a
patch creates a file, patch checks if the *backup file* is already known.
This strategy is not fully compatible with numbered backups: when a patch
deletes and later recreates a file with numbered backups, two numbered
backups will be created. */
if (! to_st || ! to_errno)
{
to_st = &tmp_st;
to_errno = &tmp_errno;
}
*to_errno = lstat (to, to_st) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (! to_errno && ! (S_ISREG (to_st->st_mode) || S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode)))
fatal ("File %s is not a %s -- refusing to create backup",
to, S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode) ? "symbolic link" : "regular file");
if (! *to_errno && file_already_seen (to_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
int try_makedirs_errno = 0;
char *bakname;
if (origprae || origbase || origsuff)
{
char const *p = origprae ? origprae : "";
char const *b = origbase ? origbase : "";
char const *s = origsuff ? origsuff : "";
char const *t = to;
size_t plen = strlen (p);
size_t blen = strlen (b);
size_t slen = strlen (s);
size_t tlen = strlen (t);
char const *o;
size_t olen;
for (o = t + tlen, olen = 0;
o > t && ! ISSLASH (*(o - 1));
o--)
/* do nothing */ ;
olen = t + tlen - o;
tlen -= olen;
bakname = xmalloc (plen + tlen + blen + olen + slen + 1);
memcpy (bakname, p, plen);
memcpy (bakname + plen, t, tlen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen, b, blen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen, o, olen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen + olen, s, slen + 1);
if ((origprae
&& (contains_slash (origprae + FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (origprae))
|| contains_slash (to)))
|| (origbase && contains_slash (origbase)))
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
}
else
{
bakname = find_backup_file_name (to, backup_type);
if (!bakname)
xalloc_die ();
}
if (*to_errno)
{
struct stat backup_st;
int fd;
if (lstat (bakname, &backup_st) == 0
&& file_already_seen (&backup_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Creating empty file %s\n", quotearg (bakname));
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
unlink (bakname);
while ((fd = creat (bakname, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
if (remember_backup && fstat (fd, &backup_st) == 0)
insert_file (&backup_st);
if (close (fd) != 0)
pfatal ("Can't close file %s", quotearg (bakname));
}
}
else if (leave_original)
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st, try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Renaming file %s to %s\n",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
while (rename (to, bakname) != 0)
{
if (errno == try_makedirs_errno)
{
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
else if (errno == EXDEV)
{
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st,
try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
unlink (to);
break;
}
else
pfatal ("Can't rename file %s to %s",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
}
if (remember_backup)
insert_file (to_st);
}
free (bakname);
}
}
|
create_backup (char const *to, struct stat *to_st, int *to_errno,
bool leave_original, bool remember_backup)
{
struct stat tmp_st;
int tmp_errno;
/* When the input to patch modifies the same file more than once, patch only
backs up the initial version of each file.
To figure out which files have already been backed up, patch remembers the
files that replace the original files. Files not known already are backed
up; files already known have already been backed up before, and are
skipped.
When a patch deletes a file, this leaves patch without such a "sentinel"
file. In that case, patch remembers the *backup file* instead; when a
patch creates a file, patch checks if the *backup file* is already known.
This strategy is not fully compatible with numbered backups: when a patch
deletes and later recreates a file with numbered backups, two numbered
backups will be created. */
if (! to_st || ! to_errno)
{
to_st = &tmp_st;
to_errno = &tmp_errno;
}
*to_errno = lstat (to, to_st) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (! to_errno && ! (S_ISREG (to_st->st_mode) || S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode)))
fatal ("File %s is not a %s -- refusing to create backup",
to, S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode) ? "symbolic link" : "regular file");
if (! *to_errno && file_already_seen (to_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
int try_makedirs_errno = 0;
char *bakname;
if (origprae || origbase || origsuff)
{
char const *p = origprae ? origprae : "";
char const *b = origbase ? origbase : "";
char const *s = origsuff ? origsuff : "";
char const *t = to;
size_t plen = strlen (p);
size_t blen = strlen (b);
size_t slen = strlen (s);
size_t tlen = strlen (t);
char const *o;
size_t olen;
for (o = t + tlen, olen = 0;
o > t && ! ISSLASH (*(o - 1));
o--)
/* do nothing */ ;
olen = t + tlen - o;
tlen -= olen;
bakname = xmalloc (plen + tlen + blen + olen + slen + 1);
memcpy (bakname, p, plen);
memcpy (bakname + plen, t, tlen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen, b, blen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen, o, olen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen + olen, s, slen + 1);
if ((origprae
&& (contains_slash (origprae + FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (origprae))
|| contains_slash (to)))
|| (origbase && contains_slash (origbase)))
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
}
else
{
bakname = find_backup_file_name (to, backup_type);
if (!bakname)
xalloc_die ();
}
if (*to_errno)
{
struct stat backup_st;
int fd;
if (lstat (bakname, &backup_st) == 0
&& file_already_seen (&backup_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Creating empty file %s\n", quotearg (bakname));
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
unlink (bakname);
while ((fd = creat (bakname, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
if (remember_backup && fstat (fd, &backup_st) == 0)
insert_file (&backup_st);
if (close (fd) != 0)
pfatal ("Can't close file %s", quotearg (bakname));
}
}
else if (leave_original)
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st, try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Renaming file %s to %s\n",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
while (rename (to, bakname) != 0)
{
if (errno == try_makedirs_errno)
{
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
else if (errno == EXDEV)
{
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st,
try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
unlink (to);
break;
}
else
pfatal ("Can't rename file %s to %s",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
}
if (remember_backup)
insert_file (to_st);
}
free (bakname);
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderView::OnDragTargetDrop(const gfx::Point& client_point,
const gfx::Point& screen_point) {
webview()->dragTargetDrop(client_point, screen_point);
Send(new DragHostMsg_TargetDrop_ACK(routing_id_));
}
|
void RenderView::OnDragTargetDrop(const gfx::Point& client_point,
const gfx::Point& screen_point) {
webview()->dragTargetDrop(client_point, screen_point);
Send(new DragHostMsg_TargetDrop_ACK(routing_id_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12980
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12980/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/2223f7a1e431455a1411bee77c90db94a6f8e8fe
|
2223f7a1e431455a1411bee77c90db94a6f8e8fe
|
Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
|
newSWFInput_allocedBuffer(unsigned char *buffer, int length)
{
SWFInput input = newSWFInput_buffer(buffer, length);
input->destroy = SWFInput_buffer_dtor;
#if TRACK_ALLOCS
input->gcnode = ming_gc_add_node(input, (dtorfunctype) destroySWFInput);
#endif
return input;
}
|
newSWFInput_allocedBuffer(unsigned char *buffer, int length)
{
SWFInput input = newSWFInput_buffer(buffer, length);
input->destroy = SWFInput_buffer_dtor;
#if TRACK_ALLOCS
input->gcnode = ming_gc_add_node(input, (dtorfunctype) destroySWFInput);
#endif
return input;
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
int cr;
int reg;
int err;
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
cr = exit_qualification & 15;
reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 3:
err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 4:
err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 8: {
u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
u8 cr8 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
return 1;
if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
return 1;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
return 0;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
handle_clts(vcpu);
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
case 1: /*mov from cr*/
switch (cr) {
case 3:
val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
case 8:
val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
default:
break;
}
vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
(int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
return 0;
}
|
static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
int cr;
int reg;
int err;
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
cr = exit_qualification & 15;
reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 3:
err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 4:
err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 8: {
u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
u8 cr8 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
return 1;
if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
return 1;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
return 0;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
handle_clts(vcpu);
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
case 1: /*mov from cr*/
switch (cr) {
case 3:
val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
case 8:
val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
default:
break;
}
vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
(int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage2D(ExecutionContext* execution_context,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
HTMLImageElement* image,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperHTMLImageElement(execution_context->GetSecurityOrigin(),
kTexImage2D, target, level, internalformat,
format, type, 0, 0, 0, image,
GetTextureSourceSubRectangle(width, height), 1,
unpack_image_height_, exception_state);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage2D(ExecutionContext* execution_context,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
HTMLImageElement* image,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperHTMLImageElement(execution_context->GetSecurityOrigin(),
kTexImage2D, target, level, internalformat,
format, type, 0, 0, 0, image,
GetTextureSourceSubRectangle(width, height), 1,
unpack_image_height_, exception_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1079/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573
|
43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573
|
Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
ca.device[sizeof(ca.device)-1] = 0;
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4805/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f461dcdd296eecedaffffc6bae2bfa90bd7eb89
|
1f461dcdd296eecedaffffc6bae2bfa90bd7eb89
|
ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ppp_file *pf = file->private_data;
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t ret;
if (!pf)
return -ENXIO;
ret = -ENOMEM;
skb = alloc_skb(count + pf->hdrlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto out;
skb_reserve(skb, pf->hdrlen);
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(skb_put(skb, count), buf, count)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
skb_queue_tail(&pf->xq, skb);
switch (pf->kind) {
case INTERFACE:
ppp_xmit_process(PF_TO_PPP(pf));
break;
case CHANNEL:
ppp_channel_push(PF_TO_CHANNEL(pf));
break;
}
ret = count;
out:
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ppp_file *pf = file->private_data;
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t ret;
if (!pf)
return -ENXIO;
ret = -ENOMEM;
skb = alloc_skb(count + pf->hdrlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto out;
skb_reserve(skb, pf->hdrlen);
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(skb_put(skb, count), buf, count)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
skb_queue_tail(&pf->xq, skb);
switch (pf->kind) {
case INTERFACE:
ppp_xmit_process(PF_TO_PPP(pf));
break;
case CHANNEL:
ppp_channel_push(PF_TO_CHANNEL(pf));
break;
}
ret = count;
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4177/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae
|
cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae
|
mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
{
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
kfree(ns);
}
|
static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
{
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
kfree(ns);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8617
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8617/
|
CWE-134
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
Use format string
|
static int clean_non_persistent_class(zval *zv) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce = Z_PTR_P(zv);
return (ce->type == ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS) ? ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP : ZEND_HASH_APPLY_REMOVE;
}
/* }}} */
|
static int clean_non_persistent_class(zval *zv) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce = Z_PTR_P(zv);
return (ce->type == ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS) ? ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP : ZEND_HASH_APPLY_REMOVE;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1738
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1738/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static char __init get_fdc_version(void)
{
int r;
output_byte(FD_DUMPREGS); /* 82072 and better know DUMPREGS */
if (FDCS->reset)
return FDC_NONE;
r = result();
if (r <= 0x00)
return FDC_NONE; /* No FDC present ??? */
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 8272A\n", fdc);
return FDC_8272A; /* 8272a/765 don't know DUMPREGS */
}
if (r != 10) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: DUMPREGS: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!fdc_configure()) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072; /* 82072 doesn't know CONFIGURE */
}
output_byte(FD_PERPENDICULAR);
if (need_more_output() == MORE_OUTPUT) {
output_byte(0);
} else {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072A\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072A; /* 82072A as found on Sparcs. */
}
output_byte(FD_UNLOCK);
r = result();
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a pre-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077_ORIG; /* Pre-1991 82077, doesn't know
* LOCK/UNLOCK */
}
if ((r != 1) || (reply_buffer[0] != 0x00)) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: UNLOCK: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
output_byte(FD_PARTID);
r = result();
if (r != 1) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: PARTID: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a post-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077; /* Revised 82077AA passes all the tests */
}
switch (reply_buffer[0] >> 5) {
case 0x0:
/* Either a 82078-1 or a 82078SL running at 5Volt */
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82078.\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x1:
pr_info("FDC %d is a 44pin 82078\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x2:
pr_info("FDC %d is a S82078B\n", fdc);
return FDC_S82078B;
case 0x3:
pr_info("FDC %d is a National Semiconductor PC87306\n", fdc);
return FDC_87306;
default:
pr_info("FDC %d init: 82078 variant with unknown PARTID=%d.\n",
fdc, reply_buffer[0] >> 5);
return FDC_82078_UNKN;
}
} /* get_fdc_version */
|
static char __init get_fdc_version(void)
{
int r;
output_byte(FD_DUMPREGS); /* 82072 and better know DUMPREGS */
if (FDCS->reset)
return FDC_NONE;
r = result();
if (r <= 0x00)
return FDC_NONE; /* No FDC present ??? */
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 8272A\n", fdc);
return FDC_8272A; /* 8272a/765 don't know DUMPREGS */
}
if (r != 10) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: DUMPREGS: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!fdc_configure()) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072; /* 82072 doesn't know CONFIGURE */
}
output_byte(FD_PERPENDICULAR);
if (need_more_output() == MORE_OUTPUT) {
output_byte(0);
} else {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072A\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072A; /* 82072A as found on Sparcs. */
}
output_byte(FD_UNLOCK);
r = result();
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a pre-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077_ORIG; /* Pre-1991 82077, doesn't know
* LOCK/UNLOCK */
}
if ((r != 1) || (reply_buffer[0] != 0x00)) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: UNLOCK: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
output_byte(FD_PARTID);
r = result();
if (r != 1) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: PARTID: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a post-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077; /* Revised 82077AA passes all the tests */
}
switch (reply_buffer[0] >> 5) {
case 0x0:
/* Either a 82078-1 or a 82078SL running at 5Volt */
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82078.\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x1:
pr_info("FDC %d is a 44pin 82078\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x2:
pr_info("FDC %d is a S82078B\n", fdc);
return FDC_S82078B;
case 0x3:
pr_info("FDC %d is a National Semiconductor PC87306\n", fdc);
return FDC_87306;
default:
pr_info("FDC %d init: 82078 variant with unknown PARTID=%d.\n",
fdc, reply_buffer[0] >> 5);
return FDC_82078_UNKN;
}
} /* get_fdc_version */
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16079/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2c6ce192cb3fb7bfbc3f3f862926dcb65c3891b4
|
2c6ce192cb3fb7bfbc3f3f862926dcb65c3891b4
|
Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
|
void UsbTabHelper::GetChooserService(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
mojo::InterfaceRequest<device::mojom::UsbChooserService> request) {
FrameUsbServices* frame_usb_services = GetFrameUsbService(render_frame_host);
if (!frame_usb_services->chooser_service) {
frame_usb_services->chooser_service.reset(
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
new WebUsbChooserServiceAndroid(render_frame_host));
#else
new WebUsbChooserServiceDesktop(render_frame_host));
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
frame_usb_services->chooser_service->Bind(std::move(request));
}
|
void UsbTabHelper::GetChooserService(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
mojo::InterfaceRequest<device::mojom::UsbChooserService> request) {
FrameUsbServices* frame_usb_services = GetFrameUsbService(render_frame_host);
if (!frame_usb_services->chooser_service) {
frame_usb_services->chooser_service.reset(
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
new WebUsbChooserServiceAndroid(render_frame_host));
#else
new WebUsbChooserServiceDesktop(render_frame_host));
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
frame_usb_services->chooser_service->Bind(std::move(request));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BrowserLauncherItemController::~BrowserLauncherItemController() {
tab_model_->RemoveObserver(this);
window_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (launcher_id() > 0)
launcher_controller()->CloseLauncherItem(launcher_id());
}
|
BrowserLauncherItemController::~BrowserLauncherItemController() {
tab_model_->RemoveObserver(this);
window_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (launcher_id() > 0)
launcher_controller()->CloseLauncherItem(launcher_id());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int BrowserView::NonClientHitTest(const gfx::Point& point) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (!frame_->IsMaximized() && !frame_->IsFullscreen()) {
CRect client_rect;
::GetClientRect(frame_->GetNativeWindow(), &client_rect);
gfx::Size resize_corner_size = ResizeCorner::GetSize();
gfx::Rect resize_corner_rect(client_rect.right - resize_corner_size.width(),
client_rect.bottom - resize_corner_size.height(),
resize_corner_size.width(), resize_corner_size.height());
bool rtl_dir = base::i18n::IsRTL();
if (rtl_dir)
resize_corner_rect.set_x(0);
if (resize_corner_rect.Contains(point)) {
if (rtl_dir)
return HTBOTTOMLEFT;
return HTBOTTOMRIGHT;
}
}
#endif
return GetBrowserViewLayout()->NonClientHitTest(point);
}
|
int BrowserView::NonClientHitTest(const gfx::Point& point) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (!frame_->IsMaximized() && !frame_->IsFullscreen()) {
CRect client_rect;
::GetClientRect(frame_->GetNativeWindow(), &client_rect);
gfx::Size resize_corner_size = ResizeCorner::GetSize();
gfx::Rect resize_corner_rect(client_rect.right - resize_corner_size.width(),
client_rect.bottom - resize_corner_size.height(),
resize_corner_size.width(), resize_corner_size.height());
bool rtl_dir = base::i18n::IsRTL();
if (rtl_dir)
resize_corner_rect.set_x(0);
if (resize_corner_rect.Contains(point)) {
if (rtl_dir)
return HTBOTTOMLEFT;
return HTBOTTOMRIGHT;
}
}
#endif
return GetBrowserViewLayout()->NonClientHitTest(point);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void icmp_discard(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
|
static void icmp_discard(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1625
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1625/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41cc463ecc5f0ba708a2c8282a7e7208ca7daa57
|
41cc463ecc5f0ba708a2c8282a7e7208ca7daa57
|
Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
|
HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CloseTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
std::string target_id;
if (!params || !params->GetString("targetId", &target_id))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "targetId");
HeadlessWebContents* web_contents =
browser_->GetWebContentsForDevToolsAgentHostId(target_id);
bool success = false;
if (web_contents) {
web_contents->Close();
success = true;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result(target::CloseTargetResult::Builder()
.SetSuccess(success)
.Build()
->Serialize());
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
|
HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CloseTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
std::string target_id;
if (!params || !params->GetString("targetId", &target_id))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "targetId");
HeadlessWebContents* web_contents =
browser_->GetWebContentsForDevToolsAgentHostId(target_id);
bool success = false;
if (web_contents) {
web_contents->Close();
success = true;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result(target::CloseTargetResult::Builder()
.SetSuccess(success)
.Build()
->Serialize());
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6327/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static void srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch,
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
enum dma_data_direction dir;
BUG_ON(!ch);
BUG_ON(!ioctx);
BUG_ON(ioctx->n_rdma && !ioctx->rdma_wrs);
while (ioctx->n_rdma)
kfree(ioctx->rdma_wrs[--ioctx->n_rdma].wr.sg_list);
kfree(ioctx->rdma_wrs);
ioctx->rdma_wrs = NULL;
if (ioctx->mapped_sg_count) {
sg = ioctx->sg;
WARN_ON(!sg);
dir = ioctx->cmd.data_direction;
BUG_ON(dir == DMA_NONE);
ib_dma_unmap_sg(ch->sport->sdev->device, sg, ioctx->sg_cnt,
opposite_dma_dir(dir));
ioctx->mapped_sg_count = 0;
}
}
|
static void srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch,
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
enum dma_data_direction dir;
BUG_ON(!ch);
BUG_ON(!ioctx);
BUG_ON(ioctx->n_rdma && !ioctx->rdma_wrs);
while (ioctx->n_rdma)
kfree(ioctx->rdma_wrs[--ioctx->n_rdma].wr.sg_list);
kfree(ioctx->rdma_wrs);
ioctx->rdma_wrs = NULL;
if (ioctx->mapped_sg_count) {
sg = ioctx->sg;
WARN_ON(!sg);
dir = ioctx->cmd.data_direction;
BUG_ON(dir == DMA_NONE);
ib_dma_unmap_sg(ch->sport->sdev->device, sg, ioctx->sg_cnt,
opposite_dma_dir(dir));
ioctx->mapped_sg_count = 0;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2807
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2807/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f183580d61c054f7f6bb35cfe29e1b342390fbeb
|
f183580d61c054f7f6bb35cfe29e1b342390fbeb
|
Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlThrDefOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameFunc func)
{
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameFunc old;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
old = xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValueThrDef;
#ifdef LIBXML_OUTPUT_ENABLED
if (old == NULL) {
old = __xmlOutputBufferCreateFilename;
}
#endif
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValueThrDef = func;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return(old);
}
|
xmlThrDefOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameFunc func)
{
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameFunc old;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
old = xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValueThrDef;
#ifdef LIBXML_OUTPUT_ENABLED
if (old == NULL) {
old = __xmlOutputBufferCreateFilename;
}
#endif
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValueThrDef = func;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return(old);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
// Keep track of the total bindings accumulated in this process.
RenderProcess::current()->AddBindings(enabled_bindings_flags);
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1295/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
bool PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::allowsBrokenNullLayerTreeView() const {
return true;
}
|
bool PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::allowsBrokenNullLayerTreeView() const {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2491/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void rpcproc_encode_null(void *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *obj)
{
}
|
static void rpcproc_encode_null(void *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *obj)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1351/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=777c39f4042327eac4b63c7ee87dc1c7a09a3115
|
777c39f4042327eac4b63c7ee87dc1c7a09a3115
| null |
void *zend_shared_alloc_get_xlat_entry(const void *old)
{
void *retval;
if ((retval = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)old)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return retval;
}
|
void *zend_shared_alloc_get_xlat_entry(const void *old)
{
void *retval;
if ((retval = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)old)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return retval;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
[BlackBerry] willComposite() and didComposite() are now in InspectorController
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110343
Patch by Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> on 2013-02-21
Reviewed by Carlos Garcia Campos.
This was changed in r142879.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::willComposite):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::didComposite):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@143584 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPagePrivate::setLoadState(LoadState state)
{
if (m_loadState == state)
return;
bool isFirstLoad = m_loadState == None;
if (state == Finished && m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document())
m_mainFrame->document()->updateStyleIfNeeded();
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: m_webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_loadState = state;
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
Platform::logAlways(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::setLoadState %d", state);
#endif
switch (m_loadState) {
case Provisional:
if (isFirstLoad) {
m_backingStore->d->renderAndBlitVisibleContentsImmediately();
}
break;
case Committed:
{
#if ENABLE(ACCELERATED_2D_CANVAS)
if (m_page->settings()->canvasUsesAcceleratedDrawing()) {
SharedGraphicsContext3D::get()->makeContextCurrent();
GrContext* grContext = Platform::Graphics::getGrContext();
grContext->freeGpuResources();
}
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
releaseLayerResources();
#endif
m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
m_previousContentsSize = IntSize();
m_backingStore->d->resetRenderQueue();
m_backingStore->d->resetTiles();
m_backingStore->d->setScrollingOrZooming(false, false /* shouldBlit */);
m_shouldZoomToInitialScaleAfterLoadFinished = false;
m_userPerformedManualZoom = false;
m_userPerformedManualScroll = false;
m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode = false;
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = false;
if (m_resetVirtualViewportOnCommitted) // For DRT.
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize();
if (m_webSettings->viewportWidth() > 0)
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize(m_webSettings->viewportWidth(), m_defaultLayoutSize.height());
static ViewportArguments defaultViewportArguments;
bool documentHasViewportArguments = false;
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document() && m_mainFrame->document()->viewportArguments() != defaultViewportArguments)
documentHasViewportArguments = true;
if (!(m_didRestoreFromPageCache && documentHasViewportArguments)) {
m_viewportArguments = ViewportArguments();
m_userScalable = m_webSettings->isUserScalable();
resetScales();
dispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(m_userViewportArguments);
if (m_userViewportArguments != defaultViewportArguments)
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = true;
} else {
Platform::IntSize virtualViewport = recomputeVirtualViewportFromViewportArguments();
m_webPage->setVirtualViewportSize(virtualViewport);
if (m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode)
setViewMode(FixedDesktop);
else
setViewMode(Desktop);
}
#if ENABLE(EVENT_MODE_METATAGS)
didReceiveCursorEventMode(ProcessedCursorEvents);
didReceiveTouchEventMode(ProcessedTouchEvents);
#endif
resetBlockZoom();
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
toggleTextReflowIfEnabledForBlockZoomOnly();
#endif
m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled(false);
setScrollPosition(IntPoint::zero());
notifyTransformedScrollChanged();
m_backingStore->d->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::RenderAndBlit);
updateCursor();
break;
}
case Finished:
case Failed:
m_client->scaleChanged();
m_backingStore->d->updateTiles(true /* updateVisible */, false /* immediate */);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
void WebPagePrivate::setLoadState(LoadState state)
{
if (m_loadState == state)
return;
bool isFirstLoad = m_loadState == None;
if (state == Finished && m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document())
m_mainFrame->document()->updateStyleIfNeeded();
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: m_webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_loadState = state;
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
Platform::logAlways(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::setLoadState %d", state);
#endif
switch (m_loadState) {
case Provisional:
if (isFirstLoad) {
m_backingStore->d->renderAndBlitVisibleContentsImmediately();
}
break;
case Committed:
{
#if ENABLE(ACCELERATED_2D_CANVAS)
if (m_page->settings()->canvasUsesAcceleratedDrawing()) {
SharedGraphicsContext3D::get()->makeContextCurrent();
GrContext* grContext = Platform::Graphics::getGrContext();
grContext->freeGpuResources();
}
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
releaseLayerResources();
#endif
m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
m_previousContentsSize = IntSize();
m_backingStore->d->resetRenderQueue();
m_backingStore->d->resetTiles();
m_backingStore->d->setScrollingOrZooming(false, false /* shouldBlit */);
m_shouldZoomToInitialScaleAfterLoadFinished = false;
m_userPerformedManualZoom = false;
m_userPerformedManualScroll = false;
m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode = false;
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = false;
if (m_resetVirtualViewportOnCommitted) // For DRT.
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize();
if (m_webSettings->viewportWidth() > 0)
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize(m_webSettings->viewportWidth(), m_defaultLayoutSize.height());
static ViewportArguments defaultViewportArguments;
bool documentHasViewportArguments = false;
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document() && m_mainFrame->document()->viewportArguments() != defaultViewportArguments)
documentHasViewportArguments = true;
if (!(m_didRestoreFromPageCache && documentHasViewportArguments)) {
m_viewportArguments = ViewportArguments();
m_userScalable = m_webSettings->isUserScalable();
resetScales();
dispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(m_userViewportArguments);
if (m_userViewportArguments != defaultViewportArguments)
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = true;
} else {
Platform::IntSize virtualViewport = recomputeVirtualViewportFromViewportArguments();
m_webPage->setVirtualViewportSize(virtualViewport);
if (m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode)
setViewMode(FixedDesktop);
else
setViewMode(Desktop);
}
#if ENABLE(EVENT_MODE_METATAGS)
didReceiveCursorEventMode(ProcessedCursorEvents);
didReceiveTouchEventMode(ProcessedTouchEvents);
#endif
resetBlockZoom();
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
toggleTextReflowIfEnabledForBlockZoomOnly();
#endif
m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled(false);
setScrollPosition(IntPoint::zero());
notifyTransformedScrollChanged();
m_backingStore->d->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::RenderAndBlit);
updateCursor();
break;
}
case Finished:
case Failed:
m_client->scaleChanged();
m_backingStore->d->updateTiles(true /* updateVisible */, false /* immediate */);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1738
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1738/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void floppy_off(unsigned int drive)
{
unsigned long volatile delta;
int fdc = FDC(drive);
if (!(FDCS->dor & (0x10 << UNIT(drive))))
return;
del_timer(motor_off_timer + drive);
/* make spindle stop in a position which minimizes spinup time
* next time */
if (UDP->rps) {
delta = jiffies - UDRS->first_read_date + HZ -
UDP->spindown_offset;
delta = ((delta * UDP->rps) % HZ) / UDP->rps;
motor_off_timer[drive].expires =
jiffies + UDP->spindown - delta;
}
add_timer(motor_off_timer + drive);
}
|
static void floppy_off(unsigned int drive)
{
unsigned long volatile delta;
int fdc = FDC(drive);
if (!(FDCS->dor & (0x10 << UNIT(drive))))
return;
del_timer(motor_off_timer + drive);
/* make spindle stop in a position which minimizes spinup time
* next time */
if (UDP->rps) {
delta = jiffies - UDRS->first_read_date + HZ -
UDP->spindown_offset;
delta = ((delta * UDP->rps) % HZ) / UDP->rps;
motor_off_timer[drive].expires =
jiffies + UDP->spindown - delta;
}
add_timer(motor_off_timer + drive);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1281/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLScriptRunner::requestPendingScript(PendingScript& pendingScript, Element* script) const
{
ASSERT(!pendingScript.element());
pendingScript.setElement(script);
ScriptResource* resource = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(script)->resource().get();
if (!resource) {
notImplemented(); // Dispatch error event.
return false;
}
pendingScript.setScriptResource(resource);
return true;
}
|
bool HTMLScriptRunner::requestPendingScript(PendingScript& pendingScript, Element* script) const
{
ASSERT(!pendingScript.element());
pendingScript.setElement(script);
ScriptResource* resource = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(script)->resource().get();
if (!resource) {
notImplemented(); // Dispatch error event.
return false;
}
pendingScript.setScriptResource(resource);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
perf_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned int cpu = (long)hcpu;
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_UP_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
perf_event_init_cpu(cpu);
break;
case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
perf_event_exit_cpu(cpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
|
perf_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned int cpu = (long)hcpu;
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_UP_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
perf_event_init_cpu(cpu);
break;
case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
perf_event_exit_cpu(cpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7184
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7184/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df
|
f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df
|
xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen, err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += nla_total_size(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
len += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
}
len += NLMSG_ALIGN(headlen);
skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->portid, c->seq, c->event, headlen, 0);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (nlh == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
struct nlattr *attr;
id = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p));
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (attr == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nla_data(attr);
}
err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
|
static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen, err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += nla_total_size(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
len += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
}
len += NLMSG_ALIGN(headlen);
skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->portid, c->seq, c->event, headlen, 0);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (nlh == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
struct nlattr *attr;
id = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p));
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (attr == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nla_data(attr);
}
err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4127/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5
|
dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5
|
vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void vhost_net_disable_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq =
container_of(vq, struct vhost_net_virtqueue, vq);
struct vhost_poll *poll = n->poll + (nvq - n->vqs);
if (!vq->private_data)
return;
vhost_poll_stop(poll);
}
|
static void vhost_net_disable_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq =
container_of(vq, struct vhost_net_virtqueue, vq);
struct vhost_poll *poll = n->poll + (nvq - n->vqs);
if (!vq->private_data)
return;
vhost_poll_stop(poll);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7842/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int get_msr_hyperv_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data = 0;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
data = kvm->arch.hv_guest_os_id;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
data = kvm->arch.hv_hypercall;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT: {
data =
div_u64(get_kernel_ns() + kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset, 100);
break;
}
case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
data = kvm->arch.hv_tsc_page;
break;
default:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Hyper-V unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
|
static int get_msr_hyperv_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data = 0;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
data = kvm->arch.hv_guest_os_id;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
data = kvm->arch.hv_hypercall;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT: {
data =
div_u64(get_kernel_ns() + kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset, 100);
break;
}
case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
data = kvm->arch.hv_tsc_page;
break;
default:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Hyper-V unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
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