CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-5696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5696/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tcp_ecn_accept_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (tcp_hdr(skb)->cwr)
tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR;
}
|
static void tcp_ecn_accept_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (tcp_hdr(skb)->cwr)
tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindRenderbuffer(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* info = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
info = GetRenderbufferInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glBindRenderbuffer: id not generated by glGenRenderbuffers");
return;
}
glGenRenderbuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
CreateRenderbufferInfo(client_id, service_id);
info = GetRenderbufferInfo(client_id);
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kRenderbuffers);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
} else {
service_id = info->service_id();
}
info->MarkAsValid();
}
bound_renderbuffer_ = info;
glBindRenderbufferEXT(target, service_id);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindRenderbuffer(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* info = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
info = GetRenderbufferInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glBindRenderbuffer: id not generated by glGenRenderbuffers");
return;
}
glGenRenderbuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
CreateRenderbufferInfo(client_id, service_id);
info = GetRenderbufferInfo(client_id);
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kRenderbuffers);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
} else {
service_id = info->service_id();
}
info->MarkAsValid();
}
bound_renderbuffer_ = info;
glBindRenderbufferEXT(target, service_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0836/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool JPEGImageDecoder::outputScanlines(ImageFrame& buffer)
{
return m_scaled ? outputScanlines<colorSpace, true>(buffer) : outputScanlines<colorSpace, false>(buffer);
}
|
bool JPEGImageDecoder::outputScanlines(ImageFrame& buffer)
{
return m_scaled ? outputScanlines<colorSpace, true>(buffer) : outputScanlines<colorSpace, false>(buffer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7d97e1d327f153cce6137ef8b533d45d083802d9
|
7d97e1d327f153cce6137ef8b533d45d083802d9
|
Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PromoResourceService::CanShowNotificationPromo(Profile* profile) {
NotificationPromo notification_promo(profile);
notification_promo.InitFromPrefs();
return notification_promo.CanShow();
}
|
bool PromoResourceService::CanShowNotificationPromo(Profile* profile) {
NotificationPromo notification_promo(profile);
notification_promo.InitFromPrefs();
return notification_promo.CanShow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
filesystem_create_create_luks_device_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
MkfsLuksData *data = user_data;
/* poke the kernel so we can reread the data (new uuid etc.) */
device_generate_kernel_change_event (device);
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* OK! So we've got ourselves an luks device. Let's set it up so we can create a file
* system. Sit and wait for the change event to appear so we can setup with the right UUID.
*/
data->device_changed_signal_handler_id
= g_signal_connect_after (device->priv->daemon,
"device-changed",
(GCallback) filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_changed_cb,
mkfse_data_ref (data));
/* set up timeout for error reporting if waiting failed
*
* (the signal handler and the timeout handler share the ref to data
* as one will cancel the other)
*/
data->device_changed_timeout_id = g_timeout_add (10 * 1000,
filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_not_seen_cb,
data);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error creating file system: cryptsetup exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
|
filesystem_create_create_luks_device_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
MkfsLuksData *data = user_data;
/* poke the kernel so we can reread the data (new uuid etc.) */
device_generate_kernel_change_event (device);
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* OK! So we've got ourselves an luks device. Let's set it up so we can create a file
* system. Sit and wait for the change event to appear so we can setup with the right UUID.
*/
data->device_changed_signal_handler_id
= g_signal_connect_after (device->priv->daemon,
"device-changed",
(GCallback) filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_changed_cb,
mkfse_data_ref (data));
/* set up timeout for error reporting if waiting failed
*
* (the signal handler and the timeout handler share the ref to data
* as one will cancel the other)
*/
data->device_changed_timeout_id = g_timeout_add (10 * 1000,
filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_not_seen_cb,
data);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error creating file system: cryptsetup exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1300/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
bool HeadlessWebContentsImpl::OpenURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
content::NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
web_contents_delegate_->ActivateContents(web_contents_.get());
web_contents_->Focus();
return true;
}
|
bool HeadlessWebContentsImpl::OpenURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
content::NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
web_contents_delegate_->ActivateContents(web_contents_.get());
web_contents_->Focus();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13045/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/d23b0d22cc611e43c88d99192a59f413f951a955
|
d23b0d22cc611e43c88d99192a59f413f951a955
|
Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
|
static void init_userinfo(void)
{
unsigned int changed;
const char *set, *nick, *user_name, *str;
changed = 0;
/* check if nick/username/realname wasn't read from setup.. */
set = settings_get_str("real_name");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNAME");
settings_set_str("real_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_real_name());
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_REAL_NAME;
}
/* username */
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCUSER");
settings_set_str("user_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_user_name());
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_USER_NAME;
}
/* nick */
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
if (nick == NULL || *nick == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNICK");
settings_set_str("nick", str != NULL ? str : user_name);
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_NICK;
}
/* host name */
set = settings_get_str("hostname");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCHOST");
if (str != NULL) {
settings_set_str("hostname", str);
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_HOSTNAME;
}
}
signal_emit("irssi init userinfo changed", 1, GUINT_TO_POINTER(changed));
}
|
static void init_userinfo(void)
{
unsigned int changed;
const char *set, *nick, *user_name, *str;
changed = 0;
/* check if nick/username/realname wasn't read from setup.. */
set = settings_get_str("real_name");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNAME");
settings_set_str("real_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_real_name());
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_REAL_NAME;
}
/* username */
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCUSER");
settings_set_str("user_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_user_name());
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_USER_NAME;
}
/* nick */
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
if (nick == NULL || *nick == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNICK");
settings_set_str("nick", str != NULL ? str : user_name);
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_NICK;
}
/* host name */
set = settings_get_str("hostname");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCHOST");
if (str != NULL) {
settings_set_str("hostname", str);
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_HOSTNAME;
}
}
signal_emit("irssi init userinfo changed", 1, GUINT_TO_POINTER(changed));
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3910/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/035cb12f392860113dce96116a5150e2fde6f0cc
|
035cb12f392860113dce96116a5150e2fde6f0cc
|
soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
|
void SoundTriggerHwService::sendSoundModelEvent(struct sound_trigger_model_event *event,
Module *module)
{
AutoMutex lock(mServiceLock);
sp<IMemory> eventMemory = prepareSoundModelEvent_l(event);
if (eventMemory == 0) {
return;
}
sp<Module> strongModule;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mModules.size(); i++) {
if (mModules.valueAt(i).get() == module) {
strongModule = mModules.valueAt(i);
break;
}
}
if (strongModule == 0) {
return;
}
sendCallbackEvent_l(new CallbackEvent(CallbackEvent::TYPE_SOUNDMODEL,
eventMemory, strongModule));
}
|
void SoundTriggerHwService::sendSoundModelEvent(struct sound_trigger_model_event *event,
Module *module)
{
AutoMutex lock(mServiceLock);
sp<IMemory> eventMemory = prepareSoundModelEvent_l(event);
if (eventMemory == 0) {
return;
}
sp<Module> strongModule;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mModules.size(); i++) {
if (mModules.valueAt(i).get() == module) {
strongModule = mModules.valueAt(i);
break;
}
}
if (strongModule == 0) {
return;
}
sendCallbackEvent_l(new CallbackEvent(CallbackEvent::TYPE_SOUNDMODEL,
eventMemory, strongModule));
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
sync: ensure sync init path doesn't block on CheckTime
The call to RequestEarlyExit (which calls Abort) only happens if the SyncBackendHost has received the initialization callback from the SyncManager. But during init, the SyncManager could make a call to CheckTime, meaning that call would never be aborted. This patch makes sure to cover that case.
BUG=93829
TEST=None at the moment :(
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7862011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100543 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SyncBackendHost::Core::~Core() {
DCHECK(!sync_manager_.get());
}
|
SyncBackendHost::Core::~Core() {
DCHECK(!sync_manager_.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10507
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10507/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/da940424816e11d624362ce080bc026adffa26e8
|
da940424816e11d624362ce080bc026adffa26e8
|
Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
|
static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1P3R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* const* pDst, OPJ_INT32 const* pDstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
OPJ_INT32* pR = pDst[0];
OPJ_INT32* pG = pDst[1];
OPJ_INT32* pB = pDst[2];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_R = pLUT[0];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_G = pLUT[1];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_B = pLUT[2];
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
OPJ_UINT8 idx = pSrc[x];
pR[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_R[idx];
pG[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_G[idx];
pB[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_B[idx];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pR += pDstStride[0];
pG += pDstStride[1];
pB += pDstStride[2];
}
}
|
static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1P3R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* const* pDst, OPJ_INT32 const* pDstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
OPJ_INT32* pR = pDst[0];
OPJ_INT32* pG = pDst[1];
OPJ_INT32* pB = pDst[2];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_R = pLUT[0];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_G = pLUT[1];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_B = pLUT[2];
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
OPJ_UINT8 idx = pSrc[x];
pR[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_R[idx];
pG[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_G[idx];
pB[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_B[idx];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pR += pDstStride[0];
pG += pDstStride[1];
pB += pDstStride[2];
}
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5838/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
ActiveTabWithServiceTest() {}
|
ActiveTabWithServiceTest() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void thaw_limited_counters(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw,
unsigned long pmc5, unsigned long pmc6)
{
struct perf_event *event;
u64 val, prev;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_limited; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->limited_counter[i];
event->hw.idx = cpuhw->limited_hwidx[i];
val = (event->hw.idx == 5) ? pmc5 : pmc6;
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
if (check_and_compute_delta(prev, val))
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
}
}
|
static void thaw_limited_counters(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw,
unsigned long pmc5, unsigned long pmc6)
{
struct perf_event *event;
u64 val, prev;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_limited; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->limited_counter[i];
event->hw.idx = cpuhw->limited_hwidx[i];
val = (event->hw.idx == 5) ? pmc5 : pmc6;
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
if (check_and_compute_delta(prev, val))
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11144/
|
CWE-754
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
|
73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
| null |
int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
d->p = p;
d->q = q;
d->g = g;
return 1;
}
|
int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
d->p = p;
d->q = q;
d->g = g;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2879/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/afbc71b7a78ac99810a6b22b2b0a2e85dde18794
|
afbc71b7a78ac99810a6b22b2b0a2e85dde18794
|
Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
content::WebUIDataSource* CreateWebUIDataSource() {
content::WebUIDataSource* source =
content::WebUIDataSource::Create(chrome::kChromeUIInlineLoginHost);
source->SetUseJsonJSFormatV2();
source->SetJsonPath("strings.js");
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath("inline_login.css", IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_CSS);
source->AddResourcePath("inline_login.js", IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_JS);
return source;
};
|
content::WebUIDataSource* CreateWebUIDataSource() {
content::WebUIDataSource* source =
content::WebUIDataSource::Create(chrome::kChromeUIInlineLoginHost);
source->SetUseJsonJSFormatV2();
source->SetJsonPath("strings.js");
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath("inline_login.css", IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_CSS);
source->AddResourcePath("inline_login.js", IDR_INLINE_LOGIN_JS);
return source;
};
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6542
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6542/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
|
4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
| null |
static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
const unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
{
bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
*data += *datalen;
*datalen = 0;
}
|
static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
const unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
{
bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
*data += *datalen;
*datalen = 0;
}
|
C
|
tartarus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-5759
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5759/
|
CWE-674
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mujs.git;a=commit;h=4d45a96e57fbabf00a7378b337d0ddcace6f38c1
|
4d45a96e57fbabf00a7378b337d0ddcace6f38c1
| null |
static void jsP_freejumps(js_State *J, js_JumpList *node)
{
while (node) {
js_JumpList *next = node->next;
js_free(J, node);
node = next;
}
}
|
static void jsP_freejumps(js_State *J, js_JumpList *node)
{
while (node) {
js_JumpList *next = node->next;
js_free(J, node);
node = next;
}
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17547/
| null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/ecf7c6b288e11e7e7f75387c5e9e93e423b98397
|
ecf7c6b288e11e7e7f75387c5e9e93e423b98397
|
...
|
MagickExport DrawInfo *AcquireDrawInfo(void)
{
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
draw_info=(DrawInfo *) AcquireCriticalMemory(sizeof(*draw_info));
GetDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
return(draw_info);
}
|
MagickExport DrawInfo *AcquireDrawInfo(void)
{
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
draw_info=(DrawInfo *) AcquireCriticalMemory(sizeof(*draw_info));
GetDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
return(draw_info);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18346
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18346/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9004be20a4cfde70456579489258c3aca4ed45a4
|
9004be20a4cfde70456579489258c3aca4ed45a4
|
Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: ssid <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
|
bool SessionStore::StorageKeyMatchesLocalSession(
const std::string& storage_key) const {
std::string session_tag;
int tab_node_id;
bool success = DecodeStorageKey(storage_key, &session_tag, &tab_node_id);
DCHECK(success);
return session_tag == local_session_info_.session_tag;
}
|
bool SessionStore::StorageKeyMatchesLocalSession(
const std::string& storage_key) const {
std::string session_tag;
int tab_node_id;
bool success = DecodeStorageKey(storage_key, &session_tag, &tab_node_id);
DCHECK(success);
return session_tag == local_session_info_.session_tag;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
|
void Com_ReadFromPipe( void )
{
static char buf[MAX_STRING_CHARS];
static int accu = 0;
int read;
if( !pipefile )
return;
while( ( read = FS_Read( buf + accu, sizeof( buf ) - accu - 1, pipefile ) ) > 0 )
{
char *brk = NULL;
int i;
for( i = accu; i < accu + read; ++i )
{
if( buf[ i ] == '\0' )
buf[ i ] = '\n';
if( buf[ i ] == '\n' || buf[ i ] == '\r' )
brk = &buf[ i + 1 ];
}
buf[ accu + read ] = '\0';
accu += read;
if( brk )
{
char tmp = *brk;
*brk = '\0';
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_APPEND, buf );
*brk = tmp;
accu -= brk - buf;
memmove( buf, brk, accu + 1 );
}
else if( accu >= sizeof( buf ) - 1 ) // full
{
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_APPEND, buf );
accu = 0;
}
}
}
|
void Com_ReadFromPipe( void )
{
static char buf[MAX_STRING_CHARS];
static int accu = 0;
int read;
if( !pipefile )
return;
while( ( read = FS_Read( buf + accu, sizeof( buf ) - accu - 1, pipefile ) ) > 0 )
{
char *brk = NULL;
int i;
for( i = accu; i < accu + read; ++i )
{
if( buf[ i ] == '\0' )
buf[ i ] = '\n';
if( buf[ i ] == '\n' || buf[ i ] == '\r' )
brk = &buf[ i + 1 ];
}
buf[ accu + read ] = '\0';
accu += read;
if( brk )
{
char tmp = *brk;
*brk = '\0';
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_APPEND, buf );
*brk = tmp;
accu -= brk - buf;
memmove( buf, brk, accu + 1 );
}
else if( accu >= sizeof( buf ) - 1 ) // full
{
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_APPEND, buf );
accu = 0;
}
}
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3836/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6
|
e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6
|
DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
|
static void Convert_rgn (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_U16 regionIndex, EAS_U16 artIndex, EAS_U16 waveIndex, S_WSMP_DATA *pWsmp)
{
S_DLS_REGION *pRgn;
/* setup pointers to data structures */
pRgn = &pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSRegions[regionIndex];
/* intiailize indices */
pRgn->wtRegion.artIndex = artIndex;
pRgn->wtRegion.waveIndex = waveIndex;
/* convert region data */
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
pRgn->wtRegion.gain = (EAS_I16) (pWsmp->gain >> 16);
pRgn->wtRegion.loopStart = pWsmp->loopStart;
pRgn->wtRegion.loopEnd = (pWsmp->loopStart + pWsmp->loopLength);
pRgn->wtRegion.tuning = pWsmp->fineTune -(pWsmp->unityNote * 100) + ConvertSampleRate(pWsmp->sampleRate);
if (pWsmp->loopLength != 0)
pRgn->wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags |= REGION_FLAG_IS_LOOPED;
}
|
static void Convert_rgn (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_U16 regionIndex, EAS_U16 artIndex, EAS_U16 waveIndex, S_WSMP_DATA *pWsmp)
{
S_DLS_REGION *pRgn;
/* setup pointers to data structures */
pRgn = &pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSRegions[regionIndex];
/* intiailize indices */
pRgn->wtRegion.artIndex = artIndex;
pRgn->wtRegion.waveIndex = waveIndex;
/* convert region data */
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
pRgn->wtRegion.gain = (EAS_I16) (pWsmp->gain >> 16);
pRgn->wtRegion.loopStart = pWsmp->loopStart;
pRgn->wtRegion.loopEnd = (pWsmp->loopStart + pWsmp->loopLength);
pRgn->wtRegion.tuning = pWsmp->fineTune -(pWsmp->unityNote * 100) + ConvertSampleRate(pWsmp->sampleRate);
if (pWsmp->loopLength != 0)
pRgn->wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags |= REGION_FLAG_IS_LOOPED;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16994
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16994/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f12b26e21ab359261bf75cfcb424fdc7daeb6d
|
07f12b26e21ab359261bf75cfcb424fdc7daeb6d
|
net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int ipip6_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
struct nlattr *data[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct ip_tunnel *t = netdev_priv(dev);
struct ip_tunnel_parm p;
struct ip_tunnel_encap ipencap;
struct net *net = t->net;
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
struct ip_tunnel_6rd ip6rd;
#endif
__u32 fwmark = t->fwmark;
int err;
if (dev == sitn->fb_tunnel_dev)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipip6_netlink_encap_parms(data, &ipencap)) {
err = ip_tunnel_encap_setup(t, &ipencap);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
ipip6_netlink_parms(data, &p, &fwmark);
if (((dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && !p.iph.daddr) ||
(!(dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && p.iph.daddr))
return -EINVAL;
t = ipip6_tunnel_locate(net, &p, 0);
if (t) {
if (t->dev != dev)
return -EEXIST;
} else
t = netdev_priv(dev);
ipip6_tunnel_update(t, &p, fwmark);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
if (ipip6_netlink_6rd_parms(data, &ip6rd))
return ipip6_tunnel_update_6rd(t, &ip6rd);
#endif
return 0;
}
|
static int ipip6_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
struct nlattr *data[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct ip_tunnel *t = netdev_priv(dev);
struct ip_tunnel_parm p;
struct ip_tunnel_encap ipencap;
struct net *net = t->net;
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
struct ip_tunnel_6rd ip6rd;
#endif
__u32 fwmark = t->fwmark;
int err;
if (dev == sitn->fb_tunnel_dev)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipip6_netlink_encap_parms(data, &ipencap)) {
err = ip_tunnel_encap_setup(t, &ipencap);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
ipip6_netlink_parms(data, &p, &fwmark);
if (((dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && !p.iph.daddr) ||
(!(dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && p.iph.daddr))
return -EINVAL;
t = ipip6_tunnel_locate(net, &p, 0);
if (t) {
if (t->dev != dev)
return -EEXIST;
} else
t = netdev_priv(dev);
ipip6_tunnel_update(t, &p, fwmark);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
if (ipip6_netlink_6rd_parms(data, &ip6rd))
return ipip6_tunnel_update_6rd(t, &ip6rd);
#endif
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9940
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9940/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
|
regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
|
void regulator_unregister_supply_alias(struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
struct regulator_supply_alias *map;
map = regulator_find_supply_alias(dev, id);
if (map) {
list_del(&map->list);
kfree(map);
}
}
|
void regulator_unregister_supply_alias(struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
struct regulator_supply_alias *map;
map = regulator_find_supply_alias(dev, id);
if (map) {
list_del(&map->list);
kfree(map);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy::GetMimeTypes() const {
return std::vector<std::string>();
}
|
OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy::GetMimeTypes() const {
return std::vector<std::string>();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Element::clearHasPendingResources()
{
ensureElementRareData()->setHasPendingResources(false);
}
|
void Element::clearHasPendingResources()
{
ensureElementRareData()->setHasPendingResources(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1224
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1224/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c6e9372daae557d6857f02888e84363eeff9be9
|
5c6e9372daae557d6857f02888e84363eeff9be9
|
Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
|
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
|
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2829
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2829/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a
|
a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a
|
Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLenum StubGLCheckFramebufferStatus(GLenum target) {
return glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target);
}
|
GLenum StubGLCheckFramebufferStatus(GLenum target) {
return glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1639
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1639/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
LoginDisplay* LoginDisplayHostWebUI::GetLoginDisplay() {
return login_display_.get();
}
|
LoginDisplay* LoginDisplayHostWebUI::GetLoginDisplay() {
return login_display_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int init_sched_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map)
{
int err;
arch_update_cpu_topology();
ndoms_cur = 1;
doms_cur = alloc_sched_domains(ndoms_cur);
if (!doms_cur)
doms_cur = &fallback_doms;
cpumask_andnot(doms_cur[0], cpu_map, cpu_isolated_map);
dattr_cur = NULL;
err = build_sched_domains(doms_cur[0], NULL);
register_sched_domain_sysctl();
return err;
}
|
static int init_sched_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map)
{
int err;
arch_update_cpu_topology();
ndoms_cur = 1;
doms_cur = alloc_sched_domains(ndoms_cur);
if (!doms_cur)
doms_cur = &fallback_doms;
cpumask_andnot(doms_cur[0], cpu_map, cpu_isolated_map);
dattr_cur = NULL;
err = build_sched_domains(doms_cur[0], NULL);
register_sched_domain_sysctl();
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ccd0226c79553e318657d6285c2feacebd105996
|
ccd0226c79553e318657d6285c2feacebd105996
|
Don't allow more than one pending print dialog per browser instance.
As a future TODO, it might be nice to limit it per-tab instead of per-app.
BUG=46575
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2848011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@50203 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::DoOnClipboardReadText(Clipboard::Buffer buffer,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
string16 result;
GetClipboard()->ReadText(buffer, &result);
ViewHostMsg_ClipboardReadText::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, result);
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::SendDelayedReply, reply_msg));
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::DoOnClipboardReadText(Clipboard::Buffer buffer,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
string16 result;
GetClipboard()->ReadText(buffer, &result);
ViewHostMsg_ClipboardReadText::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, result);
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::SendDelayedReply, reply_msg));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3885/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
|
void CLASS fill_holes (int holes)
{
int row, col, val[4];
for (row=2; row < height-2; row++) {
if (!HOLE(row)) continue;
for (col=1; col < width-1; col+=4) {
val[0] = BAYER(row-1,col-1);
val[1] = BAYER(row-1,col+1);
val[2] = BAYER(row+1,col-1);
val[3] = BAYER(row+1,col+1);
BAYER(row,col) = median4(val);
}
for (col=2; col < width-2; col+=4)
if (HOLE(row-2) || HOLE(row+2))
BAYER(row,col) = (BAYER(row,col-2) + BAYER(row,col+2)) >> 1;
else {
val[0] = BAYER(row,col-2);
val[1] = BAYER(row,col+2);
val[2] = BAYER(row-2,col);
val[3] = BAYER(row+2,col);
BAYER(row,col) = median4(val);
}
}
}
|
void CLASS fill_holes (int holes)
{
int row, col, val[4];
for (row=2; row < height-2; row++) {
if (!HOLE(row)) continue;
for (col=1; col < width-1; col+=4) {
val[0] = BAYER(row-1,col-1);
val[1] = BAYER(row-1,col+1);
val[2] = BAYER(row+1,col-1);
val[3] = BAYER(row+1,col+1);
BAYER(row,col) = median4(val);
}
for (col=2; col < width-2; col+=4)
if (HOLE(row-2) || HOLE(row+2))
BAYER(row,col) = (BAYER(row,col-2) + BAYER(row,col+2)) >> 1;
else {
val[0] = BAYER(row,col-2);
val[1] = BAYER(row,col+2);
val[2] = BAYER(row-2,col);
val[3] = BAYER(row+2,col);
BAYER(row,col) = median4(val);
}
}
}
|
C
|
rawstudio
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5104/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
} else {
if (pending_render_frame_host_)
return pending_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
}
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
|
WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
} else {
if (pending_render_frame_host_)
return pending_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
}
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
~MockDownloadFileManager() {}
|
~MockDownloadFileManager() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
static gfx::Vector2dF ScrollNodeWithLocalDelta(
ScrollNode* scroll_node,
const gfx::Vector2dF& local_delta,
float page_scale_factor,
LayerTreeImpl* layer_tree_impl) {
ScrollTree& scroll_tree = layer_tree_impl->property_trees()->scroll_tree;
gfx::ScrollOffset previous_offset =
scroll_tree.current_scroll_offset(scroll_node->owning_layer_id);
gfx::Vector2dF delta = local_delta;
delta.Scale(1.f / page_scale_factor);
scroll_tree.ScrollBy(scroll_node, delta, layer_tree_impl);
gfx::ScrollOffset scrolled =
scroll_tree.current_scroll_offset(scroll_node->owning_layer_id) -
previous_offset;
gfx::Vector2dF consumed_scroll(scrolled.x(), scrolled.y());
consumed_scroll.Scale(page_scale_factor);
return consumed_scroll;
}
|
static gfx::Vector2dF ScrollNodeWithLocalDelta(
ScrollNode* scroll_node,
const gfx::Vector2dF& local_delta,
float page_scale_factor,
LayerTreeImpl* layer_tree_impl) {
ScrollTree& scroll_tree = layer_tree_impl->property_trees()->scroll_tree;
gfx::ScrollOffset previous_offset =
scroll_tree.current_scroll_offset(scroll_node->owning_layer_id);
gfx::Vector2dF delta = local_delta;
delta.Scale(1.f / page_scale_factor);
scroll_tree.ScrollBy(scroll_node, delta, layer_tree_impl);
gfx::ScrollOffset scrolled =
scroll_tree.current_scroll_offset(scroll_node->owning_layer_id) -
previous_offset;
gfx::Vector2dF consumed_scroll(scrolled.x(), scrolled.y());
consumed_scroll.Scale(page_scale_factor);
return consumed_scroll;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6623/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9fd9d629fcf836bb0d6210015d33a299cf6bca34
|
9fd9d629fcf836bb0d6210015d33a299cf6bca34
|
Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Browser* InProcessBrowserTest::CreateBrowserForPopup(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser =
new Browser(Browser::CreateParams(Browser::TYPE_POPUP, profile,
chrome::GetActiveDesktop()));
AddBlankTabAndShow(browser);
return browser;
}
|
Browser* InProcessBrowserTest::CreateBrowserForPopup(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser =
new Browser(Browser::CreateParams(Browser::TYPE_POPUP, profile,
chrome::GetActiveDesktop()));
AddBlankTabAndShow(browser);
return browser;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6053/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
|
bool TopSitesImpl::IsKnownURL(const GURL& url) {
return loaded_ && cache_->IsKnownURL(url);
}
|
bool TopSitesImpl::IsKnownURL(const GURL& url) {
return loaded_ && cache_->IsKnownURL(url);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5b51043c7c8e7e6b86e68e6d93d95ad24e11cf0e
|
5b51043c7c8e7e6b86e68e6d93d95ad24e11cf0e
|
[Payments] Prohibit opening payments UI in background tab.
Before this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() would bring the
background window to the foreground, which allows a page to open a
pop-under.
This patch adds a check for the browser window being active (in
foreground) in PaymentRequest.show(). If the window is not active (in
background), then PaymentRequest.show() promise is rejected with
"AbortError: User cancelled request." No UI is shown in that case.
After this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() does not bring the
background window to the foreground, thus preventing opening a pop-under.
Bug: 768230
Change-Id: I2b90f9086ceca5ed7b7bdf8045e44d7e99d566d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/681843
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504406}
|
void ChromePaymentRequestDelegate::CloseDialog() {
if (dialog_) {
dialog_->CloseDialog();
dialog_ = nullptr;
}
}
|
void ChromePaymentRequestDelegate::CloseDialog() {
if (dialog_) {
dialog_->CloseDialog();
dialog_ = nullptr;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
|
int DownloadCoreServiceImpl::NonMaliciousDownloadCount() const {
if (!download_manager_created_)
return 0;
return BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_)
->NonMaliciousInProgressCount();
}
|
int DownloadCoreServiceImpl::NonMaliciousDownloadCount() const {
if (!download_manager_created_)
return 0;
return BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_)
->NonMaliciousInProgressCount();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool IsScrollEndEffectEnabled() {
return CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kScrollEndEffect) == "1";
}
|
bool IsScrollEndEffectEnabled() {
return CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kScrollEndEffect) == "1";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7798/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/ruby/openssl/commit/8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062
|
8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062
|
cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
|
ossl_cipher_new(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
VALUE ret;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
ret = ossl_cipher_alloc(cCipher);
AllocCipher(ret, ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return ret;
}
|
ossl_cipher_new(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
VALUE ret;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
ret = ossl_cipher_alloc(cCipher);
AllocCipher(ret, ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetExtraServiceManifests() {
return std::vector<content::ContentBrowserClient::ServiceManifestInfo>({
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
{nacl::kNaClLoaderServiceName, IDR_NACL_LOADER_MANIFEST},
#if defined(OS_WIN)
{nacl::kNaClBrokerServiceName, IDR_NACL_BROKER_MANIFEST},
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
{printing::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_PDF_COMPOSITOR_MANIFEST},
#endif
{chrome::mojom::kRendererServiceName,
IDR_CHROME_RENDERER_SERVICE_MANIFEST},
});
}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetExtraServiceManifests() {
return std::vector<content::ContentBrowserClient::ServiceManifestInfo>({
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
{nacl::kNaClLoaderServiceName, IDR_NACL_LOADER_MANIFEST},
#if defined(OS_WIN)
{nacl::kNaClBrokerServiceName, IDR_NACL_BROKER_MANIFEST},
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
{printing::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_PDF_COMPOSITOR_MANIFEST},
#endif
{chrome::mojom::kRendererServiceName,
IDR_CHROME_RENDERER_SERVICE_MANIFEST},
});
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2822/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a64c3cf0ab6da24a9a010a45ebe4794422d40c71
|
a64c3cf0ab6da24a9a010a45ebe4794422d40c71
|
Be a little more careful whether something is an URL or a file path.
BUG=72492
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95731 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static void FixupPort(const std::string& text,
const url_parse::Component& part,
std::string* url) {
if (!part.is_valid())
return;
url->append(":");
url->append(text, part.begin, part.len);
}
|
static void FixupPort(const std::string& text,
const url_parse::Component& part,
std::string* url) {
if (!part.is_valid())
return;
url->append(":");
url->append(text, part.begin, part.len);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/net/wifi/+/a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
|
void onLinkStatsResults(wifi_request_id id, wifi_iface_stat *iface_stat,
int num_radios, wifi_radio_stat *radio_stats)
{
if (iface_stat != 0) {
memcpy(&link_stat, iface_stat, sizeof(wifi_iface_stat));
} else {
memset(&link_stat, 0, sizeof(wifi_iface_stat));
}
if (num_radios > 0 && radio_stats != 0) {
memcpy(&radio_stat, radio_stats, sizeof(wifi_radio_stat));
} else {
memset(&radio_stat, 0, sizeof(wifi_radio_stat));
}
}
|
void onLinkStatsResults(wifi_request_id id, wifi_iface_stat *iface_stat,
int num_radios, wifi_radio_stat *radio_stats)
{
if (iface_stat != 0) {
memcpy(&link_stat, iface_stat, sizeof(wifi_iface_stat));
} else {
memset(&link_stat, 0, sizeof(wifi_iface_stat));
}
if (num_radios > 0 && radio_stats != 0) {
memcpy(&radio_stat, radio_stats, sizeof(wifi_radio_stat));
} else {
memset(&radio_stat, 0, sizeof(wifi_radio_stat));
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void bump_cpu_timer(struct k_itimer *timer,
union cpu_time_count now)
{
int i;
if (timer->it.cpu.incr.sched == 0)
return;
if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(timer->it_clock) == CPUCLOCK_SCHED) {
unsigned long long delta, incr;
if (now.sched < timer->it.cpu.expires.sched)
return;
incr = timer->it.cpu.incr.sched;
delta = now.sched + incr - timer->it.cpu.expires.sched;
/* Don't use (incr*2 < delta), incr*2 might overflow. */
for (i = 0; incr < delta - incr; i++)
incr = incr << 1;
for (; i >= 0; incr >>= 1, i--) {
if (delta < incr)
continue;
timer->it.cpu.expires.sched += incr;
timer->it_overrun += 1 << i;
delta -= incr;
}
} else {
cputime_t delta, incr;
if (cputime_lt(now.cpu, timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu))
return;
incr = timer->it.cpu.incr.cpu;
delta = cputime_sub(cputime_add(now.cpu, incr),
timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu);
/* Don't use (incr*2 < delta), incr*2 might overflow. */
for (i = 0; cputime_lt(incr, cputime_sub(delta, incr)); i++)
incr = cputime_add(incr, incr);
for (; i >= 0; incr = cputime_halve(incr), i--) {
if (cputime_lt(delta, incr))
continue;
timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu =
cputime_add(timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu, incr);
timer->it_overrun += 1 << i;
delta = cputime_sub(delta, incr);
}
}
}
|
static void bump_cpu_timer(struct k_itimer *timer,
union cpu_time_count now)
{
int i;
if (timer->it.cpu.incr.sched == 0)
return;
if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(timer->it_clock) == CPUCLOCK_SCHED) {
unsigned long long delta, incr;
if (now.sched < timer->it.cpu.expires.sched)
return;
incr = timer->it.cpu.incr.sched;
delta = now.sched + incr - timer->it.cpu.expires.sched;
/* Don't use (incr*2 < delta), incr*2 might overflow. */
for (i = 0; incr < delta - incr; i++)
incr = incr << 1;
for (; i >= 0; incr >>= 1, i--) {
if (delta < incr)
continue;
timer->it.cpu.expires.sched += incr;
timer->it_overrun += 1 << i;
delta -= incr;
}
} else {
cputime_t delta, incr;
if (cputime_lt(now.cpu, timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu))
return;
incr = timer->it.cpu.incr.cpu;
delta = cputime_sub(cputime_add(now.cpu, incr),
timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu);
/* Don't use (incr*2 < delta), incr*2 might overflow. */
for (i = 0; cputime_lt(incr, cputime_sub(delta, incr)); i++)
incr = cputime_add(incr, incr);
for (; i >= 0; incr = cputime_halve(incr), i--) {
if (cputime_lt(delta, incr))
continue;
timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu =
cputime_add(timer->it.cpu.expires.cpu, incr);
timer->it_overrun += 1 << i;
delta = cputime_sub(delta, incr);
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4303
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4303/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/esnet/iperf/commit/91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
|
void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
void cJSON_Delete(cJSON *c)
{
cJSON *next;
while (c)
{
next=c->next;
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->child) cJSON_Delete(c->child);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->valuestring) cJSON_free(c->valuestring);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) && c->string) cJSON_free(c->string);
cJSON_free(c);
c=next;
}
}
|
void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
{
cJSON *next;
while ( c ) {
next = c->next;
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->child )
cJSON_Delete( c->child );
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->valuestring )
cJSON_free( c->valuestring );
if ( c->string )
cJSON_free( c->string );
cJSON_free( c );
c = next;
}
}
|
C
|
iperf
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2451
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2451/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
|
status_t OMX::fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
return findInstance(node)->fillBuffer(buffer, fenceFd);
}
|
status_t OMX::fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
return findInstance(node)->fillBuffer(buffer, fenceFd);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8645/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tcp_v6_parse_md5_keys(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
int optlen)
{
struct tcp_md5sig cmd;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&cmd.tcpm_addr;
if (optlen < sizeof(cmd))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, optval, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
if (!cmd.tcpm_keylen) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sin6->sin6_addr))
return tcp_md5_do_del(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
AF_INET);
return tcp_md5_do_del(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr,
AF_INET6);
}
if (cmd.tcpm_keylen > TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sin6->sin6_addr))
return tcp_md5_do_add(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
AF_INET, cmd.tcpm_key, cmd.tcpm_keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
return tcp_md5_do_add(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr,
AF_INET6, cmd.tcpm_key, cmd.tcpm_keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
}
|
static int tcp_v6_parse_md5_keys(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
int optlen)
{
struct tcp_md5sig cmd;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&cmd.tcpm_addr;
if (optlen < sizeof(cmd))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, optval, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
if (!cmd.tcpm_keylen) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sin6->sin6_addr))
return tcp_md5_do_del(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
AF_INET);
return tcp_md5_do_del(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr,
AF_INET6);
}
if (cmd.tcpm_keylen > TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sin6->sin6_addr))
return tcp_md5_do_add(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
AF_INET, cmd.tcpm_key, cmd.tcpm_keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
return tcp_md5_do_add(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr,
AF_INET6, cmd.tcpm_key, cmd.tcpm_keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3963/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a38f71865b63025dce4de1f8cca71979c48d14d
|
0a38f71865b63025dce4de1f8cca71979c48d14d
|
Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BluetoothOptionsHandler::~BluetoothOptionsHandler() {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBluetooth)) {
return;
}
chromeos::BluetoothManager* bluetooth_manager =
chromeos::BluetoothManager::GetInstance();
DCHECK(bluetooth_manager);
chromeos::BluetoothAdapter* default_adapter =
bluetooth_manager->DefaultAdapter();
if (default_adapter != NULL) {
default_adapter->RemoveObserver(this);
}
bluetooth_manager->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
BluetoothOptionsHandler::~BluetoothOptionsHandler() {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBluetooth)) {
return;
}
chromeos::BluetoothManager* bluetooth_manager =
chromeos::BluetoothManager::GetInstance();
DCHECK(bluetooth_manager);
chromeos::BluetoothAdapter* default_adapter =
bluetooth_manager->DefaultAdapter();
if (default_adapter != NULL) {
default_adapter->RemoveObserver(this);
}
bluetooth_manager->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15115
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15115/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74
|
df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74
|
sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr __user *addrs,
int addrs_size,
sctp_assoc_t *assoc_id)
{
struct sockaddr *kaddrs;
gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p addrs:%p addrs_size:%d\n",
__func__, sk, addrs, addrs_size);
if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* Check the user passed a healthy pointer. */
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addrs, addrs_size)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Alloc space for the address array in kernel memory. */
if (sk->sk_socket->file)
gfp = GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN;
kaddrs = kmalloc(addrs_size, gfp);
if (unlikely(!kaddrs))
return -ENOMEM;
if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id);
}
kfree(kaddrs);
return err;
}
|
static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr __user *addrs,
int addrs_size,
sctp_assoc_t *assoc_id)
{
struct sockaddr *kaddrs;
gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p addrs:%p addrs_size:%d\n",
__func__, sk, addrs, addrs_size);
if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* Check the user passed a healthy pointer. */
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addrs, addrs_size)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Alloc space for the address array in kernel memory. */
if (sk->sk_socket->file)
gfp = GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN;
kaddrs = kmalloc(addrs_size, gfp);
if (unlikely(!kaddrs))
return -ENOMEM;
if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id);
}
kfree(kaddrs);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13090
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13090/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba
|
ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba
| null |
retrieve_url (struct url * orig_parsed, const char *origurl, char **file,
char **newloc, const char *refurl, int *dt, bool recursive,
struct iri *iri, bool register_status)
{
uerr_t result;
char *url;
bool location_changed;
bool iri_fallbacked = 0;
int dummy;
char *mynewloc, *proxy;
struct url *u = orig_parsed, *proxy_url;
int up_error_code; /* url parse error code */
char *local_file = NULL;
int redirection_count = 0;
bool method_suspended = false;
char *saved_body_data = NULL;
char *saved_method = NULL;
char *saved_body_file_name = NULL;
/* If dt is NULL, use local storage. */
if (!dt)
{
dt = &dummy;
dummy = 0;
}
url = xstrdup (origurl);
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
if (file)
*file = NULL;
if (!refurl)
refurl = opt.referer;
redirected:
/* (also for IRI fallbacking) */
result = NOCONERROR;
mynewloc = NULL;
xfree(local_file);
proxy_url = NULL;
proxy = getproxy (u);
if (proxy)
{
struct iri *pi = iri_new ();
set_uri_encoding (pi, opt.locale, true);
pi->utf8_encode = false;
/* Parse the proxy URL. */
proxy_url = url_parse (proxy, &up_error_code, pi, true);
if (!proxy_url)
{
char *error = url_error (proxy, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error parsing proxy URL %s: %s.\n"),
proxy, error);
xfree (url);
xfree (error);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
if (proxy_url->scheme != SCHEME_HTTP && proxy_url->scheme != u->scheme)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in proxy URL %s: Must be HTTP.\n"), proxy);
url_free (proxy_url);
xfree (url);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
iri_free(pi);
xfree (proxy);
}
if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS
#endif
|| (proxy_url && proxy_url->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP))
{
#ifdef HAVE_HSTS
#ifdef TESTING
/* we don't link against main.o when we're testing */
hsts_store_t hsts_store = NULL;
#else
extern hsts_store_t hsts_store;
#endif
if (opt.hsts && hsts_store)
{
if (hsts_match (hsts_store, u))
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "URL transformed to HTTPS due to an HSTS policy\n");
}
#endif
result = http_loop (u, orig_parsed, &mynewloc, &local_file, refurl, dt,
proxy_url, iri);
}
else if (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
{
/* If this is a redirection, temporarily turn off opt.ftp_glob
and opt.recursive, both being undesirable when following
redirects. */
bool oldrec = recursive, glob = opt.ftp_glob;
if (redirection_count)
oldrec = glob = false;
result = ftp_loop (u, orig_parsed, &local_file, dt, proxy_url,
recursive, glob);
recursive = oldrec;
/* There is a possibility of having HTTP being redirected to
FTP. In these cases we must decide whether the text is HTML
according to the suffix. The HTML suffixes are `.html',
`.htm' and a few others, case-insensitive. */
if (redirection_count && local_file && (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
))
{
if (has_html_suffix_p (local_file))
*dt |= TEXTHTML;
}
}
if (proxy_url)
{
url_free (proxy_url);
proxy_url = NULL;
}
location_changed = (result == NEWLOCATION || result == NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST);
if (location_changed)
{
char *construced_newloc;
struct url *newloc_parsed;
assert (mynewloc != NULL);
xfree (local_file);
/* The HTTP specs only allow absolute URLs to appear in
redirects, but a ton of boneheaded webservers and CGIs out
there break the rules and use relative URLs, and popular
browsers are lenient about this, so wget should be too. */
construced_newloc = uri_merge (url, mynewloc ? mynewloc : "");
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = construced_newloc;
#ifdef ENABLE_IRI
/* Reset UTF-8 encoding state, set the URI encoding and reset
the content encoding. */
iri->utf8_encode = opt.enable_iri;
if (opt.encoding_remote)
set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.encoding_remote, true);
set_content_encoding (iri, NULL);
xfree (iri->orig_url);
#endif
/* Now, see if this new location makes sense. */
newloc_parsed = url_parse (mynewloc, &up_error_code, iri, true);
if (!newloc_parsed)
{
char *error = url_error (mynewloc, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", escnonprint_uri (mynewloc),
error);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
xfree (error);
RESTORE_METHOD;
goto bail;
}
/* Now mynewloc will become newloc_parsed->url, because if the
Location contained relative paths like .././something, we
don't want that propagating as url. */
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = xstrdup (newloc_parsed->url);
/* Check for max. number of redirections. */
if (++redirection_count > opt.max_redirect)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%d redirections exceeded.\n"),
opt.max_redirect);
url_free (newloc_parsed);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = WRONGCODE;
goto bail;
}
xfree (url);
url = mynewloc;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = newloc_parsed;
/* If we're being redirected from POST, and we received a
redirect code different than 307, we don't want to POST
again. Many requests answer POST with a redirection to an
index page; that redirection is clearly a GET. We "suspend"
POST data for the duration of the redirections, and restore
it when we're done.
RFC2616 HTTP/1.1 introduces code 307 Temporary Redirect
specifically to preserve the method of the request.
*/
if (result != NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST && !method_suspended)
SUSPEND_METHOD;
goto redirected;
}
else
{
xfree(mynewloc);
}
/* Try to not encode in UTF-8 if fetching failed */
if (!(*dt & RETROKF) && iri->utf8_encode)
{
iri->utf8_encode = false;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = url_parse (origurl, NULL, iri, true);
if (u)
{
if (strcmp(u->url, orig_parsed->url))
{
DEBUGP (("[IRI fallbacking to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
xfree (url);
url = xstrdup (u->url);
iri_fallbacked = 1;
goto redirected;
}
else
DEBUGP (("[Needn't fallback to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
}
else
DEBUGP (("[Couldn't fallback to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
}
if (local_file && u && (*dt & RETROKF || opt.content_on_error))
{
register_download (u->url, local_file);
if (!opt.spider && redirection_count && 0 != strcmp (origurl, u->url))
register_redirection (origurl, u->url);
if (*dt & TEXTHTML)
register_html (local_file);
if (*dt & TEXTCSS)
register_css (local_file);
}
if (file)
*file = local_file ? local_file : NULL;
else
xfree (local_file);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
if (redirection_count || iri_fallbacked)
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = url;
else
xfree (url);
}
else
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
xfree (url);
}
RESTORE_METHOD;
bail:
if (register_status)
inform_exit_status (result);
return result;
}
|
retrieve_url (struct url * orig_parsed, const char *origurl, char **file,
char **newloc, const char *refurl, int *dt, bool recursive,
struct iri *iri, bool register_status)
{
uerr_t result;
char *url;
bool location_changed;
bool iri_fallbacked = 0;
int dummy;
char *mynewloc, *proxy;
struct url *u = orig_parsed, *proxy_url;
int up_error_code; /* url parse error code */
char *local_file = NULL;
int redirection_count = 0;
bool method_suspended = false;
char *saved_body_data = NULL;
char *saved_method = NULL;
char *saved_body_file_name = NULL;
/* If dt is NULL, use local storage. */
if (!dt)
{
dt = &dummy;
dummy = 0;
}
url = xstrdup (origurl);
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
if (file)
*file = NULL;
if (!refurl)
refurl = opt.referer;
redirected:
/* (also for IRI fallbacking) */
result = NOCONERROR;
mynewloc = NULL;
xfree(local_file);
proxy_url = NULL;
proxy = getproxy (u);
if (proxy)
{
struct iri *pi = iri_new ();
set_uri_encoding (pi, opt.locale, true);
pi->utf8_encode = false;
/* Parse the proxy URL. */
proxy_url = url_parse (proxy, &up_error_code, pi, true);
if (!proxy_url)
{
char *error = url_error (proxy, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error parsing proxy URL %s: %s.\n"),
proxy, error);
xfree (url);
xfree (error);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
if (proxy_url->scheme != SCHEME_HTTP && proxy_url->scheme != u->scheme)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in proxy URL %s: Must be HTTP.\n"), proxy);
url_free (proxy_url);
xfree (url);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
iri_free(pi);
xfree (proxy);
}
if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS
#endif
|| (proxy_url && proxy_url->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP))
{
#ifdef HAVE_HSTS
#ifdef TESTING
/* we don't link against main.o when we're testing */
hsts_store_t hsts_store = NULL;
#else
extern hsts_store_t hsts_store;
#endif
if (opt.hsts && hsts_store)
{
if (hsts_match (hsts_store, u))
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "URL transformed to HTTPS due to an HSTS policy\n");
}
#endif
result = http_loop (u, orig_parsed, &mynewloc, &local_file, refurl, dt,
proxy_url, iri);
}
else if (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
{
/* If this is a redirection, temporarily turn off opt.ftp_glob
and opt.recursive, both being undesirable when following
redirects. */
bool oldrec = recursive, glob = opt.ftp_glob;
if (redirection_count)
oldrec = glob = false;
result = ftp_loop (u, orig_parsed, &local_file, dt, proxy_url,
recursive, glob);
recursive = oldrec;
/* There is a possibility of having HTTP being redirected to
FTP. In these cases we must decide whether the text is HTML
according to the suffix. The HTML suffixes are `.html',
`.htm' and a few others, case-insensitive. */
if (redirection_count && local_file && (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
))
{
if (has_html_suffix_p (local_file))
*dt |= TEXTHTML;
}
}
if (proxy_url)
{
url_free (proxy_url);
proxy_url = NULL;
}
location_changed = (result == NEWLOCATION || result == NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST);
if (location_changed)
{
char *construced_newloc;
struct url *newloc_parsed;
assert (mynewloc != NULL);
xfree (local_file);
/* The HTTP specs only allow absolute URLs to appear in
redirects, but a ton of boneheaded webservers and CGIs out
there break the rules and use relative URLs, and popular
browsers are lenient about this, so wget should be too. */
construced_newloc = uri_merge (url, mynewloc ? mynewloc : "");
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = construced_newloc;
#ifdef ENABLE_IRI
/* Reset UTF-8 encoding state, set the URI encoding and reset
the content encoding. */
iri->utf8_encode = opt.enable_iri;
if (opt.encoding_remote)
set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.encoding_remote, true);
set_content_encoding (iri, NULL);
xfree (iri->orig_url);
#endif
/* Now, see if this new location makes sense. */
newloc_parsed = url_parse (mynewloc, &up_error_code, iri, true);
if (!newloc_parsed)
{
char *error = url_error (mynewloc, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", escnonprint_uri (mynewloc),
error);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
xfree (error);
RESTORE_METHOD;
goto bail;
}
/* Now mynewloc will become newloc_parsed->url, because if the
Location contained relative paths like .././something, we
don't want that propagating as url. */
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = xstrdup (newloc_parsed->url);
/* Check for max. number of redirections. */
if (++redirection_count > opt.max_redirect)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%d redirections exceeded.\n"),
opt.max_redirect);
url_free (newloc_parsed);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = WRONGCODE;
goto bail;
}
xfree (url);
url = mynewloc;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = newloc_parsed;
/* If we're being redirected from POST, and we received a
redirect code different than 307, we don't want to POST
again. Many requests answer POST with a redirection to an
index page; that redirection is clearly a GET. We "suspend"
POST data for the duration of the redirections, and restore
it when we're done.
RFC2616 HTTP/1.1 introduces code 307 Temporary Redirect
specifically to preserve the method of the request.
*/
if (result != NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST && !method_suspended)
SUSPEND_METHOD;
goto redirected;
}
else
{
xfree(mynewloc);
}
/* Try to not encode in UTF-8 if fetching failed */
if (!(*dt & RETROKF) && iri->utf8_encode)
{
iri->utf8_encode = false;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = url_parse (origurl, NULL, iri, true);
if (u)
{
if (strcmp(u->url, orig_parsed->url))
{
DEBUGP (("[IRI fallbacking to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
xfree (url);
url = xstrdup (u->url);
iri_fallbacked = 1;
goto redirected;
}
else
DEBUGP (("[Needn't fallback to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
}
else
DEBUGP (("[Couldn't fallback to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
}
if (local_file && u && (*dt & RETROKF || opt.content_on_error))
{
register_download (u->url, local_file);
if (!opt.spider && redirection_count && 0 != strcmp (origurl, u->url))
register_redirection (origurl, u->url);
if (*dt & TEXTHTML)
register_html (local_file);
if (*dt & TEXTCSS)
register_css (local_file);
}
if (file)
*file = local_file ? local_file : NULL;
else
xfree (local_file);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
if (redirection_count || iri_fallbacked)
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = url;
else
xfree (url);
}
else
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
xfree (url);
}
RESTORE_METHOD;
bail:
if (register_status)
inform_exit_status (result);
return result;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3400
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3400/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256
|
adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256
|
udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static int udf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *options, int silent)
{
int i;
int ret;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct udf_options uopt;
struct kernel_lb_addr rootdir, fileset;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi;
uopt.flags = (1 << UDF_FLAG_USE_AD_IN_ICB) | (1 << UDF_FLAG_STRICT);
uopt.uid = -1;
uopt.gid = -1;
uopt.umask = 0;
uopt.fmode = UDF_INVALID_MODE;
uopt.dmode = UDF_INVALID_MODE;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct udf_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
mutex_init(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
if (!udf_parse_options((char *)options, &uopt, false))
goto error_out;
if (uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_UTF8) &&
uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
udf_err(sb, "utf8 cannot be combined with iocharset\n");
goto error_out;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_UDF_NLS
if ((uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) && !uopt.nls_map) {
uopt.nls_map = load_nls_default();
if (!uopt.nls_map)
uopt.flags &= ~(1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP);
else
udf_debug("Using default NLS map\n");
}
#endif
if (!(uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)))
uopt.flags |= (1 << UDF_FLAG_UTF8);
fileset.logicalBlockNum = 0xFFFFFFFF;
fileset.partitionReferenceNum = 0xFFFF;
sbi->s_flags = uopt.flags;
sbi->s_uid = uopt.uid;
sbi->s_gid = uopt.gid;
sbi->s_umask = uopt.umask;
sbi->s_fmode = uopt.fmode;
sbi->s_dmode = uopt.dmode;
sbi->s_nls_map = uopt.nls_map;
rwlock_init(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
if (uopt.session == 0xFFFFFFFF)
sbi->s_session = udf_get_last_session(sb);
else
sbi->s_session = uopt.session;
udf_debug("Multi-session=%d\n", sbi->s_session);
/* Fill in the rest of the superblock */
sb->s_op = &udf_sb_ops;
sb->s_export_op = &udf_export_ops;
sb->s_dirt = 0;
sb->s_magic = UDF_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_time_gran = 1000;
if (uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_BLOCKSIZE_SET)) {
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
} else {
uopt.blocksize = bdev_logical_block_size(sb->s_bdev);
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
if (!ret && uopt.blocksize != UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!silent)
pr_notice("Rescanning with blocksize %d\n",
UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE);
uopt.blocksize = UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE;
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
}
}
if (!ret) {
udf_warn(sb, "No partition found (1)\n");
goto error_out;
}
udf_debug("Lastblock=%d\n", sbi->s_last_block);
if (sbi->s_lvid_bh) {
struct logicalVolIntegrityDescImpUse *lvidiu =
udf_sb_lvidiu(sbi);
uint16_t minUDFReadRev = le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFReadRev);
uint16_t minUDFWriteRev = le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFWriteRev);
/* uint16_t maxUDFWriteRev =
le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->maxUDFWriteRev); */
if (minUDFReadRev > UDF_MAX_READ_VERSION) {
udf_err(sb, "minUDFReadRev=%x (max is %x)\n",
le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFReadRev),
UDF_MAX_READ_VERSION);
goto error_out;
} else if (minUDFWriteRev > UDF_MAX_WRITE_VERSION)
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
sbi->s_udfrev = minUDFWriteRev;
if (minUDFReadRev >= UDF_VERS_USE_EXTENDED_FE)
UDF_SET_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_EXTENDED_FE);
if (minUDFReadRev >= UDF_VERS_USE_STREAMS)
UDF_SET_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_STREAMS);
}
if (!sbi->s_partitions) {
udf_warn(sb, "No partition found (2)\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (sbi->s_partmaps[sbi->s_partition].s_partition_flags &
UDF_PART_FLAG_READ_ONLY) {
pr_notice("Partition marked readonly; forcing readonly mount\n");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
}
if (udf_find_fileset(sb, &fileset, &rootdir)) {
udf_warn(sb, "No fileset found\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (!silent) {
struct timestamp ts;
udf_time_to_disk_stamp(&ts, sbi->s_record_time);
udf_info("Mounting volume '%s', timestamp %04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u (%x)\n",
sbi->s_volume_ident,
le16_to_cpu(ts.year), ts.month, ts.day,
ts.hour, ts.minute, le16_to_cpu(ts.typeAndTimezone));
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
udf_open_lvid(sb);
/* Assign the root inode */
/* assign inodes by physical block number */
/* perhaps it's not extensible enough, but for now ... */
inode = udf_iget(sb, &rootdir);
if (!inode) {
udf_err(sb, "Error in udf_iget, block=%d, partition=%d\n",
rootdir.logicalBlockNum, rootdir.partitionReferenceNum);
goto error_out;
}
/* Allocate a dentry for the root inode */
sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!sb->s_root) {
udf_err(sb, "Couldn't allocate root dentry\n");
goto error_out;
}
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_max_links = UDF_MAX_LINKS;
return 0;
error_out:
if (sbi->s_vat_inode)
iput(sbi->s_vat_inode);
if (sbi->s_partitions)
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_partitions; i++)
udf_free_partition(&sbi->s_partmaps[i]);
#ifdef CONFIG_UDF_NLS
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP))
unload_nls(sbi->s_nls_map);
#endif
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
udf_close_lvid(sb);
brelse(sbi->s_lvid_bh);
kfree(sbi->s_partmaps);
kfree(sbi);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int udf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *options, int silent)
{
int i;
int ret;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct udf_options uopt;
struct kernel_lb_addr rootdir, fileset;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi;
uopt.flags = (1 << UDF_FLAG_USE_AD_IN_ICB) | (1 << UDF_FLAG_STRICT);
uopt.uid = -1;
uopt.gid = -1;
uopt.umask = 0;
uopt.fmode = UDF_INVALID_MODE;
uopt.dmode = UDF_INVALID_MODE;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct udf_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
mutex_init(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
if (!udf_parse_options((char *)options, &uopt, false))
goto error_out;
if (uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_UTF8) &&
uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
udf_err(sb, "utf8 cannot be combined with iocharset\n");
goto error_out;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_UDF_NLS
if ((uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) && !uopt.nls_map) {
uopt.nls_map = load_nls_default();
if (!uopt.nls_map)
uopt.flags &= ~(1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP);
else
udf_debug("Using default NLS map\n");
}
#endif
if (!(uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)))
uopt.flags |= (1 << UDF_FLAG_UTF8);
fileset.logicalBlockNum = 0xFFFFFFFF;
fileset.partitionReferenceNum = 0xFFFF;
sbi->s_flags = uopt.flags;
sbi->s_uid = uopt.uid;
sbi->s_gid = uopt.gid;
sbi->s_umask = uopt.umask;
sbi->s_fmode = uopt.fmode;
sbi->s_dmode = uopt.dmode;
sbi->s_nls_map = uopt.nls_map;
rwlock_init(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
if (uopt.session == 0xFFFFFFFF)
sbi->s_session = udf_get_last_session(sb);
else
sbi->s_session = uopt.session;
udf_debug("Multi-session=%d\n", sbi->s_session);
/* Fill in the rest of the superblock */
sb->s_op = &udf_sb_ops;
sb->s_export_op = &udf_export_ops;
sb->s_dirt = 0;
sb->s_magic = UDF_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_time_gran = 1000;
if (uopt.flags & (1 << UDF_FLAG_BLOCKSIZE_SET)) {
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
} else {
uopt.blocksize = bdev_logical_block_size(sb->s_bdev);
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
if (!ret && uopt.blocksize != UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!silent)
pr_notice("Rescanning with blocksize %d\n",
UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE);
uopt.blocksize = UDF_DEFAULT_BLOCKSIZE;
ret = udf_load_vrs(sb, &uopt, silent, &fileset);
}
}
if (!ret) {
udf_warn(sb, "No partition found (1)\n");
goto error_out;
}
udf_debug("Lastblock=%d\n", sbi->s_last_block);
if (sbi->s_lvid_bh) {
struct logicalVolIntegrityDescImpUse *lvidiu =
udf_sb_lvidiu(sbi);
uint16_t minUDFReadRev = le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFReadRev);
uint16_t minUDFWriteRev = le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFWriteRev);
/* uint16_t maxUDFWriteRev =
le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->maxUDFWriteRev); */
if (minUDFReadRev > UDF_MAX_READ_VERSION) {
udf_err(sb, "minUDFReadRev=%x (max is %x)\n",
le16_to_cpu(lvidiu->minUDFReadRev),
UDF_MAX_READ_VERSION);
goto error_out;
} else if (minUDFWriteRev > UDF_MAX_WRITE_VERSION)
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
sbi->s_udfrev = minUDFWriteRev;
if (minUDFReadRev >= UDF_VERS_USE_EXTENDED_FE)
UDF_SET_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_EXTENDED_FE);
if (minUDFReadRev >= UDF_VERS_USE_STREAMS)
UDF_SET_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_STREAMS);
}
if (!sbi->s_partitions) {
udf_warn(sb, "No partition found (2)\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (sbi->s_partmaps[sbi->s_partition].s_partition_flags &
UDF_PART_FLAG_READ_ONLY) {
pr_notice("Partition marked readonly; forcing readonly mount\n");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
}
if (udf_find_fileset(sb, &fileset, &rootdir)) {
udf_warn(sb, "No fileset found\n");
goto error_out;
}
if (!silent) {
struct timestamp ts;
udf_time_to_disk_stamp(&ts, sbi->s_record_time);
udf_info("Mounting volume '%s', timestamp %04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u (%x)\n",
sbi->s_volume_ident,
le16_to_cpu(ts.year), ts.month, ts.day,
ts.hour, ts.minute, le16_to_cpu(ts.typeAndTimezone));
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
udf_open_lvid(sb);
/* Assign the root inode */
/* assign inodes by physical block number */
/* perhaps it's not extensible enough, but for now ... */
inode = udf_iget(sb, &rootdir);
if (!inode) {
udf_err(sb, "Error in udf_iget, block=%d, partition=%d\n",
rootdir.logicalBlockNum, rootdir.partitionReferenceNum);
goto error_out;
}
/* Allocate a dentry for the root inode */
sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!sb->s_root) {
udf_err(sb, "Couldn't allocate root dentry\n");
goto error_out;
}
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_max_links = UDF_MAX_LINKS;
return 0;
error_out:
if (sbi->s_vat_inode)
iput(sbi->s_vat_inode);
if (sbi->s_partitions)
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_partitions; i++)
udf_free_partition(&sbi->s_partmaps[i]);
#ifdef CONFIG_UDF_NLS
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP))
unload_nls(sbi->s_nls_map);
#endif
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
udf_close_lvid(sb);
brelse(sbi->s_lvid_bh);
kfree(sbi->s_partmaps);
kfree(sbi);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void JavascriptGo(std::string distance) {
GURL url("javascript:history.go('" + distance + "')");
ASSERT_TRUE(tab_->NavigateToURL(url));
}
|
void JavascriptGo(std::string distance) {
GURL url("javascript:history.go('" + distance + "')");
ASSERT_TRUE(tab_->NavigateToURL(url));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2857
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2857/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7d085fbb43b21e959900b94f191588fd10546a94
|
7d085fbb43b21e959900b94f191588fd10546a94
|
Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ImageLoader::setImageWithoutConsideringPendingLoadEvent(CachedImage* newImage)
{
ASSERT(m_failedLoadURL.isEmpty());
CachedImage* oldImage = m_image.get();
if (newImage != oldImage) {
m_image = newImage;
if (m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent) {
beforeLoadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingLoadEvent) {
loadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingErrorEvent) {
errorEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = false;
}
m_imageComplete = true;
if (newImage)
newImage->addClient(this);
if (oldImage)
oldImage->removeClient(this);
}
if (RenderImageResource* imageResource = renderImageResource())
imageResource->resetAnimation();
}
|
void ImageLoader::setImageWithoutConsideringPendingLoadEvent(CachedImage* newImage)
{
ASSERT(m_failedLoadURL.isEmpty());
CachedImage* oldImage = m_image.get();
if (newImage != oldImage) {
m_image = newImage;
if (m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent) {
beforeLoadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingBeforeLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingLoadEvent) {
loadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingErrorEvent) {
errorEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = false;
}
m_imageComplete = true;
if (newImage)
newImage->addClient(this);
if (oldImage)
oldImage->removeClient(this);
}
if (RenderImageResource* imageResource = renderImageResource())
imageResource->resetAnimation();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *filename, int flags)
{
struct open_flags op;
int err = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (flags & O_CREAT)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op);
}
|
struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *filename, int flags)
{
struct open_flags op;
int err = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (flags & O_CREAT)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0f177948ae2640bfe4d70f8e4248e106406b3b0a
|
0f177948ae2640bfe4d70f8e4248e106406b3b0a
|
DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
OMX_U32 getPortIndex() {
return mPortIndex;
}
|
OMX_U32 getPortIndex() {
return mPortIndex;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1625
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1625/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41cc463ecc5f0ba708a2c8282a7e7208ca7daa57
|
41cc463ecc5f0ba708a2c8282a7e7208ca7daa57
|
Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
|
HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate(
base::WeakPtr<HeadlessBrowserImpl> browser)
: browser_(std::move(browser)) {
command_map_["Target.createTarget"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateTarget, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.closeTarget"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CloseTarget, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.createBrowserContext"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateBrowserContext,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.disposeBrowserContext"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::DisposeBrowserContext,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.close"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::Close, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.getWindowForTarget"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::GetWindowForTarget,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.getWindowBounds"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::GetWindowBounds,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.setWindowBounds"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::SetWindowBounds,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.enable"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::EnableHeadlessExperimental,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.disable"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::DisableHeadlessExperimental,
base::Unretained(this));
unhandled_command_map_["Network.emulateNetworkConditions"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::EmulateNetworkConditions,
base::Unretained(this));
unhandled_command_map_["Network.disable"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::NetworkDisable, base::Unretained(this));
async_command_map_["Page.printToPDF"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::PrintToPDF, base::Unretained(this));
async_command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::BeginFrame, base::Unretained(this));
}
|
HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate(
base::WeakPtr<HeadlessBrowserImpl> browser)
: browser_(std::move(browser)) {
command_map_["Target.createTarget"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateTarget, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.closeTarget"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CloseTarget, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.createBrowserContext"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateBrowserContext,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Target.disposeBrowserContext"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::DisposeBrowserContext,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.close"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::Close, base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.getWindowForTarget"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::GetWindowForTarget,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.getWindowBounds"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::GetWindowBounds,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["Browser.setWindowBounds"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::SetWindowBounds,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.enable"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::EnableHeadlessExperimental,
base::Unretained(this));
command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.disable"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::DisableHeadlessExperimental,
base::Unretained(this));
unhandled_command_map_["Network.emulateNetworkConditions"] =
base::Bind(&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::EmulateNetworkConditions,
base::Unretained(this));
unhandled_command_map_["Network.disable"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::NetworkDisable, base::Unretained(this));
async_command_map_["Page.printToPDF"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::PrintToPDF, base::Unretained(this));
async_command_map_["HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame"] = base::Bind(
&HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::BeginFrame, base::Unretained(this));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int _nfs4_do_set_security_label(struct inode *inode,
struct nfs4_label *ilabel,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *olabel)
{
struct iattr sattr = {0};
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
const u32 bitmask[3] = { 0, 0, FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };
struct nfs_setattrargs arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.iap = &sattr,
.server = server,
.bitmask = bitmask,
.label = ilabel,
};
struct nfs_setattrres res = {
.fattr = fattr,
.label = olabel,
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETATTR],
.rpc_argp = &arg,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status;
nfs4_stateid_copy(&arg.stateid, &zero_stateid);
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &arg.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status)
dprintk("%s failed: %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
|
static int _nfs4_do_set_security_label(struct inode *inode,
struct nfs4_label *ilabel,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *olabel)
{
struct iattr sattr = {0};
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
const u32 bitmask[3] = { 0, 0, FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };
struct nfs_setattrargs arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.iap = &sattr,
.server = server,
.bitmask = bitmask,
.label = ilabel,
};
struct nfs_setattrres res = {
.fattr = fattr,
.label = olabel,
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETATTR],
.rpc_argp = &arg,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status;
nfs4_stateid_copy(&arg.stateid, &zero_stateid);
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &arg.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status)
dprintk("%s failed: %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2146/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e
|
f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e
|
perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_event *event, int idx)
{
event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx;
if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_0) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01b7;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0;
} else if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_1) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01bb;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1;
}
}
|
static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_event *event, int idx)
{
event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx;
if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_0) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01b7;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0;
} else if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_1) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01bb;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5104/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
void RenderFrameHostManager::CreateProxiesForNewNamedFrame() {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return;
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->frame_name().empty());
FrameTreeNode* opener = frame_tree_node_->opener();
if (!opener || !frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())
return;
SiteInstance* current_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
for (FrameTreeNode* ancestor = opener->parent(); ancestor;
ancestor = ancestor->parent()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* ancestor_rfh = ancestor->current_frame_host();
if (ancestor_rfh->GetSiteInstance() != current_instance)
CreateRenderFrameProxy(ancestor_rfh->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
|
void RenderFrameHostManager::CreateProxiesForNewNamedFrame() {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return;
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->frame_name().empty());
FrameTreeNode* opener = frame_tree_node_->opener();
if (!opener || !frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())
return;
SiteInstance* current_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
for (FrameTreeNode* ancestor = opener->parent(); ancestor;
ancestor = ancestor->parent()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* ancestor_rfh = ancestor->current_frame_host();
if (ancestor_rfh->GetSiteInstance() != current_instance)
CreateRenderFrameProxy(ancestor_rfh->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5375/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
|
int btrfs_commit_transaction_async(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
int wait_for_unblock)
{
struct btrfs_async_commit *ac;
struct btrfs_transaction *cur_trans;
ac = kmalloc(sizeof(*ac), GFP_NOFS);
if (!ac)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ac->work, do_async_commit);
ac->root = root;
ac->newtrans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(ac->newtrans)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(ac->newtrans);
kfree(ac);
return err;
}
/* take transaction reference */
cur_trans = trans->transaction;
atomic_inc(&cur_trans->use_count);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
/*
* Tell lockdep we've released the freeze rwsem, since the
* async commit thread will be the one to unlock it.
*/
if (trans->type < TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK)
rwsem_release(
&root->fs_info->sb->s_writers.lock_map[SB_FREEZE_FS-1],
1, _THIS_IP_);
schedule_delayed_work(&ac->work, 0);
/* wait for transaction to start and unblock */
if (wait_for_unblock)
wait_current_trans_commit_start_and_unblock(root, cur_trans);
else
wait_current_trans_commit_start(root, cur_trans);
if (current->journal_info == trans)
current->journal_info = NULL;
put_transaction(cur_trans);
return 0;
}
|
int btrfs_commit_transaction_async(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
int wait_for_unblock)
{
struct btrfs_async_commit *ac;
struct btrfs_transaction *cur_trans;
ac = kmalloc(sizeof(*ac), GFP_NOFS);
if (!ac)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ac->work, do_async_commit);
ac->root = root;
ac->newtrans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(ac->newtrans)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(ac->newtrans);
kfree(ac);
return err;
}
/* take transaction reference */
cur_trans = trans->transaction;
atomic_inc(&cur_trans->use_count);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
/*
* Tell lockdep we've released the freeze rwsem, since the
* async commit thread will be the one to unlock it.
*/
if (trans->type < TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK)
rwsem_release(
&root->fs_info->sb->s_writers.lock_map[SB_FREEZE_FS-1],
1, _THIS_IP_);
schedule_delayed_work(&ac->work, 0);
/* wait for transaction to start and unblock */
if (wait_for_unblock)
wait_current_trans_commit_start_and_unblock(root, cur_trans);
else
wait_current_trans_commit_start(root, cur_trans);
if (current->journal_info == trans)
current->journal_info = NULL;
put_transaction(cur_trans);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
base::string16 TemplateURL::GenerateKeyword(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(url.is_valid());
base::string16 keyword = url_formatter::StripWWW(
url_formatter::IDNToUnicode(url.host()));
return keyword.empty() ? base::ASCIIToUTF16("www") : keyword;
}
|
base::string16 TemplateURL::GenerateKeyword(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(url.is_valid());
base::string16 keyword = url_formatter::StripWWW(
url_formatter::IDNToUnicode(url.host()));
return keyword.empty() ? base::ASCIIToUTF16("www") : keyword;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5139
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5139/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9e417dae2833230a651989bb4e56b835355dda39
|
9e417dae2833230a651989bb4e56b835355dda39
|
Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
[email protected],[email protected]
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static std::string error_headers() {
return URLRequestTestJob::test_error_headers();
}
|
static std::string error_headers() {
return URLRequestTestJob::test_error_headers();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
C++ readability change for cindylau.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2090008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool CookiesFunction::ParseUrl(const DictionaryValue* details, GURL* url) {
bool CookiesFunction::ParseUrl(const DictionaryValue* details, GURL* url,
bool check_host_permissions) {
DCHECK(details && url);
std::string url_string;
// Get the URL string or return false.
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(details->GetString(keys::kUrlKey, &url_string));
*url = GURL(url_string);
if (!url->is_valid()) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kInvalidUrlError, url_string);
return false;
}
// Check against host permissions if needed.
if (check_host_permissions &&
!GetExtension()->HasHostPermission(*url)) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNoHostPermissionsError, url->spec());
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool CookiesFunction::ParseUrl(const DictionaryValue* details, GURL* url) {
DCHECK(details && url);
std::string url_string;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(details->GetString(keys::kUrlKey, &url_string));
*url = GURL(url_string);
if (!url->is_valid()) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kInvalidUrlError, url_string);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues RenderBlockFlow::marginValuesForChild(RenderBox* child) const
{
LayoutUnit childBeforePositive = 0;
LayoutUnit childBeforeNegative = 0;
LayoutUnit childAfterPositive = 0;
LayoutUnit childAfterNegative = 0;
LayoutUnit beforeMargin = 0;
LayoutUnit afterMargin = 0;
RenderBlockFlow* childRenderBlockFlow = child->isRenderBlockFlow() ? toRenderBlockFlow(child) : 0;
if (!child->isWritingModeRoot()) {
if (childRenderBlockFlow) {
childBeforePositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore();
childBeforeNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore();
childAfterPositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginAfter();
childAfterNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginAfter();
} else {
beforeMargin = child->marginBefore();
afterMargin = child->marginAfter();
}
} else if (child->isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode()) {
if (childRenderBlockFlow) {
childBeforePositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginAfter();
childBeforeNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginAfter();
childAfterPositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore();
childAfterNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore();
} else {
beforeMargin = child->marginAfter();
afterMargin = child->marginBefore();
}
} else {
beforeMargin = marginBeforeForChild(child);
afterMargin = marginAfterForChild(child);
}
if (beforeMargin) {
if (beforeMargin > 0)
childBeforePositive = beforeMargin;
else
childBeforeNegative = -beforeMargin;
}
if (afterMargin) {
if (afterMargin > 0)
childAfterPositive = afterMargin;
else
childAfterNegative = -afterMargin;
}
return RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues(childBeforePositive, childBeforeNegative, childAfterPositive, childAfterNegative);
}
|
RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues RenderBlockFlow::marginValuesForChild(RenderBox* child) const
{
LayoutUnit childBeforePositive = 0;
LayoutUnit childBeforeNegative = 0;
LayoutUnit childAfterPositive = 0;
LayoutUnit childAfterNegative = 0;
LayoutUnit beforeMargin = 0;
LayoutUnit afterMargin = 0;
RenderBlockFlow* childRenderBlockFlow = child->isRenderBlockFlow() ? toRenderBlockFlow(child) : 0;
if (!child->isWritingModeRoot()) {
if (childRenderBlockFlow) {
childBeforePositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore();
childBeforeNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore();
childAfterPositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginAfter();
childAfterNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginAfter();
} else {
beforeMargin = child->marginBefore();
afterMargin = child->marginAfter();
}
} else if (child->isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode()) {
if (childRenderBlockFlow) {
childBeforePositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginAfter();
childBeforeNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginAfter();
childAfterPositive = childRenderBlockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore();
childAfterNegative = childRenderBlockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore();
} else {
beforeMargin = child->marginAfter();
afterMargin = child->marginBefore();
}
} else {
beforeMargin = marginBeforeForChild(child);
afterMargin = marginAfterForChild(child);
}
if (beforeMargin) {
if (beforeMargin > 0)
childBeforePositive = beforeMargin;
else
childBeforeNegative = -beforeMargin;
}
if (afterMargin) {
if (afterMargin > 0)
childAfterPositive = afterMargin;
else
childAfterNegative = -afterMargin;
}
return RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues(childBeforePositive, childBeforeNegative, childAfterPositive, childAfterNegative);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6663
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6663/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cace1e6998293b9b025d4bbdaf5cb5b6a1c2efb4
|
cace1e6998293b9b025d4bbdaf5cb5b6a1c2efb4
|
Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void SVGImage::draw(GraphicsContext* context, const FloatRect& dstRect, const FloatRect& srcRect, CompositeOperator compositeOp, blink::WebBlendMode blendMode)
{
if (!m_page)
return;
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*context);
context->setCompositeOperation(compositeOp, blendMode);
context->clip(enclosingIntRect(dstRect));
bool compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer = compositeOp != CompositeSourceOver || blendMode != blink::WebBlendModeNormal;
float opacity = context->getNormalizedAlpha() / 255.f;
bool requiresTransparencyLayer = compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer || opacity < 1;
if (requiresTransparencyLayer) {
context->beginTransparencyLayer(opacity);
if (compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer)
context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeSourceOver, blink::WebBlendModeNormal);
}
FloatSize scale(dstRect.width() / srcRect.width(), dstRect.height() / srcRect.height());
FloatSize topLeftOffset(srcRect.location().x() * scale.width(), srcRect.location().y() * scale.height());
FloatPoint destOffset = dstRect.location() - topLeftOffset;
context->translate(destOffset.x(), destOffset.y());
context->scale(scale);
FrameView* view = frameView();
view->resize(containerSize());
if (view->needsLayout())
view->layout();
view->paint(context, enclosingIntRect(srcRect));
if (requiresTransparencyLayer)
context->endLayer();
stateSaver.restore();
if (imageObserver())
imageObserver()->didDraw(this);
}
|
void SVGImage::draw(GraphicsContext* context, const FloatRect& dstRect, const FloatRect& srcRect, CompositeOperator compositeOp, blink::WebBlendMode blendMode)
{
if (!m_page)
return;
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*context);
context->setCompositeOperation(compositeOp, blendMode);
context->clip(enclosingIntRect(dstRect));
bool compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer = compositeOp != CompositeSourceOver || blendMode != blink::WebBlendModeNormal;
float opacity = context->getNormalizedAlpha() / 255.f;
bool requiresTransparencyLayer = compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer || opacity < 1;
if (requiresTransparencyLayer) {
context->beginTransparencyLayer(opacity);
if (compositingRequiresTransparencyLayer)
context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeSourceOver, blink::WebBlendModeNormal);
}
FloatSize scale(dstRect.width() / srcRect.width(), dstRect.height() / srcRect.height());
FloatSize topLeftOffset(srcRect.location().x() * scale.width(), srcRect.location().y() * scale.height());
FloatPoint destOffset = dstRect.location() - topLeftOffset;
context->translate(destOffset.x(), destOffset.y());
context->scale(scale);
FrameView* view = frameView();
view->resize(containerSize());
if (view->needsLayout())
view->layout();
view->paint(context, enclosingIntRect(srcRect));
if (requiresTransparencyLayer)
context->endLayer();
stateSaver.restore();
if (imageObserver())
imageObserver()->didDraw(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThread::WidgetRestored() {
DCHECK(hidden_widget_count_ > 0);
hidden_widget_count_--;
}
|
void RenderThread::WidgetRestored() {
DCHECK(hidden_widget_count_ > 0);
hidden_widget_count_--;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12232/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14
|
6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14
|
socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool skb_is_swtx_tstamp(const struct sk_buff *skb, int false_tstamp)
{
return skb->tstamp && !false_tstamp && skb_is_err_queue(skb);
}
|
static bool skb_is_swtx_tstamp(const struct sk_buff *skb, int false_tstamp)
{
return skb->tstamp && !false_tstamp && skb_is_err_queue(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
LocalDOMWindow* LocalDOMWindow::From(const ScriptState* script_state) {
v8::HandleScope scope(script_state->GetIsolate());
return blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(script_state->GetContext());
}
|
LocalDOMWindow* LocalDOMWindow::From(const ScriptState* script_state) {
v8::HandleScope scope(script_state->GetIsolate());
return blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(script_state->GetContext());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5384
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5384/
|
CWE-415
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/commit/?id=7a4a5bd7897d216f0794ca9dbce0a4a5c9d14940
|
7a4a5bd7897d216f0794ca9dbce0a4a5c9d14940
| null |
FcCacheFindByStat (struct stat *cache_stat)
{
FcCacheSkip *s;
lock_cache ();
for (s = fcCacheChains[0]; s; s = s->next[0])
if (s->cache_dev == cache_stat->st_dev &&
s->cache_ino == cache_stat->st_ino &&
s->cache_mtime == cache_stat->st_mtime)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
if (s->cache_mtime != cache_stat->st_mtim.tv_nsec)
continue;
#endif
FcRefInc (&s->ref);
unlock_cache ();
return s->cache;
}
unlock_cache ();
return NULL;
}
|
FcCacheFindByStat (struct stat *cache_stat)
{
FcCacheSkip *s;
lock_cache ();
for (s = fcCacheChains[0]; s; s = s->next[0])
if (s->cache_dev == cache_stat->st_dev &&
s->cache_ino == cache_stat->st_ino &&
s->cache_mtime == cache_stat->st_mtime)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
if (s->cache_mtime != cache_stat->st_mtim.tv_nsec)
continue;
#endif
FcRefInc (&s->ref);
unlock_cache ();
return s->cache;
}
unlock_cache ();
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
fontconfig
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
int r;
r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
if (r < 0)
goto out_vmcs02;
vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12)
goto out_cached_vmcs12;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
shadow_vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!shadow_vmcs)
goto out_shadow_vmcs;
/* mark vmcs as shadow */
shadow_vmcs->revision_id |= (1u << 31);
/* init shadow vmcs */
vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs;
}
hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn;
vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
return 0;
out_shadow_vmcs:
kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
out_cached_vmcs12:
free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
out_vmcs02:
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
int r;
r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
if (r < 0)
goto out_vmcs02;
vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12)
goto out_cached_vmcs12;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
shadow_vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!shadow_vmcs)
goto out_shadow_vmcs;
/* mark vmcs as shadow */
shadow_vmcs->revision_id |= (1u << 31);
/* init shadow vmcs */
vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs;
}
hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn;
vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
return 0;
out_shadow_vmcs:
kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
out_cached_vmcs12:
free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
out_vmcs02:
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
static int GetLayersUpdateTimeHistogramBucket(size_t numLayers) {
if (numLayers < 10)
return 0;
if (numLayers < 30)
return 1;
if (numLayers < 70)
return 2;
if (numLayers < 150)
return 3;
return 4;
}
|
static int GetLayersUpdateTimeHistogramBucket(size_t numLayers) {
if (numLayers < 10)
return 0;
if (numLayers < 30)
return 1;
if (numLayers < 70)
return 2;
if (numLayers < 150)
return 3;
return 4;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static int cm_lap_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg;
struct ib_cm_lap_event_param *param;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = NULL;
int ret;
/* todo: verify LAP request and send reject APR if invalid. */
lap_msg = (struct cm_lap_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(lap_msg->remote_comm_id,
lap_msg->local_comm_id);
if (!cm_id_priv)
return -EINVAL;
param = &work->cm_event.param.lap_rcvd;
param->alternate_path = &work->path[0];
cm_format_path_from_lap(cm_id_priv, param->alternate_path, lap_msg);
work->cm_event.private_data = &lap_msg->private_data;
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->id.state != IB_CM_ESTABLISHED)
goto unlock;
switch (cm_id_priv->id.lap_state) {
case IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT:
case IB_CM_LAP_IDLE:
break;
case IB_CM_MRA_LAP_SENT:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_LAP_COUNTER]);
if (cm_alloc_response_msg(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc, &msg))
goto unlock;
cm_format_mra((struct cm_mra_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
CM_MSG_RESPONSE_OTHER,
cm_id_priv->service_timeout,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ib_post_send_mad(msg, NULL))
cm_free_msg(msg);
goto deref;
case IB_CM_LAP_RCVD:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_LAP_COUNTER]);
goto unlock;
default:
goto unlock;
}
cm_id_priv->id.lap_state = IB_CM_LAP_RCVD;
cm_id_priv->tid = lap_msg->hdr.tid;
cm_init_av_for_response(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc->wc,
work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.grh,
&cm_id_priv->av);
cm_init_av_by_path(param->alternate_path, &cm_id_priv->alt_av);
ret = atomic_inc_and_test(&cm_id_priv->work_count);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&work->list, &cm_id_priv->work_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ret)
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
else
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return 0;
unlock: spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
deref: cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int cm_lap_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg;
struct ib_cm_lap_event_param *param;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = NULL;
int ret;
/* todo: verify LAP request and send reject APR if invalid. */
lap_msg = (struct cm_lap_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(lap_msg->remote_comm_id,
lap_msg->local_comm_id);
if (!cm_id_priv)
return -EINVAL;
param = &work->cm_event.param.lap_rcvd;
param->alternate_path = &work->path[0];
cm_format_path_from_lap(cm_id_priv, param->alternate_path, lap_msg);
work->cm_event.private_data = &lap_msg->private_data;
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->id.state != IB_CM_ESTABLISHED)
goto unlock;
switch (cm_id_priv->id.lap_state) {
case IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT:
case IB_CM_LAP_IDLE:
break;
case IB_CM_MRA_LAP_SENT:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_LAP_COUNTER]);
if (cm_alloc_response_msg(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc, &msg))
goto unlock;
cm_format_mra((struct cm_mra_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
CM_MSG_RESPONSE_OTHER,
cm_id_priv->service_timeout,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ib_post_send_mad(msg, NULL))
cm_free_msg(msg);
goto deref;
case IB_CM_LAP_RCVD:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_LAP_COUNTER]);
goto unlock;
default:
goto unlock;
}
cm_id_priv->id.lap_state = IB_CM_LAP_RCVD;
cm_id_priv->tid = lap_msg->hdr.tid;
cm_init_av_for_response(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc->wc,
work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.grh,
&cm_id_priv->av);
cm_init_av_by_path(param->alternate_path, &cm_id_priv->alt_av);
ret = atomic_inc_and_test(&cm_id_priv->work_count);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&work->list, &cm_id_priv->work_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ret)
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
else
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return 0;
unlock: spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
deref: cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
start_monitoring_file_list (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
DirectoryLoadState *state;
if (!directory->details->file_list_monitored)
{
g_assert (!directory->details->directory_load_in_progress);
directory->details->file_list_monitored = TRUE;
nautilus_file_list_ref (directory->details->file_list);
}
if (directory->details->directory_loaded ||
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress != NULL)
{
return;
}
if (!async_job_start (directory, "file list"))
{
return;
}
mark_all_files_unconfirmed (directory);
state = g_new0 (DirectoryLoadState, 1);
state->directory = directory;
state->cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
state->load_mime_list_hash = istr_set_new ();
state->load_file_count = 0;
g_assert (directory->details->location != NULL);
state->load_directory_file =
nautilus_directory_get_corresponding_file (directory);
state->load_directory_file->details->loading_directory = TRUE;
#ifdef DEBUG_LOAD_DIRECTORY
g_message ("load_directory called to monitor file list of %p", directory->details->location);
#endif
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress = state;
g_file_enumerate_children_async (directory->details->location,
NAUTILUS_FILE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTES,
0, /* flags */
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, /* prio */
state->cancellable,
enumerate_children_callback,
state);
}
|
start_monitoring_file_list (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
DirectoryLoadState *state;
if (!directory->details->file_list_monitored)
{
g_assert (!directory->details->directory_load_in_progress);
directory->details->file_list_monitored = TRUE;
nautilus_file_list_ref (directory->details->file_list);
}
if (directory->details->directory_loaded ||
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress != NULL)
{
return;
}
if (!async_job_start (directory, "file list"))
{
return;
}
mark_all_files_unconfirmed (directory);
state = g_new0 (DirectoryLoadState, 1);
state->directory = directory;
state->cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
state->load_mime_list_hash = istr_set_new ();
state->load_file_count = 0;
g_assert (directory->details->location != NULL);
state->load_directory_file =
nautilus_directory_get_corresponding_file (directory);
state->load_directory_file->details->loading_directory = TRUE;
#ifdef DEBUG_LOAD_DIRECTORY
g_message ("load_directory called to monitor file list of %p", directory->details->location);
#endif
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress = state;
g_file_enumerate_children_async (directory->details->location,
NAUTILUS_FILE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTES,
0, /* flags */
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, /* prio */
state->cancellable,
enumerate_children_callback,
state);
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3e5dae3b38fdb566fb2b7183e810b82eb3ce6f21
|
3e5dae3b38fdb566fb2b7183e810b82eb3ce6f21
|
Use a new field trial group to enable the SWReporter
BUG=533484
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1376803002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351788}
|
void RegisterProfilePrefsForSwReporter(
user_prefs::PrefRegistrySyncable* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSwReporterPromptVersion, "");
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSwReporterPromptSeed, "");
}
|
void RegisterProfilePrefsForSwReporter(
user_prefs::PrefRegistrySyncable* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSwReporterPromptVersion, "");
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSwReporterPromptSeed, "");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7026
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7026/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a399b29dfbaaaf91162b2dc5a5875dd51bbfa2a1
|
a399b29dfbaaaf91162b2dc5a5875dd51bbfa2a1
|
ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline void shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *s)
{
ipc_rmid(&shm_ids(ns), &s->shm_perm);
}
|
static inline void shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *s)
{
ipc_rmid(&shm_ids(ns), &s->shm_perm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3418
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3418/
|
CWE-369
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
|
dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
| null |
ProcChangeAccessControl(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xSetAccessControlReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSetAccessControlReq);
if ((stuff->mode != EnableAccess) && (stuff->mode != DisableAccess)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->mode;
return BadValue;
}
return ChangeAccessControl(client, stuff->mode == EnableAccess);
}
|
ProcChangeAccessControl(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xSetAccessControlReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSetAccessControlReq);
if ((stuff->mode != EnableAccess) && (stuff->mode != DisableAccess)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->mode;
return BadValue;
}
return ChangeAccessControl(client, stuff->mode == EnableAccess);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3185/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818
|
6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818
|
USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int whiteheat_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct whiteheat_private *info;
info = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
kfree(info);
return 0;
}
|
static int whiteheat_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct whiteheat_private *info;
info = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
kfree(info);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &tmr->stop) < 0) {
abort();
}
}
|
void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &tmr->stop) < 0) {
abort();
}
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12146/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6265539776a0810b7ce6398c27866ddb9c6bd154
|
6265539776a0810b7ce6398c27866ddb9c6bd154
|
driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int platform_pm_poweroff(struct device *dev)
{
struct device_driver *drv = dev->driver;
int ret = 0;
if (!drv)
return 0;
if (drv->pm) {
if (drv->pm->poweroff)
ret = drv->pm->poweroff(dev);
} else {
ret = platform_legacy_suspend(dev, PMSG_HIBERNATE);
}
return ret;
}
|
int platform_pm_poweroff(struct device *dev)
{
struct device_driver *drv = dev->driver;
int ret = 0;
if (!drv)
return 0;
if (drv->pm) {
if (drv->pm->poweroff)
ret = drv->pm->poweroff(dev);
} else {
ret = platform_legacy_suspend(dev, PMSG_HIBERNATE);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6491/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
MagickExport void DestroyImageProperties(Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties != (void *) NULL)
image->properties=(void *) DestroySplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *)
image->properties);
}
|
MagickExport void DestroyImageProperties(Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties != (void *) NULL)
image->properties=(void *) DestroySplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *)
image->properties);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
ofpacts_parse_instructions(const char *s, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
return ofpacts_parse_copy(s, ofpacts, usable_protocols, true, 0);
}
|
ofpacts_parse_instructions(const char *s, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
return ofpacts_parse_copy(s, ofpacts, usable_protocols, true, 0);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12589
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12589/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/commit/eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134
|
eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134
|
mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
|
static void save_nogroups(void) {
if (arg_nogroups == 0)
return;
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_GROUPS_CFG, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, 0, 0, 0644); // assume mode 0644
fclose(fp);
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot save nogroups state\n");
exit(1);
}
}
|
static void save_nogroups(void) {
if (arg_nogroups == 0)
return;
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_GROUPS_CFG, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, 0, 0, 0644); // assume mode 0644
fclose(fp);
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot save nogroups state\n");
exit(1);
}
}
|
C
|
firejail
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5580
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5580/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/src/gallium/auxiliary/tgsi/tgsi_text.c?id=28894a30a17a84529be102b21118e55d6c9f23fa
|
28894a30a17a84529be102b21118e55d6c9f23fa
| null |
parse_register_file_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file )
{
if (!parse_file( &ctx->cur, file )) {
report_error( ctx, "Unknown register file" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '[') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `['" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
|
parse_register_file_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file )
{
if (!parse_file( &ctx->cur, file )) {
report_error( ctx, "Unknown register file" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '[') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `['" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
virglrenderer
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static void cm_format_rep(struct cm_rep_msg *rep_msg,
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_cm_rep_param *param)
{
cm_format_mad_hdr(&rep_msg->hdr, CM_REP_ATTR_ID, cm_id_priv->tid);
rep_msg->local_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.local_id;
rep_msg->remote_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.remote_id;
cm_rep_set_starting_psn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->starting_psn));
rep_msg->resp_resources = param->responder_resources;
cm_rep_set_target_ack_delay(rep_msg,
cm_id_priv->av.port->cm_dev->ack_delay);
cm_rep_set_failover(rep_msg, param->failover_accepted);
cm_rep_set_rnr_retry_count(rep_msg, param->rnr_retry_count);
rep_msg->local_ca_guid = cm_id_priv->id.device->node_guid;
if (cm_id_priv->qp_type != IB_QPT_XRC_TGT) {
rep_msg->initiator_depth = param->initiator_depth;
cm_rep_set_flow_ctrl(rep_msg, param->flow_control);
cm_rep_set_srq(rep_msg, param->srq);
cm_rep_set_local_qpn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->qp_num));
} else {
cm_rep_set_srq(rep_msg, 1);
cm_rep_set_local_eecn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->qp_num));
}
if (param->private_data && param->private_data_len)
memcpy(rep_msg->private_data, param->private_data,
param->private_data_len);
}
|
static void cm_format_rep(struct cm_rep_msg *rep_msg,
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_cm_rep_param *param)
{
cm_format_mad_hdr(&rep_msg->hdr, CM_REP_ATTR_ID, cm_id_priv->tid);
rep_msg->local_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.local_id;
rep_msg->remote_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.remote_id;
cm_rep_set_starting_psn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->starting_psn));
rep_msg->resp_resources = param->responder_resources;
cm_rep_set_target_ack_delay(rep_msg,
cm_id_priv->av.port->cm_dev->ack_delay);
cm_rep_set_failover(rep_msg, param->failover_accepted);
cm_rep_set_rnr_retry_count(rep_msg, param->rnr_retry_count);
rep_msg->local_ca_guid = cm_id_priv->id.device->node_guid;
if (cm_id_priv->qp_type != IB_QPT_XRC_TGT) {
rep_msg->initiator_depth = param->initiator_depth;
cm_rep_set_flow_ctrl(rep_msg, param->flow_control);
cm_rep_set_srq(rep_msg, param->srq);
cm_rep_set_local_qpn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->qp_num));
} else {
cm_rep_set_srq(rep_msg, 1);
cm_rep_set_local_eecn(rep_msg, cpu_to_be32(param->qp_num));
}
if (param->private_data && param->private_data_len)
memcpy(rep_msg->private_data, param->private_data,
param->private_data_len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void StartCapture(int client_id, const media::VideoCaptureParams& params) {
const auto state_update_callback = base::Bind(
&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnStateUpdate, base::Unretained(this));
const auto frame_ready_callback =
base::Bind(&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnFrameReady, base::Unretained(this));
video_capture_impl_->StartCapture(client_id, params, state_update_callback,
frame_ready_callback);
}
|
void StartCapture(int client_id, const media::VideoCaptureParams& params) {
const auto state_update_callback = base::Bind(
&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnStateUpdate, base::Unretained(this));
const auto frame_ready_callback =
base::Bind(&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnFrameReady, base::Unretained(this));
video_capture_impl_->StartCapture(client_id, params, state_update_callback,
frame_ready_callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int validate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
unsigned long *map)
{
void *p;
void *addr = page_address(page);
if (!check_slab(s, page) ||
!on_freelist(s, page, NULL))
return 0;
/* Now we know that a valid freelist exists */
bitmap_zero(map, page->objects);
for_each_free_object(p, s, page->freelist) {
set_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map);
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 0))
return 0;
}
for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects)
if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map))
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
static int validate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
unsigned long *map)
{
void *p;
void *addr = page_address(page);
if (!check_slab(s, page) ||
!on_freelist(s, page, NULL))
return 0;
/* Now we know that a valid freelist exists */
bitmap_zero(map, page->objects);
for_each_free_object(p, s, page->freelist) {
set_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map);
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 0))
return 0;
}
for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects)
if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map))
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
fz_get_icc_link(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *dst, int dst_extras, const fz_colorspace *src, int src_extras, const fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_color_params *rend, int num_bytes, int copy_spots, int *src_n)
{
fz_icclink *link = NULL;
fz_iccprofile *src_icc = NULL;
fz_iccprofile *dst_icc = dst->data;
fz_iccprofile *prf_icc = NULL;
fz_link_key *key = NULL;
fz_icclink *new_link;
assert(!copy_spots || src_extras == dst_extras);
if (prf != NULL)
prf_icc = prf->data;
if (fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, src))
src_icc = src->data;
else if (fz_colorspace_is_cal(ctx, src))
{
fz_cal_colorspace *cal;
cal = src->data;
src_icc = cal->profile;
/* Check if we have any work to do. */
if (src_icc == NULL)
src_icc = fz_icc_from_cal(ctx, src);
if (src_icc->cmm_handle == NULL)
{
fz_cmm_init_profile(ctx, src_icc);
/* The CMM failed to make a profile. Use the default. */
if (src_icc->cmm_handle == NULL)
{
switch (src->n)
{
case 1:
src_icc = fz_device_gray(ctx)->data;
break;
case 3:
src_icc = fz_device_rgb(ctx)->data;
break;
case 4:
src_icc = fz_device_cmyk(ctx)->data;
break;
default:
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Poorly formed Cal color space");
}
/* To avoid repeated failures building the pdf-cal color space,
* assign the default profile. */
fz_cmm_fin_profile(ctx, src_icc);
cal->profile = src_icc;
}
}
}
else
src_icc = get_base_icc_profile(ctx, src);
if (src_icc == NULL)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Profile missing during link creation");
*src_n = src_icc->num_devcomp;
fz_var(link);
fz_var(key);
if (rend == NULL)
rend = fz_default_color_params(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
/* Check the storable to see if we have a copy. */
key = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_link_key);
key->refs = 1;
memcpy(&key->dst_md5, dst_icc->md5, 16);
memcpy(&key->src_md5, src_icc->md5, 16);
key->rend.ri = rend->ri;
key->rend.bp = rend->bp;
key->src_extras = src_extras;
key->dst_extras = dst_extras;
key->depth = num_bytes;
key->proof = (prf_icc != NULL);
key->copy_spots = copy_spots;
link = fz_find_item(ctx, fz_drop_link_imp, key, &fz_link_store_type);
/* Not found. Make new one add to store. */
if (link == NULL)
{
link = fz_new_icc_link(ctx, dst_icc, dst_extras, src_icc, src_extras, prf_icc, rend, num_bytes, copy_spots);
new_link = fz_store_item(ctx, key, link, sizeof(fz_icclink), &fz_link_store_type);
if (new_link != NULL)
{
/* Found one while adding! Perhaps from another thread? */
fz_drop_icclink(ctx, link);
link = new_link;
}
}
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
fz_drop_link_key(ctx, key);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
/* Ignore any error that came just from the enstoring. */
if (link == NULL)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
return link;
}
|
fz_get_icc_link(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *dst, int dst_extras, const fz_colorspace *src, int src_extras, const fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_color_params *rend, int num_bytes, int copy_spots, int *src_n)
{
fz_icclink *link = NULL;
fz_iccprofile *src_icc = NULL;
fz_iccprofile *dst_icc = dst->data;
fz_iccprofile *prf_icc = NULL;
fz_link_key *key = NULL;
fz_icclink *new_link;
assert(!copy_spots || src_extras == dst_extras);
if (prf != NULL)
prf_icc = prf->data;
if (fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, src))
src_icc = src->data;
else if (fz_colorspace_is_cal(ctx, src))
{
fz_cal_colorspace *cal;
cal = src->data;
src_icc = cal->profile;
/* Check if we have any work to do. */
if (src_icc == NULL)
src_icc = fz_icc_from_cal(ctx, src);
if (src_icc->cmm_handle == NULL)
{
fz_cmm_init_profile(ctx, src_icc);
/* The CMM failed to make a profile. Use the default. */
if (src_icc->cmm_handle == NULL)
{
switch (src->n)
{
case 1:
src_icc = fz_device_gray(ctx)->data;
break;
case 3:
src_icc = fz_device_rgb(ctx)->data;
break;
case 4:
src_icc = fz_device_cmyk(ctx)->data;
break;
default:
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Poorly formed Cal color space");
}
/* To avoid repeated failures building the pdf-cal color space,
* assign the default profile. */
fz_cmm_fin_profile(ctx, src_icc);
cal->profile = src_icc;
}
}
}
else
src_icc = get_base_icc_profile(ctx, src);
if (src_icc == NULL)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Profile missing during link creation");
*src_n = src_icc->num_devcomp;
fz_var(link);
fz_var(key);
if (rend == NULL)
rend = fz_default_color_params(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
/* Check the storable to see if we have a copy. */
key = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_link_key);
key->refs = 1;
memcpy(&key->dst_md5, dst_icc->md5, 16);
memcpy(&key->src_md5, src_icc->md5, 16);
key->rend.ri = rend->ri;
key->rend.bp = rend->bp;
key->src_extras = src_extras;
key->dst_extras = dst_extras;
key->depth = num_bytes;
key->proof = (prf_icc != NULL);
key->copy_spots = copy_spots;
link = fz_find_item(ctx, fz_drop_link_imp, key, &fz_link_store_type);
/* Not found. Make new one add to store. */
if (link == NULL)
{
link = fz_new_icc_link(ctx, dst_icc, dst_extras, src_icc, src_extras, prf_icc, rend, num_bytes, copy_spots);
new_link = fz_store_item(ctx, key, link, sizeof(fz_icclink), &fz_link_store_type);
if (new_link != NULL)
{
/* Found one while adding! Perhaps from another thread? */
fz_drop_icclink(ctx, link);
link = new_link;
}
}
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
fz_drop_link_key(ctx, key);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
/* Ignore any error that came just from the enstoring. */
if (link == NULL)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
return link;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorResourceAgent::clearBrowserCache(ErrorString*)
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
|
void InspectorResourceAgent::clearBrowserCache(ErrorString*)
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
unsigned int dn_mss_from_pmtu(struct net_device *dev, int mtu)
{
unsigned int mss = 230 - DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER;
if (dev) {
struct dn_dev *dn_db = rcu_dereference_raw(dev->dn_ptr);
mtu -= LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
if (dn_db->use_long)
mtu -= 21;
else
mtu -= 6;
mtu -= DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER;
} else {
/*
* 21 = long header, 16 = guess at MAC header length
*/
mtu -= (21 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER + 16);
}
if (mtu > mss)
mss = mtu;
return mss;
}
|
unsigned int dn_mss_from_pmtu(struct net_device *dev, int mtu)
{
unsigned int mss = 230 - DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER;
if (dev) {
struct dn_dev *dn_db = rcu_dereference_raw(dev->dn_ptr);
mtu -= LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
if (dn_db->use_long)
mtu -= 21;
else
mtu -= 6;
mtu -= DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER;
} else {
/*
* 21 = long header, 16 = guess at MAC header length
*/
mtu -= (21 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER + 16);
}
if (mtu > mss)
mss = mtu;
return mss;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6158
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6158/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
[oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
void LargeObjectPage::PoisonUnmarkedObjects() {
HeapObjectHeader* header = GetHeapObjectHeader();
if (!header->IsMarked())
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(header->Payload(), header->PayloadSize());
}
|
void LargeObjectPage::PoisonUnmarkedObjects() {
HeapObjectHeader* header = GetHeapObjectHeader();
if (!header->IsMarked())
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(header->Payload(), header->PayloadSize());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8876cdc1294b2a10be1724a04f864c542e2d9b6f
|
8876cdc1294b2a10be1724a04f864c542e2d9b6f
|
[SVG] Handle non-SVGAnimateElement results in calculateAnimatedValue()
Currently, SVGAnimateElement::calculateAnimatedValue() assumes that the
result element is a subtype of SVGAnimateElement, but that is not always
the case: SMILTimeContainer::updateAnimations() may pick an
SVGAnimateMotionElement for the result.
This CL is a workaround - we should take a good look at the SVG
animation type hierarchy and figure out why this is needed.
BUG=333176
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/133893005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165009 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void SVGAnimateElement::applyResultsToTarget()
{
ASSERT(m_animatedPropertyType != AnimatedTransformList || hasTagName(SVGNames::animateTransformTag));
ASSERT(m_animatedPropertyType != AnimatedUnknown);
ASSERT(m_animator);
if (!m_animatedType)
return;
if (m_animatedProperties.isEmpty()) {
applyCSSPropertyToTargetAndInstances(targetElement(), attributeName(), m_animatedType->valueAsString());
return;
}
m_animator->animValDidChange(m_animatedProperties);
notifyTargetAndInstancesAboutAnimValChange(targetElement(), attributeName());
}
|
void SVGAnimateElement::applyResultsToTarget()
{
ASSERT(m_animatedPropertyType != AnimatedTransformList || hasTagName(SVGNames::animateTransformTag));
ASSERT(m_animatedPropertyType != AnimatedUnknown);
ASSERT(m_animator);
if (!m_animatedType)
return;
if (m_animatedProperties.isEmpty()) {
applyCSSPropertyToTargetAndInstances(targetElement(), attributeName(), m_animatedType->valueAsString());
return;
}
m_animator->animValDidChange(m_animatedProperties);
notifyTargetAndInstancesAboutAnimValChange(targetElement(), attributeName());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9620
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9620/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=3ee55637480d5e319a5de0481b01c3346855cbc9
|
3ee55637480d5e319a5de0481b01c3346855cbc9
| null |
xps_parse_glyphs(xps_context_t *ctx,
char *base_uri, xps_resource_t *dict, xps_item_t *root)
{
xps_item_t *node;
int code;
char *fill_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *bidi_level_att;
/*char *caret_stops_att;*/
char *fill_att;
char *font_size_att;
char *font_uri_att;
char *origin_x_att;
char *origin_y_att;
char *is_sideways_att;
char *indices_att;
char *unicode_att;
char *style_att;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
xps_item_t *transform_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *clip_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *fill_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
xps_part_t *part;
xps_font_t *font;
char partname[1024];
char *subfont;
gs_matrix matrix;
float font_size = 10.0;
int subfontid = 0;
int is_sideways = 0;
int bidi_level = 0;
int sim_bold = 0;
int sim_italic = 0;
gs_matrix shear = { 1, 0, 0.36397f, 1, 0, 0 }; /* shear by 20 degrees */
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
bidi_level_att = xps_att(root, "BidiLevel");
/*caret_stops_att = xps_att(root, "CaretStops");*/
fill_att = xps_att(root, "Fill");
font_size_att = xps_att(root, "FontRenderingEmSize");
font_uri_att = xps_att(root, "FontUri");
origin_x_att = xps_att(root, "OriginX");
origin_y_att = xps_att(root, "OriginY");
is_sideways_att = xps_att(root, "IsSideways");
indices_att = xps_att(root, "Indices");
unicode_att = xps_att(root, "UnicodeString");
style_att = xps_att(root, "StyleSimulations");
transform_att = xps_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = xps_att(root, "Clip");
opacity_att = xps_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = xps_att(root, "OpacityMask");
for (node = xps_down(root); node; node = xps_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.Clip"))
clip_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.Fill"))
fill_tag = xps_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Check that we have all the necessary information.
*/
if (!font_size_att || !font_uri_att || !origin_x_att || !origin_y_att)
return gs_throw(-1, "missing attributes in glyphs element");
if (!indices_att && !unicode_att)
return 0; /* nothing to draw */
if (is_sideways_att)
is_sideways = !strcmp(is_sideways_att, "true");
if (bidi_level_att)
bidi_level = atoi(bidi_level_att);
/*
* Find and load the font resource
*/
xps_absolute_path(partname, base_uri, font_uri_att, sizeof partname);
subfont = strrchr(partname, '#');
if (subfont)
{
subfontid = atoi(subfont + 1);
*subfont = 0;
}
font = xps_hash_lookup(ctx->font_table, partname);
if (!font)
{
part = xps_read_part(ctx, partname);
if (!part)
return gs_throw1(-1, "cannot find font resource part '%s'", partname);
/* deobfuscate if necessary */
if (strstr(part->name, ".odttf"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(ctx, part);
if (strstr(part->name, ".ODTTF"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(ctx, part);
font = xps_new_font(ctx, part->data, part->size, subfontid);
if (!font)
return gs_rethrow1(-1, "cannot load font resource '%s'", partname);
xps_select_best_font_encoding(font);
xps_hash_insert(ctx, ctx->font_table, part->name, font);
/* NOTE: we kept part->name in the hashtable and part->data in the font */
xps_free(ctx, part);
}
if (style_att)
{
if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldSimulation"))
sim_bold = 1;
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "ItalicSimulation"))
sim_italic = 1;
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldItalicSimulation"))
sim_bold = sim_italic = 1;
}
/*
* Set up graphics state.
*/
gs_gsave(ctx->pgs);
if (transform_att || transform_tag)
{
gs_matrix transform;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(ctx, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(ctx, transform_tag, &transform);
gs_concat(ctx->pgs, &transform);
}
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
{
if (clip_att)
xps_parse_abbreviated_geometry(ctx, clip_att);
if (clip_tag)
xps_parse_path_geometry(ctx, dict, clip_tag, 0);
xps_clip(ctx);
}
font_size = atof(font_size_att);
gs_setfont(ctx->pgs, font->font);
gs_make_scaling(font_size, -font_size, &matrix);
if (is_sideways)
gs_matrix_rotate(&matrix, 90.0, &matrix);
if (sim_italic)
gs_matrix_multiply(&shear, &matrix, &matrix);
gs_setcharmatrix(ctx->pgs, &matrix);
gs_matrix_multiply(&matrix, &font->font->orig_FontMatrix, &font->font->FontMatrix);
code = xps_begin_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag, false, false);
if (code)
{
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot create transparency group");
}
/*
* If it's a solid color brush fill/stroke do a simple fill
*/
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(xps_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = xps_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = xps_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (fill_att)
{
float samples[XPS_MAX_COLORS];
gs_color_space *colorspace;
xps_parse_color(ctx, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(ctx, colorspace, samples);
if (sim_bold)
{
/* widening strokes by 1% of em size */
gs_setlinewidth(ctx->pgs, font_size * 0.02);
gs_settextrenderingmode(ctx->pgs, 2);
}
code = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(ctx, font, font_size,
atof(origin_x_att), atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level,
indices_att, unicode_att, sim_bold && !ctx->preserve_tr_mode, sim_bold);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse glyphs data");
}
if (sim_bold && !ctx->preserve_tr_mode)
{
gs_gsave(ctx->pgs);
gs_fill(ctx->pgs);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
gs_stroke(ctx->pgs);
}
gs_settextrenderingmode(ctx->pgs, 0);
}
/*
* If it's a visual brush or image, use the charpath as a clip mask to paint brush
*/
if (fill_tag)
{
ctx->fill_rule = 1; /* always use non-zero winding rule for char paths */
code = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(ctx, font, font_size,
atof(origin_x_att), atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level, indices_att, unicode_att, 1, sim_bold);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse glyphs data");
}
code = xps_parse_brush(ctx, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse fill brush");
}
}
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return 0;
}
|
xps_parse_glyphs(xps_context_t *ctx,
char *base_uri, xps_resource_t *dict, xps_item_t *root)
{
xps_item_t *node;
int code;
char *fill_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *bidi_level_att;
/*char *caret_stops_att;*/
char *fill_att;
char *font_size_att;
char *font_uri_att;
char *origin_x_att;
char *origin_y_att;
char *is_sideways_att;
char *indices_att;
char *unicode_att;
char *style_att;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
xps_item_t *transform_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *clip_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *fill_tag = NULL;
xps_item_t *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
xps_part_t *part;
xps_font_t *font;
char partname[1024];
char *subfont;
gs_matrix matrix;
float font_size = 10.0;
int subfontid = 0;
int is_sideways = 0;
int bidi_level = 0;
int sim_bold = 0;
int sim_italic = 0;
gs_matrix shear = { 1, 0, 0.36397f, 1, 0, 0 }; /* shear by 20 degrees */
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
bidi_level_att = xps_att(root, "BidiLevel");
/*caret_stops_att = xps_att(root, "CaretStops");*/
fill_att = xps_att(root, "Fill");
font_size_att = xps_att(root, "FontRenderingEmSize");
font_uri_att = xps_att(root, "FontUri");
origin_x_att = xps_att(root, "OriginX");
origin_y_att = xps_att(root, "OriginY");
is_sideways_att = xps_att(root, "IsSideways");
indices_att = xps_att(root, "Indices");
unicode_att = xps_att(root, "UnicodeString");
style_att = xps_att(root, "StyleSimulations");
transform_att = xps_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = xps_att(root, "Clip");
opacity_att = xps_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = xps_att(root, "OpacityMask");
for (node = xps_down(root); node; node = xps_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.Clip"))
clip_tag = xps_down(node);
if (!strcmp(xps_tag(node), "Glyphs.Fill"))
fill_tag = xps_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(ctx, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Check that we have all the necessary information.
*/
if (!font_size_att || !font_uri_att || !origin_x_att || !origin_y_att)
return gs_throw(-1, "missing attributes in glyphs element");
if (!indices_att && !unicode_att)
return 0; /* nothing to draw */
if (is_sideways_att)
is_sideways = !strcmp(is_sideways_att, "true");
if (bidi_level_att)
bidi_level = atoi(bidi_level_att);
/*
* Find and load the font resource
*/
xps_absolute_path(partname, base_uri, font_uri_att, sizeof partname);
subfont = strrchr(partname, '#');
if (subfont)
{
subfontid = atoi(subfont + 1);
*subfont = 0;
}
font = xps_hash_lookup(ctx->font_table, partname);
if (!font)
{
part = xps_read_part(ctx, partname);
if (!part)
return gs_throw1(-1, "cannot find font resource part '%s'", partname);
/* deobfuscate if necessary */
if (strstr(part->name, ".odttf"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(ctx, part);
if (strstr(part->name, ".ODTTF"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(ctx, part);
font = xps_new_font(ctx, part->data, part->size, subfontid);
if (!font)
return gs_rethrow1(-1, "cannot load font resource '%s'", partname);
xps_select_best_font_encoding(font);
xps_hash_insert(ctx, ctx->font_table, part->name, font);
/* NOTE: we kept part->name in the hashtable and part->data in the font */
xps_free(ctx, part);
}
if (style_att)
{
if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldSimulation"))
sim_bold = 1;
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "ItalicSimulation"))
sim_italic = 1;
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldItalicSimulation"))
sim_bold = sim_italic = 1;
}
/*
* Set up graphics state.
*/
gs_gsave(ctx->pgs);
if (transform_att || transform_tag)
{
gs_matrix transform;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(ctx, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(ctx, transform_tag, &transform);
gs_concat(ctx->pgs, &transform);
}
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
{
if (clip_att)
xps_parse_abbreviated_geometry(ctx, clip_att);
if (clip_tag)
xps_parse_path_geometry(ctx, dict, clip_tag, 0);
xps_clip(ctx);
}
font_size = atof(font_size_att);
gs_setfont(ctx->pgs, font->font);
gs_make_scaling(font_size, -font_size, &matrix);
if (is_sideways)
gs_matrix_rotate(&matrix, 90.0, &matrix);
if (sim_italic)
gs_matrix_multiply(&shear, &matrix, &matrix);
gs_setcharmatrix(ctx->pgs, &matrix);
gs_matrix_multiply(&matrix, &font->font->orig_FontMatrix, &font->font->FontMatrix);
code = xps_begin_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag, false, false);
if (code)
{
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot create transparency group");
}
/*
* If it's a solid color brush fill/stroke do a simple fill
*/
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(xps_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = xps_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = xps_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (fill_att)
{
float samples[XPS_MAX_COLORS];
gs_color_space *colorspace;
xps_parse_color(ctx, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(ctx, colorspace, samples);
if (sim_bold)
{
/* widening strokes by 1% of em size */
gs_setlinewidth(ctx->pgs, font_size * 0.02);
gs_settextrenderingmode(ctx->pgs, 2);
}
code = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(ctx, font, font_size,
atof(origin_x_att), atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level,
indices_att, unicode_att, sim_bold && !ctx->preserve_tr_mode, sim_bold);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse glyphs data");
}
if (sim_bold && !ctx->preserve_tr_mode)
{
gs_gsave(ctx->pgs);
gs_fill(ctx->pgs);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
gs_stroke(ctx->pgs);
}
gs_settextrenderingmode(ctx->pgs, 0);
}
/*
* If it's a visual brush or image, use the charpath as a clip mask to paint brush
*/
if (fill_tag)
{
ctx->fill_rule = 1; /* always use non-zero winding rule for char paths */
code = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(ctx, font, font_size,
atof(origin_x_att), atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level, indices_att, unicode_att, 1, sim_bold);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse glyphs data");
}
code = xps_parse_brush(ctx, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
if (code)
{
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot parse fill brush");
}
}
xps_end_opacity(ctx, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
gs_grestore(ctx->pgs);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
WallpaperManager* WallpaperManager::Get() {
DCHECK(wallpaper_manager);
return wallpaper_manager;
}
|
WallpaperManager* WallpaperManager::Get() {
DCHECK(wallpaper_manager);
return wallpaper_manager;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14568
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14568/
| null |
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3428/commits/843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
|
static int StreamTcpTest09 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[1] = {0x42};
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof(StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof(TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
stream_config.midstream = TRUE;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = htonl(20);
tcph.th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 1;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(12);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(p->flow->protoctx == NULL);
StreamTcpSetSessionNoReassemblyFlag(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx)), 0);
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *) (p->flow->protoctx))->client.seg_list->next != NULL);
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
PASS;
}
|
static int StreamTcpTest09 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[1] = {0x42};
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof(StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof(TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
stream_config.midstream = TRUE;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = htonl(20);
tcph.th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 1;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(12);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(p->flow->protoctx == NULL);
StreamTcpSetSessionNoReassemblyFlag(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx)), 0);
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *) (p->flow->protoctx))->client.seg_list->next != NULL);
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
PASS;
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5932/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?id=4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715
|
4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715
| null |
print_dev_fd_list ()
{
register int i;
fprintf (stderr, "pid %ld: dev_fd_list:", (long)getpid ());
fflush (stderr);
for (i = 0; i < totfds; i++)
{
if (dev_fd_list[i])
fprintf (stderr, " %d", i);
}
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
}
|
print_dev_fd_list ()
{
register int i;
fprintf (stderr, "pid %ld: dev_fd_list:", (long)getpid ());
fflush (stderr);
for (i = 0; i < totfds; i++)
{
if (dev_fd_list[i])
fprintf (stderr, " %d", i);
}
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void skb_gro_reset_offset(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct skb_shared_info *pinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
const skb_frag_t *frag0 = &pinfo->frags[0];
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->data_offset = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = NULL;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = 0;
if (skb_mac_header(skb) == skb_tail_pointer(skb) &&
pinfo->nr_frags &&
!PageHighMem(skb_frag_page(frag0))) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = skb_frag_address(frag0);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = min_t(unsigned int,
skb_frag_size(frag0),
skb->end - skb->tail);
}
}
|
static void skb_gro_reset_offset(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct skb_shared_info *pinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
const skb_frag_t *frag0 = &pinfo->frags[0];
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->data_offset = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = NULL;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = 0;
if (skb_mac_header(skb) == skb_tail_pointer(skb) &&
pinfo->nr_frags &&
!PageHighMem(skb_frag_page(frag0))) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = skb_frag_address(frag0);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = min_t(unsigned int,
skb_frag_size(frag0),
skb->end - skb->tail);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5165/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
|
void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnPluginLoadingError(
const base::FilePath& plugin_path) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_metrics_provider_->LogPluginLoadingError(plugin_path);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
}
|
void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnPluginLoadingError(
const base::FilePath& plugin_path) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_metrics_provider_->LogPluginLoadingError(plugin_path);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5101
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5101/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/29734f46c6dc9362783091180c2ee279ad53637f
|
29734f46c6dc9362783091180c2ee279ad53637f
|
media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
|
size_t V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::InputBufferQueuedCount() {
return input_buffer_map_.size() - free_input_buffers_.size();
}
|
size_t V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::InputBufferQueuedCount() {
return input_buffer_map_.size() - free_input_buffers_.size();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
WebTextInputMode InputMethodController::InputModeOfFocusedElement() const {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::InputModeAttributeEnabled())
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
AtomicString mode = GetInputModeAttribute(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (mode.IsEmpty())
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
if (mode == InputModeNames::verbatim)
return kWebTextInputModeVerbatim;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin)
return kWebTextInputModeLatin;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin_name)
return kWebTextInputModeLatinName;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin_prose)
return kWebTextInputModeLatinProse;
if (mode == InputModeNames::full_width_latin)
return kWebTextInputModeFullWidthLatin;
if (mode == InputModeNames::kana)
return kWebTextInputModeKana;
if (mode == InputModeNames::kana_name)
return kWebTextInputModeKanaName;
if (mode == InputModeNames::katakana)
return kWebTextInputModeKataKana;
if (mode == InputModeNames::numeric)
return kWebTextInputModeNumeric;
if (mode == InputModeNames::tel)
return kWebTextInputModeTel;
if (mode == InputModeNames::email)
return kWebTextInputModeEmail;
if (mode == InputModeNames::url)
return kWebTextInputModeUrl;
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
}
|
WebTextInputMode InputMethodController::InputModeOfFocusedElement() const {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::InputModeAttributeEnabled())
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
AtomicString mode = GetInputModeAttribute(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (mode.IsEmpty())
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
if (mode == InputModeNames::verbatim)
return kWebTextInputModeVerbatim;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin)
return kWebTextInputModeLatin;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin_name)
return kWebTextInputModeLatinName;
if (mode == InputModeNames::latin_prose)
return kWebTextInputModeLatinProse;
if (mode == InputModeNames::full_width_latin)
return kWebTextInputModeFullWidthLatin;
if (mode == InputModeNames::kana)
return kWebTextInputModeKana;
if (mode == InputModeNames::kana_name)
return kWebTextInputModeKanaName;
if (mode == InputModeNames::katakana)
return kWebTextInputModeKataKana;
if (mode == InputModeNames::numeric)
return kWebTextInputModeNumeric;
if (mode == InputModeNames::tel)
return kWebTextInputModeTel;
if (mode == InputModeNames::email)
return kWebTextInputModeEmail;
if (mode == InputModeNames::url)
return kWebTextInputModeUrl;
return kWebTextInputModeDefault;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14054
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14054/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/124eb202e70678539544f6268efc98131f19fa49
|
124eb202e70678539544f6268efc98131f19fa49
|
avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int ivr_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
unsigned tag, type, len, tlen, value;
int i, j, n, count, nb_streams = 0, ret;
uint8_t key[256], val[256];
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
int64_t pos, offset, temp;
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag == MKTAG('.','R','1','M')) {
if (avio_rb16(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
avio_skip(pb, 5);
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
while (!avio_feof(pb) && temp) {
offset = temp;
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
}
avio_skip(pb, offset - avio_tell(pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 16);
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
}
if (tag != MKTAG('.','R','E','C'))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "StreamCount", tlen)) {
nb_streams = value = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
for (n = 0; n < nb_streams; n++) {
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4 && !strncmp(key, "OpaqueData", tlen)) {
ret = ffio_ensure_seekback(pb, 4);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_rb32(pb) == MKBETAG('M', 'L', 'T', 'I')) {
ret = rm_read_multi(s, pb, st, NULL);
} else {
avio_seek(pb, -4, SEEK_CUR);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, pb, st, st->priv_data, len, NULL);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
} else if (type == 4) {
int j;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "Duration", tlen)) {
st->duration = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
}
if (avio_r8(pb) != 6)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 12);
avio_skip(pb, avio_rb64(pb) + pos - avio_tell(s->pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 8);
return 0;
}
|
static int ivr_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
unsigned tag, type, len, tlen, value;
int i, j, n, count, nb_streams = 0, ret;
uint8_t key[256], val[256];
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
int64_t pos, offset, temp;
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag == MKTAG('.','R','1','M')) {
if (avio_rb16(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
avio_skip(pb, 5);
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
while (!avio_feof(pb) && temp) {
offset = temp;
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
}
avio_skip(pb, offset - avio_tell(pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 16);
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
}
if (tag != MKTAG('.','R','E','C'))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "StreamCount", tlen)) {
nb_streams = value = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
for (n = 0; n < nb_streams; n++) {
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4 && !strncmp(key, "OpaqueData", tlen)) {
ret = ffio_ensure_seekback(pb, 4);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_rb32(pb) == MKBETAG('M', 'L', 'T', 'I')) {
ret = rm_read_multi(s, pb, st, NULL);
} else {
avio_seek(pb, -4, SEEK_CUR);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, pb, st, st->priv_data, len, NULL);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
} else if (type == 4) {
int j;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "Duration", tlen)) {
st->duration = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
}
if (avio_r8(pb) != 6)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 12);
avio_skip(pb, avio_rb64(pb) + pos - avio_tell(s->pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 8);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 1 |
CVE-2017-7889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7889/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94
|
a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94
|
mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
|
static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void)
{
#if !defined(CONFIG_KMEMCHECK)
/*
* For CONFIG_KMEMCHECK or pagealloc debugging, identity mapping will
* use small pages.
* This will simplify cpa(), which otherwise needs to support splitting
* large pages into small in interrupt context, etc.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE) && !debug_pagealloc_enabled())
page_size_mask |= 1 << PG_LEVEL_2M;
#endif
/* Enable PSE if available */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE))
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PSE);
/* Enable PGE if available */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PGE);
__supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_GLOBAL;
} else
__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
/* Enable 1 GB linear kernel mappings if available: */
if (direct_gbpages && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Using GB pages for direct mapping\n");
page_size_mask |= 1 << PG_LEVEL_1G;
} else {
direct_gbpages = 0;
}
}
|
static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void)
{
#if !defined(CONFIG_KMEMCHECK)
/*
* For CONFIG_KMEMCHECK or pagealloc debugging, identity mapping will
* use small pages.
* This will simplify cpa(), which otherwise needs to support splitting
* large pages into small in interrupt context, etc.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE) && !debug_pagealloc_enabled())
page_size_mask |= 1 << PG_LEVEL_2M;
#endif
/* Enable PSE if available */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE))
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PSE);
/* Enable PGE if available */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PGE);
__supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_GLOBAL;
} else
__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
/* Enable 1 GB linear kernel mappings if available: */
if (direct_gbpages && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Using GB pages for direct mapping\n");
page_size_mask |= 1 << PG_LEVEL_1G;
} else {
direct_gbpages = 0;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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