CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-9794
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9794/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4
|
3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4
|
ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_msbits(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime,
unsigned int cond,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int msbits)
{
unsigned long l = (msbits << 16) | width;
return snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, cond, -1,
snd_pcm_hw_rule_msbits,
(void*) l,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_SAMPLE_BITS, -1);
}
|
int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_msbits(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime,
unsigned int cond,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int msbits)
{
unsigned long l = (msbits << 16) | width;
return snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, cond, -1,
snd_pcm_hw_rule_msbits,
(void*) l,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_SAMPLE_BITS, -1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18216/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/853bc26a7ea39e354b9f8889ae7ad1492ffa28d2
|
853bc26a7ea39e354b9f8889ae7ad1492ffa28d2
|
ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct o2nm_cluster *to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(struct o2nm_node *node)
{
/* through the first node_set .parent
* mycluster/nodes/mynode == o2nm_cluster->o2nm_node_group->o2nm_node */
if (node->nd_item.ci_parent)
return to_o2nm_cluster(node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent);
else
return NULL;
}
|
static struct o2nm_cluster *to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(struct o2nm_node *node)
{
/* through the first node_set .parent
* mycluster/nodes/mynode == o2nm_cluster->o2nm_node_group->o2nm_node */
return to_o2nm_cluster(node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0823
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0823/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/ril/+/cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42
|
cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42
|
DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
|
static void dispatchNVWriteItem(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
RIL_NV_WriteItem nvwi;
int32_t t;
status_t status;
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
status = p.readInt32(&t);
nvwi.itemID = (RIL_NV_Item) t;
nvwi.value = strdupReadString(p);
if (status != NO_ERROR || nvwi.value == NULL) {
goto invalid;
}
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("%snvwi.itemID=%d, value=%s, ", printBuf, nvwi.itemID,
nvwi.value);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, &nvwi, sizeof(nvwi), pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memsetString(nvwi.value);
#endif
free(nvwi.value);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
#endif
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
|
static void dispatchNVWriteItem(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
RIL_NV_WriteItem nvwi;
int32_t t;
status_t status;
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
status = p.readInt32(&t);
nvwi.itemID = (RIL_NV_Item) t;
nvwi.value = strdupReadString(p);
if (status != NO_ERROR || nvwi.value == NULL) {
goto invalid;
}
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("%snvwi.itemID=%d, value=%s, ", printBuf, nvwi.itemID,
nvwi.value);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, &nvwi, sizeof(nvwi), pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memsetString(nvwi.value);
#endif
free(nvwi.value);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
#endif
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t bb_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *page, size_t len)
{
int rv = badblocks_store(&rdev->badblocks, page, len, 0);
/* Maybe that ack was all we needed */
if (test_and_clear_bit(BlockedBadBlocks, &rdev->flags))
wake_up(&rdev->blocked_wait);
return rv;
}
|
static ssize_t bb_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *page, size_t len)
{
int rv = badblocks_store(&rdev->badblocks, page, len, 0);
/* Maybe that ack was all we needed */
if (test_and_clear_bit(BlockedBadBlocks, &rdev->flags))
wake_up(&rdev->blocked_wait);
return rv;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8382
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8382/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834
|
c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834
| null |
static PHP_FUNCTION(preg_quote)
{
int in_str_len;
char *in_str; /* Input string argument */
char *in_str_end; /* End of the input string */
int delim_len = 0;
char *delim = NULL; /* Additional delimiter argument */
char *out_str, /* Output string with quoted characters */
*p, /* Iterator for input string */
*q, /* Iterator for output string */
delim_char=0, /* Delimiter character to be quoted */
c; /* Current character */
zend_bool quote_delim = 0; /* Whether to quote additional delim char */
/* Get the arguments and check for errors */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s", &in_str, &in_str_len,
&delim, &delim_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
in_str_end = in_str + in_str_len;
/* Nothing to do if we got an empty string */
if (in_str == in_str_end) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (delim && *delim) {
delim_char = delim[0];
quote_delim = 1;
}
/* Allocate enough memory so that even if each character
is quoted, we won't run out of room */
out_str = safe_emalloc(4, in_str_len, 1);
/* Go through the string and quote necessary characters */
for(p = in_str, q = out_str; p != in_str_end; p++) {
c = *p;
switch(c) {
case '.':
case '\\':
case '+':
case '*':
case '?':
case '[':
case '^':
case ']':
case '$':
case '(':
case ')':
case '{':
case '}':
case '=':
case '!':
case '>':
case '<':
case '|':
case ':':
case '-':
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = c;
break;
case '\0':
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = '0';
*q++ = '0';
*q++ = '0';
break;
default:
if (quote_delim && c == delim_char)
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = c;
break;
}
}
*q = '\0';
/* Reallocate string and return it */
RETVAL_STRINGL(erealloc(out_str, q - out_str + 1), q - out_str, 0);
}
|
static PHP_FUNCTION(preg_quote)
{
int in_str_len;
char *in_str; /* Input string argument */
char *in_str_end; /* End of the input string */
int delim_len = 0;
char *delim = NULL; /* Additional delimiter argument */
char *out_str, /* Output string with quoted characters */
*p, /* Iterator for input string */
*q, /* Iterator for output string */
delim_char=0, /* Delimiter character to be quoted */
c; /* Current character */
zend_bool quote_delim = 0; /* Whether to quote additional delim char */
/* Get the arguments and check for errors */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s", &in_str, &in_str_len,
&delim, &delim_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
in_str_end = in_str + in_str_len;
/* Nothing to do if we got an empty string */
if (in_str == in_str_end) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (delim && *delim) {
delim_char = delim[0];
quote_delim = 1;
}
/* Allocate enough memory so that even if each character
is quoted, we won't run out of room */
out_str = safe_emalloc(4, in_str_len, 1);
/* Go through the string and quote necessary characters */
for(p = in_str, q = out_str; p != in_str_end; p++) {
c = *p;
switch(c) {
case '.':
case '\\':
case '+':
case '*':
case '?':
case '[':
case '^':
case ']':
case '$':
case '(':
case ')':
case '{':
case '}':
case '=':
case '!':
case '>':
case '<':
case '|':
case ':':
case '-':
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = c;
break;
case '\0':
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = '0';
*q++ = '0';
*q++ = '0';
break;
default:
if (quote_delim && c == delim_char)
*q++ = '\\';
*q++ = c;
break;
}
}
*q = '\0';
/* Reallocate string and return it */
RETVAL_STRINGL(erealloc(out_str, q - out_str + 1), q - out_str, 0);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static __init int p4_pmu_init(void)
{
unsigned int low, high;
/* If we get stripped -- indexing fails */
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARCH_P4_MAX_CCCR > X86_PMC_MAX_GENERIC);
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, low, high);
if (!(low & (1 << 7))) {
pr_cont("unsupported Netburst CPU model %d ",
boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
return -ENODEV;
}
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, p4_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
pr_cont("Netburst events, ");
x86_pmu = p4_pmu;
return 0;
}
|
static __init int p4_pmu_init(void)
{
unsigned int low, high;
/* If we get stripped -- indexing fails */
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARCH_P4_MAX_CCCR > X86_PMC_MAX_GENERIC);
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, low, high);
if (!(low & (1 << 7))) {
pr_cont("unsupported Netburst CPU model %d ",
boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
return -ENODEV;
}
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, p4_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
pr_cont("Netburst events, ");
x86_pmu = p4_pmu;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2915
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2915/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DoImagesMatch(const gfx::Image& a, const gfx::Image& b) {
SkBitmap a_bitmap = a.AsBitmap();
SkBitmap b_bitmap = b.AsBitmap();
if (a_bitmap.width() != b_bitmap.width() ||
a_bitmap.height() != b_bitmap.height()) {
return false;
}
SkAutoLockPixels a_bitmap_lock(a_bitmap);
SkAutoLockPixels b_bitmap_lock(b_bitmap);
return memcmp(a_bitmap.getPixels(),
b_bitmap.getPixels(),
a_bitmap.getSize()) == 0;
}
|
bool DoImagesMatch(const gfx::Image& a, const gfx::Image& b) {
SkBitmap a_bitmap = a.AsBitmap();
SkBitmap b_bitmap = b.AsBitmap();
if (a_bitmap.width() != b_bitmap.width() ||
a_bitmap.height() != b_bitmap.height()) {
return false;
}
SkAutoLockPixels a_bitmap_lock(a_bitmap);
SkAutoLockPixels b_bitmap_lock(b_bitmap);
return memcmp(a_bitmap.getPixels(),
b_bitmap.getPixels(),
a_bitmap.getSize()) == 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5822/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f81d000fdb5331121cba7ff81dfaaec25b520a5
|
2f81d000fdb5331121cba7ff81dfaaec25b520a5
|
When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
ResourceLoader* ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::GetLoader(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
auto i = pending_loaders_.find(id);
if (i == pending_loaders_.end())
return nullptr;
return i->second.get();
}
|
ResourceLoader* ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::GetLoader(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
auto i = pending_loaders_.find(id);
if (i == pending_loaders_.end())
return nullptr;
return i->second.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9084/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
|
static int msix_sparse_mmap_cap(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
struct vfio_info_cap *caps)
{
struct vfio_info_cap_header *header;
struct vfio_region_info_cap_sparse_mmap *sparse;
size_t end, size;
int nr_areas = 2, i = 0;
end = pci_resource_len(vdev->pdev, vdev->msix_bar);
/* If MSI-X table is aligned to the start or end, only one area */
if (((vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK) == 0) ||
(PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset + vdev->msix_size) >= end))
nr_areas = 1;
size = sizeof(*sparse) + (nr_areas * sizeof(*sparse->areas));
header = vfio_info_cap_add(caps, size,
VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_SPARSE_MMAP, 1);
if (IS_ERR(header))
return PTR_ERR(header);
sparse = container_of(header,
struct vfio_region_info_cap_sparse_mmap, header);
sparse->nr_areas = nr_areas;
if (vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK) {
sparse->areas[i].offset = 0;
sparse->areas[i].size = vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK;
i++;
}
if (PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset + vdev->msix_size) < end) {
sparse->areas[i].offset = PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset +
vdev->msix_size);
sparse->areas[i].size = end - sparse->areas[i].offset;
i++;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int msix_sparse_mmap_cap(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
struct vfio_info_cap *caps)
{
struct vfio_info_cap_header *header;
struct vfio_region_info_cap_sparse_mmap *sparse;
size_t end, size;
int nr_areas = 2, i = 0;
end = pci_resource_len(vdev->pdev, vdev->msix_bar);
/* If MSI-X table is aligned to the start or end, only one area */
if (((vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK) == 0) ||
(PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset + vdev->msix_size) >= end))
nr_areas = 1;
size = sizeof(*sparse) + (nr_areas * sizeof(*sparse->areas));
header = vfio_info_cap_add(caps, size,
VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_SPARSE_MMAP, 1);
if (IS_ERR(header))
return PTR_ERR(header);
sparse = container_of(header,
struct vfio_region_info_cap_sparse_mmap, header);
sparse->nr_areas = nr_areas;
if (vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK) {
sparse->areas[i].offset = 0;
sparse->areas[i].size = vdev->msix_offset & PAGE_MASK;
i++;
}
if (PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset + vdev->msix_size) < end) {
sparse->areas[i].offset = PAGE_ALIGN(vdev->msix_offset +
vdev->msix_size);
sparse->areas[i].size = end - sparse->areas[i].offset;
i++;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5039/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/69b4b9ef7455753b12c3efe4eec71647e6fb1da1
|
69b4b9ef7455753b12c3efe4eec71647e6fb1da1
|
Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
void DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged(
network::mojom::ConnectionType type) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
connection_type_ = type;
RecordNetworkChangeEvent(NETWORK_CHANGED);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (get_network_id_asynchronously_) {
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
g_get_network_id_task_runner.Get().get(), FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DoGetCurrentNetworkID,
base::Unretained(network_connection_tracker_)),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::ContinueNetworkChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ContinueNetworkChanged(GetCurrentNetworkID());
}
|
void DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged(
network::mojom::ConnectionType type) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
connection_type_ = type;
RecordNetworkChangeEvent(NETWORK_CHANGED);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (get_network_id_asynchronously_) {
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
g_get_network_id_task_runner.Get().get(), FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DoGetCurrentNetworkID,
base::Unretained(network_connection_tracker_)),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::ContinueNetworkChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ContinueNetworkChanged(GetCurrentNetworkID());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void DefaultAudioDestinationHandler::StopPlatformDestination() {
if (platform_destination_->IsPlaying()) {
platform_destination_->Stop();
}
}
|
void DefaultAudioDestinationHandler::StopPlatformDestination() {
if (platform_destination_->IsPlaying()) {
platform_destination_->Stop();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree(xsltCompilerCtxtPtr cctxt, xmlNodePtr node)
{
xmlNodePtr deleteNode, cur, txt, textNode = NULL;
xmlDocPtr doc;
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
int internalize = 0, findSpaceAttr;
int xsltStylesheetElemDepth;
xmlAttrPtr attr;
xmlChar *value;
const xmlChar *name, *nsNameXSLT = NULL;
int strictWhitespace, inXSLText = 0;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
xsltNsMapPtr nsMapItem;
#endif
if ((cctxt == NULL) || (cctxt->style == NULL) ||
(node == NULL) || (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return(-1);
doc = node->doc;
if (doc == NULL)
goto internal_err;
style = cctxt->style;
if ((style->dict != NULL) && (doc->dict == style->dict))
internalize = 1;
else
style->internalized = 0;
/*
* Init value of xml:space. Since this might be an embedded
* stylesheet, this is needed to be performed on the element
* where the stylesheet is rooted at, taking xml:space of
* ancestors into account.
*/
if (! cctxt->simplified)
xsltStylesheetElemDepth = cctxt->depth +1;
else
xsltStylesheetElemDepth = 0;
if (xmlNodeGetSpacePreserve(node) != 1)
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 0;
else
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
/*
* Eval if we should keep the old incorrect behaviour.
*/
strictWhitespace = (cctxt->strict != 0) ? 1 : 0;
nsNameXSLT = xsltConstNamespaceNameXSLT;
deleteNode = NULL;
cur = node;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (deleteNode != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_BLANKS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree: removing node\n");
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(deleteNode);
xmlFreeNode(deleteNode);
deleteNode = NULL;
}
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Clear the PSVI field.
*/
cur->psvi = NULL;
xsltCompilerNodePush(cctxt, cur);
inXSLText = 0;
textNode = NULL;
findSpaceAttr = 1;
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 0;
/*
* TODO: I'd love to use a string pointer comparison here :-/
*/
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur)) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
if (cur->ns->href != nsNameXSLT) {
nsMapItem = xsltNewNamespaceMapItem(cctxt,
doc, cur->ns, cur);
if (nsMapItem == NULL)
goto internal_err;
cur->ns->href = nsNameXSLT;
}
#endif
if (cur->name == NULL)
goto process_attributes;
/*
* Mark the XSLT element for later recognition.
* TODO: Using the marker is still too dangerous, since if
* the parsing mechanism leaves out an XSLT element, then
* this might hit the transformation-mechanism, which
* will break if it doesn't expect such a marker.
*/
/* cur->psvi = (void *) xsltXSLTElemMarker; */
/*
* XSLT 2.0: "Any whitespace text node whose parent is
* one of the following elements is removed from the "
* tree, regardless of any xml:space attributes:..."
* xsl:apply-imports,
* xsl:apply-templates,
* xsl:attribute-set,
* xsl:call-template,
* xsl:choose,
* xsl:stylesheet, xsl:transform.
* XSLT 2.0: xsl:analyze-string,
* xsl:character-map,
* xsl:next-match
*
* TODO: I'd love to use a string pointer comparison here :-/
*/
name = cur->name;
switch (*name) {
case 't':
if ((name[0] == 't') && (name[1] == 'e') &&
(name[2] == 'x') && (name[3] == 't') &&
(name[4] == 0))
{
/*
* Process the xsl:text element.
* ----------------------------
* Mark it for later recognition.
*/
cur->psvi = (void *) xsltXSLTTextMarker;
/*
* For stylesheets, the set of
* whitespace-preserving element names
* consists of just xsl:text.
*/
findSpaceAttr = 0;
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
inXSLText = 1;
}
break;
case 'c':
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "choose") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "call-template"))
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
case 'a':
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "apply-templates") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "apply-imports") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "attribute-set"))
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
default:
if (xsltStylesheetElemDepth == cctxt->depth) {
/*
* This is a xsl:stylesheet/xsl:transform.
*/
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
}
if ((cur->prev != NULL) &&
(cur->prev->type == XML_TEXT_NODE))
{
/*
* XSLT 2.0 : "Any whitespace text node whose
* following-sibling node is an xsl:param or
* xsl:sort element is removed from the tree,
* regardless of any xml:space attributes."
*/
if (((*name == 'p') || (*name == 's')) &&
(xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "param") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "sort")))
{
do {
if (IS_BLANK_NODE(cur->prev)) {
txt = cur->prev;
xmlUnlinkNode(txt);
xmlFreeNode(txt);
} else {
/*
* This will result in a content
* error, when hitting the parsing
* functions.
*/
break;
}
} while (cur->prev);
}
}
break;
}
}
process_attributes:
/*
* Process attributes.
* ------------------
*/
if (cur->properties != NULL) {
if (cur->children == NULL)
findSpaceAttr = 0;
attr = cur->properties;
do {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
if ((attr->ns) && (attr->ns->href != nsNameXSLT) &&
xmlStrEqual(attr->ns->href, nsNameXSLT))
{
nsMapItem = xsltNewNamespaceMapItem(cctxt,
doc, attr->ns, cur);
if (nsMapItem == NULL)
goto internal_err;
attr->ns->href = nsNameXSLT;
}
#endif
if (internalize) {
/*
* Internalize the attribute's value; the goal is to
* speed up operations and minimize used space by
* compiled stylesheets.
*/
txt = attr->children;
/*
* NOTE that this assumes only one
* text-node in the attribute's content.
*/
if ((txt != NULL) && (txt->content != NULL) &&
(!xmlDictOwns(style->dict, txt->content)))
{
value = (xmlChar *) xmlDictLookup(style->dict,
txt->content, -1);
xmlNodeSetContent(txt, NULL);
txt->content = value;
}
}
/*
* Process xml:space attributes.
* ----------------------------
*/
if ((findSpaceAttr != 0) &&
(attr->ns != NULL) &&
(attr->name != NULL) &&
(attr->name[0] == 's') &&
(attr->ns->prefix != NULL) &&
(attr->ns->prefix[0] == 'x') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[1] == 'm') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[2] == 'l') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[3] == 0))
{
value = xmlGetNsProp(cur, BAD_CAST "space",
XML_XML_NAMESPACE);
if (value != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(value, BAD_CAST "preserve")) {
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(value, BAD_CAST "default")) {
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 0;
} else {
/* Invalid value for xml:space. */
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Attribute xml:space: Invalid value.\n");
cctxt->style->warnings++;
}
findSpaceAttr = 0;
xmlFree(value);
}
}
attr = attr->next;
} while (attr != NULL);
}
/*
* We'll descend into the children of element nodes only.
*/
if (cur->children != NULL) {
cur = cur->children;
continue;
}
} else if ((cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
/*
* Merge adjacent text/CDATA-section-nodes
* ---------------------------------------
* In order to avoid breaking of existing stylesheets,
* if the old behaviour is wanted (strictWhitespace == 0),
* then we *won't* merge adjacent text-nodes
* (except in xsl:text); this will ensure that whitespace-only
* text nodes are (incorrectly) not stripped in some cases.
*
* Example: : <foo> <!-- bar -->zoo</foo>
* Corrent (strict) result: <foo> zoo</foo>
* Incorrect (old) result : <foo>zoo</foo>
*
* NOTE that we *will* merge adjacent text-nodes if
* they are in xsl:text.
* Example, the following:
* <xsl:text> <!-- bar -->zoo<xsl:text>
* will result in both cases in:
* <xsl:text> zoo<xsl:text>
*/
cur->type = XML_TEXT_NODE;
if ((strictWhitespace != 0) || (inXSLText != 0)) {
/*
* New behaviour; merge nodes.
*/
if (textNode == NULL)
textNode = cur;
else {
if (cur->content != NULL)
xmlNodeAddContent(textNode, cur->content);
deleteNode = cur;
}
if ((cur->next == NULL) ||
(cur->next->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
goto end_of_text;
else
goto next_sibling;
} else {
/*
* Old behaviour.
*/
if (textNode == NULL)
textNode = cur;
goto end_of_text;
}
} else if ((cur->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_PI_NODE))
{
/*
* Remove processing instructions and comments.
*/
deleteNode = cur;
if ((cur->next == NULL) ||
(cur->next->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
goto end_of_text;
else
goto next_sibling;
} else {
textNode = NULL;
/*
* Invalid node-type for this data-model.
*/
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Invalid type of node for the XSLT data model.\n");
cctxt->style->errors++;
goto next_sibling;
}
end_of_text:
if (textNode) {
value = textNode->content;
/*
* At this point all adjacent text/CDATA-section nodes
* have been merged.
*
* Strip whitespace-only text-nodes.
* (cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace)
*/
if ((value == NULL) || (*value == 0) ||
(((cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace) ||
(! cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace)) &&
IS_BLANK(*value) &&
xsltIsBlank(value)))
{
if (textNode != cur) {
xmlUnlinkNode(textNode);
xmlFreeNode(textNode);
} else
deleteNode = textNode;
textNode = NULL;
goto next_sibling;
}
/*
* Convert CDATA-section nodes to text-nodes.
* TODO: Can this produce problems?
*/
if (textNode->type != XML_TEXT_NODE) {
textNode->type = XML_TEXT_NODE;
textNode->name = xmlStringText;
}
if (internalize &&
(textNode->content != NULL) &&
(!xmlDictOwns(style->dict, textNode->content)))
{
/*
* Internalize the string.
*/
value = (xmlChar *) xmlDictLookup(style->dict,
textNode->content, -1);
xmlNodeSetContent(textNode, NULL);
textNode->content = value;
}
textNode = NULL;
/*
* Note that "disable-output-escaping" of the xsl:text
* element will be applied at a later level, when
* XSLT elements are processed.
*/
}
next_sibling:
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
xsltCompilerNodePop(cctxt, cur);
}
if (cur == node)
break;
if (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
inXSLText = 0;
goto next_sibling;
};
}
if (deleteNode != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PARSING
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree: removing node\n");
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(deleteNode);
xmlFreeNode(deleteNode);
}
return(0);
internal_err:
return(-1);
}
|
xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree(xsltCompilerCtxtPtr cctxt, xmlNodePtr node)
{
xmlNodePtr deleteNode, cur, txt, textNode = NULL;
xmlDocPtr doc;
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
int internalize = 0, findSpaceAttr;
int xsltStylesheetElemDepth;
xmlAttrPtr attr;
xmlChar *value;
const xmlChar *name, *nsNameXSLT = NULL;
int strictWhitespace, inXSLText = 0;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
xsltNsMapPtr nsMapItem;
#endif
if ((cctxt == NULL) || (cctxt->style == NULL) ||
(node == NULL) || (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return(-1);
doc = node->doc;
if (doc == NULL)
goto internal_err;
style = cctxt->style;
if ((style->dict != NULL) && (doc->dict == style->dict))
internalize = 1;
else
style->internalized = 0;
/*
* Init value of xml:space. Since this might be an embedded
* stylesheet, this is needed to be performed on the element
* where the stylesheet is rooted at, taking xml:space of
* ancestors into account.
*/
if (! cctxt->simplified)
xsltStylesheetElemDepth = cctxt->depth +1;
else
xsltStylesheetElemDepth = 0;
if (xmlNodeGetSpacePreserve(node) != 1)
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 0;
else
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
/*
* Eval if we should keep the old incorrect behaviour.
*/
strictWhitespace = (cctxt->strict != 0) ? 1 : 0;
nsNameXSLT = xsltConstNamespaceNameXSLT;
deleteNode = NULL;
cur = node;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (deleteNode != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_BLANKS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree: removing node\n");
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(deleteNode);
xmlFreeNode(deleteNode);
deleteNode = NULL;
}
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Clear the PSVI field.
*/
cur->psvi = NULL;
xsltCompilerNodePush(cctxt, cur);
inXSLText = 0;
textNode = NULL;
findSpaceAttr = 1;
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 0;
/*
* TODO: I'd love to use a string pointer comparison here :-/
*/
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur)) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
if (cur->ns->href != nsNameXSLT) {
nsMapItem = xsltNewNamespaceMapItem(cctxt,
doc, cur->ns, cur);
if (nsMapItem == NULL)
goto internal_err;
cur->ns->href = nsNameXSLT;
}
#endif
if (cur->name == NULL)
goto process_attributes;
/*
* Mark the XSLT element for later recognition.
* TODO: Using the marker is still too dangerous, since if
* the parsing mechanism leaves out an XSLT element, then
* this might hit the transformation-mechanism, which
* will break if it doesn't expect such a marker.
*/
/* cur->psvi = (void *) xsltXSLTElemMarker; */
/*
* XSLT 2.0: "Any whitespace text node whose parent is
* one of the following elements is removed from the "
* tree, regardless of any xml:space attributes:..."
* xsl:apply-imports,
* xsl:apply-templates,
* xsl:attribute-set,
* xsl:call-template,
* xsl:choose,
* xsl:stylesheet, xsl:transform.
* XSLT 2.0: xsl:analyze-string,
* xsl:character-map,
* xsl:next-match
*
* TODO: I'd love to use a string pointer comparison here :-/
*/
name = cur->name;
switch (*name) {
case 't':
if ((name[0] == 't') && (name[1] == 'e') &&
(name[2] == 'x') && (name[3] == 't') &&
(name[4] == 0))
{
/*
* Process the xsl:text element.
* ----------------------------
* Mark it for later recognition.
*/
cur->psvi = (void *) xsltXSLTTextMarker;
/*
* For stylesheets, the set of
* whitespace-preserving element names
* consists of just xsl:text.
*/
findSpaceAttr = 0;
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
inXSLText = 1;
}
break;
case 'c':
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "choose") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "call-template"))
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
case 'a':
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "apply-templates") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "apply-imports") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "attribute-set"))
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
default:
if (xsltStylesheetElemDepth == cctxt->depth) {
/*
* This is a xsl:stylesheet/xsl:transform.
*/
cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace = 1;
break;
}
if ((cur->prev != NULL) &&
(cur->prev->type == XML_TEXT_NODE))
{
/*
* XSLT 2.0 : "Any whitespace text node whose
* following-sibling node is an xsl:param or
* xsl:sort element is removed from the tree,
* regardless of any xml:space attributes."
*/
if (((*name == 'p') || (*name == 's')) &&
(xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "param") ||
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "sort")))
{
do {
if (IS_BLANK_NODE(cur->prev)) {
txt = cur->prev;
xmlUnlinkNode(txt);
xmlFreeNode(txt);
} else {
/*
* This will result in a content
* error, when hitting the parsing
* functions.
*/
break;
}
} while (cur->prev);
}
}
break;
}
}
process_attributes:
/*
* Process attributes.
* ------------------
*/
if (cur->properties != NULL) {
if (cur->children == NULL)
findSpaceAttr = 0;
attr = cur->properties;
do {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
if ((attr->ns) && (attr->ns->href != nsNameXSLT) &&
xmlStrEqual(attr->ns->href, nsNameXSLT))
{
nsMapItem = xsltNewNamespaceMapItem(cctxt,
doc, attr->ns, cur);
if (nsMapItem == NULL)
goto internal_err;
attr->ns->href = nsNameXSLT;
}
#endif
if (internalize) {
/*
* Internalize the attribute's value; the goal is to
* speed up operations and minimize used space by
* compiled stylesheets.
*/
txt = attr->children;
/*
* NOTE that this assumes only one
* text-node in the attribute's content.
*/
if ((txt != NULL) && (txt->content != NULL) &&
(!xmlDictOwns(style->dict, txt->content)))
{
value = (xmlChar *) xmlDictLookup(style->dict,
txt->content, -1);
xmlNodeSetContent(txt, NULL);
txt->content = value;
}
}
/*
* Process xml:space attributes.
* ----------------------------
*/
if ((findSpaceAttr != 0) &&
(attr->ns != NULL) &&
(attr->name != NULL) &&
(attr->name[0] == 's') &&
(attr->ns->prefix != NULL) &&
(attr->ns->prefix[0] == 'x') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[1] == 'm') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[2] == 'l') &&
(attr->ns->prefix[3] == 0))
{
value = xmlGetNsProp(cur, BAD_CAST "space",
XML_XML_NAMESPACE);
if (value != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(value, BAD_CAST "preserve")) {
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 1;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(value, BAD_CAST "default")) {
cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace = 0;
} else {
/* Invalid value for xml:space. */
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Attribute xml:space: Invalid value.\n");
cctxt->style->warnings++;
}
findSpaceAttr = 0;
xmlFree(value);
}
}
attr = attr->next;
} while (attr != NULL);
}
/*
* We'll descend into the children of element nodes only.
*/
if (cur->children != NULL) {
cur = cur->children;
continue;
}
} else if ((cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
/*
* Merge adjacent text/CDATA-section-nodes
* ---------------------------------------
* In order to avoid breaking of existing stylesheets,
* if the old behaviour is wanted (strictWhitespace == 0),
* then we *won't* merge adjacent text-nodes
* (except in xsl:text); this will ensure that whitespace-only
* text nodes are (incorrectly) not stripped in some cases.
*
* Example: : <foo> <!-- bar -->zoo</foo>
* Corrent (strict) result: <foo> zoo</foo>
* Incorrect (old) result : <foo>zoo</foo>
*
* NOTE that we *will* merge adjacent text-nodes if
* they are in xsl:text.
* Example, the following:
* <xsl:text> <!-- bar -->zoo<xsl:text>
* will result in both cases in:
* <xsl:text> zoo<xsl:text>
*/
cur->type = XML_TEXT_NODE;
if ((strictWhitespace != 0) || (inXSLText != 0)) {
/*
* New behaviour; merge nodes.
*/
if (textNode == NULL)
textNode = cur;
else {
if (cur->content != NULL)
xmlNodeAddContent(textNode, cur->content);
deleteNode = cur;
}
if ((cur->next == NULL) ||
(cur->next->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
goto end_of_text;
else
goto next_sibling;
} else {
/*
* Old behaviour.
*/
if (textNode == NULL)
textNode = cur;
goto end_of_text;
}
} else if ((cur->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_PI_NODE))
{
/*
* Remove processing instructions and comments.
*/
deleteNode = cur;
if ((cur->next == NULL) ||
(cur->next->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
goto end_of_text;
else
goto next_sibling;
} else {
textNode = NULL;
/*
* Invalid node-type for this data-model.
*/
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Invalid type of node for the XSLT data model.\n");
cctxt->style->errors++;
goto next_sibling;
}
end_of_text:
if (textNode) {
value = textNode->content;
/*
* At this point all adjacent text/CDATA-section nodes
* have been merged.
*
* Strip whitespace-only text-nodes.
* (cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace)
*/
if ((value == NULL) || (*value == 0) ||
(((cctxt->inode->stripWhitespace) ||
(! cctxt->inode->preserveWhitespace)) &&
IS_BLANK(*value) &&
xsltIsBlank(value)))
{
if (textNode != cur) {
xmlUnlinkNode(textNode);
xmlFreeNode(textNode);
} else
deleteNode = textNode;
textNode = NULL;
goto next_sibling;
}
/*
* Convert CDATA-section nodes to text-nodes.
* TODO: Can this produce problems?
*/
if (textNode->type != XML_TEXT_NODE) {
textNode->type = XML_TEXT_NODE;
textNode->name = xmlStringText;
}
if (internalize &&
(textNode->content != NULL) &&
(!xmlDictOwns(style->dict, textNode->content)))
{
/*
* Internalize the string.
*/
value = (xmlChar *) xmlDictLookup(style->dict,
textNode->content, -1);
xmlNodeSetContent(textNode, NULL);
textNode->content = value;
}
textNode = NULL;
/*
* Note that "disable-output-escaping" of the xsl:text
* element will be applied at a later level, when
* XSLT elements are processed.
*/
}
next_sibling:
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
xsltCompilerNodePop(cctxt, cur);
}
if (cur == node)
break;
if (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
inXSLText = 0;
goto next_sibling;
};
}
if (deleteNode != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PARSING
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltParsePreprocessStylesheetTree: removing node\n");
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(deleteNode);
xmlFreeNode(deleteNode);
}
return(0);
internal_err:
return(-1);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1068/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6
|
b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6
|
netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static int compat_target_to_user(struct ebt_entry_target *t,
void __user **dstptr,
unsigned int *size)
{
const struct xt_target *target = t->u.target;
struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt __user *cm = *dstptr;
int off = xt_compat_target_offset(target);
compat_uint_t tsize = t->target_size - off;
if (WARN_ON(off >= t->target_size))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(cm->u.name, target->name,
strlen(target->name) + 1) || put_user(tsize, &cm->match_size))
return -EFAULT;
if (target->compat_to_user) {
if (target->compat_to_user(cm->data, t->data))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (xt_data_to_user(cm->data, t->data, target->usersize, tsize,
COMPAT_XT_ALIGN(tsize)))
return -EFAULT;
}
*size -= ebt_compat_entry_padsize() + off;
*dstptr = cm->data;
*dstptr += tsize;
return 0;
}
|
static int compat_target_to_user(struct ebt_entry_target *t,
void __user **dstptr,
unsigned int *size)
{
const struct xt_target *target = t->u.target;
struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt __user *cm = *dstptr;
int off = xt_compat_target_offset(target);
compat_uint_t tsize = t->target_size - off;
if (WARN_ON(off >= t->target_size))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(cm->u.name, target->name,
strlen(target->name) + 1) || put_user(tsize, &cm->match_size))
return -EFAULT;
if (target->compat_to_user) {
if (target->compat_to_user(cm->data, t->data))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (xt_data_to_user(cm->data, t->data, target->usersize, tsize,
COMPAT_XT_ALIGN(tsize)))
return -EFAULT;
}
*size -= ebt_compat_entry_padsize() + off;
*dstptr = cm->data;
*dstptr += tsize;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1747
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1747/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
|
void TrayCast::OnCastingSessionStartedOrStopped(bool started) {
is_casting_ = started;
UpdatePrimaryView();
}
|
void TrayCast::OnCastingSessionStartedOrStopped(bool started) {
is_casting_ = started;
UpdatePrimaryView();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
rdev_size_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct mddev *my_mddev = rdev->mddev;
sector_t oldsectors = rdev->sectors;
sector_t sectors;
if (strict_blocks_to_sectors(buf, §ors) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (rdev->data_offset != rdev->new_data_offset)
return -EINVAL; /* too confusing */
if (my_mddev->pers && rdev->raid_disk >= 0) {
if (my_mddev->persistent) {
sectors = super_types[my_mddev->major_version].
rdev_size_change(rdev, sectors);
if (!sectors)
return -EBUSY;
} else if (!sectors)
sectors = (i_size_read(rdev->bdev->bd_inode) >> 9) -
rdev->data_offset;
if (!my_mddev->pers->resize)
/* Cannot change size for RAID0 or Linear etc */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sectors < my_mddev->dev_sectors)
return -EINVAL; /* component must fit device */
rdev->sectors = sectors;
if (sectors > oldsectors && my_mddev->external) {
/* Need to check that all other rdevs with the same
* ->bdev do not overlap. 'rcu' is sufficient to walk
* the rdev lists safely.
* This check does not provide a hard guarantee, it
* just helps avoid dangerous mistakes.
*/
struct mddev *mddev;
int overlap = 0;
struct list_head *tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_mddev(mddev, tmp) {
struct md_rdev *rdev2;
rdev_for_each(rdev2, mddev)
if (rdev->bdev == rdev2->bdev &&
rdev != rdev2 &&
overlaps(rdev->data_offset, rdev->sectors,
rdev2->data_offset,
rdev2->sectors)) {
overlap = 1;
break;
}
if (overlap) {
mddev_put(mddev);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (overlap) {
/* Someone else could have slipped in a size
* change here, but doing so is just silly.
* We put oldsectors back because we *know* it is
* safe, and trust userspace not to race with
* itself
*/
rdev->sectors = oldsectors;
return -EBUSY;
}
}
return len;
}
|
rdev_size_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct mddev *my_mddev = rdev->mddev;
sector_t oldsectors = rdev->sectors;
sector_t sectors;
if (strict_blocks_to_sectors(buf, §ors) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (rdev->data_offset != rdev->new_data_offset)
return -EINVAL; /* too confusing */
if (my_mddev->pers && rdev->raid_disk >= 0) {
if (my_mddev->persistent) {
sectors = super_types[my_mddev->major_version].
rdev_size_change(rdev, sectors);
if (!sectors)
return -EBUSY;
} else if (!sectors)
sectors = (i_size_read(rdev->bdev->bd_inode) >> 9) -
rdev->data_offset;
if (!my_mddev->pers->resize)
/* Cannot change size for RAID0 or Linear etc */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sectors < my_mddev->dev_sectors)
return -EINVAL; /* component must fit device */
rdev->sectors = sectors;
if (sectors > oldsectors && my_mddev->external) {
/* Need to check that all other rdevs with the same
* ->bdev do not overlap. 'rcu' is sufficient to walk
* the rdev lists safely.
* This check does not provide a hard guarantee, it
* just helps avoid dangerous mistakes.
*/
struct mddev *mddev;
int overlap = 0;
struct list_head *tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_mddev(mddev, tmp) {
struct md_rdev *rdev2;
rdev_for_each(rdev2, mddev)
if (rdev->bdev == rdev2->bdev &&
rdev != rdev2 &&
overlaps(rdev->data_offset, rdev->sectors,
rdev2->data_offset,
rdev2->sectors)) {
overlap = 1;
break;
}
if (overlap) {
mddev_put(mddev);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (overlap) {
/* Someone else could have slipped in a size
* change here, but doing so is just silly.
* We put oldsectors back because we *know* it is
* safe, and trust userspace not to race with
* itself
*/
rdev->sectors = oldsectors;
return -EBUSY;
}
}
return len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f045c704568e9cf6279b3cbccbec6d86c35f8a13
|
f045c704568e9cf6279b3cbccbec6d86c35f8a13
|
Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
|
void FileSystemManagerImpl::DidWrite(OperationListenerID listener_id,
base::File::Error result,
int64_t bytes,
bool complete) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
blink::mojom::FileSystemOperationListener* listener =
GetOpListener(listener_id);
if (!listener)
return;
if (result == base::File::FILE_OK) {
listener->DidWrite(bytes, complete);
if (complete)
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
} else {
listener->ErrorOccurred(result);
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
}
}
|
void FileSystemManagerImpl::DidWrite(OperationListenerID listener_id,
base::File::Error result,
int64_t bytes,
bool complete) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
blink::mojom::FileSystemOperationListener* listener =
GetOpListener(listener_id);
if (!listener)
return;
if (result == base::File::FILE_OK) {
listener->DidWrite(bytes, complete);
if (complete)
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
} else {
listener->ErrorOccurred(result);
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9664
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9664/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=dd89710f0f643eb0f99a3830e0712d26c7642acd
|
dd89710f0f643eb0f99a3830e0712d26c7642acd
| null |
parse_subrs( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table table = &loader->subrs;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Int num_subrs;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* test for empty array */
if ( parser->root.cursor < parser->root.limit &&
*parser->root.cursor == '[' )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= parser->root.limit ||
*parser->root.cursor != ']' )
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
num_subrs = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
/* position the parser right before the `dup' of the first subr */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `array' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* initialize subrs array -- with synthetic fonts it is possible */
/* we get here twice */
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
{
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( table, num_subrs, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
/* the format is simple: */
/* */
/* `index' + binary data */
/* */
for (;;)
{
FT_Long idx, size;
FT_Byte* base;
/* If we are out of data, or if the next token isn't `dup', */
/* we are done. */
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 >= parser->root.limit ||
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "dup", 3 ) != 0 )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `dup' */
idx = T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( !read_binary_data( parser, &size, &base, IS_INCREMENTAL ) )
return;
/* The binary string is followed by one token, e.g. `NP' */
/* (bound to `noaccess put') or by two separate tokens: */
/* `noaccess' & `put'. We position the parser right */
/* before the next `dup', if any. */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `NP' or `|' or `noaccess' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 < parser->root.limit &&
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "put", 3 ) == 0 )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* skip `put' */
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
}
/* with synthetic fonts it is possible we get here twice */
if ( loader->num_subrs )
continue;
/* some fonts use a value of -1 for lenIV to indicate that */
/* the charstrings are unencoded */
/* */
/* thanks to Tom Kacvinsky for pointing this out */
/* */
if ( face->type1.private_dict.lenIV >= 0 )
{
FT_Byte* temp;
/* some fonts define empty subr records -- this is not totally */
/* compliant to the specification (which says they should at */
/* least contain a `return'), but we support them anyway */
if ( size < face->type1.private_dict.lenIV )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* t1_decrypt() shouldn't write to base -- make temporary copy */
if ( FT_ALLOC( temp, size ) )
goto Fail;
FT_MEM_COPY( temp, base, size );
psaux->t1_decrypt( temp, size, 4330 );
size -= face->type1.private_dict.lenIV;
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx,
temp + face->type1.private_dict.lenIV, size );
FT_FREE( temp );
}
else
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx, base, size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
loader->num_subrs = num_subrs;
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
|
parse_subrs( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table table = &loader->subrs;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Int num_subrs;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* test for empty array */
if ( parser->root.cursor < parser->root.limit &&
*parser->root.cursor == '[' )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= parser->root.limit ||
*parser->root.cursor != ']' )
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
num_subrs = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
/* position the parser right before the `dup' of the first subr */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `array' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* initialize subrs array -- with synthetic fonts it is possible */
/* we get here twice */
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
{
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( table, num_subrs, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
/* the format is simple: */
/* */
/* `index' + binary data */
/* */
for (;;)
{
FT_Long idx, size;
FT_Byte* base;
/* If we are out of data, or if the next token isn't `dup', */
/* we are done. */
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 >= parser->root.limit ||
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "dup", 3 ) != 0 )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `dup' */
idx = T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( !read_binary_data( parser, &size, &base, IS_INCREMENTAL ) )
return;
/* The binary string is followed by one token, e.g. `NP' */
/* (bound to `noaccess put') or by two separate tokens: */
/* `noaccess' & `put'. We position the parser right */
/* before the next `dup', if any. */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `NP' or `|' or `noaccess' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 < parser->root.limit &&
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "put", 3 ) == 0 )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* skip `put' */
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
}
/* with synthetic fonts it is possible we get here twice */
if ( loader->num_subrs )
continue;
/* some fonts use a value of -1 for lenIV to indicate that */
/* the charstrings are unencoded */
/* */
/* thanks to Tom Kacvinsky for pointing this out */
/* */
if ( face->type1.private_dict.lenIV >= 0 )
{
FT_Byte* temp;
/* some fonts define empty subr records -- this is not totally */
/* compliant to the specification (which says they should at */
/* least contain a `return'), but we support them anyway */
if ( size < face->type1.private_dict.lenIV )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* t1_decrypt() shouldn't write to base -- make temporary copy */
if ( FT_ALLOC( temp, size ) )
goto Fail;
FT_MEM_COPY( temp, base, size );
psaux->t1_decrypt( temp, size, 4330 );
size -= face->type1.private_dict.lenIV;
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx,
temp + face->type1.private_dict.lenIV, size );
FT_FREE( temp );
}
else
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx, base, size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
loader->num_subrs = num_subrs;
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1828/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *head;
struct list_head tmplist;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
if (oldsp->do_auto_asconf) {
memcpy(&tmplist, &newsp->auto_asconf_list, sizeof(tmplist));
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
memcpy(&newsp->auto_asconf_list, &tmplist, sizeof(tmplist));
} else
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
head = &sctp_port_hashtable[sctp_phashfn(sock_net(oldsk),
inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num)];
sctp_local_bh_disable();
sctp_spin_lock(&head->lock);
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->inet_num = inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num;
sctp_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
sctp_bind_addr_dup(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
atomic_set(&sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode, assoc->ulpq.pd_mode);
if (atomic_read(&sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode)) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk, NULL);
}
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.reasm, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.lobby, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*
* The caller has just allocated newsk so we can guarantee that other
* paths won't try to lock it and then oldsk.
*/
lock_sock_nested(newsk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp_release_sock(newsk);
}
|
static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *head;
struct list_head tmplist;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
if (oldsp->do_auto_asconf) {
memcpy(&tmplist, &newsp->auto_asconf_list, sizeof(tmplist));
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
memcpy(&newsp->auto_asconf_list, &tmplist, sizeof(tmplist));
} else
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
head = &sctp_port_hashtable[sctp_phashfn(sock_net(oldsk),
inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num)];
sctp_local_bh_disable();
sctp_spin_lock(&head->lock);
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->inet_num = inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num;
sctp_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
sctp_bind_addr_dup(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
atomic_set(&sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode, assoc->ulpq.pd_mode);
if (atomic_read(&sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode)) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk, NULL);
}
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.reasm, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.lobby, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*
* The caller has just allocated newsk so we can guarantee that other
* paths won't try to lock it and then oldsk.
*/
lock_sock_nested(newsk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp_release_sock(newsk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> CreateVertexAttribManager(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
bool client_visible) {
return vertex_array_manager()->CreateVertexAttribManager(
client_id, service_id, group_->max_vertex_attribs(), client_visible);
}
|
scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> CreateVertexAttribManager(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
bool client_visible) {
return vertex_array_manager()->CreateVertexAttribManager(
client_id, service_id, group_->max_vertex_attribs(), client_visible);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3515/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
|
88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
| null |
static void spl_object_storage_free_hash(spl_SplObjectStorage *intern, char *hash) {
if (intern->fptr_get_hash) {
efree(hash);
} else {
#if HAVE_PACKED_OBJECT_VALUE
/* Nothing to do */
#else
efree(hash);
#endif
}
}
|
static void spl_object_storage_free_hash(spl_SplObjectStorage *intern, char *hash) {
if (intern->fptr_get_hash) {
efree(hash);
} else {
#if HAVE_PACKED_OBJECT_VALUE
/* Nothing to do */
#else
efree(hash);
#endif
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9228
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9228/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/3b63d12038c8d8fc278e81c942fa9bec7c704c8b
|
3b63d12038c8d8fc278e81c942fa9bec7c704c8b
|
fix #60 : invalid state(CCS_VALUE) in parse_char_class()
|
fetch_name(OnigCodePoint start_code, UChar** src, UChar* end,
UChar** rname_end, ScanEnv* env, int* rback_num, int ref)
{
int r, is_num, sign;
OnigCodePoint end_code;
OnigCodePoint c = 0;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
UChar *name_end;
UChar *pnum_head;
UChar *p = *src;
*rback_num = 0;
end_code = get_name_end_code_point(start_code);
name_end = end;
pnum_head = *src;
r = 0;
is_num = 0;
sign = 1;
if (PEND) {
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
}
else {
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code)
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_DIGIT(enc, c)) {
if (ref == 1)
is_num = 1;
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else if (c == '-') {
if (ref == 1) {
is_num = 2;
sign = -1;
pnum_head = p;
}
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')') {
if (is_num == 2) r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
break;
}
if (is_num != 0) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_DIGIT(enc, c)) {
is_num = 1;
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c))
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
else
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
}
if (c != end_code) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
name_end = end;
}
if (is_num != 0) {
*rback_num = onig_scan_unsigned_number(&pnum_head, name_end, enc);
if (*rback_num < 0) return ONIGERR_TOO_BIG_NUMBER;
else if (*rback_num == 0) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
goto err;
}
*rback_num *= sign;
}
*rname_end = name_end;
*src = p;
return 0;
}
else {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')')
break;
}
if (PEND)
name_end = end;
err:
onig_scan_env_set_error_string(env, r, *src, name_end);
return r;
}
}
|
fetch_name(OnigCodePoint start_code, UChar** src, UChar* end,
UChar** rname_end, ScanEnv* env, int* rback_num, int ref)
{
int r, is_num, sign;
OnigCodePoint end_code;
OnigCodePoint c = 0;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
UChar *name_end;
UChar *pnum_head;
UChar *p = *src;
*rback_num = 0;
end_code = get_name_end_code_point(start_code);
name_end = end;
pnum_head = *src;
r = 0;
is_num = 0;
sign = 1;
if (PEND) {
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
}
else {
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code)
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_DIGIT(enc, c)) {
if (ref == 1)
is_num = 1;
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else if (c == '-') {
if (ref == 1) {
is_num = 2;
sign = -1;
pnum_head = p;
}
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')') {
if (is_num == 2) r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
break;
}
if (is_num != 0) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_DIGIT(enc, c)) {
is_num = 1;
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c))
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
else
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
is_num = 0;
}
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
}
if (c != end_code) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
name_end = end;
}
if (is_num != 0) {
*rback_num = onig_scan_unsigned_number(&pnum_head, name_end, enc);
if (*rback_num < 0) return ONIGERR_TOO_BIG_NUMBER;
else if (*rback_num == 0) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
goto err;
}
*rback_num *= sign;
}
*rname_end = name_end;
*src = p;
return 0;
}
else {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')')
break;
}
if (PEND)
name_end = end;
err:
onig_scan_env_set_error_string(env, r, *src, name_end);
return r;
}
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::adjustPositionedBlock(LayoutBox& child, const MarginInfo& marginInfo)
{
LayoutUnit logicalTop = logicalHeight();
updateStaticInlinePositionForChild(child, logicalTop);
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforePos = marginInfo.positiveMargin();
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforeNeg = marginInfo.negativeMargin();
logicalTop += collapsedBeforePos - collapsedBeforeNeg;
}
PaintLayer* childLayer = child.layer();
if (childLayer->staticBlockPosition() != logicalTop)
childLayer->setStaticBlockPosition(logicalTop);
}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::adjustPositionedBlock(LayoutBox& child, const MarginInfo& marginInfo)
{
LayoutUnit logicalTop = logicalHeight();
updateStaticInlinePositionForChild(child, logicalTop);
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforePos = marginInfo.positiveMargin();
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforeNeg = marginInfo.negativeMargin();
logicalTop += collapsedBeforePos - collapsedBeforeNeg;
}
PaintLayer* childLayer = child.layer();
if (childLayer->staticBlockPosition() != logicalTop)
childLayer->setStaticBlockPosition(logicalTop);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6942/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
|
29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
| null |
Ins_NPUSHB( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort L, K;
L = (FT_UShort)exc->code[exc->IP + 1];
if ( BOUNDS( L, exc->stackSize + 1 - exc->top ) )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Stack_Overflow );
return;
}
for ( K = 1; K <= L; K++ )
args[K - 1] = exc->code[exc->IP + K + 1];
exc->new_top += L;
}
|
Ins_NPUSHB( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort L, K;
L = (FT_UShort)exc->code[exc->IP + 1];
if ( BOUNDS( L, exc->stackSize + 1 - exc->top ) )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Stack_Overflow );
return;
}
for ( K = 1; K <= L; K++ )
args[K - 1] = exc->code[exc->IP + K + 1];
exc->new_top += L;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> [email protected]
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Reset() {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
DVLOG(1) << "Got reset request";
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
state_ = kResetting;
finish_flush_pending_ = false;
while (!input_buffers_.empty()) {
message_loop_->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&Client::NotifyEndOfBitstreamBuffer, client_,
input_buffers_.front()->id));
input_buffers_.pop();
}
decoder_thread_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::ResetTask,
base::Unretained(this)));
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
}
|
void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Reset() {
DCHECK_EQ(message_loop_, base::MessageLoop::current());
DVLOG(1) << "Got reset request";
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
state_ = kResetting;
finish_flush_pending_ = false;
while (!input_buffers_.empty()) {
message_loop_->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&Client::NotifyEndOfBitstreamBuffer, client_,
input_buffers_.front()->id));
input_buffers_.pop();
}
decoder_thread_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::ResetTask,
base::Unretained(this)));
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3927/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
[skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool isPointSkiaSafe(const SkMatrix& transform, const SkPoint& pt)
{
#ifdef ENSURE_VALUE_SAFETY_FOR_SKIA
SkPoint xPt;
transform.mapPoints(&xPt, &pt, 1);
return isCoordinateSkiaSafe(xPt.fX) && isCoordinateSkiaSafe(xPt.fY);
#else
return true;
#endif
}
|
static bool isPointSkiaSafe(const SkMatrix& transform, const SkPoint& pt)
{
#ifdef ENSURE_VALUE_SAFETY_FOR_SKIA
SkPoint xPt;
transform.mapPoints(&xPt, &pt, 1);
return isCoordinateSkiaSafe(xPt.fX) && isCoordinateSkiaSafe(xPt.fY);
#else
return true;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_core_reset(E1000ECore *core)
{
int i;
timer_del(core->autoneg_timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_reset(core);
memset(core->phy, 0, sizeof core->phy);
memmove(core->phy, e1000e_phy_reg_init, sizeof e1000e_phy_reg_init);
memset(core->mac, 0, sizeof core->mac);
memmove(core->mac, e1000e_mac_reg_init, sizeof e1000e_mac_reg_init);
core->rxbuf_min_shift = 1 + E1000_RING_DESC_LEN_SHIFT;
if (qemu_get_queue(core->owner_nic)->link_down) {
e1000e_link_down(core);
}
e1000x_reset_mac_addr(core->owner_nic, core->mac, core->permanent_mac);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(core->tx); i++) {
net_tx_pkt_reset(core->tx[i].tx_pkt);
memset(&core->tx[i].props, 0, sizeof(core->tx[i].props));
core->tx[i].skip_cp = false;
}
}
|
e1000e_core_reset(E1000ECore *core)
{
int i;
timer_del(core->autoneg_timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_reset(core);
memset(core->phy, 0, sizeof core->phy);
memmove(core->phy, e1000e_phy_reg_init, sizeof e1000e_phy_reg_init);
memset(core->mac, 0, sizeof core->mac);
memmove(core->mac, e1000e_mac_reg_init, sizeof e1000e_mac_reg_init);
core->rxbuf_min_shift = 1 + E1000_RING_DESC_LEN_SHIFT;
if (qemu_get_queue(core->owner_nic)->link_down) {
e1000e_link_down(core);
}
e1000x_reset_mac_addr(core->owner_nic, core->mac, core->permanent_mac);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(core->tx); i++) {
net_tx_pkt_reset(core->tx[i].tx_pkt);
memset(&core->tx[i].props, 0, sizeof(core->tx[i].props));
core->tx[i].skip_cp = false;
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0589
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0589/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/bcfc7124f6ef9f1ec128fb2e90de774a5b33d199
|
bcfc7124f6ef9f1ec128fb2e90de774a5b33d199
|
Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
|
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_prediction_unit(codec_t *ps_codec,
WORD32 x0,
WORD32 y0,
WORD32 wd,
WORD32 ht)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
WORD32 ctb_x_base;
WORD32 ctb_y_base;
pu_t *ps_pu = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pu;
cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_cabac;
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr;
/* Set PU structure to default values */
memset(ps_pu, 0, sizeof(pu_t));
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ctb_x_base = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
ctb_y_base = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
ps_pu->b4_pos_x = (x0 - ctb_x_base) >> 2;
ps_pu->b4_pos_y = (y0 - ctb_y_base) >> 2;
ps_pu->b4_wd = (wd >> 2) - 1;
ps_pu->b4_ht = (ht >> 2) - 1;
ps_pu->b1_intra_flag = 0;
ps_pu->b3_part_mode = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_part_mode;
if(PRED_MODE_SKIP == ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pred_mode)
{
WORD32 merge_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 1)
{
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_IDX_EXT;
WORD32 bin;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
bin = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(bin)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 2)
{
merge_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(
ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand - 2));
}
merge_idx++;
}
AEV_TRACE("merge_idx", merge_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ps_pu->b1_merge_flag = 1;
ps_pu->b3_merge_idx = merge_idx;
}
else
{
/* MODE_INTER */
WORD32 merge_flag;
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_FLAG_EXT;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_flag", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
merge_flag = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("merge_flag", merge_flag, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_pu->b1_merge_flag = merge_flag;
if(merge_flag)
{
WORD32 merge_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 1)
{
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_IDX_EXT;
WORD32 bin;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
bin = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(bin)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 2)
{
merge_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(
ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand - 2));
}
merge_idx++;
}
AEV_TRACE("merge_idx", merge_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ps_pu->b3_merge_idx = merge_idx;
}
else
{
ihevcd_parse_pu_mvp(ps_codec, ps_pu);
}
}
STATS_UPDATE_PU_SIZE(ps_pu);
/* Increment PU pointer */
ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pu++;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_pic_pu_idx++;
return ret;
}
|
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_prediction_unit(codec_t *ps_codec,
WORD32 x0,
WORD32 y0,
WORD32 wd,
WORD32 ht)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
WORD32 ctb_x_base;
WORD32 ctb_y_base;
pu_t *ps_pu = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pu;
cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_cabac;
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr;
/* Set PU structure to default values */
memset(ps_pu, 0, sizeof(pu_t));
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ctb_x_base = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
ctb_y_base = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
ps_pu->b4_pos_x = (x0 - ctb_x_base) >> 2;
ps_pu->b4_pos_y = (y0 - ctb_y_base) >> 2;
ps_pu->b4_wd = (wd >> 2) - 1;
ps_pu->b4_ht = (ht >> 2) - 1;
ps_pu->b1_intra_flag = 0;
ps_pu->b3_part_mode = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_part_mode;
if(PRED_MODE_SKIP == ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pred_mode)
{
WORD32 merge_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 1)
{
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_IDX_EXT;
WORD32 bin;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
bin = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(bin)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 2)
{
merge_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(
ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand - 2));
}
merge_idx++;
}
AEV_TRACE("merge_idx", merge_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ps_pu->b1_merge_flag = 1;
ps_pu->b3_merge_idx = merge_idx;
}
else
{
/* MODE_INTER */
WORD32 merge_flag;
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_FLAG_EXT;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_flag", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
merge_flag = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("merge_flag", merge_flag, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_pu->b1_merge_flag = merge_flag;
if(merge_flag)
{
WORD32 merge_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 1)
{
WORD32 ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MERGE_IDX_EXT;
WORD32 bin;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("merge_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
bin = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(bin)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand > 2)
{
merge_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(
ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand - 2));
}
merge_idx++;
}
AEV_TRACE("merge_idx", merge_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ps_pu->b3_merge_idx = merge_idx;
}
else
{
ihevcd_parse_pu_mvp(ps_codec, ps_pu);
}
}
STATS_UPDATE_PU_SIZE(ps_pu);
/* Increment PU pointer */
ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pu++;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_pic_pu_idx++;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5044/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
FakeRemoteGattService* FakeCentral::GetFakeRemoteGattService(
const std::string& peripheral_address,
const std::string& service_id) const {
FakePeripheral* fake_peripheral = GetFakePeripheral(peripheral_address);
if (fake_peripheral == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return static_cast<FakeRemoteGattService*>(
fake_peripheral->GetGattService(service_id));
}
|
FakeRemoteGattService* FakeCentral::GetFakeRemoteGattService(
const std::string& peripheral_address,
const std::string& service_id) const {
FakePeripheral* fake_peripheral = GetFakePeripheral(peripheral_address);
if (fake_peripheral == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return static_cast<FakeRemoteGattService*>(
fake_peripheral->GetGattService(service_id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::SetSrc(const AtomicString& url) {
setAttribute(srcAttr, url);
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::SetSrc(const AtomicString& url) {
setAttribute(srcAttr, url);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9317
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9317/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
|
HWB_Diff (int r1, int g1, int b1, int r2, int g2, int b2)
{
RGBType RGB1, RGB2;
HWBType HWB1, HWB2;
float diff;
SETUP_RGB (RGB1, r1, g1, b1);
SETUP_RGB (RGB2, r2, g2, b2);
RGB_to_HWB (RGB1, &HWB1);
RGB_to_HWB (RGB2, &HWB2);
/*
* I made this bit up; it seems to produce OK results, and it is certainly
* more visually correct than the current RGB metric. (PJW)
*/
if ((HWB1.H == HWB_UNDEFINED) || (HWB2.H == HWB_UNDEFINED)) {
diff = 0; /* Undefined hues always match... */
} else {
diff = fabs (HWB1.H - HWB2.H);
if (diff > 3) {
diff = 6 - diff; /* Remember, it's a colour circle */
}
}
diff =
diff * diff + (HWB1.W - HWB2.W) * (HWB1.W - HWB2.W) + (HWB1.B -
HWB2.B) * (HWB1.B -
HWB2.B);
return diff;
}
|
HWB_Diff (int r1, int g1, int b1, int r2, int g2, int b2)
{
RGBType RGB1, RGB2;
HWBType HWB1, HWB2;
float diff;
SETUP_RGB (RGB1, r1, g1, b1);
SETUP_RGB (RGB2, r2, g2, b2);
RGB_to_HWB (RGB1, &HWB1);
RGB_to_HWB (RGB2, &HWB2);
/*
* I made this bit up; it seems to produce OK results, and it is certainly
* more visually correct than the current RGB metric. (PJW)
*/
if ((HWB1.H == HWB_UNDEFINED) || (HWB2.H == HWB_UNDEFINED)) {
diff = 0; /* Undefined hues always match... */
} else {
diff = fabs (HWB1.H - HWB2.H);
if (diff > 3) {
diff = 6 - diff; /* Remember, it's a colour circle */
}
}
diff =
diff * diff + (HWB1.W - HWB2.W) * (HWB1.W - HWB2.W) + (HWB1.B -
HWB2.B) * (HWB1.B -
HWB2.B);
return diff;
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12980
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12980/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/2223f7a1e431455a1411bee77c90db94a6f8e8fe
|
2223f7a1e431455a1411bee77c90db94a6f8e8fe
|
Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
|
newSWFInput_input(SWFInput in, unsigned int length)
{
SWFInput input;
struct SWFInputPtr *data;
if (in == NULL)
return NULL;
input = (SWFInput)malloc(sizeof(struct SWFInput_s));
/* If malloc failed, return NULL to signify this */
if (NULL == input)
return NULL;
input->getChar = SWFInput_input_getChar;
input->destroy = SWFInput_input_dtor;
input->eof = SWFInput_input_eof;
input->read = SWFInput_input_read;
input->seek = SWFInput_input_seek;
data = (struct SWFInputPtr *)malloc(sizeof(struct SWFInputPtr));
/* If malloc failed, free memory allocated for input and return NULL to signify the failure */
if (NULL == data)
{
free(input);
return NULL;
}
data->offset = SWFInput_tell(in);
data->input = in;
input->offset = 0;
input->length = length;
input->data = (void *)data;
input->buffer = 0;
input->bufbits = 0;
#if TRACK_ALLOCS
input->gcnode = ming_gc_add_node(input, (dtorfunctype) destroySWFInput);
#endif
return input;
}
|
newSWFInput_input(SWFInput in, unsigned int length)
{
SWFInput input;
struct SWFInputPtr *data;
if (in == NULL)
return NULL;
input = (SWFInput)malloc(sizeof(struct SWFInput_s));
/* If malloc failed, return NULL to signify this */
if (NULL == input)
return NULL;
input->getChar = SWFInput_input_getChar;
input->destroy = SWFInput_input_dtor;
input->eof = SWFInput_input_eof;
input->read = SWFInput_input_read;
input->seek = SWFInput_input_seek;
data = (struct SWFInputPtr *)malloc(sizeof(struct SWFInputPtr));
/* If malloc failed, free memory allocated for input and return NULL to signify the failure */
if (NULL == data)
{
free(input);
return NULL;
}
data->offset = SWFInput_tell(in);
data->input = in;
input->offset = 0;
input->length = length;
input->data = (void *)data;
input->buffer = 0;
input->bufbits = 0;
#if TRACK_ALLOCS
input->gcnode = ming_gc_add_node(input, (dtorfunctype) destroySWFInput);
#endif
return input;
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0292/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus-glib/commit/?id=166978a09cf5edff4028e670b6074215a4c75eca
|
166978a09cf5edff4028e670b6074215a4c75eca
| null |
g_proxy_get_signal_match_rule (DBusGProxy *proxy)
{
DBusGProxyPrivate *priv = DBUS_G_PROXY_GET_PRIVATE(proxy);
/* FIXME Escaping is required here */
if (priv->name)
return g_strdup_printf ("type='signal',sender='%s',path='%s',interface='%s'",
priv->name, priv->path, priv->interface);
else
return g_strdup_printf ("type='signal',path='%s',interface='%s'",
priv->path, priv->interface);
}
|
g_proxy_get_signal_match_rule (DBusGProxy *proxy)
{
DBusGProxyPrivate *priv = DBUS_G_PROXY_GET_PRIVATE(proxy);
/* FIXME Escaping is required here */
if (priv->name)
return g_strdup_printf ("type='signal',sender='%s',path='%s',interface='%s'",
priv->name, priv->path, priv->interface);
else
return g_strdup_printf ("type='signal',path='%s',interface='%s'",
priv->path, priv->interface);
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6094/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
FreeList::FreeList() : m_biggestFreeListIndex(0) {}
|
FreeList::FreeList() : m_biggestFreeListIndex(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010298
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010298/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/70697bf3c5dc3d201341b01a1a8e5bc6d2fb48f8
|
70697bf3c5dc3d201341b01a1a8e5bc6d2fb48f8
|
svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
TEE_Result syscall_asymm_operate(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *src_data, size_t src_len,
void *dst_data, uint64_t *dst_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
uint64_t dlen64;
size_t dlen;
struct tee_obj *o;
void *label = NULL;
size_t label_len = 0;
size_t n;
int salt_len;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) src_data, src_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&dlen64, dst_len, sizeof(dlen64));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dlen = dlen64;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) dst_data, dlen);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
size_t alloc_size = 0;
if (MUL_OVERFLOW(sizeof(TEE_Attribute), num_params, &alloc_size))
return TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW;
params = malloc(alloc_size);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD:
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_encrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_decrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else {
/*
* We will panic because "the mode is not compatible
* with the function"
*/
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
break;
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512:
for (n = 0; n < num_params; n++) {
if (params[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_RSA_OAEP_LABEL) {
label = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
label_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
break;
}
}
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_encrypt(cs->algo, o->attr,
label, label_len,
src_data, src_len,
dst_data, &dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_decrypt(
cs->algo, o->attr, label, label_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
break;
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_RSASSA_NA1)
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5:
#endif
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512:
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params, src_len);
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256:
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
TEE_Result res2;
dlen64 = dlen;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(dst_len, &dlen64, sizeof(*dst_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
}
return res;
}
|
TEE_Result syscall_asymm_operate(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *src_data, size_t src_len,
void *dst_data, uint64_t *dst_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
uint64_t dlen64;
size_t dlen;
struct tee_obj *o;
void *label = NULL;
size_t label_len = 0;
size_t n;
int salt_len;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) src_data, src_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&dlen64, dst_len, sizeof(dlen64));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dlen = dlen64;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) dst_data, dlen);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * num_params);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD:
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_encrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_decrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else {
/*
* We will panic because "the mode is not compatible
* with the function"
*/
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
break;
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512:
for (n = 0; n < num_params; n++) {
if (params[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_RSA_OAEP_LABEL) {
label = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
label_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
break;
}
}
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_encrypt(cs->algo, o->attr,
label, label_len,
src_data, src_len,
dst_data, &dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_decrypt(
cs->algo, o->attr, label, label_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
break;
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_RSASSA_NA1)
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5:
#endif
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512:
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params, src_len);
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256:
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
TEE_Result res2;
dlen64 = dlen;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(dst_len, &dlen64, sizeof(*dst_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
}
return res;
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6053/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
|
int TopSitesImpl::num_results_to_request_from_history() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const base::DictionaryValue* blacklist =
pref_service_->GetDictionary(kMostVisitedURLsBlacklist);
return kNonForcedTopSitesNumber + (blacklist ? blacklist->size() : 0);
}
|
int TopSitesImpl::num_results_to_request_from_history() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const base::DictionaryValue* blacklist =
pref_service_->GetDictionary(kMostVisitedURLsBlacklist);
return kNonForcedTopSitesNumber + (blacklist ? blacklist->size() : 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void tcp_proc_unregister(struct net *net, struct tcp_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
proc_net_remove(net, afinfo->name);
}
|
void tcp_proc_unregister(struct net *net, struct tcp_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
proc_net_remove(net, afinfo->name);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0291
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0291/
| null |
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=76343947ada960b6269090638f5391068daee88d
|
76343947ada960b6269090638f5391068daee88d
| null |
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
switch (hash_alg) {
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
# endif
return EVP_md5();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
return EVP_sha1();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
return EVP_sha224();
case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
return EVP_sha256();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
return EVP_sha384();
case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
return EVP_sha512();
# endif
default:
return NULL;
}
}
|
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
switch (hash_alg) {
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
# endif
return EVP_md5();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
return EVP_sha1();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
return EVP_sha224();
case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
return EVP_sha256();
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
return EVP_sha384();
case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
return EVP_sha512();
# endif
default:
return NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14954
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14954/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6c85501f2fabcfc4fc6ed976543d252c4eaf4be9
|
6c85501f2fabcfc4fc6ed976543d252c4eaf4be9
|
fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
kill_orphaned_pgrp(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
struct task_struct *ignored_task = tsk;
if (!parent)
/* exit: our father is in a different pgrp than
* we are and we were the only connection outside.
*/
parent = tsk->real_parent;
else
/* reparent: our child is in a different pgrp than
* we are, and it was the only connection outside.
*/
ignored_task = NULL;
if (task_pgrp(parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(parent) == task_session(tsk) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, ignored_task) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
|
kill_orphaned_pgrp(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
struct task_struct *ignored_task = tsk;
if (!parent)
/* exit: our father is in a different pgrp than
* we are and we were the only connection outside.
*/
parent = tsk->real_parent;
else
/* reparent: our child is in a different pgrp than
* we are, and it was the only connection outside.
*/
ignored_task = NULL;
if (task_pgrp(parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(parent) == task_session(tsk) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, ignored_task) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15391
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15391/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
[Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
const Extension* ExtensionBrowserTest::InstallExtensionFromWebstore(
const base::FilePath& path,
int expected_change) {
return InstallOrUpdateExtension(
std::string(), path, INSTALL_UI_TYPE_AUTO_CONFIRM, expected_change,
Manifest::INTERNAL, browser(), Extension::FROM_WEBSTORE, true, false);
}
|
const Extension* ExtensionBrowserTest::InstallExtensionFromWebstore(
const base::FilePath& path,
int expected_change) {
return InstallOrUpdateExtension(
std::string(), path, INSTALL_UI_TYPE_AUTO_CONFIRM, expected_change,
Manifest::INTERNAL, browser(), Extension::FROM_WEBSTORE, true, false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3897/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
printing::PrintDialogGtkInterface* PrintDialogGtk::CreatePrintDialog(
PrintingContextCairo* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
return new PrintDialogGtk(context);
}
|
printing::PrintDialogGtkInterface* PrintDialogGtk::CreatePrintDialog(
PrintingContextCairo* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
return new PrintDialogGtk(context);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserTabStripController::IsIncognito() {
return browser_->profile()->IsOffTheRecord();
}
|
bool BrowserTabStripController::IsIncognito() {
return browser_->profile()->IsOffTheRecord();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3607
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3607/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=c839b706
|
c839b706092583f6b12ed3cc634bf5af34b7a2bb
| null |
poppler_page_get_transition (PopplerPage *page)
{
PageTransition *trans;
PopplerPageTransition *transition;
Object obj;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), NULL);
trans = new PageTransition (page->page->getTrans (&obj));
obj.free ();
if (!trans->isOk ()) {
delete trans;
return NULL;
}
transition = poppler_page_transition_new ();
switch (trans->getType ())
{
case transitionReplace:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_REPLACE;
break;
case transitionSplit:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_SPLIT;
break;
case transitionBlinds:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_BLINDS;
break;
case transitionBox:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_BOX;
break;
case transitionWipe:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_WIPE;
break;
case transitionDissolve:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_DISSOLVE;
break;
case transitionGlitter:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_GLITTER;
break;
case transitionFly:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_FLY;
break;
case transitionPush:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_PUSH;
break;
case transitionCover:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_COVER;
break;
case transitionUncover:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_UNCOVER;
break;
case transitionFade:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_FADE;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
transition->alignment = (trans->getAlignment() == transitionHorizontal) ?
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_HORIZONTAL :
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_VERTICAL;
transition->direction = (trans->getDirection() == transitionInward) ?
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_INWARD :
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_OUTWARD;
transition->duration = trans->getDuration();
transition->angle = trans->getAngle();
transition->scale = trans->getScale();
transition->rectangular = trans->isRectangular();
delete trans;
return transition;
}
|
poppler_page_get_transition (PopplerPage *page)
{
PageTransition *trans;
PopplerPageTransition *transition;
Object obj;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), NULL);
trans = new PageTransition (page->page->getTrans (&obj));
obj.free ();
if (!trans->isOk ()) {
delete trans;
return NULL;
}
transition = poppler_page_transition_new ();
switch (trans->getType ())
{
case transitionReplace:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_REPLACE;
break;
case transitionSplit:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_SPLIT;
break;
case transitionBlinds:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_BLINDS;
break;
case transitionBox:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_BOX;
break;
case transitionWipe:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_WIPE;
break;
case transitionDissolve:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_DISSOLVE;
break;
case transitionGlitter:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_GLITTER;
break;
case transitionFly:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_FLY;
break;
case transitionPush:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_PUSH;
break;
case transitionCover:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_COVER;
break;
case transitionUncover:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_UNCOVER;
break;
case transitionFade:
transition->type = POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_FADE;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
transition->alignment = (trans->getAlignment() == transitionHorizontal) ?
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_HORIZONTAL :
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_VERTICAL;
transition->direction = (trans->getDirection() == transitionInward) ?
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_INWARD :
POPPLER_PAGE_TRANSITION_OUTWARD;
transition->duration = trans->getDuration();
transition->angle = trans->getAngle();
transition->scale = trans->getScale();
transition->rectangular = trans->isRectangular();
delete trans;
return transition;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2347
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2347/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/60cc89e8d2e761dea28bb9e4cf9ebbad516bff09
|
60cc89e8d2e761dea28bb9e4cf9ebbad516bff09
|
iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestCropFront(int pos, int size) {
CompoundBuffer cropped;
cropped.CopyFrom(target_, 0, target_.total_bytes());
cropped.CropFront(pos);
EXPECT_TRUE(CompareData(cropped, data_->data() + pos,
target_.total_bytes() - pos));
}
|
void TestCropFront(int pos, int size) {
CompoundBuffer cropped;
cropped.CopyFrom(target_, 0, target_.total_bytes());
cropped.CropFront(pos);
EXPECT_TRUE(CompareData(cropped, data_->data() + pos,
target_.total_bytes() - pos));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
HTMLDataListElement* HTMLInputElement::DataList() const {
if (!has_non_empty_list_)
return nullptr;
if (!input_type_->ShouldRespectListAttribute())
return nullptr;
return ToHTMLDataListElementOrNull(
GetTreeScope().getElementById(FastGetAttribute(listAttr)));
}
|
HTMLDataListElement* HTMLInputElement::DataList() const {
if (!has_non_empty_list_)
return nullptr;
if (!input_type_->ShouldRespectListAttribute())
return nullptr;
return ToHTMLDataListElementOrNull(
GetTreeScope().getElementById(FastGetAttribute(listAttr)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFramebufferTextureMultiviewOVR(
GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLuint texture,
GLint level,
GLint base_view_index,
GLsizei num_views) {
if (IsEmulatedFramebufferBound(target)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"Cannot change the attachments of the default framebuffer.");
return error::kNoError;
}
api()->glFramebufferTextureMultiviewOVRFn(
target, attachment,
GetTextureServiceID(api(), texture, resources_, false), level,
base_view_index, num_views);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFramebufferTextureMultiviewOVR(
GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLuint texture,
GLint level,
GLint base_view_index,
GLsizei num_views) {
if (IsEmulatedFramebufferBound(target)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"Cannot change the attachments of the default framebuffer.");
return error::kNoError;
}
api()->glFramebufferTextureMultiviewOVRFn(
target, attachment,
GetTextureServiceID(api(), texture, resources_, false), level,
base_view_index, num_views);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10664
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10664/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
|
void CWebServer::RType_Notifications(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Notifications";
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & ittNotifiers : m_notifications.m_notifiers)
{
root["notifiers"][ii]["name"] = ittNotifiers.first;
root["notifiers"][ii]["description"] = ittNotifiers.first;
ii++;
}
uint64_t idx = 0;
if (request::findValue(&req, "idx") != "")
{
idx = std::strtoull(request::findValue(&req, "idx").c_str(), nullptr, 10);
}
std::vector<_tNotification> notifications = m_notifications.GetNotifications(idx);
if (notifications.size() > 0)
{
ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : notifications)
{
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = itt.ID;
std::string sParams = itt.Params;
if (sParams.empty()) {
sParams = "S";
}
root["result"][ii]["Params"] = sParams;
root["result"][ii]["Priority"] = itt.Priority;
root["result"][ii]["SendAlways"] = itt.SendAlways;
root["result"][ii]["CustomMessage"] = itt.CustomMessage;
root["result"][ii]["ActiveSystems"] = itt.ActiveSystems;
ii++;
}
}
}
|
void CWebServer::RType_Notifications(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Notifications";
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & ittNotifiers : m_notifications.m_notifiers)
{
root["notifiers"][ii]["name"] = ittNotifiers.first;
root["notifiers"][ii]["description"] = ittNotifiers.first;
ii++;
}
uint64_t idx = 0;
if (request::findValue(&req, "idx") != "")
{
idx = std::strtoull(request::findValue(&req, "idx").c_str(), nullptr, 10);
}
std::vector<_tNotification> notifications = m_notifications.GetNotifications(idx);
if (notifications.size() > 0)
{
ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : notifications)
{
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = itt.ID;
std::string sParams = itt.Params;
if (sParams.empty()) {
sParams = "S";
}
root["result"][ii]["Params"] = sParams;
root["result"][ii]["Priority"] = itt.Priority;
root["result"][ii]["SendAlways"] = itt.SendAlways;
root["result"][ii]["CustomMessage"] = itt.CustomMessage;
root["result"][ii]["ActiveSystems"] = itt.ActiveSystems;
ii++;
}
}
}
|
C
|
domoticz
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
float ComputeRedirectConfidence(const predictors::RedirectStat& redirect) {
return (redirect.number_of_hits() + 0.0) /
(redirect.number_of_hits() + redirect.number_of_misses());
}
|
float ComputeRedirectConfidence(const predictors::RedirectStat& redirect) {
return (redirect.number_of_hits() + 0.0) /
(redirect.number_of_hits() + redirect.number_of_misses());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9985
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9985/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e2b791796bd68816fa115f12be5320de2b8021
|
20e2b791796bd68816fa115f12be5320de2b8021
|
ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_msnd_write_cfg_io1(int cfg, int num, u16 io)
{
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_LOGDEVICE, num))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASEHI, HIBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASELO, LOBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
|
static int snd_msnd_write_cfg_io1(int cfg, int num, u16 io)
{
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_LOGDEVICE, num))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASEHI, HIBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASELO, LOBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int nonpaging_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
u32 error_code, bool prefault)
{
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
pgprintk("%s: gva %lx error %x\n", __func__, gva, error_code);
if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
r = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, gva, error_code, true);
if (likely(r != RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
return r;
}
r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
ASSERT(vcpu);
ASSERT(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa));
gfn = gva >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return nonpaging_map(vcpu, gva & PAGE_MASK,
error_code, gfn, prefault);
}
|
static int nonpaging_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
u32 error_code, bool prefault)
{
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
pgprintk("%s: gva %lx error %x\n", __func__, gva, error_code);
if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
r = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, gva, error_code, true);
if (likely(r != RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
return r;
}
r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
ASSERT(vcpu);
ASSERT(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa));
gfn = gva >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return nonpaging_map(vcpu, gva & PAGE_MASK,
error_code, gfn, prefault);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
put_u32(struct ofpbuf *b, uint32_t x)
{
put_be32(b, htonl(x));
}
|
put_u32(struct ofpbuf *b, uint32_t x)
{
put_be32(b, htonl(x));
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/0f6fc2d5bf8f500820c3dbcf0d23ee14f2d9f734
|
0f6fc2d5bf8f500820c3dbcf0d23ee14f2d9f734
| null |
MagickExport const char *GetMagickLicense(void)
{
return(MagickAuthoritativeLicense);
}
|
MagickExport const char *GetMagickLicense(void)
{
return(MagickAuthoritativeLicense);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6140/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
[DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host() { return agent_host_.get(); }
|
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host() { return agent_host_.get(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataRootDirectory::AddEntryToResourceMap(GDataEntry* entry) {
DVLOG(1) << "AddEntryToResourceMap " << entry->resource_id();
resource_map_.insert(std::make_pair(entry->resource_id(), entry));
}
|
void GDataRootDirectory::AddEntryToResourceMap(GDataEntry* entry) {
DVLOG(1) << "AddEntryToResourceMap " << entry->resource_id();
resource_map_.insert(std::make_pair(entry->resource_id(), entry));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GetActiveUniformBlockiv(GLuint program,
GLuint index,
GLenum pname,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetActiveUniformBlockiv("
<< program << ", " << index << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringUniformBlockParameter(pname) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(params) << ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetActiveUniformBlockiv");
bool success = share_group_->program_info_manager()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
this, program, index, pname, params);
if (success) {
if (params) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" params: " << params[0]);
}
}
CheckGLError();
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GetActiveUniformBlockiv(GLuint program,
GLuint index,
GLenum pname,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetActiveUniformBlockiv("
<< program << ", " << index << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringUniformBlockParameter(pname) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(params) << ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetActiveUniformBlockiv");
bool success = share_group_->program_info_manager()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
this, program, index, pname, params);
if (success) {
if (params) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" params: " << params[0]);
}
}
CheckGLError();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9059/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/npat-efault/picocom/commit/1ebc60b20fbe9a02436d5cbbf8951714e749ddb1
|
1ebc60b20fbe9a02436d5cbbf8951714e749ddb1
|
Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
|
read_filename (void)
{
char fname[_POSIX_PATH_MAX];
int r;
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** file: ");
r = fd_readline(STI, STO, fname, sizeof(fname));
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n");
if ( r < 0 )
return NULL;
else
return strdup(fname);
}
|
read_filename (void)
{
char fname[_POSIX_PATH_MAX];
int r;
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** file: ");
r = fd_readline(STI, STO, fname, sizeof(fname));
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n");
if ( r < 0 )
return NULL;
else
return strdup(fname);
}
|
C
|
picocom
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/283fb25624bf253d120708152e23cf9143519198
|
283fb25624bf253d120708152e23cf9143519198
|
Coverity; Fixing pass by value bugs.
CID=101466, 101464, 101494, 101495, 101496, 101497
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8956046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115399 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::HasAbortButtonLabel() const {
return kAbortButtonIds[type_] > 0;
}
|
bool ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::HasAbortButtonLabel() const {
return kAbortButtonIds[type_] > 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2881/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
[chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void CCLayerTreeHostTest::endTest()
{
if (!isMainThread())
m_mainThreadProxy->postTask(createMainThreadTask(this, &CCLayerTreeHostTest::endTest));
else {
if (m_beginning)
m_endWhenBeginReturns = true;
else
onEndTest(static_cast<void*>(this));
}
}
|
void CCLayerTreeHostTest::endTest()
{
if (!isMainThread())
CCMainThread::postTask(createMainThreadTask(this, &CCLayerTreeHostTest::endTest));
else {
if (m_beginning)
m_endWhenBeginReturns = true;
else
onEndTest(static_cast<void*>(this));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2496/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
|
bool InputDispatcher::isWindowObscuredAtPointLocked(
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle, int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
int32_t displayId = windowHandle->getInfo()->displayId;
size_t numWindows = mWindowHandles.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < numWindows; i++) {
sp<InputWindowHandle> otherHandle = mWindowHandles.itemAt(i);
if (otherHandle == windowHandle) {
break;
}
const InputWindowInfo* otherInfo = otherHandle->getInfo();
if (otherInfo->displayId == displayId
&& otherInfo->visible && !otherInfo->isTrustedOverlay()
&& otherInfo->frameContainsPoint(x, y)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
bool InputDispatcher::isWindowObscuredAtPointLocked(
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle, int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
int32_t displayId = windowHandle->getInfo()->displayId;
size_t numWindows = mWindowHandles.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < numWindows; i++) {
sp<InputWindowHandle> otherHandle = mWindowHandles.itemAt(i);
if (otherHandle == windowHandle) {
break;
}
const InputWindowInfo* otherInfo = otherHandle->getInfo();
if (otherInfo->displayId == displayId
&& otherInfo->visible && !otherInfo->isTrustedOverlay()
&& otherInfo->frameContainsPoint(x, y)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultDownloadName() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_FILENAME);
}
|
std::string ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultDownloadName() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_FILENAME);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Segment::Segment(
|
Segment::Segment(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long elem_start,
long long start,
long long size) :
m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0)
{
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
|
static int sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
blink::WebPushClient* RenderFrameImpl::pushClient() {
if (!push_messaging_dispatcher_)
push_messaging_dispatcher_ = new PushMessagingDispatcher(this);
return push_messaging_dispatcher_;
}
|
blink::WebPushClient* RenderFrameImpl::pushClient() {
if (!push_messaging_dispatcher_)
push_messaging_dispatcher_ = new PushMessagingDispatcher(this);
return push_messaging_dispatcher_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
static void gray_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *gray, float *rgb)
{
rgb[0] = gray[0];
rgb[1] = gray[0];
rgb[2] = gray[0];
}
|
static void gray_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *gray, float *rgb)
{
rgb[0] = gray[0];
rgb[1] = gray[0];
rgb[2] = gray[0];
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
static void dm_blk_close(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
md = disk->private_data;
if (WARN_ON(!md))
goto out;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&md->open_count) &&
(test_bit(DMF_DEFERRED_REMOVE, &md->flags)))
queue_work(deferred_remove_workqueue, &deferred_remove_work);
dm_put(md);
out:
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
}
|
static void dm_blk_close(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
md = disk->private_data;
if (WARN_ON(!md))
goto out;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&md->open_count) &&
(test_bit(DMF_DEFERRED_REMOVE, &md->flags)))
queue_work(deferred_remove_workqueue, &deferred_remove_work);
dm_put(md);
out:
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8ea5693d5cf304e56174bb6b65412f04209904db
|
8ea5693d5cf304e56174bb6b65412f04209904db
|
Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
|
static bool ExecuteMoveRight(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, SelectionModifyDirection::kRight,
TextGranularity::kCharacter, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
}
|
static bool ExecuteMoveRight(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, SelectionModifyDirection::kRight,
TextGranularity::kCharacter, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18241
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
void register_inmem_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct inmem_pages *new;
f2fs_trace_pid(page);
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE);
SetPagePrivate(page);
new = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inmem_entry_slab, GFP_NOFS);
/* add atomic page indices to the list */
new->page = page;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
/* increase reference count with clean state */
mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
get_page(page);
list_add_tail(&new->list, &fi->inmem_pages);
inc_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
trace_f2fs_register_inmem_page(page, INMEM);
}
|
void register_inmem_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct inmem_pages *new;
f2fs_trace_pid(page);
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE);
SetPagePrivate(page);
new = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inmem_entry_slab, GFP_NOFS);
/* add atomic page indices to the list */
new->page = page;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
/* increase reference count with clean state */
mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
get_page(page);
list_add_tail(&new->list, &fi->inmem_pages);
inc_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
trace_f2fs_register_inmem_page(page, INMEM);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void overloadedMethod4Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("overloadedMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<String>, arrayArg, toNativeArray<String>(info[0], 1, info.GetIsolate()));
imp->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
}
|
static void overloadedMethod4Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("overloadedMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<String>, arrayArg, toNativeArray<String>(info[0], 1, info.GetIsolate()));
imp->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6779
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6779/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1eefa26e1795192c5a347a1e1e7a99e88c47f9c4
|
1eefa26e1795192c5a347a1e1e7a99e88c47f9c4
|
This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
|
bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFile(
int child_id, const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
bool result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, permissions);
if (!result) {
WorkerToMainProcessMap::iterator iter = worker_map_.find(child_id);
if (iter != worker_map_.end() && iter->second != 0) {
result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(iter->second,
file,
permissions);
}
}
return result;
}
|
bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFile(
int child_id, const base::FilePath& file, int permissions) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
bool result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, permissions);
if (!result) {
WorkerToMainProcessMap::iterator iter = worker_map_.find(child_id);
if (iter != worker_map_.end() && iter->second != 0) {
result = ChildProcessHasPermissionsForFile(iter->second,
file,
permissions);
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4997
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4997/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c
|
ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c
|
netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
get_entries(struct net *net, struct ip6t_get_entries __user *uptr,
const int *len)
{
int ret;
struct ip6t_get_entries get;
struct xt_table *t;
if (*len < sizeof(get)) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u < %zu\n", *len, sizeof(get));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&get, uptr, sizeof(get)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (*len != sizeof(struct ip6t_get_entries) + get.size) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u != %zu\n",
*len, sizeof(get) + get.size);
return -EINVAL;
}
get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0';
t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, get.name);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
struct xt_table_info *private = t->private;
duprintf("t->private->number = %u\n", private->number);
if (get.size == private->size)
ret = copy_entries_to_user(private->size,
t, uptr->entrytable);
else {
duprintf("get_entries: I've got %u not %u!\n",
private->size, get.size);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
module_put(t->me);
xt_table_unlock(t);
} else
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
return ret;
}
|
get_entries(struct net *net, struct ip6t_get_entries __user *uptr,
const int *len)
{
int ret;
struct ip6t_get_entries get;
struct xt_table *t;
if (*len < sizeof(get)) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u < %zu\n", *len, sizeof(get));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&get, uptr, sizeof(get)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (*len != sizeof(struct ip6t_get_entries) + get.size) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u != %zu\n",
*len, sizeof(get) + get.size);
return -EINVAL;
}
get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0';
t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, get.name);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
struct xt_table_info *private = t->private;
duprintf("t->private->number = %u\n", private->number);
if (get.size == private->size)
ret = copy_entries_to_user(private->size,
t, uptr->entrytable);
else {
duprintf("get_entries: I've got %u not %u!\n",
private->size, get.size);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
module_put(t->me);
xt_table_unlock(t);
} else
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void prism2_tx_timeout(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
local_info_t *local;
struct hfa384x_regs regs;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
local = iface->local;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s Tx timed out! Resetting card\n", dev->name);
netif_stop_queue(local->dev);
local->func->read_regs(dev, ®s);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: CMD=%04x EVSTAT=%04x "
"OFFSET0=%04x OFFSET1=%04x SWSUPPORT0=%04x\n",
dev->name, regs.cmd, regs.evstat, regs.offset0, regs.offset1,
regs.swsupport0);
local->func->schedule_reset(local);
}
|
static void prism2_tx_timeout(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
local_info_t *local;
struct hfa384x_regs regs;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
local = iface->local;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s Tx timed out! Resetting card\n", dev->name);
netif_stop_queue(local->dev);
local->func->read_regs(dev, ®s);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: CMD=%04x EVSTAT=%04x "
"OFFSET0=%04x OFFSET1=%04x SWSUPPORT0=%04x\n",
dev->name, regs.cmd, regs.evstat, regs.offset0, regs.offset1,
regs.swsupport0);
local->func->schedule_reset(local);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel,
ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg;
int ret;
u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip);
u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip,
ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset, &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base,
&tss_seg.prev_task_link,
sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
}
return load_state_from_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
}
|
static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel,
ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg;
int ret;
u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip);
u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip,
ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset, &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base,
&tss_seg.prev_task_link,
sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
}
return load_state_from_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15649
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15649/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4971613c1639d8e5f102c4e797c3bf8f83a5a69e
|
4971613c1639d8e5f102c4e797c3bf8f83a5a69e
|
packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,
int size_max, void **data)
{
union tpacket_uhdr ph;
int tp_len, off;
ph.raw = frame;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
if (ph.h3->tp_next_offset != 0) {
pr_warn_once("variable sized slot not supported");
return -EINVAL;
}
tp_len = ph.h3->tp_len;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
tp_len = ph.h2->tp_len;
break;
default:
tp_len = ph.h1->tp_len;
break;
}
if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max)) {
pr_err("packet size is too long (%d > %d)\n", tp_len, size_max);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
off_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size - tp_len;
if (po->sk.sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
off = ph.h3->tp_net;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_net;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_net;
break;
}
} else {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
off = ph.h3->tp_mac;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_mac;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_mac;
break;
}
}
if (unlikely((off < off_min) || (off_max < off)))
return -EINVAL;
} else {
off = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
}
*data = frame + off;
return tp_len;
}
|
static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,
int size_max, void **data)
{
union tpacket_uhdr ph;
int tp_len, off;
ph.raw = frame;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
if (ph.h3->tp_next_offset != 0) {
pr_warn_once("variable sized slot not supported");
return -EINVAL;
}
tp_len = ph.h3->tp_len;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
tp_len = ph.h2->tp_len;
break;
default:
tp_len = ph.h1->tp_len;
break;
}
if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max)) {
pr_err("packet size is too long (%d > %d)\n", tp_len, size_max);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
off_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size - tp_len;
if (po->sk.sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
off = ph.h3->tp_net;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_net;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_net;
break;
}
} else {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
off = ph.h3->tp_mac;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_mac;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_mac;
break;
}
}
if (unlikely((off < off_min) || (off_max < off)))
return -EINVAL;
} else {
off = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
}
*data = frame + off;
return tp_len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13094/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bb3d48dcf86a97dc25fe9fc2c11938e19cb4399a
|
bb3d48dcf86a97dc25fe9fc2c11938e19cb4399a
|
xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
|
xfs_attr3_leaf_add(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
int tablesize;
int entsize;
int sum;
int tmp;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_add(args);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(args->geo, &ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0 && args->index <= ichdr.count);
entsize = xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(args, NULL);
/*
* Search through freemap for first-fit on new name length.
* (may need to figure in size of entry struct too)
*/
tablesize = (ichdr.count + 1) * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf);
for (sum = 0, i = XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (tablesize > ichdr.firstused) {
sum += ichdr.freemap[i].size;
continue;
}
if (!ichdr.freemap[i].size)
continue; /* no space in this map */
tmp = entsize;
if (ichdr.freemap[i].base < ichdr.firstused)
tmp += sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
if (ichdr.freemap[i].size >= tmp) {
tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(bp, &ichdr, args, i);
goto out_log_hdr;
}
sum += ichdr.freemap[i].size;
}
/*
* If there are no holes in the address space of the block,
* and we don't have enough freespace, then compaction will do us
* no good and we should just give up.
*/
if (!ichdr.holes && sum < entsize)
return -ENOSPC;
/*
* Compact the entries to coalesce free space.
* This may change the hdr->count via dropping INCOMPLETE entries.
*/
xfs_attr3_leaf_compact(args, &ichdr, bp);
/*
* After compaction, the block is guaranteed to have only one
* free region, in freemap[0]. If it is not big enough, give up.
*/
if (ichdr.freemap[0].size < (entsize + sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t))) {
tmp = -ENOSPC;
goto out_log_hdr;
}
tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(bp, &ichdr, args, 0);
out_log_hdr:
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_to_disk(args->geo, leaf, &ichdr);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, &leaf->hdr,
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf)));
return tmp;
}
|
xfs_attr3_leaf_add(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
int tablesize;
int entsize;
int sum;
int tmp;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_add(args);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(args->geo, &ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0 && args->index <= ichdr.count);
entsize = xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(args, NULL);
/*
* Search through freemap for first-fit on new name length.
* (may need to figure in size of entry struct too)
*/
tablesize = (ichdr.count + 1) * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf);
for (sum = 0, i = XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (tablesize > ichdr.firstused) {
sum += ichdr.freemap[i].size;
continue;
}
if (!ichdr.freemap[i].size)
continue; /* no space in this map */
tmp = entsize;
if (ichdr.freemap[i].base < ichdr.firstused)
tmp += sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
if (ichdr.freemap[i].size >= tmp) {
tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(bp, &ichdr, args, i);
goto out_log_hdr;
}
sum += ichdr.freemap[i].size;
}
/*
* If there are no holes in the address space of the block,
* and we don't have enough freespace, then compaction will do us
* no good and we should just give up.
*/
if (!ichdr.holes && sum < entsize)
return -ENOSPC;
/*
* Compact the entries to coalesce free space.
* This may change the hdr->count via dropping INCOMPLETE entries.
*/
xfs_attr3_leaf_compact(args, &ichdr, bp);
/*
* After compaction, the block is guaranteed to have only one
* free region, in freemap[0]. If it is not big enough, give up.
*/
if (ichdr.freemap[0].size < (entsize + sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t))) {
tmp = -ENOSPC;
goto out_log_hdr;
}
tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(bp, &ichdr, args, 0);
out_log_hdr:
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_to_disk(args->geo, leaf, &ichdr);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, &leaf->hdr,
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf)));
return tmp;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void AXLayoutObject::addInlineTextBoxChildren(bool force) {
Settings* settings = getDocument()->settings();
if (!force &&
(!settings || !settings->getInlineTextBoxAccessibilityEnabled()))
return;
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getLayoutObject()->isText())
return;
if (getLayoutObject()->needsLayout()) {
return;
}
LayoutText* layoutText = toLayoutText(getLayoutObject());
for (RefPtr<AbstractInlineTextBox> box =
layoutText->firstAbstractInlineTextBox();
box.get(); box = box->nextInlineTextBox()) {
AXObject* axObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(box.get());
if (!axObject->accessibilityIsIgnored())
m_children.push_back(axObject);
}
}
|
void AXLayoutObject::addInlineTextBoxChildren(bool force) {
Settings* settings = getDocument()->settings();
if (!force &&
(!settings || !settings->getInlineTextBoxAccessibilityEnabled()))
return;
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getLayoutObject()->isText())
return;
if (getLayoutObject()->needsLayout()) {
return;
}
LayoutText* layoutText = toLayoutText(getLayoutObject());
for (RefPtr<AbstractInlineTextBox> box =
layoutText->firstAbstractInlineTextBox();
box.get(); box = box->nextInlineTextBox()) {
AXObject* axObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(box.get());
if (!axObject->accessibilityIsIgnored())
m_children.push_back(axObject);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
IntSize DrawingBuffer::AdjustSize(const IntSize& desired_size,
const IntSize& cur_size,
int max_texture_size) {
IntSize adjusted_size = desired_size;
if (adjusted_size.Height() > max_texture_size)
adjusted_size.SetHeight(max_texture_size);
if (adjusted_size.Width() > max_texture_size)
adjusted_size.SetWidth(max_texture_size);
return adjusted_size;
}
|
IntSize DrawingBuffer::AdjustSize(const IntSize& desired_size,
const IntSize& cur_size,
int max_texture_size) {
IntSize adjusted_size = desired_size;
if (adjusted_size.Height() > max_texture_size)
adjusted_size.SetHeight(max_texture_size);
if (adjusted_size.Width() > max_texture_size)
adjusted_size.SetWidth(max_texture_size);
return adjusted_size;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidContainInsecureFormAction() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->DidContainInsecureFormAction();
}
|
void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidContainInsecureFormAction() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->DidContainInsecureFormAction();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
static size_t dm_dax_copy_from_iter(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff,
void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
{
struct mapped_device *md = dax_get_private(dax_dev);
sector_t sector = pgoff * PAGE_SECTORS;
struct dm_target *ti;
long ret = 0;
int srcu_idx;
ti = dm_dax_get_live_target(md, sector, &srcu_idx);
if (!ti)
goto out;
if (!ti->type->dax_copy_from_iter) {
ret = copy_from_iter(addr, bytes, i);
goto out;
}
ret = ti->type->dax_copy_from_iter(ti, pgoff, addr, bytes, i);
out:
dm_put_live_table(md, srcu_idx);
return ret;
}
|
static size_t dm_dax_copy_from_iter(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff,
void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
{
struct mapped_device *md = dax_get_private(dax_dev);
sector_t sector = pgoff * PAGE_SECTORS;
struct dm_target *ti;
long ret = 0;
int srcu_idx;
ti = dm_dax_get_live_target(md, sector, &srcu_idx);
if (!ti)
goto out;
if (!ti->type->dax_copy_from_iter) {
ret = copy_from_iter(addr, bytes, i);
goto out;
}
ret = ti->type->dax_copy_from_iter(ti, pgoff, addr, bytes, i);
out:
dm_put_live_table(md, srcu_idx);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17476/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
|
base::string16 LocaleWindowCaptionFromPageTitle(
const base::string16& expected_title) {
base::string16 page_title = WindowCaptionFromPageTitle(expected_title);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
std::string locale = g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale();
if (base::i18n::GetTextDirectionForLocale(locale.c_str()) ==
base::i18n::RIGHT_TO_LEFT) {
base::i18n::WrapStringWithLTRFormatting(&page_title);
}
return page_title;
#else
return page_title;
#endif
}
|
base::string16 LocaleWindowCaptionFromPageTitle(
const base::string16& expected_title) {
base::string16 page_title = WindowCaptionFromPageTitle(expected_title);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
std::string locale = g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale();
if (base::i18n::GetTextDirectionForLocale(locale.c_str()) ==
base::i18n::RIGHT_TO_LEFT) {
base::i18n::WrapStringWithLTRFormatting(&page_title);
}
return page_title;
#else
return page_title;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6634
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6634/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CurrentHistoryCleaner::WebContentsDestroyed(
content::WebContents* contents) {
delete this; // Failure.
}
|
void CurrentHistoryCleaner::WebContentsDestroyed(
content::WebContents* contents) {
delete this; // Failure.
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
|
bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-0206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0206/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/edfbbf388f293d70bf4b7c0bc38774d05e6f711a
|
edfbbf388f293d70bf4b7c0bc38774d05e6f711a
|
aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
long ret = 0;
int i = 0;
struct blk_plug plug;
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
blk_start_plug(&plug);
/*
* AKPM: should this return a partial result if some of the IOs were
* successfully submitted?
*/
for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
struct iocb tmp;
if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&tmp, user_iocb, sizeof(tmp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = io_submit_one(ctx, user_iocb, &tmp, compat);
if (ret)
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
percpu_ref_put(&ctx->users);
return i ? i : ret;
}
|
long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
long ret = 0;
int i = 0;
struct blk_plug plug;
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
blk_start_plug(&plug);
/*
* AKPM: should this return a partial result if some of the IOs were
* successfully submitted?
*/
for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
struct iocb tmp;
if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&tmp, user_iocb, sizeof(tmp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = io_submit_one(ctx, user_iocb, &tmp, compat);
if (ret)
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
percpu_ref_put(&ctx->users);
return i ? i : ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11399
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11399/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static inline int range_decode_culshift(APEContext *ctx, int shift)
{
range_dec_normalize(ctx);
ctx->rc.help = ctx->rc.range >> shift;
return ctx->rc.low / ctx->rc.help;
}
|
static inline int range_decode_culshift(APEContext *ctx, int shift)
{
range_dec_normalize(ctx);
ctx->rc.help = ctx->rc.range >> shift;
return ctx->rc.low / ctx->rc.help;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
|
String8::String8(StaticLinkage)
: mString(0)
{
char* data = static_cast<char*>(
SharedBuffer::alloc(sizeof(char))->data());
data[0] = 0;
mString = data;
}
|
String8::String8(StaticLinkage)
: mString(0)
{
char* data = static_cast<char*>(
SharedBuffer::alloc(sizeof(char))->data());
data[0] = 0;
mString = data;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6432
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6432/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0
|
cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0
|
ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __net_init ping_v4_proc_init_net(struct net *net)
{
return ping_proc_register(net, &ping_v4_seq_afinfo);
}
|
static int __net_init ping_v4_proc_init_net(struct net *net)
{
return ping_proc_register(net, &ping_v4_seq_afinfo);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5185/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
[Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
bool ShouldShowCardsFromAccountOption(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
return should_show_cards_from_account_option_;
}
|
bool ShouldShowCardsFromAccountOption(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
return should_show_cards_from_account_option_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BackgroundContentsService::LoadBackgroundContentsFromPrefs(
Profile* profile) {
if (!prefs_)
return;
const DictionaryValue* contents =
prefs_->GetDictionary(prefs::kRegisteredBackgroundContents);
if (!contents)
return;
ExtensionService* extensions_service = profile->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(extensions_service);
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator it = contents->begin_keys();
it != contents->end_keys(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extensions_service->GetExtensionById(
*it, false);
if (!extension) {
NOTREACHED() << "No extension found for BackgroundContents - id = "
<< *it;
continue;
}
LoadBackgroundContentsFromDictionary(profile, *it, contents);
}
}
|
void BackgroundContentsService::LoadBackgroundContentsFromPrefs(
Profile* profile) {
if (!prefs_)
return;
const DictionaryValue* contents =
prefs_->GetDictionary(prefs::kRegisteredBackgroundContents);
if (!contents)
return;
ExtensionService* extensions_service = profile->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(extensions_service);
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator it = contents->begin_keys();
it != contents->end_keys(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extensions_service->GetExtensionById(
*it, false);
if (!extension) {
NOTREACHED() << "No extension found for BackgroundContents - id = "
<< *it;
continue;
}
LoadBackgroundContentsFromDictionary(profile, *it, contents);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0918/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b
|
0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b
|
Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderViewImpl::WillHandleMouseEvent(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& event) {
possible_drag_event_info_.event_source =
ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_EVENT_SOURCE_MOUSE;
possible_drag_event_info_.event_location =
gfx::Point(event.globalX, event.globalY);
pepper_helper_->WillHandleMouseEvent();
return mouse_lock_dispatcher_->WillHandleMouseEvent(event);
}
|
bool RenderViewImpl::WillHandleMouseEvent(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& event) {
possible_drag_event_info_.event_source =
ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_EVENT_SOURCE_MOUSE;
possible_drag_event_info_.event_location =
gfx::Point(event.globalX, event.globalY);
pepper_helper_->WillHandleMouseEvent();
return mouse_lock_dispatcher_->WillHandleMouseEvent(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7910/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84
|
77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84
|
block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t disk_range_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", disk->minors);
}
|
static ssize_t disk_range_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", disk->minors);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12897/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
|
juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4565/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static void ucma_unlock_files(struct ucma_file *file1, struct ucma_file *file2)
{
if (file1 < file2) {
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
} else {
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
}
}
|
static void ucma_unlock_files(struct ucma_file *file1, struct ucma_file *file2)
{
if (file1 < file2) {
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
} else {
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0791/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/sidhpurwala-huzaifa/FreeRDP/commit/e2745807c4c3e0a590c0f69a9b655dc74ebaa03e
|
e2745807c4c3e0a590c0f69a9b655dc74ebaa03e
|
Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
|
BOOL license_read_error_alert_packet(rdpLicense* license, wStream* s)
{
UINT32 dwErrorCode;
UINT32 dwStateTransition;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, dwErrorCode); /* dwErrorCode (4 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, dwStateTransition); /* dwStateTransition (4 bytes) */
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, license->ErrorInfo)) /* bbErrorInfo */
return FALSE;
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_LICENSE
fprintf(stderr, "dwErrorCode: %s, dwStateTransition: %s\n",
error_codes[dwErrorCode], state_transitions[dwStateTransition]);
#endif
if (dwErrorCode == STATUS_VALID_CLIENT)
{
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_COMPLETED;
return TRUE;
}
switch (dwStateTransition)
{
case ST_TOTAL_ABORT:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_ABORTED;
break;
case ST_NO_TRANSITION:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_COMPLETED;
break;
case ST_RESET_PHASE_TO_START:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_AWAIT;
break;
case ST_RESEND_LAST_MESSAGE:
break;
default:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
BOOL license_read_error_alert_packet(rdpLicense* license, wStream* s)
{
UINT32 dwErrorCode;
UINT32 dwStateTransition;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, dwErrorCode); /* dwErrorCode (4 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, dwStateTransition); /* dwStateTransition (4 bytes) */
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, license->ErrorInfo)) /* bbErrorInfo */
return FALSE;
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_LICENSE
fprintf(stderr, "dwErrorCode: %s, dwStateTransition: %s\n",
error_codes[dwErrorCode], state_transitions[dwStateTransition]);
#endif
if (dwErrorCode == STATUS_VALID_CLIENT)
{
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_COMPLETED;
return TRUE;
}
switch (dwStateTransition)
{
case ST_TOTAL_ABORT:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_ABORTED;
break;
case ST_NO_TRANSITION:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_COMPLETED;
break;
case ST_RESET_PHASE_TO_START:
license->state = LICENSE_STATE_AWAIT;
break;
case ST_RESEND_LAST_MESSAGE:
break;
default:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1300/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
void PrintViewManagerBase::ReleasePrintJob() {
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh = printing_rfh_;
printing_rfh_ = nullptr;
if (!print_job_.get())
return;
if (rfh) {
auto msg = base::MakeUnique<PrintMsg_PrintingDone>(rfh->GetRoutingID(),
printing_succeeded_);
rfh->Send(msg.release());
}
registrar_.Remove(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PRINT_JOB_EVENT,
content::Source<PrintJob>(print_job_.get()));
print_job_ = nullptr;
}
|
void PrintViewManagerBase::ReleasePrintJob() {
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh = printing_rfh_;
printing_rfh_ = nullptr;
if (!print_job_.get())
return;
if (rfh) {
auto msg = base::MakeUnique<PrintMsg_PrintingDone>(rfh->GetRoutingID(),
printing_succeeded_);
rfh->Send(msg.release());
}
registrar_.Remove(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PRINT_JOB_EVENT,
content::Source<PrintJob>(print_job_.get()));
print_job_ = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14469/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c
|
396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
ikev1_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ike_sub0_print(ndo, np, ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
|
ikev1_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ike_sub0_print(ndo, np, ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent],
id[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MaxTextExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->background_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->border_color,
exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->matte_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opaque") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
count=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent],
id[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MaxTextExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->background_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->border_color,
exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->matte_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opaque") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
count=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::showContextMenu(const blink::WebContextMenuData& data) {
ContextMenuParams params = ContextMenuParamsBuilder::Build(data);
params.source_type = GetRenderWidget()->context_menu_source_type();
GetRenderWidget()->OnShowHostContextMenu(¶ms);
if (GetRenderWidget()->has_host_context_menu_location()) {
params.x = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().x();
params.y = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().y();
}
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > GetMaxURLChars())
params.src_url = GURL();
context_menu_node_ = data.node;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
gfx::Rect start_rect;
gfx::Rect end_rect;
GetRenderWidget()->GetSelectionBounds(&start_rect, &end_rect);
params.selection_start = gfx::Point(start_rect.x(), start_rect.bottom());
params.selection_end = gfx::Point(end_rect.right(), end_rect.bottom());
#endif
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::showContextMenu(const blink::WebContextMenuData& data) {
ContextMenuParams params = ContextMenuParamsBuilder::Build(data);
params.source_type = GetRenderWidget()->context_menu_source_type();
GetRenderWidget()->OnShowHostContextMenu(¶ms);
if (GetRenderWidget()->has_host_context_menu_location()) {
params.x = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().x();
params.y = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().y();
}
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > GetMaxURLChars())
params.src_url = GURL();
context_menu_node_ = data.node;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
gfx::Rect start_rect;
gfx::Rect end_rect;
GetRenderWidget()->GetSelectionBounds(&start_rect, &end_rect);
params.selection_start = gfx::Point(start_rect.x(), start_rect.bottom());
params.selection_end = gfx::Point(end_rect.right(), end_rect.bottom());
#endif
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1800
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1800/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
[Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QQuickWebView::focusOutEvent(QFocusEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleFocusOutEvent(event);
}
|
void QQuickWebView::focusOutEvent(QFocusEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleFocusOutEvent(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9060/
|
CWE-772
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=dd248ed7e204ee8a1873914e02b8b526e8f1b80d
|
dd248ed7e204ee8a1873914e02b8b526e8f1b80d
| null |
static void virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
int h;
uint32_t src_offset, dst_offset, stride;
int bpp;
pixman_format_code_t format;
struct virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d t2d;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(t2d);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_xfer_toh_2d(t2d.resource_id);
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, t2d.resource_id);
if (!res || !res->iov) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (t2d.r.x > res->width ||
t2d.r.y > res->height ||
t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.height > res->height ||
t2d.r.x + t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.y + t2d.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: transfer bounds outside resource"
" bounds for resource %d: %d %d %d %d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id, t2d.r.x, t2d.r.y,
t2d.r.width, t2d.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
stride = pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (t2d.offset || t2d.r.x || t2d.r.y ||
t2d.r.width != pixman_image_get_width(res->image)) {
void *img_data = pixman_image_get_data(res->image);
for (h = 0; h < t2d.r.height; h++) {
src_offset = t2d.offset + stride * h;
dst_offset = (t2d.r.y + h) * stride + (t2d.r.x * bpp);
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, src_offset,
(uint8_t *)img_data
+ dst_offset, t2d.r.width * bpp);
}
} else {
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, 0,
pixman_image_get_data(res->image),
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image)
* pixman_image_get_height(res->image));
}
}
|
static void virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
int h;
uint32_t src_offset, dst_offset, stride;
int bpp;
pixman_format_code_t format;
struct virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d t2d;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(t2d);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_xfer_toh_2d(t2d.resource_id);
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, t2d.resource_id);
if (!res || !res->iov) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (t2d.r.x > res->width ||
t2d.r.y > res->height ||
t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.height > res->height ||
t2d.r.x + t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.y + t2d.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: transfer bounds outside resource"
" bounds for resource %d: %d %d %d %d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id, t2d.r.x, t2d.r.y,
t2d.r.width, t2d.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
stride = pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (t2d.offset || t2d.r.x || t2d.r.y ||
t2d.r.width != pixman_image_get_width(res->image)) {
void *img_data = pixman_image_get_data(res->image);
for (h = 0; h < t2d.r.height; h++) {
src_offset = t2d.offset + stride * h;
dst_offset = (t2d.r.y + h) * stride + (t2d.r.x * bpp);
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, src_offset,
(uint8_t *)img_data
+ dst_offset, t2d.r.width * bpp);
}
} else {
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, 0,
pixman_image_get_data(res->image),
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image)
* pixman_image_get_height(res->image));
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8957
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8957/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/78f82d9d1c2944725a279acd573a22168dc6e22a
|
78f82d9d1c2944725a279acd573a22168dc6e22a
|
http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=26838
|
static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) sun_info.length,
sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(h263type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(mpeg4type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
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