CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-6431
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6431/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae7b4e1f213aa659aedf9c6ecad0bf5f0476e1e2
|
ae7b4e1f213aa659aedf9c6ecad0bf5f0476e1e2
|
net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void __net_init fib6_tables_init(struct net *net)
{
fib6_link_table(net, net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl);
}
|
static void __net_init fib6_tables_init(struct net *net)
{
fib6_link_table(net, net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3346
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3346/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/bonzini/qemu/commit/7285477ab11831b1cf56e45878a89170dd06d9b9
|
7285477ab11831b1cf56e45878a89170dd06d9b9
|
scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
|
static int scsi_disk_emulate_command(SCSIDiskReq *r, uint8_t *outbuf)
static int scsi_disk_emulate_command(SCSIDiskReq *r)
{
SCSIRequest *req = &r->req;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
uint64_t nb_sectors;
uint8_t *outbuf;
int buflen = 0;
if (!r->iov.iov_base) {
/*
* FIXME: we shouldn't return anything bigger than 4k, but the code
* requires the buffer to be as big as req->cmd.xfer in several
* places. So, do not allow CDBs with a very large ALLOCATION
* LENGTH. The real fix would be to modify scsi_read_data and
* dma_buf_read, so that they return data beyond the buflen
* as all zeros.
*/
if (req->cmd.xfer > 65536) {
goto illegal_request;
}
r->buflen = MAX(4096, req->cmd.xfer);
r->iov.iov_base = qemu_blockalign(s->bs, r->buflen);
}
outbuf = r->iov.iov_base;
switch (req->cmd.buf[0]) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs))
goto not_ready;
break;
case INQUIRY:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_inquiry(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_mode_sense(r, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case READ_TOC:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_read_toc(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case START_STOP:
if (scsi_disk_emulate_start_stop(r) < 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
s->tray_locked = req->cmd.buf[4] & 1;
bdrv_lock_medium(s->bs, req->cmd.buf[4] & 1);
break;
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
/* The normal LEN field for this command is zero. */
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
/* Clip to 2TB, instead of returning capacity modulo 2TB. */
if (nb_sectors > UINT32_MAX)
nb_sectors = UINT32_MAX;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = 0;
outbuf[5] = 0;
outbuf[6] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[7] = 0;
buflen = 8;
break;
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
/* ??? This should probably return much more information. For now
just return the basic header indicating the CD-ROM profile. */
outbuf[7] = 8; // CD-ROM
buflen = 8;
break;
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
/* Service Action In subcommands. */
if ((req->cmd.buf[1] & 31) == SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16) {
DPRINTF("SAI READ CAPACITY(16)\n");
memset(outbuf, 0, req->cmd.xfer);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 56) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 48) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 40) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = (nb_sectors >> 32) & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[5] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[6] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[7] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[8] = 0;
outbuf[9] = 0;
outbuf[10] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[11] = 0;
outbuf[12] = 0;
outbuf[13] = get_physical_block_exp(&s->qdev.conf);
/* set TPE bit if the format supports discard */
if (s->qdev.conf.discard_granularity) {
outbuf[14] = 0x80;
}
/* Protection, exponent and lowest lba field left blank. */
buflen = req->cmd.xfer;
break;
}
DPRINTF("Unsupported Service Action In\n");
goto illegal_request;
case VERIFY_10:
break;
default:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return -1;
}
return buflen;
not_ready:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs)) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(NO_MEDIUM));
} else {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LUN_NOT_READY));
}
return -1;
illegal_request:
if (r->req.status == -1) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
}
return -1;
}
|
static int scsi_disk_emulate_command(SCSIDiskReq *r, uint8_t *outbuf)
{
SCSIRequest *req = &r->req;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
uint64_t nb_sectors;
int buflen = 0;
switch (req->cmd.buf[0]) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs))
goto not_ready;
break;
case INQUIRY:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_inquiry(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_mode_sense(r, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case READ_TOC:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_read_toc(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case START_STOP:
if (scsi_disk_emulate_start_stop(r) < 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
s->tray_locked = req->cmd.buf[4] & 1;
bdrv_lock_medium(s->bs, req->cmd.buf[4] & 1);
break;
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
/* The normal LEN field for this command is zero. */
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
/* Clip to 2TB, instead of returning capacity modulo 2TB. */
if (nb_sectors > UINT32_MAX)
nb_sectors = UINT32_MAX;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = 0;
outbuf[5] = 0;
outbuf[6] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[7] = 0;
buflen = 8;
break;
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
/* ??? This should probably return much more information. For now
just return the basic header indicating the CD-ROM profile. */
outbuf[7] = 8; // CD-ROM
buflen = 8;
break;
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
/* Service Action In subcommands. */
if ((req->cmd.buf[1] & 31) == SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16) {
DPRINTF("SAI READ CAPACITY(16)\n");
memset(outbuf, 0, req->cmd.xfer);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 56) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 48) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 40) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = (nb_sectors >> 32) & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[5] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[6] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[7] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[8] = 0;
outbuf[9] = 0;
outbuf[10] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[11] = 0;
outbuf[12] = 0;
outbuf[13] = get_physical_block_exp(&s->qdev.conf);
/* set TPE bit if the format supports discard */
if (s->qdev.conf.discard_granularity) {
outbuf[14] = 0x80;
}
/* Protection, exponent and lowest lba field left blank. */
buflen = req->cmd.xfer;
break;
}
DPRINTF("Unsupported Service Action In\n");
goto illegal_request;
case VERIFY_10:
break;
default:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return -1;
}
return buflen;
not_ready:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs)) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(NO_MEDIUM));
} else {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LUN_NOT_READY));
}
return -1;
illegal_request:
if (r->req.status == -1) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
static int __send_write_same(struct clone_info *ci)
{
return __send_changing_extent_only(ci, get_num_write_same_bios, NULL);
}
|
static int __send_write_same(struct clone_info *ci)
{
return __send_changing_extent_only(ci, get_num_write_same_bios, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18190
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18190/
|
CWE-290
|
https://github.com/apple/cups/commit/afa80cb2b457bf8d64f775bed307588610476c41
|
afa80cb2b457bf8d64f775bed307588610476c41
|
Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
|
install_cupsd_conf(cupsd_client_t *con) /* I - Connection */
{
char filename[1024]; /* Configuration filename */
cups_file_t *in, /* Input file */
*out; /* Output file */
char buffer[16384]; /* Copy buffer */
ssize_t bytes; /* Number of bytes */
/*
* Open the request file...
*/
if ((in = cupsFileOpen(con->filename, "rb")) == NULL)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open request file \"%s\": %s",
con->filename, strerror(errno));
goto server_error;
}
/*
* Open the new config file...
*/
if ((out = cupsdCreateConfFile(ConfigurationFile, ConfigFilePerm)) == NULL)
{
cupsFileClose(in);
goto server_error;
}
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Installing config file \"%s\"...",
ConfigurationFile);
/*
* Copy from the request to the new config file...
*/
while ((bytes = cupsFileRead(in, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0)
if (cupsFileWrite(out, buffer, (size_t)bytes) < bytes)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to copy to config file \"%s\": %s",
ConfigurationFile, strerror(errno));
cupsFileClose(in);
cupsFileClose(out);
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.N", ConfigurationFile);
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(filename);
goto server_error;
}
/*
* Close the files...
*/
cupsFileClose(in);
if (cupsdCloseCreatedConfFile(out, ConfigurationFile))
goto server_error;
/*
* Remove the request file...
*/
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
/*
* Set the NeedReload flag...
*/
NeedReload = RELOAD_CUPSD;
ReloadTime = time(NULL);
/*
* Return that the file was created successfully...
*/
return (HTTP_STATUS_CREATED);
/*
* Common exit for errors...
*/
server_error:
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
return (HTTP_STATUS_SERVER_ERROR);
}
|
install_cupsd_conf(cupsd_client_t *con) /* I - Connection */
{
char filename[1024]; /* Configuration filename */
cups_file_t *in, /* Input file */
*out; /* Output file */
char buffer[16384]; /* Copy buffer */
ssize_t bytes; /* Number of bytes */
/*
* Open the request file...
*/
if ((in = cupsFileOpen(con->filename, "rb")) == NULL)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open request file \"%s\": %s",
con->filename, strerror(errno));
goto server_error;
}
/*
* Open the new config file...
*/
if ((out = cupsdCreateConfFile(ConfigurationFile, ConfigFilePerm)) == NULL)
{
cupsFileClose(in);
goto server_error;
}
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Installing config file \"%s\"...",
ConfigurationFile);
/*
* Copy from the request to the new config file...
*/
while ((bytes = cupsFileRead(in, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0)
if (cupsFileWrite(out, buffer, (size_t)bytes) < bytes)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to copy to config file \"%s\": %s",
ConfigurationFile, strerror(errno));
cupsFileClose(in);
cupsFileClose(out);
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.N", ConfigurationFile);
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(filename);
goto server_error;
}
/*
* Close the files...
*/
cupsFileClose(in);
if (cupsdCloseCreatedConfFile(out, ConfigurationFile))
goto server_error;
/*
* Remove the request file...
*/
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
/*
* Set the NeedReload flag...
*/
NeedReload = RELOAD_CUPSD;
ReloadTime = time(NULL);
/*
* Return that the file was created successfully...
*/
return (HTTP_STATUS_CREATED);
/*
* Common exit for errors...
*/
server_error:
cupsdUnlinkOrRemoveFile(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
return (HTTP_STATUS_SERVER_ERROR);
}
|
C
|
cups
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestActiveDOMObject* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info);
if (!castedThis->allowsAccessFrom(exec))
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestActiveDOMObject* impl = static_cast<TestActiveDOMObject*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec));
Node* nextChild(toNode(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->excitingFunction(nextChild);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestActiveDOMObject* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info);
if (!castedThis->allowsAccessFrom(exec))
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestActiveDOMObject* impl = static_cast<TestActiveDOMObject*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Node* nextChild(toNode(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->excitingFunction(nextChild);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-7904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9965adea952e84c925de418e971b204dfda7d6e0
|
9965adea952e84c925de418e971b204dfda7d6e0
|
Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
|
void TestTransactionConsumer::Read() {
state_ = READING;
read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(1024);
int result = trans_->Read(read_buf_.get(),
1024,
base::Bind(&TestTransactionConsumer::OnIOComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
DidRead(result);
}
|
void TestTransactionConsumer::Read() {
state_ = READING;
read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(1024);
int result = trans_->Read(read_buf_.get(),
1024,
base::Bind(&TestTransactionConsumer::OnIOComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
DidRead(result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8068/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace
|
5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace
|
pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int reset_mac(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
__u8 data = 0x8;
int i;
set_register(pegasus, EthCtrl1, data);
for (i = 0; i < REG_TIMEOUT; i++) {
get_registers(pegasus, EthCtrl1, 1, &data);
if (~data & 0x08) {
if (loopback)
break;
if (mii_mode && (pegasus->features & HAS_HOME_PNA))
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x34);
else
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x26);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, pegasus->features);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, DEFAULT_GPIO_SET);
break;
}
}
if (i == REG_TIMEOUT)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_LINKSYS ||
usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_DLINK) {
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x24);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x26);
}
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_ELCON) {
__u16 auxmode;
read_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
auxmode |= 4;
write_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
}
return 0;
}
|
static inline int reset_mac(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
__u8 data = 0x8;
int i;
set_register(pegasus, EthCtrl1, data);
for (i = 0; i < REG_TIMEOUT; i++) {
get_registers(pegasus, EthCtrl1, 1, &data);
if (~data & 0x08) {
if (loopback)
break;
if (mii_mode && (pegasus->features & HAS_HOME_PNA))
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x34);
else
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x26);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, pegasus->features);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, DEFAULT_GPIO_SET);
break;
}
}
if (i == REG_TIMEOUT)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_LINKSYS ||
usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_DLINK) {
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x24);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x26);
}
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_ELCON) {
__u16 auxmode;
read_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
auxmode |= 4;
write_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0850/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/bluetooth/bluedroid/+/c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
|
BOOLEAN btm_sec_are_all_trusted(UINT32 p_mask[])
{
UINT32 trusted_inx;
for (trusted_inx = 0; trusted_inx < BTM_SEC_SERVICE_ARRAY_SIZE; trusted_inx++)
{
if (p_mask[trusted_inx] != BTM_SEC_TRUST_ALL)
return(FALSE);
}
return(TRUE);
}
|
BOOLEAN btm_sec_are_all_trusted(UINT32 p_mask[])
{
UINT32 trusted_inx;
for (trusted_inx = 0; trusted_inx < BTM_SEC_SERVICE_ARRAY_SIZE; trusted_inx++)
{
if (p_mask[trusted_inx] != BTM_SEC_TRUST_ALL)
return(FALSE);
}
return(TRUE);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8099/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]>
|
static size_t read_extension(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct index_extension dest;
size_t total_size;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&dest, buffer, sizeof(struct index_extension));
dest.extension_size = ntohl(dest.extension_size);
total_size = dest.extension_size + sizeof(struct index_extension);
if (dest.extension_size > total_size ||
buffer_size < total_size ||
buffer_size - total_size < INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return 0;
/* optional extension */
if (dest.signature[0] >= 'A' && dest.signature[0] <= 'Z') {
/* tree cache */
if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_TREECACHE_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (git_tree_cache_read(&index->tree, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size, &index->tree_pool) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_UNMERGED_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_reuc(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_CONFLICT_NAME_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_conflict_names(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
}
/* else, unsupported extension. We cannot parse this, but we can skip
* it by returning `total_size */
} else {
/* we cannot handle non-ignorable extensions;
* in fact they aren't even defined in the standard */
return 0;
}
return total_size;
}
|
static size_t read_extension(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct index_extension dest;
size_t total_size;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&dest, buffer, sizeof(struct index_extension));
dest.extension_size = ntohl(dest.extension_size);
total_size = dest.extension_size + sizeof(struct index_extension);
if (dest.extension_size > total_size ||
buffer_size < total_size ||
buffer_size - total_size < INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return 0;
/* optional extension */
if (dest.signature[0] >= 'A' && dest.signature[0] <= 'Z') {
/* tree cache */
if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_TREECACHE_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (git_tree_cache_read(&index->tree, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size, &index->tree_pool) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_UNMERGED_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_reuc(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_CONFLICT_NAME_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_conflict_names(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
}
/* else, unsupported extension. We cannot parse this, but we can skip
* it by returning `total_size */
} else {
/* we cannot handle non-ignorable extensions;
* in fact they aren't even defined in the standard */
return 0;
}
return total_size;
}
|
C
|
libgit2
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> [email protected]
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
bool VaapiWrapper::CreateSurfaces(unsigned int va_format,
const gfx::Size& size,
size_t num_surfaces,
std::vector<VASurfaceID>* va_surfaces) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(*va_lock_);
DVLOG(2) << "Creating " << num_surfaces << " surfaces";
DCHECK(va_surfaces->empty());
DCHECK(va_surface_ids_.empty());
va_surface_ids_.resize(num_surfaces);
VAStatus va_res =
vaCreateSurfaces(va_display_, va_format, size.width(), size.height(),
&va_surface_ids_[0], va_surface_ids_.size(), NULL, 0);
VA_LOG_ON_ERROR(va_res, "vaCreateSurfaces failed");
if (va_res != VA_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
va_surface_ids_.clear();
return false;
}
va_res = vaCreateContext(va_display_, va_config_id_,
size.width(), size.height(), VA_PROGRESSIVE,
&va_surface_ids_[0], va_surface_ids_.size(),
&va_context_id_);
VA_LOG_ON_ERROR(va_res, "vaCreateContext failed");
if (va_res != VA_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DestroySurfaces();
return false;
}
*va_surfaces = va_surface_ids_;
return true;
}
|
bool VaapiWrapper::CreateSurfaces(unsigned int va_format,
const gfx::Size& size,
size_t num_surfaces,
std::vector<VASurfaceID>* va_surfaces) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(*va_lock_);
DVLOG(2) << "Creating " << num_surfaces << " surfaces";
DCHECK(va_surfaces->empty());
DCHECK(va_surface_ids_.empty());
va_surface_ids_.resize(num_surfaces);
VAStatus va_res =
vaCreateSurfaces(va_display_, va_format, size.width(), size.height(),
&va_surface_ids_[0], va_surface_ids_.size(), NULL, 0);
VA_LOG_ON_ERROR(va_res, "vaCreateSurfaces failed");
if (va_res != VA_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
va_surface_ids_.clear();
return false;
}
va_res = vaCreateContext(va_display_, va_config_id_,
size.width(), size.height(), VA_PROGRESSIVE,
&va_surface_ids_[0], va_surface_ids_.size(),
&va_context_id_);
VA_LOG_ON_ERROR(va_res, "vaCreateContext failed");
if (va_res != VA_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DestroySurfaces();
return false;
}
*va_surfaces = va_surface_ids_;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3104/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
[i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::vector<ExtensionPage> ExtensionSettingsHandler::GetActivePagesForExtension(
const Extension* extension) {
std::vector<ExtensionPage> result;
ExtensionProcessManager* process_manager =
extension_service_->profile()->GetExtensionProcessManager();
GetActivePagesForExtensionProcess(
process_manager->GetRenderViewHostsForExtension(
extension->id()), &result);
if (extension_service_->profile()->HasOffTheRecordProfile() &&
extension->incognito_split_mode()) {
ExtensionProcessManager* process_manager =
extension_service_->profile()->GetOffTheRecordProfile()->
GetExtensionProcessManager();
GetActivePagesForExtensionProcess(
process_manager->GetRenderViewHostsForExtension(
extension->id()), &result);
}
return result;
}
|
std::vector<ExtensionPage> ExtensionSettingsHandler::GetActivePagesForExtension(
const Extension* extension) {
std::vector<ExtensionPage> result;
ExtensionProcessManager* process_manager =
extension_service_->profile()->GetExtensionProcessManager();
GetActivePagesForExtensionProcess(
process_manager->GetRenderViewHostsForExtension(
extension->id()), &result);
if (extension_service_->profile()->HasOffTheRecordProfile() &&
extension->incognito_split_mode()) {
ExtensionProcessManager* process_manager =
extension_service_->profile()->GetOffTheRecordProfile()->
GetExtensionProcessManager();
GetActivePagesForExtensionProcess(
process_manager->GetRenderViewHostsForExtension(
extension->id()), &result);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17113
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17113/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
[Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_NumSamples(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_num_samples(file->mod);
}
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_NumSamples(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_num_samples(file->mod);
}
|
C
|
openmpt
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_before_handle_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
percpu_write(current_vcpu, vcpu);
}
|
void kvm_before_handle_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
percpu_write(current_vcpu, vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5044/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
62154472bd2c43e1790dd1bd8a527c1db9118d88
|
bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesImpl(
const blink::WebBluetoothDeviceId& device_id,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const base::Optional<BluetoothUUID>& services_uuid,
RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesCallback callback,
device::BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!device->IsGattConnected()) {
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::DEVICE_DISCONNECTED);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
return;
}
DCHECK(device->IsGattServicesDiscoveryComplete());
std::vector<device::BluetoothRemoteGattService*> services =
services_uuid ? device->GetPrimaryServicesByUUID(services_uuid.value())
: device->GetPrimaryServices();
std::vector<blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr> response_services;
for (device::BluetoothRemoteGattService* service : services) {
if (!allowed_devices().IsAllowedToAccessService(device_id,
service->GetUUID())) {
continue;
}
std::string service_instance_id = service->GetIdentifier();
const std::string& device_address = device->GetAddress();
auto insert_result = service_id_to_device_address_.insert(
make_pair(service_instance_id, device_address));
if (!insert_result.second)
DCHECK_EQ(insert_result.first->second, device_address);
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr service_ptr =
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTService::New();
service_ptr->instance_id = service_instance_id;
service_ptr->uuid = service->GetUUID();
response_services.push_back(std::move(service_ptr));
if (quantity == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
break;
}
}
if (!response_services.empty()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Services found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(quantity,
UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(response_services));
return;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Services not found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, services_uuid ? UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NOT_FOUND
: UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NO_SERVICES);
std::move(callback).Run(
services_uuid ? blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SERVICE_NOT_FOUND
: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
}
|
void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesImpl(
const blink::WebBluetoothDeviceId& device_id,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const base::Optional<BluetoothUUID>& services_uuid,
RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesCallback callback,
device::BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!device->IsGattConnected()) {
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::DEVICE_DISCONNECTED);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
return;
}
DCHECK(device->IsGattServicesDiscoveryComplete());
std::vector<device::BluetoothRemoteGattService*> services =
services_uuid ? device->GetPrimaryServicesByUUID(services_uuid.value())
: device->GetPrimaryServices();
std::vector<blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr> response_services;
for (device::BluetoothRemoteGattService* service : services) {
if (!allowed_devices().IsAllowedToAccessService(device_id,
service->GetUUID())) {
continue;
}
std::string service_instance_id = service->GetIdentifier();
const std::string& device_address = device->GetAddress();
auto insert_result = service_id_to_device_address_.insert(
make_pair(service_instance_id, device_address));
if (!insert_result.second)
DCHECK_EQ(insert_result.first->second, device_address);
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr service_ptr =
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTService::New();
service_ptr->instance_id = service_instance_id;
service_ptr->uuid = service->GetUUID();
response_services.push_back(std::move(service_ptr));
if (quantity == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
break;
}
}
if (!response_services.empty()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Services found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(quantity,
UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(response_services));
return;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Services not found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, services_uuid ? UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NOT_FOUND
: UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NO_SERVICES);
std::move(callback).Run(
services_uuid ? blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SERVICE_NOT_FOUND
: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview(PrintPreviewRequestType type) {
auto weak_this = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
print_preview_context_.source_frame()->DispatchBeforePrintEvent();
if (!weak_this)
return;
const bool is_modifiable = print_preview_context_.IsModifiable();
const bool has_selection = print_preview_context_.HasSelection();
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = is_modifiable;
params.has_selection = has_selection;
switch (type) {
case PRINT_PREVIEW_SCRIPTED: {
is_scripted_preview_delayed_ = true;
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::ShowScriptedPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
} else {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::ShowScriptedPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
auto msg = base::MakeUnique<PrintHostMsg_SetupScriptedPrintPreview>(
routing_id());
msg->EnableMessagePumping();
auto self = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
Send(msg.release());
if (self)
is_scripted_preview_delayed_ = false;
return;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME: {
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), type);
return;
}
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_SELECTION: {
DCHECK(has_selection);
DCHECK(!GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame()));
params.selection_only = has_selection;
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE: {
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), type);
return;
}
params.webnode_only = true;
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), params));
}
|
void PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview(PrintPreviewRequestType type) {
auto weak_this = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
print_preview_context_.source_frame()->DispatchBeforePrintEvent();
if (!weak_this)
return;
const bool is_modifiable = print_preview_context_.IsModifiable();
const bool has_selection = print_preview_context_.HasSelection();
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = is_modifiable;
params.has_selection = has_selection;
switch (type) {
case PRINT_PREVIEW_SCRIPTED: {
is_scripted_preview_delayed_ = true;
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::ShowScriptedPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
} else {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::ShowScriptedPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
auto msg = base::MakeUnique<PrintHostMsg_SetupScriptedPrintPreview>(
routing_id());
msg->EnableMessagePumping();
auto self = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
Send(msg.release());
if (self)
is_scripted_preview_delayed_ = false;
return;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME: {
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), type);
return;
}
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_SELECTION: {
DCHECK(has_selection);
DCHECK(!GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame()));
params.selection_only = has_selection;
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE: {
if (is_loading_ && GetPlugin(print_preview_context_.source_frame())) {
on_stop_loading_closure_ =
base::Bind(&PrintRenderFrameHelper::RequestPrintPreview,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), type);
return;
}
params.webnode_only = true;
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), params));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6765
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6765/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0
|
e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0
|
AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
|
AppCacheUpdateJob::~AppCacheUpdateJob() {
if (service_)
service_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (internal_state_ != COMPLETED)
Cancel();
DCHECK(!inprogress_cache_.get());
DCHECK(pending_master_entries_.empty());
// The job must not outlive any of its fetchers.
CHECK(!manifest_fetcher_);
CHECK(pending_url_fetches_.empty());
CHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
if (group_)
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
}
|
AppCacheUpdateJob::~AppCacheUpdateJob() {
if (service_)
service_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (internal_state_ != COMPLETED)
Cancel();
DCHECK(!manifest_fetcher_);
DCHECK(pending_url_fetches_.empty());
DCHECK(!inprogress_cache_.get());
DCHECK(pending_master_entries_.empty());
DCHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
if (group_)
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
lseg_length(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(point_dt(&lseg->p[0], &lseg->p[1]));
}
|
lseg_length(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(point_dt(&lseg->p[0], &lseg->p[1]));
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18200/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4
|
638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4
|
f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit exit_f2fs_fs(void)
{
f2fs_destroy_root_stats();
unregister_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type);
unregister_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
f2fs_exit_sysfs();
destroy_extent_cache();
destroy_checkpoint_caches();
destroy_segment_manager_caches();
destroy_node_manager_caches();
destroy_inodecache();
f2fs_destroy_trace_ios();
}
|
static void __exit exit_f2fs_fs(void)
{
f2fs_destroy_root_stats();
unregister_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type);
unregister_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
f2fs_exit_sysfs();
destroy_extent_cache();
destroy_checkpoint_caches();
destroy_segment_manager_caches();
destroy_node_manager_caches();
destroy_inodecache();
f2fs_destroy_trace_ios();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int perf_event_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, void __user *arg)
{
char *filter_str;
int ret;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
return -EINVAL;
filter_str = strndup_user(arg, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(filter_str))
return PTR_ERR(filter_str);
ret = ftrace_profile_set_filter(event, event->attr.config, filter_str);
kfree(filter_str);
return ret;
}
|
static int perf_event_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, void __user *arg)
{
char *filter_str;
int ret;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
return -EINVAL;
filter_str = strndup_user(arg, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(filter_str))
return PTR_ERR(filter_str);
ret = ftrace_profile_set_filter(event, event->attr.config, filter_str);
kfree(filter_str);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0841
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0841/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3097f364237fb552871f7639d37a7afa4563e252
|
3097f364237fb552871f7639d37a7afa4563e252
|
Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
|
sp<IMemory> MediaMetadataRetriever::extractAlbumArt()
{
ALOGV("extractAlbumArt");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
return mRetriever->extractAlbumArt();
}
|
sp<IMemory> MediaMetadataRetriever::extractAlbumArt()
{
ALOGV("extractAlbumArt");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
return mRetriever->extractAlbumArt();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
Clipboard: Opt out of PNG Encoding filters.
Set the PNG encoder's FilterFlag to kNone from the default kAll.
The clipboard should prefer faster encode time over encode size for image/png,
so set all clipboard image decoding to skip testing of different PNG encoding
filters, which takes a lot of time for not too much compression ratio benefit
in the common case.
Benchmarking with a random-pixel 8k by 4k px image
(https://www.photopea.com/clipboard_img.html), and fZLibLevel = 1, here's some
encode times (seconds) varying flags:
* kNone: 2.98 (trials: 3.00814, 2.98265, 2.99636, 2.9877, 2.96517, 2.99467)
* kSub: 3.03 (trials: 3.02345, 3.04085, 3.00886, 3.0587, 3.03992, 3.02549)
* kAll: 4.12 (trials: 4.12813, 4.12552, 4.08524, 4.13283, 4.15013, 4.11719)
Using kNone would save ~28% encode time over the current kAll.
This will be most visible for pasting of extremely large photos.
Bug: 1004867
Change-Id: I37a848498da425249e57171ae2ca3f0595c6b793
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1827953
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#700598}
|
bool DataObjectItem::HasFileSystemId() const {
return kind_ == kFileKind && !file_system_id_.IsEmpty();
}
|
bool DataObjectItem::HasFileSystemId() const {
return kind_ == kFileKind && !file_system_id_.IsEmpty();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0fb75f1e468fe9054be3b3d3d5b9bf9a66e4199d
|
0fb75f1e468fe9054be3b3d3d5b9bf9a66e4199d
|
StackSamplingProfiler: walk a copy of the stack
Changes the stack walking strategy to copy the stack while the target
thread is suspended, then walk the copy of the stack after the thread
has been resumed. This avoids deadlock on locks taken by
RtlLookupFunctionEntry when walking the actual stack while the target
thread is suspended.
BUG=528129
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1367633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353004}
|
Win32StackFrameUnwinderTest() {}
|
Win32StackFrameUnwinderTest() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2793/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TestURLFetcher* TestURLFetcherFactory::GetFetcherByID(int id) const {
Fetchers::const_iterator i = fetchers_.find(id);
return i == fetchers_.end() ? NULL : i->second;
}
|
TestURLFetcher* TestURLFetcherFactory::GetFetcherByID(int id) const {
Fetchers::const_iterator i = fetchers_.find(id);
return i == fetchers_.end() ? NULL : i->second;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5707
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5707/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/451a2886b6bf90e2fb378f7c46c655450fb96e81
|
451a2886b6bf90e2fb378f7c46c655450fb96e81
|
sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: [email protected] # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
Sg_fd *sfp;
unsigned long req_sz, len, sa;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp;
int k, length;
if ((!filp) || (!vma) || (!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)))
return -ENXIO;
req_sz = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_mmap starting, vm_start=%p, len=%d\n",
(void *) vma->vm_start, (int) req_sz));
if (vma->vm_pgoff)
return -EINVAL; /* want no offset */
rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen)
return -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */
sa = vma->vm_start;
length = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + rsv_schp->page_order);
for (k = 0; k < rsv_schp->k_use_sg && sa < vma->vm_end; k++) {
len = vma->vm_end - sa;
len = (len < length) ? len : length;
sa += len;
}
sfp->mmap_called = 1;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_private_data = sfp;
vma->vm_ops = &sg_mmap_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
|
sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
Sg_fd *sfp;
unsigned long req_sz, len, sa;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp;
int k, length;
if ((!filp) || (!vma) || (!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)))
return -ENXIO;
req_sz = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_mmap starting, vm_start=%p, len=%d\n",
(void *) vma->vm_start, (int) req_sz));
if (vma->vm_pgoff)
return -EINVAL; /* want no offset */
rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen)
return -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */
sa = vma->vm_start;
length = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + rsv_schp->page_order);
for (k = 0; k < rsv_schp->k_use_sg && sa < vma->vm_end; k++) {
len = vma->vm_end - sa;
len = (len < length) ? len : length;
sa += len;
}
sfp->mmap_called = 1;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_private_data = sfp;
vma->vm_ops = &sg_mmap_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16075
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16075/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGPU(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetWebGPUEnabled(enable);
}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGPU(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetWebGPUEnabled(enable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3965
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3965/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7352baf29ac44d23cd580c2edfa8faf4e140a480
|
7352baf29ac44d23cd580c2edfa8faf4e140a480
|
Fix null deref when walking cert chain.
BUG=109664
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117080 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SignatureUtil::CheckSignature(
const FilePath& file_path,
ClientDownloadRequest_SignatureInfo* signature_info) {
VLOG(2) << "Checking signature for " << file_path.value();
WINTRUST_FILE_INFO file_info;
file_info.cbStruct = sizeof(file_info);
file_info.pcwszFilePath = file_path.value().c_str();
file_info.hFile = NULL;
file_info.pgKnownSubject = NULL;
WINTRUST_DATA wintrust_data;
wintrust_data.cbStruct = sizeof(wintrust_data);
wintrust_data.pPolicyCallbackData = NULL;
wintrust_data.pSIPClientData = NULL;
wintrust_data.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
wintrust_data.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE;
wintrust_data.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
wintrust_data.pFile = &file_info;
wintrust_data.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
wintrust_data.hWVTStateData = NULL;
wintrust_data.pwszURLReference = NULL;
wintrust_data.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
wintrust_data.dwUIContext = WTD_UICONTEXT_EXECUTE;
GUID policy_guid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
LONG result = WinVerifyTrust(static_cast<HWND>(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE),
&policy_guid,
&wintrust_data);
CRYPT_PROVIDER_DATA* prov_data = WTHelperProvDataFromStateData(
wintrust_data.hWVTStateData);
if (prov_data) {
if (prov_data->csSigners > 0) {
signature_info->set_trusted(result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
for (DWORD i = 0; i < prov_data->csSigners; ++i) {
const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* cert_chain_context =
prov_data->pasSigners[i].pChainContext;
if (!cert_chain_context)
break;
for (DWORD j = 0; j < cert_chain_context->cChain; ++j) {
CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN* simple_chain = cert_chain_context->rgpChain[j];
ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain* chain =
signature_info->add_certificate_chain();
if (!simple_chain)
break;
for (DWORD k = 0; k < simple_chain->cElement; ++k) {
CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = simple_chain->rgpElement[k];
chain->add_element()->set_certificate(
element->pCertContext->pbCertEncoded,
element->pCertContext->cbCertEncoded);
}
}
}
wintrust_data.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
WinVerifyTrust(static_cast<HWND>(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE),
&policy_guid, &wintrust_data);
}
}
|
void SignatureUtil::CheckSignature(
const FilePath& file_path,
ClientDownloadRequest_SignatureInfo* signature_info) {
VLOG(2) << "Checking signature for " << file_path.value();
WINTRUST_FILE_INFO file_info;
file_info.cbStruct = sizeof(file_info);
file_info.pcwszFilePath = file_path.value().c_str();
file_info.hFile = NULL;
file_info.pgKnownSubject = NULL;
WINTRUST_DATA wintrust_data;
wintrust_data.cbStruct = sizeof(wintrust_data);
wintrust_data.pPolicyCallbackData = NULL;
wintrust_data.pSIPClientData = NULL;
wintrust_data.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
wintrust_data.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE;
wintrust_data.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
wintrust_data.pFile = &file_info;
wintrust_data.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
wintrust_data.hWVTStateData = NULL;
wintrust_data.pwszURLReference = NULL;
wintrust_data.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
wintrust_data.dwUIContext = WTD_UICONTEXT_EXECUTE;
GUID policy_guid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
LONG result = WinVerifyTrust(static_cast<HWND>(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE),
&policy_guid,
&wintrust_data);
CRYPT_PROVIDER_DATA* prov_data = WTHelperProvDataFromStateData(
wintrust_data.hWVTStateData);
if (prov_data) {
if (prov_data->csSigners > 0) {
signature_info->set_trusted(result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
for (DWORD i = 0; i < prov_data->csSigners; ++i) {
const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* cert_chain_context =
prov_data->pasSigners[i].pChainContext;
for (DWORD j = 0; j < cert_chain_context->cChain; ++j) {
CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN* simple_chain = cert_chain_context->rgpChain[j];
ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain* chain =
signature_info->add_certificate_chain();
for (DWORD k = 0; k < simple_chain->cElement; ++k) {
CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = simple_chain->rgpElement[k];
chain->add_element()->set_certificate(
element->pCertContext->pbCertEncoded,
element->pCertContext->cbCertEncoded);
}
}
}
wintrust_data.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
WinVerifyTrust(static_cast<HWND>(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE),
&policy_guid, &wintrust_data);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-6414
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6414/
|
CWE-772
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/libcacard/commit/?id=9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c
|
9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c
| null |
vcard_process_apdu(VCard *card, VCardAPDU *apdu, VCardResponse **response)
{
VCardStatus status;
VCardBufferResponse *buffer_response;
/* first handle any PTS commands, which aren't really APDU's */
if (apdu->a_type == VCARD_7816_PTS) {
/* the PTS responses aren't really responses either */
*response = vcard_response_new_data(apdu->a_data, apdu->a_len);
/* PTS responses have no status bytes */
(*response)->b_total_len = (*response)->b_len;
return VCARD_DONE;
}
buffer_response = vcard_get_buffer_response(card);
if (buffer_response && apdu->a_ins != VCARD7816_INS_GET_RESPONSE) {
/* clear out buffer_response, do not return an error */
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, NULL);
vcard_buffer_response_delete(buffer_response);
}
status = vcard_process_applet_apdu(card, apdu, response);
if (status != VCARD_NEXT) {
return status;
}
switch (vcard_get_type(card)) {
case VCARD_FILE_SYSTEM:
return vcard7816_file_system_process_apdu(card, apdu, response);
case VCARD_VM:
return vcard7816_vm_process_apdu(card, apdu, response);
case VCARD_DIRECT:
/* if we are type direct, then the applet should handle everything */
assert(!"VCARD_DIRECT: applet failure");
break;
default:
g_warn_if_reached();
}
*response =
vcard_make_response(VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return VCARD_DONE;
}
|
vcard_process_apdu(VCard *card, VCardAPDU *apdu, VCardResponse **response)
{
VCardStatus status;
VCardBufferResponse *buffer_response;
/* first handle any PTS commands, which aren't really APDU's */
if (apdu->a_type == VCARD_7816_PTS) {
/* the PTS responses aren't really responses either */
*response = vcard_response_new_data(apdu->a_data, apdu->a_len);
/* PTS responses have no status bytes */
(*response)->b_total_len = (*response)->b_len;
return VCARD_DONE;
}
buffer_response = vcard_get_buffer_response(card);
if (buffer_response && apdu->a_ins != VCARD7816_INS_GET_RESPONSE) {
/* clear out buffer_response, do not return an error */
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, NULL);
vcard_buffer_response_delete(buffer_response);
}
status = vcard_process_applet_apdu(card, apdu, response);
if (status != VCARD_NEXT) {
return status;
}
switch (vcard_get_type(card)) {
case VCARD_FILE_SYSTEM:
return vcard7816_file_system_process_apdu(card, apdu, response);
case VCARD_VM:
return vcard7816_vm_process_apdu(card, apdu, response);
case VCARD_DIRECT:
/* if we are type direct, then the applet should handle everything */
assert(!"VCARD_DIRECT: applet failure");
break;
default:
g_warn_if_reached();
}
*response =
vcard_make_response(VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return VCARD_DONE;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
Revert "OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder"
This reverts commit e656908dbda6ced2f4743a9b5c2ed926dc6b5b67.
Reason for revert: Appears to cause build failure on Android
[71296/78273] ACTION //content/public/android:content_java__process_prebuilt__bytecode_rewrite(//build/toolchain/android:android_clang_arm)
FAILED: obj/content/public/android/content_java__process_prebuilt-bytecode-rewritten.jar
python ../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py --script bin/helper/java_bytecode_rewriter [...removed for brevity, see link...]
Missing 2 classes missing in direct classpath. To fix, add GN deps for:
gen/third_party/blink/public/mojom/android_mojo_bindings_java.javac.jar
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 76, in <module>
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 72, in main
subprocess.check_call(cmd)
File "/b/swarming/w/ir/cipd_bin_packages/lib/python2.7/subprocess.py", line 186, in check_call
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, cmd)
(https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/android-rel/9664)
Original change's description:
> OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder
>
> This CL moves window_features.mojom, commit_result.mojom,
> devtools_frontend.mojom, selection_menu_behavior.mojom and
> remote_objects.mojom from public/platform/web to public/mojom/
> to gather mojom files to mojom folder and updates paths for these
> mojom files.
>
> Bug: 919393
> Change-Id: If6df031ed39d70e700986bd13a40d0598257e009
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1514434
> Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Julie Jeongeun Kim <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640633}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I5744072dbaeffba5706f329838e37d74c065ae27
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 919393
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1523386
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640688}
|
static bool NeedsHistoryItemRestore(WebFrameLoadType type) {
return type == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward || IsReloadLoadType(type);
}
|
static bool NeedsHistoryItemRestore(WebFrameLoadType type) {
return type == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward || IsReloadLoadType(type);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7568
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7568/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c18263e0e0769faee96a5d0ee04b750c442783c6
|
c18263e0e0769faee96a5d0ee04b750c442783c6
|
Merge branch 'PHP-5.6' into PHP-7.0
|
gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromWebpPtr (int size, void *data)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(size, data, 0);
if (!in)
return 0;
im = gdImageCreateFromWebpCtx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
|
gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromWebpPtr (int size, void *data)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(size, data, 0);
if (!in)
return 0;
im = gdImageCreateFromWebpCtx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11328
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11328/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
|
int yr_object_has_undefined_value(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* field_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
field_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
field_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (field_obj == NULL)
return TRUE;
switch(field_obj->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
return isnan(field_obj->value.d);
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
return field_obj->value.ss == NULL;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
return field_obj->value.i == UNDEFINED;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
int yr_object_has_undefined_value(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* field_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
field_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
field_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (field_obj == NULL)
return TRUE;
switch(field_obj->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
return isnan(field_obj->value.d);
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
return field_obj->value.ss == NULL;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
return field_obj->value.i == UNDEFINED;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2351/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6
|
bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6
|
Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoProcessMessage(
const std::string& name, const JsArgList& args,
const JsEventHandler* sender) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), host_->core_thread_.message_loop());
syncapi_->GetJsBackend()->ProcessMessage(name, args, sender);
}
|
void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoProcessMessage(
const std::string& name, const JsArgList& args,
const JsEventHandler* sender) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), host_->core_thread_.message_loop());
syncapi_->GetJsBackend()->ProcessMessage(name, args, sender);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnCancelDesktopNotification(int notification_id) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->CancelDesktopNotification(
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(), notification_id);
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnCancelDesktopNotification(int notification_id) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->CancelDesktopNotification(
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(), notification_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2487/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
|
void SoftOpus::onPortFlushCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (portIndex == 0 && mDecoder != NULL) {
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
opus_multistream_decoder_ctl(mDecoder, OPUS_RESET_STATE);
mAnchorTimeUs = 0;
mSamplesToDiscard = mSeekPreRoll;
}
}
|
void SoftOpus::onPortFlushCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (portIndex == 0 && mDecoder != NULL) {
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
opus_multistream_decoder_ctl(mDecoder, OPUS_RESET_STATE);
mAnchorTimeUs = 0;
mSamplesToDiscard = mSeekPreRoll;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0402
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0402/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/d72ea85c78a1a68bf99fd5804ad9784b4102fe57
|
d72ea85c78a1a68bf99fd5804ad9784b4102fe57
|
Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
|
int equalizer_set_band_level(equalizer_context_t *context, int32_t band,
int32_t level)
{
ALOGV("%s: band: %d, level: %d", __func__, band, level);
if (level > 0) {
level = (int)((level+50)/100);
} else {
level = (int)((level-50)/100);
}
context->band_levels[band] = level;
context->preset = PRESET_CUSTOM;
offload_eq_set_preset(&(context->offload_eq), PRESET_CUSTOM);
offload_eq_set_bands_level(&(context->offload_eq),
NUM_EQ_BANDS,
equalizer_band_presets_freq,
context->band_levels);
if (context->ctl)
offload_eq_send_params(context->ctl, &context->offload_eq,
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_ENABLE_FLAG |
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_BANDS_LEVEL);
return 0;
}
|
int equalizer_set_band_level(equalizer_context_t *context, int32_t band,
int32_t level)
{
ALOGV("%s: band: %d, level: %d", __func__, band, level);
if (level > 0) {
level = (int)((level+50)/100);
} else {
level = (int)((level-50)/100);
}
context->band_levels[band] = level;
context->preset = PRESET_CUSTOM;
offload_eq_set_preset(&(context->offload_eq), PRESET_CUSTOM);
offload_eq_set_bands_level(&(context->offload_eq),
NUM_EQ_BANDS,
equalizer_band_presets_freq,
context->band_levels);
if (context->ctl)
offload_eq_send_params(context->ctl, &context->offload_eq,
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_ENABLE_FLAG |
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_BANDS_LEVEL);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10184
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10184/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git;a=commit;h=3f0e1ec70173593f4c2b3681b26c04a4ed5fc588
|
3f0e1ec70173593f4c2b3681b26c04a4ed5fc588
| null |
static inline __maybe_unused void h2c_error(struct h2c *h2c, enum h2_err err)
{
h2c->errcode = err;
h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR;
}
|
static inline __maybe_unused void h2c_error(struct h2c *h2c, enum h2_err err)
{
h2c->errcode = err;
h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4072/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
|
1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
| null |
PHP_METHOD(Phar, getMetadata)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE(phar_obj->archive->metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
char *buf = estrndup((char *) Z_PTR(phar_obj->archive->metadata), phar_obj->archive->metadata_len);
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, return_value, phar_obj->archive->metadata_len);
efree(buf);
} else {
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, &phar_obj->archive->metadata);
}
}
}
|
PHP_METHOD(Phar, getMetadata)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE(phar_obj->archive->metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
char *buf = estrndup((char *) Z_PTR(phar_obj->archive->metadata), phar_obj->archive->metadata_len);
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, return_value, phar_obj->archive->metadata_len);
efree(buf);
} else {
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, &phar_obj->archive->metadata);
}
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19045/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
get_priority(vector_t *strvec, const char *process)
{
int priority;
if (vector_size(strvec) < 2) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "No %s process priority specified", process);
return 0;
}
if (!read_int_strvec(strvec, 1, &priority, -20, 19, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid %s process priority specified", process);
return 0;
}
return (int8_t)priority;
}
|
get_priority(vector_t *strvec, const char *process)
{
int priority;
if (vector_size(strvec) < 2) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "No %s process priority specified", process);
return 0;
}
if (!read_int_strvec(strvec, 1, &priority, -20, 19, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid %s process priority specified", process);
return 0;
}
return (int8_t)priority;
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::~ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate() {
DCHECK(!download_manager_);
}
|
ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::~ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate() {
DCHECK(!download_manager_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7538/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/53c1dcd34bed85181b901bfce1a2322f85a59472
|
53c1dcd34bed85181b901bfce1a2322f85a59472
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *offsets,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < offsets[y])
length=(size_t) offsets[y];
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) offsets[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *offsets,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < offsets[y])
length=(size_t) offsets[y];
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) offsets[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
~DragTargetDropAckNotificationObserver() {}
|
~DragTargetDropAckNotificationObserver() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object, int active)
{
u8 *p = object;
u8 *endobject = object + s->objsize;
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
unsigned int red =
active ? SLUB_RED_ACTIVE : SLUB_RED_INACTIVE;
if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, object, "Redzone",
endobject, red, s->inuse - s->objsize))
return 0;
} else {
if ((s->flags & SLAB_POISON) && s->objsize < s->inuse) {
check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Alignment padding",
endobject, POISON_INUSE, s->inuse - s->objsize);
}
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
if (!active && (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) &&
(!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Poison", p,
POISON_FREE, s->objsize - 1) ||
!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Poison",
p + s->objsize - 1, POISON_END, 1)))
return 0;
/*
* check_pad_bytes cleans up on its own.
*/
check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
}
if (!s->offset && active)
/*
* Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
* freepointer while object is allocated.
*/
return 1;
/* Check free pointer validity */
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, get_freepointer(s, p))) {
object_err(s, page, p, "Freepointer corrupt");
/*
* No choice but to zap it and thus loose the remainder
* of the free objects in this slab. May cause
* another error because the object count is now wrong.
*/
set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object, int active)
{
u8 *p = object;
u8 *endobject = object + s->objsize;
if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
unsigned int red =
active ? SLUB_RED_ACTIVE : SLUB_RED_INACTIVE;
if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, object, "Redzone",
endobject, red, s->inuse - s->objsize))
return 0;
} else {
if ((s->flags & SLAB_POISON) && s->objsize < s->inuse) {
check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Alignment padding",
endobject, POISON_INUSE, s->inuse - s->objsize);
}
}
if (s->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
if (!active && (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) &&
(!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Poison", p,
POISON_FREE, s->objsize - 1) ||
!check_bytes_and_report(s, page, p, "Poison",
p + s->objsize - 1, POISON_END, 1)))
return 0;
/*
* check_pad_bytes cleans up on its own.
*/
check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
}
if (!s->offset && active)
/*
* Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
* freepointer while object is allocated.
*/
return 1;
/* Check free pointer validity */
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, get_freepointer(s, p))) {
object_err(s, page, p, "Freepointer corrupt");
/*
* No choice but to zap it and thus loose the remainder
* of the free objects in this slab. May cause
* another error because the object count is now wrong.
*/
set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
bool AuthenticatorBlePairingBeginSheetModel::IsAcceptButtonVisible() const {
return true;
}
|
bool AuthenticatorBlePairingBeginSheetModel::IsAcceptButtonVisible() const {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
tcp_send_len (server *serv, char *buf, int len)
{
char *dbuf;
int noqueue = !serv->outbound_queue;
if (!prefs.hex_net_throttle)
return server_send_real (serv, buf, len);
dbuf = malloc (len + 2); /* first byte is the priority */
dbuf[0] = 2; /* pri 2 for most things */
memcpy (dbuf + 1, buf, len);
dbuf[len + 1] = 0;
/* privmsg and notice get a lower priority */
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "PRIVMSG", 7) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "NOTICE", 6) == 0)
{
dbuf[0] = 1;
}
else
{
/* WHO/MODE get the lowest priority */
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "WHO ", 4) == 0 ||
/* but only MODE queries, not changes */
(g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "MODE", 4) == 0 &&
strchr (dbuf, '-') == NULL &&
strchr (dbuf, '+') == NULL))
dbuf[0] = 0;
}
serv->outbound_queue = g_slist_append (serv->outbound_queue, dbuf);
serv->sendq_len += len; /* tcp_send_queue uses strlen */
if (tcp_send_queue (serv) && noqueue)
fe_timeout_add (500, tcp_send_queue, serv);
return 1;
}
|
tcp_send_len (server *serv, char *buf, int len)
{
char *dbuf;
int noqueue = !serv->outbound_queue;
if (!prefs.hex_net_throttle)
return server_send_real (serv, buf, len);
dbuf = malloc (len + 2); /* first byte is the priority */
dbuf[0] = 2; /* pri 2 for most things */
memcpy (dbuf + 1, buf, len);
dbuf[len + 1] = 0;
/* privmsg and notice get a lower priority */
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "PRIVMSG", 7) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "NOTICE", 6) == 0)
{
dbuf[0] = 1;
}
else
{
/* WHO/MODE get the lowest priority */
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "WHO ", 4) == 0 ||
/* but only MODE queries, not changes */
(g_ascii_strncasecmp (dbuf + 1, "MODE", 4) == 0 &&
strchr (dbuf, '-') == NULL &&
strchr (dbuf, '+') == NULL))
dbuf[0] = 0;
}
serv->outbound_queue = g_slist_append (serv->outbound_queue, dbuf);
serv->sendq_len += len; /* tcp_send_queue uses strlen */
if (tcp_send_queue (serv) && noqueue)
fe_timeout_add (500, tcp_send_queue, serv);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPage::enableDNSPrefetch()
{
d->m_page->settings()->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(true);
}
|
void WebPage::enableDNSPrefetch()
{
d->m_page->settings()->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7177/
|
CWE-358
|
https://github.com/inliniac/suricata/commit/4a04f814b15762eb446a5ead4d69d021512df6f8
|
4a04f814b15762eb446a5ead4d69d021512df6f8
|
defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL)
goto end;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(reassembled) != 19)
goto end;
/* 40 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 40; i < 40 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A')
goto end;
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 48; i < 48 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B')
goto end;
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 56; i < 56 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
|
IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL)
goto end;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(reassembled) != 19)
goto end;
/* 40 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 40; i < 40 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A')
goto end;
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 48; i < 48 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B')
goto end;
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 56; i < 56 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataFileSystem::OnGetAvailableSpace(
const GetAvailableSpaceCallback& callback,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error, -1, -1);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AccountMetadataFeed> feed;
if (data.get())
feed = AccountMetadataFeed::CreateFrom(*data);
if (!feed.get()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED, -1, -1);
return;
}
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK,
feed->quota_bytes_total(),
feed->quota_bytes_used());
}
|
void GDataFileSystem::OnGetAvailableSpace(
const GetAvailableSpaceCallback& callback,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error, -1, -1);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AccountMetadataFeed> feed;
if (data.get())
feed = AccountMetadataFeed::CreateFrom(*data);
if (!feed.get()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED, -1, -1);
return;
}
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK,
feed->quota_bytes_total(),
feed->quota_bytes_used());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8816/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void hub_irq(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
unsigned i;
unsigned long bits;
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT: /* synchronous unlink */
case -ECONNRESET: /* async unlink */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* hardware going away */
return;
default: /* presumably an error */
/* Cause a hub reset after 10 consecutive errors */
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "transfer --> %d\n", status);
if ((++hub->nerrors < 10) || hub->error)
goto resubmit;
hub->error = status;
/* FALL THROUGH */
/* let hub_wq handle things */
case 0: /* we got data: port status changed */
bits = 0;
for (i = 0; i < urb->actual_length; ++i)
bits |= ((unsigned long) ((*hub->buffer)[i]))
<< (i*8);
hub->event_bits[0] = bits;
break;
}
hub->nerrors = 0;
/* Something happened, let hub_wq figure it out */
kick_hub_wq(hub);
resubmit:
if (hub->quiescing)
return;
status = usb_submit_urb(hub->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status != 0 && status != -ENODEV && status != -EPERM)
dev_err(hub->intfdev, "resubmit --> %d\n", status);
}
|
static void hub_irq(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
unsigned i;
unsigned long bits;
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT: /* synchronous unlink */
case -ECONNRESET: /* async unlink */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* hardware going away */
return;
default: /* presumably an error */
/* Cause a hub reset after 10 consecutive errors */
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "transfer --> %d\n", status);
if ((++hub->nerrors < 10) || hub->error)
goto resubmit;
hub->error = status;
/* FALL THROUGH */
/* let hub_wq handle things */
case 0: /* we got data: port status changed */
bits = 0;
for (i = 0; i < urb->actual_length; ++i)
bits |= ((unsigned long) ((*hub->buffer)[i]))
<< (i*8);
hub->event_bits[0] = bits;
break;
}
hub->nerrors = 0;
/* Something happened, let hub_wq figure it out */
kick_hub_wq(hub);
resubmit:
if (hub->quiescing)
return;
status = usb_submit_urb(hub->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status != 0 && status != -ENODEV && status != -EPERM)
dev_err(hub->intfdev, "resubmit --> %d\n", status);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
skia::PlatformCanvas* MockRenderProcess::GetDrawingCanvas(
TransportDIB** memory,
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
size_t stride = skia::PlatformCanvas::StrideForWidth(rect.width());
size_t size = stride * rect.height();
*memory = TransportDIB::Create(size, transport_dib_next_sequence_number_++);
if (!*memory)
return NULL;
return (*memory)->GetPlatformCanvas(rect.width(), rect.height());
}
|
skia::PlatformCanvas* MockRenderProcess::GetDrawingCanvas(
TransportDIB** memory,
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
size_t stride = skia::PlatformCanvas::StrideForWidth(rect.width());
size_t size = stride * rect.height();
*memory = TransportDIB::Create(size, transport_dib_next_sequence_number_++);
if (!*memory)
return NULL;
return (*memory)->GetPlatformCanvas(rect.width(), rect.height());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1615/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertText(const base::string16& text) {
DCHECK_NE(GetTextInputType(), ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE);
if (text_input_manager_ && text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()) {
if (text.length())
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeCommitText(
text, std::vector<blink::WebCompositionUnderline>(),
gfx::Range::InvalidRange(), 0);
else if (has_composition_text_)
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeFinishComposingText(false);
}
has_composition_text_ = false;
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertText(const base::string16& text) {
DCHECK_NE(GetTextInputType(), ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE);
if (text_input_manager_ && text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()) {
if (text.length())
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeCommitText(
text, std::vector<blink::WebCompositionUnderline>(),
gfx::Range::InvalidRange(), 0);
else if (has_composition_text_)
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeFinishComposingText(false);
}
has_composition_text_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void kvm_gen_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
/* no guest entries from this point */
pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
/* guest entries allowed */
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS, &vcpu->requests);
spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
#endif
}
|
static void kvm_gen_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
/* no guest entries from this point */
pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
/* guest entries allowed */
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS, &vcpu->requests);
spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int DirectoryBackingStore::CreateTables() {
VLOG(1) << "First run, creating tables";
int result = ExecQuery(load_dbhandle_,
"CREATE TABLE share_version ("
"id VARCHAR(128) primary key, data INT)");
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_, "INSERT INTO share_version VALUES(?, ?)");
statement.bind_string(0, dir_name_);
statement.bind_int(1, kCurrentDBVersion);
result = statement.step();
}
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
const bool kCreateAsTempShareInfo = false;
result = CreateShareInfoTable(kCreateAsTempShareInfo);
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_, "INSERT INTO share_info VALUES"
"(?, " // id
"?, " // name
"?, " // store_birthday
"?, " // db_create_version
"?, " // db_create_time
"-2, " // next_id
"?, " // cache_guid
"?);"); // notification_state
statement.bind_string(0, dir_name_); // id
statement.bind_string(1, dir_name_); // name
statement.bind_string(2, ""); // store_birthday
statement.bind_string(3, SYNC_ENGINE_VERSION_STRING); // db_create_version
statement.bind_int(4, static_cast<int32>(time(0))); // db_create_time
statement.bind_string(5, GenerateCacheGUID()); // cache_guid
statement.bind_blob(11, NULL, 0); // notification_state
result = statement.step();
}
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
result = CreateModelsTable();
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
result = CreateMetasTable(false);
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
const int64 now = Now();
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_,
"INSERT INTO metas "
"( id, metahandle, is_dir, ctime, mtime) "
"VALUES ( \"r\", 1, 1, ?, ?)");
statement.bind_int64(0, now);
statement.bind_int64(1, now);
result = statement.step();
}
return result;
}
|
int DirectoryBackingStore::CreateTables() {
VLOG(1) << "First run, creating tables";
int result = ExecQuery(load_dbhandle_,
"CREATE TABLE share_version ("
"id VARCHAR(128) primary key, data INT)");
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_, "INSERT INTO share_version VALUES(?, ?)");
statement.bind_string(0, dir_name_);
statement.bind_int(1, kCurrentDBVersion);
result = statement.step();
}
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
const bool kCreateAsTempShareInfo = false;
result = CreateShareInfoTable(kCreateAsTempShareInfo);
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_, "INSERT INTO share_info VALUES"
"(?, " // id
"?, " // name
"?, " // store_birthday
"?, " // db_create_version
"?, " // db_create_time
"-2, " // next_id
"?, " // cache_guid
"?);"); // notification_state
statement.bind_string(0, dir_name_); // id
statement.bind_string(1, dir_name_); // name
statement.bind_string(2, ""); // store_birthday
statement.bind_string(3, SYNC_ENGINE_VERSION_STRING); // db_create_version
statement.bind_int(4, static_cast<int32>(time(0))); // db_create_time
statement.bind_string(5, GenerateCacheGUID()); // cache_guid
statement.bind_blob(11, NULL, 0); // notification_state
result = statement.step();
}
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
result = CreateModelsTable();
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
result = CreateMetasTable(false);
if (result != SQLITE_DONE)
return result;
{
const int64 now = browser_sync::TimeToProtoTime(base::Time::Now());
sqlite_utils::SQLStatement statement;
statement.prepare(load_dbhandle_,
"INSERT INTO metas "
"( id, metahandle, is_dir, ctime, mtime) "
"VALUES ( \"r\", 1, 1, ?, ?)");
statement.bind_int64(0, now);
statement.bind_int64(1, now);
result = statement.step();
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-3927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3927/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
[skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void setPathFromConvexPoints(SkPath* path, size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points)
{
path->incReserve(numPoints);
path->moveTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].y()));
for (size_t i = 1; i < numPoints; ++i) {
path->lineTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].y()));
}
/* The code used to just blindly call this
path->setIsConvex(true);
But webkit can sometimes send us non-convex 4-point values, so we mark the path's
convexity as unknown, so it will get computed by skia at draw time.
See crbug.com 108605
*/
SkPath::Convexity convexity = SkPath::kConvex_Convexity;
if (numPoints == 4)
convexity = SkPath::kUnknown_Convexity;
path->setConvexity(convexity);
}
|
static void setPathFromConvexPoints(SkPath* path, size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points)
{
path->incReserve(numPoints);
path->moveTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].y()));
for (size_t i = 1; i < numPoints; ++i) {
path->lineTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].y()));
}
path->setIsConvex(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-15397
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15397/
|
CWE-311
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
|
ChunkedUploadDataStream::Writer::Writer(
base::WeakPtr<ChunkedUploadDataStream> upload_data_stream)
: upload_data_stream_(upload_data_stream) {}
|
ChunkedUploadDataStream::Writer::Writer(
base::WeakPtr<ChunkedUploadDataStream> upload_data_stream)
: upload_data_stream_(upload_data_stream) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000127/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00
|
a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00
|
Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
|
void conn_close_idle(conn *c) {
if (settings.idle_timeout > 0 &&
(current_time - c->last_cmd_time) > settings.idle_timeout) {
if (c->state != conn_new_cmd && c->state != conn_read) {
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr,
"fd %d wants to timeout, but isn't in read state", c->sfd);
return;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "Closing idle fd %d\n", c->sfd);
c->thread->stats.idle_kicks++;
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
drive_machine(c);
}
}
|
void conn_close_idle(conn *c) {
if (settings.idle_timeout > 0 &&
(current_time - c->last_cmd_time) > settings.idle_timeout) {
if (c->state != conn_new_cmd && c->state != conn_read) {
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr,
"fd %d wants to timeout, but isn't in read state", c->sfd);
return;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "Closing idle fd %d\n", c->sfd);
c->thread->stats.idle_kicks++;
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
drive_machine(c);
}
}
|
C
|
memcached
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
process_triblt(STREAM s, TRIBLT_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
RD_HBITMAP bitmap;
BRUSH brush;
if (present & 0x000001)
{
in_uint8(s, os->cache_id);
in_uint8(s, os->colour_table);
}
if (present & 0x000002)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->x, delta);
if (present & 0x000004)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->y, delta);
if (present & 0x000008)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->cx, delta);
if (present & 0x000010)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->cy, delta);
if (present & 0x000020)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
if (present & 0x000040)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->srcx, delta);
if (present & 0x000080)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->srcy, delta);
if (present & 0x000100)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->bgcolour);
if (present & 0x000200)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->fgcolour);
rdp_parse_brush(s, &os->brush, present >> 10);
if (present & 0x008000)
in_uint16_le(s, os->cache_idx);
if (present & 0x010000)
in_uint16_le(s, os->unknown);
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_triblt(), op=0x%x, x=%d, y=%d, cx=%d, cy=%d, id=%d, idx=%d, bs=%d, bg=0x%x, fg=0x%x",
os->opcode, os->x, os->y, os->cx, os->cy, os->cache_id, os->cache_idx,
os->brush.style, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
bitmap = cache_get_bitmap(os->cache_id, os->cache_idx);
if (bitmap == NULL)
return;
setup_brush(&brush, &os->brush);
ui_triblt(os->opcode, os->x, os->y, os->cx, os->cy,
bitmap, os->srcx, os->srcy, &brush, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
}
|
process_triblt(STREAM s, TRIBLT_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
RD_HBITMAP bitmap;
BRUSH brush;
if (present & 0x000001)
{
in_uint8(s, os->cache_id);
in_uint8(s, os->colour_table);
}
if (present & 0x000002)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->x, delta);
if (present & 0x000004)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->y, delta);
if (present & 0x000008)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->cx, delta);
if (present & 0x000010)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->cy, delta);
if (present & 0x000020)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
if (present & 0x000040)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->srcx, delta);
if (present & 0x000080)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->srcy, delta);
if (present & 0x000100)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->bgcolour);
if (present & 0x000200)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->fgcolour);
rdp_parse_brush(s, &os->brush, present >> 10);
if (present & 0x008000)
in_uint16_le(s, os->cache_idx);
if (present & 0x010000)
in_uint16_le(s, os->unknown);
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_triblt(), op=0x%x, x=%d, y=%d, cx=%d, cy=%d, id=%d, idx=%d, bs=%d, bg=0x%x, fg=0x%x",
os->opcode, os->x, os->y, os->cx, os->cy, os->cache_id, os->cache_idx,
os->brush.style, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
bitmap = cache_get_bitmap(os->cache_id, os->cache_idx);
if (bitmap == NULL)
return;
setup_brush(&brush, &os->brush);
ui_triblt(os->opcode, os->x, os->y, os->cx, os->cy,
bitmap, os->srcx, os->srcy, &brush, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
LRESULT WebView::onShowWindowEvent(HWND hWnd, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam, bool& handled)
{
if (!lParam) {
m_isVisible = wParam;
if (m_page)
m_page->viewStateDidChange(WebPageProxy::ViewIsVisible);
}
handled = false;
return 0;
}
|
LRESULT WebView::onShowWindowEvent(HWND hWnd, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam, bool& handled)
{
if (!lParam) {
m_isVisible = wParam;
if (m_page)
m_page->viewStateDidChange(WebPageProxy::ViewIsVisible);
}
handled = false;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int qeth_get_elements_no(struct qeth_card *card,
struct sk_buff *skb, int elems)
{
int dlen = skb->len - skb->data_len;
int elements_needed = PFN_UP((unsigned long)skb->data + dlen - 1) -
PFN_DOWN((unsigned long)skb->data);
elements_needed += qeth_get_elements_for_frags(skb);
if ((elements_needed + elems) > QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS(card)) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "Invalid size of IP packet "
"(Number=%d / Length=%d). Discarded.\n",
(elements_needed+elems), skb->len);
return 0;
}
return elements_needed;
}
|
int qeth_get_elements_no(struct qeth_card *card,
struct sk_buff *skb, int elems)
{
int dlen = skb->len - skb->data_len;
int elements_needed = PFN_UP((unsigned long)skb->data + dlen - 1) -
PFN_DOWN((unsigned long)skb->data);
elements_needed += qeth_get_elements_for_frags(skb);
if ((elements_needed + elems) > QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS(card)) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "Invalid size of IP packet "
"(Number=%d / Length=%d). Discarded.\n",
(elements_needed+elems), skb->len);
return 0;
}
return elements_needed;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1747
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1747/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
1924f747637265f563892b8f56a64391f6208194
|
Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
|
void StopCast() {
|
void StopCast() {
CastConfigDelegate* cast_config =
Shell::GetInstance()->system_tray_delegate()->GetCastConfigDelegate();
if (cast_config && cast_config->HasCastExtension()) {
cast_config->GetReceiversAndActivities(
base::Bind(&StopCastCallback, cast_config));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-7822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7822/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
if (!bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count)
goto out;
error = 0;
if (--bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count > 0)
goto out;
if (!sb)
goto out;
error = thaw_super(sb);
if (error) {
bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count++;
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return error;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return 0;
}
|
int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
if (!bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count)
goto out;
error = 0;
if (--bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count > 0)
goto out;
if (!sb)
goto out;
error = thaw_super(sb);
if (error) {
bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count++;
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return error;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void proc_config_on_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_data *data = file->private_data;
struct proc_dir_entry *dp = PDE(inode);
struct net_device *dev = dp->data;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
char *line;
if ( !data->writelen ) return;
readConfigRid(ai, 1);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
line = data->wbuffer;
while( line[0] ) {
/*** Mode processing */
if ( !strncmp( line, "Mode: ", 6 ) ) {
line += 6;
if (sniffing_mode(ai))
set_bit (FLAG_RESET, &ai->flags);
ai->config.rmode &= ~RXMODE_FULL_MASK;
clear_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
ai->config.opmode &= ~MODE_CFG_MASK;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_ACTIVE;
if ( line[0] == 'a' ) {
ai->config.opmode |= MODE_STA_IBSS;
} else {
ai->config.opmode |= MODE_STA_ESS;
if ( line[0] == 'r' ) {
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_RFMON | RXMODE_DISABLE_802_3_HEADER;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_PASSIVE;
set_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
} else if ( line[0] == 'y' ) {
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_RFMON_ANYBSS | RXMODE_DISABLE_802_3_HEADER;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_PASSIVE;
set_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
} else if ( line[0] == 'l' )
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_LANMON;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
/*** Radio status */
else if (!strncmp(line,"Radio: ", 7)) {
line += 7;
if (!strncmp(line,"off",3)) {
set_bit (FLAG_RADIO_OFF, &ai->flags);
} else {
clear_bit (FLAG_RADIO_OFF, &ai->flags);
}
}
/*** NodeName processing */
else if ( !strncmp( line, "NodeName: ", 10 ) ) {
int j;
line += 10;
memset( ai->config.nodeName, 0, 16 );
/* Do the name, assume a space between the mode and node name */
for( j = 0; j < 16 && line[j] != '\n'; j++ ) {
ai->config.nodeName[j] = line[j];
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
/*** PowerMode processing */
else if ( !strncmp( line, "PowerMode: ", 11 ) ) {
line += 11;
if ( !strncmp( line, "PSPCAM", 6 ) ) {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_PSPCAM;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "PSP", 3 ) ) {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_PSP;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_CAM;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "DataRates: ", 11 ) ) {
int v, i = 0, k = 0; /* i is index into line,
k is index to rates */
line += 11;
while((v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3))!=-1) {
ai->config.rates[k++] = (u8)v;
line += i + 1;
i = 0;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "Channel: ", 9 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 9;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, i+3);
if ( v != -1 ) {
ai->config.channelSet = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "XmitPower: ", 11 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 11;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, i+3);
if ( v != -1 ) {
ai->config.txPower = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "WEP: ", 5 ) ) {
line += 5;
switch( line[0] ) {
case 's':
ai->config.authType = AUTH_SHAREDKEY;
break;
case 'e':
ai->config.authType = AUTH_ENCRYPT;
break;
default:
ai->config.authType = AUTH_OPEN;
break;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "LongRetryLimit: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>255) ? 255 : v);
ai->config.longRetryLimit = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "ShortRetryLimit: ", 17 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 17;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>255) ? 255 : v);
ai->config.shortRetryLimit = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RTSThreshold: ", 14 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 14;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 4);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>AIRO_DEF_MTU) ? AIRO_DEF_MTU : v);
ai->config.rtsThres = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "TXMSDULifetime: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 5);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : v;
ai->config.txLifetime = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RXMSDULifetime: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 5);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : v;
ai->config.rxLifetime = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "TXDiversity: ", 13 ) ) {
ai->config.txDiversity =
(line[13]=='l') ? 1 :
((line[13]=='r')? 2: 3);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RXDiversity: ", 13 ) ) {
ai->config.rxDiversity =
(line[13]=='l') ? 1 :
((line[13]=='r')? 2: 3);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "FragThreshold: ", 15 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 15;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 4);
v = (v<256) ? 256 : ((v>AIRO_DEF_MTU) ? AIRO_DEF_MTU : v);
v = v & 0xfffe; /* Make sure its even */
ai->config.fragThresh = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if (!strncmp(line, "Modulation: ", 12)) {
line += 12;
switch(*line) {
case 'd': ai->config.modulation=MOD_DEFAULT; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'c': ai->config.modulation=MOD_CCK; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'm': ai->config.modulation=MOD_MOK; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
default: airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Unknown modulation");
}
} else if (!strncmp(line, "Preamble: ", 10)) {
line += 10;
switch(*line) {
case 'a': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_AUTO; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'l': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_LONG; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 's': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_SHORT; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
default: airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Unknown preamble");
}
} else {
airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Couldn't figure out %s", line);
}
while( line[0] && line[0] != '\n' ) line++;
if ( line[0] ) line++;
}
airo_config_commit(dev, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
static void proc_config_on_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_data *data = file->private_data;
struct proc_dir_entry *dp = PDE(inode);
struct net_device *dev = dp->data;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
char *line;
if ( !data->writelen ) return;
readConfigRid(ai, 1);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
line = data->wbuffer;
while( line[0] ) {
/*** Mode processing */
if ( !strncmp( line, "Mode: ", 6 ) ) {
line += 6;
if (sniffing_mode(ai))
set_bit (FLAG_RESET, &ai->flags);
ai->config.rmode &= ~RXMODE_FULL_MASK;
clear_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
ai->config.opmode &= ~MODE_CFG_MASK;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_ACTIVE;
if ( line[0] == 'a' ) {
ai->config.opmode |= MODE_STA_IBSS;
} else {
ai->config.opmode |= MODE_STA_ESS;
if ( line[0] == 'r' ) {
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_RFMON | RXMODE_DISABLE_802_3_HEADER;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_PASSIVE;
set_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
} else if ( line[0] == 'y' ) {
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_RFMON_ANYBSS | RXMODE_DISABLE_802_3_HEADER;
ai->config.scanMode = SCANMODE_PASSIVE;
set_bit (FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags);
} else if ( line[0] == 'l' )
ai->config.rmode |= RXMODE_LANMON;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
/*** Radio status */
else if (!strncmp(line,"Radio: ", 7)) {
line += 7;
if (!strncmp(line,"off",3)) {
set_bit (FLAG_RADIO_OFF, &ai->flags);
} else {
clear_bit (FLAG_RADIO_OFF, &ai->flags);
}
}
/*** NodeName processing */
else if ( !strncmp( line, "NodeName: ", 10 ) ) {
int j;
line += 10;
memset( ai->config.nodeName, 0, 16 );
/* Do the name, assume a space between the mode and node name */
for( j = 0; j < 16 && line[j] != '\n'; j++ ) {
ai->config.nodeName[j] = line[j];
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
/*** PowerMode processing */
else if ( !strncmp( line, "PowerMode: ", 11 ) ) {
line += 11;
if ( !strncmp( line, "PSPCAM", 6 ) ) {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_PSPCAM;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "PSP", 3 ) ) {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_PSP;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else {
ai->config.powerSaveMode = POWERSAVE_CAM;
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "DataRates: ", 11 ) ) {
int v, i = 0, k = 0; /* i is index into line,
k is index to rates */
line += 11;
while((v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3))!=-1) {
ai->config.rates[k++] = (u8)v;
line += i + 1;
i = 0;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "Channel: ", 9 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 9;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, i+3);
if ( v != -1 ) {
ai->config.channelSet = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "XmitPower: ", 11 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 11;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, i+3);
if ( v != -1 ) {
ai->config.txPower = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
}
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "WEP: ", 5 ) ) {
line += 5;
switch( line[0] ) {
case 's':
ai->config.authType = AUTH_SHAREDKEY;
break;
case 'e':
ai->config.authType = AUTH_ENCRYPT;
break;
default:
ai->config.authType = AUTH_OPEN;
break;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "LongRetryLimit: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>255) ? 255 : v);
ai->config.longRetryLimit = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "ShortRetryLimit: ", 17 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 17;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 3);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>255) ? 255 : v);
ai->config.shortRetryLimit = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RTSThreshold: ", 14 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 14;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 4);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : ((v>AIRO_DEF_MTU) ? AIRO_DEF_MTU : v);
ai->config.rtsThres = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "TXMSDULifetime: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 5);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : v;
ai->config.txLifetime = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RXMSDULifetime: ", 16 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 16;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 5);
v = (v<0) ? 0 : v;
ai->config.rxLifetime = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "TXDiversity: ", 13 ) ) {
ai->config.txDiversity =
(line[13]=='l') ? 1 :
((line[13]=='r')? 2: 3);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "RXDiversity: ", 13 ) ) {
ai->config.rxDiversity =
(line[13]=='l') ? 1 :
((line[13]=='r')? 2: 3);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if ( !strncmp( line, "FragThreshold: ", 15 ) ) {
int v, i = 0;
line += 15;
v = get_dec_u16(line, &i, 4);
v = (v<256) ? 256 : ((v>AIRO_DEF_MTU) ? AIRO_DEF_MTU : v);
v = v & 0xfffe; /* Make sure its even */
ai->config.fragThresh = cpu_to_le16(v);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags);
} else if (!strncmp(line, "Modulation: ", 12)) {
line += 12;
switch(*line) {
case 'd': ai->config.modulation=MOD_DEFAULT; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'c': ai->config.modulation=MOD_CCK; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'm': ai->config.modulation=MOD_MOK; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
default: airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Unknown modulation");
}
} else if (!strncmp(line, "Preamble: ", 10)) {
line += 10;
switch(*line) {
case 'a': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_AUTO; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 'l': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_LONG; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
case 's': ai->config.preamble=PREAMBLE_SHORT; set_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags); break;
default: airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Unknown preamble");
}
} else {
airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Couldn't figure out %s", line);
}
while( line[0] && line[0] != '\n' ) line++;
if ( line[0] ) line++;
}
airo_config_commit(dev, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OSExchangeDataProviderWin::SetDragImage(
const gfx::ImageSkia& image,
const gfx::Vector2d& cursor_offset) {
drag_image_ = image;
drag_image_offset_ = cursor_offset;
}
|
void OSExchangeDataProviderWin::SetDragImage(
const gfx::ImageSkia& image,
const gfx::Vector2d& cursor_offset) {
drag_image_ = image;
drag_image_offset_ = cursor_offset;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2915
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2915/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NavigationType NavigationControllerImpl::ClassifyNavigation(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params) const {
if (params.page_id == -1) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
}
if (params.page_id > web_contents_->GetMaxPageID()) {
if (PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition))
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE;
if (!GetLastCommittedEntry())
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME;
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared);
int existing_entry_index = GetEntryIndexWithPageID(
web_contents_->GetSiteInstance(),
params.page_id);
if (existing_entry_index == -1) {
NOTREACHED();
LOG(ERROR) << "terminating renderer for bad navigation: " << params.url;
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_NC"));
std::string temp = params.url.spec();
temp.append("#page");
temp.append(base::IntToString(params.page_id));
temp.append("#max");
temp.append(base::IntToString(web_contents_->GetMaxPageID()));
temp.append("#frame");
temp.append(base::IntToString(params.frame_id));
temp.append("#ids");
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(entries_.size()); ++i) {
temp.append(base::IntToString(entries_[i]->GetPageID()));
temp.append("_");
if (entries_[i]->site_instance())
temp.append(base::IntToString(entries_[i]->site_instance()->GetId()));
else
temp.append("N");
if (entries_[i]->site_instance() != web_contents_->GetSiteInstance())
temp.append("x");
temp.append(",");
}
GURL url(temp);
static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost())->Send(
new ViewMsg_TempCrashWithData(url));
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* existing_entry = entries_[existing_entry_index].get();
if (!PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
DCHECK(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME;
}
if (pending_entry_ &&
!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() &&
existing_entry != pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetPageID() == -1 &&
existing_entry == GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE;
}
if (AreURLsInPageNavigation(existing_entry->GetURL(), params.url,
params.was_within_same_page,
NAVIGATION_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_IN_PAGE;
}
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE;
}
|
NavigationType NavigationControllerImpl::ClassifyNavigation(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params) const {
if (params.page_id == -1) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
}
if (params.page_id > web_contents_->GetMaxPageID()) {
if (PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition))
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE;
if (!GetLastCommittedEntry())
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME;
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared);
int existing_entry_index = GetEntryIndexWithPageID(
web_contents_->GetSiteInstance(),
params.page_id);
if (existing_entry_index == -1) {
NOTREACHED();
LOG(ERROR) << "terminating renderer for bad navigation: " << params.url;
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_NC"));
std::string temp = params.url.spec();
temp.append("#page");
temp.append(base::IntToString(params.page_id));
temp.append("#max");
temp.append(base::IntToString(web_contents_->GetMaxPageID()));
temp.append("#frame");
temp.append(base::IntToString(params.frame_id));
temp.append("#ids");
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(entries_.size()); ++i) {
temp.append(base::IntToString(entries_[i]->GetPageID()));
temp.append("_");
if (entries_[i]->site_instance())
temp.append(base::IntToString(entries_[i]->site_instance()->GetId()));
else
temp.append("N");
if (entries_[i]->site_instance() != web_contents_->GetSiteInstance())
temp.append("x");
temp.append(",");
}
GURL url(temp);
static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost())->Send(
new ViewMsg_TempCrashWithData(url));
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* existing_entry = entries_[existing_entry_index].get();
if (!PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
DCHECK(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME;
}
if (pending_entry_ &&
!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() &&
existing_entry != pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetPageID() == -1 &&
existing_entry == GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE;
}
if (AreURLsInPageNavigation(existing_entry->GetURL(), params.url,
params.was_within_same_page,
NAVIGATION_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_IN_PAGE;
}
return NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5366
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5366/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int udp_v6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct udphdr *uh;
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
__wsum csum = 0;
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = fl6->fl6_sport;
uh->dest = fl6->fl6_dport;
uh->len = htons(len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite)
csum = udplite_csum(skb);
else if (udp_sk(sk)->no_check6_tx) { /* UDP csum disabled */
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto send;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(sk, skb, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr, len);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum(skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
len, fl6->flowi6_proto, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip6_send_skb(skb);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet6_sk(sk)->recverr) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
return err;
}
|
static int udp_v6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct udphdr *uh;
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
__wsum csum = 0;
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = fl6->fl6_sport;
uh->dest = fl6->fl6_dport;
uh->len = htons(len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite)
csum = udplite_csum(skb);
else if (udp_sk(sk)->no_check6_tx) { /* UDP csum disabled */
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto send;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(sk, skb, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr, len);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum(skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
len, fl6->flowi6_proto, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip6_send_skb(skb);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet6_sk(sk)->recverr) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
base::FilePath GetCustomizedWallpaperDefaultRescaledFileName(
const std::string& suffix) {
const base::FilePath default_downloaded_file_name =
ServicesCustomizationDocument::GetCustomizedWallpaperDownloadedFileName();
const base::FilePath default_cache_dir =
ServicesCustomizationDocument::GetCustomizedWallpaperCacheDir();
if (default_downloaded_file_name.empty() || default_cache_dir.empty())
return base::FilePath();
return default_cache_dir.Append(
default_downloaded_file_name.BaseName().value() + suffix);
}
|
base::FilePath GetCustomizedWallpaperDefaultRescaledFileName(
const std::string& suffix) {
const base::FilePath default_downloaded_file_name =
ServicesCustomizationDocument::GetCustomizedWallpaperDownloadedFileName();
const base::FilePath default_cache_dir =
ServicesCustomizationDocument::GetCustomizedWallpaperCacheDir();
if (default_downloaded_file_name.empty() || default_cache_dir.empty())
return base::FilePath();
return default_cache_dir.Append(
default_downloaded_file_name.BaseName().value() + suffix);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6836/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
|
fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
| null |
vmxnet3_get_next_body_rx_descr(VMXNET3State *s,
struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *d,
uint32_t *didx,
uint32_t *ridx)
{
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING, d, didx);
/* Try to find corresponding descriptor in head/body ring */
if (d->gen == vmxnet3_get_rx_ring_gen(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING)) {
/* Only read after generation field verification */
smp_rmb();
/* Re-read to be sure we got the latest version */
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING, d, didx);
if (d->btype == VMXNET3_RXD_BTYPE_BODY) {
vmxnet3_inc_rx_consumption_counter(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING);
*ridx = RX_HEAD_BODY_RING;
return true;
}
}
/*
* If there is no free descriptors on head/body ring or next free
* descriptor is a head descriptor switch to body only ring
*/
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING, d, didx);
/* If no more free descriptors - return */
if (d->gen == vmxnet3_get_rx_ring_gen(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING)) {
/* Only read after generation field verification */
smp_rmb();
/* Re-read to be sure we got the latest version */
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING, d, didx);
assert(d->btype == VMXNET3_RXD_BTYPE_BODY);
*ridx = RX_BODY_ONLY_RING;
vmxnet3_inc_rx_consumption_counter(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
vmxnet3_get_next_body_rx_descr(VMXNET3State *s,
struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *d,
uint32_t *didx,
uint32_t *ridx)
{
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING, d, didx);
/* Try to find corresponding descriptor in head/body ring */
if (d->gen == vmxnet3_get_rx_ring_gen(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING)) {
/* Only read after generation field verification */
smp_rmb();
/* Re-read to be sure we got the latest version */
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING, d, didx);
if (d->btype == VMXNET3_RXD_BTYPE_BODY) {
vmxnet3_inc_rx_consumption_counter(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_HEAD_BODY_RING);
*ridx = RX_HEAD_BODY_RING;
return true;
}
}
/*
* If there is no free descriptors on head/body ring or next free
* descriptor is a head descriptor switch to body only ring
*/
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING, d, didx);
/* If no more free descriptors - return */
if (d->gen == vmxnet3_get_rx_ring_gen(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING)) {
/* Only read after generation field verification */
smp_rmb();
/* Re-read to be sure we got the latest version */
vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING, d, didx);
assert(d->btype == VMXNET3_RXD_BTYPE_BODY);
*ridx = RX_BODY_ONLY_RING;
vmxnet3_inc_rx_consumption_counter(s, RXQ_IDX, RX_BODY_ONLY_RING);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0375/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
|
connection_edge_end_errno(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
uint8_t reason;
tor_assert(conn);
reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(tor_socket_errno(conn->base_.s));
return connection_edge_end(conn, reason);
}
|
connection_edge_end_errno(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
uint8_t reason;
tor_assert(conn);
reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(tor_socket_errno(conn->base_.s));
return connection_edge_end(conn, reason);
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3078/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c?w=1
|
3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c?w=1
|
Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
|
static zval *php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr(zval *object, zval *member, int type, void **cache_slot) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
zval tmp_member;
zval *retval = NULL;
zip_prop_handler *hnd = NULL;
zend_object_handlers *std_hnd;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp_member, member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
cache_slot = NULL;
}
obj = Z_ZIP_P(object);
if (obj->prop_handler != NULL) {
hnd = zend_hash_find_ptr(obj->prop_handler, Z_STR_P(member));
}
if (hnd == NULL) {
std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->get_property_ptr_ptr(object, member, type, cache_slot);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
|
static zval *php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr(zval *object, zval *member, int type, void **cache_slot) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
zval tmp_member;
zval *retval = NULL;
zip_prop_handler *hnd = NULL;
zend_object_handlers *std_hnd;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp_member, member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
cache_slot = NULL;
}
obj = Z_ZIP_P(object);
if (obj->prop_handler != NULL) {
hnd = zend_hash_find_ptr(obj->prop_handler, Z_STR_P(member));
}
if (hnd == NULL) {
std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->get_property_ptr_ptr(object, member, type, cache_slot);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
process_desksave(STREAM s, DESKSAVE_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
int width, height;
if (present & 0x01)
in_uint32_le(s, os->offset);
if (present & 0x02)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->left, delta);
if (present & 0x04)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->top, delta);
if (present & 0x08)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->right, delta);
if (present & 0x10)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->bottom, delta);
if (present & 0x20)
in_uint8(s, os->action);
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_desksave(), l=%d, t=%d, r=%d, b=%d, off=%d, op=%d",
os->left, os->top, os->right, os->bottom, os->offset, os->action);
width = os->right - os->left + 1;
height = os->bottom - os->top + 1;
if (os->action == 0)
ui_desktop_save(os->offset, os->left, os->top, width, height);
else
ui_desktop_restore(os->offset, os->left, os->top, width, height);
}
|
process_desksave(STREAM s, DESKSAVE_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
int width, height;
if (present & 0x01)
in_uint32_le(s, os->offset);
if (present & 0x02)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->left, delta);
if (present & 0x04)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->top, delta);
if (present & 0x08)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->right, delta);
if (present & 0x10)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->bottom, delta);
if (present & 0x20)
in_uint8(s, os->action);
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_desksave(), l=%d, t=%d, r=%d, b=%d, off=%d, op=%d",
os->left, os->top, os->right, os->bottom, os->offset, os->action);
width = os->right - os->left + 1;
height = os->bottom - os->top + 1;
if (os->action == 0)
ui_desktop_save(os->offset, os->left, os->top, width, height);
else
ui_desktop_restore(os->offset, os->left, os->top, width, height);
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool AutolaunchInfoBarDelegate::ShouldExpire(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details) const {
return details.is_navigation_to_different_page() && should_expire_;
}
|
bool AutolaunchInfoBarDelegate::ShouldExpire(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details) const {
return details.is_navigation_to_different_page() && should_expire_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Cluster::GetEntry(
const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0) {
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc)) {
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;) {
if (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track) {
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc) {
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) // audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) // not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
|
Cluster::GetEntry(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const
{
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0)
{
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;)
{
if (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
{
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc)
{
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2018-20855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20855/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
void mlx5_ib_free_bfreg(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_bfreg_info *bfregi, int bfregn)
{
mutex_lock(&bfregi->lock);
bfregi->count[bfregn]--;
mutex_unlock(&bfregi->lock);
}
|
void mlx5_ib_free_bfreg(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_bfreg_info *bfregi, int bfregn)
{
mutex_lock(&bfregi->lock);
bfregi->count[bfregn]--;
mutex_unlock(&bfregi->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2491/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
void *rpc_malloc(struct rpc_task *task, size_t size)
{
struct rpc_buffer *buf;
gfp_t gfp = RPC_IS_SWAPPER(task) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOWAIT;
size += sizeof(struct rpc_buffer);
if (size <= RPC_BUFFER_MAXSIZE)
buf = mempool_alloc(rpc_buffer_mempool, gfp);
else
buf = kmalloc(size, gfp);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
buf->len = size;
dprintk("RPC: %5u allocated buffer of size %zu at %p\n",
task->tk_pid, size, buf);
return &buf->data;
}
|
void *rpc_malloc(struct rpc_task *task, size_t size)
{
struct rpc_buffer *buf;
gfp_t gfp = RPC_IS_SWAPPER(task) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOWAIT;
size += sizeof(struct rpc_buffer);
if (size <= RPC_BUFFER_MAXSIZE)
buf = mempool_alloc(rpc_buffer_mempool, gfp);
else
buf = kmalloc(size, gfp);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
buf->len = size;
dprintk("RPC: %5u allocated buffer of size %zu at %p\n",
task->tk_pid, size, buf);
return &buf->data;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7398
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7398/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/m6w6/ext-http/commit/17137d4ab1ce81a2cee0fae842340a344ef3da83
|
17137d4ab1ce81a2cee0fae842340a344ef3da83
|
fix bug #73055
|
static inline void prepare_key(unsigned flags, char *old_key, size_t old_len, char **new_key, size_t *new_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval zv;
INIT_PZVAL(&zv);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zv, old_key, old_len, 1);
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED) {
prepare_urlencoded(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED) {
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5988) {
prepare_rfc5988(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
prepare_escaped(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
*new_key = Z_STRVAL(zv);
*new_len = Z_STRLEN(zv);
}
|
static inline void prepare_key(unsigned flags, char *old_key, size_t old_len, char **new_key, size_t *new_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval zv;
INIT_PZVAL(&zv);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zv, old_key, old_len, 1);
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED) {
prepare_urlencoded(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED) {
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5988) {
prepare_rfc5988(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
prepare_escaped(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
*new_key = Z_STRVAL(zv);
*new_len = Z_STRLEN(zv);
}
|
C
|
ext-http
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
file_setpos(struct file *file, const fpos_t *pos)
{
if (fsetpos(file->file, pos))
{
perror(file->file_name);
stop(file, READ_ERROR_CODE, "fsetpos");
}
}
|
file_setpos(struct file *file, const fpos_t *pos)
{
if (fsetpos(file->file, pos))
{
perror(file->file_name);
stop(file, READ_ERROR_CODE, "fsetpos");
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
pgp_delete_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
pgp_blob_t *blob;
sc_file_t *file;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* sc_pkcs15init_delete_by_path() sets the path type to SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID */
r = pgp_select_file(card, path, &file);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot select file.");
/* save "current" blob */
blob = priv->current;
/* don't try to delete MF */
if (blob == priv->mf)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
if (card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK &&
(file->id == DO_SIGN_SYM || file->id == DO_ENCR_SYM || file->id == DO_AUTH_SYM)) {
/* These tags are just symbolic. We don't really delete them. */
r = SC_SUCCESS;
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_SIGN_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 1);
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_ENCR_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 2);
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_AUTH_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 3);
}
else {
/* call pgp_put_data() with zero-sized NULL-buffer to zap the DO contents */
r = pgp_put_data(card, file->id, NULL, 0);
}
/* set "current" blob to parent */
priv->current = blob->parent;
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
|
pgp_delete_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
pgp_blob_t *blob;
sc_file_t *file;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* sc_pkcs15init_delete_by_path() sets the path type to SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID */
r = pgp_select_file(card, path, &file);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot select file.");
/* save "current" blob */
blob = priv->current;
/* don't try to delete MF */
if (blob == priv->mf)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
if (card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK &&
(file->id == DO_SIGN_SYM || file->id == DO_ENCR_SYM || file->id == DO_AUTH_SYM)) {
/* These tags are just symbolic. We don't really delete them. */
r = SC_SUCCESS;
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_SIGN_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 1);
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_ENCR_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 2);
}
else if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK && file->id == DO_AUTH_SYM) {
r = gnuk_delete_key(card, 3);
}
else {
/* call pgp_put_data() with zero-sized NULL-buffer to zap the DO contents */
r = pgp_put_data(card, file->id, NULL, 0);
}
/* set "current" blob to parent */
priv->current = blob->parent;
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7509
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7509/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c9b92530a723ac5ef8e352885a1862b18f31b2f5
|
c9b92530a723ac5ef8e352885a1862b18f31b2f5
|
ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, int *err)
{
struct super_block * sb = dir->i_sb;
struct dx_hash_info hinfo;
struct dx_frame frames[2], *frame;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_lblk_t block;
int retval;
if (!(frame = dx_probe(d_name, dir, &hinfo, frames, err)))
return NULL;
do {
block = dx_get_block(frame->at);
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, block, 0, err)))
goto errout;
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
*err = -EIO;
goto errout;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb),
res_dir);
if (retval == 1) { /* Success! */
dx_release(frames);
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
if (retval == -1) {
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto errout;
}
/* Check to see if we should continue to search */
retval = ext4_htree_next_block(dir, hinfo.hash, frame,
frames, NULL);
if (retval < 0) {
ext4_warning(sb,
"error reading index page in directory #%lu",
dir->i_ino);
*err = retval;
goto errout;
}
} while (retval == 1);
*err = -ENOENT;
errout:
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s not found\n", d_name->name));
dx_release (frames);
return NULL;
}
|
static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, int *err)
{
struct super_block * sb = dir->i_sb;
struct dx_hash_info hinfo;
struct dx_frame frames[2], *frame;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_lblk_t block;
int retval;
if (!(frame = dx_probe(d_name, dir, &hinfo, frames, err)))
return NULL;
do {
block = dx_get_block(frame->at);
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, block, 0, err)))
goto errout;
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
*err = -EIO;
goto errout;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb),
res_dir);
if (retval == 1) { /* Success! */
dx_release(frames);
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
if (retval == -1) {
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto errout;
}
/* Check to see if we should continue to search */
retval = ext4_htree_next_block(dir, hinfo.hash, frame,
frames, NULL);
if (retval < 0) {
ext4_warning(sb,
"error reading index page in directory #%lu",
dir->i_ino);
*err = retval;
goto errout;
}
} while (retval == 1);
*err = -ENOENT;
errout:
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s not found\n", d_name->name));
dx_release (frames);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18233
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18233/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=65a8492832b7335ffabd01f5f64d89dec757c260
|
65a8492832b7335ffabd01f5f64d89dec757c260
| null |
ContainerChunk::ContainerChunk( ContainerChunk* parent, RIFF_MetaHandler* handler ) : Chunk( parent, handler, false, chunk_CONTAINER )
{
bool repairMode = ( 0 != ( handler->parent->openFlags & kXMPFiles_OpenRepairFile ));
try
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Uns8 level = handler->level;
this->containerType = XIO::ReadUns32_LE( file );
if ( level == 0 && handler->riffChunks.size() > 0 )
{
XMP_Validate( handler->parent->format == kXMP_AVIFile, "only AVI may have multiple top-level chunks", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
XMP_Validate( this->containerType == kType_AVIX, "all chunks beyond main chunk must be type AVIX", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
}
bool hasSubChunks = ( ( this->id == kChunk_RIFF ) ||
( this->id == kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_INFO ) ||
( this->id == kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_Tdat )
);
XMP_Int64 endOfChunk = this->oldPos + this->oldSize;
if ( (level == 0) && repairMode && (endOfChunk > handler->oldFileSize) )
{
endOfChunk = handler->oldFileSize; // assign actual file size
this->oldSize = endOfChunk - this->oldPos; //reversely calculate correct oldSize
}
XMP_Validate( endOfChunk <= handler->oldFileSize, "offset beyond EoF", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
Chunk* curChild = 0;
if ( hasSubChunks )
{
handler->level++;
while ( file->Offset() < endOfChunk )
{
curChild = RIFF::getChunk( this, handler );
if ( file->Offset() % 2 == 1 )
{
XMP_Uns8 pad;
file->Read ( &pad, 1 ); // Read the pad, tolerate being at EOF.
}
if ( (containerType== kType_INFO || containerType == kType_Tdat)
&& ( curChild->chunkType == chunk_JUNK ) )
{
this->children.pop_back();
delete curChild;
} // for other chunks: join neighouring Junk chunks into one
else if ( (curChild->chunkType == chunk_JUNK) && ( this->children.size() >= 2 ) )
{
Chunk* prevChunk = this->children.at( this->children.size() - 2 );
if ( prevChunk->chunkType == chunk_JUNK )
{
prevChunk->oldSize += curChild->oldSize;
prevChunk->newSize += curChild->newSize;
XMP_Enforce( prevChunk->oldSize == prevChunk->newSize );
this->children.pop_back();
delete curChild;
}
}
}
handler->level--;
XMP_Validate( file->Offset() == endOfChunk, "subchunks exceed outer chunk size", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
if ( level==1 && this->id==kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_INFO )
handler->listInfoChunk = this;
if ( level==1 && this->id==kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_Tdat )
handler->listTdatChunk = this;
}
else // skip non-interest container chunk
{
file->Seek ( (this->oldSize - 8 - 4), kXMP_SeekFromCurrent );
} // if - else
} // try
catch (XMP_Error& e) {
this->release(); // free resources
if ( this->parent != 0)
this->parent->children.pop_back(); // hereby taken care of, so removing myself...
throw e; // re-throw
}
}
|
ContainerChunk::ContainerChunk( ContainerChunk* parent, RIFF_MetaHandler* handler ) : Chunk( parent, handler, false, chunk_CONTAINER )
{
bool repairMode = ( 0 != ( handler->parent->openFlags & kXMPFiles_OpenRepairFile ));
try
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Uns8 level = handler->level;
this->containerType = XIO::ReadUns32_LE( file );
if ( level == 0 && handler->riffChunks.size() > 0 )
{
XMP_Validate( handler->parent->format == kXMP_AVIFile, "only AVI may have multiple top-level chunks", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
XMP_Validate( this->containerType == kType_AVIX, "all chunks beyond main chunk must be type AVIX", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
}
bool hasSubChunks = ( ( this->id == kChunk_RIFF ) ||
( this->id == kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_INFO ) ||
( this->id == kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_Tdat )
);
XMP_Int64 endOfChunk = this->oldPos + this->oldSize;
if ( (level == 0) && repairMode && (endOfChunk > handler->oldFileSize) )
{
endOfChunk = handler->oldFileSize; // assign actual file size
this->oldSize = endOfChunk - this->oldPos; //reversely calculate correct oldSize
}
XMP_Validate( endOfChunk <= handler->oldFileSize, "offset beyond EoF", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
Chunk* curChild = 0;
if ( hasSubChunks )
{
handler->level++;
while ( file->Offset() < endOfChunk )
{
curChild = RIFF::getChunk( this, handler );
if ( file->Offset() % 2 == 1 )
{
XMP_Uns8 pad;
file->Read ( &pad, 1 ); // Read the pad, tolerate being at EOF.
}
if ( (containerType== kType_INFO || containerType == kType_Tdat)
&& ( curChild->chunkType == chunk_JUNK ) )
{
this->children.pop_back();
delete curChild;
} // for other chunks: join neighouring Junk chunks into one
else if ( (curChild->chunkType == chunk_JUNK) && ( this->children.size() >= 2 ) )
{
Chunk* prevChunk = this->children.at( this->children.size() - 2 );
if ( prevChunk->chunkType == chunk_JUNK )
{
prevChunk->oldSize += curChild->oldSize;
prevChunk->newSize += curChild->newSize;
XMP_Enforce( prevChunk->oldSize == prevChunk->newSize );
this->children.pop_back();
delete curChild;
}
}
}
handler->level--;
XMP_Validate( file->Offset() == endOfChunk, "subchunks exceed outer chunk size", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat );
if ( level==1 && this->id==kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_INFO )
handler->listInfoChunk = this;
if ( level==1 && this->id==kChunk_LIST && this->containerType == kType_Tdat )
handler->listTdatChunk = this;
}
else // skip non-interest container chunk
{
file->Seek ( (this->oldSize - 8 - 4), kXMP_SeekFromCurrent );
} // if - else
} // try
catch (XMP_Error& e) {
this->release(); // free resources
if ( this->parent != 0)
this->parent->children.pop_back(); // hereby taken care of, so removing myself...
throw e; // re-throw
}
}
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
unsigned long snmp_fold_field(void __percpu *mib, int offt)
{
unsigned long res = 0;
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
res += snmp_get_cpu_field(mib, i, offt);
return res;
}
|
unsigned long snmp_fold_field(void __percpu *mib, int offt)
{
unsigned long res = 0;
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
res += snmp_get_cpu_field(mib, i, offt);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14463
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14463/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/stephane/libmodbus/commit/5ccdf5ef79d742640355d1132fa9e2abc7fbaefc
|
5ccdf5ef79d742640355d1132fa9e2abc7fbaefc
|
Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
|
int modbus_connect(modbus_t *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return ctx->backend->connect(ctx);
}
|
int modbus_connect(modbus_t *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return ctx->backend->connect(ctx);
}
|
C
|
libmodbus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
void hinf_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_HintInfoBox *hinf = (GF_HintInfoBox *)s;
gf_free(hinf);
}
|
void hinf_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_HintInfoBox *hinf = (GF_HintInfoBox *)s;
gf_free(hinf);
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0890/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9c887a80115ddc5c011380f132fe4b36359caf0
|
e9c887a80115ddc5c011380f132fe4b36359caf0
|
Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::ImageBitmapLoader(ImageBitmapFactories& factory, PassRefPtr<ScriptPromiseResolver> resolver, const IntRect& cropRect)
: m_scriptState(ScriptState::current())
, m_loader(FileReaderLoader::ReadAsArrayBuffer, this)
, m_factory(&factory)
, m_resolver(resolver)
, m_cropRect(cropRect)
{
}
|
ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::ImageBitmapLoader(ImageBitmapFactories& factory, PassRefPtr<ScriptPromiseResolver> resolver, const IntRect& cropRect)
: m_scriptState(ScriptState::current())
, m_loader(FileReaderLoader::ReadAsArrayBuffer, this)
, m_factory(&factory)
, m_resolver(resolver)
, m_cropRect(cropRect)
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5302/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/abrt/libreport/commit/257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
|
static void remove_tabs_from_notebook(GtkNotebook *notebook)
{
gint n_pages = gtk_notebook_get_n_pages(notebook);
int ii;
for (ii = 0; ii < n_pages; ii++)
{
/* removing a page changes the indices, so we always need to remove
* page 0
*/
gtk_notebook_remove_page(notebook, 0); //we need to always the page 0
}
/* Turn off the changed callback during the update */
g_signal_handler_block(g_tv_sensitive_sel, g_tv_sensitive_sel_hndlr);
g_current_highlighted_word = NULL;
GtkTreeIter iter;
gboolean valid = gtk_tree_model_get_iter_first(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter);
while (valid)
{
char *text = NULL;
search_item_t *word = NULL;
gtk_tree_model_get(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter,
SEARCH_COLUMN_TEXT, &text,
SEARCH_COLUMN_ITEM, &word,
-1);
free(text);
free(word);
valid = gtk_tree_model_iter_next(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter);
}
gtk_list_store_clear(g_ls_sensitive_list);
g_signal_handler_unblock(g_tv_sensitive_sel, g_tv_sensitive_sel_hndlr);
}
|
static void remove_tabs_from_notebook(GtkNotebook *notebook)
{
gint n_pages = gtk_notebook_get_n_pages(notebook);
int ii;
for (ii = 0; ii < n_pages; ii++)
{
/* removing a page changes the indices, so we always need to remove
* page 0
*/
gtk_notebook_remove_page(notebook, 0); //we need to always the page 0
}
/* Turn off the changed callback during the update */
g_signal_handler_block(g_tv_sensitive_sel, g_tv_sensitive_sel_hndlr);
g_current_highlighted_word = NULL;
GtkTreeIter iter;
gboolean valid = gtk_tree_model_get_iter_first(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter);
while (valid)
{
char *text = NULL;
search_item_t *word = NULL;
gtk_tree_model_get(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter,
SEARCH_COLUMN_TEXT, &text,
SEARCH_COLUMN_ITEM, &word,
-1);
free(text);
free(word);
valid = gtk_tree_model_iter_next(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_sensitive_list), &iter);
}
gtk_list_store_clear(g_ls_sensitive_list);
g_signal_handler_unblock(g_tv_sensitive_sel, g_tv_sensitive_sel_hndlr);
}
|
C
|
libreport
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6806/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=b7484c224738247b510ed0d268cd577076958f1b
|
b7484c224738247b510ed0d268cd577076958f1b
| null |
ClearToEOS()
{
register int y = curr->w_y, x = curr->w_x;
if (x == 0 && y == 0)
{
ClearScreen();
RestorePosRendition();
return;
}
LClearArea(&curr->w_layer, x, y, cols - 1, rows - 1, CURR_BCE, 1);
MClearArea(curr, x, y, cols - 1, rows - 1, CURR_BCE);
RestorePosRendition();
}
|
ClearToEOS()
{
register int y = curr->w_y, x = curr->w_x;
if (x == 0 && y == 0)
{
ClearScreen();
RestorePosRendition();
return;
}
LClearArea(&curr->w_layer, x, y, cols - 1, rows - 1, CURR_BCE, 1);
MClearArea(curr, x, y, cols - 1, rows - 1, CURR_BCE);
RestorePosRendition();
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::Exit() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Exit"), profile_);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::BootTimesLoader::Get()->AddLogoutTimeMarker("LogoutStarted", false);
const char kLogoutStarted[] = "logout-started";
chromeos::BootTimesLoader::Get()->RecordCurrentStats(kLogoutStarted);
PrefService* state = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (state) {
std::string owner_locale = state->GetString(prefs::kOwnerLocale);
if (!owner_locale.empty() &&
state->GetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale) != owner_locale &&
!state->IsManagedPreference(prefs::kApplicationLocale)) {
state->SetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale, owner_locale);
state->ScheduleSavePersistentPrefs();
}
}
#endif
BrowserList::Exit();
}
|
void Browser::Exit() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Exit"), profile_);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::BootTimesLoader::Get()->AddLogoutTimeMarker("LogoutStarted", false);
const char kLogoutStarted[] = "logout-started";
chromeos::BootTimesLoader::Get()->RecordCurrentStats(kLogoutStarted);
PrefService* state = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (state) {
std::string owner_locale = state->GetString(prefs::kOwnerLocale);
if (!owner_locale.empty() &&
state->GetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale) != owner_locale &&
!state->IsManagedPreference(prefs::kApplicationLocale)) {
state->SetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale, owner_locale);
state->ScheduleSavePersistentPrefs();
}
}
#endif
BrowserList::Exit();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1705
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1705/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
void CompositorImpl::SetNeedsComposite() {
if (!host_->IsVisible())
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("compositor", "Compositor::SetNeedsComposite");
host_->SetNeedsAnimate();
}
|
void CompositorImpl::SetNeedsComposite() {
if (!host_->IsVisible())
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("compositor", "Compositor::SetNeedsComposite");
host_->SetNeedsAnimate();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2304
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2304/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526
|
59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526
|
Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
|
passphrase_free(char *ppbuff)
{
if (ppbuff != NULL) {
memset(ppbuff, 0, PPBUFF_SIZE);
free(ppbuff);
}
}
|
passphrase_free(char *ppbuff)
{
if (ppbuff != NULL) {
memset(ppbuff, 0, PPBUFF_SIZE);
free(ppbuff);
}
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16078/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
[AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
|
void AutofillManager::OnQueryFormFieldAutofillImpl(
int query_id,
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
const gfx::RectF& transformed_box,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion) {
external_delegate_->OnQuery(query_id, form, field, transformed_box);
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions;
SuggestionsContext context;
GetAvailableSuggestions(form, field, &suggestions, &context);
if (context.is_autofill_available) {
switch (context.suppress_reason) {
case SuppressReason::kNotSuppressed:
break;
case SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation:
enable_ablation_logging_ = true;
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion);
return;
case SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff:
return;
}
if (!suggestions.empty()) {
if (context.is_filling_credit_card) {
AutofillMetrics::LogIsQueriedCreditCardFormSecure(
context.is_context_secure);
}
if (!has_logged_address_suggestions_count_) {
AutofillMetrics::LogAddressSuggestionsCount(suggestions.size());
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ = true;
}
}
}
if (suggestions.empty() && !ShouldShowCreditCardSigninPromo(form, field) &&
field.should_autocomplete &&
!(context.focused_field &&
(IsCreditCardExpirationType(
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType()) ||
context.focused_field->Type().html_type() == HTML_TYPE_UNRECOGNIZED ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_VERIFICATION_CODE))) {
autocomplete_history_manager_->OnGetAutocompleteSuggestions(
query_id, field.name, field.value, field.form_control_type);
return;
}
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion,
context.is_all_server_suggestions);
}
|
void AutofillManager::OnQueryFormFieldAutofillImpl(
int query_id,
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
const gfx::RectF& transformed_box,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion) {
external_delegate_->OnQuery(query_id, form, field, transformed_box);
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions;
SuggestionsContext context;
GetAvailableSuggestions(form, field, &suggestions, &context);
if (context.is_autofill_available) {
switch (context.suppress_reason) {
case SuppressReason::kNotSuppressed:
break;
case SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation:
enable_ablation_logging_ = true;
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion);
return;
case SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff:
return;
}
if (!suggestions.empty()) {
if (context.is_filling_credit_card) {
AutofillMetrics::LogIsQueriedCreditCardFormSecure(
context.is_context_secure);
}
if (!has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ &&
!context.section_has_autofilled_field) {
AutofillMetrics::LogAddressSuggestionsCount(suggestions.size());
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ = true;
}
}
}
if (suggestions.empty() && !ShouldShowCreditCardSigninPromo(form, field) &&
field.should_autocomplete &&
!(context.focused_field &&
(IsCreditCardExpirationType(
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType()) ||
context.focused_field->Type().html_type() == HTML_TYPE_UNRECOGNIZED ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_VERIFICATION_CODE))) {
autocomplete_history_manager_->OnGetAutocompleteSuggestions(
query_id, field.name, field.value, field.form_control_type);
return;
}
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion,
context.is_all_server_suggestions);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5158
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5158/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a310d99a741f9ba5e4e537c5ec49d3adbe5876f
|
6a310d99a741f9ba5e4e537c5ec49d3adbe5876f
|
Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
|
void RunCSSTest(const base::FilePath::CharType* file_path) {
base::FilePath test_path = GetTestFilePath("accessibility", "css");
{
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(test_path)) << test_path.LossyDisplayName();
}
base::FilePath css_file = test_path.Append(base::FilePath(file_path));
RunTest(css_file, "accessibility/css");
}
|
void RunCSSTest(const base::FilePath::CharType* file_path) {
base::FilePath test_path = GetTestFilePath("accessibility", "css");
{
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(test_path)) << test_path.LossyDisplayName();
}
base::FilePath css_file = test_path.Append(base::FilePath(file_path));
RunTest(css_file, "accessibility/css");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15391
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15391/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
[Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
GURL ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::GetEffectiveURL(
Profile* profile, const GURL& url) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
if (!registry)
return url;
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetHostedAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return url;
if (extension->from_bookmark())
return url;
return extension->GetResourceURL(url.path());
}
|
GURL ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::GetEffectiveURL(
Profile* profile, const GURL& url) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
if (!registry)
return url;
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetHostedAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return url;
if (extension->from_bookmark())
return url;
return extension->GetResourceURL(url.path());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_do_gray_to_rgb(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row)
{
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = row_info->width;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_gray_to_rgb");
if (row_info->bit_depth >= 8 &&
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
row != NULL && row_info != NULL &&
#endif
!(row_info->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 2;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
else
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 2 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
}
else if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 2 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 2;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
else
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 4 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
}
row_info->channels += (png_byte)2;
row_info->color_type |= PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->channels *
row_info->bit_depth);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
}
|
png_do_gray_to_rgb(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row)
{
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = row_info->width;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_gray_to_rgb");
if (row_info->bit_depth >= 8 &&
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
row != NULL && row_info != NULL &&
#endif
!(row_info->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 2;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
else
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 2 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
}
else if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 2 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 2;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
else
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width * 4 - 1;
png_bytep dp = sp + (png_size_t)row_width * 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *sp;
*(dp--) = *(sp - 1);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
*(dp--) = *(sp--);
}
}
}
row_info->channels += (png_byte)2;
row_info->color_type |= PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->channels *
row_info->bit_depth);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6198/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54d5ca871e72f2bb172ec9323497f01cd5091ec7
|
54d5ca871e72f2bb172ec9323497f01cd5091ec7
|
vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchown, unsigned int, fd, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int error = -EBADF;
if (!f.file)
goto out;
error = mnt_want_write_file(f.file);
if (error)
goto out_fput;
audit_file(f.file);
error = chown_common(&f.file->f_path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write_file(f.file);
out_fput:
fdput(f);
out:
return error;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchown, unsigned int, fd, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int error = -EBADF;
if (!f.file)
goto out;
error = mnt_want_write_file(f.file);
if (error)
goto out_fput;
audit_file(f.file);
error = chown_common(&f.file->f_path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write_file(f.file);
out_fput:
fdput(f);
out:
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnInitiatorTabClosed() {
TabContents* preview_tab =
TabContents::FromWebContents(web_ui()->GetWebContents());
printing::BackgroundPrintingManager* background_printing_manager =
g_browser_process->background_printing_manager();
if (background_printing_manager->HasPrintPreviewTab(preview_tab))
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("cancelPendingPrintRequest");
else
OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
}
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnInitiatorTabClosed() {
TabContents* preview_tab =
TabContents::FromWebContents(web_ui()->GetWebContents());
printing::BackgroundPrintingManager* background_printing_manager =
g_browser_process->background_printing_manager();
if (background_printing_manager->HasPrintPreviewTab(preview_tab))
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("cancelPendingPrintRequest");
else
OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6138
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6138/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0aca6bc05a263ea9eafee515fc6ba14da94c1964
|
0aca6bc05a263ea9eafee515fc6ba14da94c1964
|
[Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
|
ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction WindowsRemoveFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<windows::Remove::Params> params(
windows::Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
Browser* browser = nullptr;
std::string error;
if (!windows_util::GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, params->window_id,
WindowController::kNoWindowFilter,
&browser, &error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (ash::IsWindowTrustedPinned(browser->window()) &&
!ExtensionHasLockedFullscreenPermission(extension())) {
return RespondNow(
Error(keys::kMissingLockWindowFullscreenPrivatePermission));
}
#endif
WindowController* controller = browser->extension_window_controller();
WindowController::Reason reason;
if (!controller->CanClose(&reason)) {
return RespondNow(Error(reason == WindowController::REASON_NOT_EDITABLE
? keys::kTabStripNotEditableError
: kUnknownErrorDoNotUse));
}
controller->window()->Close();
return RespondNow(NoArguments());
}
|
ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction WindowsRemoveFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<windows::Remove::Params> params(
windows::Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
Browser* browser = nullptr;
std::string error;
if (!windows_util::GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, params->window_id,
WindowController::kNoWindowFilter,
&browser, &error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (ash::IsWindowTrustedPinned(browser->window()) &&
!ExtensionHasLockedFullscreenPermission(extension())) {
return RespondNow(
Error(keys::kMissingLockWindowFullscreenPrivatePermission));
}
#endif
WindowController* controller = browser->extension_window_controller();
WindowController::Reason reason;
if (!controller->CanClose(&reason)) {
return RespondNow(Error(reason == WindowController::REASON_NOT_EDITABLE
? keys::kTabStripNotEditableError
: kUnknownErrorDoNotUse));
}
controller->window()->Close();
return RespondNow(NoArguments());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7948
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7948/
|
CWE-787
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXrandr/commit/?id=a0df3e1c7728205e5c7650b2e6dce684139254a6
|
a0df3e1c7728205e5c7650b2e6dce684139254a6
| null |
XRRAllocateMonitor(Display *dpy, int noutput)
{
XRRMonitorInfo *monitor = calloc(1, sizeof (XRRMonitorInfo) + noutput * sizeof (RROutput));
if (!monitor)
return NULL;
monitor->outputs = (RROutput *) (monitor + 1);
monitor->noutput = noutput;
return monitor;
}
|
XRRAllocateMonitor(Display *dpy, int noutput)
{
XRRMonitorInfo *monitor = calloc(1, sizeof (XRRMonitorInfo) + noutput * sizeof (RROutput));
if (!monitor)
return NULL;
monitor->outputs = (RROutput *) (monitor + 1);
monitor->noutput = noutput;
return monitor;
}
|
C
|
libXrandr
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4326
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4326/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde
|
a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde
|
ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udphdr *uh,
int proto)
{
int err;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov = 0;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov = skb->len;
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
err = udplite_checksum_init(skb, uh);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (uh->check == 0) {
/* RFC 2460 section 8.1 says that we SHOULD log
this error. Well, it is reasonable.
*/
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "IPv6: udp checksum is 0\n");
return 1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE &&
!csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, proto, skb->csum))
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
if (!skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
skb->csum = ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, proto, 0));
return 0;
}
|
static inline int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udphdr *uh,
int proto)
{
int err;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov = 0;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov = skb->len;
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
err = udplite_checksum_init(skb, uh);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (uh->check == 0) {
/* RFC 2460 section 8.1 says that we SHOULD log
this error. Well, it is reasonable.
*/
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "IPv6: udp checksum is 0\n");
return 1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE &&
!csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, proto, skb->csum))
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
if (!skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
skb->csum = ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, proto, 0));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
cssp_gss_get_service_name(char *server, gss_name_t * name)
{
gss_buffer_desc output;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
const char service_name[] = "TERMSRV";
gss_OID type = (gss_OID) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
int size = (strlen(service_name) + 1 + strlen(server) + 1);
output.value = malloc(size);
snprintf(output.value, size, "%s@%s", service_name, server);
output.length = strlen(output.value) + 1;
major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &output, type, name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
{
cssp_gss_report_error(GSS_C_GSS_CODE, "Failed to create service principal name",
major_status, minor_status);
return False;
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output);
return True;
}
|
cssp_gss_get_service_name(char *server, gss_name_t * name)
{
gss_buffer_desc output;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
const char service_name[] = "TERMSRV";
gss_OID type = (gss_OID) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
int size = (strlen(service_name) + 1 + strlen(server) + 1);
output.value = malloc(size);
snprintf(output.value, size, "%s@%s", service_name, server);
output.length = strlen(output.value) + 1;
major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &output, type, name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
{
cssp_gss_report_error(GSS_C_GSS_CODE, "Failed to create service principal name",
major_status, minor_status);
return False;
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output);
return True;
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
Move supports-high-dpi flag into registry.
Calls to SetProcessDpiAwareness need to happen immediately when the app starts. Specifically, before user profile settings have been initialized.
This patch moves the --supports-high-dpi into the registry.
BUG=339152, 149881, 160457
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153403003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FinishCopyFromCompositingSurface(const base::Closure& quit_closure,
bool frame_captured) {
++callback_invoke_count_;
if (frame_captured)
++frames_captured_;
if (!quit_closure.is_null())
quit_closure.Run();
}
|
void FinishCopyFromCompositingSurface(const base::Closure& quit_closure,
bool frame_captured) {
++callback_invoke_count_;
if (frame_captured)
++frames_captured_;
if (!quit_closure.is_null())
quit_closure.Run();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2496/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
|
void InputDispatcher::InputState::MotionMemento::setPointers(const MotionEntry* entry) {
pointerCount = entry->pointerCount;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry->pointerCount; i++) {
pointerProperties[i].copyFrom(entry->pointerProperties[i]);
pointerCoords[i].copyFrom(entry->pointerCoords[i]);
}
}
|
void InputDispatcher::InputState::MotionMemento::setPointers(const MotionEntry* entry) {
pointerCount = entry->pointerCount;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry->pointerCount; i++) {
pointerProperties[i].copyFrom(entry->pointerProperties[i]);
pointerCoords[i].copyFrom(entry->pointerCoords[i]);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2451
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2451/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
|
OMX::OMX()
: mMaster(new OMXMaster),
mNodeCounter(0) {
}
|
OMX::OMX()
: mMaster(new OMXMaster),
mNodeCounter(0) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15910/
|
CWE-704
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c3476dde7743761a4e1d39a631716199b696b880
|
c3476dde7743761a4e1d39a631716199b696b880
| null |
gdev_pdf_put_params(gx_device * dev, gs_param_list * plist)
{
int code;
gx_device_pdf *pdev = (gx_device_pdf *) dev;
gs_memory_t *mem = gs_memory_stable(pdev->memory);
gx_device_pdf *save_dev = gs_malloc(mem, sizeof(gx_device_pdf), 1,
"saved gx_device_pdf");
if (!save_dev)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(save_dev, pdev, sizeof(gx_device_pdf));
code = gdev_pdf_put_params_impl(dev, save_dev, plist);
gs_free(mem, save_dev, sizeof(gx_device_pdf), 1, "saved gx_device_pdf");
return code;
}
|
gdev_pdf_put_params(gx_device * dev, gs_param_list * plist)
{
int code;
gx_device_pdf *pdev = (gx_device_pdf *) dev;
gs_memory_t *mem = gs_memory_stable(pdev->memory);
gx_device_pdf *save_dev = gs_malloc(mem, sizeof(gx_device_pdf), 1,
"saved gx_device_pdf");
if (!save_dev)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(save_dev, pdev, sizeof(gx_device_pdf));
code = gdev_pdf_put_params_impl(dev, save_dev, plist);
gs_free(mem, save_dev, sizeof(gx_device_pdf), 1, "saved gx_device_pdf");
return code;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.