CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
FilterRawEvents(const ClientPtr client, const GrabPtr grab, WindowPtr root)
{
XIClientPtr client_xi_version;
int cmp;
/* device not grabbed -> don't filter */
if (!grab)
return FALSE;
client_xi_version =
dixLookupPrivate(&client->devPrivates, XIClientPrivateKey);
cmp = version_compare(client_xi_version->major_version,
client_xi_version->minor_version, 2, 0);
/* XI 2.0: if device is grabbed, skip
XI 2.1: if device is grabbed by us, skip, we've already delivered */
if (cmp == 0)
return TRUE;
return (grab->window != root) ? FALSE : SameClient(grab, client);
}
|
FilterRawEvents(const ClientPtr client, const GrabPtr grab, WindowPtr root)
{
XIClientPtr client_xi_version;
int cmp;
/* device not grabbed -> don't filter */
if (!grab)
return FALSE;
client_xi_version =
dixLookupPrivate(&client->devPrivates, XIClientPrivateKey);
cmp = version_compare(client_xi_version->major_version,
client_xi_version->minor_version, 2, 0);
/* XI 2.0: if device is grabbed, skip
XI 2.1: if device is grabbed by us, skip, we've already delivered */
if (cmp == 0)
return TRUE;
return (grab->window != root) ? FALSE : SameClient(grab, client);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
int idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
if (rq->curr != rq->idle)
return 0;
if (rq->nr_running)
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (!llist_empty(&rq->wake_list))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
|
int idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
if (rq->curr != rq->idle)
return 0;
if (rq->nr_running)
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (!llist_empty(&rq->wake_list))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3913/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
|
status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::getDuration(int *msec)
{
ALOGV("getDuration");
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p == 0) return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
status_t ret = p->getDuration(msec);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) {
ALOGV("[%d] getDuration = %d", mConnId, *msec);
} else {
ALOGE("getDuration returned %d", ret);
}
return ret;
}
|
status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::getDuration(int *msec)
{
ALOGV("getDuration");
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p == 0) return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
status_t ret = p->getDuration(msec);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) {
ALOGV("[%d] getDuration = %d", mConnId, *msec);
} else {
ALOGE("getDuration returned %d", ret);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
_nextA(int visited)
{
HmarkerList *hl = Currentbuf->hmarklist;
BufferPoint *po;
Anchor *an, *pan;
int i, x, y, n = searchKeyNum();
ParsedURL url;
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
if (!hl || hl->nmark == 0)
return;
an = retrieveCurrentAnchor(Currentbuf);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveCurrentForm(Currentbuf);
y = Currentbuf->currentLine->linenumber;
x = Currentbuf->pos;
if (visited == TRUE) {
n = hl->nmark;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pan = an;
if (an && an->hseq >= 0) {
int hseq = an->hseq + 1;
do {
if (hseq >= hl->nmark) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
goto _end;
}
po = &hl->marks[hseq];
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->href, po->line, po->pos);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->formitem, po->line,
po->pos);
hseq++;
if (visited == TRUE && an) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
} while (an == NULL || an == pan);
}
else {
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->href, NULL, x, y);
if (visited != TRUE)
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->formitem, an, x, y);
if (an == NULL) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
break;
}
x = an->start.pos;
y = an->start.line;
if (visited == TRUE) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
}
}
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
_end:
if (an == NULL || an->hseq < 0)
return;
po = &hl->marks[an->hseq];
gotoLine(Currentbuf, po->line);
Currentbuf->pos = po->pos;
arrangeCursor(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
|
_nextA(int visited)
{
HmarkerList *hl = Currentbuf->hmarklist;
BufferPoint *po;
Anchor *an, *pan;
int i, x, y, n = searchKeyNum();
ParsedURL url;
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
if (!hl || hl->nmark == 0)
return;
an = retrieveCurrentAnchor(Currentbuf);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveCurrentForm(Currentbuf);
y = Currentbuf->currentLine->linenumber;
x = Currentbuf->pos;
if (visited == TRUE) {
n = hl->nmark;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pan = an;
if (an && an->hseq >= 0) {
int hseq = an->hseq + 1;
do {
if (hseq >= hl->nmark) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
goto _end;
}
po = &hl->marks[hseq];
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->href, po->line, po->pos);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->formitem, po->line,
po->pos);
hseq++;
if (visited == TRUE && an) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
} while (an == NULL || an == pan);
}
else {
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->href, NULL, x, y);
if (visited != TRUE)
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->formitem, an, x, y);
if (an == NULL) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
break;
}
x = an->start.pos;
y = an->start.line;
if (visited == TRUE) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
}
}
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
_end:
if (an == NULL || an->hseq < 0)
return;
po = &hl->marks[an->hseq];
gotoLine(Currentbuf, po->line);
Currentbuf->pos = po->pos;
arrangeCursor(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17407/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/TeX-Live/texlive-source/commit/6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
static void t1_subset_ascii_part(PDF pdf)
{
int j, *p;
char *glyph, **gg, **glyph_names;
struct avl_table *gl_tree;
struct avl_traverser t;
void **aa;
t1_getline();
while (!t1_prefix("/Encoding")) {
t1_scan_param(pdf);
t1_putline(pdf);
t1_getline();
}
glyph_names = t1_builtin_enc();
fd_cur->builtin_glyph_names = glyph_names;
if (is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
if (fd_cur->tx_tree != NULL) {
/*tex Take over collected non-reencoded characters from \TeX. */
avl_t_init(&t, fd_cur->tx_tree);
for (p = (int *) avl_t_first(&t, fd_cur->tx_tree); p != NULL;
p = (int *) avl_t_next(&t)) {
if ((char *) avl_find(fd_cur->gl_tree, glyph_names[*p]) == NULL) {
glyph = xstrdup(glyph_names[*p]);
aa = avl_probe(fd_cur->gl_tree, glyph);
assert(aa != NULL);
}
}
}
make_subset_tag(fd_cur);
strncpy((char *) pdf->fb->data + t1_fontname_offset, fd_cur->subset_tag,6);
}
/*tex Now really all glyphs needed from this font are in the |fd_cur->gl_tree|. */
if (t1_encoding == ENC_STANDARD)
t1_puts(pdf, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def\n");
else {
t1_puts(pdf,"/Encoding 256 array\n0 1 255 {1 index exch /.notdef put} for\n");
gl_tree = create_t1_glyph_tree(glyph_names);
avl_t_init(&t, fd_cur->gl_tree);
j = 0;
for (glyph = (char *) avl_t_first(&t, fd_cur->gl_tree); glyph != NULL;
glyph = (char *) avl_t_next(&t)) {
if ((gg = (char **) avl_find(gl_tree, &glyph)) != NULL) {
t1_printf(pdf, "dup %i /%s put\n", (int) (gg - glyph_names),*gg);
j++;
}
}
destroy_t1_glyph_tree(gl_tree);
if (j == 0) {
/*tex
We didn't mark anything for the Encoding array. We add |{dup 0
/.notdef put}| for compatibility with Acrobat 5.0.
*/
t1_puts(pdf, "dup 0 /.notdef put\n");
}
t1_puts(pdf, "readonly def\n");
}
do {
t1_getline();
t1_scan_param(pdf);
if (!t1_prefix("/UniqueID")) {
/*tex Ignore |/UniqueID| for subsetted fonts. */
t1_putline(pdf);
}
}
while (t1_in_eexec == 0);
}
|
static void t1_subset_ascii_part(PDF pdf)
{
int j, *p;
char *glyph, **gg, **glyph_names;
struct avl_table *gl_tree;
struct avl_traverser t;
void **aa;
t1_getline();
while (!t1_prefix("/Encoding")) {
t1_scan_param(pdf);
t1_putline(pdf);
t1_getline();
}
glyph_names = t1_builtin_enc();
fd_cur->builtin_glyph_names = glyph_names;
if (is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
if (fd_cur->tx_tree != NULL) {
/*tex Take over collected non-reencoded characters from \TeX. */
avl_t_init(&t, fd_cur->tx_tree);
for (p = (int *) avl_t_first(&t, fd_cur->tx_tree); p != NULL;
p = (int *) avl_t_next(&t)) {
if ((char *) avl_find(fd_cur->gl_tree, glyph_names[*p]) == NULL) {
glyph = xstrdup(glyph_names[*p]);
aa = avl_probe(fd_cur->gl_tree, glyph);
assert(aa != NULL);
}
}
}
make_subset_tag(fd_cur);
strncpy((char *) pdf->fb->data + t1_fontname_offset, fd_cur->subset_tag,6);
}
/*tex Now really all glyphs needed from this font are in the |fd_cur->gl_tree|. */
if (t1_encoding == ENC_STANDARD)
t1_puts(pdf, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def\n");
else {
t1_puts(pdf,"/Encoding 256 array\n0 1 255 {1 index exch /.notdef put} for\n");
gl_tree = create_t1_glyph_tree(glyph_names);
avl_t_init(&t, fd_cur->gl_tree);
j = 0;
for (glyph = (char *) avl_t_first(&t, fd_cur->gl_tree); glyph != NULL;
glyph = (char *) avl_t_next(&t)) {
if ((gg = (char **) avl_find(gl_tree, &glyph)) != NULL) {
t1_printf(pdf, "dup %i /%s put\n", (int) (gg - glyph_names),*gg);
j++;
}
}
destroy_t1_glyph_tree(gl_tree);
if (j == 0) {
/*tex
We didn't mark anything for the Encoding array. We add |{dup 0
/.notdef put}| for compatibility with Acrobat 5.0.
*/
t1_puts(pdf, "dup 0 /.notdef put\n");
}
t1_puts(pdf, "readonly def\n");
}
do {
t1_getline();
t1_scan_param(pdf);
if (!t1_prefix("/UniqueID")) {
/*tex Ignore |/UniqueID| for subsetted fonts. */
t1_putline(pdf);
}
}
while (t1_in_eexec == 0);
}
|
C
|
texlive-source
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(struct packet_sock *po,
int blk_size_in_bytes)
{
struct net_device *dev;
unsigned int mbits = 0, msec = 0, div = 0, tmo = 0;
struct ethtool_cmd ecmd;
int err;
u32 speed;
rtnl_lock();
dev = __dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), po->ifindex);
if (unlikely(!dev)) {
rtnl_unlock();
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
}
err = __ethtool_get_settings(dev, &ecmd);
speed = ethtool_cmd_speed(&ecmd);
rtnl_unlock();
if (!err) {
/*
* If the link speed is so slow you don't really
* need to worry about perf anyways
*/
if (speed < SPEED_1000 || speed == SPEED_UNKNOWN) {
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
} else {
msec = 1;
div = speed / 1000;
}
}
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
if (div)
mbits /= div;
tmo = mbits * msec;
if (div)
return tmo+1;
return tmo;
}
|
static int prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(struct packet_sock *po,
int blk_size_in_bytes)
{
struct net_device *dev;
unsigned int mbits = 0, msec = 0, div = 0, tmo = 0;
struct ethtool_cmd ecmd;
int err;
u32 speed;
rtnl_lock();
dev = __dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), po->ifindex);
if (unlikely(!dev)) {
rtnl_unlock();
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
}
err = __ethtool_get_settings(dev, &ecmd);
speed = ethtool_cmd_speed(&ecmd);
rtnl_unlock();
if (!err) {
/*
* If the link speed is so slow you don't really
* need to worry about perf anyways
*/
if (speed < SPEED_1000 || speed == SPEED_UNKNOWN) {
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
} else {
msec = 1;
div = speed / 1000;
}
}
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
if (div)
mbits /= div;
tmo = mbits * msec;
if (div)
return tmo+1;
return tmo;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1174/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/commit/?id=5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
|
5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
| null |
int load_env_file(
const char *fname,
char ***rl) {
FILE *f;
char **m = NULL;
int r;
assert(fname);
assert(rl);
if (!(f = fopen(fname, "re")))
return -errno;
while (!feof(f)) {
char l[LINE_MAX], *p, *u;
char **t;
if (!fgets(l, sizeof(l), f)) {
if (feof(f))
break;
r = -errno;
goto finish;
}
p = strstrip(l);
if (!*p)
continue;
if (strchr(COMMENTS, *p))
continue;
if (!(u = normalize_env_assignment(p))) {
log_error("Out of memory");
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
t = strv_append(m, u);
free(u);
if (!t) {
log_error("Out of memory");
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
strv_free(m);
m = t;
}
r = 0;
*rl = m;
m = NULL;
finish:
if (f)
fclose(f);
strv_free(m);
return r;
}
|
int load_env_file(
const char *fname,
char ***rl) {
FILE *f;
char **m = NULL;
int r;
assert(fname);
assert(rl);
if (!(f = fopen(fname, "re")))
return -errno;
while (!feof(f)) {
char l[LINE_MAX], *p, *u;
char **t;
if (!fgets(l, sizeof(l), f)) {
if (feof(f))
break;
r = -errno;
goto finish;
}
p = strstrip(l);
if (!*p)
continue;
if (strchr(COMMENTS, *p))
continue;
if (!(u = normalize_env_assignment(p))) {
log_error("Out of memory");
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
t = strv_append(m, u);
free(u);
if (!t) {
log_error("Out of memory");
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
strv_free(m);
m = t;
}
r = 0;
*rl = m;
m = NULL;
finish:
if (f)
fclose(f);
strv_free(m);
return r;
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6178/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fbeba958bb83c05ec8cc54e285a4a9ca10d1b311
|
fbeba958bb83c05ec8cc54e285a4a9ca10d1b311
|
Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
|
bool GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::Cancel() {
base::WeakPtr<GlobalConfirmInfoBar> info_bar = global_info_bar_;
if (info_bar) {
info_bar->OnInfoBarRemoved(info_bar_, false);
info_bar->delegate_->Cancel();
}
if (info_bar)
info_bar->Close();
return true;
}
|
bool GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::Cancel() {
base::WeakPtr<GlobalConfirmInfoBar> info_bar = global_info_bar_;
if (info_bar) {
info_bar->OnInfoBarRemoved(info_bar_, false);
info_bar->delegate_->Cancel();
}
if (info_bar)
info_bar->Close();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void Run(bool dialog_was_suppressed,
bool success,
const base::string16& user_input) {
if (callback_.is_null())
return;
std::move(callback_).Run(dialog_was_suppressed, success, user_input);
}
|
void Run(bool dialog_was_suppressed,
bool success,
const base::string16& user_input) {
if (callback_.is_null())
return;
std::move(callback_).Run(dialog_was_suppressed, success, user_input);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3913/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
|
ssize_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::write(const void* buffer, size_t size, bool blocking)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(mCallback != NULL, "Don't call write if supplying a callback.");
if (mTrack != 0) {
return mTrack->write(buffer, size, blocking);
}
return NO_INIT;
}
|
ssize_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::write(const void* buffer, size_t size, bool blocking)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(mCallback != NULL, "Don't call write if supplying a callback.");
if (mTrack != 0) {
return mTrack->write(buffer, size, blocking);
}
return NO_INIT;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
bool Document::parseQualifiedName(const AtomicString& qualifiedName, AtomicString& prefix, AtomicString& localName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
unsigned length = qualifiedName.length();
if (!length) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidCharacterError, "The qualified name provided is empty.");
return false;
}
ParseQualifiedNameResult returnValue;
if (qualifiedName.is8Bit())
returnValue = parseQualifiedNameInternal(qualifiedName, qualifiedName.characters8(), length, prefix, localName);
else
returnValue = parseQualifiedNameInternal(qualifiedName, qualifiedName.characters16(), length, prefix, localName);
if (returnValue.status == QNValid)
return true;
StringBuilder message;
message.append("The qualified name provided ('");
message.append(qualifiedName);
message.append("') ");
if (returnValue.status == QNMultipleColons) {
message.append("contains multiple colons.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidStartChar) {
message.append("contains the invalid name-start character '");
message.append(returnValue.character);
message.append("'.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidChar) {
message.append("contains the invalid character '");
message.append(returnValue.character);
message.append("'.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNEmptyPrefix) {
message.append("has an empty namespace prefix.");
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(returnValue.status, QNEmptyLocalName);
message.append("has an empty local name.");
}
if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidStartChar || returnValue.status == QNInvalidChar)
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidCharacterError, message.toString());
else
exceptionState.throwDOMException(NamespaceError, message.toString());
return false;
}
|
bool Document::parseQualifiedName(const AtomicString& qualifiedName, AtomicString& prefix, AtomicString& localName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
unsigned length = qualifiedName.length();
if (!length) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidCharacterError, "The qualified name provided is empty.");
return false;
}
ParseQualifiedNameResult returnValue;
if (qualifiedName.is8Bit())
returnValue = parseQualifiedNameInternal(qualifiedName, qualifiedName.characters8(), length, prefix, localName);
else
returnValue = parseQualifiedNameInternal(qualifiedName, qualifiedName.characters16(), length, prefix, localName);
if (returnValue.status == QNValid)
return true;
StringBuilder message;
message.append("The qualified name provided ('");
message.append(qualifiedName);
message.append("') ");
if (returnValue.status == QNMultipleColons) {
message.append("contains multiple colons.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidStartChar) {
message.append("contains the invalid name-start character '");
message.append(returnValue.character);
message.append("'.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidChar) {
message.append("contains the invalid character '");
message.append(returnValue.character);
message.append("'.");
} else if (returnValue.status == QNEmptyPrefix) {
message.append("has an empty namespace prefix.");
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(returnValue.status, QNEmptyLocalName);
message.append("has an empty local name.");
}
if (returnValue.status == QNInvalidStartChar || returnValue.status == QNInvalidChar)
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidCharacterError, message.toString());
else
exceptionState.throwDOMException(NamespaceError, message.toString());
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8788
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8788/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/d1112c279bd1a327e8e4d0b5f371458bf2579659
|
d1112c279bd1a327e8e4d0b5f371458bf2579659
|
Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
static BOOL nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
if (!context)
return FALSE;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
if (tempHeight == 0)
return FALSE;
if (tempWidth > context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength / tempHeight)
return FALSE;
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
BYTE* co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
BYTE* cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
const INT8* co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
const INT8* co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
const INT8* cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
const INT8* cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
|
static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
BYTE* co_dst;
BYTE* cg_dst;
INT8* co_src0;
INT8* co_src1;
INT8* cg_src0;
INT8* cg_src1;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 1 |
CVE-2017-9527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9527/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/5c114c91d4ff31859fcd84cf8bf349b737b90d99
|
5c114c91d4ff31859fcd84cf8bf349b737b90d99
|
Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
|
mrb_realloc(mrb_state *mrb, void *p, size_t len)
{
void *p2;
p2 = mrb_realloc_simple(mrb, p, len);
if (!p2 && len) {
if (mrb->gc.out_of_memory) {
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->nomem_err));
/* mrb_panic(mrb); */
}
else {
mrb->gc.out_of_memory = TRUE;
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->nomem_err));
}
}
else {
mrb->gc.out_of_memory = FALSE;
}
return p2;
}
|
mrb_realloc(mrb_state *mrb, void *p, size_t len)
{
void *p2;
p2 = mrb_realloc_simple(mrb, p, len);
if (!p2 && len) {
if (mrb->gc.out_of_memory) {
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->nomem_err));
/* mrb_panic(mrb); */
}
else {
mrb->gc.out_of_memory = TRUE;
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->nomem_err));
}
}
else {
mrb->gc.out_of_memory = FALSE;
}
return p2;
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::DidMatchCSS(
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& newly_matching_selectors,
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& stopped_matching_selectors) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidMatchCSS(newly_matching_selectors, stopped_matching_selectors);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::DidMatchCSS(
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& newly_matching_selectors,
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& stopped_matching_selectors) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidMatchCSS(newly_matching_selectors, stopped_matching_selectors);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2177/
|
CWE-190
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
|
a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
| null |
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->timeout);
}
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->timeout);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long addr,
void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
const struct read_write_emulator_ops *ops)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
gpa_t gpa;
int rc;
if (ops->read_write_prepare &&
ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes))
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 0;
/* Crossing a page boundary? */
if (((addr + bytes - 1) ^ addr) & PAGE_MASK) {
int now;
now = -addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, now, exception,
vcpu, ops);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
addr += now;
val += now;
bytes -= now;
}
rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, bytes, exception,
vcpu, ops);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (!vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments)
return rc;
gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment = 0;
vcpu->run->mmio.len = min(8u, vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len);
vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write = ops->write;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
return ops->read_write_exit_mmio(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
}
|
int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long addr,
void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
const struct read_write_emulator_ops *ops)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
gpa_t gpa;
int rc;
if (ops->read_write_prepare &&
ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes))
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 0;
/* Crossing a page boundary? */
if (((addr + bytes - 1) ^ addr) & PAGE_MASK) {
int now;
now = -addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, now, exception,
vcpu, ops);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
addr += now;
val += now;
bytes -= now;
}
rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, bytes, exception,
vcpu, ops);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (!vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments)
return rc;
gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment = 0;
vcpu->run->mmio.len = min(8u, vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len);
vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write = ops->write;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
return ops->read_write_exit_mmio(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
void* Type_CrdInfo_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsMLUdup((cmsMLU*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
void* Type_CrdInfo_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsMLUdup((cmsMLU*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2584
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2584/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/129a72a0d3c8e139a04512325384fe5ac119e74d
|
129a72a0d3c8e139a04512325384fe5ac119e74d
|
KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip, cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
struct desc_struct new_desc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_RET,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
/* Error handling is not implemented. */
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
return rc;
}
|
static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip, cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
struct desc_struct new_desc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_RET,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
/* Error handling is not implemented. */
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11222/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da
|
f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da
|
fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
|
char gf_prompt_get_char() {
return 0;
}
|
char gf_prompt_get_char() {
return 0;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2060/
| null |
https://github.com/kr/beanstalkd/commit/2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
|
fmt_stats_tube(char *buf, size_t size, tube t)
{
uint64_t time_left;
if (t->pause > 0) {
time_left = (t->deadline_at - now_usec()) / 1000000;
} else {
time_left = 0;
}
return snprintf(buf, size, STATS_TUBE_FMT,
t->name,
t->stat.urgent_ct,
t->ready.used,
t->stat.reserved_ct,
t->delay.used,
t->stat.buried_ct,
t->stat.total_jobs_ct,
t->using_ct,
t->watching_ct,
t->stat.waiting_ct,
t->stat.pause_ct,
t->pause / 1000000,
time_left);
}
|
fmt_stats_tube(char *buf, size_t size, tube t)
{
uint64_t time_left;
if (t->pause > 0) {
time_left = (t->deadline_at - now_usec()) / 1000000;
} else {
time_left = 0;
}
return snprintf(buf, size, STATS_TUBE_FMT,
t->name,
t->stat.urgent_ct,
t->ready.used,
t->stat.reserved_ct,
t->delay.used,
t->stat.buried_ct,
t->stat.total_jobs_ct,
t->using_ct,
t->watching_ct,
t->stat.waiting_ct,
t->stat.pause_ct,
t->pause / 1000000,
time_left);
}
|
C
|
beanstalkd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5125
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5125/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
|
void PushMessagingServiceImpl::SetContentSettingChangedCallbackForTesting(
const base::Closure& callback) {
content_setting_changed_callback_for_testing_ = callback;
}
|
void PushMessagingServiceImpl::SetContentSettingChangedCallbackForTesting(
const base::Closure& callback) {
content_setting_changed_callback_for_testing_ = callback;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2789/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FollowRedirect(PP_CompletionCallback callback) {
int32_t rv = ValidateCallback(callback);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return rv;
WebURL redirect_url = GURL(response_info_->redirect_url());
loader_->setDefersLoading(false); // Allow the redirect to continue.
RegisterCallback(callback);
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
|
int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FollowRedirect(PP_CompletionCallback callback) {
int32_t rv = ValidateCallback(callback);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return rv;
WebURL redirect_url = GURL(response_info_->redirect_url());
loader_->setDefersLoading(false); // Allow the redirect to continue.
RegisterCallback(callback);
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18241
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
void destroy_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool free)
{
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
if (fcc && fcc->f2fs_issue_flush) {
struct task_struct *flush_thread = fcc->f2fs_issue_flush;
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = NULL;
kthread_stop(flush_thread);
}
if (free) {
kfree(fcc);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = NULL;
}
}
|
void destroy_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool free)
{
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
if (fcc && fcc->f2fs_issue_flush) {
struct task_struct *flush_thread = fcc->f2fs_issue_flush;
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = NULL;
kthread_stop(flush_thread);
}
if (free) {
kfree(fcc);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3132
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3132/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/28a6ed9f9a36b9c517e4a8a429baf4dd382fc5d5?w=1
|
28a6ed9f9a36b9c517e4a8a429baf4dd382fc5d5?w=1
|
Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
|
SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetGet)
{
zval *zindex;
zend_long index;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &zindex) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
return;
}
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
if (element != NULL) {
zval *value = &element->data;
ZVAL_DEREF(value);
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, value);
} else {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet(mixed index, mixed newval)
|
SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetGet)
{
zval *zindex;
zend_long index;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &zindex) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
return;
}
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
if (element != NULL) {
zval *value = &element->data;
ZVAL_DEREF(value);
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, value);
} else {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet(mixed index, mixed newval)
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3899
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3899/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
|
void OMXCodec::setRawAudioFormat(
OMX_U32 portIndex, int32_t sampleRate, int32_t numChannels) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM;
CHECK_EQ(mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition,
&def, sizeof(def)), (status_t)OK);
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE pcmParams;
InitOMXParams(&pcmParams);
pcmParams.nPortIndex = portIndex;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm, &pcmParams, sizeof(pcmParams));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
pcmParams.nChannels = numChannels;
pcmParams.eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams.bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams.nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams.nSamplingRate = sampleRate;
pcmParams.ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
CHECK_EQ(getOMXChannelMapping(
numChannels, pcmParams.eChannelMapping), (status_t)OK);
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm, &pcmParams, sizeof(pcmParams));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
}
|
void OMXCodec::setRawAudioFormat(
OMX_U32 portIndex, int32_t sampleRate, int32_t numChannels) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM;
CHECK_EQ(mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition,
&def, sizeof(def)), (status_t)OK);
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE pcmParams;
InitOMXParams(&pcmParams);
pcmParams.nPortIndex = portIndex;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm, &pcmParams, sizeof(pcmParams));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
pcmParams.nChannels = numChannels;
pcmParams.eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams.bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams.nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams.nSamplingRate = sampleRate;
pcmParams.ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
CHECK_EQ(getOMXChannelMapping(
numChannels, pcmParams.eChannelMapping), (status_t)OK);
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm, &pcmParams, sizeof(pcmParams));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static int dbpageOpen(sqlite3_vtab *pVTab, sqlite3_vtab_cursor **ppCursor){
DbpageCursor *pCsr;
pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)sqlite3_malloc64(sizeof(DbpageCursor));
if( pCsr==0 ){
return SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
}else{
memset(pCsr, 0, sizeof(DbpageCursor));
pCsr->base.pVtab = pVTab;
pCsr->pgno = -1;
}
*ppCursor = (sqlite3_vtab_cursor *)pCsr;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
|
static int dbpageOpen(sqlite3_vtab *pVTab, sqlite3_vtab_cursor **ppCursor){
DbpageCursor *pCsr;
pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)sqlite3_malloc64(sizeof(DbpageCursor));
if( pCsr==0 ){
return SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
}else{
memset(pCsr, 0, sizeof(DbpageCursor));
pCsr->base.pVtab = pVTab;
pCsr->pgno = -1;
}
*ppCursor = (sqlite3_vtab_cursor *)pCsr;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
void LocalFrame::CreateView(const IntSize& viewport_size,
const Color& background_color) {
DCHECK(this);
DCHECK(GetPage());
bool is_local_root = this->IsLocalRoot();
if (is_local_root && View())
View()->SetParentVisible(false);
SetView(nullptr);
LocalFrameView* frame_view = nullptr;
if (is_local_root) {
frame_view = LocalFrameView::Create(*this, viewport_size);
frame_view->SetLayoutSizeFixedToFrameSize(false);
} else {
frame_view = LocalFrameView::Create(*this);
}
SetView(frame_view);
frame_view->UpdateBaseBackgroundColorRecursively(background_color);
if (is_local_root)
frame_view->SetParentVisible(true);
if (OwnerLayoutObject()) {
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = DeprecatedLocalOwner();
DCHECK(owner);
if (owner->ContentFrame() == this)
owner->SetEmbeddedContentView(frame_view);
}
if (Owner())
View()->SetCanHaveScrollbars(Owner()->ScrollingMode() !=
kScrollbarAlwaysOff);
}
|
void LocalFrame::CreateView(const IntSize& viewport_size,
const Color& background_color) {
DCHECK(this);
DCHECK(GetPage());
bool is_local_root = this->IsLocalRoot();
if (is_local_root && View())
View()->SetParentVisible(false);
SetView(nullptr);
LocalFrameView* frame_view = nullptr;
if (is_local_root) {
frame_view = LocalFrameView::Create(*this, viewport_size);
frame_view->SetLayoutSizeFixedToFrameSize(false);
} else {
frame_view = LocalFrameView::Create(*this);
}
SetView(frame_view);
frame_view->UpdateBaseBackgroundColorRecursively(background_color);
if (is_local_root)
frame_view->SetParentVisible(true);
if (OwnerLayoutObject()) {
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = DeprecatedLocalOwner();
DCHECK(owner);
if (owner->ContentFrame() == this)
owner->SetEmbeddedContentView(frame_view);
}
if (Owner())
View()->SetCanHaveScrollbars(Owner()->ScrollingMode() !=
kScrollbarAlwaysOff);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2870/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e741149a6b7872a2bf1f2b6cc0a56e836592fb77
|
e741149a6b7872a2bf1f2b6cc0a56e836592fb77
|
Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xsltSystemPropertyFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlChar *prefix, *name;
const xmlChar *nsURI = NULL;
if (nargs != 1) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : expects one string arg\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_STRING)) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : invalid arg expecting a string\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
if (obj->stringval == NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString((const xmlChar *)""));
} else {
name = xmlSplitQName2(obj->stringval, &prefix);
if (name == NULL) {
name = xmlStrdup(obj->stringval);
} else {
nsURI = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, prefix);
if (nsURI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : prefix %s is not bound\n", prefix);
}
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsURI, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
#ifdef DOCBOOK_XSL_HACK
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor")) {
xsltStylesheetPtr sheet;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if ((tctxt != NULL) && (tctxt->inst != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->inst->name, BAD_CAST "variable")) &&
(tctxt->inst->parent != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->inst->parent->name,
BAD_CAST "template")))
sheet = tctxt->style;
else
sheet = NULL;
if ((sheet != NULL) && (sheet->doc != NULL) &&
(sheet->doc->URL != NULL) &&
(xmlStrstr(sheet->doc->URL,
(const xmlChar *)"chunk") != NULL)) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)"libxslt (SAXON 6.2 compatible)"));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VENDOR));
}
} else
#else
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VENDOR));
} else
#endif
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"version")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VERSION));
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor-url")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_URL));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString((const xmlChar *)""));
}
}
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (prefix != NULL)
xmlFree(prefix);
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
}
|
xsltSystemPropertyFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlChar *prefix, *name;
const xmlChar *nsURI = NULL;
if (nargs != 1) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : expects one string arg\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_STRING)) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : invalid arg expecting a string\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
if (obj->stringval == NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString((const xmlChar *)""));
} else {
name = xmlSplitQName2(obj->stringval, &prefix);
if (name == NULL) {
name = xmlStrdup(obj->stringval);
} else {
nsURI = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, prefix);
if (nsURI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"system-property() : prefix %s is not bound\n", prefix);
}
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsURI, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
#ifdef DOCBOOK_XSL_HACK
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor")) {
xsltStylesheetPtr sheet;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if ((tctxt != NULL) && (tctxt->inst != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->inst->name, BAD_CAST "variable")) &&
(tctxt->inst->parent != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->inst->parent->name,
BAD_CAST "template")))
sheet = tctxt->style;
else
sheet = NULL;
if ((sheet != NULL) && (sheet->doc != NULL) &&
(sheet->doc->URL != NULL) &&
(xmlStrstr(sheet->doc->URL,
(const xmlChar *)"chunk") != NULL)) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)"libxslt (SAXON 6.2 compatible)"));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VENDOR));
}
} else
#else
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VENDOR));
} else
#endif
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"version")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_VERSION));
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"vendor-url")) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(
(const xmlChar *)XSLT_DEFAULT_URL));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString((const xmlChar *)""));
}
}
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (prefix != NULL)
xmlFree(prefix);
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
int ftrace_graph_entry_stub(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
{
return 0;
}
|
int ftrace_graph_entry_stub(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::NotifyScreenInfoChanged() {
SynchronizeVisualProperties();
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->IsWidgetForMainFrame(this))
return;
if (auto* touch_emulator = GetExistingTouchEmulator())
touch_emulator->SetDeviceScaleFactor(GetScaleFactorForView(view_.get()));
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::NotifyScreenInfoChanged() {
SynchronizeVisualProperties();
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->IsWidgetForMainFrame(this))
return;
if (auto* touch_emulator = GetExistingTouchEmulator())
touch_emulator->SetDeviceScaleFactor(GetScaleFactorForView(view_.get()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
InitializeTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const FilePath& profile_path,
bool is_incognito)
: DatabaseTaskBase(manager),
profile_path_(profile_path),
is_incognito_(is_incognito),
need_initialize_origins_(false),
temporary_storage_quota_(-1) {
}
|
InitializeTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const FilePath& profile_path,
bool is_incognito)
: DatabaseTaskBase(manager),
profile_path_(profile_path),
is_incognito_(is_incognito),
need_initialize_origins_(false),
temporary_storage_quota_(-1) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18201
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18201/
|
CWE-415
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/libcdio.git/commit/?id=f6f9c48fb40b8a1e8218799724b0b61a7161eb1d
|
f6f9c48fb40b8a1e8218799724b0b61a7161eb1d
| null |
cdio_is_device_generic(const char *source_name)
{
struct stat buf;
if (0 != stat(source_name, &buf)) {
cdio_warn ("Can't get file status for %s:\n%s", source_name,
strerror(errno));
return false;
}
return (S_ISBLK(buf.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(buf.st_mode));
}
|
cdio_is_device_generic(const char *source_name)
{
struct stat buf;
if (0 != stat(source_name, &buf)) {
cdio_warn ("Can't get file status for %s:\n%s", source_name,
strerror(errno));
return false;
}
return (S_ISBLK(buf.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(buf.st_mode));
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2672
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2672/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static void ath_buf_set_rate(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_buf *bf,
struct ath_tx_info *info, int len, bool rts)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info;
struct ieee80211_tx_rate *rates;
const struct ieee80211_rate *rate;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct ath_frame_info *fi = get_frame_info(bf->bf_mpdu);
u32 rts_thresh = sc->hw->wiphy->rts_threshold;
int i;
u8 rix = 0;
skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
rates = bf->rates;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
/* set dur_update_en for l-sig computation except for PS-Poll frames */
info->dur_update = !ieee80211_is_pspoll(hdr->frame_control);
info->rtscts_rate = fi->rtscts_rate;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bf->rates); i++) {
bool is_40, is_sgi, is_sp;
int phy;
if (!rates[i].count || (rates[i].idx < 0))
continue;
rix = rates[i].idx;
info->rates[i].Tries = rates[i].count;
/*
* Handle RTS threshold for unaggregated HT frames.
*/
if (bf_isampdu(bf) && !bf_isaggr(bf) &&
(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS) &&
unlikely(rts_thresh != (u32) -1)) {
if (!rts_thresh || (len > rts_thresh))
rts = true;
}
if (rts || rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_RTS_CTS) {
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_RTS_CTS;
info->flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA;
} else if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_CTS_PROTECT) {
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_RTS_CTS;
info->flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA;
}
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_40_MHZ_WIDTH)
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_2040;
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_SHORT_GI)
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_HALFGI;
is_sgi = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_SHORT_GI);
is_40 = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_40_MHZ_WIDTH);
is_sp = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_SHORT_PREAMBLE);
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS) {
/* MCS rates */
info->rates[i].Rate = rix | 0x80;
info->rates[i].ChSel = ath_txchainmask_reduction(sc,
ah->txchainmask, info->rates[i].Rate);
info->rates[i].PktDuration = ath_pkt_duration(sc, rix, len,
is_40, is_sgi, is_sp);
if (rix < 8 && (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_STBC))
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_STBC;
continue;
}
/* legacy rates */
rate = &sc->sbands[tx_info->band].bitrates[rates[i].idx];
if ((tx_info->band == IEEE80211_BAND_2GHZ) &&
!(rate->flags & IEEE80211_RATE_ERP_G))
phy = WLAN_RC_PHY_CCK;
else
phy = WLAN_RC_PHY_OFDM;
info->rates[i].Rate = rate->hw_value;
if (rate->hw_value_short) {
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_SHORT_PREAMBLE)
info->rates[i].Rate |= rate->hw_value_short;
} else {
is_sp = false;
}
if (bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd)
info->rates[i].ChSel = ah->txchainmask;
else
info->rates[i].ChSel = ath_txchainmask_reduction(sc,
ah->txchainmask, info->rates[i].Rate);
info->rates[i].PktDuration = ath9k_hw_computetxtime(sc->sc_ah,
phy, rate->bitrate * 100, len, rix, is_sp);
}
/* For AR5416 - RTS cannot be followed by a frame larger than 8K */
if (bf_isaggr(bf) && (len > sc->sc_ah->caps.rts_aggr_limit))
info->flags &= ~ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA;
/* ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA and ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA are mutually exclusive. */
if (info->flags & ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA)
info->flags &= ~ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA;
}
|
static void ath_buf_set_rate(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_buf *bf,
struct ath_tx_info *info, int len, bool rts)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info;
struct ieee80211_tx_rate *rates;
const struct ieee80211_rate *rate;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct ath_frame_info *fi = get_frame_info(bf->bf_mpdu);
u32 rts_thresh = sc->hw->wiphy->rts_threshold;
int i;
u8 rix = 0;
skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
rates = bf->rates;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
/* set dur_update_en for l-sig computation except for PS-Poll frames */
info->dur_update = !ieee80211_is_pspoll(hdr->frame_control);
info->rtscts_rate = fi->rtscts_rate;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bf->rates); i++) {
bool is_40, is_sgi, is_sp;
int phy;
if (!rates[i].count || (rates[i].idx < 0))
continue;
rix = rates[i].idx;
info->rates[i].Tries = rates[i].count;
/*
* Handle RTS threshold for unaggregated HT frames.
*/
if (bf_isampdu(bf) && !bf_isaggr(bf) &&
(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS) &&
unlikely(rts_thresh != (u32) -1)) {
if (!rts_thresh || (len > rts_thresh))
rts = true;
}
if (rts || rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_RTS_CTS) {
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_RTS_CTS;
info->flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA;
} else if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_CTS_PROTECT) {
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_RTS_CTS;
info->flags |= ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA;
}
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_40_MHZ_WIDTH)
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_2040;
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_SHORT_GI)
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_HALFGI;
is_sgi = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_SHORT_GI);
is_40 = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_40_MHZ_WIDTH);
is_sp = !!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_SHORT_PREAMBLE);
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS) {
/* MCS rates */
info->rates[i].Rate = rix | 0x80;
info->rates[i].ChSel = ath_txchainmask_reduction(sc,
ah->txchainmask, info->rates[i].Rate);
info->rates[i].PktDuration = ath_pkt_duration(sc, rix, len,
is_40, is_sgi, is_sp);
if (rix < 8 && (tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_STBC))
info->rates[i].RateFlags |= ATH9K_RATESERIES_STBC;
continue;
}
/* legacy rates */
rate = &sc->sbands[tx_info->band].bitrates[rates[i].idx];
if ((tx_info->band == IEEE80211_BAND_2GHZ) &&
!(rate->flags & IEEE80211_RATE_ERP_G))
phy = WLAN_RC_PHY_CCK;
else
phy = WLAN_RC_PHY_OFDM;
info->rates[i].Rate = rate->hw_value;
if (rate->hw_value_short) {
if (rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_USE_SHORT_PREAMBLE)
info->rates[i].Rate |= rate->hw_value_short;
} else {
is_sp = false;
}
if (bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd)
info->rates[i].ChSel = ah->txchainmask;
else
info->rates[i].ChSel = ath_txchainmask_reduction(sc,
ah->txchainmask, info->rates[i].Rate);
info->rates[i].PktDuration = ath9k_hw_computetxtime(sc->sc_ah,
phy, rate->bitrate * 100, len, rix, is_sp);
}
/* For AR5416 - RTS cannot be followed by a frame larger than 8K */
if (bf_isaggr(bf) && (len > sc->sc_ah->caps.rts_aggr_limit))
info->flags &= ~ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA;
/* ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA and ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA are mutually exclusive. */
if (info->flags & ATH9K_TXDESC_RTSENA)
info->flags &= ~ATH9K_TXDESC_CTSENA;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
ofport_remove_with_name(struct ofproto *ofproto, const char *name)
{
struct ofport *port = shash_find_data(&ofproto->port_by_name, name);
if (port) {
ofport_remove(port);
}
}
|
ofport_remove_with_name(struct ofproto *ofproto, const char *name)
{
struct ofport *port = shash_find_data(&ofproto->port_by_name, name);
if (port) {
ofport_remove(port);
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1295/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::HasSelection() {
return IsModifiable() && source_frame()->hasSelection();
}
|
bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::HasSelection() {
return IsModifiable() && source_frame()->hasSelection();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2858/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnURLRequestDestroyed(net::URLRequest* request) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnURLRequestDestroyed(
profile_, request);
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->OnURLRequestDestroyed(*request);
}
|
void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnURLRequestDestroyed(net::URLRequest* request) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnURLRequestDestroyed(
profile_, request);
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->OnURLRequestDestroyed(*request);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3890/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/014b01706cc64dc9c2ad94a96f62e07c058d0b5d
|
014b01706cc64dc9c2ad94a96f62e07c058d0b5d
|
adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
|
static int local_socket_enqueue(asocket* s, apacket* p) {
D("LS(%d): enqueue %d", s->id, p->len);
p->ptr = p->data;
/* if there is already data queue'd, we will receive
** events when it's time to write. just add this to
** the tail
*/
if (s->pkt_first) {
goto enqueue;
}
/* write as much as we can, until we
** would block or there is an error/eof
*/
while (p->len > 0) {
int r = adb_write(s->fd, p->ptr, p->len);
if (r > 0) {
p->len -= r;
p->ptr += r;
continue;
}
if ((r == 0) || (errno != EAGAIN)) {
D("LS(%d): not ready, errno=%d: %s", s->id, errno, strerror(errno));
put_apacket(p);
s->has_write_error = true;
s->close(s);
return 1; /* not ready (error) */
} else {
break;
}
}
if (p->len == 0) {
put_apacket(p);
return 0; /* ready for more data */
}
enqueue:
p->next = 0;
if (s->pkt_first) {
s->pkt_last->next = p;
} else {
s->pkt_first = p;
}
s->pkt_last = p;
/* make sure we are notified when we can drain the queue */
fdevent_add(&s->fde, FDE_WRITE);
return 1; /* not ready (backlog) */
}
|
static int local_socket_enqueue(asocket* s, apacket* p) {
D("LS(%d): enqueue %d", s->id, p->len);
p->ptr = p->data;
/* if there is already data queue'd, we will receive
** events when it's time to write. just add this to
** the tail
*/
if (s->pkt_first) {
goto enqueue;
}
/* write as much as we can, until we
** would block or there is an error/eof
*/
while (p->len > 0) {
int r = adb_write(s->fd, p->ptr, p->len);
if (r > 0) {
p->len -= r;
p->ptr += r;
continue;
}
if ((r == 0) || (errno != EAGAIN)) {
D("LS(%d): not ready, errno=%d: %s", s->id, errno, strerror(errno));
put_apacket(p);
s->has_write_error = true;
s->close(s);
return 1; /* not ready (error) */
} else {
break;
}
}
if (p->len == 0) {
put_apacket(p);
return 0; /* ready for more data */
}
enqueue:
p->next = 0;
if (s->pkt_first) {
s->pkt_last->next = p;
} else {
s->pkt_first = p;
}
s->pkt_last = p;
/* make sure we are notified when we can drain the queue */
fdevent_add(&s->fde, FDE_WRITE);
return 1; /* not ready (backlog) */
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15165/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/a5a36d9e82dde7265e38fe1f87b7f11c461c29f6
|
a5a36d9e82dde7265e38fe1f87b7f11c461c29f6
|
Fix some format warnings.
|
read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated pcapng dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
|
read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated pcapng dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
|
C
|
libpcap
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1237/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
|
static int nfsaclsvc_release_attrstat(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
return 1;
}
|
static int nfsaclsvc_release_attrstat(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AdjustForComponentTransform(
const std::vector<size_t>& original_offsets,
size_t original_component_begin,
size_t original_component_end,
const std::vector<size_t>& transformed_offsets,
size_t output_component_begin,
std::vector<size_t>* offsets_for_adjustment) {
if (!offsets_for_adjustment)
return;
DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, original_component_begin);
DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, original_component_end);
DCHECK_NE(string16::npos, output_component_begin);
size_t offsets_size = offsets_for_adjustment->size();
DCHECK_EQ(offsets_size, original_offsets.size());
DCHECK_EQ(offsets_size, transformed_offsets.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < offsets_size; ++i) {
size_t original_offset = original_offsets[i];
if ((original_offset >= original_component_begin) &&
(original_offset < original_component_end)) {
size_t transformed_offset = transformed_offsets[i];
(*offsets_for_adjustment)[i] = (transformed_offset == string16::npos) ?
string16::npos : (output_component_begin + transformed_offset);
}
}
}
|
void AdjustForComponentTransform(
const std::vector<size_t>& original_offsets,
size_t original_component_begin,
size_t original_component_end,
const std::vector<size_t>& transformed_offsets,
size_t output_component_begin,
std::vector<size_t>* offsets_for_adjustment) {
if (!offsets_for_adjustment)
return;
DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, original_component_begin);
DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, original_component_end);
DCHECK_NE(string16::npos, output_component_begin);
size_t offsets_size = offsets_for_adjustment->size();
DCHECK_EQ(offsets_size, original_offsets.size());
DCHECK_EQ(offsets_size, transformed_offsets.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < offsets_size; ++i) {
size_t original_offset = original_offsets[i];
if ((original_offset >= original_component_begin) &&
(original_offset < original_component_end)) {
size_t transformed_offset = transformed_offsets[i];
(*offsets_for_adjustment)[i] = (transformed_offset == string16::npos) ?
string16::npos : (output_component_begin + transformed_offset);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2861/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/508b89a64ab700aa09f21fc666a5588b47360eab
|
508b89a64ab700aa09f21fc666a5588b47360eab
|
Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::NativeWindow AppListControllerDelegateWin::GetAppListWindow() {
return AppListController::GetInstance()->GetAppListWindow();
}
|
gfx::NativeWindow AppListControllerDelegateWin::GetAppListWindow() {
return AppListController::GetInstance()->GetAppListWindow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void rawsock_exit(void)
{
nfc_proto_unregister(&rawsock_nfc_proto);
}
|
void rawsock_exit(void)
{
nfc_proto_unregister(&rawsock_nfc_proto);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661}
|
base::DictionaryValue* ParseDistributionPreferences(
const std::string& json_data) {
JSONStringValueDeserializer json(json_data);
std::string error;
scoped_ptr<base::Value> root(json.Deserialize(NULL, &error));
if (!root.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse master prefs file: " << error;
return NULL;
}
if (!root->IsType(base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse master prefs file: "
<< "Root item must be a dictionary.";
return NULL;
}
return static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(root.release());
}
|
base::DictionaryValue* ParseDistributionPreferences(
const std::string& json_data) {
JSONStringValueDeserializer json(json_data);
std::string error;
scoped_ptr<base::Value> root(json.Deserialize(NULL, &error));
if (!root.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse master prefs file: " << error;
return NULL;
}
if (!root->IsType(base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse master prefs file: "
<< "Root item must be a dictionary.";
return NULL;
}
return static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(root.release());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8070
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8070/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478
|
2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478
|
catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void catc_rx_done(struct urb *urb)
{
struct catc *catc = urb->context;
u8 *pkt_start = urb->transfer_buffer;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int pkt_len, pkt_offset = 0;
int status = urb->status;
if (!catc->is_f5u011) {
clear_bit(RX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
pkt_offset = 2;
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "rx_done, status %d, length %d\n",
status, urb->actual_length);
return;
}
do {
if(!catc->is_f5u011) {
pkt_len = le16_to_cpup((__le16*)pkt_start);
if (pkt_len > urb->actual_length) {
catc->netdev->stats.rx_length_errors++;
catc->netdev->stats.rx_errors++;
break;
}
} else {
pkt_len = urb->actual_length;
}
if (!(skb = dev_alloc_skb(pkt_len)))
return;
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, pkt_start + pkt_offset, pkt_len);
skb_put(skb, pkt_len);
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, catc->netdev);
netif_rx(skb);
catc->netdev->stats.rx_packets++;
catc->netdev->stats.rx_bytes += pkt_len;
/* F5U011 only does one packet per RX */
if (catc->is_f5u011)
break;
pkt_start += (((pkt_len + 1) >> 6) + 1) << 6;
} while (pkt_start - (u8 *) urb->transfer_buffer < urb->actual_length);
if (catc->is_f5u011) {
if (atomic_read(&catc->recq_sz)) {
int state;
atomic_dec(&catc->recq_sz);
netdev_dbg(catc->netdev, "getting extra packet\n");
urb->dev = catc->usbdev;
if ((state = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC)) < 0) {
netdev_dbg(catc->netdev,
"submit(rx_urb) status %d\n", state);
}
} else {
clear_bit(RX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
}
}
}
|
static void catc_rx_done(struct urb *urb)
{
struct catc *catc = urb->context;
u8 *pkt_start = urb->transfer_buffer;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int pkt_len, pkt_offset = 0;
int status = urb->status;
if (!catc->is_f5u011) {
clear_bit(RX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
pkt_offset = 2;
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "rx_done, status %d, length %d\n",
status, urb->actual_length);
return;
}
do {
if(!catc->is_f5u011) {
pkt_len = le16_to_cpup((__le16*)pkt_start);
if (pkt_len > urb->actual_length) {
catc->netdev->stats.rx_length_errors++;
catc->netdev->stats.rx_errors++;
break;
}
} else {
pkt_len = urb->actual_length;
}
if (!(skb = dev_alloc_skb(pkt_len)))
return;
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, pkt_start + pkt_offset, pkt_len);
skb_put(skb, pkt_len);
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, catc->netdev);
netif_rx(skb);
catc->netdev->stats.rx_packets++;
catc->netdev->stats.rx_bytes += pkt_len;
/* F5U011 only does one packet per RX */
if (catc->is_f5u011)
break;
pkt_start += (((pkt_len + 1) >> 6) + 1) << 6;
} while (pkt_start - (u8 *) urb->transfer_buffer < urb->actual_length);
if (catc->is_f5u011) {
if (atomic_read(&catc->recq_sz)) {
int state;
atomic_dec(&catc->recq_sz);
netdev_dbg(catc->netdev, "getting extra packet\n");
urb->dev = catc->usbdev;
if ((state = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC)) < 0) {
netdev_dbg(catc->netdev,
"submit(rx_urb) status %d\n", state);
}
} else {
clear_bit(RX_RUNNING, &catc->flags);
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2508/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
if (!buf) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
if (!buf) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5759
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5759/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5405341d5cc268a0b2ff0678bd78ddda0892e7ea
|
5405341d5cc268a0b2ff0678bd78ddda0892e7ea
|
Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
blink::WebAutofillClient* autofill_client = frame_->AutofillClient();
if (has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ &&
rect == rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ && autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
return;
}
if (!frame_->LocalRoot()
->FrameWidget()
->ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoView()) {
return;
}
rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ = rect;
has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ = true;
if (!GetRenderWidget()->layer_tree_view()->HasPendingPageScaleAnimation() &&
autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
blink::WebAutofillClient* autofill_client = frame_->AutofillClient();
if (has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ &&
rect == rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ && autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
return;
}
if (!frame_->LocalRoot()
->FrameWidget()
->ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoView()) {
return;
}
rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ = rect;
has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ = true;
if (!GetRenderWidget()->layer_tree_view()->HasPendingPageScaleAnimation() &&
autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7448
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7448/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/yarolig/didiwiki/commit/5e5c796617e1712905dc5462b94bd5e6c08d15ea
|
5e5c796617e1712905dc5462b94bd5e6c08d15ea
|
page_name_is_good function
|
wiki_show_header(HttpResponse *res, char *page_title, int want_edit)
{
http_response_printf(res,
"<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd\">\n"
"<html xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>\n"
"<head>\n"
"<meta http-equiv='Content-Type' content='text/html; charset=utf-8' />\n"
"<link rel='SHORTCUT ICON' href='favicon.ico' />\n"
"<link media='all' href='styles.css' rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' />\n"
"<title>%s</title>\n"
"</head>\n"
"<body>\n", page_title
);
http_response_printf(res, PAGEHEADER, page_title,
(want_edit) ? " ( <a href='?edit' title='Edit this wiki page contents. [alt-j]' accesskey='j'>Edit</a> ) " : "" );
}
|
wiki_show_header(HttpResponse *res, char *page_title, int want_edit)
{
http_response_printf(res,
"<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd\">\n"
"<html xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>\n"
"<head>\n"
"<meta http-equiv='Content-Type' content='text/html; charset=utf-8' />\n"
"<link rel='SHORTCUT ICON' href='favicon.ico' />\n"
"<link media='all' href='styles.css' rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' />\n"
"<title>%s</title>\n"
"</head>\n"
"<body>\n", page_title
);
http_response_printf(res, PAGEHEADER, page_title,
(want_edit) ? " ( <a href='?edit' title='Edit this wiki page contents. [alt-j]' accesskey='j'>Edit</a> ) " : "" );
}
|
C
|
didiwiki
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14360
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14360/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/6296f7153f0c9d5e5cd3aaf08f9731e56621bdd3
|
6296f7153f0c9d5e5cd3aaf08f9731e56621bdd3
|
Set length modifiers for group and desc
nntp_add_group parses a line controlled by the connected nntp server.
Restrict the maximum lengths read into the stack buffers group, and
desc.
|
int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING] = "";
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
/* These sscanf limits must match the sizes of the group and desc arrays */
if (sscanf(line, "%1023s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %8191[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
{
mutt_debug(4, "Cannot parse server line: %s\n", line);
return 0;
}
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
|
int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING];
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
if (sscanf(line, "%s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
return 0;
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3140/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5a07975ad0a36708c6b0a5b9fea1ff811d0b0c1f
|
5a07975ad0a36708c6b0a5b9fea1ff811d0b0c1f
|
USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int digi_startup_device(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
int i, ret = 0;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv = usb_get_serial_data(serial);
struct usb_serial_port *port;
/* be sure this happens exactly once */
spin_lock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
if (serial_priv->ds_device_started) {
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
return 0;
}
serial_priv->ds_device_started = 1;
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
/* start reading from each bulk in endpoint for the device */
/* set USB_DISABLE_SPD flag for write bulk urbs */
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1; i++) {
port = serial->port[i];
ret = usb_submit_urb(port->read_urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret != 0) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s: usb_submit_urb failed, ret=%d, port=%d\n",
__func__, ret, i);
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
|
static int digi_startup_device(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
int i, ret = 0;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv = usb_get_serial_data(serial);
struct usb_serial_port *port;
/* be sure this happens exactly once */
spin_lock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
if (serial_priv->ds_device_started) {
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
return 0;
}
serial_priv->ds_device_started = 1;
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
/* start reading from each bulk in endpoint for the device */
/* set USB_DISABLE_SPD flag for write bulk urbs */
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1; i++) {
port = serial->port[i];
ret = usb_submit_urb(port->read_urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret != 0) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s: usb_submit_urb failed, ret=%d, port=%d\n",
__func__, ret, i);
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
render_frame_host, url, transition_type));
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
render_frame_host->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->NavigationSucceeded();
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
render_frame_host, url, transition_type));
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
render_frame_host->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->NavigationSucceeded();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a
|
aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a
|
POSIX: make sure that we never pass directory descriptors into the sandbox.
BUG=43304
http://codereview.chromium.org/2733011/show
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@49446 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SendRendererReply(const std::vector<int>& fds, const Pickle& reply,
int reply_fd) {
struct msghdr msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
struct iovec iov = {const_cast<void*>(reply.data()), reply.size()};
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
char control_buffer[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
if (reply_fd != -1) {
struct stat st;
if (fstat(reply_fd, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
LOG(FATAL) << "Tried to send a directory descriptor over sandbox IPC";
// We must never send directory descriptors to a sandboxed process
// because they can use openat with ".." elements in the path in order
// to escape the sandbox and reach the real filesystem.
}
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
msg.msg_control = control_buffer;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buffer);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &reply_fd, sizeof(reply_fd));
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
}
if (HANDLE_EINTR(sendmsg(fds[0], &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT)) < 0)
PLOG(ERROR) << "sendmsg";
}
|
void SendRendererReply(const std::vector<int>& fds, const Pickle& reply,
int reply_fd) {
struct msghdr msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
struct iovec iov = {const_cast<void*>(reply.data()), reply.size()};
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
char control_buffer[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
if (reply_fd != -1) {
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
msg.msg_control = control_buffer;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buffer);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &reply_fd, sizeof(reply_fd));
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
}
if (HANDLE_EINTR(sendmsg(fds[0], &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT)) < 0)
PLOG(ERROR) << "sendmsg";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5768
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5768/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62?w=1
|
5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62?w=1
|
Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
int php_mb_regex_set_default_mbctype(const char *encname TSRMLS_DC)
{
OnigEncoding mbctype = _php_mb_regex_name2mbctype(encname);
if (mbctype == ONIG_ENCODING_UNDEF) {
return FAILURE;
}
MBREX(default_mbctype) = mbctype;
return SUCCESS;
}
|
int php_mb_regex_set_default_mbctype(const char *encname TSRMLS_DC)
{
OnigEncoding mbctype = _php_mb_regex_name2mbctype(encname);
if (mbctype == ONIG_ENCODING_UNDEF) {
return FAILURE;
}
MBREX(default_mbctype) = mbctype;
return SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20068/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
|
void Restart() {
DCHECK(IsLoaderInterceptionEnabled());
if (!default_loader_used_ ||
(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!IsURLHandledByDefaultLoader(resource_request_->url))) {
url_loader_.reset();
}
interceptor_index_ = 0;
received_response_ = false;
MaybeStartLoader(nullptr /* interceptor */,
{} /* single_request_handler */);
}
|
void Restart() {
DCHECK(IsLoaderInterceptionEnabled());
if (!default_loader_used_ ||
(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!IsURLHandledByDefaultLoader(resource_request_->url))) {
url_loader_.reset();
}
interceptor_index_ = 0;
received_response_ = false;
MaybeStartLoader(nullptr /* interceptor */,
{} /* single_request_handler */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1536
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1536/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
|
static jobject Bitmap_creator(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jintArray jColors,
jint offset, jint stride, jint width, jint height,
jint configHandle, jboolean isMutable) {
SkColorType colorType = GraphicsJNI::legacyBitmapConfigToColorType(configHandle);
if (NULL != jColors) {
size_t n = env->GetArrayLength(jColors);
if (n < SkAbs32(stride) * (size_t)height) {
doThrowAIOOBE(env);
return NULL;
}
}
if (colorType == kARGB_4444_SkColorType) {
colorType = kN32_SkColorType;
}
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.setInfo(SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, colorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType));
jbyteArray buff = GraphicsJNI::allocateJavaPixelRef(env, &bitmap, NULL);
if (NULL == buff) {
return NULL;
}
if (jColors != NULL) {
GraphicsJNI::SetPixels(env, jColors, offset, stride,
0, 0, width, height, bitmap);
}
return GraphicsJNI::createBitmap(env, new SkBitmap(bitmap), buff,
getPremulBitmapCreateFlags(isMutable), NULL, NULL);
}
|
static jobject Bitmap_creator(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jintArray jColors,
jint offset, jint stride, jint width, jint height,
jint configHandle, jboolean isMutable) {
SkColorType colorType = GraphicsJNI::legacyBitmapConfigToColorType(configHandle);
if (NULL != jColors) {
size_t n = env->GetArrayLength(jColors);
if (n < SkAbs32(stride) * (size_t)height) {
doThrowAIOOBE(env);
return NULL;
}
}
if (colorType == kARGB_4444_SkColorType) {
colorType = kN32_SkColorType;
}
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.setInfo(SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, colorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType));
jbyteArray buff = GraphicsJNI::allocateJavaPixelRef(env, &bitmap, NULL);
if (NULL == buff) {
return NULL;
}
if (jColors != NULL) {
GraphicsJNI::SetPixels(env, jColors, offset, stride,
0, 0, width, height, bitmap);
}
return GraphicsJNI::createBitmap(env, new SkBitmap(bitmap), buff,
getPremulBitmapCreateFlags(isMutable), NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QtBuiltinBundlePage::didClearWindowForFrame(WKBundleFrameRef frame, WKBundleScriptWorldRef world)
{
if (!WKBundleFrameIsMainFrame(frame) || WKBundleScriptWorldNormalWorld() != world)
return;
JSGlobalContextRef context = WKBundleFrameGetJavaScriptContextForWorld(frame, world);
registerNavigatorQtObject(context);
}
|
void QtBuiltinBundlePage::didClearWindowForFrame(WKBundleFrameRef frame, WKBundleScriptWorldRef world)
{
if (!WKBundleFrameIsMainFrame(frame) || WKBundleScriptWorldNormalWorld() != world)
return;
JSGlobalContextRef context = WKBundleFrameGetJavaScriptContextForWorld(frame, world);
registerNavigatorQtObject(context);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::Copy() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_Copy(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::Copy() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_Copy(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1640/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
int ExtensionInstallDialogView::GetDefaultDialogButton() const {
return ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_CANCEL;
}
|
int ExtensionInstallDialogView::GetDefaultDialogButton() const {
return ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_CANCEL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateNigoriEncryptionState(
Cryptographer* cryptographer,
WriteNode* nigori_node) {
DCHECK(nigori_node);
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori = nigori_node->GetNigoriSpecifics();
if (cryptographer->is_ready() &&
nigori_overwrite_count_ < kNigoriOverwriteLimit) {
sync_pb::EncryptedData original_keys = nigori.encrypted();
if (!cryptographer->GetKeys(nigori.mutable_encrypted()))
NOTREACHED();
if (nigori.encrypted().SerializeAsString() !=
original_keys.SerializeAsString()) {
nigori_overwrite_count_++;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Sync.AutoNigoriOverwrites",
nigori_overwrite_count_);
}
}
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(&nigori);
nigori_node->SetNigoriSpecifics(nigori);
}
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateNigoriEncryptionState(
Cryptographer* cryptographer,
WriteNode* nigori_node) {
DCHECK(nigori_node);
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori = nigori_node->GetNigoriSpecifics();
if (cryptographer->is_ready() &&
nigori_overwrite_count_ < kNigoriOverwriteLimit) {
sync_pb::EncryptedData original_keys = nigori.encrypted();
if (!cryptographer->GetKeys(nigori.mutable_encrypted()))
NOTREACHED();
if (nigori.encrypted().SerializeAsString() !=
original_keys.SerializeAsString()) {
nigori_overwrite_count_++;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Sync.AutoNigoriOverwrites",
nigori_overwrite_count_);
}
}
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(&nigori);
nigori_node->SetNigoriSpecifics(nigori);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14734
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14734/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_bind_ip cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr))
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_bind_ip cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr))
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct kvm_segment seg;
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
else if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
else
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, vmcs12->host_rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, vmcs12->host_rip);
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
/*
* Note that calling vmx_set_cr0 is important, even if cr0 hasn't
* actually changed, because it depends on the current state of
* fpu_active (which may have changed).
* Note that vmx_set_cr0 refers to efer set above.
*/
kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0);
/*
* If we did fpu_activate()/fpu_deactivate() during L2's run, we need
* to apply the same changes to L1's vmcs. We just set cr0 correctly,
* but we also need to update cr0_guest_host_mask and exception_bitmap.
*/
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = (vcpu->fpu_active ? X86_CR0_TS : 0);
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
/*
* Note that CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK is already set in the original vmcs01
* (KVM doesn't change it)- no reason to call set_cr4_guest_host_mask();
*/
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if (enable_vpid) {
/*
* Trivially support vpid by letting L2s share their parent
* L1's vpid. TODO: move to a more elaborate solution, giving
* each L2 its own vpid and exposing the vpid feature to L1.
*/
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_idtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_gdtr_base);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->host_ia32_pat);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl);
/* Set L1 segment info according to Intel SDM
27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers */
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.selector = vmcs12->host_cs_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.g = 1
};
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
seg.l = 1;
else
seg.db = 1;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_CS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.type = 3,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.db = 1,
.g = 1
};
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ds_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_DS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_es_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_ES);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ss_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_SS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_fs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_fs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_FS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_gs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_gs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_GS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = vmcs12->host_tr_base,
.limit = 0x67,
.selector = vmcs12->host_tr_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1
};
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_TR);
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, 0x400);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
}
|
static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct kvm_segment seg;
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
else if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
else
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, vmcs12->host_rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, vmcs12->host_rip);
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
/*
* Note that calling vmx_set_cr0 is important, even if cr0 hasn't
* actually changed, because it depends on the current state of
* fpu_active (which may have changed).
* Note that vmx_set_cr0 refers to efer set above.
*/
kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0);
/*
* If we did fpu_activate()/fpu_deactivate() during L2's run, we need
* to apply the same changes to L1's vmcs. We just set cr0 correctly,
* but we also need to update cr0_guest_host_mask and exception_bitmap.
*/
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = (vcpu->fpu_active ? X86_CR0_TS : 0);
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
/*
* Note that CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK is already set in the original vmcs01
* (KVM doesn't change it)- no reason to call set_cr4_guest_host_mask();
*/
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if (enable_vpid) {
/*
* Trivially support vpid by letting L2s share their parent
* L1's vpid. TODO: move to a more elaborate solution, giving
* each L2 its own vpid and exposing the vpid feature to L1.
*/
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_idtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_gdtr_base);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->host_ia32_pat);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl);
/* Set L1 segment info according to Intel SDM
27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers */
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.selector = vmcs12->host_cs_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.g = 1
};
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
seg.l = 1;
else
seg.db = 1;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_CS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.type = 3,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.db = 1,
.g = 1
};
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ds_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_DS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_es_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_ES);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ss_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_SS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_fs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_fs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_FS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_gs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_gs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_GS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = vmcs12->host_tr_base,
.limit = 0x67,
.selector = vmcs12->host_tr_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1
};
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_TR);
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, 0x400);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1601/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
/*
* This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
* that these two variables' stack usage should be
* combined, not added together.
*/
union {
struct kvm_pit_state ps;
struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof ident_addr))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpic)
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -EINVAL;
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
vpic = kvm_create_pic(kvm);
if (vpic) {
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_master);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_slave);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_eclr);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kfree(vpic);
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
} else
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.vpic = vpic;
smp_wmb();
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_destroy_pic(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
}
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
goto create_pit;
case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
break;
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
__s32 status;
status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event.irq, irq_event.level);
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
r = -EFAULT;
irq_event.status = status;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event,
sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
}
break;
}
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof *chip))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
s64 delta;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&user_ns, argp, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (user_ns.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
delta = user_ns.clock - now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = delta;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
|
long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
/*
* This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
* that these two variables' stack usage should be
* combined, not added together.
*/
union {
struct kvm_pit_state ps;
struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof ident_addr))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpic)
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
vpic = kvm_create_pic(kvm);
if (vpic) {
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_master);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_slave);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_eclr);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kfree(vpic);
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
} else
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.vpic = vpic;
smp_wmb();
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_destroy_pic(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
}
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
goto create_pit;
case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
break;
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
__s32 status;
status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event.irq, irq_event.level);
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
r = -EFAULT;
irq_event.status = status;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event,
sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
}
break;
}
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof *chip))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
s64 delta;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&user_ns, argp, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (user_ns.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
delta = user_ns.clock - now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = delta;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
perf_event_create_kernel_counter(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
struct task_struct *task,
perf_overflow_handler_t overflow_handler,
void *context)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
int err;
/*
* Get the target context (task or percpu):
*/
event = perf_event_alloc(attr, cpu, task, NULL, NULL,
overflow_handler, context, -1);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err;
}
/* Mark owner so we could distinguish it from user events. */
event->owner = TASK_TOMBSTONE;
ctx = find_get_context(event->pmu, task, event);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto err_free;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
if (ctx->task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) {
err = -ESRCH;
goto err_unlock;
}
if (!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx)) {
err = -EBUSY;
goto err_unlock;
}
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, cpu);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return event;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
put_ctx(ctx);
err_free:
free_event(event);
err:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
perf_event_create_kernel_counter(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
struct task_struct *task,
perf_overflow_handler_t overflow_handler,
void *context)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
int err;
/*
* Get the target context (task or percpu):
*/
event = perf_event_alloc(attr, cpu, task, NULL, NULL,
overflow_handler, context, -1);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err;
}
/* Mark owner so we could distinguish it from user events. */
event->owner = TASK_TOMBSTONE;
ctx = find_get_context(event->pmu, task, event);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto err_free;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
if (ctx->task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) {
err = -ESRCH;
goto err_unlock;
}
if (!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx)) {
err = -EBUSY;
goto err_unlock;
}
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, cpu);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return event;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
put_ctx(ctx);
err_free:
free_event(event);
err:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5321/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void __tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct file *cons_filp = NULL;
struct file *filp, *f = NULL;
struct task_struct *p;
struct tty_file_private *priv;
int closecount = 0, n;
unsigned long flags;
int refs = 0;
if (!tty)
return;
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
if (redirect && file_tty(redirect) == tty) {
f = redirect;
redirect = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
tty_lock();
/* some functions below drop BTM, so we need this bit */
set_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
/* inuse_filps is protected by the single tty lock,
this really needs to change if we want to flush the
workqueue with the lock held */
check_tty_count(tty, "tty_hangup");
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
/* This breaks for file handles being sent over AF_UNIX sockets ? */
list_for_each_entry(priv, &tty->tty_files, list) {
filp = priv->file;
if (filp->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write)
cons_filp = filp;
if (filp->f_op->write != tty_write)
continue;
closecount++;
__tty_fasync(-1, filp, 0); /* can't block */
filp->f_op = &hung_up_tty_fops;
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
/*
* it drops BTM and thus races with reopen
* we protect the race by TTY_HUPPING
*/
tty_ldisc_hangup(tty);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (tty->session) {
do_each_pid_task(tty->session, PIDTYPE_SID, p) {
spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
if (p->signal->tty == tty) {
p->signal->tty = NULL;
/* We defer the dereferences outside fo
the tasklist lock */
refs++;
}
if (!p->signal->leader) {
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
continue;
}
__group_send_sig_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
__group_send_sig_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
put_pid(p->signal->tty_old_pgrp); /* A noop */
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->pgrp)
p->signal->tty_old_pgrp = get_pid(tty->pgrp);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
} while_each_pid_task(tty->session, PIDTYPE_SID, p);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
clear_bit(TTY_THROTTLED, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_PUSH, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
put_pid(tty->session);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
tty->session = NULL;
tty->pgrp = NULL;
tty->ctrl_status = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
/* Account for the p->signal references we killed */
while (refs--)
tty_kref_put(tty);
/*
* If one of the devices matches a console pointer, we
* cannot just call hangup() because that will cause
* tty->count and state->count to go out of sync.
* So we just call close() the right number of times.
*/
if (cons_filp) {
if (tty->ops->close)
for (n = 0; n < closecount; n++)
tty->ops->close(tty, cons_filp);
} else if (tty->ops->hangup)
(tty->ops->hangup)(tty);
/*
* We don't want to have driver/ldisc interactions beyond
* the ones we did here. The driver layer expects no
* calls after ->hangup() from the ldisc side. However we
* can't yet guarantee all that.
*/
set_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
tty_ldisc_enable(tty);
tty_unlock();
if (f)
fput(f);
}
|
void __tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct file *cons_filp = NULL;
struct file *filp, *f = NULL;
struct task_struct *p;
struct tty_file_private *priv;
int closecount = 0, n;
unsigned long flags;
int refs = 0;
if (!tty)
return;
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
if (redirect && file_tty(redirect) == tty) {
f = redirect;
redirect = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
tty_lock();
/* some functions below drop BTM, so we need this bit */
set_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
/* inuse_filps is protected by the single tty lock,
this really needs to change if we want to flush the
workqueue with the lock held */
check_tty_count(tty, "tty_hangup");
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
/* This breaks for file handles being sent over AF_UNIX sockets ? */
list_for_each_entry(priv, &tty->tty_files, list) {
filp = priv->file;
if (filp->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write)
cons_filp = filp;
if (filp->f_op->write != tty_write)
continue;
closecount++;
__tty_fasync(-1, filp, 0); /* can't block */
filp->f_op = &hung_up_tty_fops;
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
/*
* it drops BTM and thus races with reopen
* we protect the race by TTY_HUPPING
*/
tty_ldisc_hangup(tty);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (tty->session) {
do_each_pid_task(tty->session, PIDTYPE_SID, p) {
spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
if (p->signal->tty == tty) {
p->signal->tty = NULL;
/* We defer the dereferences outside fo
the tasklist lock */
refs++;
}
if (!p->signal->leader) {
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
continue;
}
__group_send_sig_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
__group_send_sig_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
put_pid(p->signal->tty_old_pgrp); /* A noop */
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->pgrp)
p->signal->tty_old_pgrp = get_pid(tty->pgrp);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
} while_each_pid_task(tty->session, PIDTYPE_SID, p);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
clear_bit(TTY_THROTTLED, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_PUSH, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
put_pid(tty->session);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
tty->session = NULL;
tty->pgrp = NULL;
tty->ctrl_status = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
/* Account for the p->signal references we killed */
while (refs--)
tty_kref_put(tty);
/*
* If one of the devices matches a console pointer, we
* cannot just call hangup() because that will cause
* tty->count and state->count to go out of sync.
* So we just call close() the right number of times.
*/
if (cons_filp) {
if (tty->ops->close)
for (n = 0; n < closecount; n++)
tty->ops->close(tty, cons_filp);
} else if (tty->ops->hangup)
(tty->ops->hangup)(tty);
/*
* We don't want to have driver/ldisc interactions beyond
* the ones we did here. The driver layer expects no
* calls after ->hangup() from the ldisc side. However we
* can't yet guarantee all that.
*/
set_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
tty_ldisc_enable(tty);
tty_unlock();
if (f)
fput(f);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9084/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit vfio_pci_cleanup(void)
{
pci_unregister_driver(&vfio_pci_driver);
vfio_pci_uninit_perm_bits();
}
|
static void __exit vfio_pci_cleanup(void)
{
pci_unregister_driver(&vfio_pci_driver);
vfio_pci_uninit_perm_bits();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3845
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3845/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
|
void Parcel::Blob::release() {
if (mMapped && mData) {
::munmap(mData, mSize);
}
clear();
}
|
void Parcel::Blob::release() {
if (mMapped && mData) {
::munmap(mData, mSize);
}
clear();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline struct task_group *cgroup_tg(struct cgroup *cgrp)
{
return container_of(cgroup_subsys_state(cgrp, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id),
struct task_group, css);
}
|
static inline struct task_group *cgroup_tg(struct cgroup *cgrp)
{
return container_of(cgroup_subsys_state(cgrp, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id),
struct task_group, css);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6784/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
|
void PageSerializer::retrieveResourcesForProperties(const StylePropertySet* styleDeclaration, Document& document)
{
if (!styleDeclaration)
return;
unsigned propertyCount = styleDeclaration->propertyCount();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < propertyCount; ++i) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CSSValue> cssValue = styleDeclaration->propertyAt(i).value();
retrieveResourcesForCSSValue(cssValue.get(), document);
}
}
|
void PageSerializer::retrieveResourcesForProperties(const StylePropertySet* styleDeclaration, Document& document)
{
if (!styleDeclaration)
return;
unsigned propertyCount = styleDeclaration->propertyCount();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < propertyCount; ++i) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CSSValue> cssValue = styleDeclaration->propertyAt(i).value();
retrieveResourcesForCSSValue(cssValue.get(), document);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12897/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
ND_FALL_THROUGH;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
|
mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
ND_FALL_THROUGH;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
int reiserfs_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_PRIVATE(inode))
return 0;
if (get_inode_sd_version(inode) == STAT_DATA_V1 ||
!reiserfs_posixacl(inode->i_sb))
return 0;
return posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);
}
|
int reiserfs_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_PRIVATE(inode))
return 0;
if (get_inode_sd_version(inode) == STAT_DATA_V1 ||
!reiserfs_posixacl(inode->i_sb))
return 0;
return posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7141/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/curl-7_50_2~32
|
curl-7_50_2~32
|
nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
|
static bool any_cipher_enabled(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
PRInt32 policy = 0;
SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
if(policy)
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
static bool any_cipher_enabled(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
PRInt32 policy = 0;
SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
if(policy)
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
curl
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2498
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2498/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
|
8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
| null |
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( PSH_Hint_Table table,
PSH_Point point,
FT_UInt count,
FT_Int threshold,
FT_Int major_dir )
{
PSH_Hint* sort = table->sort;
FT_UInt num_hints = table->num_hints;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
{
FT_Int point_dir = 0;
FT_Pos org_u = point->org_u;
if ( psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
continue;
if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_in, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_in;
else if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_out, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_out;
if ( point_dir )
{
if ( point_dir == major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point_dir == -major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#if 1
else if ( psh_point_is_extremum( point ) )
{
/* treat extrema as special cases for stem edge alignment */
FT_UInt nn, min_flag, max_flag;
if ( major_dir == PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL )
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
}
else
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
}
if ( point->flags2 & min_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point->flags2 & max_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
if ( point->hint == NULL )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
if ( org_u >= hint->org_pos &&
org_u <= hint->org_pos + hint->org_len )
{
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif /* 1 */
}
}
|
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( PSH_Hint_Table table,
PSH_Point point,
FT_UInt count,
FT_Int threshold,
FT_Int major_dir )
{
PSH_Hint* sort = table->sort;
FT_UInt num_hints = table->num_hints;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
{
FT_Int point_dir = 0;
FT_Pos org_u = point->org_u;
if ( psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
continue;
if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_in, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_in;
else if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_out, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_out;
if ( point_dir )
{
if ( point_dir == major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point_dir == -major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#if 1
else if ( psh_point_is_extremum( point ) )
{
/* treat extrema as special cases for stem edge alignment */
FT_UInt nn, min_flag, max_flag;
if ( major_dir == PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL )
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
}
else
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
}
if ( point->flags2 & min_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point->flags2 & max_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
if ( point->hint == NULL )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
if ( org_u >= hint->org_pos &&
org_u <= hint->org_pos + hint->org_len )
{
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif /* 1 */
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
auto_reconnect (server *serv, int send_quit, int err)
{
session *s;
GSList *list;
int del;
if (serv->server_session == NULL)
return;
list = sess_list;
while (list) /* make sure auto rejoin can work */
{
s = list->data;
if (s->type == SESS_CHANNEL && s->channel[0])
{
strcpy (s->waitchannel, s->channel);
strcpy (s->willjoinchannel, s->channel);
}
list = list->next;
}
if (serv->connected)
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, send_quit, err);
del = prefs.hex_net_reconnect_delay * 1000;
if (del < 1000)
del = 500; /* so it doesn't block the gui */
#ifndef WIN32
if (err == -1 || err == 0 || err == ECONNRESET || err == ETIMEDOUT)
#else
if (err == -1 || err == 0 || err == WSAECONNRESET || err == WSAETIMEDOUT)
#endif
serv->reconnect_away = serv->is_away;
/* is this server in a reconnect delay? remove it! */
if (serv->recondelay_tag)
{
fe_timeout_remove (serv->recondelay_tag);
serv->recondelay_tag = 0;
}
serv->recondelay_tag = fe_timeout_add (del, timeout_auto_reconnect, serv);
fe_server_event (serv, FE_SE_RECONDELAY, del);
}
|
auto_reconnect (server *serv, int send_quit, int err)
{
session *s;
GSList *list;
int del;
if (serv->server_session == NULL)
return;
list = sess_list;
while (list) /* make sure auto rejoin can work */
{
s = list->data;
if (s->type == SESS_CHANNEL && s->channel[0])
{
strcpy (s->waitchannel, s->channel);
strcpy (s->willjoinchannel, s->channel);
}
list = list->next;
}
if (serv->connected)
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, send_quit, err);
del = prefs.hex_net_reconnect_delay * 1000;
if (del < 1000)
del = 500; /* so it doesn't block the gui */
#ifndef WIN32
if (err == -1 || err == 0 || err == ECONNRESET || err == ETIMEDOUT)
#else
if (err == -1 || err == 0 || err == WSAECONNRESET || err == WSAETIMEDOUT)
#endif
serv->reconnect_away = serv->is_away;
/* is this server in a reconnect delay? remove it! */
if (serv->recondelay_tag)
{
fe_timeout_remove (serv->recondelay_tag);
serv->recondelay_tag = 0;
}
serv->recondelay_tag = fe_timeout_add (del, timeout_auto_reconnect, serv);
fe_server_event (serv, FE_SE_RECONDELAY, del);
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2860
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2860/
|
CWE-284
|
http://git.openafs.org/?p=openafs.git;a=commitdiff;h=396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0
|
396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0
| null |
SPR_SetMax(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, afs_int32 gflag)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = setMax(call, aid, gflag, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_SetMaxEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_LONG, gflag,
AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_SetMax: code %d cid %d aid %d gflag %d\n", code, cid, aid, gflag));
return code;
}
|
SPR_SetMax(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, afs_int32 gflag)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = setMax(call, aid, gflag, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_SetMaxEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_LONG, gflag,
AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_SetMax: code %d cid %d aid %d gflag %d\n", code, cid, aid, gflag));
return code;
}
|
C
|
openafs
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
sector_t dm_get_size(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return get_capacity(md->disk);
}
|
sector_t dm_get_size(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return get_capacity(md->disk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5023
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5023/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
|
uint32_t Histogram::bucket_count() const {
return static_cast<uint32_t>(bucket_ranges_->bucket_count());
}
|
uint32_t Histogram::bucket_count() const {
return static_cast<uint32_t>(bucket_ranges_->bucket_count());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661}
|
std::string GetPlatformString() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return "win";
#elif defined(OS_IOS)
return "ios";
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return "mac";
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return "chromeos";
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
return "android";
#elif defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_BSD) || defined(OS_SOLARIS)
return "linux";
#else
#error Unknown platform
#endif
}
|
std::string GetPlatformString() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return "win";
#elif defined(OS_IOS)
return "ios";
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return "mac";
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return "chromeos";
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
return "android";
#elif defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_BSD) || defined(OS_SOLARIS)
return "linux";
#else
#error Unknown platform
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
SiteProcessMap* GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(BrowserContext* context) {
DCHECK(context);
SiteProcessMap* map = static_cast<SiteProcessMap*>(
context->GetUserData(kSiteProcessMapKeyName));
if (!map) {
map = new SiteProcessMap();
context->SetUserData(kSiteProcessMapKeyName, base::WrapUnique(map));
}
return map;
}
|
SiteProcessMap* GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(BrowserContext* context) {
DCHECK(context);
SiteProcessMap* map = static_cast<SiteProcessMap*>(
context->GetUserData(kSiteProcessMapKeyName));
if (!map) {
map = new SiteProcessMap();
context->SetUserData(kSiteProcessMapKeyName, base::WrapUnique(map));
}
return map;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b2943f5d343f5da393b99fe9efe6cefc6856aa1
|
3b2943f5d343f5da393b99fe9efe6cefc6856aa1
|
Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SavePackage::Stop() {
if (wait_state_ == INITIALIZE)
return;
DCHECK(canceled());
if (in_process_count()) {
SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = in_progress_items_.begin();
for (; it != in_progress_items_.end(); ++it) {
SaveItem* save_item = it->second;
DCHECK(save_item->state() == SaveItem::IN_PROGRESS);
save_item->Cancel();
}
while (in_process_count())
PutInProgressItemToSavedMap(in_progress_items_.begin()->second);
}
SaveIDList save_ids;
for (SavedItemMap::iterator it = saved_success_items_.begin();
it != saved_success_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->first);
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = saved_failed_items_.begin();
it != saved_failed_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->second->save_id());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RemoveSavedFileFromFileMap,
file_manager_,
save_ids));
finished_ = true;
wait_state_ = FAILED;
if (download_) {
download_->Cancel(false);
FinalizeDownloadEntry();
}
}
|
void SavePackage::Stop() {
if (wait_state_ == INITIALIZE)
return;
DCHECK(canceled());
if (in_process_count()) {
SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = in_progress_items_.begin();
for (; it != in_progress_items_.end(); ++it) {
SaveItem* save_item = it->second;
DCHECK(save_item->state() == SaveItem::IN_PROGRESS);
save_item->Cancel();
}
while (in_process_count())
PutInProgressItemToSavedMap(in_progress_items_.begin()->second);
}
SaveIDList save_ids;
for (SavedItemMap::iterator it = saved_success_items_.begin();
it != saved_success_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->first);
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = saved_failed_items_.begin();
it != saved_failed_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->second->save_id());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RemoveSavedFileFromFileMap,
file_manager_,
save_ids));
finished_ = true;
wait_state_ = FAILED;
if (download_) {
download_->Cancel(false);
FinalizeDownloadEntry();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
void tracing_snapshot_alloc(void)
{
int ret;
ret = tracing_alloc_snapshot();
if (ret < 0)
return;
tracing_snapshot();
}
|
void tracing_snapshot_alloc(void)
{
int ret;
ret = tracing_alloc_snapshot();
if (ret < 0)
return;
tracing_snapshot();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5366
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5366/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case */
if (!corkreq) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
goto release_dst;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
net_dbg_ratelimited("udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info *)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
release_dst:
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
|
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case */
if (!corkreq) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
goto release_dst;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
net_dbg_ratelimited("udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info *)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
release_dst:
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1016
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1016/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/db64ca25d661a47b996b4e2645998b5d7f0eb52c
|
db64ca25d661a47b996b4e2645998b5d7f0eb52c
|
PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[[email protected]: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved
|
pkinit_server_plugin_init_realm(krb5_context context, const char *realmname,
pkinit_kdc_context *pplgctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
*pplgctx = NULL;
plgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*plgctx));
if (plgctx == NULL)
goto errout;
pkiDebug("%s: initializing context at %p for realm '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, plgctx, realmname);
memset(plgctx, 0, sizeof(*plgctx));
plgctx->magic = PKINIT_CTX_MAGIC;
plgctx->realmname = strdup(realmname);
if (plgctx->realmname == NULL)
goto errout;
plgctx->realmname_len = strlen(plgctx->realmname);
retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&plgctx->cryptoctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_plg_opts(&plgctx->opts);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_identity_crypto(&plgctx->idctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_identity_opts(&plgctx->idopts);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_profile(context, plgctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_identity_initialize(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, NULL,
plgctx->idopts, plgctx->idctx, 0, NULL);
if (retval)
goto errout;
pkiDebug("%s: returning context at %p for realm '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, plgctx, realmname);
*pplgctx = plgctx;
retval = 0;
errout:
if (retval)
pkinit_server_plugin_fini_realm(context, plgctx);
return retval;
}
|
pkinit_server_plugin_init_realm(krb5_context context, const char *realmname,
pkinit_kdc_context *pplgctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
*pplgctx = NULL;
plgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*plgctx));
if (plgctx == NULL)
goto errout;
pkiDebug("%s: initializing context at %p for realm '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, plgctx, realmname);
memset(plgctx, 0, sizeof(*plgctx));
plgctx->magic = PKINIT_CTX_MAGIC;
plgctx->realmname = strdup(realmname);
if (plgctx->realmname == NULL)
goto errout;
plgctx->realmname_len = strlen(plgctx->realmname);
retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&plgctx->cryptoctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_plg_opts(&plgctx->opts);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_identity_crypto(&plgctx->idctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_identity_opts(&plgctx->idopts);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_profile(context, plgctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
retval = pkinit_identity_initialize(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, NULL,
plgctx->idopts, plgctx->idctx, 0, NULL);
if (retval)
goto errout;
pkiDebug("%s: returning context at %p for realm '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, plgctx, realmname);
*pplgctx = plgctx;
retval = 0;
errout:
if (retval)
pkinit_server_plugin_fini_realm(context, plgctx);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7
|
Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
|
const KURL ContentSecurityPolicy::Url() const {
return execution_context_->Url();
}
|
const KURL ContentSecurityPolicy::Url() const {
return execution_context_->Url();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8952
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8952/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/82939d7999dfc1f1998c4b1c12e2f19edbdff272
|
82939d7999dfc1f1998c4b1c12e2f19edbdff272
|
ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static inline void ext4_xattr_hash_entry(struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry)
{
__u32 hash = 0;
char *name = entry->e_name;
int n;
for (n = 0; n < entry->e_name_len; n++) {
hash = (hash << NAME_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - NAME_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
*name++;
}
if (entry->e_value_block == 0 && entry->e_value_size != 0) {
__le32 *value = (__le32 *)((char *)header +
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs));
for (n = (le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size) +
EXT4_XATTR_ROUND) >> EXT4_XATTR_PAD_BITS; n; n--) {
hash = (hash << VALUE_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - VALUE_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
le32_to_cpu(*value++);
}
}
entry->e_hash = cpu_to_le32(hash);
}
|
static inline void ext4_xattr_hash_entry(struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry)
{
__u32 hash = 0;
char *name = entry->e_name;
int n;
for (n = 0; n < entry->e_name_len; n++) {
hash = (hash << NAME_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - NAME_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
*name++;
}
if (entry->e_value_block == 0 && entry->e_value_size != 0) {
__le32 *value = (__le32 *)((char *)header +
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs));
for (n = (le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size) +
EXT4_XATTR_ROUND) >> EXT4_XATTR_PAD_BITS; n; n--) {
hash = (hash << VALUE_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - VALUE_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
le32_to_cpu(*value++);
}
}
entry->e_hash = cpu_to_le32(hash);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1352/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=124fb22a13fafa3648e4e15b4f207c7096d8155e
|
124fb22a13fafa3648e4e15b4f207c7096d8155e
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_last_oid)
{
zval *result;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
#ifdef HAVE_PQOIDVALUE
Oid oid;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &result) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
pgsql_result = pg_result->result;
#ifdef HAVE_PQOIDVALUE
oid = PQoidValue(pgsql_result);
if (oid == InvalidOid) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PGSQL_RETURN_OID(oid);
#else
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = (char *) PQoidStatus(pgsql_result);
if (Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)) {
RETURN_STRING(Z_STRVAL_P(return_value));
}
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
#endif
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_last_oid)
{
zval *result;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
#ifdef HAVE_PQOIDVALUE
Oid oid;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &result) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
pgsql_result = pg_result->result;
#ifdef HAVE_PQOIDVALUE
oid = PQoidValue(pgsql_result);
if (oid == InvalidOid) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PGSQL_RETURN_OID(oid);
#else
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = (char *) PQoidStatus(pgsql_result);
if (Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)) {
RETURN_STRING(Z_STRVAL_P(return_value));
}
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
#endif
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2862/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual bool GetCellColors(int model_row,
int column,
ItemColor* foreground,
ItemColor* background,
LOGFONT* logfont) {
if (!model_->IsBackgroundResource(model_row))
return false;
background->color_is_set = true;
background->color = kBackgroundResourceHighlight;
foreground->color_is_set = false;
return true;
}
|
virtual bool GetCellColors(int model_row,
int column,
ItemColor* foreground,
ItemColor* background,
LOGFONT* logfont) {
if (!model_->IsBackgroundResource(model_row))
return false;
background->color_is_set = true;
background->color = kBackgroundResourceHighlight;
foreground->color_is_set = false;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/
|
CWE-416
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
|
c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
| null |
bool xmp_set_property_bool(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
bool value, uint32_t optionBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
try {
txmp->SetProperty_Bool(schema, name, value, optionBits);
ret = true;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
catch (...) {
}
return ret;
}
|
bool xmp_set_property_bool(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
bool value, uint32_t optionBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
try {
txmp->SetProperty_Bool(schema, name, value, optionBits);
ret = true;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
catch (...) {
}
return ret;
}
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3193
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3193/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/harfbuzz.old/commit/?id=81c8ef785b079980ad5b46be4fe7c7bf156dbf65
|
81c8ef785b079980ad5b46be4fe7c7bf156dbf65
| null |
HB_Error HB_GPOS_Query_Scripts( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos,
HB_UInt** script_tag_list )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort n;
HB_UInt* stl;
HB_ScriptList* sl;
HB_ScriptRecord* sr;
if ( !gpos || !script_tag_list )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
sl = &gpos->ScriptList;
sr = sl->ScriptRecord;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( stl, sl->ScriptCount + 1, HB_UInt ) )
return error;
for ( n = 0; n < sl->ScriptCount; n++ )
stl[n] = sr[n].ScriptTag;
stl[n] = 0;
*script_tag_list = stl;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
|
HB_Error HB_GPOS_Query_Scripts( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos,
HB_UInt** script_tag_list )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort n;
HB_UInt* stl;
HB_ScriptList* sl;
HB_ScriptRecord* sr;
if ( !gpos || !script_tag_list )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
sl = &gpos->ScriptList;
sr = sl->ScriptRecord;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( stl, sl->ScriptCount + 1, HB_UInt ) )
return error;
for ( n = 0; n < sl->ScriptCount; n++ )
stl[n] = sr[n].ScriptTag;
stl[n] = 0;
*script_tag_list = stl;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
|
C
|
harfbuzz
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20145
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20145/
| null |
https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/commit/9097577b49b7fdcf45d30975976dd93808ccc0c4
|
9097577b49b7fdcf45d30975976dd93808ccc0c4
|
Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073
|
static char *fgets_extending(char **buf, int *buflen, FILE *stream)
{
char *rc;
char endchar;
int offset = 0;
char *newbuf;
do{
rc = fgets(&((*buf)[offset]), *buflen-offset, stream);
if(feof(stream)){
return rc;
}
endchar = (*buf)[strlen(*buf)-1];
if(endchar == '\n'){
return rc;
}
/* No EOL char found, so extend buffer */
offset = *buflen-1;
*buflen += 1000;
newbuf = realloc(*buf, *buflen);
if(!newbuf){
return NULL;
}
*buf = newbuf;
}while(1);
}
|
static char *fgets_extending(char **buf, int *buflen, FILE *stream)
{
char *rc;
char endchar;
int offset = 0;
char *newbuf;
do{
rc = fgets(&((*buf)[offset]), *buflen-offset, stream);
if(feof(stream)){
return rc;
}
endchar = (*buf)[strlen(*buf)-1];
if(endchar == '\n'){
return rc;
}
/* No EOL char found, so extend buffer */
offset = *buflen-1;
*buflen += 1000;
newbuf = realloc(*buf, *buflen);
if(!newbuf){
return NULL;
}
*buf = newbuf;
}while(1);
}
|
C
|
mosquitto
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int sha1_neon_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(sctx, in, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
|
static int sha1_neon_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(sctx, in, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1703
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1703/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
void ConvertInterfaceDescriptor(const UsbInterfaceDescriptor& input,
InterfaceDescriptor* output) {
output->interface_number = input.interface_number;
output->alternate_setting = input.alternate_setting;
output->interface_class = input.interface_class;
output->interface_subclass = input.interface_subclass;
output->interface_protocol = input.interface_protocol;
for (const UsbEndpointDescriptor& input_endpoint : input.endpoints) {
linked_ptr<EndpointDescriptor> endpoint(new EndpointDescriptor);
ConvertEndpointDescriptor(input_endpoint, endpoint.get());
output->endpoints.push_back(endpoint);
}
output->extra_data.assign(input.extra_data.begin(), input.extra_data.end());
}
|
void ConvertInterfaceDescriptor(const UsbInterfaceDescriptor& input,
InterfaceDescriptor* output) {
output->interface_number = input.interface_number;
output->alternate_setting = input.alternate_setting;
output->interface_class = input.interface_class;
output->interface_subclass = input.interface_subclass;
output->interface_protocol = input.interface_protocol;
for (const UsbEndpointDescriptor& input_endpoint : input.endpoints) {
linked_ptr<EndpointDescriptor> endpoint(new EndpointDescriptor);
ConvertEndpointDescriptor(input_endpoint, endpoint.get());
output->endpoints.push_back(endpoint);
}
output->extra_data.assign(input.extra_data.begin(), input.extra_data.end());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18174/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8dca4a41f1ad65043a78c2338d9725f859c8d2c3
|
8dca4a41f1ad65043a78c2338d9725f859c8d2c3
|
pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
|
static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = -1;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = resource_size(res) / 4;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->hwbank_num = gpio_dev->gc.ngpio / 64;
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = devm_pinctrl_register(&pdev->dev, &amd_pinctrl_desc,
gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, gpio_dev->gc.ngpio);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
return ret;
}
|
static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = -1;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = resource_size(res) / 4;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->hwbank_num = gpio_dev->gc.ngpio / 64;
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = devm_pinctrl_register(&pdev->dev, &amd_pinctrl_desc,
gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, gpio_dev->gc.ngpio);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b654d718218ece17c496e74acd250038656f31c3
|
b654d718218ece17c496e74acd250038656f31c3
|
[WIN] Implement WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation() for !USE(CF)
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104456
Reviewed by Brent Fulgham.
Convert the UTF-16 path to the system default Windows ANSI code page (usually Windows Latin1).
* platform/win/FileSystemWin.cpp:
(WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137547 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
String pathGetFileName(const String& path)
{
return String(::PathFindFileName(String(path).charactersWithNullTermination()));
}
|
String pathGetFileName(const String& path)
{
return String(::PathFindFileName(String(path).charactersWithNullTermination()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7fdd2894ef51ee234882fa2457bb1f2a8895cbe
|
f7fdd2894ef51ee234882fa2457bb1f2a8895cbe
|
Makes the extension resize gripper only visible when the mouse is over
it.
BUG=45750
TEST=see bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2800022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@50515 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::wstring ImageView::GetTooltipText() {
return tooltip_text_;
}
|
std::wstring ImageView::GetTooltipText() {
return tooltip_text_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4817
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4817/
| null |
https://github.com/h2o/h2o/commit/1c0808d580da09fdec5a9a74ff09e103ea058dd4
|
1c0808d580da09fdec5a9a74ff09e103ea058dd4
|
h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
|
static ssize_t expect_continuation_of_headers(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, const uint8_t *src, size_t len, const char **err_desc)
{
h2o_http2_frame_t frame;
ssize_t ret;
h2o_http2_stream_t *stream;
int hret;
if ((ret = h2o_http2_decode_frame(&frame, src, len, &H2O_HTTP2_SETTINGS_HOST, err_desc)) < 0)
return ret;
if (frame.type != H2O_HTTP2_FRAME_TYPE_CONTINUATION) {
*err_desc = "expected CONTINUATION frame";
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
}
if (conn->state >= H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_HALF_CLOSED)
return 0;
if ((stream = h2o_http2_conn_get_stream(conn, frame.stream_id)) == NULL ||
!(stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_HEADERS || stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_BODY)) {
*err_desc = "unexpected stream id in CONTINUATION frame";
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
}
h2o_buffer_reserve(&conn->_headers_unparsed, frame.length);
memcpy(conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes + conn->_headers_unparsed->size, frame.payload, frame.length);
conn->_headers_unparsed->size += frame.length;
if (conn->_headers_unparsed->size <= H2O_MAX_REQLEN) {
if ((frame.flags & H2O_HTTP2_FRAME_FLAG_END_HEADERS) != 0) {
conn->_read_expect = expect_default;
if (stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_HEADERS) {
hret = handle_incoming_request(conn, stream, (const uint8_t *)conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes,
conn->_headers_unparsed->size, err_desc);
} else {
hret = handle_trailing_headers(conn, stream, (const uint8_t *)conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes,
conn->_headers_unparsed->size, err_desc);
}
if (hret != 0)
ret = hret;
h2o_buffer_dispose(&conn->_headers_unparsed);
conn->_headers_unparsed = NULL;
}
} else {
/* request is too large (TODO log) */
send_stream_error(conn, stream->stream_id, H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_REFUSED_STREAM);
h2o_http2_stream_reset(conn, stream);
}
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t expect_continuation_of_headers(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, const uint8_t *src, size_t len, const char **err_desc)
{
h2o_http2_frame_t frame;
ssize_t ret;
h2o_http2_stream_t *stream;
int hret;
if ((ret = h2o_http2_decode_frame(&frame, src, len, &H2O_HTTP2_SETTINGS_HOST, err_desc)) < 0)
return ret;
if (frame.type != H2O_HTTP2_FRAME_TYPE_CONTINUATION) {
*err_desc = "expected CONTINUATION frame";
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
}
if (conn->state >= H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_HALF_CLOSED)
return 0;
if ((stream = h2o_http2_conn_get_stream(conn, frame.stream_id)) == NULL ||
!(stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_HEADERS || stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_BODY)) {
*err_desc = "unexpected stream id in CONTINUATION frame";
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
}
h2o_buffer_reserve(&conn->_headers_unparsed, frame.length);
memcpy(conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes + conn->_headers_unparsed->size, frame.payload, frame.length);
conn->_headers_unparsed->size += frame.length;
if (conn->_headers_unparsed->size <= H2O_MAX_REQLEN) {
if ((frame.flags & H2O_HTTP2_FRAME_FLAG_END_HEADERS) != 0) {
conn->_read_expect = expect_default;
if (stream->state == H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_RECV_HEADERS) {
hret = handle_incoming_request(conn, stream, (const uint8_t *)conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes,
conn->_headers_unparsed->size, err_desc);
} else {
hret = handle_trailing_headers(conn, stream, (const uint8_t *)conn->_headers_unparsed->bytes,
conn->_headers_unparsed->size, err_desc);
}
if (hret != 0)
ret = hret;
h2o_buffer_dispose(&conn->_headers_unparsed);
conn->_headers_unparsed = NULL;
}
} else {
/* request is too large (TODO log) */
send_stream_error(conn, stream->stream_id, H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_REFUSED_STREAM);
h2o_http2_stream_reset(conn, stream);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
h2o
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
int btsock_thread_exit(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0};
if(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0)) == sizeof(cmd))
{
pthread_join(ts[h].thread_id, 0);
pthread_mutex_lock(&thread_slot_lock);
free_thread_slot(h);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thread_slot_lock);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
int btsock_thread_exit(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0};
if(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd))
{
pthread_join(ts[h].thread_id, 0);
pthread_mutex_lock(&thread_slot_lock);
free_thread_slot(h);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thread_slot_lock);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Element::clearTabIndexExplicitlyIfNeeded()
{
if (hasRareData())
elementRareData()->clearTabIndexExplicitly();
}
|
void Element::clearTabIndexExplicitlyIfNeeded()
{
if (hasRareData())
elementRareData()->clearTabIndexExplicitly();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5838/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
void ClearActiveTab() {
void ClearActiveTab(const Extension& extension) {
extension.permissions_data()->ClearTabSpecificPermissions(kTabId);
}
|
void ClearActiveTab() {
active_tab_->permissions_data()->ClearTabSpecificPermissions(kTabId);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-1848
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1848/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc
|
8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc
|
ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static journal_t *ext3_get_journal(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned int journal_inum)
{
struct inode *journal_inode;
journal_t *journal;
/* First, test for the existence of a valid inode on disk. Bad
* things happen if we iget() an unused inode, as the subsequent
* iput() will try to delete it. */
journal_inode = ext3_iget(sb, journal_inum);
if (IS_ERR(journal_inode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: no journal found");
return NULL;
}
if (!journal_inode->i_nlink) {
make_bad_inode(journal_inode);
iput(journal_inode);
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: journal inode is deleted");
return NULL;
}
jbd_debug(2, "Journal inode found at %p: %Ld bytes\n",
journal_inode, journal_inode->i_size);
if (!S_ISREG(journal_inode->i_mode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: invalid journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal = journal_init_inode(journal_inode);
if (!journal) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: could not load journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal->j_private = sb;
ext3_init_journal_params(sb, journal);
return journal;
}
|
static journal_t *ext3_get_journal(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned int journal_inum)
{
struct inode *journal_inode;
journal_t *journal;
/* First, test for the existence of a valid inode on disk. Bad
* things happen if we iget() an unused inode, as the subsequent
* iput() will try to delete it. */
journal_inode = ext3_iget(sb, journal_inum);
if (IS_ERR(journal_inode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: no journal found");
return NULL;
}
if (!journal_inode->i_nlink) {
make_bad_inode(journal_inode);
iput(journal_inode);
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: journal inode is deleted");
return NULL;
}
jbd_debug(2, "Journal inode found at %p: %Ld bytes\n",
journal_inode, journal_inode->i_size);
if (!S_ISREG(journal_inode->i_mode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: invalid journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal = journal_init_inode(journal_inode);
if (!journal) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: could not load journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal->j_private = sb;
ext3_init_journal_params(sb, journal);
return journal;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static void nfs4_proc_commit_rpc_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_commit_data *data)
{
nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(data->inode),
&data->args.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res,
task);
}
|
static void nfs4_proc_commit_rpc_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_commit_data *data)
{
nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(data->inode),
&data->args.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res,
task);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4805/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f461dcdd296eecedaffffc6bae2bfa90bd7eb89
|
1f461dcdd296eecedaffffc6bae2bfa90bd7eb89
|
ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ppp_net_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct ppp *ppp = netdev_priv(dev);
int err = -EFAULT;
void __user *addr = (void __user *) ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data;
struct ppp_stats stats;
struct ppp_comp_stats cstats;
char *vers;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGPPPSTATS:
ppp_get_stats(ppp, &stats);
if (copy_to_user(addr, &stats, sizeof(stats)))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case SIOCGPPPCSTATS:
memset(&cstats, 0, sizeof(cstats));
if (ppp->xc_state)
ppp->xcomp->comp_stat(ppp->xc_state, &cstats.c);
if (ppp->rc_state)
ppp->rcomp->decomp_stat(ppp->rc_state, &cstats.d);
if (copy_to_user(addr, &cstats, sizeof(cstats)))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case SIOCGPPPVER:
vers = PPP_VERSION;
if (copy_to_user(addr, vers, strlen(vers) + 1))
break;
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
}
return err;
}
|
ppp_net_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct ppp *ppp = netdev_priv(dev);
int err = -EFAULT;
void __user *addr = (void __user *) ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data;
struct ppp_stats stats;
struct ppp_comp_stats cstats;
char *vers;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGPPPSTATS:
ppp_get_stats(ppp, &stats);
if (copy_to_user(addr, &stats, sizeof(stats)))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case SIOCGPPPCSTATS:
memset(&cstats, 0, sizeof(cstats));
if (ppp->xc_state)
ppp->xcomp->comp_stat(ppp->xc_state, &cstats.c);
if (ppp->rc_state)
ppp->rcomp->decomp_stat(ppp->rc_state, &cstats.d);
if (copy_to_user(addr, &cstats, sizeof(cstats)))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case SIOCGPPPVER:
vers = PPP_VERSION;
if (copy_to_user(addr, vers, strlen(vers) + 1))
break;
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.