CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2012-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2862/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
c4f40933f2cd7f975af63e56ea4cdcdc6c636f73
|
accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TaskManagerView::OnDoubleClick() {
ActivateFocusedTab();
}
|
void TaskManagerView::OnDoubleClick() {
ActivateFocusedTab();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-5321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5321/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int __tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(filp);
unsigned long flags;
int retval = 0;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode, "tty_fasync"))
goto out;
retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &tty->fasync);
if (retval <= 0)
goto out;
if (on) {
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
if (!waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->pgrp) {
pid = tty->pgrp;
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
} else {
pid = task_pid(current);
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
}
get_pid(pid);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
retval = __f_setown(filp, pid, type, 0);
put_pid(pid);
if (retval)
goto out;
} else {
if (!tty->fasync && !waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = N_TTY_BUF_SIZE;
}
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
|
static int __tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(filp);
unsigned long flags;
int retval = 0;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode, "tty_fasync"))
goto out;
retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &tty->fasync);
if (retval <= 0)
goto out;
if (on) {
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
if (!waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->pgrp) {
pid = tty->pgrp;
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
} else {
pid = task_pid(current);
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
}
get_pid(pid);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
retval = __f_setown(filp, pid, type, 0);
put_pid(pid);
if (retval)
goto out;
} else {
if (!tty->fasync && !waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = N_TTY_BUF_SIZE;
}
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void partition_sched_domains(int ndoms_new, cpumask_var_t doms_new[],
struct sched_domain_attr *dattr_new)
{
int i, j, n;
int new_topology;
mutex_lock(&sched_domains_mutex);
/* always unregister in case we don't destroy any domains */
unregister_sched_domain_sysctl();
/* Let architecture update cpu core mappings. */
new_topology = arch_update_cpu_topology();
n = doms_new ? ndoms_new : 0;
/* Destroy deleted domains */
for (i = 0; i < ndoms_cur; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < n && !new_topology; j++) {
if (cpumask_equal(doms_cur[i], doms_new[j])
&& dattrs_equal(dattr_cur, i, dattr_new, j))
goto match1;
}
/* no match - a current sched domain not in new doms_new[] */
detach_destroy_domains(doms_cur[i]);
match1:
;
}
if (doms_new == NULL) {
ndoms_cur = 0;
doms_new = &fallback_doms;
cpumask_andnot(doms_new[0], cpu_active_mask, cpu_isolated_map);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dattr_new);
}
/* Build new domains */
for (i = 0; i < ndoms_new; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < ndoms_cur && !new_topology; j++) {
if (cpumask_equal(doms_new[i], doms_cur[j])
&& dattrs_equal(dattr_new, i, dattr_cur, j))
goto match2;
}
/* no match - add a new doms_new */
build_sched_domains(doms_new[i], dattr_new ? dattr_new + i : NULL);
match2:
;
}
/* Remember the new sched domains */
if (doms_cur != &fallback_doms)
free_sched_domains(doms_cur, ndoms_cur);
kfree(dattr_cur); /* kfree(NULL) is safe */
doms_cur = doms_new;
dattr_cur = dattr_new;
ndoms_cur = ndoms_new;
register_sched_domain_sysctl();
mutex_unlock(&sched_domains_mutex);
}
|
void partition_sched_domains(int ndoms_new, cpumask_var_t doms_new[],
struct sched_domain_attr *dattr_new)
{
int i, j, n;
int new_topology;
mutex_lock(&sched_domains_mutex);
/* always unregister in case we don't destroy any domains */
unregister_sched_domain_sysctl();
/* Let architecture update cpu core mappings. */
new_topology = arch_update_cpu_topology();
n = doms_new ? ndoms_new : 0;
/* Destroy deleted domains */
for (i = 0; i < ndoms_cur; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < n && !new_topology; j++) {
if (cpumask_equal(doms_cur[i], doms_new[j])
&& dattrs_equal(dattr_cur, i, dattr_new, j))
goto match1;
}
/* no match - a current sched domain not in new doms_new[] */
detach_destroy_domains(doms_cur[i]);
match1:
;
}
if (doms_new == NULL) {
ndoms_cur = 0;
doms_new = &fallback_doms;
cpumask_andnot(doms_new[0], cpu_active_mask, cpu_isolated_map);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dattr_new);
}
/* Build new domains */
for (i = 0; i < ndoms_new; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < ndoms_cur && !new_topology; j++) {
if (cpumask_equal(doms_new[i], doms_cur[j])
&& dattrs_equal(dattr_new, i, dattr_cur, j))
goto match2;
}
/* no match - add a new doms_new */
build_sched_domains(doms_new[i], dattr_new ? dattr_new + i : NULL);
match2:
;
}
/* Remember the new sched domains */
if (doms_cur != &fallback_doms)
free_sched_domains(doms_cur, ndoms_cur);
kfree(dattr_cur); /* kfree(NULL) is safe */
doms_cur = doms_new;
dattr_cur = dattr_new;
ndoms_cur = ndoms_new;
register_sched_domain_sysctl();
mutex_unlock(&sched_domains_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5774/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
b32471d5abb3b3a4fe56e1dd79871400b51a0cca
|
Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
|
static std::map<std::string, int> getMimeTypeToDownloadTextMap() {
return {{"text/plain", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_PLAIN},
{"text/css", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CSS},
{"text/csv", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CSV},
{"text/html", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_HTML},
{"text/calendar", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CALENDAR}};
}
|
static std::map<std::string, int> getMimeTypeToDownloadTextMap() {
return {{"text/plain", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_PLAIN},
{"text/css", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CSS},
{"text/csv", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CSV},
{"text/html", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_HTML},
{"text/calendar", DOWNLOAD_TEXT_CALENDAR}};
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b2943f5d343f5da393b99fe9efe6cefc6856aa1
|
3b2943f5d343f5da393b99fe9efe6cefc6856aa1
|
Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SavePackage::SaveCanceled(SaveItem* save_item) {
file_manager_->RemoveSaveFile(save_item->save_id(),
save_item->url(),
this);
if (save_item->save_id() != -1)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::CancelSave,
file_manager_,
save_item->save_id()));
}
|
void SavePackage::SaveCanceled(SaveItem* save_item) {
file_manager_->RemoveSaveFile(save_item->save_id(),
save_item->url(),
this);
if (save_item->save_id() != -1)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::CancelSave,
file_manager_,
save_item->save_id()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
int clientHasPendingReplies(client *c) {
return c->bufpos || listLength(c->reply);
}
|
int clientHasPendingReplies(client *c) {
return c->bufpos || listLength(c->reply);
}
|
C
|
redis
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnDisownOpener() {
CHECK(!frame_->parent());
if (frame_->opener())
frame_->setOpener(NULL);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnDisownOpener() {
CHECK(!frame_->parent());
if (frame_->opener())
frame_->setOpener(NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2793/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void LiveSyncTest::ReadPasswordFile() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
password_file_ = cl->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kPasswordFileForTest);
if (password_file_.empty())
LOG(FATAL) << "Can't run live server test without specifying --"
<< switches::kPasswordFileForTest << "=<filename>";
std::string file_contents;
file_util::ReadFileToString(password_file_, &file_contents);
ASSERT_NE(file_contents, "") << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value() << "\" does not exist.";
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
std::string delimiters = "\r\n";
Tokenize(file_contents, delimiters, &tokens);
ASSERT_TRUE(tokens.size() == 2) << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value()
<< "\" must contain exactly two lines of text.";
username_ = tokens[0];
password_ = tokens[1];
}
|
void LiveSyncTest::ReadPasswordFile() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
password_file_ = cl->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kPasswordFileForTest);
if (password_file_.empty())
LOG(FATAL) << "Can't run live server test without specifying --"
<< switches::kPasswordFileForTest << "=<filename>";
std::string file_contents;
file_util::ReadFileToString(password_file_, &file_contents);
ASSERT_NE(file_contents, "") << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value() << "\" does not exist.";
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
std::string delimiters = "\r\n";
Tokenize(file_contents, delimiters, &tokens);
ASSERT_TRUE(tokens.size() == 2) << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value()
<< "\" must contain exactly two lines of text.";
username_ = tokens[0];
password_ = tokens[1];
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathErr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int error)
{
if ((error < 0) || (error > MAXERRNO))
error = MAXERRNO;
if (ctxt == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
return;
}
ctxt->error = error;
if (ctxt->context == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) ctxt->base, NULL, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
return;
}
/* cleanup current last error */
xmlResetError(&ctxt->context->lastError);
ctxt->context->lastError.domain = XML_FROM_XPATH;
ctxt->context->lastError.code = error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK -
XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK;
ctxt->context->lastError.level = XML_ERR_ERROR;
ctxt->context->lastError.str1 = (char *) xmlStrdup(ctxt->base);
ctxt->context->lastError.int1 = ctxt->cur - ctxt->base;
ctxt->context->lastError.node = ctxt->context->debugNode;
if (ctxt->context->error != NULL) {
ctxt->context->error(ctxt->context->userData,
&ctxt->context->lastError);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, ctxt->context->debugNode, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) ctxt->base, NULL, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
}
}
|
xmlXPathErr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int error)
{
if ((error < 0) || (error > MAXERRNO))
error = MAXERRNO;
if (ctxt == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
return;
}
ctxt->error = error;
if (ctxt->context == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) ctxt->base, NULL, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
return;
}
/* cleanup current last error */
xmlResetError(&ctxt->context->lastError);
ctxt->context->lastError.domain = XML_FROM_XPATH;
ctxt->context->lastError.code = error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK -
XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK;
ctxt->context->lastError.level = XML_ERR_ERROR;
ctxt->context->lastError.str1 = (char *) xmlStrdup(ctxt->base);
ctxt->context->lastError.int1 = ctxt->cur - ctxt->base;
ctxt->context->lastError.node = ctxt->context->debugNode;
if (ctxt->context->error != NULL) {
ctxt->context->error(ctxt->context->userData,
&ctxt->context->lastError);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, ctxt->context->debugNode, XML_FROM_XPATH,
error + XML_XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK - XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) ctxt->base, NULL, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
"%s", xmlXPathErrorMessages[error]);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4943
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4943/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf
|
3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf
|
net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
sk = ps->sock;
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
struct pppox_sock *po;
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to ppp\n",
session->name, data_len);
/* We need to forget all info related to the L2TP packet
* gathered in the skb as we are going to reuse the same
* skb for the inner packet.
* Namely we need to:
* - reset xfrm (IPSec) information as it applies to
* the outer L2TP packet and not to the inner one
* - release the dst to force a route lookup on the inner
* IP packet since skb->dst currently points to the dst
* of the UDP tunnel
* - reset netfilter information as it doesn't apply
* to the inner packet either
*/
secpath_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
po = pppox_sk(sk);
ppp_input(&po->chan, skb);
} else {
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to L2TP socket\n",
session->name, data_len);
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb) < 0) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
return;
no_sock:
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
sk = ps->sock;
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
struct pppox_sock *po;
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to ppp\n",
session->name, data_len);
/* We need to forget all info related to the L2TP packet
* gathered in the skb as we are going to reuse the same
* skb for the inner packet.
* Namely we need to:
* - reset xfrm (IPSec) information as it applies to
* the outer L2TP packet and not to the inner one
* - release the dst to force a route lookup on the inner
* IP packet since skb->dst currently points to the dst
* of the UDP tunnel
* - reset netfilter information as it doesn't apply
* to the inner packet either
*/
secpath_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
po = pppox_sk(sk);
ppp_input(&po->chan, skb);
} else {
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to L2TP socket\n",
session->name, data_len);
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb) < 0) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
return;
no_sock:
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2505
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2505/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c
|
4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c
|
Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
|
void ATSParser::PSISection::clear() {
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->setRange(0, 0);
}
mSkipBytes = 0;
}
|
void ATSParser::PSISection::clear() {
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->setRange(0, 0);
}
mSkipBytes = 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPagePrivate::setCompositorDrawsRootLayer(bool compositorDrawsRootLayer)
{
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (m_page->settings()->forceCompositingMode() == compositorDrawsRootLayer)
return;
m_page->settings()->setForceCompositingMode(compositorDrawsRootLayer);
if (!m_mainFrame)
return;
if (FrameView* view = m_mainFrame->view())
view->updateCompositingLayers();
#endif
}
|
void WebPagePrivate::setCompositorDrawsRootLayer(bool compositorDrawsRootLayer)
{
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (m_page->settings()->forceCompositingMode() == compositorDrawsRootLayer)
return;
m_page->settings()->setForceCompositingMode(compositorDrawsRootLayer);
if (!m_mainFrame)
return;
if (FrameView* view = m_mainFrame->view())
view->updateCompositingLayers();
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
bool ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::IsControlledByServiceWorker() const {
return context() && context()->controller();
}
|
bool ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::IsControlledByServiceWorker() const {
return context() && context()->controller();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11328
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11328/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
|
YR_OBJECT* yr_object_lookup_field(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field_name)
{
YR_STRUCTURE_MEMBER* member;
assert(object != NULL);
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE);
member = object_as_structure(object)->members;
while (member != NULL)
{
if (strcmp(member->object->identifier, field_name) == 0)
return member->object;
member = member->next;
}
return NULL;
}
|
YR_OBJECT* yr_object_lookup_field(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field_name)
{
YR_STRUCTURE_MEMBER* member;
assert(object != NULL);
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE);
member = object_as_structure(object)->members;
while (member != NULL)
{
if (strcmp(member->object->identifier, field_name) == 0)
return member->object;
member = member->next;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
|
static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
file_sb_list_del(f);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2127/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/905ad269c55fc62bee3da29f7b1d1efeba8aa1e1
|
905ad269c55fc62bee3da29f7b1d1efeba8aa1e1
|
procfs: fix a vfsmount longterm reference leak
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_root_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat
)
{
generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes();
return 0;
}
|
static int proc_root_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat
)
{
generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9644/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *d,
struct blkcipher_walk *w, struct priv *ctx,
void (*tw)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *),
void (*fn)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *))
{
int err;
unsigned int avail;
const int bs = XTS_BLOCK_SIZE;
struct sinfo s = {
.tfm = crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->child),
.fn = fn
};
u8 *wsrc;
u8 *wdst;
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(d, w);
if (!w->nbytes)
return err;
s.t = (be128 *)w->iv;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
/* calculate first value of T */
tw(crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->tweak), w->iv, w->iv);
goto first;
for (;;) {
do {
gf128mul_x_ble(s.t, s.t);
first:
xts_round(&s, wdst, wsrc);
wsrc += bs;
wdst += bs;
} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(d, w, avail);
if (!w->nbytes)
break;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
}
return err;
}
|
static int crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *d,
struct blkcipher_walk *w, struct priv *ctx,
void (*tw)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *),
void (*fn)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *))
{
int err;
unsigned int avail;
const int bs = XTS_BLOCK_SIZE;
struct sinfo s = {
.tfm = crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->child),
.fn = fn
};
u8 *wsrc;
u8 *wdst;
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(d, w);
if (!w->nbytes)
return err;
s.t = (be128 *)w->iv;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
/* calculate first value of T */
tw(crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->tweak), w->iv, w->iv);
goto first;
for (;;) {
do {
gf128mul_x_ble(s.t, s.t);
first:
xts_round(&s, wdst, wsrc);
wsrc += bs;
wdst += bs;
} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(d, w, avail);
if (!w->nbytes)
break;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0889/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OpenDownload(DownloadItem* download) {
platform_util::OpenItem(download->GetFullPath());
}
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OpenDownload(DownloadItem* download) {
platform_util::OpenItem(download->GetFullPath());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6491/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
static inline signed short ReadPropertyMSBShort(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[2];
unsigned short
value;
if (*length < 2)
return((unsigned short) ~0);
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
|
static inline signed short ReadPropertyMSBShort(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[2];
unsigned short
value;
if (*length < 2)
return((unsigned short) ~0);
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6345/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sock *__llc_lookup(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct llc_addr *daddr,
struct llc_addr *laddr)
{
struct sock *sk = __llc_lookup_established(sap, daddr, laddr);
return sk ? : llc_lookup_listener(sap, laddr);
}
|
static struct sock *__llc_lookup(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct llc_addr *daddr,
struct llc_addr *laddr)
{
struct sock *sk = __llc_lookup_established(sap, daddr, laddr);
return sk ? : llc_lookup_listener(sap, laddr);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
CancelPendingTask() {
|
CancelPendingTask() {
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5221/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2a1d9fff62718d7175bf47c7903dda127ee0228c
|
2a1d9fff62718d7175bf47c7903dda127ee0228c
|
[SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
|
SendTabToSelfInfoBar::CreateRenderInfoBar(JNIEnv* env) {
return Java_SendTabToSelfInfoBar_create(env);
}
|
SendTabToSelfInfoBar::CreateRenderInfoBar(JNIEnv* env) {
return Java_SendTabToSelfInfoBar_create(env);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2921/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1228817ab04a14df53b5a8446085f9c03bf6e964
|
1228817ab04a14df53b5a8446085f9c03bf6e964
|
repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DelegatedFrameHost::SendDelegatedFrameAck(uint32 output_surface_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = client_->GetHost();
cc::CompositorFrameAck ack;
if (!surface_returned_resources_.empty())
ack.resources.swap(surface_returned_resources_);
if (resource_collection_)
resource_collection_->TakeUnusedResourcesForChildCompositor(&ack.resources);
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendSwapCompositorFrameAck(host->GetRoutingID(),
output_surface_id,
host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
ack);
DCHECK_GT(pending_delegated_ack_count_, 0);
pending_delegated_ack_count_--;
}
|
void DelegatedFrameHost::SendDelegatedFrameAck(uint32 output_surface_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = client_->GetHost();
cc::CompositorFrameAck ack;
if (!surface_returned_resources_.empty())
ack.resources.swap(surface_returned_resources_);
if (resource_collection_)
resource_collection_->TakeUnusedResourcesForChildCompositor(&ack.resources);
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendSwapCompositorFrameAck(host->GetRoutingID(),
output_surface_id,
host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
ack);
DCHECK_GT(pending_delegated_ack_count_, 0);
pending_delegated_ack_count_--;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::DisableAutoResize(const gfx::Size& new_size) {
SetShouldAutoResize(false);
Send(new ViewMsg_DisableAutoResize(GetRoutingID(), new_size));
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::DisableAutoResize(const gfx::Size& new_size) {
SetShouldAutoResize(false);
Send(new ViewMsg_DisableAutoResize(GetRoutingID(), new_size));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getFramebufferAttachmentParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned attachment = toInt32(args[1]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[2]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(target, attachment, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getFramebufferAttachmentParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned attachment = toInt32(args[1]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[2]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(target, attachment, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2206/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_prm_shutdown(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
int disposition;
/* From 9.2 Shutdown of an Association
* Upon receipt of the SHUTDOWN primitive from its upper
* layer, the endpoint enters SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and
* remains there until all outstanding data has been
* acknowledged by its peer. The endpoint accepts no new data
* from its upper layer, but retransmits data to the far end
* if necessary to fill gaps.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING));
disposition = SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
if (sctp_outq_is_empty(&asoc->outqueue)) {
disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(net, ep, asoc, type,
arg, commands);
}
return disposition;
}
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_prm_shutdown(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
int disposition;
/* From 9.2 Shutdown of an Association
* Upon receipt of the SHUTDOWN primitive from its upper
* layer, the endpoint enters SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and
* remains there until all outstanding data has been
* acknowledged by its peer. The endpoint accepts no new data
* from its upper layer, but retransmits data to the far end
* if necessary to fill gaps.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING));
disposition = SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
if (sctp_outq_is_empty(&asoc->outqueue)) {
disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(net, ep, asoc, type,
arg, commands);
}
return disposition;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void watchdog_prepare_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct hrtimer *hrtimer = &per_cpu(watchdog_hrtimer, cpu);
WARN_ON(per_cpu(softlockup_watchdog, cpu));
hrtimer_init(hrtimer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
hrtimer->function = watchdog_timer_fn;
}
|
static void watchdog_prepare_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct hrtimer *hrtimer = &per_cpu(watchdog_hrtimer, cpu);
WARN_ON(per_cpu(softlockup_watchdog, cpu));
hrtimer_init(hrtimer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
hrtimer->function = watchdog_timer_fn;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1632
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1632/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3f38b2253b19f9f9595f79fb92bfb5077e7b1959
|
3f38b2253b19f9f9595f79fb92bfb5077e7b1959
|
Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
void EnableRecording() { provider_.OnRecordingEnabled(); }
|
void EnableRecording() { provider_.OnRecordingEnabled(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5511
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5511/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/c8c6a0f123d5e35c173125365c97e2c0fc7eca42
|
c8c6a0f123d5e35c173125365c97e2c0fc7eca42
|
Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
|
static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
|
static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12247
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12247/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/55edae0226409de25e59922807cb09acb45731a2
|
55edae0226409de25e59922807cb09acb45731a2
|
Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
|
mrb_method_missing(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_sym name, mrb_value self, mrb_value args)
{
mrb_no_method_error(mrb, name, args, "undefined method '%S'", mrb_sym2str(mrb, name));
}
|
mrb_method_missing(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_sym name, mrb_value self, mrb_value args)
{
mrb_no_method_error(mrb, name, args, "undefined method '%S'", mrb_sym2str(mrb, name));
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Browser::RunUnloadEventsHelper(WebContents* contents) {
if (contents->NeedToFireBeforeUnload()) {
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool Browser::RunUnloadEventsHelper(WebContents* contents) {
if (contents->NeedToFireBeforeUnload()) {
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
static inline void ceph_set_cached_acl(struct inode *inode,
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
if (__ceph_caps_issued_mask(ci, CEPH_CAP_XATTR_SHARED, 0))
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
else
forget_cached_acl(inode, type);
spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
}
|
static inline void ceph_set_cached_acl(struct inode *inode,
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
if (__ceph_caps_issued_mask(ci, CEPH_CAP_XATTR_SHARED, 0))
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
else
forget_cached_acl(inode, type);
spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int __init udp4_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&udp4_net_ops);
}
|
int __init udp4_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&udp4_net_ops);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2903/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/92029a982fac85a4ebb614a825012a2e9ee84ef3
|
92029a982fac85a4ebb614a825012a2e9ee84ef3
|
Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool FolderHeaderView::OnKeyPressed(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
if (event.key_code() == ui::VKEY_RETURN)
delegate_->GiveBackFocusToSearchBox();
return false;
}
|
bool FolderHeaderView::OnKeyPressed(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
if (event.key_code() == ui::VKEY_RETURN)
delegate_->GiveBackFocusToSearchBox();
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
static void tx3g_dump_style_nobox(FILE * trace, GF_StyleRecord *rec, u32 *shift_offset, u32 so_count)
{
fprintf(trace, "<Style ");
if (rec->startCharOffset || rec->endCharOffset)
tx3g_print_char_offsets(trace, rec->startCharOffset, rec->endCharOffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(trace, "styles=\"");
if (!rec->style_flags) {
fprintf(trace, "Normal");
} else {
if (rec->style_flags & 1) fprintf(trace, "Bold ");
if (rec->style_flags & 2) fprintf(trace, "Italic ");
if (rec->style_flags & 4) fprintf(trace, "Underlined ");
}
fprintf(trace, "\" fontID=\"%d\" fontSize=\"%d\" ", rec->fontID, rec->font_size);
tx3g_dump_rgba8(trace, "color", rec->text_color);
fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
}
|
static void tx3g_dump_style_nobox(FILE * trace, GF_StyleRecord *rec, u32 *shift_offset, u32 so_count)
{
fprintf(trace, "<Style ");
if (rec->startCharOffset || rec->endCharOffset)
tx3g_print_char_offsets(trace, rec->startCharOffset, rec->endCharOffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(trace, "styles=\"");
if (!rec->style_flags) {
fprintf(trace, "Normal");
} else {
if (rec->style_flags & 1) fprintf(trace, "Bold ");
if (rec->style_flags & 2) fprintf(trace, "Italic ");
if (rec->style_flags & 4) fprintf(trace, "Underlined ");
}
fprintf(trace, "\" fontID=\"%d\" fontSize=\"%d\" ", rec->fontID, rec->font_size);
tx3g_dump_rgba8(trace, "color", rec->text_color);
fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2417
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2417/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1171e7c047bf79e7c93342bb6a812c9edd86aa84
|
1171e7c047bf79e7c93342bb6a812c9edd86aa84
|
Clear allocation to avoid info leak
Bug: 26914474
Change-Id: Ie1a86e86d78058d041149fe599a4996e7f8185cf
|
virtual status_t allocateBufferWithBackup(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
buffer_id *buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.writeStrongBinder(params->asBinder());
remote()->transact(ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err != OK) {
*buffer = 0;
return err;
}
*buffer = (buffer_id)reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
|
virtual status_t allocateBufferWithBackup(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
buffer_id *buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.writeStrongBinder(params->asBinder());
remote()->transact(ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err != OK) {
*buffer = 0;
return err;
}
*buffer = (buffer_id)reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20068/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
4f8104c528f0147c7527718d5aa7c9c38c8220d0
|
Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
|
HistoryNavigationBeforeCommitInjector(WebContentsImpl* web_contents,
const GURL& url)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
did_trigger_history_navigation_(false),
url_(url) {}
|
HistoryNavigationBeforeCommitInjector(WebContentsImpl* web_contents,
const GURL& url)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
did_trigger_history_navigation_(false),
url_(url) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7815
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7815/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
|
e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
| null |
static void vnc_dpy_cursor_define(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
QEMUCursor *c)
{
VncDisplay *vd = vnc_display;
VncState *vs;
cursor_put(vd->cursor);
g_free(vd->cursor_mask);
vd->cursor = c;
cursor_get(vd->cursor);
vd->cursor_msize = cursor_get_mono_bpl(c) * c->height;
vd->cursor_mask = g_malloc0(vd->cursor_msize);
cursor_get_mono_mask(c, 0, vd->cursor_mask);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
}
}
|
static void vnc_dpy_cursor_define(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
QEMUCursor *c)
{
VncDisplay *vd = vnc_display;
VncState *vs;
cursor_put(vd->cursor);
g_free(vd->cursor_mask);
vd->cursor = c;
cursor_get(vd->cursor);
vd->cursor_msize = cursor_get_mono_bpl(c) * c->height;
vd->cursor_mask = g_malloc0(vd->cursor_msize);
cursor_get_mono_mask(c, 0, vd->cursor_mask);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::handleCorrectionPanelResult(const String& result)
{
#if !defined(BUILDING_ON_SNOW_LEOPARD)
if (!isClosed())
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::HandleCorrectionPanelResult(result), m_pageID, 0);
#endif
}
|
void WebPageProxy::handleCorrectionPanelResult(const String& result)
{
#if !defined(BUILDING_ON_SNOW_LEOPARD)
if (!isClosed())
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::HandleCorrectionPanelResult(result), m_pageID, 0);
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5794
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5794/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
|
mojom::NavigationClient* NavigationRequest::GetCommitNavigationClient() {
if (commit_navigation_client_ && commit_navigation_client_.is_bound())
return commit_navigation_client_.get();
commit_navigation_client_ =
render_frame_host_->GetNavigationClientFromInterfaceProvider();
return commit_navigation_client_.get();
}
|
mojom::NavigationClient* NavigationRequest::GetCommitNavigationClient() {
if (commit_navigation_client_ && commit_navigation_client_.is_bound())
return commit_navigation_client_.get();
commit_navigation_client_ =
render_frame_host_->GetNavigationClientFromInterfaceProvider();
return commit_navigation_client_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3827/
|
CWE-172
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/a4567c66f4764442c6cb7b5c1858810194480fb5
|
a4567c66f4764442c6cb7b5c1858810194480fb5
|
SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
|
status_t SoftHEVC::deInitDecoder() {
size_t i;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
if (mCodecCtx) {
ivdext_delete_ip_t s_delete_ip;
ivdext_delete_op_t s_delete_op;
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_ip_t);
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_DELETE;
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_op_t);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_delete_ip, (void *)&s_delete_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in delete: 0x%x",
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
}
mChangingResolution = false;
return OK;
}
|
status_t SoftHEVC::deInitDecoder() {
size_t i;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
if (mCodecCtx) {
ivdext_delete_ip_t s_delete_ip;
ivdext_delete_op_t s_delete_op;
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_ip_t);
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_DELETE;
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_op_t);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_delete_ip, (void *)&s_delete_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in delete: 0x%x",
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
}
mChangingResolution = false;
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_checkl(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_read64(field);
return __vmcs_readl(field);
}
|
static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_checkl(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_read64(field);
return __vmcs_readl(field);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16612
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16612/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXcursor/commit/?id=4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8
|
4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8
| null |
XcursorFilenameLoadImage (const char *file, int size)
{
FILE *f;
XcursorImage *image;
if (!file || size < 0)
return NULL;
f = fopen (file, "r");
if (!f)
return NULL;
image = XcursorFileLoadImage (f, size);
fclose (f);
return image;
}
|
XcursorFilenameLoadImage (const char *file, int size)
{
FILE *f;
XcursorImage *image;
if (!file || size < 0)
return NULL;
f = fopen (file, "r");
if (!f)
return NULL;
image = XcursorFileLoadImage (f, size);
fclose (f);
return image;
}
|
C
|
xcursor
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2790/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
Path path;
path.addRoundedRect(rect, topLeft, topRight, bottomLeft, bottomRight);
m_data->context->SetBrush(wxBrush(color));
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
gc->FillPath(*path.platformPath());
#endif
}
|
void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void inet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
pr_err("Attempt to release TCP socket in state %d %p\n",
sk->sk_state, sk);
return;
}
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_err("Attempt to release alive inet socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(sk->sk_wmem_queued);
WARN_ON(sk->sk_forward_alloc);
kfree(rcu_dereference_protected(inet->inet_opt, 1));
dst_release(rcu_dereference_check(sk->sk_dst_cache, 1));
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
}
|
void inet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
pr_err("Attempt to release TCP socket in state %d %p\n",
sk->sk_state, sk);
return;
}
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_err("Attempt to release alive inet socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(sk->sk_wmem_queued);
WARN_ON(sk->sk_forward_alloc);
kfree(inet->opt);
dst_release(rcu_dereference_check(sk->sk_dst_cache, 1));
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4425/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/akheron/jansson/pull/284/commits/64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318
|
64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318
|
Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco.
|
static void lex_unget_unsave(lex_t *lex, int c)
{
if(c != STREAM_STATE_EOF && c != STREAM_STATE_ERROR) {
/* Since we treat warnings as errors, when assertions are turned
* off the "d" variable would be set but never used. Which is
* treated as an error by GCC.
*/
#ifndef NDEBUG
char d;
#endif
stream_unget(&lex->stream, c);
#ifndef NDEBUG
d =
#endif
strbuffer_pop(&lex->saved_text);
assert(c == d);
}
}
|
static void lex_unget_unsave(lex_t *lex, int c)
{
if(c != STREAM_STATE_EOF && c != STREAM_STATE_ERROR) {
/* Since we treat warnings as errors, when assertions are turned
* off the "d" variable would be set but never used. Which is
* treated as an error by GCC.
*/
#ifndef NDEBUG
char d;
#endif
stream_unget(&lex->stream, c);
#ifndef NDEBUG
d =
#endif
strbuffer_pop(&lex->saved_text);
assert(c == d);
}
}
|
C
|
jansson
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15385
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15385/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/21a6f570ba33fa9f52f1bba87f07acc4e8c178f4
|
21a6f570ba33fa9f52f1bba87f07acc4e8c178f4
|
Fix #8685 - Crash in ELF version parsing
|
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
vstart += entry->vn_aux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
|
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
vstart += entry->vn_aux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
u64 pdptr, pm_mask;
gfn_t root_gfn;
int i;
root_gfn = vcpu->arch.mmu.get_cr3(vcpu) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, root_gfn))
return 1;
/*
* Do we shadow a long mode page table? If so we need to
* write-protect the guests page table root.
*/
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa;
ASSERT(!VALID_PAGE(root));
spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, root_gfn, 0, PT64_ROOT_LEVEL,
0, ACC_ALL, NULL);
root = __pa(sp->spt);
++sp->root_count;
spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = root;
return 0;
}
/*
* We shadow a 32 bit page table. This may be a legacy 2-level
* or a PAE 3-level page table. In either case we need to be aware that
* the shadow page table may be a PAE or a long mode page table.
*/
pm_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL)
pm_mask |= PT_ACCESSED_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i];
ASSERT(!VALID_PAGE(root));
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
pdptr = vcpu->arch.mmu.get_pdptr(vcpu, i);
if (!is_present_gpte(pdptr)) {
vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i] = 0;
continue;
}
root_gfn = pdptr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, root_gfn))
return 1;
}
spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, root_gfn, i << 30,
PT32_ROOT_LEVEL, 0,
ACC_ALL, NULL);
root = __pa(sp->spt);
++sp->root_count;
spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i] = root | pm_mask;
}
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root);
/*
* If we shadow a 32 bit page table with a long mode page
* table we enter this path.
*/
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL) {
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root == NULL) {
/*
* The additional page necessary for this is only
* allocated on demand.
*/
u64 *lm_root;
lm_root = (void*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (lm_root == NULL)
return 1;
lm_root[0] = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root) | pm_mask;
vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root = lm_root;
}
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
u64 pdptr, pm_mask;
gfn_t root_gfn;
int i;
root_gfn = vcpu->arch.mmu.get_cr3(vcpu) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, root_gfn))
return 1;
/*
* Do we shadow a long mode page table? If so we need to
* write-protect the guests page table root.
*/
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa;
ASSERT(!VALID_PAGE(root));
spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, root_gfn, 0, PT64_ROOT_LEVEL,
0, ACC_ALL, NULL);
root = __pa(sp->spt);
++sp->root_count;
spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = root;
return 0;
}
/*
* We shadow a 32 bit page table. This may be a legacy 2-level
* or a PAE 3-level page table. In either case we need to be aware that
* the shadow page table may be a PAE or a long mode page table.
*/
pm_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL)
pm_mask |= PT_ACCESSED_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i];
ASSERT(!VALID_PAGE(root));
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
pdptr = vcpu->arch.mmu.get_pdptr(vcpu, i);
if (!is_present_gpte(pdptr)) {
vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i] = 0;
continue;
}
root_gfn = pdptr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, root_gfn))
return 1;
}
spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, root_gfn, i << 30,
PT32_ROOT_LEVEL, 0,
ACC_ALL, NULL);
root = __pa(sp->spt);
++sp->root_count;
spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i] = root | pm_mask;
}
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root);
/*
* If we shadow a 32 bit page table with a long mode page
* table we enter this path.
*/
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL) {
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root == NULL) {
/*
* The additional page necessary for this is only
* allocated on demand.
*/
u64 *lm_root;
lm_root = (void*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (lm_root == NULL)
return 1;
lm_root[0] = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root) | pm_mask;
vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root = lm_root;
}
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = __pa(vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnFrameFocused() {
if (!is_active())
return;
delegate_->SetFocusedFrame(frame_tree_node_, GetSiteInstance());
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnFrameFocused() {
if (!is_active())
return;
delegate_->SetFocusedFrame(frame_tree_node_, GetSiteInstance());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3105
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3105/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d6cc2749d2f90acc2d92a526c1d2cbebbc101a19
|
d6cc2749d2f90acc2d92a526c1d2cbebbc101a19
|
sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::HandleCalculateChangesChangeEventFromSyncer(
const ImmutableWriteTransactionInfo& write_transaction_info,
syncable::BaseTransaction* trans) {
LOG_IF(WARNING, !ChangeBuffersAreEmpty()) <<
"CALCULATE_CHANGES called with unapplied old changes.";
Cryptographer* crypto = dir_manager()->GetCryptographer(trans);
const syncable::ImmutableEntryKernelMutationMap& mutations =
write_transaction_info.Get().mutations;
for (syncable::EntryKernelMutationMap::const_iterator it =
mutations.Get().begin(); it != mutations.Get().end(); ++it) {
bool existed_before = !it->second.original.ref(syncable::IS_DEL);
bool exists_now = !it->second.mutated.ref(syncable::IS_DEL);
syncable::ModelType type =
syncable::GetModelTypeFromSpecifics(
it->second.mutated.ref(SPECIFICS));
if (type < syncable::FIRST_REAL_MODEL_TYPE)
continue;
int64 handle = it->first;
if (exists_now && !existed_before)
change_buffers_[type].PushAddedItem(handle);
else if (!exists_now && existed_before)
change_buffers_[type].PushDeletedItem(handle);
else if (exists_now && existed_before &&
VisiblePropertiesDiffer(it->second, crypto)) {
change_buffers_[type].PushUpdatedItem(
handle, VisiblePositionsDiffer(it->second));
}
SetExtraChangeRecordData(handle, type, &change_buffers_[type], crypto,
it->second.original, existed_before, exists_now);
}
}
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::HandleCalculateChangesChangeEventFromSyncer(
const ImmutableWriteTransactionInfo& write_transaction_info,
syncable::BaseTransaction* trans) {
LOG_IF(WARNING, !ChangeBuffersAreEmpty()) <<
"CALCULATE_CHANGES called with unapplied old changes.";
Cryptographer* crypto = dir_manager()->GetCryptographer(trans);
const syncable::ImmutableEntryKernelMutationMap& mutations =
write_transaction_info.Get().mutations;
for (syncable::EntryKernelMutationMap::const_iterator it =
mutations.Get().begin(); it != mutations.Get().end(); ++it) {
bool existed_before = !it->second.original.ref(syncable::IS_DEL);
bool exists_now = !it->second.mutated.ref(syncable::IS_DEL);
syncable::ModelType type =
syncable::GetModelTypeFromSpecifics(
it->second.mutated.ref(SPECIFICS));
if (type < syncable::FIRST_REAL_MODEL_TYPE)
continue;
int64 handle = it->first;
if (exists_now && !existed_before)
change_buffers_[type].PushAddedItem(handle);
else if (!exists_now && existed_before)
change_buffers_[type].PushDeletedItem(handle);
else if (exists_now && existed_before &&
VisiblePropertiesDiffer(it->second, crypto)) {
change_buffers_[type].PushUpdatedItem(
handle, VisiblePositionsDiffer(it->second));
}
SetExtraChangeRecordData(handle, type, &change_buffers_[type], crypto,
it->second.original, existed_before, exists_now);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13083
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13083/
|
CWE-494
|
https://github.com/pbatard/rufus/commit/c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb
|
c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb
|
[pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
|
char* FileDialog(BOOL save, char* path, const ext_t* ext, DWORD options)
{
DWORD tmp;
OPENFILENAMEA ofn;
char selected_name[MAX_PATH];
char *ext_string = NULL, *all_files = NULL;
size_t i, j, ext_strlen;
BOOL r;
char* filepath = NULL;
HRESULT hr = FALSE;
IFileDialog *pfd = NULL;
IShellItem *psiResult;
COMDLG_FILTERSPEC* filter_spec = NULL;
wchar_t *wpath = NULL, *wfilename = NULL;
IShellItem *si_path = NULL; // Automatically freed
if ((ext == NULL) || (ext->count == 0) || (ext->extension == NULL) || (ext->description == NULL))
return NULL;
dialog_showing++;
if (nWindowsVersion >= WINDOWS_VISTA) {
INIT_VISTA_SHELL32;
filter_spec = (COMDLG_FILTERSPEC*)calloc(ext->count + 1, sizeof(COMDLG_FILTERSPEC));
if ((IS_VISTA_SHELL32_AVAILABLE) && (filter_spec != NULL)) {
for (i = 0; i < ext->count; i++) {
filter_spec[i].pszSpec = utf8_to_wchar(ext->extension[i]);
filter_spec[i].pszName = utf8_to_wchar(ext->description[i]);
}
filter_spec[i].pszSpec = L"*.*";
filter_spec[i].pszName = utf8_to_wchar(lmprintf(MSG_107));
hr = CoCreateInstance(save ? &CLSID_FileSaveDialog : &CLSID_FileOpenDialog, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC,
&IID_IFileDialog, (LPVOID)&pfd);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("CoCreateInstance for FileOpenDialog failed: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
pfd = NULL; // Just in case
goto fallback;
}
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFileTypes(pfd, (UINT)ext->count + 1, filter_spec);
wpath = utf8_to_wchar(path);
hr = (*pfSHCreateItemFromParsingName)(wpath, NULL, &IID_IShellItem, (LPVOID)&si_path);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFolder(pfd, si_path);
}
safe_free(wpath);
wfilename = utf8_to_wchar((ext->filename == NULL) ? "" : ext->filename);
if (wfilename != NULL) {
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFileName(pfd, wfilename);
}
hr = pfd->lpVtbl->Show(pfd, hMainDialog);
safe_free(wfilename);
for (i = 0; i < ext->count; i++) {
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszSpec);
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszName);
}
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszName);
safe_free(filter_spec);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = pfd->lpVtbl->GetResult(pfd, &psiResult);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = psiResult->lpVtbl->GetDisplayName(psiResult, SIGDN_FILESYSPATH, &wpath);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
filepath = wchar_to_utf8(wpath);
CoTaskMemFree(wpath);
} else {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("Unable to access file path: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
}
psiResult->lpVtbl->Release(psiResult);
}
} else if ((hr & 0xFFFF) != ERROR_CANCELLED) {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("Could not show FileOpenDialog: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
goto fallback;
}
pfd->lpVtbl->Release(pfd);
dialog_showing--;
return filepath;
}
fallback:
safe_free(filter_spec);
if (pfd != NULL) {
pfd->lpVtbl->Release(pfd);
}
}
memset(&ofn, 0, sizeof(ofn));
ofn.lStructSize = sizeof(ofn);
ofn.hwndOwner = hMainDialog;
static_sprintf(selected_name, "%s", (ext->filename == NULL)?"":ext->filename);
ofn.lpstrFile = selected_name;
ofn.nMaxFile = MAX_PATH;
all_files = lmprintf(MSG_107);
ext_strlen = 0;
for (i=0; i<ext->count; i++) {
ext_strlen += safe_strlen(ext->description[i]) + 2*safe_strlen(ext->extension[i]) + sizeof(" ()\r\r");
}
ext_strlen += safe_strlen(all_files) + sizeof(" (*.*)\r*.*\r");
ext_string = (char*)malloc(ext_strlen+1);
if (ext_string == NULL)
return NULL;
ext_string[0] = 0;
for (i=0, j=0; i<ext->count; i++) {
j += _snprintf(&ext_string[j], ext_strlen-j, "%s (%s)\r%s\r", ext->description[i], ext->extension[i], ext->extension[i]);
}
j = _snprintf(&ext_string[j], ext_strlen-j, "%s (*.*)\r*.*\r", all_files);
for (i=0; i<ext_strlen; i++) {
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning(suppress: 6385)
#endif
if (ext_string[i] == '\r') {
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning(suppress: 6386)
#endif
ext_string[i] = 0;
}
}
ofn.lpstrFilter = ext_string;
ofn.nFilterIndex = 1;
ofn.lpstrInitialDir = path;
ofn.Flags = OFN_OVERWRITEPROMPT | options;
if (save) {
r = GetSaveFileNameU(&ofn);
} else {
r = GetOpenFileNameU(&ofn);
}
if (r) {
filepath = safe_strdup(selected_name);
} else {
tmp = CommDlgExtendedError();
if (tmp != 0) {
uprintf("Could not select file for %s. Error %X\n", save?"save":"open", tmp);
}
}
safe_free(ext_string);
dialog_showing--;
return filepath;
}
|
char* FileDialog(BOOL save, char* path, const ext_t* ext, DWORD options)
{
DWORD tmp;
OPENFILENAMEA ofn;
char selected_name[MAX_PATH];
char *ext_string = NULL, *all_files = NULL;
size_t i, j, ext_strlen;
BOOL r;
char* filepath = NULL;
HRESULT hr = FALSE;
IFileDialog *pfd = NULL;
IShellItem *psiResult;
COMDLG_FILTERSPEC* filter_spec = NULL;
wchar_t *wpath = NULL, *wfilename = NULL;
IShellItem *si_path = NULL; // Automatically freed
if ((ext == NULL) || (ext->count == 0) || (ext->extension == NULL) || (ext->description == NULL))
return NULL;
dialog_showing++;
if (nWindowsVersion >= WINDOWS_VISTA) {
INIT_VISTA_SHELL32;
filter_spec = (COMDLG_FILTERSPEC*)calloc(ext->count + 1, sizeof(COMDLG_FILTERSPEC));
if ((IS_VISTA_SHELL32_AVAILABLE) && (filter_spec != NULL)) {
for (i = 0; i < ext->count; i++) {
filter_spec[i].pszSpec = utf8_to_wchar(ext->extension[i]);
filter_spec[i].pszName = utf8_to_wchar(ext->description[i]);
}
filter_spec[i].pszSpec = L"*.*";
filter_spec[i].pszName = utf8_to_wchar(lmprintf(MSG_107));
hr = CoCreateInstance(save ? &CLSID_FileSaveDialog : &CLSID_FileOpenDialog, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC,
&IID_IFileDialog, (LPVOID)&pfd);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("CoCreateInstance for FileOpenDialog failed: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
pfd = NULL; // Just in case
goto fallback;
}
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFileTypes(pfd, (UINT)ext->count + 1, filter_spec);
wpath = utf8_to_wchar(path);
hr = (*pfSHCreateItemFromParsingName)(wpath, NULL, &IID_IShellItem, (LPVOID)&si_path);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFolder(pfd, si_path);
}
safe_free(wpath);
wfilename = utf8_to_wchar((ext->filename == NULL) ? "" : ext->filename);
if (wfilename != NULL) {
pfd->lpVtbl->SetFileName(pfd, wfilename);
}
hr = pfd->lpVtbl->Show(pfd, hMainDialog);
safe_free(wfilename);
for (i = 0; i < ext->count; i++) {
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszSpec);
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszName);
}
safe_free(filter_spec[i].pszName);
safe_free(filter_spec);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = pfd->lpVtbl->GetResult(pfd, &psiResult);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = psiResult->lpVtbl->GetDisplayName(psiResult, SIGDN_FILESYSPATH, &wpath);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
filepath = wchar_to_utf8(wpath);
CoTaskMemFree(wpath);
} else {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("Unable to access file path: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
}
psiResult->lpVtbl->Release(psiResult);
}
} else if ((hr & 0xFFFF) != ERROR_CANCELLED) {
SetLastError(hr);
uprintf("Could not show FileOpenDialog: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
goto fallback;
}
pfd->lpVtbl->Release(pfd);
dialog_showing--;
return filepath;
}
fallback:
safe_free(filter_spec);
if (pfd != NULL) {
pfd->lpVtbl->Release(pfd);
}
}
memset(&ofn, 0, sizeof(ofn));
ofn.lStructSize = sizeof(ofn);
ofn.hwndOwner = hMainDialog;
static_sprintf(selected_name, "%s", (ext->filename == NULL)?"":ext->filename);
ofn.lpstrFile = selected_name;
ofn.nMaxFile = MAX_PATH;
all_files = lmprintf(MSG_107);
ext_strlen = 0;
for (i=0; i<ext->count; i++) {
ext_strlen += safe_strlen(ext->description[i]) + 2*safe_strlen(ext->extension[i]) + sizeof(" ()\r\r");
}
ext_strlen += safe_strlen(all_files) + sizeof(" (*.*)\r*.*\r");
ext_string = (char*)malloc(ext_strlen+1);
if (ext_string == NULL)
return NULL;
ext_string[0] = 0;
for (i=0, j=0; i<ext->count; i++) {
j += _snprintf(&ext_string[j], ext_strlen-j, "%s (%s)\r%s\r", ext->description[i], ext->extension[i], ext->extension[i]);
}
j = _snprintf(&ext_string[j], ext_strlen-j, "%s (*.*)\r*.*\r", all_files);
for (i=0; i<ext_strlen; i++) {
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning(suppress: 6385)
#endif
if (ext_string[i] == '\r') {
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning(suppress: 6386)
#endif
ext_string[i] = 0;
}
}
ofn.lpstrFilter = ext_string;
ofn.nFilterIndex = 1;
ofn.lpstrInitialDir = path;
ofn.Flags = OFN_OVERWRITEPROMPT | options;
if (save) {
r = GetSaveFileNameU(&ofn);
} else {
r = GetOpenFileNameU(&ofn);
}
if (r) {
filepath = safe_strdup(selected_name);
} else {
tmp = CommDlgExtendedError();
if (tmp != 0) {
uprintf("Could not select file for %s. Error %X\n", save?"save":"open", tmp);
}
}
safe_free(ext_string);
dialog_showing--;
return filepath;
}
|
C
|
rufus
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1444
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1444/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
fst_intr(int dummy, void *dev_id)
{
struct fst_card_info *card = dev_id;
struct fst_port_info *port;
int rdidx; /* Event buffer indices */
int wridx;
int event; /* Actual event for processing */
unsigned int dma_intcsr = 0;
unsigned int do_card_interrupt;
unsigned int int_retry_count;
/*
* Check to see if the interrupt was for this card
* return if not
* Note that the call to clear the interrupt is important
*/
dbg(DBG_INTR, "intr: %d %p\n", card->irq, card);
if (card->state != FST_RUNNING) {
pr_err("Interrupt received for card %d in a non running state (%d)\n",
card->card_no, card->state);
/*
* It is possible to really be running, i.e. we have re-loaded
* a running card
* Clear and reprime the interrupt source
*/
fst_clear_intr(card);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Clear and reprime the interrupt source */
fst_clear_intr(card);
/*
* Is the interrupt for this card (handshake == 1)
*/
do_card_interrupt = 0;
if (FST_RDB(card, interruptHandshake) == 1) {
do_card_interrupt += FST_CARD_INT;
/* Set the software acknowledge */
FST_WRB(card, interruptHandshake, 0xEE);
}
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
/*
* Is it a DMA Interrupt
*/
dma_intcsr = inl(card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9054);
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00200000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 0 (Rx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_RX, "DMA Rx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR0);
fst_rx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_rx,
card->dma_len_rx, card->dma_skb_rx,
card->dma_rxpos);
card->dmarx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_RX_DMA_INT;
}
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00400000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 1 (Tx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "DMA Tx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR1);
fst_tx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_tx,
card->dma_len_tx, card->dma_txpos);
card->dmatx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_TX_DMA_INT;
}
}
/*
* Have we been missing Interrupts
*/
int_retry_count = FST_RDL(card, interruptRetryCount);
if (int_retry_count) {
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Card %d int_retry_count is %d\n",
card->card_no, int_retry_count);
FST_WRL(card, interruptRetryCount, 0);
}
if (!do_card_interrupt) {
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Scehdule the bottom half of the ISR */
fst_q_work_item(&fst_work_intq, card->card_no);
tasklet_schedule(&fst_int_task);
/* Drain the event queue */
rdidx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex) & 0x1f;
wridx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.wrindex) & 0x1f;
while (rdidx != wridx) {
event = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.evntbuff[rdidx]);
port = &card->ports[event & 0x03];
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Processing Interrupt event: %x\n", event);
switch (event) {
case TE1_ALMA:
dbg(DBG_INTR, "TE1 Alarm intr\n");
if (port->run)
fst_intr_te1_alarm(card, port);
break;
case CTLA_CHG:
case CTLB_CHG:
case CTLC_CHG:
case CTLD_CHG:
if (port->run)
fst_intr_ctlchg(card, port);
break;
case ABTA_SENT:
case ABTB_SENT:
case ABTC_SENT:
case ABTD_SENT:
dbg(DBG_TX, "Abort complete port %d\n", port->index);
break;
case TXA_UNDF:
case TXB_UNDF:
case TXC_UNDF:
case TXD_UNDF:
/* Difficult to see how we'd get this given that we
* always load up the entire packet for DMA.
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "Tx underflow port %d\n", port->index);
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_errors++;
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_fifo_errors++;
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Tx underflow on card %d port %d\n",
card->card_no, port->index);
break;
case INIT_CPLT:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init OK intr\n");
break;
case INIT_FAIL:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init FAILED intr\n");
card->state = FST_IFAILED;
break;
default:
pr_err("intr: unknown card event %d. ignored\n", event);
break;
}
/* Bump and wrap the index */
if (++rdidx >= MAX_CIRBUFF)
rdidx = 0;
}
FST_WRB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex, rdidx);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
|
fst_intr(int dummy, void *dev_id)
{
struct fst_card_info *card = dev_id;
struct fst_port_info *port;
int rdidx; /* Event buffer indices */
int wridx;
int event; /* Actual event for processing */
unsigned int dma_intcsr = 0;
unsigned int do_card_interrupt;
unsigned int int_retry_count;
/*
* Check to see if the interrupt was for this card
* return if not
* Note that the call to clear the interrupt is important
*/
dbg(DBG_INTR, "intr: %d %p\n", card->irq, card);
if (card->state != FST_RUNNING) {
pr_err("Interrupt received for card %d in a non running state (%d)\n",
card->card_no, card->state);
/*
* It is possible to really be running, i.e. we have re-loaded
* a running card
* Clear and reprime the interrupt source
*/
fst_clear_intr(card);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Clear and reprime the interrupt source */
fst_clear_intr(card);
/*
* Is the interrupt for this card (handshake == 1)
*/
do_card_interrupt = 0;
if (FST_RDB(card, interruptHandshake) == 1) {
do_card_interrupt += FST_CARD_INT;
/* Set the software acknowledge */
FST_WRB(card, interruptHandshake, 0xEE);
}
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
/*
* Is it a DMA Interrupt
*/
dma_intcsr = inl(card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9054);
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00200000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 0 (Rx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_RX, "DMA Rx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR0);
fst_rx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_rx,
card->dma_len_rx, card->dma_skb_rx,
card->dma_rxpos);
card->dmarx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_RX_DMA_INT;
}
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00400000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 1 (Tx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "DMA Tx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR1);
fst_tx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_tx,
card->dma_len_tx, card->dma_txpos);
card->dmatx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_TX_DMA_INT;
}
}
/*
* Have we been missing Interrupts
*/
int_retry_count = FST_RDL(card, interruptRetryCount);
if (int_retry_count) {
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Card %d int_retry_count is %d\n",
card->card_no, int_retry_count);
FST_WRL(card, interruptRetryCount, 0);
}
if (!do_card_interrupt) {
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Scehdule the bottom half of the ISR */
fst_q_work_item(&fst_work_intq, card->card_no);
tasklet_schedule(&fst_int_task);
/* Drain the event queue */
rdidx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex) & 0x1f;
wridx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.wrindex) & 0x1f;
while (rdidx != wridx) {
event = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.evntbuff[rdidx]);
port = &card->ports[event & 0x03];
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Processing Interrupt event: %x\n", event);
switch (event) {
case TE1_ALMA:
dbg(DBG_INTR, "TE1 Alarm intr\n");
if (port->run)
fst_intr_te1_alarm(card, port);
break;
case CTLA_CHG:
case CTLB_CHG:
case CTLC_CHG:
case CTLD_CHG:
if (port->run)
fst_intr_ctlchg(card, port);
break;
case ABTA_SENT:
case ABTB_SENT:
case ABTC_SENT:
case ABTD_SENT:
dbg(DBG_TX, "Abort complete port %d\n", port->index);
break;
case TXA_UNDF:
case TXB_UNDF:
case TXC_UNDF:
case TXD_UNDF:
/* Difficult to see how we'd get this given that we
* always load up the entire packet for DMA.
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "Tx underflow port %d\n", port->index);
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_errors++;
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_fifo_errors++;
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Tx underflow on card %d port %d\n",
card->card_no, port->index);
break;
case INIT_CPLT:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init OK intr\n");
break;
case INIT_FAIL:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init FAILED intr\n");
card->state = FST_IFAILED;
break;
default:
pr_err("intr: unknown card event %d. ignored\n", event);
break;
}
/* Bump and wrap the index */
if (++rdidx >= MAX_CIRBUFF)
rdidx = 0;
}
FST_WRB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex, rdidx);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
double WebPagePrivate::clampedScale(double scale) const
{
if (scale < minimumScale())
return minimumScale();
if (scale > maximumScale())
return maximumScale();
return scale;
}
|
double WebPagePrivate::clampedScale(double scale) const
{
if (scale < minimumScale())
return minimumScale();
if (scale > maximumScale())
return maximumScale();
return scale;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14468/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/aa3e54f594385ce7e1e319b0c84999e51192578b
|
aa3e54f594385ce7e1e319b0c84999e51192578b
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14468/FRF.16: Add a missing length check.
The specification says in a well-formed Magic Number information element
the data is exactly 4 bytes long. In mfr_print() check this before trying
to read those 4 bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
/* FRF.16.1 Section 3.4.3 Magic Number Information Element */
if (ie_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(invalid length)"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
|
mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c4225d1e9b23e7071bbf47ada310a9a7e5661a3
|
0c4225d1e9b23e7071bbf47ada310a9a7e5661a3
|
2011-07-01 Oliver Hunt <[email protected]>
IE Web Workers demo crashes in JSC::SlotVisitor::visitChildren()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63732
Reviewed by Gavin Barraclough.
Initialise the memory at the head of the new storage so that
GC is safe if triggered by reportExtraMemoryCost.
* runtime/JSArray.cpp:
(JSC::JSArray::increaseVectorPrefixLength):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@90282 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSArray::~JSArray()
{
ASSERT(vptr() == JSGlobalData::jsArrayVPtr);
checkConsistency(DestructorConsistencyCheck);
delete m_storage->m_sparseValueMap;
fastFree(m_storage->m_allocBase);
}
|
JSArray::~JSArray()
{
ASSERT(vptr() == JSGlobalData::jsArrayVPtr);
checkConsistency(DestructorConsistencyCheck);
delete m_storage->m_sparseValueMap;
fastFree(m_storage->m_allocBase);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
static void php_image_filter_selective_blur(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageSelectiveBlur(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
|
static void php_image_filter_selective_blur(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageSelectiveBlur(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4014/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void drop_nlink(struct inode *inode)
{
WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0);
inode->__i_nlink--;
if (!inode->i_nlink)
atomic_long_inc(&inode->i_sb->s_remove_count);
}
|
void drop_nlink(struct inode *inode)
{
WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0);
inode->__i_nlink--;
if (!inode->i_nlink)
atomic_long_inc(&inode->i_sb->s_remove_count);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9727
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9727/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b
|
937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b
| null |
ttfFont *ttfFont__create(gs_font_dir *dir)
{
gs_memory_t *mem = dir->memory->stable_memory;
ttfFont *ttf;
if (dir->ttm == NULL) {
gx_ttfMemory *m = gs_alloc_struct(mem, gx_ttfMemory, &st_gx_ttfMemory, "ttfFont__create(gx_ttfMemory)");
if (!m)
return 0;
m->super.alloc_struct = gx_ttfMemory__alloc_struct;
m->super.alloc_bytes = gx_ttfMemory__alloc_bytes;
m->super.free = gx_ttfMemory__free;
m->memory = mem;
dir->ttm = m;
}
if(ttfInterpreter__obtain(&dir->ttm->super, &dir->tti))
return 0;
if(gx_san__obtain(mem, &dir->san))
return 0;
ttf = gs_alloc_struct(mem, ttfFont, &st_ttfFont, "ttfFont__create");
if (ttf == NULL)
return 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
ttfFont__init(ttf, &dir->ttm->super, DebugRepaint,
(gs_debug_c('Y') ? DebugPrint : NULL), mem);
#else
ttfFont__init(ttf, &dir->ttm->super, DebugRepaint, NULL, mem);
#endif
return ttf;
}
|
ttfFont *ttfFont__create(gs_font_dir *dir)
{
gs_memory_t *mem = dir->memory->stable_memory;
ttfFont *ttf;
if (dir->ttm == NULL) {
gx_ttfMemory *m = gs_alloc_struct(mem, gx_ttfMemory, &st_gx_ttfMemory, "ttfFont__create(gx_ttfMemory)");
if (!m)
return 0;
m->super.alloc_struct = gx_ttfMemory__alloc_struct;
m->super.alloc_bytes = gx_ttfMemory__alloc_bytes;
m->super.free = gx_ttfMemory__free;
m->memory = mem;
dir->ttm = m;
}
if(ttfInterpreter__obtain(&dir->ttm->super, &dir->tti))
return 0;
if(gx_san__obtain(mem, &dir->san))
return 0;
ttf = gs_alloc_struct(mem, ttfFont, &st_ttfFont, "ttfFont__create");
if (ttf == NULL)
return 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
ttfFont__init(ttf, &dir->ttm->super, DebugRepaint,
(gs_debug_c('Y') ? DebugPrint : NULL), mem);
#else
ttfFont__init(ttf, &dir->ttm->super, DebugRepaint, NULL, mem);
#endif
return ttf;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int decode_setattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_setattrres *res)
{
__be32 *p;
uint32_t bmlen;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_SETATTR);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(bmlen);
READ_BUF(bmlen << 2);
return 0;
}
|
static int decode_setattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_setattrres *res)
{
__be32 *p;
uint32_t bmlen;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_SETATTR);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(bmlen);
READ_BUF(bmlen << 2);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5202
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
Ensure that OpenVR only adds placeholder buttons when needed.
The current implementation of the OpenVRGamepadHelper always adds the
optional grip and secondary axes buttons; however, if those buttons are
missing and no additional buttons need to be supported, they should not
be included. A prime example of this is the vive controller, which has
a trigger, a grip, and a touchpad, but no secondary axis button. This
is essentially the controller that the new TestGamepadOptionalData test
builds.
Bug: 964026
Change-Id: I1de93b5bd7bd0d9e75013cf33b8f333e5d70270f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1627914
Reviewed-by: Bill Orr <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Cooper <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#662843}
|
std::map<vr::EVRButtonId, GamepadBuilder::ButtonData> GetAxesButtons(
vr::IVRSystem* vr_system,
const vr::VRControllerState_t& controller_state,
uint64_t supported_buttons,
uint32_t controller_id) {
std::map<vr::EVRButtonId, GamepadBuilder::ButtonData> button_data_map;
for (uint32_t j = 0; j < vr::k_unControllerStateAxisCount; ++j) {
int32_t axis_type = vr_system->GetInt32TrackedDeviceProperty(
controller_id,
static_cast<vr::TrackedDeviceProperty>(vr::Prop_Axis0Type_Int32 + j));
GamepadBuilder::ButtonData button_data;
double x_axis = controller_state.rAxis[j].x;
double y_axis = -controller_state.rAxis[j].y;
switch (axis_type) {
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_Joystick:
x_axis = std::fabs(x_axis) < kJoystickDeadzone ? 0 : x_axis;
y_axis = std::fabs(y_axis) < kJoystickDeadzone ? 0 : y_axis;
FALLTHROUGH;
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_TrackPad: {
button_data.has_both_axes = true;
button_data.x_axis = x_axis;
button_data.y_axis = y_axis;
vr::EVRButtonId button_id = GetAxisId(j);
GamepadButton button;
if (TryGetGamepadButton(controller_state, supported_buttons, button_id,
&button)) {
button_data.touched = button.touched;
button_data.pressed = button.pressed;
button_data.value = button.value;
button_data_map[button_id] = button_data;
}
} break;
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_Trigger: {
GamepadButton button;
GamepadBuilder::ButtonData button_data;
vr::EVRButtonId button_id = GetAxisId(j);
if (TryGetGamepadButton(controller_state, supported_buttons, button_id,
&button)) {
button_data.touched = button.touched;
button_data.pressed = button.pressed;
button_data.value = x_axis;
button_data_map[button_id] = button_data;
}
} break;
}
}
return button_data_map;
}
|
std::map<vr::EVRButtonId, GamepadBuilder::ButtonData> GetAxesButtons(
vr::IVRSystem* vr_system,
const vr::VRControllerState_t& controller_state,
uint64_t supported_buttons,
uint32_t controller_id) {
std::map<vr::EVRButtonId, GamepadBuilder::ButtonData> button_data_map;
for (uint32_t j = 0; j < vr::k_unControllerStateAxisCount; ++j) {
int32_t axis_type = vr_system->GetInt32TrackedDeviceProperty(
controller_id,
static_cast<vr::TrackedDeviceProperty>(vr::Prop_Axis0Type_Int32 + j));
GamepadBuilder::ButtonData button_data;
double x_axis = controller_state.rAxis[j].x;
double y_axis = -controller_state.rAxis[j].y;
switch (axis_type) {
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_Joystick:
x_axis = std::fabs(x_axis) < kJoystickDeadzone ? 0 : x_axis;
y_axis = std::fabs(y_axis) < kJoystickDeadzone ? 0 : y_axis;
FALLTHROUGH;
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_TrackPad: {
button_data.has_both_axes = true;
button_data.x_axis = x_axis;
button_data.y_axis = y_axis;
vr::EVRButtonId button_id = GetAxisId(j);
GamepadButton button;
if (TryGetGamepadButton(controller_state, supported_buttons, button_id,
&button)) {
button_data.touched = button.touched;
button_data.pressed = button.pressed;
button_data.value = button.value;
button_data_map[button_id] = button_data;
}
} break;
case vr::k_eControllerAxis_Trigger: {
GamepadButton button;
GamepadBuilder::ButtonData button_data;
vr::EVRButtonId button_id = GetAxisId(j);
if (TryGetGamepadButton(controller_state, supported_buttons, button_id,
&button)) {
button_data.touched = button.touched;
button_data.pressed = button.pressed;
button_data.value = x_axis;
button_data_map[button_id] = button_data;
}
} break;
}
}
return button_data_map;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_add_ssl_client(SpiceServer *s, int socket, int skip_auth)
{
RedLinkInfo *link;
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!(link = reds_init_client_ssl_connection(socket))) {
return -1;
}
link->skip_auth = skip_auth;
return 0;
}
|
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_add_ssl_client(SpiceServer *s, int socket, int skip_auth)
{
RedLinkInfo *link;
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!(link = reds_init_client_ssl_connection(socket))) {
return -1;
}
link->skip_auth = skip_auth;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8816/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int hub_set_port_link_state(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
unsigned int link_status)
{
return set_port_feature(hub->hdev,
port1 | (link_status << 3),
USB_PORT_FEAT_LINK_STATE);
}
|
static int hub_set_port_link_state(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
unsigned int link_status)
{
return set_port_feature(hub->hdev,
port1 | (link_status << 3),
USB_PORT_FEAT_LINK_STATE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ec14f31eca3a51f665432973552ee575635132b3
|
ec14f31eca3a51f665432973552ee575635132b3
|
[EFL] Change the behavior of ewk_view_scale_set.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70078
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Remove center point basis zoom alignment from ewk_view_scale_set to call
Page::setPageScaleFactor without any adjustment.
* ewk/ewk_view.cpp:
(ewk_view_scale_set):
* ewk/ewk_view.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@103288 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Eina_Bool ewk_view_mixed_content_displayed_get(const Evas_Object* ewkView)
{
EWK_VIEW_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkView, smartData, false);
EWK_VIEW_PRIV_GET_OR_RETURN(smartData, priv, false);
return priv->flags.hasDisplayedMixedContent;
}
|
Eina_Bool ewk_view_mixed_content_displayed_get(const Evas_Object* ewkView)
{
EWK_VIEW_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkView, smartData, false);
EWK_VIEW_PRIV_GET_OR_RETURN(smartData, priv, false);
return priv->flags.hasDisplayedMixedContent;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20847
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20847/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/pull/1168/commits/c58df149900df862806d0e892859b41115875845
|
c58df149900df862806d0e892859b41115875845
|
[OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
|
static void opj_get_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* non-corrected (in regard to image offset) tile offset */
OPJ_UINT32 l_tx0, l_ty0;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
l_tx0 = p_cp->tx0 + p *
p_cp->tdx; /* can't be greater than p_image->x1 so won't overflow */
*p_tx0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_tx0, p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_tx0, p_cp->tdx), p_image->x1);
l_ty0 = p_cp->ty0 + q *
p_cp->tdy; /* can't be greater than p_image->y1 so won't overflow */
*p_ty0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_ty0, p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_ty0, p_cp->tdy), p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0 == l_rx1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0 == l_ry1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
|
static void opj_get_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0 == l_rx1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0 == l_ry1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 1 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
nautilus_file_operations_new_file (GtkWidget *parent_view,
GdkPoint *target_point,
const char *parent_dir,
const char *target_filename,
const char *initial_contents,
int length,
NautilusCreateCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
CreateJob *job;
GtkWindow *parent_window;
parent_window = NULL;
if (parent_view)
{
parent_window = (GtkWindow *) gtk_widget_get_ancestor (parent_view, GTK_TYPE_WINDOW);
}
job = op_job_new (CreateJob, parent_window);
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
job->dest_dir = g_file_new_for_uri (parent_dir);
if (target_point != NULL)
{
job->position = *target_point;
job->has_position = TRUE;
}
job->src_data = g_memdup (initial_contents, length);
job->length = length;
job->filename = g_strdup (target_filename);
if (!nautilus_file_undo_manager_is_operating ())
{
job->common.undo_info = nautilus_file_undo_info_create_new (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_OP_CREATE_EMPTY_FILE);
}
task = g_task_new (NULL, job->common.cancellable, create_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, create_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
|
nautilus_file_operations_new_file (GtkWidget *parent_view,
GdkPoint *target_point,
const char *parent_dir,
const char *target_filename,
const char *initial_contents,
int length,
NautilusCreateCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
CreateJob *job;
GtkWindow *parent_window;
parent_window = NULL;
if (parent_view)
{
parent_window = (GtkWindow *) gtk_widget_get_ancestor (parent_view, GTK_TYPE_WINDOW);
}
job = op_job_new (CreateJob, parent_window);
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
job->dest_dir = g_file_new_for_uri (parent_dir);
if (target_point != NULL)
{
job->position = *target_point;
job->has_position = TRUE;
}
job->src_data = g_memdup (initial_contents, length);
job->length = length;
job->filename = g_strdup (target_filename);
if (!nautilus_file_undo_manager_is_operating ())
{
job->common.undo_info = nautilus_file_undo_info_create_new (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_OP_CREATE_EMPTY_FILE);
}
task = g_task_new (NULL, job->common.cancellable, create_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, create_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_find_reclaim_client(const char *recdir, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
unsigned int strhashval;
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp = NULL;
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_find_reclaim_client for recdir %s\n", recdir);
strhashval = clientstr_hashval(recdir);
list_for_each_entry(crp, &nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[strhashval], cr_strhash) {
if (same_name(crp->cr_recdir, recdir)) {
return crp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
nfsd4_find_reclaim_client(const char *recdir, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
unsigned int strhashval;
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp = NULL;
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_find_reclaim_client for recdir %s\n", recdir);
strhashval = clientstr_hashval(recdir);
list_for_each_entry(crp, &nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[strhashval], cr_strhash) {
if (same_name(crp->cr_recdir, recdir)) {
return crp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8897/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int trapnr)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct fpu *fpu = &task->thread.fpu;
siginfo_t info;
char *str = (trapnr == X86_TRAP_MF) ? "fpu exception" :
"simd exception";
if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, error_code, trapnr, SIGFPE) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (!fixup_exception(regs, trapnr)) {
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
die(str, regs, error_code);
}
return;
}
/*
* Save the info for the exception handler and clear the error.
*/
fpu__save(fpu);
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs);
info.si_code = fpu__exception_code(fpu, trapnr);
/* Retry when we get spurious exceptions: */
if (!info.si_code)
return;
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, task);
}
|
static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int trapnr)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct fpu *fpu = &task->thread.fpu;
siginfo_t info;
char *str = (trapnr == X86_TRAP_MF) ? "fpu exception" :
"simd exception";
if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, error_code, trapnr, SIGFPE) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (!fixup_exception(regs, trapnr)) {
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
die(str, regs, error_code);
}
return;
}
/*
* Save the info for the exception handler and clear the error.
*/
fpu__save(fpu);
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs);
info.si_code = fpu__exception_code(fpu, trapnr);
/* Retry when we get spurious exceptions: */
if (!info.si_code)
return;
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, task);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3101
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3101/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f0b86c2fc77fca1508d81314f864011abe25f04
|
8f0b86c2fc77fca1508d81314f864011abe25f04
|
Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRenderbufferStorage(
GLenum target, GLenum internalformat, GLsizei width, GLsizei height) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* renderbuffer =
GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(GL_RENDERBUFFER);
if (!renderbuffer) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetRenderbufferStorage: no renderbuffer bound");
return;
}
if (width > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size() ||
height > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetRenderbufferStorage: size too large");
return;
}
GLenum impl_format = internalformat;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() != gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2) {
switch (impl_format) {
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT16:
impl_format = GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT;
break;
case GL_RGBA4:
case GL_RGB5_A1:
impl_format = GL_RGBA;
break;
case GL_RGB565:
impl_format = GL_RGB;
break;
}
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glRenderbufferStorageEXT(target, impl_format, width, height);
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
framebuffer_manager()->IncFramebufferStateChangeCount();
renderbuffer_manager()->SetInfo(
renderbuffer, 0, internalformat, width, height);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRenderbufferStorage(
GLenum target, GLenum internalformat, GLsizei width, GLsizei height) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* renderbuffer =
GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(GL_RENDERBUFFER);
if (!renderbuffer) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetRenderbufferStorage: no renderbuffer bound");
return;
}
if (width > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size() ||
height > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetRenderbufferStorage: size too large");
return;
}
GLenum impl_format = internalformat;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() != gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2) {
switch (impl_format) {
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT16:
impl_format = GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT;
break;
case GL_RGBA4:
case GL_RGB5_A1:
impl_format = GL_RGBA;
break;
case GL_RGB565:
impl_format = GL_RGB;
break;
}
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glRenderbufferStorageEXT(target, impl_format, width, height);
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
framebuffer_manager()->IncFramebufferStateChangeCount();
renderbuffer_manager()->SetInfo(
renderbuffer, 0, internalformat, width, height);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_do_open_expired(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_open_expired(ctx, state);
switch (err) {
default:
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
err = 0;
}
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
|
static int nfs4_do_open_expired(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_open_expired(ctx, state);
switch (err) {
default:
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
err = 0;
}
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripGtk::TabSelectionChanged(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
const TabStripSelectionModel& old_model) {
bool tiny_tabs = current_unselected_width_ != current_selected_width_;
if (!IsAnimating() && (!needs_resize_layout_ || tiny_tabs))
Layout();
if (model_->active_index() >= 0)
GetTabAt(model_->active_index())->SchedulePaint();
if (old_model.active() >= 0) {
GetTabAt(old_model.active())->SchedulePaint();
GetTabAt(old_model.active())->StopMiniTabTitleAnimation();
}
std::vector<int> indices_affected;
std::insert_iterator<std::vector<int> > it1(indices_affected,
indices_affected.begin());
std::set_symmetric_difference(
old_model.selected_indices().begin(),
old_model.selected_indices().end(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().begin(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().end(),
it1);
for (std::vector<int>::iterator it = indices_affected.begin();
it != indices_affected.end(); ++it) {
if (*it != model_->active_index() && *it != old_model.active())
GetTabAtAdjustForAnimation(*it)->SchedulePaint();
}
TabStripSelectionModel::SelectedIndices no_longer_selected;
std::insert_iterator<std::vector<int> > it2(no_longer_selected,
no_longer_selected.begin());
std::set_difference(old_model.selected_indices().begin(),
old_model.selected_indices().end(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().begin(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().end(),
it2);
for (std::vector<int>::iterator it = no_longer_selected.begin();
it != no_longer_selected.end(); ++it) {
GetTabAtAdjustForAnimation(*it)->StopMiniTabTitleAnimation();
}
}
|
void TabStripGtk::TabSelectionChanged(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
const TabStripSelectionModel& old_model) {
bool tiny_tabs = current_unselected_width_ != current_selected_width_;
if (!IsAnimating() && (!needs_resize_layout_ || tiny_tabs))
Layout();
if (model_->active_index() >= 0)
GetTabAt(model_->active_index())->SchedulePaint();
if (old_model.active() >= 0) {
GetTabAt(old_model.active())->SchedulePaint();
GetTabAt(old_model.active())->StopMiniTabTitleAnimation();
}
std::vector<int> indices_affected;
std::insert_iterator<std::vector<int> > it1(indices_affected,
indices_affected.begin());
std::set_symmetric_difference(
old_model.selected_indices().begin(),
old_model.selected_indices().end(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().begin(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().end(),
it1);
for (std::vector<int>::iterator it = indices_affected.begin();
it != indices_affected.end(); ++it) {
if (*it != model_->active_index() && *it != old_model.active())
GetTabAtAdjustForAnimation(*it)->SchedulePaint();
}
TabStripSelectionModel::SelectedIndices no_longer_selected;
std::insert_iterator<std::vector<int> > it2(no_longer_selected,
no_longer_selected.begin());
std::set_difference(old_model.selected_indices().begin(),
old_model.selected_indices().end(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().begin(),
model_->selection_model().selected_indices().end(),
it2);
for (std::vector<int>::iterator it = no_longer_selected.begin();
it != no_longer_selected.end(); ++it) {
GetTabAtAdjustForAnimation(*it)->StopMiniTabTitleAnimation();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2486
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2486/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/davidben/nspluginwrapper/commit/7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
|
7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
|
Support all the new variables added
|
g_NPN_GetValue(NPP instance, NPNVariable variable, void *value)
{
D(bug("NPN_GetValue instance=%p, variable=%d [%s]\n", instance, variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetValue not called from the main thread\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
PluginInstance *plugin = NULL;
if (instance)
plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
switch (variable) {
case NPNVxDisplay:
*(void **)value = x_display;
break;
case NPNVxtAppContext:
*(void **)value = XtDisplayToApplicationContext(x_display);
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
break;
#if USE_XPCOM
case NPNVserviceManager: {
nsIServiceManager *sm;
int ret = NS_GetServiceManager(&sm);
if (NS_FAILED(ret)) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NS_GetServiceManager failed\n");
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*(nsIServiceManager **)value = sm;
break;
}
case NPNVDOMWindow:
case NPNVDOMElement:
npw_printf("WARNING: %s is not supported by NPN_GetValue()\n", string_of_NPNVariable(variable));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
#endif
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
if (plugin == NULL) {
npw_printf("ERROR: NPNVnetscapeWindow requires a non NULL instance\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL) {
GdkNativeWindow netscape_xid = None;
NPError error = g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, &netscape_xid);
if (error != NPERR_NO_ERROR)
return error;
if (netscape_xid == None)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
plugin->browser_toplevel = gdk_window_foreign_new(netscape_xid);
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*((GdkNativeWindow *)value) = GDK_WINDOW_XWINDOW(plugin->browser_toplevel);
break;
#if ALLOW_WINDOWLESS_PLUGINS
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
#endif
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
case NPNVprivateModeBool:
case NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:
return g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, value);
default:
switch (variable & 0xff) {
case 13: /* NPNVToolkit */
if (NPW_TOOLKIT == NPNVGtk2) {
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
break;
}
D(bug("WARNING: unhandled variable %d (%s) in NPN_GetValue()\n", variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
g_NPN_GetValue(NPP instance, NPNVariable variable, void *value)
{
D(bug("NPN_GetValue instance=%p, variable=%d [%s]\n", instance, variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetValue not called from the main thread\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
PluginInstance *plugin = NULL;
if (instance)
plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
switch (variable) {
case NPNVxDisplay:
*(void **)value = x_display;
break;
case NPNVxtAppContext:
*(void **)value = XtDisplayToApplicationContext(x_display);
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
break;
#if USE_XPCOM
case NPNVserviceManager: {
nsIServiceManager *sm;
int ret = NS_GetServiceManager(&sm);
if (NS_FAILED(ret)) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NS_GetServiceManager failed\n");
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*(nsIServiceManager **)value = sm;
break;
}
case NPNVDOMWindow:
case NPNVDOMElement:
npw_printf("WARNING: %s is not supported by NPN_GetValue()\n", string_of_NPNVariable(variable));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
#endif
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
if (plugin == NULL) {
npw_printf("ERROR: NPNVnetscapeWindow requires a non NULL instance\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL) {
GdkNativeWindow netscape_xid = None;
NPError error = g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, &netscape_xid);
if (error != NPERR_NO_ERROR)
return error;
if (netscape_xid == None)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
plugin->browser_toplevel = gdk_window_foreign_new(netscape_xid);
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*((GdkNativeWindow *)value) = GDK_WINDOW_XWINDOW(plugin->browser_toplevel);
break;
#if ALLOW_WINDOWLESS_PLUGINS
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
#endif
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
return g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, value);
default:
switch (variable & 0xff) {
case 13: /* NPNVToolkit */
if (NPW_TOOLKIT == NPNVGtk2) {
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
break;
}
D(bug("WARNING: unhandled variable %d (%s) in NPN_GetValue()\n", variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
nspluginwrapper
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
StyleResolver& Document::EnsureStyleResolver() const {
return style_engine_->EnsureResolver();
}
|
StyleResolver& Document::EnsureStyleResolver() const {
return style_engine_->EnsureResolver();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3909/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/d4271b792bdad85a80e2b83ab34c4b30b74f53ec
|
d4271b792bdad85a80e2b83ab34c4b30b74f53ec
|
SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
|
void SoftMPEG4::updatePortDefinitions(bool updateCrop, bool updateInputSize) {
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop, updateInputSize);
/* We have to align our width and height - this should affect stride! */
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = align(def->format.video.nStride, 16);
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = align(def->format.video.nSliceHeight, 16);
def->nBufferSize = (def->format.video.nStride * def->format.video.nSliceHeight * 3) / 2;
}
|
void SoftMPEG4::updatePortDefinitions(bool updateCrop, bool updateInputSize) {
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop, updateInputSize);
/* We have to align our width and height - this should affect stride! */
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = align(def->format.video.nStride, 16);
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = align(def->format.video.nSliceHeight, 16);
def->nBufferSize = (def->format.video.nStride * def->format.video.nSliceHeight * 3) / 2;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5794
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5794/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnResponseStarted(
const scoped_refptr<network::ResourceResponse>& response,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr url_loader_client_endpoints,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationData> navigation_data,
const GlobalRequestID& request_id,
bool is_download,
NavigationDownloadPolicy download_policy,
bool is_stream,
base::Optional<SubresourceLoaderParams> subresource_loader_params) {
is_download_ = is_download && IsNavigationDownloadAllowed(download_policy);
is_stream_ = is_stream;
request_id_ = request_id;
if (is_download &&
download_policy == NavigationDownloadPolicy::kDisallowOpenerCrossOrigin) {
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh = frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
rfh->AddMessageToConsole(
CONSOLE_MESSAGE_LEVEL_ERROR,
base::StringPrintf(
"Navigating a cross-origin opener to a download (%s) is "
"deprecated, see "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5742188281462784.",
navigation_handle_->GetURL().spec().c_str()));
GetContentClient()->browser()->LogWebFeatureForCurrentPage(
rfh, blink::mojom::WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOrigin);
}
if (state_ != STARTED) {
DEBUG_ALIAS_FOR_GURL(url, navigation_handle_->GetURL());
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
}
DCHECK_EQ(state_, STARTED);
DCHECK(response);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO0("navigation", "NavigationRequest", this,
"OnResponseStarted");
state_ = RESPONSE_STARTED;
response_should_be_rendered_ =
!is_download_ && (!response->head.headers.get() ||
(response->head.headers->response_code() != 204 &&
response->head.headers->response_code() != 205));
if (!response_should_be_rendered_) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
net_error_ = net::ERR_ABORTED;
}
commit_params_.service_worker_provider_id =
navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle()
? navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle()
->service_worker_provider_host_id()
: kInvalidServiceWorkerProviderId;
commit_params_.appcache_host_id =
navigation_handle_->appcache_handle()
? navigation_handle_->appcache_handle()->appcache_host_id()
: blink::mojom::kAppCacheNoHostId;
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start =
std::max(commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start,
response->head.service_worker_ready_time);
if (commit_params_.was_activated == WasActivatedOption::kUnknown) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kNo;
if (navigation_handle_->IsRendererInitiated() &&
(frame_tree_node_->has_received_user_gesture() ||
frame_tree_node_->has_received_user_gesture_before_nav()) &&
ShouldPropagateUserActivation(
frame_tree_node_->current_origin(),
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetURL()))) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kYes;
} else if (((navigation_handle_->HasUserGesture() &&
navigation_handle_->IsRendererInitiated()) ||
navigation_handle_->WasStartedFromContextMenu()) &&
ShouldPropagateUserActivation(
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetReferrer().url),
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetURL()))) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kYes;
}
}
if (response_should_be_rendered_) {
render_frame_host_ =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(
render_frame_host_, common_params_.url);
} else {
render_frame_host_ = nullptr;
}
DCHECK(render_frame_host_ || !response_should_be_rendered_);
if (!browser_initiated_ && render_frame_host_ &&
render_frame_host_ != frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host()) {
common_params_.source_location.reset();
if (!frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetDelegate()->ShouldTransferNavigation(
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
}
if (navigation_data)
navigation_handle_->set_navigation_data(std::move(navigation_data));
navigation_handle_->set_proxy_server(response->head.proxy_server);
common_params_.previews_state =
GetContentClient()->browser()->DetermineCommittedPreviews(
common_params_.previews_state, navigation_handle_.get(),
response->head.headers.get());
response_ = response;
url_loader_client_endpoints_ = std::move(url_loader_client_endpoints);
ssl_info_ = response->head.ssl_info;
subresource_loader_params_ = std::move(subresource_loader_params);
if (render_frame_host_ &&
SiteInstanceImpl::ShouldAssignSiteForURL(common_params_.url)) {
render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->SetIsUsed();
SiteInstanceImpl* instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
if (!instance->HasSite() &&
SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
instance->GetBrowserContext(), instance->GetIsolationContext(),
common_params_.url)) {
instance->SetSite(common_params_.url);
}
}
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationResponseReceived(*this, *response);
if (is_download_ && (response->head.headers.get() &&
(response->head.headers->response_code() / 100 != 2))) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net::ERR_INVALID_RESPONSE),
false /* skip_throttles */, base::nullopt /* error_page_content */,
false /* collapse_frame */);
return;
}
net::Error net_error = CheckContentSecurityPolicy(
navigation_handle_->WasServerRedirect() /* has_followed_redirect */,
false /* url_upgraded_after_redirect */, true /* is_response_check */);
if (net_error != net::OK) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net_error),
false /* skip_throttles */,
base::nullopt /* error_page_content */,
false /* collapse_frame */);
return;
}
navigation_handle_->WillProcessResponse(
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnWillProcessResponseChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnResponseStarted(
const scoped_refptr<network::ResourceResponse>& response,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr url_loader_client_endpoints,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationData> navigation_data,
const GlobalRequestID& request_id,
bool is_download,
NavigationDownloadPolicy download_policy,
bool is_stream,
base::Optional<SubresourceLoaderParams> subresource_loader_params) {
is_download_ = is_download && IsNavigationDownloadAllowed(download_policy);
is_stream_ = is_stream;
request_id_ = request_id;
if (is_download &&
download_policy == NavigationDownloadPolicy::kDisallowOpenerCrossOrigin) {
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh = frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
rfh->AddMessageToConsole(
CONSOLE_MESSAGE_LEVEL_ERROR,
base::StringPrintf(
"Navigating a cross-origin opener to a download (%s) is "
"deprecated, see "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5742188281462784.",
navigation_handle_->GetURL().spec().c_str()));
GetContentClient()->browser()->LogWebFeatureForCurrentPage(
rfh, blink::mojom::WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOrigin);
}
if (state_ != STARTED) {
DEBUG_ALIAS_FOR_GURL(url, navigation_handle_->GetURL());
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
}
DCHECK_EQ(state_, STARTED);
DCHECK(response);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO0("navigation", "NavigationRequest", this,
"OnResponseStarted");
state_ = RESPONSE_STARTED;
response_should_be_rendered_ =
!is_download_ && (!response->head.headers.get() ||
(response->head.headers->response_code() != 204 &&
response->head.headers->response_code() != 205));
if (!response_should_be_rendered_) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
net_error_ = net::ERR_ABORTED;
}
commit_params_.service_worker_provider_id =
navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle()
? navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle()
->service_worker_provider_host_id()
: kInvalidServiceWorkerProviderId;
commit_params_.appcache_host_id =
navigation_handle_->appcache_handle()
? navigation_handle_->appcache_handle()->appcache_host_id()
: blink::mojom::kAppCacheNoHostId;
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start =
std::max(commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start,
response->head.service_worker_ready_time);
if (commit_params_.was_activated == WasActivatedOption::kUnknown) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kNo;
if (navigation_handle_->IsRendererInitiated() &&
(frame_tree_node_->has_received_user_gesture() ||
frame_tree_node_->has_received_user_gesture_before_nav()) &&
ShouldPropagateUserActivation(
frame_tree_node_->current_origin(),
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetURL()))) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kYes;
} else if (((navigation_handle_->HasUserGesture() &&
navigation_handle_->IsRendererInitiated()) ||
navigation_handle_->WasStartedFromContextMenu()) &&
ShouldPropagateUserActivation(
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetReferrer().url),
url::Origin::Create(navigation_handle_->GetURL()))) {
commit_params_.was_activated = WasActivatedOption::kYes;
}
}
if (response_should_be_rendered_) {
render_frame_host_ =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(
render_frame_host_, common_params_.url);
} else {
render_frame_host_ = nullptr;
}
DCHECK(render_frame_host_ || !response_should_be_rendered_);
if (!browser_initiated_ && render_frame_host_ &&
render_frame_host_ != frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host()) {
common_params_.source_location.reset();
if (!frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetDelegate()->ShouldTransferNavigation(
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
}
if (navigation_data)
navigation_handle_->set_navigation_data(std::move(navigation_data));
navigation_handle_->set_proxy_server(response->head.proxy_server);
common_params_.previews_state =
GetContentClient()->browser()->DetermineCommittedPreviews(
common_params_.previews_state, navigation_handle_.get(),
response->head.headers.get());
response_ = response;
url_loader_client_endpoints_ = std::move(url_loader_client_endpoints);
ssl_info_ = response->head.ssl_info;
subresource_loader_params_ = std::move(subresource_loader_params);
if (render_frame_host_ &&
SiteInstanceImpl::ShouldAssignSiteForURL(common_params_.url)) {
render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->SetIsUsed();
SiteInstanceImpl* instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
if (!instance->HasSite() &&
SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
instance->GetBrowserContext(), instance->GetIsolationContext(),
common_params_.url)) {
instance->SetSite(common_params_.url);
}
}
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationResponseReceived(*this, *response);
if (is_download_ && (response->head.headers.get() &&
(response->head.headers->response_code() / 100 != 2))) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net::ERR_INVALID_RESPONSE),
false /* skip_throttles */, base::nullopt /* error_page_content */,
false /* collapse_frame */);
return;
}
net::Error net_error = CheckContentSecurityPolicy(
navigation_handle_->WasServerRedirect() /* has_followed_redirect */,
false /* url_upgraded_after_redirect */, true /* is_response_check */);
if (net_error != net::OK) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net_error),
false /* skip_throttles */,
base::nullopt /* error_page_content */,
false /* collapse_frame */);
return;
}
navigation_handle_->WillProcessResponse(
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnWillProcessResponseChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7485
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7485/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/lurcher/unixODBC/commit/45ef78e037f578b15fc58938a3a3251655e71d6f#diff-d52750c7ba4e594410438569d8e2963aL24
|
45ef78e037f578b15fc58938a3a3251655e71d6f#diff-d52750c7ba4e594410438569d8e2963aL24
|
New Pre Source
|
static void WriteBodyDelimited( SQLHSTMT hStmt, char cDelimiter )
{
SQLINTEGER nCol = 0;
SQLSMALLINT nColumns = 0;
SQLLEN nIndicator = 0;
SQLTCHAR szColumnValue[MAX_DATA_WIDTH+1];
SQLRETURN nReturn = 0;
SQLRETURN ret;
szColumnValue[ 0 ] = 0;
if ( SQLNumResultCols( hStmt, &nColumns ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
nColumns = -1;
/* ROWS */
while (( ret = SQLFetch( hStmt )) == SQL_SUCCESS )
{
/* COLS */
for ( nCol = 1; nCol <= nColumns; nCol++ )
{
nReturn = SQLGetData( hStmt, nCol, SQL_C_WCHAR, (SQLPOINTER)szColumnValue, sizeof(szColumnValue), &nIndicator );
if ( nReturn == SQL_SUCCESS && nIndicator != SQL_NULL_DATA )
{
uc_to_ascii( szColumnValue );
fputs((char*) szColumnValue, stdout );
if ( nCol < nColumns )
putchar( cDelimiter );
}
else if ( nReturn == SQL_ERROR )
{
ret = SQL_ERROR;
break;
}
else
{
if ( nCol < nColumns )
putchar( cDelimiter );
}
}
if (ret != SQL_SUCCESS)
break;
printf( "\n" );
}
if ( ret == SQL_ERROR )
{
if ( bVerbose ) DumpODBCLog( 0, 0, hStmt );
}
}
|
static void WriteBodyDelimited( SQLHSTMT hStmt, char cDelimiter )
{
SQLINTEGER nCol = 0;
SQLSMALLINT nColumns = 0;
SQLLEN nIndicator = 0;
SQLTCHAR szColumnValue[MAX_DATA_WIDTH+1];
SQLRETURN nReturn = 0;
SQLRETURN ret;
szColumnValue[ 0 ] = 0;
if ( SQLNumResultCols( hStmt, &nColumns ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
nColumns = -1;
/* ROWS */
while (( ret = SQLFetch( hStmt )) == SQL_SUCCESS )
{
/* COLS */
for ( nCol = 1; nCol <= nColumns; nCol++ )
{
nReturn = SQLGetData( hStmt, nCol, SQL_C_WCHAR, (SQLPOINTER)szColumnValue, sizeof(szColumnValue), &nIndicator );
if ( nReturn == SQL_SUCCESS && nIndicator != SQL_NULL_DATA )
{
uc_to_ascii( szColumnValue );
fputs((char*) szColumnValue, stdout );
if ( nCol < nColumns )
putchar( cDelimiter );
}
else if ( nReturn == SQL_ERROR )
{
ret = SQL_ERROR;
break;
}
else
{
if ( nCol < nColumns )
putchar( cDelimiter );
}
}
if (ret != SQL_SUCCESS)
break;
printf( "\n" );
}
if ( ret == SQL_ERROR )
{
if ( bVerbose ) DumpODBCLog( 0, 0, hStmt );
}
}
|
C
|
unixODBC
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_x86_mce *mce)
{
u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
u64 *banks = vcpu->arch.mce_banks;
if (mce->bank >= bank_num || !(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* if IA32_MCG_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
* reporting is disabled
*/
if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) &&
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl != ~(u64)0)
return 0;
banks += 4 * mce->bank;
/*
* if IA32_MCi_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
* reporting is disabled for the bank
*/
if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && banks[0] != ~(u64)0)
return 0;
if (mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) {
if ((vcpu->arch.mcg_status & MCG_STATUS_MCIP) ||
!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_MCE)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "kvm: set_mce: "
"injects mce exception while "
"previous one is in progress!\n");
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return 0;
}
if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
banks[2] = mce->addr;
banks[3] = mce->misc;
vcpu->arch.mcg_status = mce->mcg_status;
banks[1] = mce->status;
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, MC_VECTOR);
} else if (!(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
|| !(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_UC)) {
if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
banks[2] = mce->addr;
banks[3] = mce->misc;
banks[1] = mce->status;
} else
banks[1] |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
return 0;
}
|
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_x86_mce *mce)
{
u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
u64 *banks = vcpu->arch.mce_banks;
if (mce->bank >= bank_num || !(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* if IA32_MCG_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
* reporting is disabled
*/
if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) &&
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl != ~(u64)0)
return 0;
banks += 4 * mce->bank;
/*
* if IA32_MCi_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
* reporting is disabled for the bank
*/
if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && banks[0] != ~(u64)0)
return 0;
if (mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) {
if ((vcpu->arch.mcg_status & MCG_STATUS_MCIP) ||
!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_MCE)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "kvm: set_mce: "
"injects mce exception while "
"previous one is in progress!\n");
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return 0;
}
if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
banks[2] = mce->addr;
banks[3] = mce->misc;
vcpu->arch.mcg_status = mce->mcg_status;
banks[1] = mce->status;
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, MC_VECTOR);
} else if (!(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
|| !(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_UC)) {
if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
banks[2] = mce->addr;
banks[3] = mce->misc;
banks[1] = mce->status;
} else
banks[1] |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreePath(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,const char *path)
{
char
**components,
subnode[MaxTextExtent],
tag[MaxTextExtent];
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_components;
ssize_t
j;
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
node=xml_info;
components=GetPathComponents(path,&number_components);
if (components == (char **) NULL)
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
{
GetPathComponent(components[i],SubimagePath,subnode);
GetPathComponent(components[i],CanonicalPath,tag);
node=GetXMLTreeChild(node,tag);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
for (j=(ssize_t) StringToLong(subnode)-1; j > 0; j--)
{
node=GetXMLTreeOrdered(node);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
}
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
components=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(components);
return(node);
}
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreePath(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,const char *path)
{
char
**components,
subnode[MaxTextExtent],
tag[MaxTextExtent];
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_components;
ssize_t
j;
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
node=xml_info;
components=GetPathComponents(path,&number_components);
if (components == (char **) NULL)
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
{
GetPathComponent(components[i],SubimagePath,subnode);
GetPathComponent(components[i],CanonicalPath,tag);
node=GetXMLTreeChild(node,tag);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
for (j=(ssize_t) StringToLong(subnode)-1; j > 0; j--)
{
node=GetXMLTreeOrdered(node);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
}
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
components=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(components);
return(node);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2527/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2-demos.git/commit/?id=b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
|
b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
| null |
event_size_change( int delta )
{
status.ptsize += delta;
if ( status.ptsize < 64 * 1 )
status.ptsize = 1 * 64;
else if ( status.ptsize > MAXPTSIZE * 64 )
status.ptsize = MAXPTSIZE * 64;
FTDemo_Set_Current_Charsize( handle, status.ptsize, status.res );
}
|
event_size_change( int delta )
{
status.ptsize += delta;
if ( status.ptsize < 64 * 1 )
status.ptsize = 1 * 64;
else if ( status.ptsize > MAXPTSIZE * 64 )
status.ptsize = MAXPTSIZE * 64;
FTDemo_Set_Current_Charsize( handle, status.ptsize, status.res );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
store_malloc(png_structp ppIn, png_alloc_size_t cb)
{
png_const_structp pp = ppIn;
store_pool *pool = voidcast(store_pool*, png_get_mem_ptr(pp));
store_memory *new = voidcast(store_memory*, malloc(cb + (sizeof *new) +
(sizeof pool->mark)));
if (new != NULL)
{
if (cb > pool->max)
pool->max = cb;
pool->current += cb;
if (pool->current > pool->limit)
pool->limit = pool->current;
pool->total += cb;
new->size = cb;
memcpy(new->mark, pool->mark, sizeof new->mark);
memcpy((png_byte*)(new+1) + cb, pool->mark, sizeof pool->mark);
new->pool = pool;
new->next = pool->list;
pool->list = new;
++new;
}
else
{
/* NOTE: the PNG user malloc function cannot use the png_ptr it is passed
* other than to retrieve the allocation pointer! libpng calls the
* store_malloc callback in two basic cases:
*
* 1) From png_malloc; png_malloc will do a png_error itself if NULL is
* returned.
* 2) From png_struct or png_info structure creation; png_malloc is
* to return so cleanup can be performed.
*
* To handle this store_malloc can log a message, but can't do anything
* else.
*/
store_log(pool->store, pp, "out of memory", 1 /* is_error */);
}
return new;
}
|
store_malloc(png_structp ppIn, png_alloc_size_t cb)
{
png_const_structp pp = ppIn;
store_pool *pool = voidcast(store_pool*, png_get_mem_ptr(pp));
store_memory *new = voidcast(store_memory*, malloc(cb + (sizeof *new) +
(sizeof pool->mark)));
if (new != NULL)
{
if (cb > pool->max)
pool->max = cb;
pool->current += cb;
if (pool->current > pool->limit)
pool->limit = pool->current;
pool->total += cb;
new->size = cb;
memcpy(new->mark, pool->mark, sizeof new->mark);
memcpy((png_byte*)(new+1) + cb, pool->mark, sizeof pool->mark);
new->pool = pool;
new->next = pool->list;
pool->list = new;
++new;
}
else
{
/* NOTE: the PNG user malloc function cannot use the png_ptr it is passed
* other than to retrieve the allocation pointer! libpng calls the
* store_malloc callback in two basic cases:
*
* 1) From png_malloc; png_malloc will do a png_error itself if NULL is
* returned.
* 2) From png_struct or png_info structure creation; png_malloc is
* to return so cleanup can be performed.
*
* To handle this store_malloc can log a message, but can't do anything
* else.
*/
store_log(pool->store, pp, "out of memory", 1 /* is_error */);
}
return new;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void inet_bind_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_bind_bucket *tb,
const unsigned short snum)
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = sk->sk_prot->h.hashinfo;
atomic_inc(&hashinfo->bsockets);
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = snum;
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &tb->owners);
tb->num_owners++;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash = tb;
}
|
void inet_bind_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_bind_bucket *tb,
const unsigned short snum)
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = sk->sk_prot->h.hashinfo;
atomic_inc(&hashinfo->bsockets);
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = snum;
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &tb->owners);
tb->num_owners++;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash = tb;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
void GLManager::SetCommandsPaused(bool paused) {
command_buffer_->SetCommandsPaused(paused);
}
|
void GLManager::SetCommandsPaused(bool paused) {
command_buffer_->SetCommandsPaused(paused);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5361
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5361/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libreswan/libreswan/commit/152d6d95632d8b9477c170f1de99bcd86d7fb1d6
|
152d6d95632d8b9477c170f1de99bcd86d7fb1d6
|
IKEv1: packet retransmit fixes for Main/Aggr/Xauth modes
- Do not schedule retransmits for inI1outR1 packets (prevent DDOS)
- Do schedule retransmits for XAUTH packets
|
static stf_status informational(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
/* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
if (n_pld != NULL) {
pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
struct isakmp_notification *const n =
&n_pld->payload.notification;
struct state *st = md->st; /* may be NULL */
/* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
/* note that we _can_ get notification payloads unencrypted
* once we are at least in R3/I4.
* and that the handler is expected to treat them suspiciously.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("processing informational %s (%d)",
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type),
n->isan_type));
switch (n->isan_type) {
case R_U_THERE:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inI_outR(st, n, n_pbs);
case R_U_THERE_ACK:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE_ACK informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inR(st, n, n_pbs);
case PAYLOAD_MALFORMED:
if (st != NULL) {
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received++;
libreswan_log(
"received %u malformed payload notifies",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
if (st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY / 2 &&
((st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent +
st->hidden_variables.
st_malformed_received) >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY)) {
libreswan_log(
"too many malformed payloads (we sent %u and received %u",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent,
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
}
}
return STF_IGNORE;
case ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE:
if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) {
/* Saving connection name and whack sock id */
const char *tmp_name = st->st_connection->name;
int tmp_whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
/* deleting ISAKMP SA with the current remote peer */
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
/* to find and store the connection associated with tmp_name */
/* ??? how do we know that tmp_name hasn't been freed? */
struct connection *tmp_c = con_by_name(tmp_name, FALSE);
DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING,
"redirected remote end info:", n_pbs->cur + pbs_left(
n_pbs) - 4, 4);
/* Current remote peer info */
{
ipstr_buf b;
const struct spd_route *tmp_spd =
&tmp_c->spd;
int count_spd = 0;
do {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("spd route number: %d",
++count_spd));
/**that info**/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id kind: %d",
tmp_spd->that.id.kind));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id ipaddr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.id.ip_addr, &b)));
if (tmp_spd->that.id.name.ptr
!= NULL)
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_dump_chunk(
"that id name",
tmp_spd->
that.id.
name));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that host_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_addr, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that nexthop: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_nexthop, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that srcip: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_srcip, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that client_addr: %s, maskbits:%d",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.client.addr, &b),
tmp_spd->that.
client.maskbits));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_port_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_port_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_id_wildcards: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_id_wildcards));
tmp_spd = tmp_spd->spd_next;
} while (tmp_spd != NULL);
if (tmp_c->interface != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Current interface_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->interface->ip_addr, &b)));
}
if (tmp_c->gw_info != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
DBG_log("Current gw_client_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->client_id.ip_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Current gw_gw_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->gw_id.ip_addr, &b));
});
}
}
/* storing old address for comparison purposes */
ip_address old_addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Decoding remote peer address info where connection has to be redirected to */
memcpy(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
(u_int32_t *)(n_pbs->cur +
pbs_left(n_pbs) - 4),
sizeof(tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.
sin_addr.
s_addr));
/* Modifying connection info to store the redirected remote peer info */
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Old host_addr_name : %s",
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name = NULL;
tmp_c->spd.that.id.ip_addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
ipstr_buf b;
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.this.
host_nexthop,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old remote addr %s",
ipstr(&old_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Old this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
host_srcip,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
client.addr,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
}
});
tmp_c->host_pair->him.addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Initiating connection to the redirected peer */
initiate_connection(tmp_name, tmp_whack_sock,
LEMPTY, pcim_demand_crypto);
return STF_IGNORE;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message with ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE for unestablished state.");
return STF_IGNORE;
default:
if (st != NULL &&
(st->st_connection->extra_debugging &
IMPAIR_DIE_ONINFO)) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received unhandled informational notification payload %d: '%s'",
n->isan_type,
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type));
return STF_FATAL;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
} else {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored empty informational notification payload");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
}
|
static stf_status informational(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
/* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
if (n_pld != NULL) {
pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
struct isakmp_notification *const n =
&n_pld->payload.notification;
struct state *st = md->st; /* may be NULL */
/* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
/* note that we _can_ get notification payloads unencrypted
* once we are at least in R3/I4.
* and that the handler is expected to treat them suspiciously.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("processing informational %s (%d)",
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type),
n->isan_type));
switch (n->isan_type) {
case R_U_THERE:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inI_outR(st, n, n_pbs);
case R_U_THERE_ACK:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE_ACK informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inR(st, n, n_pbs);
case PAYLOAD_MALFORMED:
if (st != NULL) {
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received++;
libreswan_log(
"received %u malformed payload notifies",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
if (st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY / 2 &&
((st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent +
st->hidden_variables.
st_malformed_received) >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY)) {
libreswan_log(
"too many malformed payloads (we sent %u and received %u",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent,
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
}
}
return STF_IGNORE;
case ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE:
if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) {
/* Saving connection name and whack sock id */
const char *tmp_name = st->st_connection->name;
int tmp_whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
/* deleting ISAKMP SA with the current remote peer */
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
/* to find and store the connection associated with tmp_name */
/* ??? how do we know that tmp_name hasn't been freed? */
struct connection *tmp_c = con_by_name(tmp_name, FALSE);
DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING,
"redirected remote end info:", n_pbs->cur + pbs_left(
n_pbs) - 4, 4);
/* Current remote peer info */
{
ipstr_buf b;
const struct spd_route *tmp_spd =
&tmp_c->spd;
int count_spd = 0;
do {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("spd route number: %d",
++count_spd));
/**that info**/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id kind: %d",
tmp_spd->that.id.kind));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id ipaddr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.id.ip_addr, &b)));
if (tmp_spd->that.id.name.ptr
!= NULL)
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_dump_chunk(
"that id name",
tmp_spd->
that.id.
name));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that host_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_addr, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that nexthop: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_nexthop, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that srcip: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_srcip, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that client_addr: %s, maskbits:%d",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.client.addr, &b),
tmp_spd->that.
client.maskbits));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_port_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_port_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_id_wildcards: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_id_wildcards));
tmp_spd = tmp_spd->spd_next;
} while (tmp_spd != NULL);
if (tmp_c->interface != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Current interface_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->interface->ip_addr, &b)));
}
if (tmp_c->gw_info != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
DBG_log("Current gw_client_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->client_id.ip_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Current gw_gw_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->gw_id.ip_addr, &b));
});
}
}
/* storing old address for comparison purposes */
ip_address old_addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Decoding remote peer address info where connection has to be redirected to */
memcpy(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
(u_int32_t *)(n_pbs->cur +
pbs_left(n_pbs) - 4),
sizeof(tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.
sin_addr.
s_addr));
/* Modifying connection info to store the redirected remote peer info */
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Old host_addr_name : %s",
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name = NULL;
tmp_c->spd.that.id.ip_addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
ipstr_buf b;
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.this.
host_nexthop,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old remote addr %s",
ipstr(&old_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Old this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
host_srcip,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
client.addr,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
}
});
tmp_c->host_pair->him.addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Initiating connection to the redirected peer */
initiate_connection(tmp_name, tmp_whack_sock,
LEMPTY, pcim_demand_crypto);
return STF_IGNORE;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message with ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE for unestablished state.");
return STF_IGNORE;
default:
if (st != NULL &&
(st->st_connection->extra_debugging &
IMPAIR_DIE_ONINFO)) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received unhandled informational notification payload %d: '%s'",
n->isan_type,
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type));
return STF_FATAL;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
} else {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored empty informational notification payload");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
}
|
C
|
libreswan
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
InputMethodContext* Element::getInputContext()
{
return ensureElementRareData()->ensureInputMethodContext(toHTMLElement(this));
}
|
InputMethodContext* Element::getInputContext()
{
return ensureElementRareData()->ensureInputMethodContext(toHTMLElement(this));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
fz_md5_icc(fz_context *ctx, fz_iccprofile *profile)
{
if (profile)
fz_md5_buffer(ctx, profile->buffer, profile->md5);
}
|
fz_md5_icc(fz_context *ctx, fz_iccprofile *profile)
{
if (profile)
fz_md5_buffer(ctx, profile->buffer, profile->md5);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0037
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0037/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/dajobe/raptor/commit/a676f235309a59d4aa78eeffd2574ae5d341fcb0
|
a676f235309a59d4aa78eeffd2574ae5d341fcb0
|
CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
|
raptor_libxml_error_common(void* user_data, const char *msg, va_list args,
const char *prefix, int is_fatal)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = NULL;
int prefix_length = RAPTOR_BAD_CAST(int, strlen(prefix));
int length;
char *nmsg;
int msg_len;
raptor_world* world = NULL;
raptor_locator* locator = NULL;
if(user_data) {
/* Work around libxml2 bug - sometimes the sax2->error
* returns a user_data, sometimes the userdata
*/
if(((raptor_sax2*)user_data)->magic == RAPTOR_LIBXML_MAGIC)
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
else
/* user_data is not userData */
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)((xmlParserCtxtPtr)user_data)->userData;
}
if(sax2) {
world = sax2->world;
locator = sax2->locator;
if(locator)
raptor_libxml_update_document_locator(sax2, sax2->locator);
}
msg_len = RAPTOR_BAD_CAST(int, strlen(msg));
length = prefix_length + msg_len + 1;
nmsg = RAPTOR_MALLOC(char*, length);
if(nmsg) {
memcpy(nmsg, prefix, prefix_length); /* Do not copy NUL */
memcpy(nmsg + prefix_length, msg, msg_len + 1); /* Copy NUL */
if(nmsg[length-1] == '\n')
nmsg[length-1]='\0';
}
if(is_fatal)
raptor_log_error_varargs(world,
RAPTOR_LOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
locator,
nmsg ? nmsg : msg,
args);
else
raptor_log_error_varargs(world,
RAPTOR_LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
locator,
nmsg ? nmsg : msg,
args);
if(nmsg)
RAPTOR_FREE(char*, nmsg);
}
|
raptor_libxml_error_common(void* user_data, const char *msg, va_list args,
const char *prefix, int is_fatal)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = NULL;
int prefix_length = RAPTOR_BAD_CAST(int, strlen(prefix));
int length;
char *nmsg;
int msg_len;
raptor_world* world = NULL;
raptor_locator* locator = NULL;
if(user_data) {
/* Work around libxml2 bug - sometimes the sax2->error
* returns a user_data, sometimes the userdata
*/
if(((raptor_sax2*)user_data)->magic == RAPTOR_LIBXML_MAGIC)
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
else
/* user_data is not userData */
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)((xmlParserCtxtPtr)user_data)->userData;
}
if(sax2) {
world = sax2->world;
locator = sax2->locator;
if(locator)
raptor_libxml_update_document_locator(sax2, sax2->locator);
}
msg_len = RAPTOR_BAD_CAST(int, strlen(msg));
length = prefix_length + msg_len + 1;
nmsg = RAPTOR_MALLOC(char*, length);
if(nmsg) {
memcpy(nmsg, prefix, prefix_length); /* Do not copy NUL */
memcpy(nmsg + prefix_length, msg, msg_len + 1); /* Copy NUL */
if(nmsg[length-1] == '\n')
nmsg[length-1]='\0';
}
if(is_fatal)
raptor_log_error_varargs(world,
RAPTOR_LOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
locator,
nmsg ? nmsg : msg,
args);
else
raptor_log_error_varargs(world,
RAPTOR_LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
locator,
nmsg ? nmsg : msg,
args);
if(nmsg)
RAPTOR_FREE(char*, nmsg);
}
|
C
|
raptor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/aquynh/capstone/commit/87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
|
void op_addReg(MCInst *MI, int reg)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].type = X86_OP_REG;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].reg = reg;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count++;
}
if (MI->op1_size == 0)
MI->op1_size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
}
|
void op_addReg(MCInst *MI, int reg)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].type = X86_OP_REG;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].reg = reg;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count++;
}
if (MI->op1_size == 0)
MI->op1_size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
}
|
C
|
capstone
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5794
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5794/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
bool collapse_frame =
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE;
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL) {
DCHECK(result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_ABORTED);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
net::HttpRequestHeaders modified_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeModifiedRequestHeaders();
std::vector<std::string> removed_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeRemovedRequestHeaders();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetBrowserContext();
if (browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()) {
net::HttpRequestHeaders client_hints_extra_headers;
browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()
->GetAdditionalNavigationRequestClientHintsHeaders(
common_params_.url, &client_hints_extra_headers);
modified_headers.MergeFrom(client_hints_extra_headers);
}
loader_->FollowRedirect(std::move(removed_headers),
std::move(modified_headers),
common_params_.previews_state);
}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
bool collapse_frame =
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE;
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL) {
DCHECK(result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_ABORTED);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
net::HttpRequestHeaders modified_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeModifiedRequestHeaders();
std::vector<std::string> removed_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeRemovedRequestHeaders();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetBrowserContext();
if (browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()) {
net::HttpRequestHeaders client_hints_extra_headers;
browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()
->GetAdditionalNavigationRequestClientHintsHeaders(
common_params_.url, &client_hints_extra_headers);
modified_headers.MergeFrom(client_hints_extra_headers);
}
loader_->FollowRedirect(std::move(removed_headers),
std::move(modified_headers),
common_params_.previews_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16995
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16995/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626
|
6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626
|
net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool is_slave_up(struct net_device *dev)
{
return dev && is_admin_up(dev) && netif_oper_up(dev);
}
|
static bool is_slave_up(struct net_device *dev)
{
return dev && is_admin_up(dev) && netif_oper_up(dev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0891/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58936737b65052775b67b1409b87edbbbc09f72b
|
58936737b65052775b67b1409b87edbbbc09f72b
|
Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BlobURLRequestJob::HeadersCompleted(int status_code,
const std::string& status_text) {
std::string status("HTTP/1.1 ");
status.append(base::IntToString(status_code));
status.append(" ");
status.append(status_text);
status.append("\0\0", 2);
net::HttpResponseHeaders* headers = new net::HttpResponseHeaders(status);
if (status_code == kHTTPOk || status_code == kHTTPPartialContent) {
std::string content_length_header(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentLength);
content_length_header.append(": ");
content_length_header.append(base::Int64ToString(remaining_bytes_));
headers->AddHeader(content_length_header);
if (!blob_data_->content_type().empty()) {
std::string content_type_header(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentType);
content_type_header.append(": ");
content_type_header.append(blob_data_->content_type());
headers->AddHeader(content_type_header);
}
if (!blob_data_->content_disposition().empty()) {
std::string content_disposition_header("Content-Disposition: ");
content_disposition_header.append(blob_data_->content_disposition());
headers->AddHeader(content_disposition_header);
}
}
response_info_.reset(new net::HttpResponseInfo());
response_info_->headers = headers;
set_expected_content_size(remaining_bytes_);
headers_set_ = true;
NotifyHeadersComplete();
}
|
void BlobURLRequestJob::HeadersCompleted(int status_code,
const std::string& status_text) {
std::string status("HTTP/1.1 ");
status.append(base::IntToString(status_code));
status.append(" ");
status.append(status_text);
status.append("\0\0", 2);
net::HttpResponseHeaders* headers = new net::HttpResponseHeaders(status);
if (status_code == kHTTPOk || status_code == kHTTPPartialContent) {
std::string content_length_header(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentLength);
content_length_header.append(": ");
content_length_header.append(base::Int64ToString(remaining_bytes_));
headers->AddHeader(content_length_header);
if (!blob_data_->content_type().empty()) {
std::string content_type_header(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentType);
content_type_header.append(": ");
content_type_header.append(blob_data_->content_type());
headers->AddHeader(content_type_header);
}
if (!blob_data_->content_disposition().empty()) {
std::string content_disposition_header("Content-Disposition: ");
content_disposition_header.append(blob_data_->content_disposition());
headers->AddHeader(content_disposition_header);
}
}
response_info_.reset(new net::HttpResponseInfo());
response_info_->headers = headers;
set_expected_content_size(remaining_bytes_);
headers_set_ = true;
NotifyHeadersComplete();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::didReceiveDocumentData(
WebFrame* frame, const char* data, size_t data_len,
bool& prevent_default) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
document_state->set_use_error_page(false);
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::didReceiveDocumentData(
WebFrame* frame, const char* data, size_t data_len,
bool& prevent_default) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
document_state->set_use_error_page(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3638/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3
|
667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3
|
ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
|
static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le32(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
|
static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le32(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1296/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508
|
c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508
|
Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutomationProvider::EnableExtension(int extension_handle,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
const Extension* extension = GetDisabledExtension(extension_handle);
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
ExtensionProcessManager* manager = profile_->GetExtensionProcessManager();
if (extension && service && manager) {
new ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver(
manager,
this,
AutomationMsg_EnableExtension::ID,
reply_message);
service->EnableExtension(extension->id());
} else {
AutomationMsg_EnableExtension::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, false);
Send(reply_message);
}
}
|
void AutomationProvider::EnableExtension(int extension_handle,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
const Extension* extension = GetDisabledExtension(extension_handle);
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
ExtensionProcessManager* manager = profile_->GetExtensionProcessManager();
if (extension && service && manager) {
new ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver(
manager,
this,
AutomationMsg_EnableExtension::ID,
reply_message);
service->EnableExtension(extension->id());
} else {
AutomationMsg_EnableExtension::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, false);
Send(reply_message);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2496/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
|
void InputDispatcher::finishDispatchCycleLocked(nsecs_t currentTime,
const sp<Connection>& connection, uint32_t seq, bool handled) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ finishDispatchCycle - seq=%u, handled=%s",
connection->getInputChannelName(), seq, toString(handled));
#endif
connection->inputPublisherBlocked = false;
if (connection->status == Connection::STATUS_BROKEN
|| connection->status == Connection::STATUS_ZOMBIE) {
return;
}
onDispatchCycleFinishedLocked(currentTime, connection, seq, handled);
}
|
void InputDispatcher::finishDispatchCycleLocked(nsecs_t currentTime,
const sp<Connection>& connection, uint32_t seq, bool handled) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ finishDispatchCycle - seq=%u, handled=%s",
connection->getInputChannelName(), seq, toString(handled));
#endif
connection->inputPublisherBlocked = false;
if (connection->status == Connection::STATUS_BROKEN
|| connection->status == Connection::STATUS_ZOMBIE) {
return;
}
onDispatchCycleFinishedLocked(currentTime, connection, seq, handled);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9756/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6
|
725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6
|
src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
|
psf_fgets (char *buffer, sf_count_t bufsize, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t k = 0 ;
sf_count_t count ;
while (k < bufsize - 1)
{ count = read (psf->file.filedes, &(buffer [k]), 1) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0 || buffer [k++] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
buffer [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* psf_fgets */
|
psf_fgets (char *buffer, sf_count_t bufsize, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t k = 0 ;
sf_count_t count ;
while (k < bufsize - 1)
{ count = read (psf->file.filedes, &(buffer [k]), 1) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0 || buffer [k++] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
buffer [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* psf_fgets */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3141/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b1bd4119bcafab6f9a8f84d92cd65eec3afeface
|
b1bd4119bcafab6f9a8f84d92cd65eec3afeface
| null |
static void php_wddx_serialize_object(wddx_packet *packet, zval *obj)
{
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
zval **ent, *fname, **varname;
zval *retval = NULL;
const char *key;
ulong idx;
char tmp_buf[WDDX_BUF_LEN];
HashTable *objhash, *sleephash;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__sleep", 1);
/*
* We try to call __sleep() method on object. It's supposed to return an
* array of property names to be serialized.
*/
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), &obj, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (retval && (sleephash = HASH_OF(retval))) {
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(sleephash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(sleephash, (void **)&varname) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(sleephash)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(varname) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "__sleep should return an array only containing the names of instance-variables to serialize.");
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_find(objhash, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname)+1, (void **)&ent) == SUCCESS) {
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname) TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
} else {
uint key_len;
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(objhash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(objhash, (void**)&ent) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(objhash)) {
if (*ent == obj) {
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(objhash, &key, &key_len, &idx, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
const char *class_name, *prop_name;
zend_unmangle_property_name(key, key_len-1, &class_name, &prop_name);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, prop_name, strlen(prop_name)+1 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
key_len = slprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%ld", idx);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, tmp_buf, key_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
|
static void php_wddx_serialize_object(wddx_packet *packet, zval *obj)
{
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
zval **ent, *fname, **varname;
zval *retval = NULL;
const char *key;
ulong idx;
char tmp_buf[WDDX_BUF_LEN];
HashTable *objhash, *sleephash;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__sleep", 1);
/*
* We try to call __sleep() method on object. It's supposed to return an
* array of property names to be serialized.
*/
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), &obj, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (retval && (sleephash = HASH_OF(retval))) {
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(sleephash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(sleephash, (void **)&varname) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(sleephash)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(varname) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "__sleep should return an array only containing the names of instance-variables to serialize.");
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_find(objhash, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname)+1, (void **)&ent) == SUCCESS) {
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname) TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
} else {
uint key_len;
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(objhash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(objhash, (void**)&ent) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(objhash)) {
if (*ent == obj) {
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(objhash, &key, &key_len, &idx, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
const char *class_name, *prop_name;
zend_unmangle_property_name(key, key_len-1, &class_name, &prop_name);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, prop_name, strlen(prop_name)+1 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
key_len = slprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%ld", idx);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, tmp_buf, key_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6782
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6782/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
|
Color Document::themeColor() const
{
for (HTMLMetaElement* metaElement = head() ? Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::firstChild(*head()) : 0; metaElement; metaElement = Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::nextSibling(*metaElement)) {
RGBA32 rgb = Color::transparent;
if (equalIgnoringCase(metaElement->name(), "theme-color") && CSSParser::parseColor(rgb, metaElement->content().string().stripWhiteSpace(), true))
return Color(rgb);
}
return Color();
}
|
Color Document::themeColor() const
{
for (HTMLMetaElement* metaElement = head() ? Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::firstChild(*head()) : 0; metaElement; metaElement = Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::nextSibling(*metaElement)) {
RGBA32 rgb = Color::transparent;
if (equalIgnoringCase(metaElement->name(), "theme-color") && CSSParser::parseColor(rgb, metaElement->content().string().stripWhiteSpace(), true))
return Color(rgb);
}
return Color();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct completion *vfork_done = tsk->vfork_done;
/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
#endif
/* Get rid of any cached register state */
deactivate_mm(tsk, mm);
/* notify parent sleeping on vfork() */
if (vfork_done) {
tsk->vfork_done = NULL;
complete(vfork_done);
}
/*
* If we're exiting normally, clear a user-space tid field if
* requested. We leave this alone when dying by signal, to leave
* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary
* trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit.
*/
if (tsk->clear_child_tid) {
if (!(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) &&
atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid);
sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE,
1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
}
}
|
void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct completion *vfork_done = tsk->vfork_done;
/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
#endif
/* Get rid of any cached register state */
deactivate_mm(tsk, mm);
/* notify parent sleeping on vfork() */
if (vfork_done) {
tsk->vfork_done = NULL;
complete(vfork_done);
}
/*
* If we're exiting normally, clear a user-space tid field if
* requested. We leave this alone when dying by signal, to leave
* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary
* trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit.
*/
if (tsk->clear_child_tid) {
if (!(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) &&
atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid);
sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE,
1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenMailboxCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GenMailboxCHROMIUM& c) {
return error::kUnknownCommand;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenMailboxCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GenMailboxCHROMIUM& c) {
return error::kUnknownCommand;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0839/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/ebbb82365172337c6c250c6cac4e326970a9e351
|
ebbb82365172337c6c250c6cac4e326970a9e351
|
post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
|
static int vol_effect_process(effect_handle_t self,
audio_buffer_t *in_buffer,
audio_buffer_t *out_buffer)
{
int status = 0;
ALOGV("%s Called ", __func__);
vol_listener_context_t *context = (vol_listener_context_t *)self;
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
if (context->state != VOL_LISTENER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
ALOGE("%s: state is not active .. return error", __func__);
status = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (in_buffer->raw != out_buffer->raw) {
memcpy(out_buffer->raw, in_buffer->raw, out_buffer->frameCount * 2 * sizeof(int16_t));
} else {
ALOGW("%s: something wrong, didn't handle in_buffer and out_buffer same address case",
__func__);
}
exit:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
return status;
}
|
static int vol_effect_process(effect_handle_t self,
audio_buffer_t *in_buffer,
audio_buffer_t *out_buffer)
{
int status = 0;
ALOGV("%s Called ", __func__);
vol_listener_context_t *context = (vol_listener_context_t *)self;
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
if (context->state != VOL_LISTENER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
ALOGE("%s: state is not active .. return error", __func__);
status = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (in_buffer->raw != out_buffer->raw) {
memcpy(out_buffer->raw, in_buffer->raw, out_buffer->frameCount * 2 * sizeof(int16_t));
} else {
ALOGW("%s: something wrong, didn't handle in_buffer and out_buffer same address case",
__func__);
}
exit:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
return status;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5157
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5157/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/e078172b1c3f98d2219c37076b238fb759c751ea
|
e078172b1c3f98d2219c37076b238fb759c751ea
|
Add sanity check for tile coordinates (#823)
Coordinates are casted from OPJ_UINT32 to OPJ_INT32
Add sanity check for negative values and upper bound becoming lower
than lower bound.
See also
https://pdfium.googlesource.com/pdfium/+/b6befb2ed2485a3805cddea86dc7574510178ea9
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate (opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t * p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_max_size = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE;
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate 8192 elements of code_block->data\n");*/
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
OPJ_BYTE* l_data = p_code_block->data;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_max_size = p_code_block->data_max_size;
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->data = l_data;
p_code_block->data_max_size = l_data_max_size;
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate (opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t * p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_max_size = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE;
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate 8192 elements of code_block->data\n");*/
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
OPJ_BYTE* l_data = p_code_block->data;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_max_size = p_code_block->data_max_size;
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->data = l_data;
p_code_block->data_max_size = l_data_max_size;
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.