CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-3078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3078/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c?w=1
|
3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c?w=1
|
Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
|
static int php_zip_status(struct zip *za) /* {{{ */
{
#if LIBZIP_VERSION_MAJOR < 1
int zep, syp;
zip_error_get(za, &zep, &syp);
#else
int zep;
zip_error_t *err;
err = zip_get_error(za);
zep = zip_error_code_zip(err);
zip_error_fini(err);
#endif
return zep;
}
/* }}} */
|
static int php_zip_status(struct zip *za) /* {{{ */
{
#if LIBZIP_VERSION_MAJOR < 1
int zep, syp;
zip_error_get(za, &zep, &syp);
#else
int zep;
zip_error_t *err;
err = zip_get_error(za);
zep = zip_error_code_zip(err);
zip_error_fini(err);
#endif
return zep;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static u32 vmx_get_pkru(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return to_vmx(vcpu)->guest_pkru;
}
|
static u32 vmx_get_pkru(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return to_vmx(vcpu)->guest_pkru;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
int status;
status = nfs4_run_open_task(data, 1);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
nfs_fattr_map_and_free_names(NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->f_attr);
nfs_refresh_inode(dir, o_res->dir_attr);
if (o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
return status;
}
|
static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
int status;
status = nfs4_run_open_task(data, 1);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
nfs_fattr_map_and_free_names(NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->f_attr);
nfs_refresh_inode(dir, o_res->dir_attr);
if (o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2915
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2915/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::PruneOldestEntryIfFull() {
if (entries_.size() >= max_entry_count()) {
DCHECK_EQ(max_entry_count(), entries_.size());
DCHECK_GT(last_committed_entry_index_, 0);
RemoveEntryAtIndex(0);
NotifyPrunedEntries(this, true, 1);
}
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::PruneOldestEntryIfFull() {
if (entries_.size() >= max_entry_count()) {
DCHECK_EQ(max_entry_count(), entries_.size());
DCHECK_GT(last_committed_entry_index_, 0);
RemoveEntryAtIndex(0);
NotifyPrunedEntries(this, true, 1);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
Range* Document::caretRangeFromPoint(int x, int y) {
if (!GetLayoutView())
return nullptr;
HitTestResult result = HitTestInDocument(this, x, y);
PositionWithAffinity position_with_affinity = result.GetPosition();
if (position_with_affinity.IsNull())
return nullptr;
Position range_compliant_position =
position_with_affinity.GetPosition().ParentAnchoredEquivalent();
return CreateRangeAdjustedToTreeScope(*this, range_compliant_position);
}
|
Range* Document::caretRangeFromPoint(int x, int y) {
if (!GetLayoutView())
return nullptr;
HitTestResult result = HitTestInDocument(this, x, y);
PositionWithAffinity position_with_affinity = result.GetPosition();
if (position_with_affinity.IsNull())
return nullptr;
Position range_compliant_position =
position_with_affinity.GetPosition().ParentAnchoredEquivalent();
return CreateRangeAdjustedToTreeScope(*this, range_compliant_position);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2486
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2486/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/ad40e57890f81a3cf436c5f06da66396010bd9e5
|
ad40e57890f81a3cf436c5f06da66396010bd9e5
|
Check mp3 output buffer size
Bug: 27793371
Change-Id: I0fe40a4cfd0a5b488f93d3f3ba6f9495235926ac
|
void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
if ((int32)outHeader->nAllocLen < mConfig->outputFrameSize) {
ALOGE("input buffer too small: got %lu, expected %u",
outHeader->nAllocLen, mConfig->outputFrameSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793371");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
memset(outHeader->pBuffer, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
memset(outHeader->pBuffer,
0,
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
|
void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
memset(outHeader->pBuffer, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
memset(outHeader->pBuffer,
0,
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
void GfxState::clearPath() {
delete path;
path = new GfxPath();
}
|
void GfxState::clearPath() {
delete path;
path = new GfxPath();
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9490/
|
CWE-704
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/chromium-libpac/+/948d4753664cc4e6b33cc3de634ac8fd5f781382
|
948d4753664cc4e6b33cc3de634ac8fd5f781382
|
Test for error in handling getters changing element kind.
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Merged-In: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
Change-Id: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
(cherry picked from commit 59b9b11a462fe3aad313b8538fb98468f22d9095)
|
std::string StringPrintf(std::string str, int d) {
char buf[30];
sprintf(buf, str.c_str(), d);
return std::string(buf);
}
|
std::string StringPrintf(std::string str, int d) {
char buf[30];
sprintf(buf, str.c_str(), d);
return std::string(buf);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0008e75b613a252c8a5e2cca58c8376bf0e0a6a8
|
0008e75b613a252c8a5e2cca58c8376bf0e0a6a8
|
Disables PanelBrowserTest.MinimizeTwoPanelsWithoutTabbedWindow on
windows as it's causing other interactive ui tests to fail.
BUG=103253
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8467025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@108901 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::vector<Panel::ExpansionState> GetAllPanelExpansionStates() {
std::vector<Panel*> panels = PanelManager::GetInstance()->panels();
std::vector<Panel::ExpansionState> expansion_states;
for (size_t i = 0; i < panels.size(); i++)
expansion_states.push_back(panels[i]->expansion_state());
return expansion_states;
}
|
std::vector<Panel::ExpansionState> GetAllPanelExpansionStates() {
std::vector<Panel*> panels = PanelManager::GetInstance()->panels();
std::vector<Panel::ExpansionState> expansion_states;
for (size_t i = 0; i < panels.size(); i++)
expansion_states.push_back(panels[i]->expansion_state());
return expansion_states;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
int finish_open(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
int *opened)
{
int error;
BUG_ON(*opened & FILE_OPENED); /* once it's opened, it's opened */
file->f_path.dentry = dentry;
error = do_dentry_open(file, open, current_cred());
if (!error)
*opened |= FILE_OPENED;
return error;
}
|
int finish_open(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
int *opened)
{
int error;
BUG_ON(*opened & FILE_OPENED); /* once it's opened, it's opened */
file->f_path.dentry = dentry;
error = do_dentry_open(file, open, current_cred());
if (!error)
*opened |= FILE_OPENED;
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OpenEditURLUIThread(Profile* profile, const GURL* edit_url) {
Browser* browser = browser::FindLastActiveWithProfile(profile);
if (browser) {
browser->OpenURL(content::OpenURLParams(*edit_url, content::Referrer(),
CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false));
}
}
|
void OpenEditURLUIThread(Profile* profile, const GURL* edit_url) {
Browser* browser = browser::FindLastActiveWithProfile(profile);
if (browser) {
browser->OpenURL(content::OpenURLParams(*edit_url, content::Referrer(),
CURRENT_TAB, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9476/
|
CWE-416
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/dd28d8ddf2985d654781770c691c60b45d7f32b4
|
dd28d8ddf2985d654781770c691c60b45d7f32b4
|
DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
|
static void btif_report_source_codec_state(UNUSED_ATTR void* p_data) {
btav_a2dp_codec_config_t codec_config;
std::vector<btav_a2dp_codec_config_t> codecs_local_capabilities;
std::vector<btav_a2dp_codec_config_t> codecs_selectable_capabilities;
A2dpCodecs* a2dp_codecs = bta_av_get_a2dp_codecs();
if (a2dp_codecs == nullptr) return;
if (!a2dp_codecs->getCodecConfigAndCapabilities(
&codec_config, &codecs_local_capabilities,
&codecs_selectable_capabilities)) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: error reporting audio source codec state: "
"cannot get codec config and capabilities",
__func__);
return;
}
if (bt_av_src_callbacks != NULL) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_av_src_callbacks, audio_config_cb, codec_config,
codecs_local_capabilities, codecs_selectable_capabilities);
}
}
|
static void btif_report_source_codec_state(UNUSED_ATTR void* p_data) {
btav_a2dp_codec_config_t codec_config;
std::vector<btav_a2dp_codec_config_t> codecs_local_capabilities;
std::vector<btav_a2dp_codec_config_t> codecs_selectable_capabilities;
A2dpCodecs* a2dp_codecs = bta_av_get_a2dp_codecs();
if (a2dp_codecs == nullptr) return;
if (!a2dp_codecs->getCodecConfigAndCapabilities(
&codec_config, &codecs_local_capabilities,
&codecs_selectable_capabilities)) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: error reporting audio source codec state: "
"cannot get codec config and capabilities",
__func__);
return;
}
if (bt_av_src_callbacks != NULL) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_av_src_callbacks, audio_config_cb, codec_config,
codecs_local_capabilities, codecs_selectable_capabilities);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathStepOpPtr op,
xmlNodeSetPtr set,
int contextSize,
int hasNsNodes)
{
if (op->ch1 != -1) {
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp = ctxt->comp;
/*
* Process inner predicates first.
*/
if (comp->steps[op->ch1].op != XPATH_OP_PREDICATE) {
/*
* TODO: raise an internal error.
*/
}
contextSize = xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1], set, contextSize, hasNsNodes);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (contextSize <= 0)
return(0);
}
if (op->ch2 != -1) {
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->context;
xmlNodePtr contextNode, oldContextNode;
xmlDocPtr oldContextDoc;
int i, res, contextPos = 0, newContextSize;
xmlXPathStepOpPtr exprOp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr contextObj = NULL, exprRes = NULL;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* URGENT TODO: Check the following:
* We don't expect location sets if evaluating prediates, right?
* Only filters should expect location sets, right?
*/
#endif
/*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "For each node in the node-set to be filtered, the
* PredicateExpr is evaluated with that node as the
* context node, with the number of nodes in the
* node-set as the context size, and with the proximity
* position of the node in the node-set with respect to
* the axis as the context position;"
* @oldset is the node-set" to be filtered.
*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "only predicates change the context position and
* context size (see [2.4 Predicates])."
* Example:
* node-set context pos
* nA 1
* nB 2
* nC 3
* After applying predicate [position() > 1] :
* node-set context pos
* nB 1
* nC 2
*/
oldContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
/*
* Get the expression of this predicate.
*/
exprOp = &ctxt->comp->steps[op->ch2];
newContextSize = 0;
for (i = 0; i < set->nodeNr; i++) {
if (set->nodeTab[i] == NULL)
continue;
contextNode = set->nodeTab[i];
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = contextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = ++contextPos;
/*
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() are evaluated in the predicate.
*/
if ((contextNode->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(contextNode->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = contextNode->doc;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate expression with 1 context node
* at a time; this node is packaged into a node set; this
* node set is handed over to the evaluation mechanism.
*/
if (contextObj == NULL)
contextObj = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(xpctxt, contextNode);
else
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(contextObj->nodesetval,
contextNode);
valuePush(ctxt, contextObj);
res = xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt, exprOp, 1);
if ((ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) || (res == -1)) {
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
newContextSize = 0;
goto evaluation_exit;
}
if (res != 0) {
newContextSize++;
} else {
/*
* Remove the entry from the initial node set.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
xmlXPathNodeSetFreeNs((xmlNsPtr) contextNode);
}
if (ctxt->value == contextObj) {
/*
* Don't free the temporary XPath object holding the
* context node, in order to avoid massive recreation
* inside this loop.
*/
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(contextObj->nodesetval, hasNsNodes);
} else {
/*
* TODO: The object was lost in the evaluation machinery.
* Can this happen? Maybe in internal-error cases.
*/
contextObj = NULL;
}
}
if (contextObj != NULL) {
if (ctxt->value == contextObj)
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, contextObj);
}
evaluation_exit:
if (exprRes != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
/*
* Reset/invalidate the context.
*/
xpctxt->node = oldContextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldContextDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = -1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = -1;
return(newContextSize);
}
return(contextSize);
}
|
xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathStepOpPtr op,
xmlNodeSetPtr set,
int contextSize,
int hasNsNodes)
{
if (op->ch1 != -1) {
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp = ctxt->comp;
/*
* Process inner predicates first.
*/
if (comp->steps[op->ch1].op != XPATH_OP_PREDICATE) {
/*
* TODO: raise an internal error.
*/
}
contextSize = xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1], set, contextSize, hasNsNodes);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (contextSize <= 0)
return(0);
}
if (op->ch2 != -1) {
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->context;
xmlNodePtr contextNode, oldContextNode;
xmlDocPtr oldContextDoc;
int i, res, contextPos = 0, newContextSize;
xmlXPathStepOpPtr exprOp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr contextObj = NULL, exprRes = NULL;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* URGENT TODO: Check the following:
* We don't expect location sets if evaluating prediates, right?
* Only filters should expect location sets, right?
*/
#endif
/*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "For each node in the node-set to be filtered, the
* PredicateExpr is evaluated with that node as the
* context node, with the number of nodes in the
* node-set as the context size, and with the proximity
* position of the node in the node-set with respect to
* the axis as the context position;"
* @oldset is the node-set" to be filtered.
*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "only predicates change the context position and
* context size (see [2.4 Predicates])."
* Example:
* node-set context pos
* nA 1
* nB 2
* nC 3
* After applying predicate [position() > 1] :
* node-set context pos
* nB 1
* nC 2
*/
oldContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
/*
* Get the expression of this predicate.
*/
exprOp = &ctxt->comp->steps[op->ch2];
newContextSize = 0;
for (i = 0; i < set->nodeNr; i++) {
if (set->nodeTab[i] == NULL)
continue;
contextNode = set->nodeTab[i];
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = contextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = ++contextPos;
/*
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() are evaluated in the predicate.
*/
if ((contextNode->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(contextNode->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = contextNode->doc;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate expression with 1 context node
* at a time; this node is packaged into a node set; this
* node set is handed over to the evaluation mechanism.
*/
if (contextObj == NULL)
contextObj = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(xpctxt, contextNode);
else
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(contextObj->nodesetval,
contextNode);
valuePush(ctxt, contextObj);
res = xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt, exprOp, 1);
if ((ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) || (res == -1)) {
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
newContextSize = 0;
goto evaluation_exit;
}
if (res != 0) {
newContextSize++;
} else {
/*
* Remove the entry from the initial node set.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
xmlXPathNodeSetFreeNs((xmlNsPtr) contextNode);
}
if (ctxt->value == contextObj) {
/*
* Don't free the temporary XPath object holding the
* context node, in order to avoid massive recreation
* inside this loop.
*/
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(contextObj->nodesetval, hasNsNodes);
} else {
/*
* TODO: The object was lost in the evaluation machinery.
* Can this happen? Maybe in internal-error cases.
*/
contextObj = NULL;
}
}
if (contextObj != NULL) {
if (ctxt->value == contextObj)
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, contextObj);
}
evaluation_exit:
if (exprRes != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
/*
* Reset/invalidate the context.
*/
xpctxt->node = oldContextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldContextDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = -1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = -1;
return(newContextSize);
}
return(contextSize);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8073
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8073/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/weechat/weechat/commit/2fb346f25f79e412cf0ed314fdf791763c19b70b
|
2fb346f25f79e412cf0ed314fdf791763c19b70b
|
irc: fix parsing of DCC filename
|
irc_ctcp_get_default_reply (const char *ctcp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].name; i++)
{
if (weechat_strcasecmp (irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].name, ctcp) == 0)
return irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].reply;
}
/* unknown CTCP */
return NULL;
}
|
irc_ctcp_get_default_reply (const char *ctcp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].name; i++)
{
if (weechat_strcasecmp (irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].name, ctcp) == 0)
return irc_ctcp_default_reply[i].reply;
}
/* unknown CTCP */
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
weechat
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int do_nothing(request_rec *r) { return OK; }
|
static int do_nothing(request_rec *r) { return OK; }
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9202
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9202/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
dc49c807926b96e503bd7c0dec35119eecd6c6fe
|
Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
|
IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_resize_alg(struct iw_context *ctx, int dimension, int family,
double blur, double param1, double param2)
{
struct iw_resize_settings *rs;
if(dimension<0 || dimension>1) dimension=0;
rs=&ctx->resize_settings[dimension];
rs->family = family;
rs->blur_factor = blur;
rs->param1 = param1;
rs->param2 = param2;
}
|
IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_resize_alg(struct iw_context *ctx, int dimension, int family,
double blur, double param1, double param2)
{
struct iw_resize_settings *rs;
if(dimension<0 || dimension>1) dimension=0;
rs=&ctx->resize_settings[dimension];
rs->family = family;
rs->blur_factor = blur;
rs->param1 = param1;
rs->param2 = param2;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8935
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8935/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
Update header handling to RFC 7230
|
SAPI_API char *sapi_getenv(char *name, size_t name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (sapi_module.getenv) {
char *value, *tmp = sapi_module.getenv(name, name_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (tmp) {
value = estrdup(tmp);
} else {
return NULL;
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter) {
sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_STRING, name, &value, strlen(value), NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
return value;
}
return NULL;
}
|
SAPI_API char *sapi_getenv(char *name, size_t name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (sapi_module.getenv) {
char *value, *tmp = sapi_module.getenv(name, name_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (tmp) {
value = estrdup(tmp);
} else {
return NULL;
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter) {
sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_STRING, name, &value, strlen(value), NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
return value;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17178/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/akallabeth/FreeRDP/commit/fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
static void setBitOfReversedStream0(size_t* bitpointer, unsigned char* bitstream, unsigned char bit)
{
/*the current bit in bitstream must be 0 for this to work*/
if(bit)
{
/*earlier bit of huffman code is in a lesser significant bit of an earlier byte*/
bitstream[(*bitpointer) >> 3] |= (bit << (7 - ((*bitpointer) & 0x7)));
}
(*bitpointer)++;
}
|
static void setBitOfReversedStream0(size_t* bitpointer, unsigned char* bitstream, unsigned char bit)
{
/*the current bit in bitstream must be 0 for this to work*/
if(bit)
{
/*earlier bit of huffman code is in a lesser significant bit of an earlier byte*/
bitstream[(*bitpointer) >> 3] |= (bit << (7 - ((*bitpointer) & 0x7)));
}
(*bitpointer)++;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void ServiceWorkerContextCore::NotifyRegistrationStored(int64_t registration_id,
const GURL& scope) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnRegistrationStored,
registration_id, scope);
}
|
void ServiceWorkerContextCore::NotifyRegistrationStored(int64_t registration_id,
const GURL& scope) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnRegistrationStored,
registration_id, scope);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2795
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2795/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLElement::setInnerText(const String& text, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
if (hasLocalName(colTag) || hasLocalName(colgroupTag) || hasLocalName(framesetTag) ||
hasLocalName(headTag) || hasLocalName(htmlTag) || hasLocalName(tableTag) ||
hasLocalName(tbodyTag) || hasLocalName(tfootTag) || hasLocalName(theadTag) ||
hasLocalName(trTag)) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
if (!text.contains('\n') && !text.contains('\r')) {
if (text.isEmpty()) {
removeChildren();
return;
}
replaceChildrenWithText(this, text, ec);
return;
}
RenderObject* r = renderer();
if (r && r->style()->preserveNewline()) {
if (!text.contains('\r')) {
replaceChildrenWithText(this, text, ec);
return;
}
String textWithConsistentLineBreaks = text;
textWithConsistentLineBreaks.replace("\r\n", "\n");
textWithConsistentLineBreaks.replace('\r', '\n');
replaceChildrenWithText(this, textWithConsistentLineBreaks, ec);
return;
}
ec = 0;
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = textToFragment(text, ec);
if (!ec)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
|
void HTMLElement::setInnerText(const String& text, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
if (hasLocalName(colTag) || hasLocalName(colgroupTag) || hasLocalName(framesetTag) ||
hasLocalName(headTag) || hasLocalName(htmlTag) || hasLocalName(tableTag) ||
hasLocalName(tbodyTag) || hasLocalName(tfootTag) || hasLocalName(theadTag) ||
hasLocalName(trTag)) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
if (!text.contains('\n') && !text.contains('\r')) {
if (text.isEmpty()) {
removeChildren();
return;
}
replaceChildrenWithText(this, text, ec);
return;
}
RenderObject* r = renderer();
if (r && r->style()->preserveNewline()) {
if (!text.contains('\r')) {
replaceChildrenWithText(this, text, ec);
return;
}
String textWithConsistentLineBreaks = text;
textWithConsistentLineBreaks.replace("\r\n", "\n");
textWithConsistentLineBreaks.replace('\r', '\n');
replaceChildrenWithText(this, textWithConsistentLineBreaks, ec);
return;
}
ec = 0;
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = textToFragment(text, ec);
if (!ec)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform4fv(
GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type;
if (!GetUniformTypeByLocation(location, "glUniform4fv", &type)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 4;
scoped_array<GLint> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii]);
}
glUniform4iv(location, count, temp.get());
} else {
glUniform4fv(location, count, value);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform4fv(
GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type;
if (!GetUniformTypeByLocation(location, "glUniform4fv", &type)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 4;
scoped_array<GLint> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii]);
}
glUniform4iv(location, count, temp.get());
} else {
glUniform4fv(location, count, value);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
int tok, const char *next, const char **nextPtr, XML_Bool haveMore,
XML_Bool allowClosingDoctype) {
#ifdef XML_DTD
static const XML_Char externalSubsetName[] = {ASCII_HASH, '\0'};
#endif /* XML_DTD */
static const XML_Char atypeCDATA[]
= {ASCII_C, ASCII_D, ASCII_A, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeID[] = {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREF[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREFS[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITY[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T, ASCII_Y, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITIES[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_E, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKEN[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K, ASCII_E, ASCII_N, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKENS[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K,
ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char notationPrefix[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_O, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_O, ASCII_N, ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueSep[] = {ASCII_PIPE, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueStart[] = {ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
enum XML_Content_Quant quant;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
for (;;) {
int role;
XML_Bool handleDefault = XML_TRUE;
*eventPP = s;
*eventEndPP = next;
if (tok <= 0) {
if (haveMore && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case -XML_TOK_PROLOG_S:
tok = -tok;
break;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* for internal PE NOT referenced between declarations */
if (enc != parser->m_encoding
&& ! parser->m_openInternalEntities->betweenDecl) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
/* WFC: PE Between Declarations - must check that PE contains
complete markup, not only for external PEs, but also for
internal PEs if the reference occurs between declarations.
*/
if (parser->m_isParamEntity || enc != parser->m_encoding) {
if (XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, XML_TOK_NONE, end, end, enc)
== XML_ROLE_ERROR)
return XML_ERROR_INCOMPLETE_PE;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
default:
tok = -tok;
next = end;
break;
}
}
role = XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, tok, s, next, enc);
switch (role) {
case XML_ROLE_XML_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 0, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NAME:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_doctypeName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL; /* always initialize to NULL */
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 1);
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_TEXT_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 1, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
XML_Char *pubId;
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
pubId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! pubId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(pubId);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = pubId;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
goto alreadyChecked;
}
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
alreadyChecked:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
XML_Char *tem
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = tem;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_CLOSE:
if (allowClosingDoctype != XML_TRUE) {
/* Must not close doctype from within expanded parameter entities */
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
if (parser->m_doctypeName) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 0);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
/* parser->m_doctypeSysid will be non-NULL in the case of a previous
XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID, even if parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler
was not set, indicating an external subset
*/
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid || parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity) {
/* The external subset name "#" will have already been
* inserted into the hash table at the start of the
* external entity parsing, so no allocation will happen
* and lookup() cannot fail.
*/
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD)
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else if (! parser->m_doctypeSysid)
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_INSTANCE_START:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* if there is no DOCTYPE declaration then now is the
last chance to read the foreign DTD
*/
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
return contentProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_ELEMENT_NAME:
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME:
parser->m_declAttributeId = getAttributeId(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declAttributeId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_CDATA:
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeCDATA;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ID:
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeID;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREF:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREF;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREFS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREFS;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITY:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITIES:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITIES;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKEN:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKEN;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKENS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKENS;
checkAttListDeclHandler:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_ENUM_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *prefix;
if (parser->m_declAttributeType) {
prefix = enumValueSep;
} else {
prefix = (role == XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE ? notationPrefix
: enumValueStart);
}
if (! poolAppendString(&parser->m_tempPool, prefix))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! poolAppend(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_IMPLIED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
if (! defineAttribute(parser->m_declElementType,
parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
parser->m_declAttributeIsId, 0, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType, 0,
role == XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *attVal;
enum XML_Error result = storeAttributeValue(
parser, enc, parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar, &dtd->pool);
if (result)
return result;
attVal = poolStart(&dtd->pool);
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* ID attributes aren't allowed to have a default */
if (! defineAttribute(
parser->m_declElementType, parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata, XML_FALSE, attVal, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType,
attVal, role == XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
enum XML_Error result = storeEntityValue(
parser, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->textPtr = poolStart(&dtd->entityValuePool);
parser->m_declEntity->textLen
= (int)(poolLength(&dtd->entityValuePool));
poolFinish(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, parser->m_declEntity->textPtr,
parser->m_declEntity->textLen, parser->m_curBase, 0, 0, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else
poolDiscard(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeSysid = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
else
/* use externalSubsetName to make parser->m_doctypeSysid non-NULL
for the case where no parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler is set */
parser->m_doctypeSysid = externalSubsetName;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone
#ifdef XML_DTD
&& ! parser->m_paramEntityParsing
#endif /* XML_DTD */
&& parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
#ifndef XML_DTD
break;
#else /* XML_DTD */
if (! parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->systemId
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->base = parser->m_curBase;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_COMPLETE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity
&& parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, 0, 0, parser->m_declEntity->base,
parser->m_declEntity->systemId, parser->m_declEntity->publicId, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NOTATION_NAME:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->notation
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} else if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name, 0, 0, 0,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GENERAL_ENTITY_NAME: {
if (XmlPredefinedEntityName(enc, s, next)) {
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
break;
}
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_FALSE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
} break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_NAME:
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_TRUE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
#else /* not XML_DTD */
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NAME:
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declNotationName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declNotationName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
if (parser
->m_declNotationName) { /* means m_notationDeclHandler != NULL */
XML_Char *tem = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = tem;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationName && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *systemId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
systemId, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NO_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationPublicId && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
0, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_ERROR:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
/* PE references in internal subset are
not allowed within declarations. */
return XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
default:
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_IGNORE_SECT: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
result = doIgnoreSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = ignoreSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_OPEN:
if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
if (parser->m_groupSize) {
{
char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
if (new_connector == NULL) {
parser->m_groupSize /= 2;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_groupConnector = new_connector;
}
if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffIndex = new_scaff_index;
}
} else {
parser->m_groupConnector
= (char *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_groupSize = 32);
if (! parser->m_groupConnector) {
parser->m_groupSize = 0;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = 0;
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
assert(dtd->scaffIndex != NULL);
dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel] = myindex;
dtd->scaffLevel++;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_SEQ;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_SEQUENCE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_PIPE)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_COMMA;
if (dtd->in_eldecl && parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CHOICE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_COMMA)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
if (dtd->in_eldecl
&& ! parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level]
&& (dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
!= XML_CTYPE_MIXED)) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_CHOICE;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_PIPE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_INNER_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_paramEntityParsing)
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
else {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* first, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity handler
*/
if (parser->m_prologState.documentEntity
&& (dtd->standalone ? ! parser->m_openInternalEntities
: ! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs)) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal) {
/* It's hard to exhaustively search the code to be sure,
* but there doesn't seem to be a way of executing the
* following line. There are two cases:
*
* If 'standalone' is false, the DTD must have no
* parameter entities or we wouldn't have passed the outer
* 'if' statement. That measn the only entity in the hash
* table is the external subset name "#" which cannot be
* given as a parameter entity name in XML syntax, so the
* lookup must have returned NULL and we don't even reach
* the test for an internal entity.
*
* If 'standalone' is true, it does not seem to be
* possible to create entities taking this code path that
* are not internal entities, so fail the test above.
*
* Because this analysis is very uncertain, the code is
* being left in place and merely removed from the
* coverage test statistics.
*/
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
} else if (! entity) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
/* cannot report skipped entities in declarations */
if ((role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF)
&& parser->m_skippedEntityHandler) {
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 1);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Bool betweenDecl
= (role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF ? XML_TRUE : XML_FALSE);
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, betweenDecl);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId)) {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
}
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
if (! dtd->paramEntityRead) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
} else {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
break;
/* Element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NAME:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffLevel = 0;
dtd->scaffCount = 0;
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_TRUE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY:
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_EMPTY:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
XML_Content *content
= (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Content));
if (! content)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
content->quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
content->name = NULL;
content->numchildren = 0;
content->children = NULL;
content->type = ((role == XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY) ? XML_CTYPE_ANY
: XML_CTYPE_EMPTY);
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, content);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_PCDATA:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_MIXED;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
elementContent:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
const XML_Char *name;
int nameLen;
const char *nxt
= (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_NAME;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].quant = quant;
el = getElementType(parser, enc, s, nxt);
if (! el)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
name = el->name;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].name = name;
nameLen = 0;
for (; name[nameLen++];)
;
dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
closeGroup:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
dtd->scaffLevel--;
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel]].quant = quant;
if (dtd->scaffLevel == 0) {
if (! handleDefault) {
XML_Content *model = build_model(parser);
if (! model)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, model);
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
dtd->contentStringLen = 0;
}
}
break;
/* End element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NONE:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_BOM:
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NONE:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NONE:
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NONE:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
} /* end of big switch */
if (handleDefault && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(enc, s, end, &next);
}
}
/* not reached */
}
|
doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
int tok, const char *next, const char **nextPtr, XML_Bool haveMore) {
#ifdef XML_DTD
static const XML_Char externalSubsetName[] = {ASCII_HASH, '\0'};
#endif /* XML_DTD */
static const XML_Char atypeCDATA[]
= {ASCII_C, ASCII_D, ASCII_A, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeID[] = {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREF[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREFS[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITY[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T, ASCII_Y, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITIES[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_E, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKEN[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K, ASCII_E, ASCII_N, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKENS[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K,
ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char notationPrefix[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_O, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_O, ASCII_N, ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueSep[] = {ASCII_PIPE, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueStart[] = {ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
enum XML_Content_Quant quant;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
for (;;) {
int role;
XML_Bool handleDefault = XML_TRUE;
*eventPP = s;
*eventEndPP = next;
if (tok <= 0) {
if (haveMore && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case -XML_TOK_PROLOG_S:
tok = -tok;
break;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* for internal PE NOT referenced between declarations */
if (enc != parser->m_encoding
&& ! parser->m_openInternalEntities->betweenDecl) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
/* WFC: PE Between Declarations - must check that PE contains
complete markup, not only for external PEs, but also for
internal PEs if the reference occurs between declarations.
*/
if (parser->m_isParamEntity || enc != parser->m_encoding) {
if (XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, XML_TOK_NONE, end, end, enc)
== XML_ROLE_ERROR)
return XML_ERROR_INCOMPLETE_PE;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
default:
tok = -tok;
next = end;
break;
}
}
role = XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, tok, s, next, enc);
switch (role) {
case XML_ROLE_XML_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 0, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NAME:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_doctypeName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL; /* always initialize to NULL */
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 1);
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_TEXT_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 1, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
XML_Char *pubId;
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
pubId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! pubId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(pubId);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = pubId;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
goto alreadyChecked;
}
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
alreadyChecked:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
XML_Char *tem
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = tem;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_CLOSE:
if (parser->m_doctypeName) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 0);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
/* parser->m_doctypeSysid will be non-NULL in the case of a previous
XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID, even if parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler
was not set, indicating an external subset
*/
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid || parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity) {
/* The external subset name "#" will have already been
* inserted into the hash table at the start of the
* external entity parsing, so no allocation will happen
* and lookup() cannot fail.
*/
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD)
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else if (! parser->m_doctypeSysid)
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_INSTANCE_START:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* if there is no DOCTYPE declaration then now is the
last chance to read the foreign DTD
*/
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
return contentProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_ELEMENT_NAME:
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME:
parser->m_declAttributeId = getAttributeId(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declAttributeId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_CDATA:
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeCDATA;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ID:
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeID;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREF:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREF;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREFS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREFS;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITY:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITIES:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITIES;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKEN:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKEN;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKENS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKENS;
checkAttListDeclHandler:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_ENUM_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *prefix;
if (parser->m_declAttributeType) {
prefix = enumValueSep;
} else {
prefix = (role == XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE ? notationPrefix
: enumValueStart);
}
if (! poolAppendString(&parser->m_tempPool, prefix))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! poolAppend(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_IMPLIED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
if (! defineAttribute(parser->m_declElementType,
parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
parser->m_declAttributeIsId, 0, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType, 0,
role == XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *attVal;
enum XML_Error result = storeAttributeValue(
parser, enc, parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar, &dtd->pool);
if (result)
return result;
attVal = poolStart(&dtd->pool);
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* ID attributes aren't allowed to have a default */
if (! defineAttribute(
parser->m_declElementType, parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata, XML_FALSE, attVal, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType,
attVal, role == XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
enum XML_Error result = storeEntityValue(
parser, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->textPtr = poolStart(&dtd->entityValuePool);
parser->m_declEntity->textLen
= (int)(poolLength(&dtd->entityValuePool));
poolFinish(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, parser->m_declEntity->textPtr,
parser->m_declEntity->textLen, parser->m_curBase, 0, 0, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else
poolDiscard(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeSysid = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
else
/* use externalSubsetName to make parser->m_doctypeSysid non-NULL
for the case where no parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler is set */
parser->m_doctypeSysid = externalSubsetName;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone
#ifdef XML_DTD
&& ! parser->m_paramEntityParsing
#endif /* XML_DTD */
&& parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
#ifndef XML_DTD
break;
#else /* XML_DTD */
if (! parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->systemId
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->base = parser->m_curBase;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_COMPLETE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity
&& parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, 0, 0, parser->m_declEntity->base,
parser->m_declEntity->systemId, parser->m_declEntity->publicId, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NOTATION_NAME:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->notation
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} else if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name, 0, 0, 0,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GENERAL_ENTITY_NAME: {
if (XmlPredefinedEntityName(enc, s, next)) {
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
break;
}
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_FALSE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
} break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_NAME:
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_TRUE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
#else /* not XML_DTD */
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NAME:
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declNotationName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declNotationName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
if (parser
->m_declNotationName) { /* means m_notationDeclHandler != NULL */
XML_Char *tem = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = tem;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationName && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *systemId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
systemId, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NO_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationPublicId && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
0, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_ERROR:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
/* PE references in internal subset are
not allowed within declarations. */
return XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
default:
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_IGNORE_SECT: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
result = doIgnoreSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = ignoreSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_OPEN:
if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
if (parser->m_groupSize) {
{
char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
if (new_connector == NULL) {
parser->m_groupSize /= 2;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_groupConnector = new_connector;
}
if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffIndex = new_scaff_index;
}
} else {
parser->m_groupConnector
= (char *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_groupSize = 32);
if (! parser->m_groupConnector) {
parser->m_groupSize = 0;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = 0;
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
assert(dtd->scaffIndex != NULL);
dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel] = myindex;
dtd->scaffLevel++;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_SEQ;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_SEQUENCE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_PIPE)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_COMMA;
if (dtd->in_eldecl && parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CHOICE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_COMMA)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
if (dtd->in_eldecl
&& ! parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level]
&& (dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
!= XML_CTYPE_MIXED)) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_CHOICE;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_PIPE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_INNER_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_paramEntityParsing)
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
else {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* first, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity handler
*/
if (parser->m_prologState.documentEntity
&& (dtd->standalone ? ! parser->m_openInternalEntities
: ! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs)) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal) {
/* It's hard to exhaustively search the code to be sure,
* but there doesn't seem to be a way of executing the
* following line. There are two cases:
*
* If 'standalone' is false, the DTD must have no
* parameter entities or we wouldn't have passed the outer
* 'if' statement. That measn the only entity in the hash
* table is the external subset name "#" which cannot be
* given as a parameter entity name in XML syntax, so the
* lookup must have returned NULL and we don't even reach
* the test for an internal entity.
*
* If 'standalone' is true, it does not seem to be
* possible to create entities taking this code path that
* are not internal entities, so fail the test above.
*
* Because this analysis is very uncertain, the code is
* being left in place and merely removed from the
* coverage test statistics.
*/
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
} else if (! entity) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
/* cannot report skipped entities in declarations */
if ((role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF)
&& parser->m_skippedEntityHandler) {
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 1);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Bool betweenDecl
= (role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF ? XML_TRUE : XML_FALSE);
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, betweenDecl);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId)) {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
}
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
if (! dtd->paramEntityRead) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
} else {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
break;
/* Element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NAME:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffLevel = 0;
dtd->scaffCount = 0;
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_TRUE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY:
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_EMPTY:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
XML_Content *content
= (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Content));
if (! content)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
content->quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
content->name = NULL;
content->numchildren = 0;
content->children = NULL;
content->type = ((role == XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY) ? XML_CTYPE_ANY
: XML_CTYPE_EMPTY);
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, content);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_PCDATA:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_MIXED;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
elementContent:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
const XML_Char *name;
int nameLen;
const char *nxt
= (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_NAME;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].quant = quant;
el = getElementType(parser, enc, s, nxt);
if (! el)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
name = el->name;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].name = name;
nameLen = 0;
for (; name[nameLen++];)
;
dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
closeGroup:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
dtd->scaffLevel--;
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel]].quant = quant;
if (dtd->scaffLevel == 0) {
if (! handleDefault) {
XML_Content *model = build_model(parser);
if (! model)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, model);
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
dtd->contentStringLen = 0;
}
}
break;
/* End element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NONE:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_BOM:
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NONE:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NONE:
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NONE:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
} /* end of big switch */
if (handleDefault && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(enc, s, end, &next);
}
}
/* not reached */
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 1 |
CVE-2016-6136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6136/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
if (!ab)
return;
switch (context->type) {
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_format(ab,
"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
context->ipc.qbytes,
context->ipc.perm_uid,
context->ipc.perm_gid,
context->ipc.perm_mode);
}
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
audit_log_format(ab,
"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
audit_log_format(ab,
"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
"abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
context->mq_notify.mqdes,
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
audit_log_format(ab,
"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
break; }
case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
break; }
case AUDIT_MMAP: {
audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
context->mmap.flags);
break; }
case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
break; }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
|
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
if (!ab)
return;
switch (context->type) {
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_format(ab,
"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
context->ipc.qbytes,
context->ipc.perm_uid,
context->ipc.perm_gid,
context->ipc.perm_mode);
}
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
audit_log_format(ab,
"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
audit_log_format(ab,
"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
"abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
context->mq_notify.mqdes,
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
break; }
case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
audit_log_format(ab,
"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
break; }
case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
break; }
case AUDIT_MMAP: {
audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
context->mmap.flags);
break; }
case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
break; }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5355
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5355/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/3270dfac43da861c714df76513456b46765ff47f
|
3270dfac43da861c714df76513456b46765ff47f
|
Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12394
Change-Id: I4b19b95f2e1ffc96dac5c91bff6698c246f52007
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15230
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
|
static gboolean toshiba_check_file_type(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char buf[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH];
guint i, reclen, level, line;
char byte;
buf[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH-1] = 0;
for (line = 0; line < TOSHIBA_HEADER_LINES_TO_CHECK; line++) {
if (file_gets(buf, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, wth->fh) == NULL) {
/* EOF or error. */
*err = file_error(wth->fh, err_info);
return FALSE;
}
reclen = (guint) strlen(buf);
if (reclen < TOSHIBA_HDR_MAGIC_SIZE) {
continue;
}
level = 0;
for (i = 0; i < reclen; i++) {
byte = buf[i];
if (byte == toshiba_hdr_magic[level]) {
level++;
if (level >= TOSHIBA_HDR_MAGIC_SIZE) {
return TRUE;
}
}
else {
level = 0;
}
}
}
*err = 0;
return FALSE;
}
|
static gboolean toshiba_check_file_type(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char buf[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH];
guint i, reclen, level, line;
char byte;
buf[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH-1] = 0;
for (line = 0; line < TOSHIBA_HEADER_LINES_TO_CHECK; line++) {
if (file_gets(buf, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, wth->fh) == NULL) {
/* EOF or error. */
*err = file_error(wth->fh, err_info);
return FALSE;
}
reclen = (guint) strlen(buf);
if (reclen < TOSHIBA_HDR_MAGIC_SIZE) {
continue;
}
level = 0;
for (i = 0; i < reclen; i++) {
byte = buf[i];
if (byte == toshiba_hdr_magic[level]) {
level++;
if (level >= TOSHIBA_HDR_MAGIC_SIZE) {
return TRUE;
}
}
else {
level = 0;
}
}
}
*err = 0;
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Document::recalcStyleForLayoutIgnoringPendingStylesheets()
{
TemporaryChange<bool> ignorePendingStylesheets(m_ignorePendingStylesheets, m_ignorePendingStylesheets);
if (!haveStylesheetsLoaded()) {
m_ignorePendingStylesheets = true;
HTMLElement* bodyElement = body();
if (bodyElement && !bodyElement->renderer() && m_pendingSheetLayout == NoLayoutWithPendingSheets) {
m_pendingSheetLayout = DidLayoutWithPendingSheets;
styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleImmediately);
} else if (m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle) {
recalcStyle(Force);
}
}
}
|
void Document::recalcStyleForLayoutIgnoringPendingStylesheets()
{
TemporaryChange<bool> ignorePendingStylesheets(m_ignorePendingStylesheets, m_ignorePendingStylesheets);
if (!haveStylesheetsLoaded()) {
m_ignorePendingStylesheets = true;
HTMLElement* bodyElement = body();
if (bodyElement && !bodyElement->renderer() && m_pendingSheetLayout == NoLayoutWithPendingSheets) {
m_pendingSheetLayout = DidLayoutWithPendingSheets;
styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleImmediately);
} else if (m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle) {
recalcStyle(Force);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
int emulator_write_emulated(unsigned long addr,
const void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Crossing a page boundary? */
if (((addr + bytes - 1) ^ addr) & PAGE_MASK) {
int rc, now;
now = -addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
rc = emulator_write_emulated_onepage(addr, val, now, exception,
vcpu);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
addr += now;
val += now;
bytes -= now;
}
return emulator_write_emulated_onepage(addr, val, bytes, exception,
vcpu);
}
|
int emulator_write_emulated(unsigned long addr,
const void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Crossing a page boundary? */
if (((addr + bytes - 1) ^ addr) & PAGE_MASK) {
int rc, now;
now = -addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
rc = emulator_write_emulated_onepage(addr, val, now, exception,
vcpu);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
addr += now;
val += now;
bytes -= now;
}
return emulator_write_emulated_onepage(addr, val, bytes, exception,
vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
|
0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
| null |
bool ldb_dn_is_valid(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
if ( ! dn) return false;
return ! dn->invalid;
}
|
bool ldb_dn_is_valid(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
if ( ! dn) return false;
return ! dn->invalid;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SetSize(const gfx::Size& size) {
if (surface_texture_transport_.get())
surface_texture_transport_->SetSize(size);
host_->WasResized();
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SetSize(const gfx::Size& size) {
if (surface_texture_transport_.get())
surface_texture_transport_->SetSize(size);
host_->WasResized();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9652/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/59e63838913eee47f5c120a6c53d4565af638158
|
59e63838913eee47f5c120a6c53d4565af638158
|
PR/398: Correctly truncate pascal strings (fixes out of bounds read of 1, 2,
or 4 bytes).
|
mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
uint8_t type;
switch (type = cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
size_t sz = file_pstring_length_size(m);
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + sz;
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
sz = sizeof(p->s) - sz; /* maximum length of string */
if (len >= sz) {
/*
* The size of the pascal string length (sz)
* is 1, 2, or 4. We need at least 1 byte for NUL
* termination, but we've already truncated the
* string by p->s, so we need to deduct sz.
* Because we can use one of the bytes of the length
* after we shifted as NUL termination.
*/
len = sz;
}
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
if (type == FILE_BELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
if (type == FILE_BEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
if (type == FILE_LELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
if (type == FILE_LEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
if (type == FILE_MELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
|
mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
uint8_t type;
switch (type = cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
size_t sz = file_pstring_length_size(m);
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + sz;
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s)) {
/*
* The size of the pascal string length (sz)
* is 1, 2, or 4. We need at least 1 byte for NUL
* termination, but we've already truncated the
* string by p->s, so we need to deduct sz.
*/
len = sizeof(p->s) - sz;
}
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
if (type == FILE_BELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
if (type == FILE_BEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
if (type == FILE_LELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
if (type == FILE_LEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
if (type == FILE_MELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
file
| 1 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
bool HasProvider() const { return test_data_providers.size() == 1U; }
|
bool HasProvider() const { return test_data_providers.size() == 1U; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1065/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct compat_arpt_replace tmp;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
if (copy_from_user(loc_cpu_entry, user + sizeof(tmp), tmp.size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_newinfo;
}
ret = translate_compat_table(&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
ret = __do_replace(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, newinfo,
tmp.num_counters, compat_ptr(tmp.counters));
if (ret)
goto free_newinfo_untrans;
return 0;
free_newinfo_untrans:
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter);
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
|
static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct compat_arpt_replace tmp;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
if (copy_from_user(loc_cpu_entry, user + sizeof(tmp), tmp.size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_newinfo;
}
ret = translate_compat_table(&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
ret = __do_replace(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, newinfo,
tmp.num_counters, compat_ptr(tmp.counters));
if (ret)
goto free_newinfo_untrans;
return 0;
free_newinfo_untrans:
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter);
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
void replaceClientCommandVector(client *c, int argc, robj **argv) {
freeClientArgv(c);
zfree(c->argv);
c->argv = argv;
c->argc = argc;
c->cmd = lookupCommandOrOriginal(c->argv[0]->ptr);
serverAssertWithInfo(c,NULL,c->cmd != NULL);
}
|
void replaceClientCommandVector(client *c, int argc, robj **argv) {
freeClientArgv(c);
zfree(c->argv);
c->argv = argv;
c->argc = argc;
c->cmd = lookupCommandOrOriginal(c->argv[0]->ptr);
serverAssertWithInfo(c,NULL,c->cmd != NULL);
}
|
C
|
redis
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
int32_t RenderThreadImpl::GetClientId() {
return client_id_;
}
|
int32_t RenderThreadImpl::GetClientId() {
return client_id_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
[Print Preview]: Added code to support pdf fit to page functionality.
BUG=85132
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10083060
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0058
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0058/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/802f43594d6e4d2ac61086d239153c17873a0428
|
802f43594d6e4d2ac61086d239153c17873a0428
|
Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static inline void set_timeout(long start_jiffies, struct aio_timeout *to,
const struct timespec *ts)
{
to->timer.expires = start_jiffies + timespec_to_jiffies(ts);
if (time_after(to->timer.expires, jiffies))
add_timer(&to->timer);
else
to->timed_out = 1;
}
|
static inline void set_timeout(long start_jiffies, struct aio_timeout *to,
const struct timespec *ts)
{
to->timer.expires = start_jiffies + timespec_to_jiffies(ts);
if (time_after(to->timer.expires, jiffies))
add_timer(&to->timer);
else
to->timed_out = 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6288
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6288/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=629e4da7cc8b174acdeab84969cbfc606a019b31
|
629e4da7cc8b174acdeab84969cbfc606a019b31
| null |
PHPAPI int php_raw_url_decode(char *str, int len)
{
char *dest = str;
char *data = str;
while (len--) {
if (*data == '%' && len >= 2 && isxdigit((int) *(data + 1))
&& isxdigit((int) *(data + 2))) {
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
*dest = (char) php_htoi(data + 1);
#else
*dest = os_toebcdic[(char) php_htoi(data + 1)];
#endif
data += 2;
len -= 2;
} else {
*dest = *data;
}
data++;
dest++;
}
*dest = '\0';
return dest - str;
}
|
PHPAPI int php_raw_url_decode(char *str, int len)
{
char *dest = str;
char *data = str;
while (len--) {
if (*data == '%' && len >= 2 && isxdigit((int) *(data + 1))
&& isxdigit((int) *(data + 2))) {
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
*dest = (char) php_htoi(data + 1);
#else
*dest = os_toebcdic[(char) php_htoi(data + 1)];
#endif
data += 2;
len -= 2;
} else {
*dest = *data;
}
data++;
dest++;
}
*dest = '\0';
return dest - str;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18386/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/966031f340185eddd05affcf72b740549f056348
|
966031f340185eddd05affcf72b740549f056348
|
n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
n_tty_receive_char_special(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char c)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
if (I_IXON(tty)) {
if (c == START_CHAR(tty)) {
start_tty(tty);
process_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == STOP_CHAR(tty)) {
stop_tty(tty);
return 0;
}
}
if (L_ISIG(tty)) {
if (c == INTR_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGINT, c);
return 0;
} else if (c == QUIT_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGQUIT, c);
return 0;
} else if (c == SUSP_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGTSTP, c);
return 0;
}
}
if (tty->stopped && !tty->flow_stopped && I_IXON(tty) && I_IXANY(tty)) {
start_tty(tty);
process_echoes(tty);
}
if (c == '\r') {
if (I_IGNCR(tty))
return 0;
if (I_ICRNL(tty))
c = '\n';
} else if (c == '\n' && I_INLCR(tty))
c = '\r';
if (ldata->icanon) {
if (c == ERASE_CHAR(tty) || c == KILL_CHAR(tty) ||
(c == WERASE_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty))) {
eraser(c, tty);
commit_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == LNEXT_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty)) {
ldata->lnext = 1;
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
finish_erasing(ldata);
if (L_ECHOCTL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('^', ldata);
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
}
return 1;
}
if (c == REPRINT_CHAR(tty) && L_ECHO(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty)) {
size_t tail = ldata->canon_head;
finish_erasing(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
while (tail != ldata->read_head) {
echo_char(read_buf(ldata, tail), tty);
tail++;
}
commit_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == '\n') {
if (L_ECHO(tty) || L_ECHONL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
goto handle_newline;
}
if (c == EOF_CHAR(tty)) {
c = __DISABLED_CHAR;
goto handle_newline;
}
if ((c == EOL_CHAR(tty)) ||
(c == EOL2_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty))) {
/*
* XXX are EOL_CHAR and EOL2_CHAR echoed?!?
*/
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
/* Record the column of first canon char. */
if (ldata->canon_head == ldata->read_head)
echo_set_canon_col(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
/*
* XXX does PARMRK doubling happen for
* EOL_CHAR and EOL2_CHAR?
*/
if (c == (unsigned char) '\377' && I_PARMRK(tty))
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
handle_newline:
set_bit(ldata->read_head & (N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - 1), ldata->read_flags);
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
smp_store_release(&ldata->canon_head, ldata->read_head);
kill_fasync(&tty->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->read_wait, POLLIN);
return 0;
}
}
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
finish_erasing(ldata);
if (c == '\n')
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
else {
/* Record the column of first canon char. */
if (ldata->canon_head == ldata->read_head)
echo_set_canon_col(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
}
commit_echoes(tty);
}
/* PARMRK doubling check */
if (c == (unsigned char) '\377' && I_PARMRK(tty))
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
return 0;
}
|
n_tty_receive_char_special(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char c)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
if (I_IXON(tty)) {
if (c == START_CHAR(tty)) {
start_tty(tty);
process_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == STOP_CHAR(tty)) {
stop_tty(tty);
return 0;
}
}
if (L_ISIG(tty)) {
if (c == INTR_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGINT, c);
return 0;
} else if (c == QUIT_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGQUIT, c);
return 0;
} else if (c == SUSP_CHAR(tty)) {
n_tty_receive_signal_char(tty, SIGTSTP, c);
return 0;
}
}
if (tty->stopped && !tty->flow_stopped && I_IXON(tty) && I_IXANY(tty)) {
start_tty(tty);
process_echoes(tty);
}
if (c == '\r') {
if (I_IGNCR(tty))
return 0;
if (I_ICRNL(tty))
c = '\n';
} else if (c == '\n' && I_INLCR(tty))
c = '\r';
if (ldata->icanon) {
if (c == ERASE_CHAR(tty) || c == KILL_CHAR(tty) ||
(c == WERASE_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty))) {
eraser(c, tty);
commit_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == LNEXT_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty)) {
ldata->lnext = 1;
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
finish_erasing(ldata);
if (L_ECHOCTL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('^', ldata);
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
}
return 1;
}
if (c == REPRINT_CHAR(tty) && L_ECHO(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty)) {
size_t tail = ldata->canon_head;
finish_erasing(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
while (tail != ldata->read_head) {
echo_char(read_buf(ldata, tail), tty);
tail++;
}
commit_echoes(tty);
return 0;
}
if (c == '\n') {
if (L_ECHO(tty) || L_ECHONL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
goto handle_newline;
}
if (c == EOF_CHAR(tty)) {
c = __DISABLED_CHAR;
goto handle_newline;
}
if ((c == EOL_CHAR(tty)) ||
(c == EOL2_CHAR(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty))) {
/*
* XXX are EOL_CHAR and EOL2_CHAR echoed?!?
*/
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
/* Record the column of first canon char. */
if (ldata->canon_head == ldata->read_head)
echo_set_canon_col(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
commit_echoes(tty);
}
/*
* XXX does PARMRK doubling happen for
* EOL_CHAR and EOL2_CHAR?
*/
if (c == (unsigned char) '\377' && I_PARMRK(tty))
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
handle_newline:
set_bit(ldata->read_head & (N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - 1), ldata->read_flags);
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
smp_store_release(&ldata->canon_head, ldata->read_head);
kill_fasync(&tty->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->read_wait, POLLIN);
return 0;
}
}
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
finish_erasing(ldata);
if (c == '\n')
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
else {
/* Record the column of first canon char. */
if (ldata->canon_head == ldata->read_head)
echo_set_canon_col(ldata);
echo_char(c, tty);
}
commit_echoes(tty);
}
/* PARMRK doubling check */
if (c == (unsigned char) '\377' && I_PARMRK(tty))
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7418
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7418/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/proftpd/proftpd/pull/444/commits/349addc3be4fcdad9bd4ec01ad1ccd916c898ed8
|
349addc3be4fcdad9bd4ec01ad1ccd916c898ed8
|
Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
|
static int auth_cmd_chk_cb(cmd_rec *cmd) {
if (auth_have_authenticated == FALSE) {
unsigned char *authd;
authd = get_param_ptr(cmd->server->conf, "authenticated", FALSE);
if (authd == NULL ||
*authd == FALSE) {
pr_response_send(R_530, _("Please login with USER and PASS"));
return FALSE;
}
auth_have_authenticated = TRUE;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
static int auth_cmd_chk_cb(cmd_rec *cmd) {
if (auth_have_authenticated == FALSE) {
unsigned char *authd;
authd = get_param_ptr(cmd->server->conf, "authenticated", FALSE);
if (authd == NULL ||
*authd == FALSE) {
pr_response_send(R_530, _("Please login with USER and PASS"));
return FALSE;
}
auth_have_authenticated = TRUE;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
proftpd
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
GfxShadingBitBuf::GfxShadingBitBuf(Stream *strA) {
str = strA;
str->reset();
bitBuf = 0;
nBits = 0;
}
|
GfxShadingBitBuf::GfxShadingBitBuf(Stream *strA) {
str = strA;
str->reset();
bitBuf = 0;
nBits = 0;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6145
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6145/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/133bc5c262b2555af223263452e9875a95db9eb7
|
133bc5c262b2555af223263452e9875a95db9eb7
|
HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
|
static bool TokenExitsMath(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
return ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::miTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::moTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mnTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::msTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mtextTag);
}
|
static bool TokenExitsMath(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
return ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::miTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::moTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mnTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::msTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mtextTag);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9490/
|
CWE-704
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/v8/+/a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
|
static void CopyObjectToDoubleElements(FixedArrayBase* from_base,
uint32_t from_start,
FixedArrayBase* to_base,
uint32_t to_start, int raw_copy_size) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_allocation;
int copy_size = raw_copy_size;
if (raw_copy_size < 0) {
DCHECK(raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEnd ||
raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole);
copy_size = from_base->length() - from_start;
if (raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole) {
for (int i = to_start + copy_size; i < to_base->length(); ++i) {
FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base)->set_the_hole(i);
}
}
}
DCHECK((copy_size + static_cast<int>(to_start)) <= to_base->length() &&
(copy_size + static_cast<int>(from_start)) <= from_base->length());
if (copy_size == 0) return;
FixedArray* from = FixedArray::cast(from_base);
FixedDoubleArray* to = FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base);
Object* the_hole = from->GetHeap()->the_hole_value();
for (uint32_t from_end = from_start + copy_size;
from_start < from_end; from_start++, to_start++) {
Object* hole_or_object = from->get(from_start);
if (hole_or_object == the_hole) {
to->set_the_hole(to_start);
} else {
to->set(to_start, hole_or_object->Number());
}
}
}
|
static void CopyObjectToDoubleElements(FixedArrayBase* from_base,
uint32_t from_start,
FixedArrayBase* to_base,
uint32_t to_start, int raw_copy_size) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_allocation;
int copy_size = raw_copy_size;
if (raw_copy_size < 0) {
DCHECK(raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEnd ||
raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole);
copy_size = from_base->length() - from_start;
if (raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole) {
for (int i = to_start + copy_size; i < to_base->length(); ++i) {
FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base)->set_the_hole(i);
}
}
}
DCHECK((copy_size + static_cast<int>(to_start)) <= to_base->length() &&
(copy_size + static_cast<int>(from_start)) <= from_base->length());
if (copy_size == 0) return;
FixedArray* from = FixedArray::cast(from_base);
FixedDoubleArray* to = FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base);
Object* the_hole = from->GetHeap()->the_hole_value();
for (uint32_t from_end = from_start + copy_size;
from_start < from_end; from_start++, to_start++) {
Object* hole_or_object = from->get(from_start);
if (hole_or_object == the_hole) {
to->set_the_hole(to_start);
} else {
to->set(to_start, hole_or_object->Number());
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::isGestureNeededForPlaybackIfPendingUserGestureIsLocked()
const {
if (loadType() == WebMediaPlayer::LoadTypeMediaStream)
return false;
if (isHTMLVideoElement() && muted() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::autoplayMutedVideosEnabled() &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getDataSaverEnabled()) &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getForcePreloadNoneForMediaElements()) &&
isAutoplayAllowedPerSettings()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::isGestureNeededForPlaybackIfPendingUserGestureIsLocked()
const {
if (loadType() == WebMediaPlayer::LoadTypeMediaStream)
return false;
if (isHTMLVideoElement() && muted() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::autoplayMutedVideosEnabled() &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getDataSaverEnabled()) &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getForcePreloadNoneForMediaElements()) &&
isAutoplayAllowedPerSettings()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p,
struct nlattr **attrs,
int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
struct xfrm_mark m;
int err;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(p->proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY)) {
err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
} else {
xfrm_address_t *saddr = NULL;
verify_one_addr(attrs, XFRMA_SRCADDR, &saddr);
if (!saddr) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark,
&p->daddr, saddr,
p->proto, p->family);
}
out:
if (!x && errp)
*errp = err;
return x;
}
|
static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p,
struct nlattr **attrs,
int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
struct xfrm_mark m;
int err;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(p->proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY)) {
err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
} else {
xfrm_address_t *saddr = NULL;
verify_one_addr(attrs, XFRMA_SRCADDR, &saddr);
if (!saddr) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark,
&p->daddr, saddr,
p->proto, p->family);
}
out:
if (!x && errp)
*errp = err;
return x;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE OMXNodeInstance::OnFillBufferDone(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE /* hComponent */,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR pAppData,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* pBuffer) {
if (pAppData == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
OMXNodeInstance *instance = static_cast<OMXNodeInstance *>(pAppData);
if (instance->mDying) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
int fenceFd = instance->retrieveFenceFromMeta_l(pBuffer, kPortIndexOutput);
return instance->owner()->OnFillBufferDone(instance->nodeID(),
instance->findBufferID(pBuffer), pBuffer, fenceFd);
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE OMXNodeInstance::OnFillBufferDone(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE /* hComponent */,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR pAppData,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* pBuffer) {
if (pAppData == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
OMXNodeInstance *instance = static_cast<OMXNodeInstance *>(pAppData);
if (instance->mDying) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
int fenceFd = instance->retrieveFenceFromMeta_l(pBuffer, kPortIndexOutput);
return instance->owner()->OnFillBufferDone(instance->nodeID(),
instance->findBufferID(pBuffer), pBuffer, fenceFd);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static __init int spawn_ksoftirqd(void)
{
cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_SOFTIRQ_DEAD, "softirq:dead", NULL,
takeover_tasklets);
BUG_ON(smpboot_register_percpu_thread(&softirq_threads));
return 0;
}
|
static __init int spawn_ksoftirqd(void)
{
cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_SOFTIRQ_DEAD, "softirq:dead", NULL,
takeover_tasklets);
BUG_ON(smpboot_register_percpu_thread(&softirq_threads));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6410
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6410/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65
|
c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65
|
udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static void __udf_clear_extent_cache(struct inode *inode)
{
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (iinfo->cached_extent.lstart != -1) {
brelse(iinfo->cached_extent.epos.bh);
iinfo->cached_extent.lstart = -1;
}
}
|
static void __udf_clear_extent_cache(struct inode *inode)
{
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (iinfo->cached_extent.lstart != -1) {
brelse(iinfo->cached_extent.epos.bh);
iinfo->cached_extent.lstart = -1;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
void CL_RequestMotd( void ) {
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
char info[MAX_INFO_STRING];
if ( !cl_motd->integer ) {
return;
}
Com_Printf( "Resolving %s\n", UPDATE_SERVER_NAME );
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( UPDATE_SERVER_NAME, &cls.updateServer, NA_IP ) ) {
Com_Printf( "Couldn't resolve address\n" );
return;
}
cls.updateServer.port = BigShort( PORT_UPDATE );
Com_Printf( "%s resolved to %i.%i.%i.%i:%i\n", UPDATE_SERVER_NAME,
cls.updateServer.ip[0], cls.updateServer.ip[1],
cls.updateServer.ip[2], cls.updateServer.ip[3],
BigShort( cls.updateServer.port ) );
info[0] = 0;
Com_sprintf( cls.updateChallenge, sizeof( cls.updateChallenge ), "%i", rand() );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "challenge", cls.updateChallenge );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "renderer", cls.glconfig.renderer_string );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "version", com_version->string );
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, cls.updateServer, "getmotd \"%s\"\n", info );
#endif
}
|
void CL_RequestMotd( void ) {
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
char info[MAX_INFO_STRING];
if ( !cl_motd->integer ) {
return;
}
Com_Printf( "Resolving %s\n", UPDATE_SERVER_NAME );
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( UPDATE_SERVER_NAME, &cls.updateServer, NA_IP ) ) {
Com_Printf( "Couldn't resolve address\n" );
return;
}
cls.updateServer.port = BigShort( PORT_UPDATE );
Com_Printf( "%s resolved to %i.%i.%i.%i:%i\n", UPDATE_SERVER_NAME,
cls.updateServer.ip[0], cls.updateServer.ip[1],
cls.updateServer.ip[2], cls.updateServer.ip[3],
BigShort( cls.updateServer.port ) );
info[0] = 0;
Com_sprintf( cls.updateChallenge, sizeof( cls.updateChallenge ), "%i", rand() );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "challenge", cls.updateChallenge );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "renderer", cls.glconfig.renderer_string );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "version", com_version->string );
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, cls.updateServer, "getmotd \"%s\"\n", info );
#endif
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void CeReactionsOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "ceReactionsOverloadedMethod");
CEReactionsScope ce_reactions_scope;
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->ceReactionsOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
|
static void CeReactionsOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "ceReactionsOverloadedMethod");
CEReactionsScope ce_reactions_scope;
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->ceReactionsOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5844
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5844/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
|
isodate7(const unsigned char *v)
{
struct tm tm;
int offset;
time_t t;
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
tm.tm_year = v[0];
tm.tm_mon = v[1] - 1;
tm.tm_mday = v[2];
tm.tm_hour = v[3];
tm.tm_min = v[4];
tm.tm_sec = v[5];
/* v[6] is the signed timezone offset, in 1/4-hour increments. */
offset = ((const signed char *)v)[6];
if (offset > -48 && offset < 52) {
tm.tm_hour -= offset / 4;
tm.tm_min -= (offset % 4) * 15;
}
t = time_from_tm(&tm);
if (t == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)0);
return (t);
}
|
isodate7(const unsigned char *v)
{
struct tm tm;
int offset;
time_t t;
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
tm.tm_year = v[0];
tm.tm_mon = v[1] - 1;
tm.tm_mday = v[2];
tm.tm_hour = v[3];
tm.tm_min = v[4];
tm.tm_sec = v[5];
/* v[6] is the signed timezone offset, in 1/4-hour increments. */
offset = ((const signed char *)v)[6];
if (offset > -48 && offset < 52) {
tm.tm_hour -= offset / 4;
tm.tm_min -= (offset % 4) * 15;
}
t = time_from_tm(&tm);
if (t == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)0);
return (t);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutocompleteEditModel::AcceptInput(WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool for_drop) {
AutocompleteMatch match;
GURL alternate_nav_url;
GetInfoForCurrentText(&match, &alternate_nav_url);
if (!match.destination_url.is_valid())
return;
if ((match.transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED) &&
(match.destination_url ==
URLFixerUpper::FixupURL(UTF16ToUTF8(permanent_text_), std::string()))) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD;
} else if (for_drop || ((paste_state_ != NONE) &&
match.is_history_what_you_typed_match)) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url = match.GetTemplateURL(profile_);
if (template_url && template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs())
GoogleURLTracker::GoogleURLSearchCommitted(profile_);
view_->OpenMatch(match, disposition, alternate_nav_url,
AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch);
}
|
void AutocompleteEditModel::AcceptInput(WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool for_drop) {
AutocompleteMatch match;
GURL alternate_nav_url;
GetInfoForCurrentText(&match, &alternate_nav_url);
if (!match.destination_url.is_valid())
return;
if ((match.transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED) &&
(match.destination_url ==
URLFixerUpper::FixupURL(UTF16ToUTF8(permanent_text_), std::string()))) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD;
} else if (for_drop || ((paste_state_ != NONE) &&
match.is_history_what_you_typed_match)) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url = match.GetTemplateURL(profile_);
if (template_url && template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs())
GoogleURLTracker::GoogleURLSearchCommitted(profile_);
view_->OpenMatch(match, disposition, alternate_nav_url,
AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static __always_inline void vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
{
vmcs_checkl(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_write64(field, value);
__vmcs_writel(field, value);
}
|
static __always_inline void vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
{
vmcs_checkl(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_write64(field, value);
__vmcs_writel(field, value);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15407/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a96567f02a0881561c964e5c11afe9c1af17a5f7
|
a96567f02a0881561c964e5c11afe9c1af17a5f7
|
Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
|
bool QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::RetireBlockIfEmpty(size_t block_index) {
DCHECK(ReadableBytes() == 0 || GetInBlockOffset(total_bytes_read_) == 0)
<< "RetireBlockIfEmpty() should only be called when advancing to next "
<< "block or a gap has been reached.";
if (Empty()) {
return RetireBlock(block_index);
}
if (GetBlockIndex(gaps_.back().begin_offset - 1) == block_index) {
return true;
}
if (NextBlockToRead() == block_index) {
Gap first_gap = gaps_.front();
DCHECK(first_gap.begin_offset == total_bytes_read_);
bool gap_ends_in_this_block =
(GetBlockIndex(first_gap.end_offset) == block_index);
if (gap_ends_in_this_block) {
return true;
}
}
return RetireBlock(block_index);
}
|
bool QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::RetireBlockIfEmpty(size_t block_index) {
DCHECK(ReadableBytes() == 0 || GetInBlockOffset(total_bytes_read_) == 0)
<< "RetireBlockIfEmpty() should only be called when advancing to next "
<< "block or a gap has been reached.";
if (Empty()) {
return RetireBlock(block_index);
}
if (GetBlockIndex(gaps_.back().begin_offset - 1) == block_index) {
return true;
}
if (NextBlockToRead() == block_index) {
Gap first_gap = gaps_.front();
DCHECK(first_gap.begin_offset == total_bytes_read_);
bool gap_ends_in_this_block =
(GetBlockIndex(first_gap.end_offset) == block_index);
if (gap_ends_in_this_block) {
return true;
}
}
return RetireBlock(block_index);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661}
|
void VariationsService::StartGoogleUpdateRegistrySync() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
registry_syncer_.RequestRegistrySync();
}
|
void VariationsService::StartGoogleUpdateRegistrySync() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
registry_syncer_.RequestRegistrySync();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7145
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7145/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18f39e7be0121317550d03e267e3ebd4dbfbb3ce
|
18f39e7be0121317550d03e267e3ebd4dbfbb3ce
|
[CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <[email protected]>
|
SMB2_flush(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid,
u64 volatile_fid)
{
struct smb2_flush_req *req;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
struct kvec iov[1];
int resp_buftype;
int rc = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Flush\n");
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_FLUSH, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 1, &resp_buftype, 0);
if ((rc != 0) && tcon)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_FLUSH_HE);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, iov[0].iov_base);
return rc;
}
|
SMB2_flush(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid,
u64 volatile_fid)
{
struct smb2_flush_req *req;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
struct kvec iov[1];
int resp_buftype;
int rc = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Flush\n");
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_FLUSH, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 1, &resp_buftype, 0);
if ((rc != 0) && tcon)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_FLUSH_HE);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, iov[0].iov_base);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2745
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2745/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33
|
79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33
|
cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
BUG();
}
|
void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
BUG();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tcp_match_skb_to_sack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 start_seq, u32 end_seq)
{
int in_sack, err;
unsigned int pkt_len;
unsigned int mss;
in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) &&
!before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) > 1 && !in_sack &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start_seq)) {
mss = tcp_skb_mss(skb);
in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
if (!in_sack) {
pkt_len = start_seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (pkt_len < mss)
pkt_len = mss;
} else {
pkt_len = end_seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (pkt_len < mss)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Round if necessary so that SACKs cover only full MSSes
* and/or the remaining small portion (if present)
*/
if (pkt_len > mss) {
unsigned int new_len = (pkt_len / mss) * mss;
if (!in_sack && new_len < pkt_len) {
new_len += mss;
if (new_len > skb->len)
return 0;
}
pkt_len = new_len;
}
err = tcp_fragment(sk, skb, pkt_len, mss);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return in_sack;
}
|
static int tcp_match_skb_to_sack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 start_seq, u32 end_seq)
{
int in_sack, err;
unsigned int pkt_len;
unsigned int mss;
in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) &&
!before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) > 1 && !in_sack &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start_seq)) {
mss = tcp_skb_mss(skb);
in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
if (!in_sack) {
pkt_len = start_seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (pkt_len < mss)
pkt_len = mss;
} else {
pkt_len = end_seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (pkt_len < mss)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Round if necessary so that SACKs cover only full MSSes
* and/or the remaining small portion (if present)
*/
if (pkt_len > mss) {
unsigned int new_len = (pkt_len / mss) * mss;
if (!in_sack && new_len < pkt_len) {
new_len += mss;
if (new_len > skb->len)
return 0;
}
pkt_len = new_len;
}
err = tcp_fragment(sk, skb, pkt_len, mss);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return in_sack;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int hostap_enable_hostapd_sta(local_info_t *local, int rtnl_locked)
{
struct net_device *dev = local->dev;
if (local->stadev)
return -EEXIST;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: enabling hostapd STA mode\n", dev->name);
local->stadev = hostap_add_interface(local, HOSTAP_INTERFACE_STA,
rtnl_locked, local->ddev->name,
"sta");
if (local->stadev == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
static int hostap_enable_hostapd_sta(local_info_t *local, int rtnl_locked)
{
struct net_device *dev = local->dev;
if (local->stadev)
return -EEXIST;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: enabling hostapd STA mode\n", dev->name);
local->stadev = hostap_add_interface(local, HOSTAP_INTERFACE_STA,
rtnl_locked, local->ddev->name,
"sta");
if (local->stadev == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16932/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
xmlParseEndTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
}
|
xmlParseEndTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6527/
|
CWE-17
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=6aeee47b2cd47915ccfa3b41433a3f57aea24dd5
|
6aeee47b2cd47915ccfa3b41433a3f57aea24dd5
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(ltrim)
{
php_do_trim(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(ltrim)
{
php_do_trim(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int mpi_send_packet (struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *buffer;
s16 len;
__le16 *payloadLen;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
u8 *sendbuf;
/* get a packet to send */
if ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ai->txq)) == NULL) {
airo_print_err(dev->name,
"%s: Dequeue'd zero in send_packet()",
__func__);
return 0;
}
/* check min length*/
len = ETH_ZLEN < skb->len ? skb->len : ETH_ZLEN;
buffer = skb->data;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.offset = 0;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.valid = 1;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.eoc = 1;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.len =len+sizeof(WifiHdr);
/*
* Magic, the cards firmware needs a length count (2 bytes) in the host buffer
* right after TXFID_HDR.The TXFID_HDR contains the status short so payloadlen
* is immediately after it. ------------------------------------------------
* |TXFIDHDR+STATUS|PAYLOADLEN|802.3HDR|PACKETDATA|
* ------------------------------------------------
*/
memcpy((char *)ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr,
(char *)&wifictlhdr8023, sizeof(wifictlhdr8023));
payloadLen = (__le16 *)(ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr +
sizeof(wifictlhdr8023));
sendbuf = ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr +
sizeof(wifictlhdr8023) + 2 ;
/*
* Firmware automatically puts 802 header on so
* we don't need to account for it in the length
*/
if (test_bit(FLAG_MIC_CAPABLE, &ai->flags) && ai->micstats.enabled &&
(ntohs(((__be16 *)buffer)[6]) != 0x888E)) {
MICBuffer pMic;
if (encapsulate(ai, (etherHead *)buffer, &pMic, len - sizeof(etherHead)) != SUCCESS)
return ERROR;
*payloadLen = cpu_to_le16(len-sizeof(etherHead)+sizeof(pMic));
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.len += sizeof(pMic);
/* copy data into airo dma buffer */
memcpy (sendbuf, buffer, sizeof(etherHead));
buffer += sizeof(etherHead);
sendbuf += sizeof(etherHead);
memcpy (sendbuf, &pMic, sizeof(pMic));
sendbuf += sizeof(pMic);
memcpy (sendbuf, buffer, len - sizeof(etherHead));
} else {
*payloadLen = cpu_to_le16(len - sizeof(etherHead));
dev->trans_start = jiffies;
/* copy data into airo dma buffer */
memcpy(sendbuf, buffer, len);
}
memcpy_toio(ai->txfids[0].card_ram_off,
&ai->txfids[0].tx_desc, sizeof(TxFid));
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, 8);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return 1;
}
|
static int mpi_send_packet (struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *buffer;
s16 len;
__le16 *payloadLen;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
u8 *sendbuf;
/* get a packet to send */
if ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ai->txq)) == NULL) {
airo_print_err(dev->name,
"%s: Dequeue'd zero in send_packet()",
__func__);
return 0;
}
/* check min length*/
len = ETH_ZLEN < skb->len ? skb->len : ETH_ZLEN;
buffer = skb->data;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.offset = 0;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.valid = 1;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.eoc = 1;
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.len =len+sizeof(WifiHdr);
/*
* Magic, the cards firmware needs a length count (2 bytes) in the host buffer
* right after TXFID_HDR.The TXFID_HDR contains the status short so payloadlen
* is immediately after it. ------------------------------------------------
* |TXFIDHDR+STATUS|PAYLOADLEN|802.3HDR|PACKETDATA|
* ------------------------------------------------
*/
memcpy((char *)ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr,
(char *)&wifictlhdr8023, sizeof(wifictlhdr8023));
payloadLen = (__le16 *)(ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr +
sizeof(wifictlhdr8023));
sendbuf = ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr +
sizeof(wifictlhdr8023) + 2 ;
/*
* Firmware automatically puts 802 header on so
* we don't need to account for it in the length
*/
if (test_bit(FLAG_MIC_CAPABLE, &ai->flags) && ai->micstats.enabled &&
(ntohs(((__be16 *)buffer)[6]) != 0x888E)) {
MICBuffer pMic;
if (encapsulate(ai, (etherHead *)buffer, &pMic, len - sizeof(etherHead)) != SUCCESS)
return ERROR;
*payloadLen = cpu_to_le16(len-sizeof(etherHead)+sizeof(pMic));
ai->txfids[0].tx_desc.len += sizeof(pMic);
/* copy data into airo dma buffer */
memcpy (sendbuf, buffer, sizeof(etherHead));
buffer += sizeof(etherHead);
sendbuf += sizeof(etherHead);
memcpy (sendbuf, &pMic, sizeof(pMic));
sendbuf += sizeof(pMic);
memcpy (sendbuf, buffer, len - sizeof(etherHead));
} else {
*payloadLen = cpu_to_le16(len - sizeof(etherHead));
dev->trans_start = jiffies;
/* copy data into airo dma buffer */
memcpy(sendbuf, buffer, len);
}
memcpy_toio(ai->txfids[0].card_ram_off,
&ai->txfids[0].tx_desc, sizeof(TxFid));
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, 8);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18222/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
|
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void hns_xgmac_lf_rf_insert(struct mac_driver *mac_drv, u32 mode)
{
dsaf_set_dev_field(mac_drv, XGMAC_MAC_TX_LF_RF_CONTROL_REG,
XGMAC_LF_RF_INSERT_M, XGMAC_LF_RF_INSERT_S, mode);
}
|
static void hns_xgmac_lf_rf_insert(struct mac_driver *mac_drv, u32 mode)
{
dsaf_set_dev_field(mac_drv, XGMAC_MAC_TX_LF_RF_CONTROL_REG,
XGMAC_LF_RF_INSERT_M, XGMAC_LF_RF_INSERT_S, mode);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/283fb25624bf253d120708152e23cf9143519198
|
283fb25624bf253d120708152e23cf9143519198
|
Coverity; Fixing pass by value bugs.
CID=101466, 101464, 101494, 101495, 101496, 101497
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8956046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115399 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::SetPermissions(
std::vector<string16> permissions) {
permissions_ = permissions;
}
|
void ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::SetPermissions(
std::vector<string16> permissions) {
permissions_ = permissions;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11379
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11379/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c
|
4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c
|
Fix crash in pe
|
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t *PE_(check_msvcseh) (struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t) *bin) {
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t* entry;
ut8 b[512];
int n = 0;
if (!bin || !bin->b) {
return 0LL;
}
entry = PE_(r_bin_pe_get_entrypoint) (bin);
ZERO_FILL (b);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) < 0) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot read entry at 0x%08"PFMT64x "\n", entry->paddr);
free (entry);
return NULL;
}
if (b[0] == 0xe8 && b[5] == 0xe9) {
const st32 jmp_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (5 + 5 + jmp_dst);
entry->vaddr += (5 + 5 + jmp_dst);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) > 0) {
ut32 imageBase = bin->nt_headers->optional_header.ImageBase;
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 6; n++) {
const ut32 tmp_imgbase = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 1, bin->big_endian);
if (b[n] == 0x68 && tmp_imgbase == imageBase && b[n + 5] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 6; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n+1] == 0xff && b[n + 3] == 0xff && b[n + 5] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 20; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n + 1] == 0xff && b[n + 7] == 0xff && b[n + 13] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 14, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 13 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 13 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 5; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n + 1] == 0x57 && b[n + 2] == 0xff && b[n + 4] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 5, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 4 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 4 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
}
}
if (b[4] == 0xe8 && b[13] == 0xe9) {
const st32 jmp_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 14, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (5 + 13 + jmp_dst);
entry->vaddr += (5 + 13 + jmp_dst);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 13; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x4c && b[n + 3] == 0x48 && b[n + 6] == 0x8b && b[n + 8] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 9, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 8 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 8 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
}
}
if (b[188] == 0x50 && b[201] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 202, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (201 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (201 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
if (b[292] == 0x50 && b[303] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 304, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (303 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (303 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
free (entry);
return NULL;
}
|
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t *PE_(check_msvcseh) (struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t) *bin) {
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t* entry;
ut8 b[512];
int n = 0;
if (!bin || !bin->b) {
return 0LL;
}
entry = PE_(r_bin_pe_get_entrypoint) (bin);
ZERO_FILL (b);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) < 0) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot read entry at 0x%08"PFMT64x "\n", entry->paddr);
free (entry);
return NULL;
}
if (b[0] == 0xe8 && b[5] == 0xe9) {
const st32 jmp_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (5 + 5 + jmp_dst);
entry->vaddr += (5 + 5 + jmp_dst);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) > 0) {
ut32 imageBase = bin->nt_headers->optional_header.ImageBase;
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 6; n++) {
const ut32 tmp_imgbase = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 1, bin->big_endian);
if (b[n] == 0x68 && tmp_imgbase == imageBase && b[n + 5] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 6; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n+1] == 0xff && b[n + 3] == 0xff && b[n + 5] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 6, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 20; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n + 1] == 0xff && b[n + 7] == 0xff && b[n + 13] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 14, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 13 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 13 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 5; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x50 && b[n + 1] == 0x57 && b[n + 2] == 0xff && b[n + 4] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 5, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 4 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 4 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
}
}
if (b[4] == 0xe8 && b[13] == 0xe9) {
const st32 jmp_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 14, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (5 + 13 + jmp_dst);
entry->vaddr += (5 + 13 + jmp_dst);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry->paddr, b, sizeof (b)) > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < sizeof (b) - 13; n++) {
if (b[n] == 0x4c && b[n + 3] == 0x48 && b[n + 6] == 0x8b && b[n + 8] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + n + 9, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (n + 5 + 8 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (n + 5 + 8 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
}
}
}
if (b[188] == 0x50 && b[201] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 202, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (201 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (201 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
if (b[292] == 0x50 && b[303] == 0xe8) {
const st32 call_dst = r_read_ble32 (b + 304, bin->big_endian);
entry->paddr += (303 + 5 + call_dst);
entry->vaddr += (303 + 5 + call_dst);
return entry;
}
free (entry);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit atalk_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
atalk_unregister_sysctl();
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
atalk_proc_exit();
aarp_cleanup_module(); /* General aarp clean-up. */
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ddp_notifier);
dev_remove_pack(<alk_packet_type);
dev_remove_pack(&ppptalk_packet_type);
unregister_snap_client(ddp_dl);
sock_unregister(PF_APPLETALK);
proto_unregister(&ddp_proto);
}
|
static void __exit atalk_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
atalk_unregister_sysctl();
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
atalk_proc_exit();
aarp_cleanup_module(); /* General aarp clean-up. */
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ddp_notifier);
dev_remove_pack(<alk_packet_type);
dev_remove_pack(&ppptalk_packet_type);
unregister_snap_client(ddp_dl);
sock_unregister(PF_APPLETALK);
proto_unregister(&ddp_proto);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
static void format_default(format_list *pf, int redundant)
{
if (redundant)
{
int i;
/* set everything, including flags that are pointless */
for (i=0; i<FORMAT_SET_COUNT; ++i)
pf->bits[i] = ~(png_uint_32)0;
}
else
{
png_uint_32 f;
for (f=0; f<FORMAT_COUNT; ++f)
{
/* Eliminate redundant and unsupported settings. */
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
/* BGR is meaningless if no color: */
if ((f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) == 0 &&
(f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR) != 0)
# else
if ((f & 0x10U/*HACK: fixed value*/) != 0)
# endif
continue;
/* AFIRST is meaningless if no alpha: */
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if ((f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA) == 0 &&
(f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST) != 0)
# else
if ((f & 0x20U/*HACK: fixed value*/) != 0)
# endif
continue;
format_set(pf, f);
}
}
}
|
static void format_default(format_list *pf, int redundant)
{
if (redundant)
{
int i;
/* set everything, including flags that are pointless */
for (i=0; i<FORMAT_SET_COUNT; ++i)
pf->bits[i] = ~(png_uint_32)0;
}
else
{
png_uint_32 f;
for (f=0; f<FORMAT_COUNT; ++f)
{
/* Eliminate redundant and unsupported settings. */
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
/* BGR is meaningless if no color: */
if ((f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) == 0 &&
(f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR) != 0)
# else
if ((f & 0x10U/*HACK: fixed value*/) != 0)
# endif
continue;
/* AFIRST is meaningless if no alpha: */
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if ((f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA) == 0 &&
(f & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST) != 0)
# else
if ((f & 0x20U/*HACK: fixed value*/) != 0)
# endif
continue;
format_set(pf, f);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6140/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
[DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
void DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients() {
if (!g_devtools_instances.IsCreated())
return;
DevToolsMap copy = g_devtools_instances.Get();
for (DevToolsMap::iterator it(copy.begin()); it != copy.end(); ++it) {
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host = it->second;
agent_host->ForceDetachAllSessions();
}
}
|
void DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients() {
if (!g_devtools_instances.IsCreated())
return;
DevToolsMap copy = g_devtools_instances.Get();
for (DevToolsMap::iterator it(copy.begin()); it != copy.end(); ++it) {
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host = it->second;
agent_host->ForceDetachAllClients();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_get_sock_info(SpiceServer *s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t *salen)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (main_channel_getsockname(reds->main_channel, sa, salen) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
|
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_get_sock_info(SpiceServer *s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t *salen)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (main_channel_getsockname(reds->main_channel, sa, salen) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7485
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7485/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/lurcher/unixODBC/commit/45ef78e037f578b15fc58938a3a3251655e71d6f#diff-d52750c7ba4e594410438569d8e2963aL24
|
45ef78e037f578b15fc58938a3a3251655e71d6f#diff-d52750c7ba4e594410438569d8e2963aL24
|
New Pre Source
|
static void WriteHeaderHTMLTable( SQLHSTMT hStmt )
{
SQLINTEGER nCol = 0;
SQLSMALLINT nColumns = 0;
SQLTCHAR szColumnName[MAX_DATA_WIDTH+1];
szColumnName[ 0 ] = 0;
printf( "<table BORDER>\n" );
printf( "<tr BGCOLOR=#000099>\n" );
if ( SQLNumResultCols( hStmt, &nColumns ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
nColumns = -1;
for ( nCol = 1; nCol <= nColumns; nCol++ )
{
SQLColAttribute( hStmt, nCol, SQL_DESC_LABEL, szColumnName, sizeof(szColumnName), NULL, NULL );
printf( "<td>\n" );
printf( "<font face=Arial,Helvetica><font color=#FFFFFF>\n" );
printf( "%s\n", uc_to_ascii( szColumnName ));
printf( "</font></font>\n" );
printf( "</td>\n" );
}
printf( "</tr>\n" );
}
|
static void WriteHeaderHTMLTable( SQLHSTMT hStmt )
{
SQLINTEGER nCol = 0;
SQLSMALLINT nColumns = 0;
SQLTCHAR szColumnName[MAX_DATA_WIDTH+1];
szColumnName[ 0 ] = 0;
printf( "<table BORDER>\n" );
printf( "<tr BGCOLOR=#000099>\n" );
if ( SQLNumResultCols( hStmt, &nColumns ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
nColumns = -1;
for ( nCol = 1; nCol <= nColumns; nCol++ )
{
SQLColAttribute( hStmt, nCol, SQL_DESC_LABEL, szColumnName, sizeof(szColumnName), NULL, NULL );
printf( "<td>\n" );
printf( "<font face=Arial,Helvetica><font color=#FFFFFF>\n" );
printf( "%s\n", uc_to_ascii( szColumnName ));
printf( "</font></font>\n" );
printf( "</td>\n" );
}
printf( "</tr>\n" );
}
|
C
|
unixODBC
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3841
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3841/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39
|
45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39
|
ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void ipv6_push_frag_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, u8 *proto)
{
if (opt->dst1opt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_DEST, opt->dst1opt);
}
|
void ipv6_push_frag_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, u8 *proto)
{
if (opt->dst1opt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_DEST, opt->dst1opt);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3091/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnWorkerRunLoopStopped() {
delete this;
}
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnWorkerRunLoopStopped() {
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2795
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2795/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void setHasDirAutoFlagRecursively(Node* firstNode, bool flag, Node* lastNode = 0)
{
firstNode->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
Node* node = firstNode->firstChild();
while (node) {
if (node->selfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute() == flag)
return;
if (elementAffectsDirectionality(node)) {
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextSibling(firstNode);
continue;
}
node->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextNode(firstNode);
}
}
|
static void setHasDirAutoFlagRecursively(Node* firstNode, bool flag, Node* lastNode = 0)
{
firstNode->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
Node* node = firstNode->firstChild();
while (node) {
if (node->selfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute() == flag)
return;
if (elementAffectsDirectionality(node)) {
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextSibling(firstNode);
continue;
}
node->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextNode(firstNode);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3107/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
[Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::didChangeViewportProperties(const WebCore::ViewportAttributes& newAttributes)
{
if (m_viewportHandler)
m_viewportHandler->viewportAttributesChanged(newAttributes);
}
|
void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::didChangeViewportProperties(const WebCore::ViewportAttributes& newAttributes)
{
if (m_viewportHandler)
m_viewportHandler->viewportAttributesChanged(newAttributes);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
uint32_t OfflineAudioDestinationHandler::MaxChannelCount() const {
return channel_count_;
}
|
uint32_t OfflineAudioDestinationHandler::MaxChannelCount() const {
return channel_count_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14357/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
int imap_cmd_step(struct ImapData *idata)
{
size_t len = 0;
int c;
int rc;
int stillrunning = 0;
struct ImapCommand *cmd = NULL;
if (idata->status == IMAP_FATAL)
{
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
/* read into buffer, expanding buffer as necessary until we have a full
* line */
do
{
if (len == idata->blen)
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->buf, idata->blen + IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE);
idata->blen = idata->blen + IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE;
mutt_debug(3, "grew buffer to %u bytes\n", idata->blen);
}
/* back up over '\0' */
if (len)
len--;
c = mutt_socket_readln(idata->buf + len, idata->blen - len, idata->conn);
if (c <= 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error reading server response.\n");
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
len += c;
}
/* if we've read all the way to the end of the buffer, we haven't read a
* full line (mutt_socket_readln strips the \r, so we always have at least
* one character free when we've read a full line) */
while (len == idata->blen);
/* don't let one large string make cmd->buf hog memory forever */
if ((idata->blen > IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE) && (len <= IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE))
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->buf, IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE);
idata->blen = IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE;
mutt_debug(3, "shrank buffer to %u bytes\n", idata->blen);
}
idata->lastread = time(NULL);
/* handle untagged messages. The caller still gets its shot afterwards. */
if (((mutt_str_strncmp(idata->buf, "* ", 2) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncmp(imap_next_word(idata->buf), "OK [", 4) == 0)) &&
cmd_handle_untagged(idata))
{
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
/* server demands a continuation response from us */
if (idata->buf[0] == '+')
return IMAP_CMD_RESPOND;
/* Look for tagged command completions.
*
* Some response handlers can end up recursively calling
* imap_cmd_step() and end up handling all tagged command
* completions.
* (e.g. FETCH->set_flag->set_header_color->~h pattern match.)
*
* Other callers don't even create an idata->cmds entry.
*
* For both these cases, we default to returning OK */
rc = IMAP_CMD_OK;
c = idata->lastcmd;
do
{
cmd = &idata->cmds[c];
if (cmd->state == IMAP_CMD_NEW)
{
if (mutt_str_strncmp(idata->buf, cmd->seq, SEQLEN) == 0)
{
if (!stillrunning)
{
/* first command in queue has finished - move queue pointer up */
idata->lastcmd = (idata->lastcmd + 1) % idata->cmdslots;
}
cmd->state = cmd_status(idata->buf);
/* bogus - we don't know which command result to return here. Caller
* should provide a tag. */
rc = cmd->state;
}
else
stillrunning++;
}
c = (c + 1) % idata->cmdslots;
} while (c != idata->nextcmd);
if (stillrunning)
rc = IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE;
else
{
mutt_debug(3, "IMAP queue drained\n");
imap_cmd_finish(idata);
}
return rc;
}
|
int imap_cmd_step(struct ImapData *idata)
{
size_t len = 0;
int c;
int rc;
int stillrunning = 0;
struct ImapCommand *cmd = NULL;
if (idata->status == IMAP_FATAL)
{
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
/* read into buffer, expanding buffer as necessary until we have a full
* line */
do
{
if (len == idata->blen)
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->buf, idata->blen + IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE);
idata->blen = idata->blen + IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE;
mutt_debug(3, "grew buffer to %u bytes\n", idata->blen);
}
/* back up over '\0' */
if (len)
len--;
c = mutt_socket_readln(idata->buf + len, idata->blen - len, idata->conn);
if (c <= 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error reading server response.\n");
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
len += c;
}
/* if we've read all the way to the end of the buffer, we haven't read a
* full line (mutt_socket_readln strips the \r, so we always have at least
* one character free when we've read a full line) */
while (len == idata->blen);
/* don't let one large string make cmd->buf hog memory forever */
if ((idata->blen > IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE) && (len <= IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE))
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->buf, IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE);
idata->blen = IMAP_CMD_BUFSIZE;
mutt_debug(3, "shrank buffer to %u bytes\n", idata->blen);
}
idata->lastread = time(NULL);
/* handle untagged messages. The caller still gets its shot afterwards. */
if (((mutt_str_strncmp(idata->buf, "* ", 2) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncmp(imap_next_word(idata->buf), "OK [", 4) == 0)) &&
cmd_handle_untagged(idata))
{
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
/* server demands a continuation response from us */
if (idata->buf[0] == '+')
return IMAP_CMD_RESPOND;
/* Look for tagged command completions.
*
* Some response handlers can end up recursively calling
* imap_cmd_step() and end up handling all tagged command
* completions.
* (e.g. FETCH->set_flag->set_header_color->~h pattern match.)
*
* Other callers don't even create an idata->cmds entry.
*
* For both these cases, we default to returning OK */
rc = IMAP_CMD_OK;
c = idata->lastcmd;
do
{
cmd = &idata->cmds[c];
if (cmd->state == IMAP_CMD_NEW)
{
if (mutt_str_strncmp(idata->buf, cmd->seq, SEQLEN) == 0)
{
if (!stillrunning)
{
/* first command in queue has finished - move queue pointer up */
idata->lastcmd = (idata->lastcmd + 1) % idata->cmdslots;
}
cmd->state = cmd_status(idata->buf);
/* bogus - we don't know which command result to return here. Caller
* should provide a tag. */
rc = cmd->state;
}
else
stillrunning++;
}
c = (c + 1) % idata->cmdslots;
} while (c != idata->nextcmd);
if (stillrunning)
rc = IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE;
else
{
mutt_debug(3, "IMAP queue drained\n");
imap_cmd_finish(idata);
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameView::setNodeToDraw(Node* node)
{
m_nodeToDraw = node;
}
|
void FrameView::setNodeToDraw(Node* node)
{
m_nodeToDraw = node;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
ConnectionTracker* connection_tracker() { return connection_tracker_.get(); }
|
ConnectionTracker* connection_tracker() { return connection_tracker_.get(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::FirstRectForCharacterRange(
unsigned location,
unsigned length,
WebRect& rect_in_viewport) const {
if ((location + length < location) && (location + length))
length = 0;
Element* editable =
GetFrame()->Selection().RootEditableElementOrDocumentElement();
if (!editable)
return false;
editable->GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange range =
PlainTextRange(location, location + length).CreateRange(*editable);
if (range.IsNull())
return false;
IntRect int_rect = GetFrame()->GetEditor().FirstRectForRange(range);
rect_in_viewport = WebRect(int_rect);
rect_in_viewport = GetFrame()->View()->ContentsToViewport(rect_in_viewport);
return true;
}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::FirstRectForCharacterRange(
unsigned location,
unsigned length,
WebRect& rect_in_viewport) const {
if ((location + length < location) && (location + length))
length = 0;
Element* editable =
GetFrame()->Selection().RootEditableElementOrDocumentElement();
if (!editable)
return false;
editable->GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange range =
PlainTextRange(location, location + length).CreateRange(*editable);
if (range.IsNull())
return false;
IntRect int_rect = GetFrame()->GetEditor().FirstRectForRange(range);
rect_in_viewport = WebRect(int_rect);
rect_in_viewport = GetFrame()->View()->ContentsToViewport(rect_in_viewport);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
gpa_t vmptr;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (nested_vmx_check_vmptr(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD, &vmptr))
return 1;
if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr != vmptr) {
struct vmcs12 *new_vmcs12;
struct page *page;
page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmptr);
if (page == NULL) {
nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
new_vmcs12 = kmap(page);
if (new_vmcs12->revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION) {
kunmap(page);
nested_release_page_clean(page);
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
nested_release_vmcs12(vmx);
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = vmptr;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = new_vmcs12;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page = page;
/*
* Load VMCS12 from guest memory since it is not already
* cached.
*/
memcpy(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12,
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12, VMCS12_SIZE);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER,
__pa(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs));
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = true;
}
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
|
static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
gpa_t vmptr;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (nested_vmx_check_vmptr(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD, &vmptr))
return 1;
if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr != vmptr) {
struct vmcs12 *new_vmcs12;
struct page *page;
page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmptr);
if (page == NULL) {
nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
new_vmcs12 = kmap(page);
if (new_vmcs12->revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION) {
kunmap(page);
nested_release_page_clean(page);
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
nested_release_vmcs12(vmx);
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = vmptr;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = new_vmcs12;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page = page;
/*
* Load VMCS12 from guest memory since it is not already
* cached.
*/
memcpy(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12,
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12, VMCS12_SIZE);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER,
__pa(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs));
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = true;
}
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
decode_filename(__be32 *p, char **namp, unsigned int *lenp)
{
char *name;
unsigned int i;
if ((p = xdr_decode_string_inplace(p, namp, lenp, NFS_MAXNAMLEN)) != NULL) {
for (i = 0, name = *namp; i < *lenp; i++, name++) {
if (*name == '\0' || *name == '/')
return NULL;
}
}
return p;
}
|
decode_filename(__be32 *p, char **namp, unsigned int *lenp)
{
char *name;
unsigned int i;
if ((p = xdr_decode_string_inplace(p, namp, lenp, NFS_MAXNAMLEN)) != NULL) {
for (i = 0, name = *namp; i < *lenp; i++, name++) {
if (*name == '\0' || *name == '/')
return NULL;
}
}
return p;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10714/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/58d9c46929ca0828edde34d263700c3a5fe8dc3c
|
58d9c46929ca0828edde34d263700c3a5fe8dc3c
|
...
|
MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c == EOF)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
|
MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2013-1774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1774/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int edge_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port,
const unsigned char *data, int count)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (count == 0) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - write request of 0 bytes\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (edge_port == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (edge_port->close_pending == 1)
return -ENODEV;
count = kfifo_in_locked(&edge_port->write_fifo, data, count,
&edge_port->ep_lock);
edge_send(tty);
return count;
}
|
static int edge_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port,
const unsigned char *data, int count)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (count == 0) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - write request of 0 bytes\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (edge_port == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (edge_port->close_pending == 1)
return -ENODEV;
count = kfifo_in_locked(&edge_port->write_fifo, data, count,
&edge_port->ep_lock);
edge_send(tty);
return count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
rdp_out_share_caps(STREAM s)
{
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_SHARE);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_SHARE);
out_uint16(s, 0); /* userid */
out_uint16(s, 0); /* pad */
}
|
rdp_out_share_caps(STREAM s)
{
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_SHARE);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_SHARE);
out_uint16(s, 0); /* userid */
out_uint16(s, 0); /* pad */
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4642
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4642/
|
CWE-78
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=d2ac264ffea5ca2e85640b6736e0c7cd4ee9a4a9
|
d2ac264ffea5ca2e85640b6736e0c7cd4ee9a4a9
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(passthru)
{
php_exec_ex(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 3);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(passthru)
{
php_exec_ex(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 3);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
RenderView* RenderFrameImpl::GetRenderView() {
return render_view_;
}
|
RenderView* RenderFrameImpl::GetRenderView() {
return render_view_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4118/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/7d58aac24fe20ffaad7bd9b40c9ddf457c1b06e7
|
7d58aac24fe20ffaad7bd9b40c9ddf457c1b06e7
|
security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
|
rdpRdp* rdp_new(freerdp* instance)
{
rdpRdp* rdp;
rdp = (rdpRdp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpRdp));
if (rdp != NULL)
{
ZeroMemory(rdp, sizeof(rdpRdp));
rdp->instance = instance;
rdp->settings = freerdp_settings_new((void*) instance);
if (instance != NULL)
instance->settings = rdp->settings;
rdp->extension = extension_new(instance);
rdp->transport = transport_new(rdp->settings);
rdp->license = license_new(rdp);
rdp->input = input_new(rdp);
rdp->update = update_new(rdp);
rdp->fastpath = fastpath_new(rdp);
rdp->nego = nego_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->mcs = mcs_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->redirection = redirection_new();
rdp->mppc_dec = mppc_dec_new();
rdp->mppc_enc = mppc_enc_new(PROTO_RDP_50);
}
return rdp;
}
|
rdpRdp* rdp_new(freerdp* instance)
{
rdpRdp* rdp;
rdp = (rdpRdp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpRdp));
if (rdp != NULL)
{
ZeroMemory(rdp, sizeof(rdpRdp));
rdp->instance = instance;
rdp->settings = freerdp_settings_new((void*) instance);
if (instance != NULL)
instance->settings = rdp->settings;
rdp->extension = extension_new(instance);
rdp->transport = transport_new(rdp->settings);
rdp->license = license_new(rdp);
rdp->input = input_new(rdp);
rdp->update = update_new(rdp);
rdp->fastpath = fastpath_new(rdp);
rdp->nego = nego_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->mcs = mcs_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->redirection = redirection_new();
rdp->mppc_dec = mppc_dec_new();
rdp->mppc_enc = mppc_enc_new(PROTO_RDP_50);
}
return rdp;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2853
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2853/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c18dbcb79e5f700c453d1ac01fb6d8768e4844a
|
9c18dbcb79e5f700c453d1ac01fb6d8768e4844a
|
net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string GetResponseHeaderLines(const net::HttpResponseHeaders& headers) {
std::string raw_headers = headers.raw_headers();
const char* null_separated_headers = raw_headers.c_str();
const char* header_line = null_separated_headers;
std::string cr_separated_headers;
while (header_line[0] != 0) {
cr_separated_headers += header_line;
cr_separated_headers += "\n";
header_line += strlen(header_line) + 1;
}
return cr_separated_headers;
}
|
std::string GetResponseHeaderLines(const net::HttpResponseHeaders& headers) {
std::string raw_headers = headers.raw_headers();
const char* null_separated_headers = raw_headers.c_str();
const char* header_line = null_separated_headers;
std::string cr_separated_headers;
while (header_line[0] != 0) {
cr_separated_headers += header_line;
cr_separated_headers += "\n";
header_line += strlen(header_line) + 1;
}
return cr_separated_headers;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void pppoe_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pppoe_net *pn;
int i;
pn = pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev));
write_lock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
for (i = 0; i < PPPOE_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
struct pppox_sock *po = pn->hash_table[i];
struct sock *sk;
while (po) {
while (po && po->pppoe_dev != dev) {
po = po->next;
}
if (!po)
break;
sk = sk_pppox(po);
/* We always grab the socket lock, followed by the
* hash_lock, in that order. Since we should hold the
* sock lock while doing any unbinding, we need to
* release the lock we're holding. Hold a reference to
* the sock so it doesn't disappear as we're jumping
* between locks.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (po->pppoe_dev == dev &&
sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) {
pppox_unbind_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_ZOMBIE;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
po->pppoe_dev = NULL;
dev_put(dev);
}
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
/* Restart the process from the start of the current
* hash chain. We dropped locks so the world may have
* change from underneath us.
*/
BUG_ON(pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev)) == NULL);
write_lock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
po = pn->hash_table[i];
}
}
write_unlock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
}
|
static void pppoe_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pppoe_net *pn;
int i;
pn = pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev));
write_lock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
for (i = 0; i < PPPOE_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
struct pppox_sock *po = pn->hash_table[i];
struct sock *sk;
while (po) {
while (po && po->pppoe_dev != dev) {
po = po->next;
}
if (!po)
break;
sk = sk_pppox(po);
/* We always grab the socket lock, followed by the
* hash_lock, in that order. Since we should hold the
* sock lock while doing any unbinding, we need to
* release the lock we're holding. Hold a reference to
* the sock so it doesn't disappear as we're jumping
* between locks.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (po->pppoe_dev == dev &&
sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) {
pppox_unbind_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_ZOMBIE;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
po->pppoe_dev = NULL;
dev_put(dev);
}
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
/* Restart the process from the start of the current
* hash chain. We dropped locks so the world may have
* change from underneath us.
*/
BUG_ON(pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev)) == NULL);
write_lock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
po = pn->hash_table[i];
}
}
write_unlock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7540/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=530d50a1abdcdf4d1775652d4c456c1274d83d8d
|
530d50a1abdcdf4d1775652d4c456c1274d83d8d
| null |
static bool decode_server_sort_response(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB attr;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_sort_resp_control *lsrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lsrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_sort_resp_control);
if (!lsrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_enumerated(data, &(lsrc->result))) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = NULL;
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &attr)) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = talloc_strndup(lsrc, (const char *)attr.data, attr.length);
if (!lsrc->attr_desc) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lsrc;
return true;
}
|
static bool decode_server_sort_response(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB attr;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_sort_resp_control *lsrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lsrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_sort_resp_control);
if (!lsrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_enumerated(data, &(lsrc->result))) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = NULL;
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &attr)) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = talloc_strndup(lsrc, (const char *)attr.data, attr.length);
if (!lsrc->attr_desc) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lsrc;
return true;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
|
0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
| null |
static void xbzrle_cache_zero_page(ram_addr_t current_addr)
{
if (ram_bulk_stage || !migrate_use_xbzrle()) {
return;
}
/* We don't care if this fails to allocate a new cache page
* as long as it updated an old one */
cache_insert(XBZRLE.cache, current_addr, ZERO_TARGET_PAGE);
}
|
static void xbzrle_cache_zero_page(ram_addr_t current_addr)
{
if (ram_bulk_stage || !migrate_use_xbzrle()) {
return;
}
/* We don't care if this fails to allocate a new cache page
* as long as it updated an old one */
cache_insert(XBZRLE.cache, current_addr, ZERO_TARGET_PAGE);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
Access ChromotingHost::clients_ only on network thread.
Previously ChromotingHost was doing some work on the main thread and
some on the network thread. |clients_| and some other members were
accessed without lock on both of these threads. Moved most of the
ChromotingHost activity to the network thread to avoid possible
race conditions.
BUG=96325
TEST=Chromoting works
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ChromotingHost* ChromotingHost::Create(ChromotingHostContext* context,
MutableHostConfig* config,
DesktopEnvironment* environment,
AccessVerifier* access_verifier,
bool allow_nat_traversal) {
return new ChromotingHost(context, config, environment, access_verifier,
allow_nat_traversal);
}
|
ChromotingHost* ChromotingHost::Create(ChromotingHostContext* context,
MutableHostConfig* config,
DesktopEnvironment* environment,
AccessVerifier* access_verifier,
bool allow_nat_traversal) {
return new ChromotingHost(context, config, environment, access_verifier,
allow_nat_traversal);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10746/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
|
virDomainAddIOThread(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int iothread_id,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "iothread_id=%u, flags=%x",
iothread_id, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainAddIOThread) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainAddIOThread(domain, iothread_id, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
|
virDomainAddIOThread(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int iothread_id,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "iothread_id=%u, flags=%x",
iothread_id, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainAddIOThread) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainAddIOThread(domain, iothread_id, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
|
C
|
libvirt
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
TimeRanges* HTMLMediaElement::buffered() const {
if (media_source_)
return media_source_->Buffered();
if (!GetWebMediaPlayer())
return TimeRanges::Create();
return TimeRanges::Create(GetWebMediaPlayer()->Buffered());
}
|
TimeRanges* HTMLMediaElement::buffered() const {
if (media_source_)
return media_source_->Buffered();
if (!GetWebMediaPlayer())
return TimeRanges::Create();
return TimeRanges::Create(GetWebMediaPlayer()->Buffered());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void mem_cgroup_unmark_under_oom(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
struct mem_cgroup *iter;
/*
* When a new child is created while the hierarchy is under oom,
* mem_cgroup_oom_lock() may not be called. We have to use
* atomic_add_unless() here.
*/
for_each_mem_cgroup_tree(iter, memcg)
atomic_add_unless(&iter->under_oom, -1, 0);
}
|
static void mem_cgroup_unmark_under_oom(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
struct mem_cgroup *iter;
/*
* When a new child is created while the hierarchy is under oom,
* mem_cgroup_oom_lock() may not be called. We have to use
* atomic_add_unless() here.
*/
for_each_mem_cgroup_tree(iter, memcg)
atomic_add_unless(&iter->under_oom, -1, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush(int32 put_offset) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu",
"CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush",
"put_offset",
put_offset);
if (last_put_offset_ == put_offset)
return;
last_put_offset_ = put_offset;
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_AsyncFlush(route_id_,
put_offset,
++flush_count_));
}
|
void CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush(int32 put_offset) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu",
"CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush",
"put_offset",
put_offset);
if (last_put_offset_ == put_offset)
return;
last_put_offset_ = put_offset;
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_AsyncFlush(route_id_,
put_offset,
++flush_count_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_create_info_struct(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_infop info_ptr;
png_debug(1, "in png_create_info_struct");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return (NULL);
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct_2(PNG_STRUCT_INFO,
png_ptr->malloc_fn, png_ptr->mem_ptr);
#else
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_INFO);
#endif
if (info_ptr != NULL)
png_info_init_3(&info_ptr, png_sizeof(png_info));
return (info_ptr);
}
|
png_create_info_struct(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_infop info_ptr;
png_debug(1, "in png_create_info_struct");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return (NULL);
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct_2(PNG_STRUCT_INFO,
png_ptr->malloc_fn, png_ptr->mem_ptr);
#else
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_INFO);
#endif
if (info_ptr != NULL)
png_info_init_3(&info_ptr, png_sizeof(png_info));
return (info_ptr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
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Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
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LayoutRect columnRect() const { return m_colRect; }
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LayoutRect columnRect() const { return m_colRect; }
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C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5688
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5688/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
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aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType SyncImagesSettings(ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
image=images;
for ( ; image != (Image *) NULL; image=GetNextImageInList(image))
(void) SyncImageSettings(image_info,image,exception);
(void) DeleteImageOption(image_info,"page");
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType SyncImagesSettings(ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
image=images;
for ( ; image != (Image *) NULL; image=GetNextImageInList(image))
(void) SyncImageSettings(image_info,image,exception);
(void) DeleteImageOption(image_info,"page");
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
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0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
explicit ChromePrintContext(LocalFrame* frame)
: PrintContext(frame), printed_page_width_(0) {}
|
explicit ChromePrintContext(LocalFrame* frame)
: PrintContext(frame), printed_page_width_(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5185/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
[Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
std::unique_ptr<views::Background> AutofillPopupFooterView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(
is_selected_ ? popup_view_->GetSelectedBackgroundColor()
: popup_view_->GetFooterBackgroundColor());
}
|
std::unique_ptr<views::Background> AutofillPopupFooterView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(
is_selected_ ? popup_view_->GetSelectedBackgroundColor()
: popup_view_->GetFooterBackgroundColor());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
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void TestingAutomationProvider::GetFindWindowVisibility(int handle,
bool* visible) {
*visible = false;
Browser* browser = browser_tracker_->GetResource(handle);
if (browser) {
FindBarTesting* find_bar =
browser->GetFindBarController()->find_bar()->GetFindBarTesting();
find_bar->GetFindBarWindowInfo(NULL, visible);
}
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetFindWindowVisibility(int handle,
bool* visible) {
*visible = false;
Browser* browser = browser_tracker_->GetResource(handle);
if (browser) {
FindBarTesting* find_bar =
browser->GetFindBarController()->find_bar()->GetFindBarTesting();
find_bar->GetFindBarWindowInfo(NULL, visible);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
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