CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-17434
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17434/
| null |
https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=70aeb5fddd1b2f8e143276f8d5a085db16c593b9
|
70aeb5fddd1b2f8e143276f8d5a085db16c593b9
| null |
void send_protected_args(int fd, char *args[])
{
int i;
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
int convert = ic_send != (iconv_t)-1;
xbuf outbuf, inbuf;
if (convert)
alloc_xbuf(&outbuf, 1024);
#endif
for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) {} /* find first NULL */
args[i] = "rsync"; /* set a new arg0 */
if (DEBUG_GTE(CMD, 1))
print_child_argv("protected args:", args + i + 1);
do {
if (!args[i][0])
write_buf(fd, ".", 2);
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
else if (convert) {
INIT_XBUF_STRLEN(inbuf, args[i]);
iconvbufs(ic_send, &inbuf, &outbuf,
ICB_EXPAND_OUT | ICB_INCLUDE_BAD | ICB_INCLUDE_INCOMPLETE | ICB_INIT);
outbuf.buf[outbuf.len] = '\0';
write_buf(fd, outbuf.buf, outbuf.len + 1);
outbuf.len = 0;
}
#endif
else
write_buf(fd, args[i], strlen(args[i]) + 1);
} while (args[++i]);
write_byte(fd, 0);
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
if (convert)
free(outbuf.buf);
#endif
}
|
void send_protected_args(int fd, char *args[])
{
int i;
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
int convert = ic_send != (iconv_t)-1;
xbuf outbuf, inbuf;
if (convert)
alloc_xbuf(&outbuf, 1024);
#endif
for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) {} /* find first NULL */
args[i] = "rsync"; /* set a new arg0 */
if (DEBUG_GTE(CMD, 1))
print_child_argv("protected args:", args + i + 1);
do {
if (!args[i][0])
write_buf(fd, ".", 2);
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
else if (convert) {
INIT_XBUF_STRLEN(inbuf, args[i]);
iconvbufs(ic_send, &inbuf, &outbuf,
ICB_EXPAND_OUT | ICB_INCLUDE_BAD | ICB_INCLUDE_INCOMPLETE | ICB_INIT);
outbuf.buf[outbuf.len] = '\0';
write_buf(fd, outbuf.buf, outbuf.len + 1);
outbuf.len = 0;
}
#endif
else
write_buf(fd, args[i], strlen(args[i]) + 1);
} while (args[++i]);
write_byte(fd, 0);
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
if (convert)
free(outbuf.buf);
#endif
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameView::performPreLayoutTasks()
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "FrameView::performPreLayoutTasks");
lifecycle().advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::InPreLayout);
TemporaryChange<bool> changeSchedulingEnabled(m_layoutSchedulingEnabled, false);
if (!m_nestedLayoutCount && !m_inSynchronousPostLayout && m_postLayoutTasksTimer.isActive()) {
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = true;
performPostLayoutTasks();
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = false;
}
Document* document = m_frame->document();
document->notifyResizeForViewportUnits();
if (!document->styleResolver() || document->styleResolver()->mediaQueryAffectedByViewportChange()) {
document->styleResolverChanged();
document->mediaQueryAffectingValueChanged();
InspectorInstrumentation::mediaQueryResultChanged(document);
} else {
document->evaluateMediaQueryList();
}
document->updateRenderTreeIfNeeded();
lifecycle().advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::StyleClean);
}
|
void FrameView::performPreLayoutTasks()
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "FrameView::performPreLayoutTasks");
lifecycle().advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::InPreLayout);
TemporaryChange<bool> changeSchedulingEnabled(m_layoutSchedulingEnabled, false);
if (!m_nestedLayoutCount && !m_inSynchronousPostLayout && m_postLayoutTasksTimer.isActive()) {
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = true;
performPostLayoutTasks();
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = false;
}
Document* document = m_frame->document();
document->notifyResizeForViewportUnits();
if (!document->styleResolver() || document->styleResolver()->mediaQueryAffectedByViewportChange()) {
document->styleResolverChanged();
document->mediaQueryAffectingValueChanged();
InspectorInstrumentation::mediaQueryResultChanged(document);
} else {
document->evaluateMediaQueryList();
}
document->updateRenderTreeIfNeeded();
lifecycle().advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::StyleClean);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5760/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3514a77e7fa2e5b8bfe5d98af22964bbd69d680f
|
3514a77e7fa2e5b8bfe5d98af22964bbd69d680f
|
Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
|
void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::Stop() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
DVLOG(1) << "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::stop";
if (is_closed_ || !native_peer_connection_.get())
return; // Already stopped.
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackStop(this);
native_peer_connection_->Close();
is_closed_ = true;
}
|
void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::Stop() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
DVLOG(1) << "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::stop";
if (is_closed_ || !native_peer_connection_.get())
return; // Already stopped.
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackStop(this);
native_peer_connection_->Close();
is_closed_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5035/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::NavigateToPendingEntry(ReloadType reload_type) {
needs_reload_ = false;
if (pending_entry_index_ != -1 &&
pending_entry_index_ == last_committed_entry_index_ &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->restore_type() == RestoreType::NONE) &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->GetTransitionType() &
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK)) {
delegate_->Stop();
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()->DontProceed();
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<InterstitialPageImpl*>(delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
->CancelForNavigation();
}
NavigationEntryImpl* last_navigation =
last_pending_entry_ ? last_pending_entry_ : GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (reload_type == ReloadType::NONE && last_navigation && pending_entry_ &&
ShouldTreatNavigationAsReload(pending_entry_) &&
!last_navigation->ssl_error() &&
last_transient_entry_index_ == -1 &&
pending_entry_->frame_tree_node_id() == -1 &&
pending_entry_->GetURL() == last_navigation->GetURL() &&
!pending_entry_->GetHasPostData() && !last_navigation->GetHasPostData() &&
last_navigation->GetVirtualURL() == pending_entry_->GetVirtualURL() &&
(pending_entry_->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) &&
pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL().is_valid()
? pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL() ==
last_navigation->GetBaseURLForDataURL()
: true)) {
reload_type = ReloadType::NORMAL;
}
if (last_pending_entry_index_ == -1 && last_pending_entry_)
delete last_pending_entry_;
last_transient_entry_index_ = -1;
last_pending_entry_ = nullptr;
last_pending_entry_index_ = -1;
if (!pending_entry_) {
CHECK_NE(pending_entry_index_, -1);
pending_entry_ = entries_[pending_entry_index_].get();
}
if (IsRendererDebugURL(pending_entry_->GetURL())) {
if (!delegate_->GetRenderViewHost()->IsRenderViewLive() &&
!IsInitialNavigation()) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!in_navigate_to_pending_entry_);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = true;
bool success = NavigateToPendingEntryInternal(reload_type);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = false;
if (!success)
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::NavigateToPendingEntry(ReloadType reload_type) {
needs_reload_ = false;
if (pending_entry_index_ != -1 &&
pending_entry_index_ == last_committed_entry_index_ &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->restore_type() == RestoreType::NONE) &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->GetTransitionType() &
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK)) {
delegate_->Stop();
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()->DontProceed();
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<InterstitialPageImpl*>(delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
->CancelForNavigation();
}
NavigationEntryImpl* last_navigation =
last_pending_entry_ ? last_pending_entry_ : GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (reload_type == ReloadType::NONE && last_navigation && pending_entry_ &&
ShouldTreatNavigationAsReload(pending_entry_) &&
!last_navigation->ssl_error() &&
last_transient_entry_index_ == -1 &&
pending_entry_->frame_tree_node_id() == -1 &&
pending_entry_->GetURL() == last_navigation->GetURL() &&
!pending_entry_->GetHasPostData() && !last_navigation->GetHasPostData() &&
last_navigation->GetVirtualURL() == pending_entry_->GetVirtualURL() &&
(pending_entry_->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) &&
pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL().is_valid()
? pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL() ==
last_navigation->GetBaseURLForDataURL()
: true)) {
reload_type = ReloadType::NORMAL;
}
if (last_pending_entry_index_ == -1 && last_pending_entry_)
delete last_pending_entry_;
last_transient_entry_index_ = -1;
last_pending_entry_ = nullptr;
last_pending_entry_index_ = -1;
if (!pending_entry_) {
CHECK_NE(pending_entry_index_, -1);
pending_entry_ = entries_[pending_entry_index_].get();
}
if (IsRendererDebugURL(pending_entry_->GetURL())) {
if (!delegate_->GetRenderViewHost()->IsRenderViewLive() &&
!IsInitialNavigation()) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!in_navigate_to_pending_entry_);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = true;
bool success = NavigateToPendingEntryInternal(reload_type);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = false;
if (!success)
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void ResourceFetcher::MakePreloadedResourceBlockOnloadIfNeeded(
Resource* resource,
const FetchParameters& params) {
if (resource && resource->Loader() &&
resource->IsLoadEventBlockingResourceType() &&
resource->IsLinkPreload() && !params.IsLinkPreload() &&
non_blocking_loaders_.Contains(resource->Loader())) {
non_blocking_loaders_.erase(resource->Loader());
loaders_.insert(resource->Loader());
}
}
|
void ResourceFetcher::MakePreloadedResourceBlockOnloadIfNeeded(
Resource* resource,
const FetchParameters& params) {
if (resource && resource->Loader() &&
resource->IsLoadEventBlockingResourceType() &&
resource->IsLinkPreload() && !params.IsLinkPreload() &&
non_blocking_loaders_.Contains(resource->Loader())) {
non_blocking_loaders_.erase(resource->Loader());
loaders_.insert(resource->Loader());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14980
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14980/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/c5d012a46ae22be9444326aa37969a3f75daa3ba
|
c5d012a46ae22be9444326aa37969a3f75daa3ba
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
|
MagickExport MagickOffsetType SeekBlob(Image *image,
const MagickOffsetType offset,const int whence)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->type != UndefinedStream);
blob_info=image->blob;
switch (blob_info->type)
{
case UndefinedStream:
break;
case StandardStream:
case PipeStream:
return(-1);
case FileStream:
{
if ((offset < 0) && (whence == SEEK_SET))
return(-1);
if (fseek(blob_info->file_info.file,offset,whence) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=TellBlob(image);
break;
}
case ZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (gzseek(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,offset,whence) < 0)
return(-1);
#endif
blob_info->offset=TellBlob(image);
break;
}
case BZipStream:
return(-1);
case FifoStream:
return(-1);
case BlobStream:
{
switch (whence)
{
case SEEK_SET:
default:
{
if (offset < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_CUR:
{
if (((offset > 0) && (blob_info->offset > (SSIZE_MAX-offset))) ||
((offset < 0) && (blob_info->offset < (-SSIZE_MAX-offset))))
{
errno=EOVERFLOW;
return(-1);
}
if ((blob_info->offset+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset+=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_END:
{
if (((MagickOffsetType) blob_info->length+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=blob_info->length+offset;
break;
}
}
if (blob_info->offset < (MagickOffsetType) ((off_t) blob_info->length))
{
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (blob_info->offset >= (MagickOffsetType) ((off_t) blob_info->extent))
return(-1);
break;
}
case CustomStream:
{
if (blob_info->custom_stream->seeker == (CustomStreamSeeker) NULL)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=blob_info->custom_stream->seeker(offset,whence,
blob_info->custom_stream->data);
break;
}
}
return(blob_info->offset);
}
|
MagickExport MagickOffsetType SeekBlob(Image *image,
const MagickOffsetType offset,const int whence)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->type != UndefinedStream);
blob_info=image->blob;
switch (blob_info->type)
{
case UndefinedStream:
break;
case StandardStream:
case PipeStream:
return(-1);
case FileStream:
{
if ((offset < 0) && (whence == SEEK_SET))
return(-1);
if (fseek(blob_info->file_info.file,offset,whence) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=TellBlob(image);
break;
}
case ZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (gzseek(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,offset,whence) < 0)
return(-1);
#endif
blob_info->offset=TellBlob(image);
break;
}
case BZipStream:
return(-1);
case FifoStream:
return(-1);
case BlobStream:
{
switch (whence)
{
case SEEK_SET:
default:
{
if (offset < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_CUR:
{
if (((offset > 0) && (blob_info->offset > (SSIZE_MAX-offset))) ||
((offset < 0) && (blob_info->offset < (-SSIZE_MAX-offset))))
{
errno=EOVERFLOW;
return(-1);
}
if ((blob_info->offset+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset+=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_END:
{
if (((MagickOffsetType) blob_info->length+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=blob_info->length+offset;
break;
}
}
if (blob_info->offset < (MagickOffsetType) ((off_t) blob_info->length))
{
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (blob_info->offset >= (MagickOffsetType) ((off_t) blob_info->extent))
return(-1);
break;
}
case CustomStream:
{
if (blob_info->custom_stream->seeker == (CustomStreamSeeker) NULL)
return(-1);
blob_info->offset=blob_info->custom_stream->seeker(offset,whence,
blob_info->custom_stream->data);
break;
}
}
return(blob_info->offset);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1215/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
|
ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptor(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const StringOrUnsignedLong& descriptorUUID,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
String descriptor =
BluetoothUUID::getDescriptor(descriptorUUID, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return exceptionState.reject(scriptState);
return getDescriptorsImpl(scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE,
descriptor);
}
|
ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptor(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const StringOrUnsignedLong& descriptorUUID,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
String descriptor =
BluetoothUUID::getDescriptor(descriptorUUID, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return exceptionState.reject(scriptState);
return getDescriptorsImpl(scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE,
descriptor);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
job_local_end (Device *device)
{
if (!device->priv->job_in_progress || device->priv->job != NULL)
{
g_warning ("There is no job running");
goto out;
}
device->priv->job_in_progress = FALSE;
g_free (device->priv->job_id);
device->priv->job_id = NULL;
device->priv->job_initiated_by_uid = 0;
device->priv->job_is_cancellable = FALSE;
device->priv->job_percentage = -1.0;
emit_job_changed (device);
out:
;
}
|
job_local_end (Device *device)
{
if (!device->priv->job_in_progress || device->priv->job != NULL)
{
g_warning ("There is no job running");
goto out;
}
device->priv->job_in_progress = FALSE;
g_free (device->priv->job_id);
device->priv->job_id = NULL;
device->priv->job_initiated_by_uid = 0;
device->priv->job_is_cancellable = FALSE;
device->priv->job_percentage = -1.0;
emit_job_changed (device);
out:
;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3120/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7
|
93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7
|
Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
|
get_local_tgt(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
krb5_db_entry *candidate, krb5_db_entry **alias_out,
krb5_db_entry **storage_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal princ;
krb5_db_entry *tgt;
*alias_out = NULL;
*storage_out = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal_ext(context, &princ, realm->length, realm->data,
KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realm->length, realm->data, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, candidate->princ, princ)) {
ret = krb5_db_get_principal(context, princ, 0, &tgt);
if (!ret)
*storage_out = *alias_out = tgt;
} else {
*alias_out = candidate;
}
krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
return ret;
}
|
get_local_tgt(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
krb5_db_entry *candidate, krb5_db_entry **alias_out,
krb5_db_entry **storage_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal princ;
krb5_db_entry *tgt;
*alias_out = NULL;
*storage_out = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal_ext(context, &princ, realm->length, realm->data,
KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realm->length, realm->data, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, candidate->princ, princ)) {
ret = krb5_db_get_principal(context, princ, 0, &tgt);
if (!ret)
*storage_out = *alias_out = tgt;
} else {
*alias_out = candidate;
}
krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
static AccessibilityRole decideRoleFromSibling(LayoutTableCell* siblingCell) {
if (!siblingCell)
return CellRole;
if (Node* siblingNode = siblingCell->node()) {
if (siblingNode->hasTagName(thTag))
return ColumnHeaderRole;
if (siblingNode->hasTagName(tdTag))
return RowHeaderRole;
}
return CellRole;
}
|
static AccessibilityRole decideRoleFromSibling(LayoutTableCell* siblingCell) {
if (!siblingCell)
return CellRole;
if (Node* siblingNode = siblingCell->node()) {
if (siblingNode->hasTagName(thTag))
return ColumnHeaderRole;
if (siblingNode->hasTagName(tdTag))
return RowHeaderRole;
}
return CellRole;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0553
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0553/
|
CWE-190
|
http://git.infradead.org/users/tgr/libnl.git/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
|
3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
| null |
struct nl_msg *nlmsg_alloc_simple(int nlmsgtype, int flags)
{
struct nl_msg *msg;
struct nlmsghdr nlh = {
.nlmsg_type = nlmsgtype,
.nlmsg_flags = flags,
};
msg = nlmsg_inherit(&nlh);
if (msg)
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Allocated new simple message\n", msg);
return msg;
}
|
struct nl_msg *nlmsg_alloc_simple(int nlmsgtype, int flags)
{
struct nl_msg *msg;
struct nlmsghdr nlh = {
.nlmsg_type = nlmsgtype,
.nlmsg_flags = flags,
};
msg = nlmsg_inherit(&nlh);
if (msg)
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Allocated new simple message\n", msg);
return msg;
}
|
C
|
infradead
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::detachFromParent()
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
closeURL();
stopAllLoaders();
history()->saveScrollPositionAndViewStateToItem(history()->currentItem());
detachChildren();
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
if (Page* page = m_frame->page())
page->inspectorController()->frameDetachedFromParent(m_frame);
#endif
detachViewsAndDocumentLoader();
if (Frame* parent = m_frame->tree()->parent()) {
parent->loader()->closeAndRemoveChild(m_frame);
parent->loader()->scheduleCheckCompleted();
} else {
m_frame->setView(0);
m_frame->pageDestroyed();
}
}
|
void FrameLoader::detachFromParent()
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
closeURL();
stopAllLoaders();
history()->saveScrollPositionAndViewStateToItem(history()->currentItem());
detachChildren();
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
if (Page* page = m_frame->page())
page->inspectorController()->frameDetachedFromParent(m_frame);
#endif
detachViewsAndDocumentLoader();
if (Frame* parent = m_frame->tree()->parent()) {
parent->loader()->closeAndRemoveChild(m_frame);
parent->loader()->scheduleCheckCompleted();
} else {
m_frame->setView(0);
m_frame->pageDestroyed();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6051/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0da6dcdbe8e34740133773d20cc466b89d399d0a
|
0da6dcdbe8e34740133773d20cc466b89d399d0a
|
Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
|
static bool IsSemicolonSeparatedValueContainingJavaScriptURL(
const String& value) {
Vector<String> value_list;
value.Split(';', value_list);
for (size_t i = 0; i < value_list.size(); ++i) {
String stripped = StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(value_list[i]);
if (ProtocolIsJavaScript(stripped))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool IsSemicolonSeparatedValueContainingJavaScriptURL(
const String& value) {
Vector<String> value_list;
value.Split(';', value_list);
for (size_t i = 0; i < value_list.size(); ++i) {
String stripped = StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(value_list[i]);
if (ProtocolIsJavaScript(stripped))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreRenderbufferBindings() {}
|
void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreRenderbufferBindings() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8539/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int ret;
ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
if (ret < 0)
trusted_shash_release();
return ret;
}
|
static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int ret;
ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
if (ret < 0)
trusted_shash_release();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
static int sb_equal(mdp_super_t *sb1, mdp_super_t *sb2)
{
int ret;
mdp_super_t *tmp1, *tmp2;
tmp1 = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp1),GFP_KERNEL);
tmp2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp2),GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp1 || !tmp2) {
ret = 0;
printk(KERN_INFO "md.c sb_equal(): failed to allocate memory!\n");
goto abort;
}
*tmp1 = *sb1;
*tmp2 = *sb2;
/*
* nr_disks is not constant
*/
tmp1->nr_disks = 0;
tmp2->nr_disks = 0;
ret = (memcmp(tmp1, tmp2, MD_SB_GENERIC_CONSTANT_WORDS * 4) == 0);
abort:
kfree(tmp1);
kfree(tmp2);
return ret;
}
|
static int sb_equal(mdp_super_t *sb1, mdp_super_t *sb2)
{
int ret;
mdp_super_t *tmp1, *tmp2;
tmp1 = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp1),GFP_KERNEL);
tmp2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp2),GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp1 || !tmp2) {
ret = 0;
printk(KERN_INFO "md.c sb_equal(): failed to allocate memory!\n");
goto abort;
}
*tmp1 = *sb1;
*tmp2 = *sb2;
/*
* nr_disks is not constant
*/
tmp1->nr_disks = 0;
tmp2->nr_disks = 0;
ret = (memcmp(tmp1, tmp2, MD_SB_GENERIC_CONSTANT_WORDS * 4) == 0);
abort:
kfree(tmp1);
kfree(tmp2);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7842/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff
|
KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events)
kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events(vcpu, false);
return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
|| !list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done)
|| kvm_apic_has_events(vcpu)
|| vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted
|| atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued) ||
(kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu));
}
|
int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events)
kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events(vcpu, false);
return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
|| !list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done)
|| kvm_apic_has_events(vcpu)
|| vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted
|| atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued) ||
(kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13045/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/d23b0d22cc611e43c88d99192a59f413f951a955
|
d23b0d22cc611e43c88d99192a59f413f951a955
|
Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
|
static CHANNEL_SETUP_REC *create_channel_setup(void)
{
return g_malloc0(sizeof(CHANNEL_SETUP_REC));
}
|
static CHANNEL_SETUP_REC *create_channel_setup(void)
{
return g_malloc0(sizeof(CHANNEL_SETUP_REC));
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0253
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0253/
| null |
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/6a974059190b8a0c7e499f4ab12fe108127099cb
|
6a974059190b8a0c7e499f4ab12fe108127099cb
|
*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_setup_make_content_type(apr_pool_t *pool)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
continue;
}
needcset_patterns = (const apr_strmatch_pattern **)
apr_palloc(pool, (i + 1) * sizeof(apr_strmatch_pattern *));
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
needcset_patterns[i] = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, needcset[i], 0);
}
needcset_patterns[i] = NULL;
charset_pattern = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, "charset=", 0);
}
|
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_setup_make_content_type(apr_pool_t *pool)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
continue;
}
needcset_patterns = (const apr_strmatch_pattern **)
apr_palloc(pool, (i + 1) * sizeof(apr_strmatch_pattern *));
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
needcset_patterns[i] = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, needcset[i], 0);
}
needcset_patterns[i] = NULL;
charset_pattern = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, "charset=", 0);
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1907
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1907/
|
CWE-119
|
https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0
|
2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0
| null |
sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
|
sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
|
C
|
mindrot
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::AnimationsPreserveAxisAlignment(
const LayerImpl* layer) const {
return mutator_host_->AnimationsPreserveAxisAlignment(layer->element_id());
}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::AnimationsPreserveAxisAlignment(
const LayerImpl* layer) const {
return mutator_host_->AnimationsPreserveAxisAlignment(layer->element_id());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1858/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
|
e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
|
userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns;
struct cred *cred;
/* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
* the same user namespace.
*/
if (user_ns == current_user_ns())
return -EINVAL;
/* Threaded processes may not enter a different user namespace */
if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) > 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (current->fs->users != 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
return commit_creds(cred);
}
|
static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns;
struct cred *cred;
/* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
* the same user namespace.
*/
if (user_ns == current_user_ns())
return -EINVAL;
/* Threaded processes may not enter a different user namespace */
if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) > 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
return commit_creds(cred);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2014-7841
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7841/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e40607cbe270a9e8360907cb1e62ddf0736e4864
|
e40607cbe270a9e8360907cb1e62ddf0736e4864
|
net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *chunk_hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
skb = alloc_skb(WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto nodata;
/* Make room for the chunk header. */
chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk_hdr->type = type;
chunk_hdr->flags = flags;
chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL;
retval = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk);
if (!retval) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto nodata;
}
retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr;
retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
/* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */
if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc))
retval->auth = 1;
return retval;
nodata:
return NULL;
}
|
static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *chunk_hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
skb = alloc_skb(WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto nodata;
/* Make room for the chunk header. */
chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk_hdr->type = type;
chunk_hdr->flags = flags;
chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL;
retval = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk);
if (!retval) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto nodata;
}
retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr;
retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
/* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */
if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc))
retval->auth = 1;
return retval;
nodata:
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
bt_status_t btif_le_test_mode(uint16_t opcode, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t len)
{
switch (opcode) {
case HCI_BLE_TRANSMITTER_TEST:
if (len != 3) return BT_STATUS_PARM_INVALID;
BTM_BleTransmitterTest(buf[0],buf[1],buf[2], btif_dm_ble_tx_test_cback);
break;
case HCI_BLE_RECEIVER_TEST:
if (len != 1) return BT_STATUS_PARM_INVALID;
BTM_BleReceiverTest(buf[0], btif_dm_ble_rx_test_cback);
break;
case HCI_BLE_TEST_END:
BTM_BleTestEnd((tBTM_CMPL_CB*) btif_dm_ble_test_end_cback);
break;
default:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Unknown LE Test Mode Command 0x%x", __FUNCTION__, opcode);
return BT_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
bt_status_t btif_le_test_mode(uint16_t opcode, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t len)
{
switch (opcode) {
case HCI_BLE_TRANSMITTER_TEST:
if (len != 3) return BT_STATUS_PARM_INVALID;
BTM_BleTransmitterTest(buf[0],buf[1],buf[2], btif_dm_ble_tx_test_cback);
break;
case HCI_BLE_RECEIVER_TEST:
if (len != 1) return BT_STATUS_PARM_INVALID;
BTM_BleReceiverTest(buf[0], btif_dm_ble_rx_test_cback);
break;
case HCI_BLE_TEST_END:
BTM_BleTestEnd((tBTM_CMPL_CB*) btif_dm_ble_test_end_cback);
break;
default:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Unknown LE Test Mode Command 0x%x", __FUNCTION__, opcode);
return BT_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2301/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b2cf3f064b8f5efef89bb084521b61318c71781b
|
b2cf3f064b8f5efef89bb084521b61318c71781b
| null |
static zval *phar_convert_to_other(phar_archive_data *source, int convert, char *ext, php_uint32 flags TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
phar_entry_info *entry, newentry;
zval *ret;
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
phar = (phar_archive_data *) ecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data));
/* set whole-archive compression and type from parameter */
phar->flags = flags;
phar->is_data = source->is_data;
switch (convert) {
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
phar->is_tar = 1;
break;
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
phar->is_zip = 1;
break;
default:
phar->is_data = 0;
break;
}
zend_hash_init(&(phar->manifest), sizeof(phar_entry_info),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->mounted_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->virtual_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
phar->fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (phar->fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "unable to create temporary file");
return NULL;
}
phar->fname = source->fname;
phar->fname_len = source->fname_len;
phar->is_temporary_alias = source->is_temporary_alias;
phar->alias = source->alias;
if (source->metadata) {
zval *t;
t = source->metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(phar->metadata);
*phar->metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(phar->metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(phar->metadata, 1);
phar->metadata_len = 0;
}
/* first copy each file's uncompressed contents to a temporary file and set per-file flags */
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&source->manifest); SUCCESS == zend_hash_has_more_elements(&source->manifest); zend_hash_move_forward(&source->manifest)) {
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_get_current_data(&source->manifest, (void **) &entry)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\"", source->fname);
return NULL;
}
newentry = *entry;
if (newentry.link) {
newentry.link = estrdup(newentry.link);
goto no_copy;
}
if (newentry.tmp) {
newentry.tmp = estrdup(newentry.tmp);
goto no_copy;
}
newentry.metadata_str.c = 0;
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_file_contents(&newentry, phar->fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
/* exception already thrown */
return NULL;
}
no_copy:
newentry.filename = estrndup(newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len);
if (newentry.metadata) {
zval *t;
t = newentry.metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(newentry.metadata);
*newentry.metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(newentry.metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newentry.metadata, 1);
newentry.metadata_str.c = NULL;
newentry.metadata_str.len = 0;
}
newentry.is_zip = phar->is_zip;
newentry.is_tar = phar->is_tar;
if (newentry.is_tar) {
newentry.tar_type = (entry->is_dir ? TAR_DIR : TAR_FILE);
}
newentry.is_modified = 1;
newentry.phar = phar;
newentry.old_flags = newentry.flags & ~PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK; /* remove compression from old_flags */
phar_set_inode(&newentry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&(phar->manifest), newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len, (void*)&newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL);
phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar, newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
if ((ret = phar_rename_archive(phar, ext, 0 TSRMLS_CC))) {
return ret;
} else {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->mounted_dirs));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->virtual_dirs));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar->fname);
efree(phar);
return NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
static zval *phar_convert_to_other(phar_archive_data *source, int convert, char *ext, php_uint32 flags TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
phar_entry_info *entry, newentry;
zval *ret;
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
phar = (phar_archive_data *) ecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data));
/* set whole-archive compression and type from parameter */
phar->flags = flags;
phar->is_data = source->is_data;
switch (convert) {
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
phar->is_tar = 1;
break;
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
phar->is_zip = 1;
break;
default:
phar->is_data = 0;
break;
}
zend_hash_init(&(phar->manifest), sizeof(phar_entry_info),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->mounted_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->virtual_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
phar->fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (phar->fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "unable to create temporary file");
return NULL;
}
phar->fname = source->fname;
phar->fname_len = source->fname_len;
phar->is_temporary_alias = source->is_temporary_alias;
phar->alias = source->alias;
if (source->metadata) {
zval *t;
t = source->metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(phar->metadata);
*phar->metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(phar->metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(phar->metadata, 1);
phar->metadata_len = 0;
}
/* first copy each file's uncompressed contents to a temporary file and set per-file flags */
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&source->manifest); SUCCESS == zend_hash_has_more_elements(&source->manifest); zend_hash_move_forward(&source->manifest)) {
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_get_current_data(&source->manifest, (void **) &entry)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\"", source->fname);
return NULL;
}
newentry = *entry;
if (newentry.link) {
newentry.link = estrdup(newentry.link);
goto no_copy;
}
if (newentry.tmp) {
newentry.tmp = estrdup(newentry.tmp);
goto no_copy;
}
newentry.metadata_str.c = 0;
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_file_contents(&newentry, phar->fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
/* exception already thrown */
return NULL;
}
no_copy:
newentry.filename = estrndup(newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len);
if (newentry.metadata) {
zval *t;
t = newentry.metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(newentry.metadata);
*newentry.metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(newentry.metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newentry.metadata, 1);
newentry.metadata_str.c = NULL;
newentry.metadata_str.len = 0;
}
newentry.is_zip = phar->is_zip;
newentry.is_tar = phar->is_tar;
if (newentry.is_tar) {
newentry.tar_type = (entry->is_dir ? TAR_DIR : TAR_FILE);
}
newentry.is_modified = 1;
newentry.phar = phar;
newentry.old_flags = newentry.flags & ~PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK; /* remove compression from old_flags */
phar_set_inode(&newentry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&(phar->manifest), newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len, (void*)&newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL);
phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar, newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
if ((ret = phar_rename_archive(phar, ext, 0 TSRMLS_CC))) {
return ret;
} else {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->mounted_dirs));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->virtual_dirs));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar->fname);
efree(phar);
return NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8109
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8109/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb
|
3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb
|
Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int lua_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
{
apr_pool_t **pool;
const char *tempdir;
apr_status_t rs;
lua_ssl_val = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ssl_var_lookup);
lua_ssl_is_https = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ssl_is_https);
if (ap_state_query(AP_SQ_MAIN_STATE) == AP_SQ_MS_CREATE_PRE_CONFIG)
return OK;
/* Create ivm mutex */
rs = ap_global_mutex_create(&lua_ivm_mutex, NULL, "lua-ivm-shm", NULL,
s, pconf, 0);
if (APR_SUCCESS != rs) {
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/* Create shared memory space */
rs = apr_temp_dir_get(&tempdir, pconf);
if (rs != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rs, s, APLOGNO(02664)
"mod_lua IVM: Failed to find temporary directory");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
lua_ivm_shmfile = apr_psprintf(pconf, "%s/httpd_lua_shm.%ld", tempdir,
(long int)getpid());
rs = apr_shm_create(&lua_ivm_shm, sizeof(apr_pool_t**),
(const char *) lua_ivm_shmfile, pconf);
if (rs != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rs, s, APLOGNO(02665)
"mod_lua: Failed to create shared memory segment on file %s",
lua_ivm_shmfile);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
pool = (apr_pool_t **)apr_shm_baseaddr_get(lua_ivm_shm);
apr_pool_create(pool, pconf);
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, shm_cleanup_wrapper,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
return OK;
}
|
static int lua_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
{
apr_pool_t **pool;
const char *tempdir;
apr_status_t rs;
lua_ssl_val = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ssl_var_lookup);
lua_ssl_is_https = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ssl_is_https);
if (ap_state_query(AP_SQ_MAIN_STATE) == AP_SQ_MS_CREATE_PRE_CONFIG)
return OK;
/* Create ivm mutex */
rs = ap_global_mutex_create(&lua_ivm_mutex, NULL, "lua-ivm-shm", NULL,
s, pconf, 0);
if (APR_SUCCESS != rs) {
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/* Create shared memory space */
rs = apr_temp_dir_get(&tempdir, pconf);
if (rs != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rs, s, APLOGNO(02664)
"mod_lua IVM: Failed to find temporary directory");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
lua_ivm_shmfile = apr_psprintf(pconf, "%s/httpd_lua_shm.%ld", tempdir,
(long int)getpid());
rs = apr_shm_create(&lua_ivm_shm, sizeof(apr_pool_t**),
(const char *) lua_ivm_shmfile, pconf);
if (rs != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rs, s, APLOGNO(02665)
"mod_lua: Failed to create shared memory segment on file %s",
lua_ivm_shmfile);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
pool = (apr_pool_t **)apr_shm_baseaddr_get(lua_ivm_shm);
apr_pool_create(pool, pconf);
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, shm_cleanup_wrapper,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
return OK;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2744
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2744/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9e2dcf72023d1447f09c47d77c99b0c49659e5ce
|
9e2dcf72023d1447f09c47d77c99b0c49659e5ce
|
netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct frag_hdr *fhdr, int nhoff)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
int offset, end;
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE) {
pr_debug("Allready completed\n");
goto err;
}
offset = ntohs(fhdr->frag_off) & ~0x7;
end = offset + (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) -
((u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - (u8 *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1)));
if ((unsigned int)end > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("offset is too large.\n");
return -1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
skb->csum = csum_sub(skb->csum,
csum_partial(nh, (u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - nh,
0));
}
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(IP6_MF))) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrupted.
*/
if (end < fq->q.len ||
((fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != fq->q.len)) {
pr_debug("already received last fragment\n");
goto err;
}
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
fq->q.len = end;
} else {
/* Check if the fragment is rounded to 8 bytes.
* Required by the RFC.
*/
if (end & 0x7) {
/* RFC2460 says always send parameter problem in
* this case. -DaveM
*/
pr_debug("end of fragment not rounded to 8 bytes.\n");
return -1;
}
if (end > fq->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) {
pr_debug("last packet already reached.\n");
goto err;
}
fq->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
/* Point into the IP datagram 'data' part. */
if (!pskb_pull(skb, (u8 *) (fhdr + 1) - skb->data)) {
pr_debug("queue: message is too short.\n");
goto err;
}
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset)) {
pr_debug("Can't trim\n");
goto err;
}
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = NULL;
for (next = fq->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
if (end <= offset) {
pr_debug("overlap\n");
goto err;
}
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i)) {
pr_debug("Can't pull\n");
goto err;
}
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
/* Look for overlap with succeeding segments.
* If we can merge fragments, do it.
*/
while (next && NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset < end) {
/* overlap is 'i' bytes */
int i = end - NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset;
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
pr_debug("Eat head of the overlapped parts.: %d", i);
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
/* next fragment */
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset += i;
fq->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragmnet is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
fq->q.fragments = next;
fq->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(free_it, NULL);
}
}
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
fq->q.fragments = skb;
skb->dev = NULL;
fq->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
fq->q.meat += skb->len;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
/* The first fragment.
* nhoffset is obtained from the first fragment, of course.
*/
if (offset == 0) {
fq->nhoffset = nhoff;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
}
write_lock(&nf_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&fq->q.lru_list, &nf_init_frags.lru_list);
write_unlock(&nf_frags.lock);
return 0;
err:
return -1;
}
|
static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct frag_hdr *fhdr, int nhoff)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
int offset, end;
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE) {
pr_debug("Allready completed\n");
goto err;
}
offset = ntohs(fhdr->frag_off) & ~0x7;
end = offset + (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) -
((u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - (u8 *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1)));
if ((unsigned int)end > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("offset is too large.\n");
return -1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
skb->csum = csum_sub(skb->csum,
csum_partial(nh, (u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - nh,
0));
}
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(IP6_MF))) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrupted.
*/
if (end < fq->q.len ||
((fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != fq->q.len)) {
pr_debug("already received last fragment\n");
goto err;
}
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
fq->q.len = end;
} else {
/* Check if the fragment is rounded to 8 bytes.
* Required by the RFC.
*/
if (end & 0x7) {
/* RFC2460 says always send parameter problem in
* this case. -DaveM
*/
pr_debug("end of fragment not rounded to 8 bytes.\n");
return -1;
}
if (end > fq->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) {
pr_debug("last packet already reached.\n");
goto err;
}
fq->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
/* Point into the IP datagram 'data' part. */
if (!pskb_pull(skb, (u8 *) (fhdr + 1) - skb->data)) {
pr_debug("queue: message is too short.\n");
goto err;
}
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset)) {
pr_debug("Can't trim\n");
goto err;
}
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = NULL;
for (next = fq->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
if (end <= offset) {
pr_debug("overlap\n");
goto err;
}
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i)) {
pr_debug("Can't pull\n");
goto err;
}
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
/* Look for overlap with succeeding segments.
* If we can merge fragments, do it.
*/
while (next && NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset < end) {
/* overlap is 'i' bytes */
int i = end - NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset;
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
pr_debug("Eat head of the overlapped parts.: %d", i);
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
/* next fragment */
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(next)->offset += i;
fq->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragmnet is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
fq->q.fragments = next;
fq->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(free_it, NULL);
}
}
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
fq->q.fragments = skb;
skb->dev = NULL;
fq->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
fq->q.meat += skb->len;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
/* The first fragment.
* nhoffset is obtained from the first fragment, of course.
*/
if (offset == 0) {
fq->nhoffset = nhoff;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
}
write_lock(&nf_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&fq->q.lru_list, &nf_init_frags.lru_list);
write_unlock(&nf_frags.lock);
return 0;
err:
return -1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3520/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
/* error messages get the original request appened */
if (err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = nlmsg_new(payload, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, err ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
|
void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
/* error messages get the original request appened */
if (err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = nlmsg_new(payload, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, err ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
static bool inNormalFlow(LayoutBox* child)
{
LayoutBlock* curr = child->containingBlock();
LayoutView* layoutView = child->view();
while (curr && curr != layoutView) {
if (curr->isLayoutFlowThread())
return true;
if (curr->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned())
return false;
curr = curr->containingBlock();
}
return true;
}
|
static bool inNormalFlow(LayoutBox* child)
{
LayoutBlock* curr = child->containingBlock();
LayoutView* layoutView = child->view();
while (curr && curr != layoutView) {
if (curr->isLayoutFlowThread())
return true;
if (curr->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned())
return false;
curr = curr->containingBlock();
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int chksum_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length)
{
struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
ctx->crc = crc_t10dif_generic(ctx->crc, data, length);
return 0;
}
|
static int chksum_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length)
{
struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
ctx->crc = crc_t10dif_generic(ctx->crc, data, length);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1196
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1196/
|
CWE-59
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=4e9269a5fc1fe80a1095a92593dd85db871e1fd3
|
4e9269a5fc1fe80a1095a92593dd85db871e1fd3
| null |
static inline struct timespec pch_timestamp (bool which)
{
return p_timestamp[which];
}
|
static inline struct timespec pch_timestamp (bool which)
{
return p_timestamp[which];
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2496/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
03a53d1c7765eeb3af0bc34c3dff02ada1953fbf
|
Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
|
ssize_t InputDispatcher::InputState::findKeyMemento(const KeyEntry* entry) const {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mKeyMementos.size(); i++) {
const KeyMemento& memento = mKeyMementos.itemAt(i);
if (memento.deviceId == entry->deviceId
&& memento.source == entry->source
&& memento.keyCode == entry->keyCode
&& memento.scanCode == entry->scanCode) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
ssize_t InputDispatcher::InputState::findKeyMemento(const KeyEntry* entry) const {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mKeyMementos.size(); i++) {
const KeyMemento& memento = mKeyMementos.itemAt(i);
if (memento.deviceId == entry->deviceId
&& memento.source == entry->source
&& memento.keyCode == entry->keyCode
&& memento.scanCode == entry->scanCode) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void longMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::longMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void longMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::longMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebPluginDelegateProxy::ImeCompositionCompleted(const string16& text,
int plugin_id) {
if (instance_id_ != plugin_id)
return;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_ImeCompositionCompleted(instance_id_,
text);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
|
void WebPluginDelegateProxy::ImeCompositionCompleted(const string16& text,
int plugin_id) {
if (instance_id_ != plugin_id)
return;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_ImeCompositionCompleted(instance_id_,
text);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<AccessibilityUIElement> AccessibilityUIElement::selectedChildAtIndex(unsigned index) const
{
return 0;
}
|
PassRefPtr<AccessibilityUIElement> AccessibilityUIElement::selectedChildAtIndex(unsigned index) const
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7969
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7969/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libass/libass/pull/240/commits/b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
|
ASS_Image *ass_render_frame(ASS_Renderer *priv, ASS_Track *track,
long long now, int *detect_change)
{
int i, cnt, rc;
EventImages *last;
ASS_Image **tail;
rc = ass_start_frame(priv, track, now);
if (rc != 0) {
if (detect_change) {
*detect_change = 2;
}
return NULL;
}
cnt = 0;
for (i = 0; i < track->n_events; ++i) {
ASS_Event *event = track->events + i;
if ((event->Start <= now)
&& (now < (event->Start + event->Duration))) {
if (cnt >= priv->eimg_size) {
priv->eimg_size += 100;
priv->eimg =
realloc(priv->eimg,
priv->eimg_size * sizeof(EventImages));
}
rc = ass_render_event(priv, event, priv->eimg + cnt);
if (!rc)
++cnt;
}
}
qsort(priv->eimg, cnt, sizeof(EventImages), cmp_event_layer);
last = priv->eimg;
for (i = 1; i < cnt; ++i)
if (last->event->Layer != priv->eimg[i].event->Layer) {
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + i - last);
last = priv->eimg + i;
}
if (cnt > 0)
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + cnt - last);
tail = &priv->images_root;
for (i = 0; i < cnt; ++i) {
ASS_Image *cur = priv->eimg[i].imgs;
while (cur) {
*tail = cur;
tail = &cur->next;
cur = cur->next;
}
}
ass_frame_ref(priv->images_root);
if (detect_change)
*detect_change = ass_detect_change(priv);
ass_frame_unref(priv->prev_images_root);
priv->prev_images_root = NULL;
return priv->images_root;
}
|
ASS_Image *ass_render_frame(ASS_Renderer *priv, ASS_Track *track,
long long now, int *detect_change)
{
int i, cnt, rc;
EventImages *last;
ASS_Image **tail;
rc = ass_start_frame(priv, track, now);
if (rc != 0) {
if (detect_change) {
*detect_change = 2;
}
return NULL;
}
cnt = 0;
for (i = 0; i < track->n_events; ++i) {
ASS_Event *event = track->events + i;
if ((event->Start <= now)
&& (now < (event->Start + event->Duration))) {
if (cnt >= priv->eimg_size) {
priv->eimg_size += 100;
priv->eimg =
realloc(priv->eimg,
priv->eimg_size * sizeof(EventImages));
}
rc = ass_render_event(priv, event, priv->eimg + cnt);
if (!rc)
++cnt;
}
}
qsort(priv->eimg, cnt, sizeof(EventImages), cmp_event_layer);
last = priv->eimg;
for (i = 1; i < cnt; ++i)
if (last->event->Layer != priv->eimg[i].event->Layer) {
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + i - last);
last = priv->eimg + i;
}
if (cnt > 0)
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + cnt - last);
tail = &priv->images_root;
for (i = 0; i < cnt; ++i) {
ASS_Image *cur = priv->eimg[i].imgs;
while (cur) {
*tail = cur;
tail = &cur->next;
cur = cur->next;
}
}
ass_frame_ref(priv->images_root);
if (detect_change)
*detect_change = ass_detect_change(priv);
ass_frame_unref(priv->prev_images_root);
priv->prev_images_root = NULL;
return priv->images_root;
}
|
C
|
libass
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0196
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0196/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
|
4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
|
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
n_tty_receive_buf_raw(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
while (count--) {
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
if (likely(flag == TTY_NORMAL))
put_tty_queue(*cp++, ldata);
else
n_tty_receive_char_flagged(tty, *cp++, flag);
}
}
|
n_tty_receive_buf_raw(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
while (count--) {
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
if (likely(flag == TTY_NORMAL))
put_tty_queue(*cp++, ldata);
else
n_tty_receive_char_flagged(tty, *cp++, flag);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4118/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/7d58aac24fe20ffaad7bd9b40c9ddf457c1b06e7
|
7d58aac24fe20ffaad7bd9b40c9ddf457c1b06e7
|
security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
|
BOOL rdp_send_data_pdu(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, BYTE type, UINT16 channel_id)
{
UINT16 length;
UINT32 sec_bytes;
BYTE* sec_hold;
length = stream_get_length(s);
stream_set_pos(s, 0);
rdp_write_header(rdp, s, length, MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL_ID);
sec_bytes = rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdp);
sec_hold = s->p;
stream_seek(s, sec_bytes);
rdp_write_share_control_header(s, length - sec_bytes, PDU_TYPE_DATA, channel_id);
rdp_write_share_data_header(s, length - sec_bytes, type, rdp->settings->ShareId);
s->p = sec_hold;
length += rdp_security_stream_out(rdp, s, length);
stream_set_pos(s, length);
if (transport_write(rdp->transport, s) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
|
BOOL rdp_send_data_pdu(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, BYTE type, UINT16 channel_id)
{
UINT16 length;
UINT32 sec_bytes;
BYTE* sec_hold;
length = stream_get_length(s);
stream_set_pos(s, 0);
rdp_write_header(rdp, s, length, MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL_ID);
sec_bytes = rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdp);
sec_hold = s->p;
stream_seek(s, sec_bytes);
rdp_write_share_control_header(s, length - sec_bytes, PDU_TYPE_DATA, channel_id);
rdp_write_share_data_header(s, length - sec_bytes, type, rdp->settings->ShareId);
s->p = sec_hold;
length += rdp_security_stream_out(rdp, s, length);
stream_set_pos(s, length);
if (transport_write(rdp->transport, s) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20065/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33b9b0262029fea75c436229f9bdfe74b1937ad2
|
33b9b0262029fea75c436229f9bdfe74b1937ad2
|
Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
|
std::string RunCreateWindowExpectError(const std::string& args) {
scoped_refptr<WindowsCreateFunction> function(new WindowsCreateFunction);
function->set_extension(ExtensionBuilder("Test").Build().get());
return api_test_utils::RunFunctionAndReturnError(function.get(), args,
browser()->profile());
}
|
std::string RunCreateWindowExpectError(const std::string& args) {
scoped_refptr<WindowsCreateFunction> function(new WindowsCreateFunction);
function->set_extension(ExtensionBuilder("Test").Build().get());
return api_test_utils::RunFunctionAndReturnError(function.get(), args,
browser()->profile());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static int adev_set_mode(struct audio_hw_device *dev, int mode)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(mode);
FNLOG();
return 0;
}
|
static int adev_set_mode(struct audio_hw_device *dev, int mode)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(mode);
FNLOG();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5847
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5847/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/GStreamer/gst-plugins-ugly/commit/d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
|
gst_asf_demux_class_init (GstASFDemuxClass * klass)
{
GstElementClass *gstelement_class;
gstelement_class = (GstElementClass *) klass;
gst_element_class_set_static_metadata (gstelement_class, "ASF Demuxer",
"Codec/Demuxer",
"Demultiplexes ASF Streams", "Owen Fraser-Green <[email protected]>");
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&audio_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&video_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&gst_asf_demux_sink_template);
gstelement_class->change_state =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_change_state);
gstelement_class->send_event =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_element_send_event);
}
|
gst_asf_demux_class_init (GstASFDemuxClass * klass)
{
GstElementClass *gstelement_class;
gstelement_class = (GstElementClass *) klass;
gst_element_class_set_static_metadata (gstelement_class, "ASF Demuxer",
"Codec/Demuxer",
"Demultiplexes ASF Streams", "Owen Fraser-Green <[email protected]>");
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&audio_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&video_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&gst_asf_demux_sink_template);
gstelement_class->change_state =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_change_state);
gstelement_class->send_event =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_element_send_event);
}
|
C
|
gst-plugins-ugly
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
uint64_t val)
{
uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
return !(val & ~valid_bits);
}
|
static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
uint64_t val)
{
uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
return !(val & ~valid_bits);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17541/
| null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/39f226a9c137f547e12afde972eeba7551124493
|
39f226a9c137f547e12afde972eeba7551124493
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterJPEGImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PJPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPS");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPEG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPE");
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterJPEGImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PJPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPS");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPEG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPE");
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16612
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16612/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXcursor/commit/?id=4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8
|
4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8
| null |
XcursorXcFileLoad (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorComments **commentsp,
XcursorImages **imagesp)
{
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader;
int nimage;
int ncomment;
XcursorImages *images;
XcursorImage *image;
XcursorComment *comment;
XcursorComments *comments;
int toc;
if (!file)
return 0;
fileHeader = _XcursorReadFileHeader (file);
if (!fileHeader)
return 0;
nimage = 0;
ncomment = 0;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
switch (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type) {
case XCURSOR_COMMENT_TYPE:
ncomment++;
break;
case XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE:
nimage++;
break;
}
}
images = XcursorImagesCreate (nimage);
if (!images)
return 0;
comments = XcursorCommentsCreate (ncomment);
if (!comments)
{
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
return 0;
}
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
switch (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type) {
case XCURSOR_COMMENT_TYPE:
comment = _XcursorReadComment (file, fileHeader, toc);
if (comment)
{
comments->comments[comments->ncomment] = comment;
comments->ncomment++;
}
break;
case XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE:
image = _XcursorReadImage (file, fileHeader, toc);
if (image)
{
images->images[images->nimage] = image;
images->nimage++;
}
break;
}
}
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (fileHeader);
if (images->nimage != nimage || comments->ncomment != ncomment)
{
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
XcursorCommentsDestroy (comments);
images = NULL;
comments = NULL;
return XcursorFalse;
}
*imagesp = images;
*commentsp = comments;
return XcursorTrue;
}
|
XcursorXcFileLoad (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorComments **commentsp,
XcursorImages **imagesp)
{
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader;
int nimage;
int ncomment;
XcursorImages *images;
XcursorImage *image;
XcursorComment *comment;
XcursorComments *comments;
int toc;
if (!file)
return 0;
fileHeader = _XcursorReadFileHeader (file);
if (!fileHeader)
return 0;
nimage = 0;
ncomment = 0;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
switch (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type) {
case XCURSOR_COMMENT_TYPE:
ncomment++;
break;
case XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE:
nimage++;
break;
}
}
images = XcursorImagesCreate (nimage);
if (!images)
return 0;
comments = XcursorCommentsCreate (ncomment);
if (!comments)
{
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
return 0;
}
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
switch (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type) {
case XCURSOR_COMMENT_TYPE:
comment = _XcursorReadComment (file, fileHeader, toc);
if (comment)
{
comments->comments[comments->ncomment] = comment;
comments->ncomment++;
}
break;
case XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE:
image = _XcursorReadImage (file, fileHeader, toc);
if (image)
{
images->images[images->nimage] = image;
images->nimage++;
}
break;
}
}
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (fileHeader);
if (images->nimage != nimage || comments->ncomment != ncomment)
{
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
XcursorCommentsDestroy (comments);
images = NULL;
comments = NULL;
return XcursorFalse;
}
*imagesp = images;
*commentsp = comments;
return XcursorTrue;
}
|
C
|
xcursor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11232/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void etm_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
kfree(event->hw.addr_filters);
event->hw.addr_filters = NULL;
}
|
static void etm_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
kfree(event->hw.addr_filters);
event->hw.addr_filters = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5023
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5023/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
|
Factory(const std::string& name,
const std::vector<Sample>* custom_ranges,
int32_t flags)
: Histogram::Factory(name, CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM, 0, 0, 0, flags) {
custom_ranges_ = custom_ranges;
}
|
Factory(const std::string& name,
const std::vector<Sample>* custom_ranges,
int32_t flags)
: Histogram::Factory(name, CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM, 0, 0, 0, flags) {
custom_ranges_ = custom_ranges;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int em_bswap(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case 8:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(ctxt->dst.val));
break;
#endif
default:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(*(u32 *)&ctxt->dst.val));
break;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_bswap(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case 8:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(ctxt->dst.val));
break;
#endif
default:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(*(u32 *)&ctxt->dst.val));
break;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if (mask == 0)
svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
else
svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
}
|
static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if (mask == 0)
svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
else
svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2900/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GpuProcessHost::SurfaceRef::~SurfaceRef() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ReleasePermanentXIDDispatcher, surface_));
}
|
GpuProcessHost::SurfaceRef::~SurfaceRef() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ReleasePermanentXIDDispatcher, surface_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3234/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/52dac009556881941c60d378e34867cdb2fd00a0
|
52dac009556881941c60d378e34867cdb2fd00a0
|
Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ExtensionPrefs::ReadExtensionPrefBoolean(
const std::string& extension_id, const std::string& pref_key) {
const DictionaryValue* ext = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
if (!ext) {
return false;
}
return ReadBooleanFromPref(ext, pref_key);
}
|
bool ExtensionPrefs::ReadExtensionPrefBoolean(
const std::string& extension_id, const std::string& pref_key) {
const DictionaryValue* ext = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
if (!ext) {
return false;
}
return ReadBooleanFromPref(ext, pref_key);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0380
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0380/
|
CWE-532
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
|
rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id)
{
rend_service_t *s;
if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal.");
return -1;
}
if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for "
"removal.");
return -1;
}
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(s)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal.");
return -1;
}
/* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from
* the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem.
*
* XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction
* would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code.
*/
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
tor_assert(oc->rend_data);
if (!rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) {
continue;
}
log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
oc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data));
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s);
rend_service_free(s);
log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id);
return 0;
}
|
rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id)
{
rend_service_t *s;
if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal.");
return -1;
}
if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for "
"removal.");
return -1;
}
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(s)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal.");
return -1;
}
/* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from
* the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem.
*
* XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction
* would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code.
*/
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
tor_assert(oc->rend_data);
if (!rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) {
continue;
}
log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
oc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data));
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s);
rend_service_free(s);
log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
MkfsLuksData *data = user_data;
throw_error (data->context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error creating luks encrypted file system: timeout (10s) waiting for luks device to show up");
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->device->priv->daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
mkfse_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
|
filesystem_create_wait_for_luks_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
MkfsLuksData *data = user_data;
throw_error (data->context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error creating luks encrypted file system: timeout (10s) waiting for luks device to show up");
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->device->priv->daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
mkfse_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void d_invalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/*
* If it's already been dropped, return OK.
*/
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (d_unhashed(dentry)) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
return;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
/* Negative dentries can be dropped without further checks */
if (!dentry->d_inode) {
d_drop(dentry);
return;
}
for (;;) {
struct detach_data data;
data.mountpoint = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data.select.dispose);
data.select.start = dentry;
data.select.found = 0;
d_walk(dentry, &data, detach_and_collect, check_and_drop);
if (!list_empty(&data.select.dispose))
shrink_dentry_list(&data.select.dispose);
else if (!data.mountpoint)
return;
if (data.mountpoint) {
detach_mounts(data.mountpoint);
dput(data.mountpoint);
}
cond_resched();
}
}
|
void d_invalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/*
* If it's already been dropped, return OK.
*/
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (d_unhashed(dentry)) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
return;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
/* Negative dentries can be dropped without further checks */
if (!dentry->d_inode) {
d_drop(dentry);
return;
}
for (;;) {
struct detach_data data;
data.mountpoint = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data.select.dispose);
data.select.start = dentry;
data.select.found = 0;
d_walk(dentry, &data, detach_and_collect, check_and_drop);
if (!list_empty(&data.select.dispose))
shrink_dentry_list(&data.select.dispose);
else if (!data.mountpoint)
return;
if (data.mountpoint) {
detach_mounts(data.mountpoint);
dput(data.mountpoint);
}
cond_resched();
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
bool ACodec::FlushingState::onOMXEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 data1, OMX_U32 data2) {
ALOGV("[%s] FlushingState onOMXEvent(%u,%d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), event, (OMX_S32)data1);
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
{
if (data1 != (OMX_U32)OMX_CommandFlush) {
ALOGE("unexpected EventCmdComplete %s(%d) data2:%d in FlushingState",
asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)data1), data1, data2);
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, FAILED_TRANSACTION);
return true;
}
if (data2 == kPortIndexInput || data2 == kPortIndexOutput) {
if (mFlushComplete[data2]) {
ALOGW("Flush already completed for %s port",
data2 == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
return true;
}
mFlushComplete[data2] = true;
if (mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput] && mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]) {
changeStateIfWeOwnAllBuffers();
}
} else if (data2 == OMX_ALL) {
if (!mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput] || !mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]) {
ALOGW("received flush complete event for OMX_ALL before ports have been"
"flushed (%d/%d)",
mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput], mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]);
return false;
}
changeStateIfWeOwnAllBuffers();
} else {
ALOGW("data2 not OMX_ALL but %u in EventCmdComplete CommandFlush", data2);
}
return true;
}
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
{
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatOMXMessage, mCodec);
msg->setInt32("type", omx_message::EVENT);
msg->setInt32("node", mCodec->mNode);
msg->setInt32("event", event);
msg->setInt32("data1", data1);
msg->setInt32("data2", data2);
ALOGV("[%s] Deferring OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
mCodec->deferMessage(msg);
return true;
}
default:
return BaseState::onOMXEvent(event, data1, data2);
}
return true;
}
|
bool ACodec::FlushingState::onOMXEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 data1, OMX_U32 data2) {
ALOGV("[%s] FlushingState onOMXEvent(%u,%d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), event, (OMX_S32)data1);
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
{
if (data1 != (OMX_U32)OMX_CommandFlush) {
ALOGE("unexpected EventCmdComplete %s(%d) data2:%d in FlushingState",
asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)data1), data1, data2);
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, FAILED_TRANSACTION);
return true;
}
if (data2 == kPortIndexInput || data2 == kPortIndexOutput) {
if (mFlushComplete[data2]) {
ALOGW("Flush already completed for %s port",
data2 == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
return true;
}
mFlushComplete[data2] = true;
if (mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput] && mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]) {
changeStateIfWeOwnAllBuffers();
}
} else if (data2 == OMX_ALL) {
if (!mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput] || !mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]) {
ALOGW("received flush complete event for OMX_ALL before ports have been"
"flushed (%d/%d)",
mFlushComplete[kPortIndexInput], mFlushComplete[kPortIndexOutput]);
return false;
}
changeStateIfWeOwnAllBuffers();
} else {
ALOGW("data2 not OMX_ALL but %u in EventCmdComplete CommandFlush", data2);
}
return true;
}
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
{
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatOMXMessage, mCodec);
msg->setInt32("type", omx_message::EVENT);
msg->setInt32("node", mCodec->mNode);
msg->setInt32("event", event);
msg->setInt32("data1", data1);
msg->setInt32("data2", data2);
ALOGV("[%s] Deferring OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
mCodec->deferMessage(msg);
return true;
}
default:
return BaseState::onOMXEvent(event, data1, data2);
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7308
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7308/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda
|
d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda
|
bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
{
bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
(opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
u32 off;
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
if (mask_to_left)
*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
else
*ptr_limit = -off;
return 0;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
if (mask_to_left) {
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
} else {
off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;
}
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
{
bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
(opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
u32 off;
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
if (mask_to_left)
*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
else
*ptr_limit = -off;
return 0;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
if (mask_to_left) {
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
} else {
off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;
}
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5366
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5366/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int udp_v6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
int err = 0;
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
/* ip6_finish_skb will release the cork, so make a copy of
* fl6 here.
*/
fl6 = inet_sk(sk)->cork.fl.u.ip6;
skb = ip6_finish_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
goto out;
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
out:
up->len = 0;
up->pending = 0;
return err;
}
|
static int udp_v6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
int err = 0;
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
/* ip6_finish_skb will release the cork, so make a copy of
* fl6 here.
*/
fl6 = inet_sk(sk)->cork.fl.u.ip6;
skb = ip6_finish_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
goto out;
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
out:
up->len = 0;
up->pending = 0;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedLongLongAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedLongLongAttr(static_cast<unsigned long long>(value.toInteger(exec)));
}
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedLongLongAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedLongLongAttr(static_cast<unsigned long long>(value.toInteger(exec)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
struct kvm_segment s;
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
return s.base;
}
return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
}
|
static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
struct kvm_segment s;
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
return s.base;
}
return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void RenderViewImpl::SetFocus(bool enable) {
GetWidget()->SetFocus(enable);
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::SetFocus(bool enable) {
GetWidget()->SetFocus(enable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1237/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
|
nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
struct nfs4_acl *acl)
{
__be32 error;
int host_error;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
unsigned int flags = 0;
/* Get inode */
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
if (error)
return error;
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
inode = d_inode(dentry);
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
host_error = nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(acl, &pacl, &dpacl, flags);
if (host_error == -EINVAL)
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
if (host_error < 0)
goto out_nfserr;
fh_lock(fhp);
host_error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, pacl);
if (host_error < 0)
goto out_drop_lock;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
host_error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, dpacl);
}
out_drop_lock:
fh_unlock(fhp);
posix_acl_release(pacl);
posix_acl_release(dpacl);
out_nfserr:
if (host_error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
else
return nfserrno(host_error);
}
|
nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
struct nfs4_acl *acl)
{
__be32 error;
int host_error;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
unsigned int flags = 0;
/* Get inode */
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
if (error)
return error;
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
inode = d_inode(dentry);
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl || !IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
host_error = nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(acl, &pacl, &dpacl, flags);
if (host_error == -EINVAL)
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
if (host_error < 0)
goto out_nfserr;
host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, pacl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (host_error < 0)
goto out_release;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, dpacl,
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
}
out_release:
posix_acl_release(pacl);
posix_acl_release(dpacl);
out_nfserr:
if (host_error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
else
return nfserrno(host_error);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6041/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
|
RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
SiteInstance* candidate_instance,
ui::PageTransition transition,
bool dest_is_restore,
bool dest_is_view_source_mode,
bool was_server_redirect) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
SiteInstance* current_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
if (current_instance->GetSiteURL().SchemeIs(kGuestScheme))
return current_instance;
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
const GURL& current_effective_url =
!render_frame_host_->last_successful_url().is_empty()
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(
browser_context, render_frame_host_->last_successful_url())
: render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
const NavigationEntry* current_entry =
delegate_->GetLastCommittedNavigationEntryForRenderManager();
bool current_is_view_source_mode = current_entry ?
current_entry->IsViewSourceMode() : dest_is_view_source_mode;
bool force_swap = ShouldSwapBrowsingInstancesForNavigation(
current_effective_url,
current_is_view_source_mode,
dest_instance,
SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, dest_url),
dest_is_view_source_mode);
SiteInstanceDescriptor new_instance_descriptor =
SiteInstanceDescriptor(current_instance);
if (ShouldTransitionCrossSite() || force_swap) {
new_instance_descriptor = DetermineSiteInstanceForURL(
dest_url, source_instance, current_instance, dest_instance, transition,
dest_is_restore, dest_is_view_source_mode, force_swap,
was_server_redirect);
}
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> new_instance =
ConvertToSiteInstance(new_instance_descriptor, candidate_instance);
if (force_swap)
CHECK_NE(new_instance, current_instance);
if (new_instance == current_instance) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::CleanupSpareRenderProcessHost();
}
DCHECK_EQ(new_instance->GetBrowserContext(), browser_context);
SiteInstanceImpl* new_instance_impl =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(new_instance.get());
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && !new_instance_impl->HasProcess() &&
new_instance_impl->RequiresDedicatedProcess()) {
new_instance_impl->set_process_reuse_policy(
SiteInstanceImpl::ProcessReusePolicy::REUSE_PENDING_OR_COMMITTED_SITE);
}
return new_instance;
}
|
RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
SiteInstance* candidate_instance,
ui::PageTransition transition,
bool dest_is_restore,
bool dest_is_view_source_mode,
bool was_server_redirect) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
SiteInstance* current_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
if (current_instance->GetSiteURL().SchemeIs(kGuestScheme))
return current_instance;
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
const GURL& current_effective_url =
!render_frame_host_->last_successful_url().is_empty()
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(
browser_context, render_frame_host_->last_successful_url())
: render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
const NavigationEntry* current_entry =
delegate_->GetLastCommittedNavigationEntryForRenderManager();
bool current_is_view_source_mode = current_entry ?
current_entry->IsViewSourceMode() : dest_is_view_source_mode;
bool force_swap = ShouldSwapBrowsingInstancesForNavigation(
current_effective_url,
current_is_view_source_mode,
dest_instance,
SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, dest_url),
dest_is_view_source_mode);
SiteInstanceDescriptor new_instance_descriptor =
SiteInstanceDescriptor(current_instance);
if (ShouldTransitionCrossSite() || force_swap) {
new_instance_descriptor = DetermineSiteInstanceForURL(
dest_url, source_instance, current_instance, dest_instance, transition,
dest_is_restore, dest_is_view_source_mode, force_swap,
was_server_redirect);
}
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> new_instance =
ConvertToSiteInstance(new_instance_descriptor, candidate_instance);
if (force_swap)
CHECK_NE(new_instance, current_instance);
if (new_instance == current_instance) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::CleanupSpareRenderProcessHost();
}
DCHECK_EQ(new_instance->GetBrowserContext(), browser_context);
SiteInstanceImpl* new_instance_impl =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(new_instance.get());
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && !new_instance_impl->HasProcess() &&
new_instance_impl->RequiresDedicatedProcess()) {
new_instance_impl->set_process_reuse_policy(
SiteInstanceImpl::ProcessReusePolicy::REUSE_PENDING_OR_COMMITTED_SITE);
}
return new_instance;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010292/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/e3adcf566cb278444830e7badfdcc3983e334fd1
|
e3adcf566cb278444830e7badfdcc3983e334fd1
|
core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
void __weak tee_entry_std(struct thread_smc_args *smc_args)
{
paddr_t parg;
struct optee_msg_arg *arg = NULL; /* fix gcc warning */
uint32_t num_params = 0; /* fix gcc warning */
struct mobj *mobj;
if (smc_args->a0 != OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG) {
EMSG("Unknown SMC 0x%" PRIx64, (uint64_t)smc_args->a0);
DMSG("Expected 0x%x\n", OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADCMD;
return;
}
parg = (uint64_t)smc_args->a1 << 32 | smc_args->a2;
/* Check if this region is in static shared space */
if (core_pbuf_is(CORE_MEM_NSEC_SHM, parg,
sizeof(struct optee_msg_arg))) {
mobj = get_cmd_buffer(parg, &num_params);
} else {
if (parg & SMALL_PAGE_MASK) {
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADADDR;
return;
}
mobj = map_cmd_buffer(parg, &num_params);
}
if (!mobj || !ALIGNMENT_IS_OK(parg, struct optee_msg_arg)) {
EMSG("Bad arg address 0x%" PRIxPA, parg);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADADDR;
mobj_free(mobj);
return;
}
arg = mobj_get_va(mobj, 0);
assert(arg && mobj_is_nonsec(mobj));
/* Enable foreign interrupts for STD calls */
thread_set_foreign_intr(true);
switch (arg->cmd) {
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_OPEN_SESSION:
entry_open_session(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CLOSE_SESSION:
entry_close_session(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_INVOKE_COMMAND:
entry_invoke_command(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CANCEL:
entry_cancel(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_REGISTER_SHM:
register_shm(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_UNREGISTER_SHM:
unregister_shm(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
default:
EMSG("Unknown cmd 0x%x\n", arg->cmd);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADCMD;
}
mobj_free(mobj);
}
|
void __weak tee_entry_std(struct thread_smc_args *smc_args)
{
paddr_t parg;
struct optee_msg_arg *arg = NULL; /* fix gcc warning */
uint32_t num_params = 0; /* fix gcc warning */
struct mobj *mobj;
if (smc_args->a0 != OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG) {
EMSG("Unknown SMC 0x%" PRIx64, (uint64_t)smc_args->a0);
DMSG("Expected 0x%x\n", OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADCMD;
return;
}
parg = (uint64_t)smc_args->a1 << 32 | smc_args->a2;
/* Check if this region is in static shared space */
if (core_pbuf_is(CORE_MEM_NSEC_SHM, parg,
sizeof(struct optee_msg_arg))) {
mobj = get_cmd_buffer(parg, &num_params);
} else {
if (parg & SMALL_PAGE_MASK) {
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADADDR;
return;
}
mobj = map_cmd_buffer(parg, &num_params);
}
if (!mobj || !ALIGNMENT_IS_OK(parg, struct optee_msg_arg)) {
EMSG("Bad arg address 0x%" PRIxPA, parg);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADADDR;
mobj_free(mobj);
return;
}
arg = mobj_get_va(mobj, 0);
assert(arg && mobj_is_nonsec(mobj));
/* Enable foreign interrupts for STD calls */
thread_set_foreign_intr(true);
switch (arg->cmd) {
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_OPEN_SESSION:
entry_open_session(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CLOSE_SESSION:
entry_close_session(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_INVOKE_COMMAND:
entry_invoke_command(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CANCEL:
entry_cancel(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_REGISTER_SHM:
register_shm(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_CMD_UNREGISTER_SHM:
unregister_shm(smc_args, arg, num_params);
break;
default:
EMSG("Unknown cmd 0x%x\n", arg->cmd);
smc_args->a0 = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_EBADCMD;
}
mobj_free(mobj);
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
void ProcessScrollInternal(ui::EventType type,
const gfx::Vector2dF& delta,
bool bounds_check) {
if (GetShelfLayoutManager()->visibility_state() == SHELF_HIDDEN)
return;
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_BEGIN) {
scroll_ = gfx::Vector2dF();
was_visible_on_drag_start_ = GetShelfLayoutManager()->IsVisible();
return;
}
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END)
return;
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE)
scroll_.Add(delta);
Shelf* shelf = AshTestBase::GetPrimaryShelf();
gfx::Rect shelf_bounds = GetShelfWidget()->GetWindowBoundsInScreen();
float scroll_delta =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->PrimaryAxisValue(scroll_.y(), scroll_.x());
bool increasing_drag =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->SelectValueForShelfAlignment(
scroll_delta<0, scroll_delta> 0, scroll_delta < 0);
const int shelf_size = GetShelfLayoutManager()->PrimaryAxisValue(
shelf_bounds.height(), shelf_bounds.width());
if (was_visible_on_drag_start_) {
if (increasing_drag) {
const int bounds_delta =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->SelectValueForShelfAlignment(
visible_shelf_bounds_.y() - shelf_bounds.y(),
shelf_bounds.x() - visible_shelf_bounds_.x(),
visible_shelf_bounds_.x() - shelf_bounds.x());
EXPECT_GE(bounds_delta, 0);
EXPECT_LE(bounds_delta, std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(visible_shelf_bounds_.y(), shelf_bounds.y());
else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(shelf_bounds.x(), visible_shelf_bounds_.x());
else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(visible_shelf_bounds_.x(), shelf_bounds.x());
}
} else {
if (increasing_drag && bounds_check) {
constexpr float kEpsilon = 1.f;
if (std::abs(scroll_delta) < shelf_size) {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.y(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.y() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.x(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() -
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion +
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.x(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
}
} else {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_GT(shelf_bounds.y(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.y() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_LT(shelf_bounds.x(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() -
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion +
std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_GT(shelf_bounds.x(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta));
}
}
}
}
}
|
void ProcessScrollInternal(ui::EventType type,
const gfx::Vector2dF& delta,
bool bounds_check) {
if (GetShelfLayoutManager()->visibility_state() == SHELF_HIDDEN)
return;
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_BEGIN) {
scroll_ = gfx::Vector2dF();
was_visible_on_drag_start_ = GetShelfLayoutManager()->IsVisible();
return;
}
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END)
return;
if (type == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE)
scroll_.Add(delta);
Shelf* shelf = AshTestBase::GetPrimaryShelf();
gfx::Rect shelf_bounds = GetShelfWidget()->GetWindowBoundsInScreen();
float scroll_delta =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->PrimaryAxisValue(scroll_.y(), scroll_.x());
bool increasing_drag =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->SelectValueForShelfAlignment(
scroll_delta<0, scroll_delta> 0, scroll_delta < 0);
const int shelf_size = GetShelfLayoutManager()->PrimaryAxisValue(
shelf_bounds.height(), shelf_bounds.width());
if (was_visible_on_drag_start_) {
if (increasing_drag) {
const int bounds_delta =
GetShelfLayoutManager()->SelectValueForShelfAlignment(
visible_shelf_bounds_.y() - shelf_bounds.y(),
shelf_bounds.x() - visible_shelf_bounds_.x(),
visible_shelf_bounds_.x() - shelf_bounds.x());
EXPECT_GE(bounds_delta, 0);
EXPECT_LE(bounds_delta, std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(visible_shelf_bounds_.y(), shelf_bounds.y());
else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(shelf_bounds.x(), visible_shelf_bounds_.x());
else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment())
EXPECT_LE(visible_shelf_bounds_.x(), shelf_bounds.x());
}
} else {
if (increasing_drag && bounds_check) {
constexpr float kEpsilon = 1.f;
if (std::abs(scroll_delta) < shelf_size) {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.y(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.y() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.x(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() -
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion +
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_NEAR(shelf_bounds.x(),
auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta),
kEpsilon);
}
} else {
if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_GT(shelf_bounds.y(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.y() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_LT(shelf_bounds.x(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() -
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion +
std::abs(scroll_delta));
} else if (SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT == shelf->alignment()) {
EXPECT_GT(shelf_bounds.x(), auto_hidden_shelf_bounds_.x() +
kHiddenShelfInScreenPortion -
std::abs(scroll_delta));
}
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8654
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8654/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/4a59cfaf9ab3d48fca4a15c0d2674bf7138e3d1a
|
4a59cfaf9ab3d48fca4a15c0d2674bf7138e3d1a
|
Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
|
void jpc_ns_invlift_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the scaling step. */
#if defined(WT_DOSCALE)
lptr = &a[0];
n = llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(lptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / LGAIN));
++lptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
n = numrows - llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
hptr2 = hptr;
hptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(hptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / HGAIN));
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
#endif
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(DELTA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(GAMMA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the third lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(BETA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the fourth lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(ALPHA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
} else {
#if defined(WT_LENONE)
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
#endif
}
}
|
void jpc_ns_invlift_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the scaling step. */
#if defined(WT_DOSCALE)
lptr = &a[0];
n = llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(lptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / LGAIN));
++lptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
n = numrows - llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
hptr2 = hptr;
hptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(hptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / HGAIN));
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
#endif
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(DELTA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(GAMMA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the third lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(BETA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the fourth lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(ALPHA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
} else {
#if defined(WT_LENONE)
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
#endif
}
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
CC: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void gen_intermediate_code(CPUX86State *env, TranslationBlock *tb)
{
X86CPU *cpu = x86_env_get_cpu(env);
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
DisasContext dc1, *dc = &dc1;
target_ulong pc_ptr;
uint32_t flags;
target_ulong pc_start;
target_ulong cs_base;
int num_insns;
int max_insns;
/* generate intermediate code */
pc_start = tb->pc;
cs_base = tb->cs_base;
flags = tb->flags;
dc->pe = (flags >> HF_PE_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->code32 = (flags >> HF_CS32_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->ss32 = (flags >> HF_SS32_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->addseg = (flags >> HF_ADDSEG_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->f_st = 0;
dc->vm86 = (flags >> VM_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->cpl = (flags >> HF_CPL_SHIFT) & 3;
dc->iopl = (flags >> IOPL_SHIFT) & 3;
dc->tf = (flags >> TF_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->singlestep_enabled = cs->singlestep_enabled;
dc->cc_op = CC_OP_DYNAMIC;
dc->cc_op_dirty = false;
dc->cs_base = cs_base;
dc->tb = tb;
dc->popl_esp_hack = 0;
/* select memory access functions */
dc->mem_index = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTMMU
dc->mem_index = cpu_mmu_index(env, false);
#endif
dc->cpuid_features = env->features[FEAT_1_EDX];
dc->cpuid_ext_features = env->features[FEAT_1_ECX];
dc->cpuid_ext2_features = env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_EDX];
dc->cpuid_ext3_features = env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX];
dc->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features = env->features[FEAT_7_0_EBX];
dc->cpuid_xsave_features = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE];
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
dc->lma = (flags >> HF_LMA_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->code64 = (flags >> HF_CS64_SHIFT) & 1;
#endif
dc->flags = flags;
dc->jmp_opt = !(dc->tf || cs->singlestep_enabled ||
(flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK));
/* Do not optimize repz jumps at all in icount mode, because
rep movsS instructions are execured with different paths
in !repz_opt and repz_opt modes. The first one was used
always except single step mode. And this setting
disables jumps optimization and control paths become
equivalent in run and single step modes.
Now there will be no jump optimization for repz in
record/replay modes and there will always be an
additional step for ecx=0 when icount is enabled.
*/
dc->repz_opt = !dc->jmp_opt && !(tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT);
#if 0
/* check addseg logic */
if (!dc->addseg && (dc->vm86 || !dc->pe || !dc->code32))
printf("ERROR addseg\n");
#endif
cpu_T0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_T1 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_A0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_tmp0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_tmp1_i64 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
cpu_tmp2_i32 = tcg_temp_new_i32();
cpu_tmp3_i32 = tcg_temp_new_i32();
cpu_tmp4 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_ptr0 = tcg_temp_new_ptr();
cpu_ptr1 = tcg_temp_new_ptr();
cpu_cc_srcT = tcg_temp_local_new();
dc->is_jmp = DISAS_NEXT;
pc_ptr = pc_start;
num_insns = 0;
max_insns = tb->cflags & CF_COUNT_MASK;
if (max_insns == 0) {
max_insns = CF_COUNT_MASK;
}
if (max_insns > TCG_MAX_INSNS) {
max_insns = TCG_MAX_INSNS;
}
gen_tb_start(tb);
for(;;) {
tcg_gen_insn_start(pc_ptr, dc->cc_op);
num_insns++;
/* If RF is set, suppress an internally generated breakpoint. */
if (unlikely(cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc_ptr,
tb->flags & HF_RF_MASK
? BP_GDB : BP_ANY))) {
gen_debug(dc, pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
/* The address covered by the breakpoint must be included in
[tb->pc, tb->pc + tb->size) in order to for it to be
properly cleared -- thus we increment the PC here so that
the logic setting tb->size below does the right thing. */
pc_ptr += 1;
goto done_generating;
}
if (num_insns == max_insns && (tb->cflags & CF_LAST_IO)) {
gen_io_start();
}
pc_ptr = disas_insn(env, dc, pc_ptr);
/* stop translation if indicated */
if (dc->is_jmp)
break;
/* if single step mode, we generate only one instruction and
generate an exception */
/* if irq were inhibited with HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK, we clear
the flag and abort the translation to give the irqs a
change to be happen */
if (dc->tf || dc->singlestep_enabled ||
(flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK)) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
/* Do not cross the boundary of the pages in icount mode,
it can cause an exception. Do it only when boundary is
crossed by the first instruction in the block.
If current instruction already crossed the bound - it's ok,
because an exception hasn't stopped this code.
*/
if ((tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT)
&& ((pc_ptr & TARGET_PAGE_MASK)
!= ((pc_ptr + TARGET_MAX_INSN_SIZE - 1) & TARGET_PAGE_MASK)
|| (pc_ptr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK) == 0)) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
/* if too long translation, stop generation too */
if (tcg_op_buf_full() ||
(pc_ptr - pc_start) >= (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 32) ||
num_insns >= max_insns) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
if (singlestep) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
}
if (tb->cflags & CF_LAST_IO)
gen_io_end();
done_generating:
gen_tb_end(tb, num_insns);
#ifdef DEBUG_DISAS
if (qemu_loglevel_mask(CPU_LOG_TB_IN_ASM)
&& qemu_log_in_addr_range(pc_start)) {
int disas_flags;
qemu_log_lock();
qemu_log("----------------\n");
qemu_log("IN: %s\n", lookup_symbol(pc_start));
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (dc->code64)
disas_flags = 2;
else
#endif
disas_flags = !dc->code32;
log_target_disas(cs, pc_start, pc_ptr - pc_start, disas_flags);
qemu_log("\n");
qemu_log_unlock();
}
#endif
tb->size = pc_ptr - pc_start;
tb->icount = num_insns;
}
|
void gen_intermediate_code(CPUX86State *env, TranslationBlock *tb)
{
X86CPU *cpu = x86_env_get_cpu(env);
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
DisasContext dc1, *dc = &dc1;
target_ulong pc_ptr;
uint32_t flags;
target_ulong pc_start;
target_ulong cs_base;
int num_insns;
int max_insns;
/* generate intermediate code */
pc_start = tb->pc;
cs_base = tb->cs_base;
flags = tb->flags;
dc->pe = (flags >> HF_PE_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->code32 = (flags >> HF_CS32_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->ss32 = (flags >> HF_SS32_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->addseg = (flags >> HF_ADDSEG_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->f_st = 0;
dc->vm86 = (flags >> VM_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->cpl = (flags >> HF_CPL_SHIFT) & 3;
dc->iopl = (flags >> IOPL_SHIFT) & 3;
dc->tf = (flags >> TF_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->singlestep_enabled = cs->singlestep_enabled;
dc->cc_op = CC_OP_DYNAMIC;
dc->cc_op_dirty = false;
dc->cs_base = cs_base;
dc->tb = tb;
dc->popl_esp_hack = 0;
/* select memory access functions */
dc->mem_index = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTMMU
dc->mem_index = cpu_mmu_index(env, false);
#endif
dc->cpuid_features = env->features[FEAT_1_EDX];
dc->cpuid_ext_features = env->features[FEAT_1_ECX];
dc->cpuid_ext2_features = env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_EDX];
dc->cpuid_ext3_features = env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX];
dc->cpuid_7_0_ebx_features = env->features[FEAT_7_0_EBX];
dc->cpuid_xsave_features = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE];
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
dc->lma = (flags >> HF_LMA_SHIFT) & 1;
dc->code64 = (flags >> HF_CS64_SHIFT) & 1;
#endif
dc->flags = flags;
dc->jmp_opt = !(dc->tf || cs->singlestep_enabled ||
(flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK));
/* Do not optimize repz jumps at all in icount mode, because
rep movsS instructions are execured with different paths
in !repz_opt and repz_opt modes. The first one was used
always except single step mode. And this setting
disables jumps optimization and control paths become
equivalent in run and single step modes.
Now there will be no jump optimization for repz in
record/replay modes and there will always be an
additional step for ecx=0 when icount is enabled.
*/
dc->repz_opt = !dc->jmp_opt && !(tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT);
#if 0
/* check addseg logic */
if (!dc->addseg && (dc->vm86 || !dc->pe || !dc->code32))
printf("ERROR addseg\n");
#endif
cpu_T0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_T1 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_A0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_tmp0 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_tmp1_i64 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
cpu_tmp2_i32 = tcg_temp_new_i32();
cpu_tmp3_i32 = tcg_temp_new_i32();
cpu_tmp4 = tcg_temp_new();
cpu_ptr0 = tcg_temp_new_ptr();
cpu_ptr1 = tcg_temp_new_ptr();
cpu_cc_srcT = tcg_temp_local_new();
dc->is_jmp = DISAS_NEXT;
pc_ptr = pc_start;
num_insns = 0;
max_insns = tb->cflags & CF_COUNT_MASK;
if (max_insns == 0) {
max_insns = CF_COUNT_MASK;
}
if (max_insns > TCG_MAX_INSNS) {
max_insns = TCG_MAX_INSNS;
}
gen_tb_start(tb);
for(;;) {
tcg_gen_insn_start(pc_ptr, dc->cc_op);
num_insns++;
/* If RF is set, suppress an internally generated breakpoint. */
if (unlikely(cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc_ptr,
tb->flags & HF_RF_MASK
? BP_GDB : BP_ANY))) {
gen_debug(dc, pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
/* The address covered by the breakpoint must be included in
[tb->pc, tb->pc + tb->size) in order to for it to be
properly cleared -- thus we increment the PC here so that
the logic setting tb->size below does the right thing. */
pc_ptr += 1;
goto done_generating;
}
if (num_insns == max_insns && (tb->cflags & CF_LAST_IO)) {
gen_io_start();
}
pc_ptr = disas_insn(env, dc, pc_ptr);
/* stop translation if indicated */
if (dc->is_jmp)
break;
/* if single step mode, we generate only one instruction and
generate an exception */
/* if irq were inhibited with HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK, we clear
the flag and abort the translation to give the irqs a
change to be happen */
if (dc->tf || dc->singlestep_enabled ||
(flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK)) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
/* Do not cross the boundary of the pages in icount mode,
it can cause an exception. Do it only when boundary is
crossed by the first instruction in the block.
If current instruction already crossed the bound - it's ok,
because an exception hasn't stopped this code.
*/
if ((tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT)
&& ((pc_ptr & TARGET_PAGE_MASK)
!= ((pc_ptr + TARGET_MAX_INSN_SIZE - 1) & TARGET_PAGE_MASK)
|| (pc_ptr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK) == 0)) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
/* if too long translation, stop generation too */
if (tcg_op_buf_full() ||
(pc_ptr - pc_start) >= (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 32) ||
num_insns >= max_insns) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
if (singlestep) {
gen_jmp_im(pc_ptr - dc->cs_base);
gen_eob(dc);
break;
}
}
if (tb->cflags & CF_LAST_IO)
gen_io_end();
done_generating:
gen_tb_end(tb, num_insns);
#ifdef DEBUG_DISAS
if (qemu_loglevel_mask(CPU_LOG_TB_IN_ASM)
&& qemu_log_in_addr_range(pc_start)) {
int disas_flags;
qemu_log_lock();
qemu_log("----------------\n");
qemu_log("IN: %s\n", lookup_symbol(pc_start));
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (dc->code64)
disas_flags = 2;
else
#endif
disas_flags = !dc->code32;
log_target_disas(cs, pc_start, pc_ptr - pc_start, disas_flags);
qemu_log("\n");
qemu_log_unlock();
}
#endif
tb->size = pc_ptr - pc_start;
tb->icount = num_insns;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
LocalDOMWindow* LocalDOMWindow::ToLocalDOMWindow() {
return this;
}
|
LocalDOMWindow* LocalDOMWindow::ToLocalDOMWindow() {
return this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15164
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15164/
|
CWE-918
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/33834cb2a4d035b52aa2a26742f832a112e90a0a
|
33834cb2a4d035b52aa2a26742f832a112e90a0a
|
In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
|
static void session_close(struct session *session)
{
if (session->have_thread)
{
pcap_breakloop(session->fp);
#ifdef _WIN32
SetEvent(pcap_getevent(session->fp));
WaitForSingleObject(session->thread, INFINITE);
CloseHandle(session->thread);
session->have_thread = 0;
session->thread = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
#else
pthread_kill(session->thread, SIGUSR1);
pthread_join(session->thread, NULL);
session->have_thread = 0;
memset(&session->thread, 0, sizeof(session->thread));
#endif
}
if (session->sockdata != INVALID_SOCKET)
{
sock_close(session->sockdata, NULL, 0);
session->sockdata = INVALID_SOCKET;
}
if (session->fp)
{
pcap_close(session->fp);
session->fp = NULL;
}
}
|
static void session_close(struct session *session)
{
if (session->have_thread)
{
pcap_breakloop(session->fp);
#ifdef _WIN32
SetEvent(pcap_getevent(session->fp));
WaitForSingleObject(session->thread, INFINITE);
CloseHandle(session->thread);
session->have_thread = 0;
session->thread = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
#else
pthread_kill(session->thread, SIGUSR1);
pthread_join(session->thread, NULL);
session->have_thread = 0;
memset(&session->thread, 0, sizeof(session->thread));
#endif
}
if (session->sockdata != INVALID_SOCKET)
{
sock_close(session->sockdata, NULL, 0);
session->sockdata = INVALID_SOCKET;
}
if (session->fp)
{
pcap_close(session->fp);
session->fp = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
libpcap
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18350/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d683fb12566eaec180ee0e0506288f46cc7a43e7
|
d683fb12566eaec180ee0e0506288f46cc7a43e7
|
Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
|
DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithOwnerDocument(Document* owner_document) {
DCHECK(!owner_document_);
owner_document_ = owner_document;
return *this;
}
|
DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithOwnerDocument(Document* owner_document) {
DCHECK(!owner_document_);
owner_document_ = owner_document;
return *this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1559
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1559/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e
|
e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e
| null |
static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
if (cmp > 0) {
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
return 1; /* this record in new */
}
shift = -cmp;
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
return 0; /* record previously received */
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
return 1;
}
|
static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
if (cmp > 0) {
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
return 1; /* this record in new */
}
shift = -cmp;
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
return 0; /* record previously received */
memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void Textfield::SetColor(SkColor value) {
GetRenderText()->SetColor(value);
cursor_view_.layer()->SetColor(value);
SchedulePaint();
}
|
void Textfield::SetColor(SkColor value) {
GetRenderText()->SetColor(value);
cursor_view_.layer()->SetColor(value);
SchedulePaint();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
ShellContentBrowserClient::CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
BrowserContext* content_browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
bool in_memory,
ProtocolHandlerMap* protocol_handlers,
URLRequestInterceptorScopedVector request_interceptors) {
ShellBrowserContext* shell_browser_context =
ShellBrowserContextForBrowserContext(content_browser_context);
return shell_browser_context->CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
partition_path,
in_memory,
protocol_handlers,
request_interceptors.Pass());
}
|
ShellContentBrowserClient::CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
BrowserContext* content_browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
bool in_memory,
ProtocolHandlerMap* protocol_handlers,
URLRequestInterceptorScopedVector request_interceptors) {
ShellBrowserContext* shell_browser_context =
ShellBrowserContextForBrowserContext(content_browser_context);
return shell_browser_context->CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
partition_path,
in_memory,
protocol_handlers,
request_interceptors.Pass());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
_gids_dup(gids_t *g)
{
int buf_size;
gids_t *n = xmalloc(sizeof(gids_t));
n->ngids = g->ngids;
buf_size = g->ngids * sizeof(gid_t);
n->gids = xmalloc(buf_size);
memcpy(n->gids, g->gids, buf_size);
return n;
}
|
_gids_dup(gids_t *g)
{
int buf_size;
gids_t *n = xmalloc(sizeof(gids_t));
n->ngids = g->ngids;
buf_size = g->ngids * sizeof(gid_t);
n->gids = xmalloc(buf_size);
memcpy(n->gids, g->gids, buf_size);
return n;
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8633
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8633/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <[email protected]>
|
static inline void fwnet_make_uf_hdr(struct rfc2734_header *hdr,
unsigned ether_type)
{
hdr->w0 = fwnet_set_hdr_lf(RFC2374_HDR_UNFRAG)
| fwnet_set_hdr_ether_type(ether_type);
}
|
static inline void fwnet_make_uf_hdr(struct rfc2734_header *hdr,
unsigned ether_type)
{
hdr->w0 = fwnet_set_hdr_lf(RFC2374_HDR_UNFRAG)
| fwnet_set_hdr_ether_type(ether_type);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
const KURL& FrameFetchContext::Url() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->url;
if (!document_)
return NullURL();
return document_->Url();
}
|
const KURL& FrameFetchContext::Url() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->url;
if (!document_)
return NullURL();
return document_->Url();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5768
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5768/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62?w=1
|
5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62?w=1
|
Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
|
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
rescaled_large_exists() const {
return rescaled_large_exists_;
}
|
rescaled_large_exists() const {
return rescaled_large_exists_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1640/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
void ExtensionInstallDialogView::InitView() {
int left_column_width =
(prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions() || prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount() > 0)
? kPermissionsLeftColumnWidth
: kNoPermissionsLeftColumnWidth;
if (is_external_install())
left_column_width = kExternalInstallLeftColumnWidth;
int column_set_id = 0;
views::GridLayout* layout = CreateLayout(left_column_width, column_set_id);
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::View* rating = new views::View();
rating->SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, 0, 0, 0));
layout->AddView(rating);
prompt_->AppendRatingStars(AddResourceIcon, rating);
const gfx::FontList& small_font_list =
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::SmallFont);
views::Label* rating_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRatingCount(), small_font_list);
rating_count->SetBorder(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(0, 2, 0, 0));
rating->AddChildView(rating_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* user_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetUserCount(), small_font_list);
user_count->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
user_count->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorGRAY);
layout->AddView(user_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Link* store_link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_STORE_LINK));
store_link->SetFontList(small_font_list);
store_link->set_listener(this);
layout->AddView(store_link);
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
layout->AddView(new views::Separator(views::Separator::HORIZONTAL),
3,
1,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL);
}
}
int content_width = left_column_width + views::kPanelHorizMargin + kIconSize;
CustomScrollableView* scrollable = new CustomScrollableView();
views::GridLayout* scroll_layout = new views::GridLayout(scrollable);
scrollable->SetLayoutManager(scroll_layout);
views::ColumnSet* scrollable_column_set =
scroll_layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
int scrollable_width = prompt_->has_webstore_data() ? content_width
: left_column_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING,
views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
scrollable_width,
scrollable_width);
int padding_width =
content_width + views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew - scrollable_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, padding_width);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
scroll_view_ = new views::ScrollView();
scroll_view_->set_hide_horizontal_scrollbar(true);
scroll_view_->SetContents(scrollable);
layout->AddView(scroll_view_, 4, 1);
if (is_bundle_install()) {
BundleInstaller::ItemList items = prompt_->bundle()->GetItemsWithState(
BundleInstaller::Item::STATE_PENDING);
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
for (const BundleInstaller::Item& item : items) {
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* extension_label =
new views::Label(item.GetNameForDisplay());
extension_label->SetMultiLine(true);
extension_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
extension_label->SizeToFit(
scrollable_width - kSmallIconSize - kSmallIconPadding);
gfx::ImageSkia image = gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(item.icon);
scroll_layout->AddView(new IconedView(extension_label, image));
}
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
}
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
bool has_permissions =
prompt_->GetPermissionCount(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::ALL_PERMISSIONS) > 0;
if (has_permissions) {
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::REGULAR_PERMISSIONS);
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS);
} else {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permission_label = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_NO_SPECIAL_PERMISSIONS));
permission_label->SetMultiLine(true);
permission_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permission_label->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(permission_label);
}
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_files_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedFilesHeading());
retained_files_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_files_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_files_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_files_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedFile(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_devices_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedDevicesHeading());
retained_devices_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_devices_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_devices_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_devices_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceMessageString(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
DCHECK_GE(prompt_->type(), 0);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallPrompt.Type",
prompt_->type(),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::NUM_PROMPT_TYPES);
scroll_view_->ClipHeightTo(
0,
std::min(kScrollViewMaxHeight, scrollable->GetPreferredSize().height()));
dialog_size_ = gfx::Size(
content_width + 2 * views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew,
container_->GetPreferredSize().height());
std::string event_name = ExperienceSamplingEvent::kExtensionInstallDialog;
event_name.append(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptTypeToString(prompt_->type()));
sampling_event_ = ExperienceSamplingEvent::Create(event_name);
}
|
void ExtensionInstallDialogView::InitView() {
int left_column_width =
(prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions() || prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount() > 0)
? kPermissionsLeftColumnWidth
: kNoPermissionsLeftColumnWidth;
if (is_external_install())
left_column_width = kExternalInstallLeftColumnWidth;
int column_set_id = 0;
views::GridLayout* layout = CreateLayout(left_column_width, column_set_id);
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::View* rating = new views::View();
rating->SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, 0, 0, 0));
layout->AddView(rating);
prompt_->AppendRatingStars(AddResourceIcon, rating);
const gfx::FontList& small_font_list =
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::SmallFont);
views::Label* rating_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRatingCount(), small_font_list);
rating_count->SetBorder(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(0, 2, 0, 0));
rating->AddChildView(rating_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* user_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetUserCount(), small_font_list);
user_count->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
user_count->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorGRAY);
layout->AddView(user_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Link* store_link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_STORE_LINK));
store_link->SetFontList(small_font_list);
store_link->set_listener(this);
layout->AddView(store_link);
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
layout->AddView(new views::Separator(views::Separator::HORIZONTAL),
3,
1,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL);
}
}
int content_width = left_column_width + views::kPanelHorizMargin + kIconSize;
CustomScrollableView* scrollable = new CustomScrollableView();
views::GridLayout* scroll_layout = new views::GridLayout(scrollable);
scrollable->SetLayoutManager(scroll_layout);
views::ColumnSet* scrollable_column_set =
scroll_layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
int scrollable_width = prompt_->has_webstore_data() ? content_width
: left_column_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING,
views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
scrollable_width,
scrollable_width);
int padding_width =
content_width + views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew - scrollable_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, padding_width);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
scroll_view_ = new views::ScrollView();
scroll_view_->set_hide_horizontal_scrollbar(true);
scroll_view_->SetContents(scrollable);
layout->AddView(scroll_view_, 4, 1);
if (is_bundle_install()) {
BundleInstaller::ItemList items = prompt_->bundle()->GetItemsWithState(
BundleInstaller::Item::STATE_PENDING);
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
for (const BundleInstaller::Item& item : items) {
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* extension_label =
new views::Label(item.GetNameForDisplay());
extension_label->SetMultiLine(true);
extension_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
extension_label->SizeToFit(
scrollable_width - kSmallIconSize - kSmallIconPadding);
gfx::ImageSkia image = gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(item.icon);
scroll_layout->AddView(new IconedView(extension_label, image));
}
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
}
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
bool has_permissions =
prompt_->GetPermissionCount(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::ALL_PERMISSIONS) > 0;
if (has_permissions) {
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::REGULAR_PERMISSIONS);
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS);
} else {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permission_label = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_NO_SPECIAL_PERMISSIONS));
permission_label->SetMultiLine(true);
permission_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permission_label->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(permission_label);
}
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_files_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedFilesHeading());
retained_files_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_files_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_files_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_files_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedFile(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_devices_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedDevicesHeading());
retained_devices_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_devices_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_devices_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_devices_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceMessageString(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
DCHECK(prompt_->type() >= 0);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallPrompt.Type",
prompt_->type(),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::NUM_PROMPT_TYPES);
scroll_view_->ClipHeightTo(
0,
std::min(kScrollViewMaxHeight, scrollable->GetPreferredSize().height()));
dialog_size_ = gfx::Size(
content_width + 2 * views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew,
container_->GetPreferredSize().height());
std::string event_name = ExperienceSamplingEvent::kExtensionInstallDialog;
event_name.append(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptTypeToString(prompt_->type()));
sampling_event_ = ExperienceSamplingEvent::Create(event_name);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void GamepadProvider::OnDevicesChanged(base::SystemMonitor::DeviceType type) {
base::AutoLock lock(devices_changed_lock_);
devices_changed_ = true;
}
|
void GamepadProvider::OnDevicesChanged(base::SystemMonitor::DeviceType type) {
base::AutoLock lock(devices_changed_lock_);
devices_changed_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6624/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
explicit DialogHandler(v8::Handle<v8::Value> dialogArguments)
: m_dialogArguments(dialogArguments)
{
}
|
explicit DialogHandler(v8::Handle<v8::Value> dialogArguments)
: m_dialogArguments(dialogArguments)
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
base::string16 ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAppContainerSidForSandboxType(
int sandbox_type) const {
switch (sandbox_type) {
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_RENDERER:
return base::string16(install_static::GetSandboxSidPrefix()) +
L"129201922";
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY:
return base::string16();
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_GPU:
return base::string16();
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_PPAPI:
return base::string16(install_static::GetSandboxSidPrefix()) +
L"129201925";
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
case PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER:
return base::string16();
case PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER:
return base::string16();
#endif
}
CHECK(0);
return base::string16();
}
|
base::string16 ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAppContainerSidForSandboxType(
int sandbox_type) const {
switch (sandbox_type) {
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_RENDERER:
return base::string16(install_static::GetSandboxSidPrefix()) +
L"129201922";
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY:
return base::string16();
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_GPU:
return base::string16();
case service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_PPAPI:
return base::string16(install_static::GetSandboxSidPrefix()) +
L"129201925";
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
case PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER:
return base::string16();
case PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER:
return base::string16();
#endif
}
CHECK(0);
return base::string16();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5149/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac
|
503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac
|
Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AudioInputRendererHost::DoSendRecordingMessage(
media::AudioInputController* controller) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
}
|
void AudioInputRendererHost::DoSendRecordingMessage(
media::AudioInputController* controller) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2460
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2460/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/a30d7d90c4f718e46fb41a99b3d52800e1011b73
|
a30d7d90c4f718e46fb41a99b3d52800e1011b73
|
BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
|
virtual status_t setTransformHint(uint32_t hint) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeUint32(hint);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_TRANSFORM_HINT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
virtual status_t setTransformHint(uint32_t hint) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeUint32(hint);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_TRANSFORM_HINT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5035/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::ContinuePendingReload() {
if (pending_reload_ == ReloadType::NONE) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Reload(pending_reload_, false);
pending_reload_ = ReloadType::NONE;
}
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::ContinuePendingReload() {
if (pending_reload_ == ReloadType::NONE) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Reload(pending_reload_, false);
pending_reload_ = ReloadType::NONE;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
dissect_spoolss_doc_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 level;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(
tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_DOC_INFO, NULL, "Document info");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
dissect_spoolss_doc_info_data,
NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE, "Document info", -1);
return offset;
}
|
dissect_spoolss_doc_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 level;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(
tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_DOC_INFO, NULL, "Document info");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
dissect_spoolss_doc_info_data,
NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE, "Document info", -1);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowWorkerDatabase(
const GURL& url,
const string16& name,
const string16& display_name,
unsigned long estimated_size,
content::ResourceContext* context,
const std::vector<std::pair<int, int> >& render_views) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
CookieSettings* cookie_settings = io_data->GetCookieSettings();
bool allow = cookie_settings->IsSettingCookieAllowed(url, url);
std::vector<std::pair<int, int> >::const_iterator i;
for (i = render_views.begin(); i != render_views.end(); ++i) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&TabSpecificContentSettings::WebDatabaseAccessed,
i->first, i->second, url, name, display_name, !allow));
}
return allow;
}
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowWorkerDatabase(
const GURL& url,
const string16& name,
const string16& display_name,
unsigned long estimated_size,
content::ResourceContext* context,
const std::vector<std::pair<int, int> >& render_views) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
CookieSettings* cookie_settings = io_data->GetCookieSettings();
bool allow = cookie_settings->IsSettingCookieAllowed(url, url);
std::vector<std::pair<int, int> >::const_iterator i;
for (i = render_views.begin(); i != render_views.end(); ++i) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&TabSpecificContentSettings::WebDatabaseAccessed,
i->first, i->second, url, name, display_name, !allow));
}
return allow;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6130/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/532c34b5fbf1687df63b3fcd5b2846312ac943c6
|
532c34b5fbf1687df63b3fcd5b2846312ac943c6
|
s390/sclp_ctl: fix potential information leak with /dev/sclp
The sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb function uses two copy_from_user calls to
retrieve the sclp request from user space. The first copy_from_user
fetches the length of the request which is stored in the first two
bytes of the request. The second copy_from_user gets the complete
sclp request, but this copies the length field a second time.
A malicious user may have changed the length in the meantime.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
|
static long sclp_ctl_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp;
if (is_compat_task())
argp = compat_ptr(arg);
else
argp = (void __user *) arg;
switch (cmd) {
case SCLP_CTL_SCCB:
return sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb(argp);
default: /* unknown ioctl number */
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
|
static long sclp_ctl_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp;
if (is_compat_task())
argp = compat_ptr(arg);
else
argp = (void __user *) arg;
switch (cmd) {
case SCLP_CTL_SCCB:
return sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb(argp);
default: /* unknown ioctl number */
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2390
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2390/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void __init gather_bootmem_prealloc(void)
{
struct huge_bootmem_page *m;
list_for_each_entry(m, &huge_boot_pages, list) {
struct hstate *h = m->hstate;
struct page *page;
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
page = pfn_to_page(m->phys >> PAGE_SHIFT);
free_bootmem_late((unsigned long)m,
sizeof(struct huge_bootmem_page));
#else
page = virt_to_page(m);
#endif
__ClearPageReserved(page);
WARN_ON(page_count(page) != 1);
prep_compound_huge_page(page, h->order);
prep_new_huge_page(h, page, page_to_nid(page));
/*
* If we had gigantic hugepages allocated at boot time, we need
* to restore the 'stolen' pages to totalram_pages in order to
* fix confusing memory reports from free(1) and another
* side-effects, like CommitLimit going negative.
*/
if (h->order > (MAX_ORDER - 1))
totalram_pages += 1 << h->order;
}
}
|
static void __init gather_bootmem_prealloc(void)
{
struct huge_bootmem_page *m;
list_for_each_entry(m, &huge_boot_pages, list) {
struct hstate *h = m->hstate;
struct page *page;
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
page = pfn_to_page(m->phys >> PAGE_SHIFT);
free_bootmem_late((unsigned long)m,
sizeof(struct huge_bootmem_page));
#else
page = virt_to_page(m);
#endif
__ClearPageReserved(page);
WARN_ON(page_count(page) != 1);
prep_compound_huge_page(page, h->order);
prep_new_huge_page(h, page, page_to_nid(page));
/*
* If we had gigantic hugepages allocated at boot time, we need
* to restore the 'stolen' pages to totalram_pages in order to
* fix confusing memory reports from free(1) and another
* side-effects, like CommitLimit going negative.
*/
if (h->order > (MAX_ORDER - 1))
totalram_pages += 1 << h->order;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5770
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5770/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_new_check(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value ret = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(class_type, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
ret.handlers = &spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers;
return ret;
}
|
static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_new_check(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value ret = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(class_type, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
ret.handlers = &spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserCommandController::UpdatePrintingState() {
bool print_enabled = CanPrint(browser_);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PRINT, print_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ADVANCED_PRINT,
CanAdvancedPrint(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PRINT_TO_DESTINATION,
print_enabled);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HMODULE metro_module = base::win::GetMetroModule();
if (metro_module != NULL) {
typedef void (*MetroEnablePrinting)(BOOL);
MetroEnablePrinting metro_enable_printing =
reinterpret_cast<MetroEnablePrinting>(
::GetProcAddress(metro_module, "MetroEnablePrinting"));
if (metro_enable_printing)
metro_enable_printing(print_enabled);
}
#endif
}
|
void BrowserCommandController::UpdatePrintingState() {
bool print_enabled = CanPrint(browser_);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PRINT, print_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ADVANCED_PRINT,
CanAdvancedPrint(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PRINT_TO_DESTINATION,
print_enabled);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HMODULE metro_module = base::win::GetMetroModule();
if (metro_module != NULL) {
typedef void (*MetroEnablePrinting)(BOOL);
MetroEnablePrinting metro_enable_printing =
reinterpret_cast<MetroEnablePrinting>(
::GetProcAddress(metro_module, "MetroEnablePrinting"));
if (metro_enable_printing)
metro_enable_printing(print_enabled);
}
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7822/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int ubifs_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
if (ubifs_bulk_read(page))
return 0;
do_readpage(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
|
static int ubifs_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
if (ubifs_bulk_read(page))
return 0;
do_readpage(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TabContents* Browser::OpenApplication(
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer container,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
TabContents* tab = NULL;
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = profile->GetExtensionService()->extension_prefs();
prefs->SetActiveBit(extension->id(), true);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.AppLaunchContainer", container, 100);
switch (container) {
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_WINDOW:
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_PANEL:
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationWindow(profile, extension, container,
GURL(), NULL);
break;
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_TAB: {
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationTab(profile, extension, disposition);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return tab;
}
|
TabContents* Browser::OpenApplication(
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer container,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
TabContents* tab = NULL;
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = profile->GetExtensionService()->extension_prefs();
prefs->SetActiveBit(extension->id(), true);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.AppLaunchContainer", container, 100);
switch (container) {
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_WINDOW:
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_PANEL:
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationWindow(profile, extension, container,
GURL(), NULL);
break;
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_TAB: {
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationTab(profile, extension, disposition);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return tab;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6085/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
|
void BackendImpl::SyncEndEnumeration(
std::unique_ptr<Rankings::Iterator> iterator) {
iterator->Reset();
}
|
void BackendImpl::SyncEndEnumeration(
std::unique_ptr<Rankings::Iterator> iterator) {
iterator->Reset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
static void Update(scoped_refptr<ClipPaintPropertyNode> node,
static void Update(std::unique_ptr<ClipPaintPropertyNode>& node,
const ClipPaintPropertyNode& new_parent,
const FloatRoundedRect& new_clip_rect) {
node->Update(new_parent,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{nullptr, new_clip_rect});
}
|
static void Update(scoped_refptr<ClipPaintPropertyNode> node,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> new_parent,
const FloatRoundedRect& new_clip_rect) {
node->Update(std::move(new_parent),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{nullptr, new_clip_rect});
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
DisplayItemClient& client,
const TransformPaintPropertyNode& scroll_offset) {
display_item_list_.AllocateAndConstruct<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest, scroll_offset);
return *this;
}
|
TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset) {
display_item_list_.AllocateAndConstruct<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest, std::move(scroll_offset));
return *this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-11596
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11596/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
fix jsvGetString regression
|
bool jsvIsMemoryFull() {
return !jsVarFirstEmpty;
}
|
bool jsvIsMemoryFull() {
return !jsVarFirstEmpty;
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4650
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4650/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> [2.6.31+]
|
static int fuse_get_user_pages(struct fuse_req *req, const char __user *buf,
size_t *nbytesp, int write)
{
size_t nbytes = *nbytesp;
unsigned long user_addr = (unsigned long) buf;
unsigned offset = user_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
int npages;
/* Special case for kernel I/O: can copy directly into the buffer */
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)) {
if (write)
req->in.args[1].value = (void *) user_addr;
else
req->out.args[0].value = (void *) user_addr;
return 0;
}
nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ << PAGE_SHIFT);
npages = (nbytes + offset + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = clamp(npages, 1, FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ);
npages = get_user_pages_fast(user_addr, npages, !write, req->pages);
if (npages < 0)
return npages;
req->num_pages = npages;
req->page_offset = offset;
if (write)
req->in.argpages = 1;
else
req->out.argpages = 1;
nbytes = (req->num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) - req->page_offset;
*nbytesp = min(*nbytesp, nbytes);
return 0;
}
|
static int fuse_get_user_pages(struct fuse_req *req, const char __user *buf,
size_t *nbytesp, int write)
{
size_t nbytes = *nbytesp;
unsigned long user_addr = (unsigned long) buf;
unsigned offset = user_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
int npages;
/* Special case for kernel I/O: can copy directly into the buffer */
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)) {
if (write)
req->in.args[1].value = (void *) user_addr;
else
req->out.args[0].value = (void *) user_addr;
return 0;
}
nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ << PAGE_SHIFT);
npages = (nbytes + offset + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = clamp(npages, 1, FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ);
npages = get_user_pages_fast(user_addr, npages, !write, req->pages);
if (npages < 0)
return npages;
req->num_pages = npages;
req->page_offset = offset;
if (write)
req->in.argpages = 1;
else
req->out.argpages = 1;
nbytes = (req->num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) - req->page_offset;
*nbytesp = min(*nbytesp, nbytes);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(
int id, WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper())
return;
DCHECK(command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) << "Invalid/disabled command "
<< id;
if (block_command_execution_) {
DCHECK_EQ(last_blocked_command_id_, -1);
last_blocked_command_id_ = id;
last_blocked_command_disposition_ = disposition;
return;
}
switch (id) {
case IDC_BACK: GoBack(disposition); break;
case IDC_FORWARD: GoForward(disposition); break;
case IDC_RELOAD: Reload(disposition); break;
case IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE: ReloadIgnoringCache(disposition); break;
case IDC_HOME: Home(disposition); break;
case IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL: OpenCurrentURL(); break;
case IDC_STOP: Stop(); break;
case IDC_NEW_WINDOW: NewWindow(); break;
case IDC_NEW_INCOGNITO_WINDOW: NewIncognitoWindow(); break;
case IDC_CLOSE_WINDOW: CloseWindow(); break;
case IDC_NEW_TAB: NewTab(); break;
case IDC_CLOSE_TAB: CloseTab(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_NEXT_TAB: SelectNextTab(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_PREVIOUS_TAB: SelectPreviousTab(); break;
case IDC_TABPOSE: OpenTabpose(); break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_NEXT: MoveTabNext(); break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_PREVIOUS: MoveTabPrevious(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_0:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_1:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_2:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_3:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_4:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_5:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_6:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_7: SelectNumberedTab(id - IDC_SELECT_TAB_0);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_LAST_TAB: SelectLastTab(); break;
case IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB: DuplicateTab(); break;
case IDC_RESTORE_TAB: RestoreTab(); break;
case IDC_COPY_URL: WriteCurrentURLToClipboard(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB: ConvertPopupToTabbedBrowser(); break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN: ToggleFullscreenMode(); break;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
case IDC_PRESENTATION_MODE: TogglePresentationMode(); break;
#endif
case IDC_EXIT: Exit(); break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_VERTICAL_TABS: ToggleUseVerticalTabs(); break;
case IDC_COMPACT_NAVBAR: ToggleUseCompactNavigationBar(); break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_SEARCH: Search(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_KEYBOARD_OVERLAY: ShowKeyboardOverlay(); break;
#endif
case IDC_SAVE_PAGE: SavePage(); break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE: BookmarkCurrentPage(); break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS: BookmarkAllTabs(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_SOURCE: ViewSelectedSource(); break;
case IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION: EmailPageLocation(); break;
case IDC_PRINT: Print(); break;
case IDC_ADVANCED_PRINT: AdvancedPrint(); break;
case IDC_ENCODING_AUTO_DETECT: ToggleEncodingAutoDetect(); break;
case IDC_ENCODING_UTF8:
case IDC_ENCODING_UTF16LE:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88591:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1252:
case IDC_ENCODING_GBK:
case IDC_ENCODING_GB18030:
case IDC_ENCODING_BIG5HKSCS:
case IDC_ENCODING_BIG5:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOREAN:
case IDC_ENCODING_SHIFTJIS:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO2022JP:
case IDC_ENCODING_EUCJP:
case IDC_ENCODING_THAI:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885915:
case IDC_ENCODING_MACINTOSH:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88592:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1250:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88595:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1251:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOI8R:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOI8U:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88597:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1253:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88594:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885913:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1257:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88593:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885910:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885914:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885916:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1254:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88596:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1256:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88598:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88598I:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1255:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1258: OverrideEncoding(id); break;
case IDC_CUT: Cut(); break;
case IDC_COPY: Copy(); break;
case IDC_PASTE: Paste(); break;
case IDC_FIND: Find(); break;
case IDC_FIND_NEXT: FindNext(); break;
case IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS: FindPrevious(); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_PLUS: Zoom(PageZoom::ZOOM_IN); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL: Zoom(PageZoom::RESET); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_MINUS: Zoom(PageZoom::ZOOM_OUT); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR: FocusToolbar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION: FocusLocationBar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH: FocusSearch(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR: FocusAppMenu(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS: FocusBookmarksToolbar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_CHROMEOS_STATUS: FocusChromeOSStatus(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE: FocusNextPane(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE: FocusPreviousPane(); break;
case IDC_OPEN_FILE: OpenFile(); break;
case IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS: OpenCreateShortcutsDialog(); break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_NONE);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_SHOW_CONSOLE);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_INSPECT);
break;
case IDC_TASK_MANAGER: OpenTaskManager(false); break;
case IDC_VIEW_BACKGROUND_PAGES: OpenTaskManager(true); break;
case IDC_FEEDBACK: OpenBugReportDialog(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR: ToggleBookmarkBar(); break;
case IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED: Profiling::Toggle(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_MANAGER: OpenBookmarkManager(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU: ShowAppMenu(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_HISTORY: ShowHistoryTab(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_DOWNLOADS: ShowDownloadsTab(); break;
case IDC_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS: ShowExtensionsTab(); break;
case IDC_SYNC_BOOKMARKS: OpenSyncMyBookmarksDialog(); break;
case IDC_OPTIONS: OpenOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES: OpenSearchEngineOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS: OpenPasswordManager(); break;
case IDC_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA: OpenClearBrowsingDataDialog(); break;
case IDC_IMPORT_SETTINGS: OpenImportSettingsDialog(); break;
case IDC_ABOUT: OpenAboutChromeDialog(); break;
case IDC_UPGRADE_DIALOG: OpenUpdateChromeDialog(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_INCOMPATIBILITIES: ShowAboutConflictsTab(); break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE: ShowHelpTab(); break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_FILE_MANAGER: OpenFileManager(); break;
case IDC_SYSTEM_OPTIONS: OpenSystemOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_INTERNET_OPTIONS: OpenInternetOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_LANGUAGE_OPTIONS: OpenLanguageOptionsDialog(); break;
#endif
case IDC_SHOW_SYNC_SETUP: ShowSyncSetup(); break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_SPEECH_INPUT: ToggleSpeechInput(); break;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Received Unimplemented Command: " << id;
break;
}
}
|
void Browser::ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(
int id, WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper())
return;
DCHECK(command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) << "Invalid/disabled command "
<< id;
if (block_command_execution_) {
DCHECK_EQ(last_blocked_command_id_, -1);
last_blocked_command_id_ = id;
last_blocked_command_disposition_ = disposition;
return;
}
switch (id) {
case IDC_BACK: GoBack(disposition); break;
case IDC_FORWARD: GoForward(disposition); break;
case IDC_RELOAD: Reload(disposition); break;
case IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE: ReloadIgnoringCache(disposition); break;
case IDC_HOME: Home(disposition); break;
case IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL: OpenCurrentURL(); break;
case IDC_STOP: Stop(); break;
case IDC_NEW_WINDOW: NewWindow(); break;
case IDC_NEW_INCOGNITO_WINDOW: NewIncognitoWindow(); break;
case IDC_CLOSE_WINDOW: CloseWindow(); break;
case IDC_NEW_TAB: NewTab(); break;
case IDC_CLOSE_TAB: CloseTab(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_NEXT_TAB: SelectNextTab(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_PREVIOUS_TAB: SelectPreviousTab(); break;
case IDC_TABPOSE: OpenTabpose(); break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_NEXT: MoveTabNext(); break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_PREVIOUS: MoveTabPrevious(); break;
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_0:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_1:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_2:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_3:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_4:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_5:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_6:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_7: SelectNumberedTab(id - IDC_SELECT_TAB_0);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_LAST_TAB: SelectLastTab(); break;
case IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB: DuplicateTab(); break;
case IDC_RESTORE_TAB: RestoreTab(); break;
case IDC_COPY_URL: WriteCurrentURLToClipboard(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB: ConvertPopupToTabbedBrowser(); break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN: ToggleFullscreenMode(); break;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
case IDC_PRESENTATION_MODE: TogglePresentationMode(); break;
#endif
case IDC_EXIT: Exit(); break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_VERTICAL_TABS: ToggleUseVerticalTabs(); break;
case IDC_COMPACT_NAVBAR: ToggleUseCompactNavigationBar(); break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_SEARCH: Search(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_KEYBOARD_OVERLAY: ShowKeyboardOverlay(); break;
#endif
case IDC_SAVE_PAGE: SavePage(); break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE: BookmarkCurrentPage(); break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS: BookmarkAllTabs(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_SOURCE: ViewSelectedSource(); break;
case IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION: EmailPageLocation(); break;
case IDC_PRINT: Print(); break;
case IDC_ADVANCED_PRINT: AdvancedPrint(); break;
case IDC_ENCODING_AUTO_DETECT: ToggleEncodingAutoDetect(); break;
case IDC_ENCODING_UTF8:
case IDC_ENCODING_UTF16LE:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88591:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1252:
case IDC_ENCODING_GBK:
case IDC_ENCODING_GB18030:
case IDC_ENCODING_BIG5HKSCS:
case IDC_ENCODING_BIG5:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOREAN:
case IDC_ENCODING_SHIFTJIS:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO2022JP:
case IDC_ENCODING_EUCJP:
case IDC_ENCODING_THAI:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885915:
case IDC_ENCODING_MACINTOSH:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88592:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1250:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88595:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1251:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOI8R:
case IDC_ENCODING_KOI8U:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88597:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1253:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88594:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885913:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1257:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88593:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885910:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885914:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO885916:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1254:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88596:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1256:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88598:
case IDC_ENCODING_ISO88598I:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1255:
case IDC_ENCODING_WINDOWS1258: OverrideEncoding(id); break;
case IDC_CUT: Cut(); break;
case IDC_COPY: Copy(); break;
case IDC_PASTE: Paste(); break;
case IDC_FIND: Find(); break;
case IDC_FIND_NEXT: FindNext(); break;
case IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS: FindPrevious(); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_PLUS: Zoom(PageZoom::ZOOM_IN); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL: Zoom(PageZoom::RESET); break;
case IDC_ZOOM_MINUS: Zoom(PageZoom::ZOOM_OUT); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR: FocusToolbar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION: FocusLocationBar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH: FocusSearch(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR: FocusAppMenu(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS: FocusBookmarksToolbar(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_CHROMEOS_STATUS: FocusChromeOSStatus(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE: FocusNextPane(); break;
case IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE: FocusPreviousPane(); break;
case IDC_OPEN_FILE: OpenFile(); break;
case IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS: OpenCreateShortcutsDialog(); break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_NONE);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_SHOW_CONSOLE);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT: ToggleDevToolsWindow(
DEVTOOLS_TOGGLE_ACTION_INSPECT);
break;
case IDC_TASK_MANAGER: OpenTaskManager(false); break;
case IDC_VIEW_BACKGROUND_PAGES: OpenTaskManager(true); break;
case IDC_FEEDBACK: OpenBugReportDialog(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR: ToggleBookmarkBar(); break;
case IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED: Profiling::Toggle(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_MANAGER: OpenBookmarkManager(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU: ShowAppMenu(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_HISTORY: ShowHistoryTab(); break;
case IDC_SHOW_DOWNLOADS: ShowDownloadsTab(); break;
case IDC_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS: ShowExtensionsTab(); break;
case IDC_SYNC_BOOKMARKS: OpenSyncMyBookmarksDialog(); break;
case IDC_OPTIONS: OpenOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES: OpenSearchEngineOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS: OpenPasswordManager(); break;
case IDC_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA: OpenClearBrowsingDataDialog(); break;
case IDC_IMPORT_SETTINGS: OpenImportSettingsDialog(); break;
case IDC_ABOUT: OpenAboutChromeDialog(); break;
case IDC_UPGRADE_DIALOG: OpenUpdateChromeDialog(); break;
case IDC_VIEW_INCOMPATIBILITIES: ShowAboutConflictsTab(); break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE: ShowHelpTab(); break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_FILE_MANAGER: OpenFileManager(); break;
case IDC_SYSTEM_OPTIONS: OpenSystemOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_INTERNET_OPTIONS: OpenInternetOptionsDialog(); break;
case IDC_LANGUAGE_OPTIONS: OpenLanguageOptionsDialog(); break;
#endif
case IDC_SHOW_SYNC_SETUP: ShowSyncSetup(); break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_SPEECH_INPUT: ToggleSpeechInput(); break;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Received Unimplemented Command: " << id;
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6196
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6196/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
|
bsearch_2short(short e1, short *ent1, short e2, short *ent2, int base,
short *indexarray, int nent)
{
int n = nent;
int k = 0;
int e = e1 * base + e2;
while (n > 0) {
int nn = n / 2;
int idx = indexarray[k + nn];
int ne = ent1[idx] * base + ent2[idx];
if (ne == e) {
k += nn;
break;
}
else if (ne < e) {
n -= nn + 1;
k += nn + 1;
}
else {
n = nn;
}
}
return k;
}
|
bsearch_2short(short e1, short *ent1, short e2, short *ent2, int base,
short *indexarray, int nent)
{
int n = nent;
int k = 0;
int e = e1 * base + e2;
while (n > 0) {
int nn = n / 2;
int idx = indexarray[k + nn];
int ne = ent1[idx] * base + ent2[idx];
if (ne == e) {
k += nn;
break;
}
else if (ne < e) {
n -= nn + 1;
k += nn + 1;
}
else {
n = nn;
}
}
return k;
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2797
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2797/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/80742f2ffeb9e90cd85cbee27acb9f924ffebd16
|
80742f2ffeb9e90cd85cbee27acb9f924ffebd16
|
Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutofillManager::OnFormsSeen(const std::vector<FormData>& forms) {
bool enabled = IsAutofillEnabled();
if (!has_logged_autofill_enabled_) {
metric_logger_->LogIsAutofillEnabledAtPageLoad(enabled);
has_logged_autofill_enabled_ = true;
}
if (!enabled)
return;
ParseForms(forms);
}
|
void AutofillManager::OnFormsSeen(const std::vector<FormData>& forms) {
bool enabled = IsAutofillEnabled();
if (!has_logged_autofill_enabled_) {
metric_logger_->LogIsAutofillEnabledAtPageLoad(enabled);
has_logged_autofill_enabled_ = true;
}
if (!enabled)
return;
ParseForms(forms);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PostMessageEvent(int32_t source_routing_id,
const base::string16& source_origin,
const base::string16& target_origin,
blink::TransferableMessage message) {
message.EnsureDataIsOwned();
WebFrame* source_frame = nullptr;
if (source_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxy* source_proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(source_routing_id);
if (source_proxy)
source_frame = source_proxy->web_frame();
}
WebSecurityOrigin target_security_origin;
if (!target_origin.empty()) {
target_security_origin = WebSecurityOrigin::CreateFromString(
WebString::FromUTF16(target_origin));
}
WebDOMMessageEvent msg_event(std::move(message),
WebString::FromUTF16(source_origin),
source_frame, frame_->GetDocument());
frame_->DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(target_security_origin, msg_event,
message.has_user_gesture);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PostMessageEvent(int32_t source_routing_id,
const base::string16& source_origin,
const base::string16& target_origin,
blink::TransferableMessage message) {
message.EnsureDataIsOwned();
WebFrame* source_frame = nullptr;
if (source_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxy* source_proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(source_routing_id);
if (source_proxy)
source_frame = source_proxy->web_frame();
}
WebSecurityOrigin target_security_origin;
if (!target_origin.empty()) {
target_security_origin = WebSecurityOrigin::CreateFromString(
WebString::FromUTF16(target_origin));
}
WebDOMMessageEvent msg_event(std::move(message),
WebString::FromUTF16(source_origin),
source_frame, frame_->GetDocument());
frame_->DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(target_security_origin, msg_event,
message.has_user_gesture);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.