CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int bond_slave_override(struct bonding *bond,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i, res = 1;
struct slave *slave = NULL;
struct slave *check_slave;
if (!skb->queue_mapping)
return 1;
/* Find out if any slaves have the same mapping as this skb. */
bond_for_each_slave(bond, check_slave, i) {
if (check_slave->queue_id == skb->queue_mapping) {
slave = check_slave;
break;
}
}
/* If the slave isn't UP, use default transmit policy. */
if (slave && slave->queue_id && IS_UP(slave->dev) &&
(slave->link == BOND_LINK_UP)) {
res = bond_dev_queue_xmit(bond, skb, slave->dev);
}
return res;
}
|
static inline int bond_slave_override(struct bonding *bond,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i, res = 1;
struct slave *slave = NULL;
struct slave *check_slave;
if (!skb->queue_mapping)
return 1;
/* Find out if any slaves have the same mapping as this skb. */
bond_for_each_slave(bond, check_slave, i) {
if (check_slave->queue_id == skb->queue_mapping) {
slave = check_slave;
break;
}
}
/* If the slave isn't UP, use default transmit policy. */
if (slave && slave->queue_id && IS_UP(slave->dev) &&
(slave->link == BOND_LINK_UP)) {
res = bond_dev_queue_xmit(bond, skb, slave->dev);
}
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149
|
41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149
|
chromeos: Send 'keypress' for the content when composing a character with dead keys
This change leaves characters outside BMP unable to be typed on docs.google.com, but surely fixes the problem for most use cases.
BUG=132668
TEST=Create a document on docs.google.com and try typing a character with dead keys (e.g. type '^'+'a' with keyboard layout "English - US international")
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10565032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142705 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void InputMethodIBus::ProcessFilteredKeyPressEvent(
const base::NativeEvent& native_event) {
if (NeedInsertChar())
DispatchKeyEventPostIME(native_event);
else
DispatchFabricatedKeyEventPostIME(
ET_KEY_PRESSED,
VKEY_PROCESSKEY,
EventFlagsFromXFlags(GetKeyEvent(native_event)->state));
}
|
void InputMethodIBus::ProcessFilteredKeyPressEvent(
const base::NativeEvent& native_event) {
if (NeedInsertChar())
DispatchKeyEventPostIME(native_event);
else
DispatchFabricatedKeyEventPostIME(
ET_KEY_PRESSED,
VKEY_PROCESSKEY,
EventFlagsFromXFlags(GetKeyEvent(native_event)->state));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11592/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/8a44b04b584b3d3ab1cb68fed410f7ecb165e50e
|
8a44b04b584b3d3ab1cb68fed410f7ecb165e50e
|
Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
|
void jswrap_graphics_setFontSizeX(JsVar *parent, int size, bool checkValid) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
if (checkValid) {
if (size<1) size=1;
if (size>1023) size=1023;
}
if (gfx.data.fontSize == JSGRAPHICS_FONTSIZE_CUSTOM) {
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_BMP);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_WIDTH);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_HEIGHT);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_FIRSTCHAR);
}
gfx.data.fontSize = (short)size;
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
|
void jswrap_graphics_setFontSizeX(JsVar *parent, int size, bool checkValid) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
if (checkValid) {
if (size<1) size=1;
if (size>1023) size=1023;
}
if (gfx.data.fontSize == JSGRAPHICS_FONTSIZE_CUSTOM) {
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_BMP);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_WIDTH);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_HEIGHT);
jsvObjectRemoveChild(parent, JSGRAPHICS_CUSTOMFONT_FIRSTCHAR);
}
gfx.data.fontSize = (short)size;
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0393
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0393/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/6886e8e0a9db2dbad723dc37a548233e004b33bc
|
6886e8e0a9db2dbad723dc37a548233e004b33bc
|
vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
|
int vp8dx_references_buffer( VP8_COMMON *oci, int ref_frame )
{
const MODE_INFO *mi = oci->mi;
int mb_row, mb_col;
for (mb_row = 0; mb_row < oci->mb_rows; mb_row++)
{
for (mb_col = 0; mb_col < oci->mb_cols; mb_col++,mi++)
{
if( mi->mbmi.ref_frame == ref_frame)
return 1;
}
mi++;
}
return 0;
}
|
int vp8dx_references_buffer( VP8_COMMON *oci, int ref_frame )
{
const MODE_INFO *mi = oci->mi;
int mb_row, mb_col;
for (mb_row = 0; mb_row < oci->mb_rows; mb_row++)
{
for (mb_col = 0; mb_col < oci->mb_cols; mb_col++,mi++)
{
if( mi->mbmi.ref_frame == ref_frame)
return 1;
}
mi++;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8645/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i)
{
int timer_active;
unsigned long timer_expires;
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
__be32 dest = inet->inet_daddr;
__be32 src = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__u16 destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
__u16 srcp = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
int rx_queue;
int state;
if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_EARLY_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
timer_active = 1;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
timer_active = 4;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (timer_pending(&sk->sk_timer)) {
timer_active = 2;
timer_expires = sk->sk_timer.expires;
} else {
timer_active = 0;
timer_expires = jiffies;
}
state = sk_state_load(sk);
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
rx_queue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
else
/* Because we don't lock the socket,
* we might find a transient negative value.
*/
rx_queue = max_t(int, tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq, 0);
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX "
"%08X %5u %8d %lu %d %pK %lu %lu %u %u %d",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, state,
tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
rx_queue,
timer_active,
jiffies_delta_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
icsk->icsk_retransmits,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(f), sock_i_uid(sk)),
icsk->icsk_probes_out,
sock_i_ino(sk),
atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), sk,
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
tp->snd_cwnd,
state == TCP_LISTEN ?
fastopenq->max_qlen :
(tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh));
}
|
static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i)
{
int timer_active;
unsigned long timer_expires;
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
__be32 dest = inet->inet_daddr;
__be32 src = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__u16 destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
__u16 srcp = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
int rx_queue;
int state;
if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_EARLY_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
timer_active = 1;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
timer_active = 4;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (timer_pending(&sk->sk_timer)) {
timer_active = 2;
timer_expires = sk->sk_timer.expires;
} else {
timer_active = 0;
timer_expires = jiffies;
}
state = sk_state_load(sk);
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
rx_queue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
else
/* Because we don't lock the socket,
* we might find a transient negative value.
*/
rx_queue = max_t(int, tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq, 0);
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX "
"%08X %5u %8d %lu %d %pK %lu %lu %u %u %d",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, state,
tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
rx_queue,
timer_active,
jiffies_delta_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
icsk->icsk_retransmits,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(f), sock_i_uid(sk)),
icsk->icsk_probes_out,
sock_i_ino(sk),
atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), sk,
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
tp->snd_cwnd,
state == TCP_LISTEN ?
fastopenq->max_qlen :
(tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2fb4f2c9c461551d43fdfa28ef4c960da81a47dd
|
2fb4f2c9c461551d43fdfa28ef4c960da81a47dd
|
Gate support for certain EOTFs/primaries/matrices on color management / hdr flags
Creates a new class VideoColorSpace specifically for encoding color spaces
according to ISO/IEC 23001-8.
Plumb this color space through from parsing to validation.
BUG=687627
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#456518}
|
void MimeUtil::SplitCodecsToVector(const std::string& codecs,
std::vector<std::string>* codecs_out,
bool strip) {
*codecs_out =
base::SplitString(base::TrimString(codecs, "\"", base::TRIM_ALL), ",",
base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (codecs_out->size() == 1 && (*codecs_out)[0].empty())
codecs_out->clear();
if (!strip)
return;
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = codecs_out->begin();
it != codecs_out->end(); ++it) {
size_t found = it->find_first_of('.');
if (found != std::string::npos)
it->resize(found);
}
}
|
void MimeUtil::SplitCodecsToVector(const std::string& codecs,
std::vector<std::string>* codecs_out,
bool strip) {
*codecs_out =
base::SplitString(base::TrimString(codecs, "\"", base::TRIM_ALL), ",",
base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (codecs_out->size() == 1 && (*codecs_out)[0].empty())
codecs_out->clear();
if (!strip)
return;
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = codecs_out->begin();
it != codecs_out->end(); ++it) {
size_t found = it->find_first_of('.');
if (found != std::string::npos)
it->resize(found);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
void* Type_ProfileSequenceDesc_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsDupProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
void* Type_ProfileSequenceDesc_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsDupProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
fixed T36302429
|
size_t ZSTD_toFlushNow(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx)
{
#ifdef ZSTD_MULTITHREAD
if (cctx->appliedParams.nbWorkers > 0) {
return ZSTDMT_toFlushNow(cctx->mtctx);
}
#endif
(void)cctx;
return 0; /* over-simplification; could also check if context is currently running in streaming mode, and in which case, report how many bytes are left to be flushed within output buffer */
}
|
size_t ZSTD_toFlushNow(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx)
{
#ifdef ZSTD_MULTITHREAD
if (cctx->appliedParams.nbWorkers > 0) {
return ZSTDMT_toFlushNow(cctx->mtctx);
}
#endif
(void)cctx;
return 0; /* over-simplification; could also check if context is currently running in streaming mode, and in which case, report how many bytes are left to be flushed within output buffer */
}
|
C
|
zstd
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9425/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
|
2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
| null |
ZEND_API void zend_ts_hash_merge_ex(TsHashTable *target, TsHashTable *source, copy_ctor_func_t pCopyConstructor, merge_checker_func_t pMergeSource, void *pParam)
{
begin_read(source);
begin_write(target);
zend_hash_merge_ex(TS_HASH(target), TS_HASH(source), pCopyConstructor, pMergeSource, pParam);
end_write(target);
end_read(source);
}
|
ZEND_API void zend_ts_hash_merge_ex(TsHashTable *target, TsHashTable *source, copy_ctor_func_t pCopyConstructor, merge_checker_func_t pMergeSource, void *pParam)
{
begin_read(source);
begin_write(target);
zend_hash_merge_ex(TS_HASH(target), TS_HASH(source), pCopyConstructor, pMergeSource, pParam);
end_write(target);
end_read(source);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5094/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/0da8b8b801f9276359262f1ef8274c7812d3dfda?w=1
|
0da8b8b801f9276359262f1ef8274c7812d3dfda?w=1
|
Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
static inline void map_to_unicode(unsigned code, const enc_to_uni *table, unsigned *res)
{
/* only single byte encodings are currently supported; assumed code <= 0xFF */
*res = table->inner[ENT_ENC_TO_UNI_STAGE1(code)]->uni_cp[ENT_ENC_TO_UNI_STAGE2(code)];
}
|
static inline void map_to_unicode(unsigned code, const enc_to_uni *table, unsigned *res)
{
/* only single byte encodings are currently supported; assumed code <= 0xFF */
*res = table->inner[ENT_ENC_TO_UNI_STAGE1(code)]->uni_cp[ENT_ENC_TO_UNI_STAGE2(code)];
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::ImageSkia* ContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultFavicon() {
static gfx::ImageSkia* empty = new gfx::ImageSkia();
return empty;
}
|
gfx::ImageSkia* ContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultFavicon() {
static gfx::ImageSkia* empty = new gfx::ImageSkia();
return empty;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010251
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010251/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3590/commits/11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe
|
11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe
|
teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
|
DecodeThreadVars *DecodeThreadVarsAlloc(ThreadVars *tv)
{
DecodeThreadVars *dtv = NULL;
if ( (dtv = SCMalloc(sizeof(DecodeThreadVars))) == NULL)
return NULL;
memset(dtv, 0, sizeof(DecodeThreadVars));
dtv->app_tctx = AppLayerGetCtxThread(tv);
if (OutputFlowLogThreadInit(tv, NULL, &dtv->output_flow_thread_data) != TM_ECODE_OK) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_THREAD_INIT, "initializing flow log API for thread failed");
DecodeThreadVarsFree(tv, dtv);
return NULL;
}
/** set config defaults */
int vlanbool = 0;
if ((ConfGetBool("vlan.use-for-tracking", &vlanbool)) == 1 && vlanbool == 0) {
dtv->vlan_disabled = 1;
}
SCLogDebug("vlan tracking is %s", dtv->vlan_disabled == 0 ? "enabled" : "disabled");
return dtv;
}
|
DecodeThreadVars *DecodeThreadVarsAlloc(ThreadVars *tv)
{
DecodeThreadVars *dtv = NULL;
if ( (dtv = SCMalloc(sizeof(DecodeThreadVars))) == NULL)
return NULL;
memset(dtv, 0, sizeof(DecodeThreadVars));
dtv->app_tctx = AppLayerGetCtxThread(tv);
if (OutputFlowLogThreadInit(tv, NULL, &dtv->output_flow_thread_data) != TM_ECODE_OK) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_THREAD_INIT, "initializing flow log API for thread failed");
DecodeThreadVarsFree(tv, dtv);
return NULL;
}
/** set config defaults */
int vlanbool = 0;
if ((ConfGetBool("vlan.use-for-tracking", &vlanbool)) == 1 && vlanbool == 0) {
dtv->vlan_disabled = 1;
}
SCLogDebug("vlan tracking is %s", dtv->vlan_disabled == 0 ? "enabled" : "disabled");
return dtv;
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/603af455b5641671b18d7d7d166630341d71b63f
|
603af455b5641671b18d7d7d166630341d71b63f
|
Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TranslateInfoBarDelegate::TranslationDeclined() {
ui_delegate_.TranslationDeclined(false);
}
|
void TranslateInfoBarDelegate::TranslationDeclined() {
ui_delegate_.TranslationDeclined(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserActionsContainer::RefreshBrowserActionViews() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < browser_action_views_.size(); ++i)
browser_action_views_[i]->button()->UpdateState();
}
|
void BrowserActionsContainer::RefreshBrowserActionViews() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < browser_action_views_.size(); ++i)
browser_action_views_[i]->button()->UpdateState();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18339/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
[scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
|
bool RendererSchedulerImpl::PolicyNeedsUpdateForTesting() {
return policy_may_need_update_.IsSet();
}
|
bool RendererSchedulerImpl::PolicyNeedsUpdateForTesting() {
return policy_may_need_update_.IsSet();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::RestoreElementAndArrayBuffers(bool restore) {
if (restore) {
RestoreArrayBuffer(restore);
if (vertex_array_object_manager_->bound_element_array_buffer() == 0) {
helper_->BindBuffer(GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0);
}
}
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::RestoreElementAndArrayBuffers(bool restore) {
if (restore) {
RestoreArrayBuffer(restore);
if (vertex_array_object_manager_->bound_element_array_buffer() == 0) {
helper_->BindBuffer(GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2737
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2737/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/accountsservice/commit/?id=bd51aa4cdac380f55d607f4ffdf2ab3c00d08721
|
bd51aa4cdac380f55d607f4ffdf2ab3c00d08721
| null |
move_extra_data (const gchar *old_name,
const gchar *new_name)
{
gchar *old_filename;
gchar *new_filename;
old_filename = g_build_filename ("/var/lib/AccountsService/users",
old_name, NULL);
new_filename = g_build_filename ("/var/lib/AccountsService/users",
new_name, NULL);
g_rename (old_filename, new_filename);
g_free (old_filename);
g_free (new_filename);
}
|
move_extra_data (const gchar *old_name,
const gchar *new_name)
{
gchar *old_filename;
gchar *new_filename;
old_filename = g_build_filename ("/var/lib/AccountsService/users",
old_name, NULL);
new_filename = g_build_filename ("/var/lib/AccountsService/users",
new_name, NULL);
g_rename (old_filename, new_filename);
g_free (old_filename);
g_free (new_filename);
}
|
C
|
accountsservice
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6198/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
|
static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
{
int retval = 0;
const char *s = nd->name->name;
nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->depth = 0;
if (flags & LOOKUP_ROOT) {
struct dentry *root = nd->root.dentry;
struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(root))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
retval = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (retval)
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
nd->path = nd->root;
nd->inode = inode;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
}
return s;
}
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
nd->path.mnt = NULL;
nd->path.dentry = NULL;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
if (*s == '/') {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
rcu_read_lock();
set_root(nd);
if (likely(!nd_jump_root(nd)))
return s;
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
} else if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
unsigned seq;
rcu_read_lock();
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq);
nd->path = fs->pwd;
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq));
} else {
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
return s;
} else {
/* Caller must check execute permissions on the starting path component */
struct fd f = fdget_raw(nd->dfd);
struct dentry *dentry;
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(dentry)) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
}
}
nd->path = f.file->f_path;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
fdput(f);
return s;
}
}
|
static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
{
int retval = 0;
const char *s = nd->name->name;
nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->depth = 0;
if (flags & LOOKUP_ROOT) {
struct dentry *root = nd->root.dentry;
struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(root))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
retval = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (retval)
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
nd->path = nd->root;
nd->inode = inode;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
}
return s;
}
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
nd->path.mnt = NULL;
nd->path.dentry = NULL;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
if (*s == '/') {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
rcu_read_lock();
set_root(nd);
if (likely(!nd_jump_root(nd)))
return s;
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
} else if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
unsigned seq;
rcu_read_lock();
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq);
nd->path = fs->pwd;
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq));
} else {
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
return s;
} else {
/* Caller must check execute permissions on the starting path component */
struct fd f = fdget_raw(nd->dfd);
struct dentry *dentry;
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(dentry)) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
}
}
nd->path = f.file->f_path;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
fdput(f);
return s;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2880/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c19b042ea31bd393d2265656f94339d1c3d82ff
|
4c19b042ea31bd393d2265656f94339d1c3d82ff
|
Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void RunCallback() {
if (callback_) {
callback_->Run(error_code(), buffer_.get(), bytes_read_);
delete callback_;
}
}
|
virtual void RunCallback() {
if (callback_) {
callback_->Run(error_code(), buffer_.get(), bytes_read_);
delete callback_;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderFlexibleBox::updateAutoMarginsInMainAxis(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit autoMarginOffset)
{
ASSERT(autoMarginOffset >= 0);
if (isHorizontalFlow()) {
if (child->style()->marginLeft().isAuto())
child->setMarginLeft(autoMarginOffset);
if (child->style()->marginRight().isAuto())
child->setMarginRight(autoMarginOffset);
} else {
if (child->style()->marginTop().isAuto())
child->setMarginTop(autoMarginOffset);
if (child->style()->marginBottom().isAuto())
child->setMarginBottom(autoMarginOffset);
}
}
|
void RenderFlexibleBox::updateAutoMarginsInMainAxis(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit autoMarginOffset)
{
ASSERT(autoMarginOffset >= 0);
if (isHorizontalFlow()) {
if (child->style()->marginLeft().isAuto())
child->setMarginLeft(autoMarginOffset);
if (child->style()->marginRight().isAuto())
child->setMarginRight(autoMarginOffset);
} else {
if (child->style()->marginTop().isAuto())
child->setMarginTop(autoMarginOffset);
if (child->style()->marginBottom().isAuto())
child->setMarginBottom(autoMarginOffset);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1797c8188e7d42f0adf6ce0e607307cd313e1d7d
|
1797c8188e7d42f0adf6ce0e607307cd313e1d7d
|
Set the original URL for downloads
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49628
Reviewed by John Sullivan.
WebCore:
Export symbols needed by WebKit2.
* WebCore.exp.in:
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Downloads/DownloadManager.cpp:
(WebKit::DownloadManager::startDownload):
* WebProcess/Downloads/DownloadManager.h:
startDownload now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/Downloads/cf/DownloadCFNet.cpp:
(WebKit::Download::start):
start now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/Downloads/mac/DownloadMac.mm:
(WebKit::originatingURL):
(WebKit::setOriginalURLForDownload):
Port code over from WebKit1 that sets the download URL.
(WebKit::Download::start):
Call setOriginalURLForDownload.
* WebProcess/Downloads/qt/DownloadQt.cpp:
(WebKit::Download::start):
start now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebFrame.cpp:
(WebKit::WebFrame::startDownload):
Pass the web page to DownloadManager::startDownload.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@72145 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Download::platformInvalidate()
{
notImplemented();
}
|
void Download::platformInvalidate()
{
notImplemented();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
CheckScreenPrivate(ScreenPtr pScreen)
{
SetupScreen(pScreen);
if (!pPriv)
return;
if (!pPriv->attr && !pPriv->events &&
!pPriv->hasWindow && pPriv->installedMap == None) {
free(pPriv);
SetScreenPrivate(pScreen, NULL);
pScreen->screensaver.ExternalScreenSaver = NULL;
}
}
|
CheckScreenPrivate(ScreenPtr pScreen)
{
SetupScreen(pScreen);
if (!pPriv)
return;
if (!pPriv->attr && !pPriv->events &&
!pPriv->hasWindow && pPriv->installedMap == None) {
free(pPriv);
SetScreenPrivate(pScreen, NULL);
pScreen->screensaver.ExternalScreenSaver = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13049
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13049/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/aa0858100096a3490edf93034a80e66a4d61aad5
|
aa0858100096a3490edf93034a80e66a4d61aad5
|
CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
prot_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
const struct rx_header *rxh;
unsigned long i;
if (length < (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ptserver/ptint.xg. Check to see if it's a
* Ubik call, however.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pt"));
if (is_ubik(opcode)) {
ubik_reply_print(ndo, bp, length, opcode);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reply %s", tok2str(pt_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA)
switch (opcode) {
case 504: /* Name to ID */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ids:"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
INTOUT();
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 505: /* ID to name */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
/*
* Who designed this chicken-shit protocol?
*
* Each character is stored as a 32-bit
* integer!
*/
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
VECOUT(PRNAMEMAX);
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 508: /* Get CPS */
case 514: /* List elements */
case 517: /* List owned */
case 518: /* Get CPS2 */
case 519: /* Get host CPS */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
INTOUT();
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 510: /* List max */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxuid"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxgid"));
INTOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
else {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " errcode"));
INTOUT();
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|pt]"));
}
|
prot_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
const struct rx_header *rxh;
unsigned long i;
if (length < (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ptserver/ptint.xg. Check to see if it's a
* Ubik call, however.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pt"));
if (is_ubik(opcode)) {
ubik_reply_print(ndo, bp, length, opcode);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reply %s", tok2str(pt_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA)
switch (opcode) {
case 504: /* Name to ID */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ids:"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
INTOUT();
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 505: /* ID to name */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
/*
* Who designed this chicken-shit protocol?
*
* Each character is stored as a 32-bit
* integer!
*/
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
VECOUT(PRNAMEMAX);
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 508: /* Get CPS */
case 514: /* List elements */
case 517: /* List owned */
case 518: /* Get CPS2 */
case 519: /* Get host CPS */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
INTOUT();
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 510: /* List max */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxuid"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxgid"));
INTOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
else {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " errcode"));
INTOUT();
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|pt]"));
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_algo *algo;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
algo = nla_data(nla);
strcpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name);
memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
return 0;
}
|
static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_algo *algo;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
algo = nla_data(nla);
strcpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name);
memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9644/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit seqiv_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&seqiv_tmpl);
}
|
static void __exit seqiv_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&seqiv_tmpl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12993
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12993/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/b534e304568585707c4a92422aeca25cf908ff02
|
b534e304568585707c4a92422aeca25cf908ff02
|
CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
|
juniper_es_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ipsec_header {
uint8_t sa_index[2];
uint8_t ttl;
uint8_t type;
uint8_t spi[4];
uint8_t src_ip[4];
uint8_t dst_ip[4];
};
u_int rewrite_len,es_type_bundle;
const struct juniper_ipsec_header *ih;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ih = (const struct juniper_ipsec_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*ih);
switch (ih->type) {
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_ESP_AUTHEN_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_AH_AUTHEN_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 0;
es_type_bundle = 1;
break;
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_AH_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPTION_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 16;
es_type_bundle = 0;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES Invalid type %u, length %u",
ih->type,
l2info.length));
return l2info.header_len;
}
l2info.length-=rewrite_len;
p+=rewrite_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (!es_type_bundle) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), spi %u, Tunnel %s > %s, length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ih->spi),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->src_ip),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->dst_ip),
l2info.length));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
l2info.length));
}
}
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_services]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
|
juniper_es_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ipsec_header {
uint8_t sa_index[2];
uint8_t ttl;
uint8_t type;
uint8_t spi[4];
uint8_t src_ip[4];
uint8_t dst_ip[4];
};
u_int rewrite_len,es_type_bundle;
const struct juniper_ipsec_header *ih;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ih = (const struct juniper_ipsec_header *)p;
switch (ih->type) {
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_ESP_AUTHEN_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_AH_AUTHEN_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 0;
es_type_bundle = 1;
break;
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_AH_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPTION_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 16;
es_type_bundle = 0;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES Invalid type %u, length %u",
ih->type,
l2info.length));
return l2info.header_len;
}
l2info.length-=rewrite_len;
p+=rewrite_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (!es_type_bundle) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), spi %u, Tunnel %s > %s, length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ih->spi),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->src_ip),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->dst_ip),
l2info.length));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
l2info.length));
}
}
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void ConnectToWifiNetwork(ConnectionSecurity security,
const std::string& ssid,
const std::string& password,
const std::string& identity,
const std::string& certpath,
bool auto_connect) {
if (!EnsureCrosLoaded())
return;
ServiceInfo* service = GetWifiService(ssid.c_str(), security);
if (service) {
SetAutoConnect(service->service_path, auto_connect);
ConnectToNetworkWithCertInfo(service->service_path,
password.empty() ? NULL : password.c_str(),
identity.empty() ? NULL : identity.c_str(),
certpath.empty() ? NULL : certpath.c_str());
FreeServiceInfo(service);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot find hidden network: " << ssid;
}
}
|
virtual void ConnectToWifiNetwork(ConnectionSecurity security,
const std::string& ssid,
const std::string& password,
const std::string& identity,
const std::string& certpath,
bool auto_connect) {
if (!EnsureCrosLoaded())
return;
ServiceInfo* service = GetWifiService(ssid.c_str(), security);
if (service) {
SetAutoConnect(service->service_path, auto_connect);
ConnectToNetworkWithCertInfo(service->service_path,
password.empty() ? NULL : password.c_str(),
identity.empty() ? NULL : identity.c_str(),
certpath.empty() ? NULL : certpath.c_str());
FreeServiceInfo(service);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot find hidden network: " << ssid;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7916/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_projid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
}
|
static int proc_projid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void napi_reuse_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (unlikely(skb->pfmemalloc)) {
consume_skb(skb);
return;
}
__skb_pull(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
/* restore the reserve we had after netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() */
skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN - skb_headroom(skb));
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb->dev = napi->dev;
skb->skb_iif = 0;
skb->encapsulation = 0;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = 0;
skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(skb));
napi->skb = skb;
}
|
static void napi_reuse_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (unlikely(skb->pfmemalloc)) {
consume_skb(skb);
return;
}
__skb_pull(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
/* restore the reserve we had after netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() */
skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN - skb_headroom(skb));
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb->dev = napi->dev;
skb->skb_iif = 0;
skb->encapsulation = 0;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = 0;
skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(skb));
napi->skb = skb;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
nfs4_stat_to_errno(int stat)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; nfs_errtbl[i].stat != -1; i++) {
if (nfs_errtbl[i].stat == stat)
return nfs_errtbl[i].errno;
}
if (stat <= 10000 || stat > 10100) {
/* The server is looney tunes. */
return -EREMOTEIO;
}
/* If we cannot translate the error, the recovery routines should
* handle it.
* Note: remaining NFSv4 error codes have values > 10000, so should
* not conflict with native Linux error codes.
*/
return -stat;
}
|
nfs4_stat_to_errno(int stat)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; nfs_errtbl[i].stat != -1; i++) {
if (nfs_errtbl[i].stat == stat)
return nfs_errtbl[i].errno;
}
if (stat <= 10000 || stat > 10100) {
/* The server is looney tunes. */
return -EREMOTEIO;
}
/* If we cannot translate the error, the recovery routines should
* handle it.
* Note: remaining NFSv4 error codes have values > 10000, so should
* not conflict with native Linux error codes.
*/
return -stat;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
void LocalFrame::SetAdTrackerForTesting(AdTracker* ad_tracker) {
ad_tracker_->Shutdown();
ad_tracker_ = ad_tracker;
}
|
void LocalFrame::SetAdTrackerForTesting(AdTracker* ad_tracker) {
ad_tracker_->Shutdown();
ad_tracker_ = ad_tracker;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
void CameraSource::signalBufferReturned(MediaBuffer *buffer) {
ALOGV("signalBufferReturned: %p", buffer->data());
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
for (List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it = mFramesBeingEncoded.begin();
it != mFramesBeingEncoded.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->pointer() == buffer->data()) {
// b/28466701
adjustOutgoingANWBuffer(it->get());
releaseOneRecordingFrame((*it));
mFramesBeingEncoded.erase(it);
++mNumFramesEncoded;
buffer->setObserver(0);
buffer->release();
mFrameCompleteCondition.signal();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"signalBufferReturned: bogus buffer");
}
|
void CameraSource::signalBufferReturned(MediaBuffer *buffer) {
ALOGV("signalBufferReturned: %p", buffer->data());
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
for (List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it = mFramesBeingEncoded.begin();
it != mFramesBeingEncoded.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->pointer() == buffer->data()) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame((*it));
mFramesBeingEncoded.erase(it);
++mNumFramesEncoded;
buffer->setObserver(0);
buffer->release();
mFrameCompleteCondition.signal();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"signalBufferReturned: bogus buffer");
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2018-1065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1065/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static int __init ip6_tables_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_pernet_subsys(&ip6_tables_net_ops);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
/* No one else will be downing sem now, so we won't sleep */
ret = xt_register_targets(ip6t_builtin_tg, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_tg));
if (ret < 0)
goto err2;
ret = xt_register_matches(ip6t_builtin_mt, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_mt));
if (ret < 0)
goto err4;
/* Register setsockopt */
ret = nf_register_sockopt(&ip6t_sockopts);
if (ret < 0)
goto err5;
return 0;
err5:
xt_unregister_matches(ip6t_builtin_mt, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_mt));
err4:
xt_unregister_targets(ip6t_builtin_tg, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_tg));
err2:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ip6_tables_net_ops);
err1:
return ret;
}
|
static int __init ip6_tables_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_pernet_subsys(&ip6_tables_net_ops);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
/* No one else will be downing sem now, so we won't sleep */
ret = xt_register_targets(ip6t_builtin_tg, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_tg));
if (ret < 0)
goto err2;
ret = xt_register_matches(ip6t_builtin_mt, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_mt));
if (ret < 0)
goto err4;
/* Register setsockopt */
ret = nf_register_sockopt(&ip6t_sockopts);
if (ret < 0)
goto err5;
return 0;
err5:
xt_unregister_matches(ip6t_builtin_mt, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_mt));
err4:
xt_unregister_targets(ip6t_builtin_tg, ARRAY_SIZE(ip6t_builtin_tg));
err2:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ip6_tables_net_ops);
err1:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2843
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2843/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d304b5ec1b16766ea2cb552a27dc14df848d6a0e
|
d304b5ec1b16766ea2cb552a27dc14df848d6a0e
|
Don't forget the ffmpeg input buffer padding when allocating a codec's
extradata buffer.
BUG=82438
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7137002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine::TryToFinishPendingFlush() {
DCHECK(flush_pending_);
if (!pending_input_buffers_ && !pending_output_buffers_) {
flush_pending_ = false;
event_handler_->OnFlushComplete();
}
}
|
void FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine::TryToFinishPendingFlush() {
DCHECK(flush_pending_);
if (!pending_input_buffers_ && !pending_output_buffers_) {
flush_pending_ = false;
event_handler_->OnFlushComplete();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3418
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3418/
|
CWE-369
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
|
dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
| null |
ProcQueryBestSize(ClientPtr client)
{
xQueryBestSizeReply reply;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
int rc;
REQUEST(xQueryBestSizeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xQueryBestSizeReq);
if ((stuff->class != CursorShape) &&
(stuff->class != TileShape) && (stuff->class != StippleShape)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->class;
return BadValue;
}
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (stuff->class != CursorShape && pDraw->type == UNDRAWABLE_WINDOW)
return BadMatch;
pScreen = pDraw->pScreen;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREEN_ACCESS, client, pScreen, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
(*pScreen->QueryBestSize) (stuff->class, &stuff->width,
&stuff->height, pScreen);
reply = (xQueryBestSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.width = stuff->width,
.height = stuff->height
};
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xQueryBestSizeReply), &reply);
return Success;
}
|
ProcQueryBestSize(ClientPtr client)
{
xQueryBestSizeReply reply;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
int rc;
REQUEST(xQueryBestSizeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xQueryBestSizeReq);
if ((stuff->class != CursorShape) &&
(stuff->class != TileShape) && (stuff->class != StippleShape)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->class;
return BadValue;
}
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (stuff->class != CursorShape && pDraw->type == UNDRAWABLE_WINDOW)
return BadMatch;
pScreen = pDraw->pScreen;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREEN_ACCESS, client, pScreen, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
(*pScreen->QueryBestSize) (stuff->class, &stuff->width,
&stuff->height, pScreen);
reply = (xQueryBestSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.width = stuff->width,
.height = stuff->height
};
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xQueryBestSizeReply), &reply);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
void BasicFindMainFallbackResponseInDatabase() {
BasicFindMainFallbackResponse(true);
}
|
void BasicFindMainFallbackResponseInDatabase() {
BasicFindMainFallbackResponse(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::valueAccessorGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.value._get");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(info.Holder());
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
float value = imp.value(lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8::Number::New(value);
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::valueAccessorGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.value._get");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(info.Holder());
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
float value = imp.value(lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8::Number::New(value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5060/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/08cb718ba7c3961c1006176c9faba0a5841ec792
|
08cb718ba7c3961c1006176c9faba0a5841ec792
|
Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
|
base::string16 FormatViewSourceUrl(
const GURL& url,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
url::Parsed* new_parsed,
size_t* prefix_end,
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
DCHECK(new_parsed);
const char kViewSource[] = "view-source:";
const size_t kViewSourceLength = arraysize(kViewSource) - 1;
const std::string& url_str(url.possibly_invalid_spec());
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 result(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(kViewSource) +
FormatUrlWithAdjustments(GURL(url_str.substr(kViewSourceLength)),
format_types, unescape_rules, new_parsed,
prefix_end, adjustments));
for (base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments::iterator it = adjustments->begin();
it != adjustments->end(); ++it)
it->original_offset += kViewSourceLength;
if (new_parsed->scheme.is_nonempty()) {
new_parsed->scheme.len += kViewSourceLength;
} else {
new_parsed->scheme.begin = 0;
new_parsed->scheme.len = kViewSourceLength - 1;
}
AdjustAllComponentsButScheme(kViewSourceLength, new_parsed);
if (prefix_end)
*prefix_end += kViewSourceLength;
return result;
}
|
base::string16 FormatViewSourceUrl(
const GURL& url,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
url::Parsed* new_parsed,
size_t* prefix_end,
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
DCHECK(new_parsed);
const char kViewSource[] = "view-source:";
const size_t kViewSourceLength = arraysize(kViewSource) - 1;
const std::string& url_str(url.possibly_invalid_spec());
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 result(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(kViewSource) +
FormatUrlWithAdjustments(GURL(url_str.substr(kViewSourceLength)),
format_types, unescape_rules, new_parsed,
prefix_end, adjustments));
for (base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments::iterator it = adjustments->begin();
it != adjustments->end(); ++it)
it->original_offset += kViewSourceLength;
if (new_parsed->scheme.is_nonempty()) {
new_parsed->scheme.len += kViewSourceLength;
} else {
new_parsed->scheme.begin = 0;
new_parsed->scheme.len = kViewSourceLength - 1;
}
AdjustAllComponentsButScheme(kViewSourceLength, new_parsed);
if (prefix_end)
*prefix_end += kViewSourceLength;
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18355
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18355/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4e4fec21ebd26d2ef20ac9f1ca0d2a16329f22bd
|
4e4fec21ebd26d2ef20ac9f1ca0d2a16329f22bd
|
Block modifier-letter-voicing character from domain names
This character (ˬ) is easy to miss between other characters. It's one of the three characters from Spacing-Modifier-Letters block that ICU lists in its recommended set in uspoof.cpp. Two of these characters (modifier-letter-turned-comma and modifier-letter-apostrophe) are already blocked in crbug/678812.
Bug: 896717
Change-Id: I24b2b591de8cc7822cd55aa005b15676be91175e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303037
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604128}
|
base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot& DangerousPatternTLS() {
static base::NoDestructor<base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot>
dangerous_pattern_tls(&OnThreadTermination);
return *dangerous_pattern_tls;
}
|
base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot& DangerousPatternTLS() {
static base::NoDestructor<base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot>
dangerous_pattern_tls(&OnThreadTermination);
return *dangerous_pattern_tls;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2894
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2894/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9dc6161824d61e899c282cfe9aa40a4d3031974d
|
9dc6161824d61e899c282cfe9aa40a4d3031974d
|
[cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebUILoginView::OnLoginPromptVisible() {
if (should_emit_login_prompt_visible_) {
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetSessionManagerClient()->
EmitLoginPromptVisible();
}
OobeUI* oobe_ui = static_cast<OobeUI*>(GetWebUI()->GetController());
oobe_ui->OnLoginPromptVisible();
}
|
void WebUILoginView::OnLoginPromptVisible() {
if (should_emit_login_prompt_visible_) {
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetSessionManagerClient()->
EmitLoginPromptVisible();
}
OobeUI* oobe_ui = static_cast<OobeUI*>(GetWebUI()->GetController());
oobe_ui->OnLoginPromptVisible();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2017/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int napi_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &ptype_base[ntohs(type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK];
int err = -ENOENT;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count == 1) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 0;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || ptype->dev || !ptype->gro_complete)
continue;
err = ptype->gro_complete(skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (err) {
WARN_ON(&ptype->list == head);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
out:
return netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
|
static int napi_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &ptype_base[ntohs(type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK];
int err = -ENOENT;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count == 1) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 0;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || ptype->dev || !ptype->gro_complete)
continue;
err = ptype->gro_complete(skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (err) {
WARN_ON(&ptype->list == head);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
out:
return netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::updateClearButtonVisibility()
{
if (!m_clearButton)
return;
if (element()->isRequired() || !m_dateTimeEditElement->anyEditableFieldsHaveValues())
m_clearButton->setInlineStyleProperty(CSSPropertyVisibility, CSSValueHidden);
else
m_clearButton->removeInlineStyleProperty(CSSPropertyVisibility);
}
|
void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::updateClearButtonVisibility()
{
if (!m_clearButton)
return;
if (element()->isRequired() || !m_dateTimeEditElement->anyEditableFieldsHaveValues())
m_clearButton->setInlineStyleProperty(CSSPropertyVisibility, CSSValueHidden);
else
m_clearButton->removeInlineStyleProperty(CSSPropertyVisibility);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ThumbnailGenerator::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type.value) {
case NotificationType::RENDER_VIEW_HOST_CREATED_FOR_TAB: {
RenderViewHost* renderer = Details<RenderViewHost>(details).ptr();
renderer->set_painting_observer(this);
break;
}
case NotificationType::RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED:
if (*Details<bool>(details).ptr())
WidgetShown(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
else
WidgetHidden(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
break;
case NotificationType::RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED:
WidgetDestroyed(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
break;
case NotificationType::TAB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED:
TabContentsDisconnected(Source<TabContents>(source).ptr());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
|
void ThumbnailGenerator::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type.value) {
case NotificationType::RENDER_VIEW_HOST_CREATED_FOR_TAB: {
RenderViewHost* renderer = Details<RenderViewHost>(details).ptr();
renderer->set_painting_observer(this);
break;
}
case NotificationType::RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED:
if (*Details<bool>(details).ptr())
WidgetShown(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
else
WidgetHidden(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
break;
case NotificationType::RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED:
WidgetDestroyed(Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr());
break;
case NotificationType::TAB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED:
TabContentsDisconnected(Source<TabContents>(source).ptr());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
int vfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 0);
if (error)
return error;
if (!dir->i_op->unlink)
return -EPERM;
vfs_dq_init(dir);
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
if (!error)
error = dir->i_op->unlink(dir, dentry);
}
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
/* We don't d_delete() NFS sillyrenamed files--they still exist. */
if (!error && !(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED)) {
fsnotify_link_count(dentry->d_inode);
d_delete(dentry);
}
return error;
}
|
int vfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 0);
if (error)
return error;
if (!dir->i_op->unlink)
return -EPERM;
vfs_dq_init(dir);
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
if (!error)
error = dir->i_op->unlink(dir, dentry);
}
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
/* We don't d_delete() NFS sillyrenamed files--they still exist. */
if (!error && !(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED)) {
fsnotify_link_count(dentry->d_inode);
d_delete(dentry);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_strerror (int error_number)
{
#ifdef DBUS_WINCE
return "unknown";
#else
const char *msg;
switch (error_number)
{
case WSAEINTR:
return "Interrupted function call";
case WSAEACCES:
return "Permission denied";
case WSAEFAULT:
return "Bad address";
case WSAEINVAL:
return "Invalid argument";
case WSAEMFILE:
return "Too many open files";
case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
return "Resource temporarily unavailable";
case WSAEINPROGRESS:
return "Operation now in progress";
case WSAEALREADY:
return "Operation already in progress";
case WSAENOTSOCK:
return "Socket operation on nonsocket";
case WSAEDESTADDRREQ:
return "Destination address required";
case WSAEMSGSIZE:
return "Message too long";
case WSAEPROTOTYPE:
return "Protocol wrong type for socket";
case WSAENOPROTOOPT:
return "Bad protocol option";
case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT:
return "Protocol not supported";
case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT:
return "Socket type not supported";
case WSAEOPNOTSUPP:
return "Operation not supported";
case WSAEPFNOSUPPORT:
return "Protocol family not supported";
case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT:
return "Address family not supported by protocol family";
case WSAEADDRINUSE:
return "Address already in use";
case WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL:
return "Cannot assign requested address";
case WSAENETDOWN:
return "Network is down";
case WSAENETUNREACH:
return "Network is unreachable";
case WSAENETRESET:
return "Network dropped connection on reset";
case WSAECONNABORTED:
return "Software caused connection abort";
case WSAECONNRESET:
return "Connection reset by peer";
case WSAENOBUFS:
return "No buffer space available";
case WSAEISCONN:
return "Socket is already connected";
case WSAENOTCONN:
return "Socket is not connected";
case WSAESHUTDOWN:
return "Cannot send after socket shutdown";
case WSAETIMEDOUT:
return "Connection timed out";
case WSAECONNREFUSED:
return "Connection refused";
case WSAEHOSTDOWN:
return "Host is down";
case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
return "No route to host";
case WSAEPROCLIM:
return "Too many processes";
case WSAEDISCON:
return "Graceful shutdown in progress";
case WSATYPE_NOT_FOUND:
return "Class type not found";
case WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND:
return "Host not found";
case WSATRY_AGAIN:
return "Nonauthoritative host not found";
case WSANO_RECOVERY:
return "This is a nonrecoverable error";
case WSANO_DATA:
return "Valid name, no data record of requested type";
case WSA_INVALID_HANDLE:
return "Specified event object handle is invalid";
case WSA_INVALID_PARAMETER:
return "One or more parameters are invalid";
case WSA_IO_INCOMPLETE:
return "Overlapped I/O event object not in signaled state";
case WSA_IO_PENDING:
return "Overlapped operations will complete later";
case WSA_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY:
return "Insufficient memory available";
case WSA_OPERATION_ABORTED:
return "Overlapped operation aborted";
#ifdef WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE
case WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE:
return "Invalid procedure table from service provider";
#endif
#ifdef WSAINVALIDPROVIDER
case WSAINVALIDPROVIDER:
return "Invalid service provider version number";
#endif
#ifdef WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT
case WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT:
return "Unable to initialize a service provider";
#endif
case WSASYSCALLFAILURE:
return "System call failure";
}
msg = strerror (error_number);
if (msg == NULL)
msg = "unknown";
return msg;
#endif //DBUS_WINCE
}
|
_dbus_strerror (int error_number)
{
#ifdef DBUS_WINCE
return "unknown";
#else
const char *msg;
switch (error_number)
{
case WSAEINTR:
return "Interrupted function call";
case WSAEACCES:
return "Permission denied";
case WSAEFAULT:
return "Bad address";
case WSAEINVAL:
return "Invalid argument";
case WSAEMFILE:
return "Too many open files";
case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
return "Resource temporarily unavailable";
case WSAEINPROGRESS:
return "Operation now in progress";
case WSAEALREADY:
return "Operation already in progress";
case WSAENOTSOCK:
return "Socket operation on nonsocket";
case WSAEDESTADDRREQ:
return "Destination address required";
case WSAEMSGSIZE:
return "Message too long";
case WSAEPROTOTYPE:
return "Protocol wrong type for socket";
case WSAENOPROTOOPT:
return "Bad protocol option";
case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT:
return "Protocol not supported";
case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT:
return "Socket type not supported";
case WSAEOPNOTSUPP:
return "Operation not supported";
case WSAEPFNOSUPPORT:
return "Protocol family not supported";
case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT:
return "Address family not supported by protocol family";
case WSAEADDRINUSE:
return "Address already in use";
case WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL:
return "Cannot assign requested address";
case WSAENETDOWN:
return "Network is down";
case WSAENETUNREACH:
return "Network is unreachable";
case WSAENETRESET:
return "Network dropped connection on reset";
case WSAECONNABORTED:
return "Software caused connection abort";
case WSAECONNRESET:
return "Connection reset by peer";
case WSAENOBUFS:
return "No buffer space available";
case WSAEISCONN:
return "Socket is already connected";
case WSAENOTCONN:
return "Socket is not connected";
case WSAESHUTDOWN:
return "Cannot send after socket shutdown";
case WSAETIMEDOUT:
return "Connection timed out";
case WSAECONNREFUSED:
return "Connection refused";
case WSAEHOSTDOWN:
return "Host is down";
case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
return "No route to host";
case WSAEPROCLIM:
return "Too many processes";
case WSAEDISCON:
return "Graceful shutdown in progress";
case WSATYPE_NOT_FOUND:
return "Class type not found";
case WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND:
return "Host not found";
case WSATRY_AGAIN:
return "Nonauthoritative host not found";
case WSANO_RECOVERY:
return "This is a nonrecoverable error";
case WSANO_DATA:
return "Valid name, no data record of requested type";
case WSA_INVALID_HANDLE:
return "Specified event object handle is invalid";
case WSA_INVALID_PARAMETER:
return "One or more parameters are invalid";
case WSA_IO_INCOMPLETE:
return "Overlapped I/O event object not in signaled state";
case WSA_IO_PENDING:
return "Overlapped operations will complete later";
case WSA_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY:
return "Insufficient memory available";
case WSA_OPERATION_ABORTED:
return "Overlapped operation aborted";
#ifdef WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE
case WSAINVALIDPROCTABLE:
return "Invalid procedure table from service provider";
#endif
#ifdef WSAINVALIDPROVIDER
case WSAINVALIDPROVIDER:
return "Invalid service provider version number";
#endif
#ifdef WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT
case WSAPROVIDERFAILEDINIT:
return "Unable to initialize a service provider";
#endif
case WSASYSCALLFAILURE:
return "System call failure";
}
msg = strerror (error_number);
if (msg == NULL)
msg = "unknown";
return msg;
#endif //DBUS_WINCE
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1643
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1643/
|
CWE-361
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2386a6a49ea992a1e859eb0296c1cc53e5772cdb
|
2386a6a49ea992a1e859eb0296c1cc53e5772cdb
|
ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
|
unsigned ImageInputType::height() const
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLInputElement> element(this->element());
if (!element->layoutObject()) {
unsigned height;
if (parseHTMLNonNegativeInteger(element->fastGetAttribute(heightAttr), height))
return height;
HTMLImageLoader* imageLoader = element->imageLoader();
if (imageLoader && imageLoader->image())
return imageLoader->image()->imageSize(LayoutObject::shouldRespectImageOrientation(nullptr), 1).height();
}
element->document().updateLayout();
LayoutBox* box = element->layoutBox();
return box ? adjustForAbsoluteZoom(box->contentHeight(), box) : 0;
}
|
unsigned ImageInputType::height() const
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLInputElement> element(this->element());
if (!element->layoutObject()) {
unsigned height;
if (parseHTMLNonNegativeInteger(element->fastGetAttribute(heightAttr), height))
return height;
HTMLImageLoader* imageLoader = element->imageLoader();
if (imageLoader && imageLoader->image())
return imageLoader->image()->imageSize(LayoutObject::shouldRespectImageOrientation(nullptr), 1).height();
}
element->document().updateLayout();
LayoutBox* box = element->layoutBox();
return box ? adjustForAbsoluteZoom(box->contentHeight(), box) : 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10746/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
|
virConnectDomainXMLFromNative(virConnectPtr conn,
const char *nativeFormat,
const char *nativeConfig,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, format=%s, config=%s, flags=%x",
conn, NULLSTR(nativeFormat), NULLSTR(nativeConfig), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nativeFormat, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nativeConfig, error);
if (conn->driver->connectDomainXMLFromNative) {
char *ret;
ret = conn->driver->connectDomainXMLFromNative(conn,
nativeFormat,
nativeConfig,
flags);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return NULL;
}
|
virConnectDomainXMLFromNative(virConnectPtr conn,
const char *nativeFormat,
const char *nativeConfig,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, format=%s, config=%s, flags=%x",
conn, NULLSTR(nativeFormat), NULLSTR(nativeConfig), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nativeFormat, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nativeConfig, error);
if (conn->driver->connectDomainXMLFromNative) {
char *ret;
ret = conn->driver->connectDomainXMLFromNative(conn,
nativeFormat,
nativeConfig,
flags);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
libvirt
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
WebFrameLoadType FrameLoader::DetermineFrameLoadType(
const FrameLoadRequest& request) {
if (frame_->Tree().Parent() &&
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad())
return WebFrameLoadType::kInitialInChildFrame;
if (!frame_->Tree().Parent() && !Client()->BackForwardLength()) {
if (Opener() && request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
}
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kValidateCache)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache;
if (request.ReplacesCurrentItem() ||
(!state_machine_.CommittedMultipleRealLoads() &&
DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(frame_->GetDocument()->Url(), BlankURL())))
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url() == document_loader_->UrlForHistory()) {
if (request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod() == HTTPNames::POST)
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
if (!request.OriginDocument())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL() ==
document_loader_->UrlForHistory() &&
document_loader_->LoadType() == WebFrameLoadType::kReload)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty() &&
request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL().IsEmpty()) {
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.OriginDocument() &&
!request.OriginDocument()->CanCreateHistoryEntry())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
}
|
WebFrameLoadType FrameLoader::DetermineFrameLoadType(
const FrameLoadRequest& request) {
if (frame_->Tree().Parent() &&
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad())
return WebFrameLoadType::kInitialInChildFrame;
if (!frame_->Tree().Parent() && !Client()->BackForwardLength()) {
if (Opener() && request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
}
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kValidateCache)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache;
if (request.ReplacesCurrentItem() ||
(!state_machine_.CommittedMultipleRealLoads() &&
DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(frame_->GetDocument()->Url(), BlankURL())))
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url() == document_loader_->UrlForHistory()) {
if (request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod() == HTTPNames::POST)
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
if (!request.OriginDocument())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL() ==
document_loader_->UrlForHistory() &&
document_loader_->LoadType() == WebFrameLoadType::kReload)
return WebFrameLoadType::kReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty() &&
request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL().IsEmpty()) {
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.OriginDocument() &&
!request.OriginDocument()->CanCreateHistoryEntry())
return WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
return WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4113
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4113/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=7d163e8a0880ae8af2dd869071393e5dc07ef271
|
7d163e8a0880ae8af2dd869071393e5dc07ef271
| null |
static char *_xml_decode_tag(xml_parser *parser, const char *tag)
{
char *newstr;
int out_len;
newstr = xml_utf8_decode(tag, strlen(tag), &out_len, parser->target_encoding);
if (parser->case_folding) {
php_strtoupper(newstr, out_len);
}
return newstr;
}
|
static char *_xml_decode_tag(xml_parser *parser, const char *tag)
{
char *newstr;
int out_len;
newstr = xml_utf8_decode(tag, strlen(tag), &out_len, parser->target_encoding);
if (parser->case_folding) {
php_strtoupper(newstr, out_len);
}
return newstr;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10051/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/ecc03a2518c2b7dd375fde3a040fdae0bdf6a521
|
ecc03a2518c2b7dd375fde3a040fdae0bdf6a521
|
Prevent memory use after free
|
static MagickBooleanType IsPWP(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 5)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType IsPWP(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 5)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1674/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
[Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::GetState(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = GetIsolate();
if (args.Length() < 2 || !args[0]->IsNumber() || !args[1]->IsNumber())
ThrowInvalidArgumentsException(this);
int tree_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
int node_id = args[1]->Int32Value();
TreeCache* cache = GetTreeCacheFromTreeID(tree_id);
if (!cache)
return;
ui::AXNode* node = cache->tree.GetFromId(node_id);
if (!node)
return;
v8::Local<v8::Object> state(v8::Object::New(isolate));
uint32_t state_pos = 0, state_shifter = node->data().state;
while (state_shifter) {
if (state_shifter & 1) {
std::string key = ToString(static_cast<ui::AXState>(state_pos));
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, key), v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
state_shifter = state_shifter >> 1;
state_pos++;
}
TreeCache* top_cache = GetTreeCacheFromTreeID(0);
if (!top_cache)
top_cache = cache;
TreeCache* focused_cache = nullptr;
ui::AXNode* focused_node = nullptr;
if (GetFocusInternal(top_cache, &focused_cache, &focused_node)) {
if (focused_cache == cache && focused_node == node) {
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, "focused"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
}
if (cache->tree.data().focus_id == node->id()) {
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, "focused"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(state);
}
|
void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::GetState(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = GetIsolate();
if (args.Length() < 2 || !args[0]->IsNumber() || !args[1]->IsNumber())
ThrowInvalidArgumentsException(this);
int tree_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
int node_id = args[1]->Int32Value();
TreeCache* cache = GetTreeCacheFromTreeID(tree_id);
if (!cache)
return;
ui::AXNode* node = cache->tree.GetFromId(node_id);
if (!node)
return;
v8::Local<v8::Object> state(v8::Object::New(isolate));
uint32_t state_pos = 0, state_shifter = node->data().state;
while (state_shifter) {
if (state_shifter & 1) {
std::string key = ToString(static_cast<ui::AXState>(state_pos));
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, key), v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
state_shifter = state_shifter >> 1;
state_pos++;
}
TreeCache* top_cache = GetTreeCacheFromTreeID(0);
if (!top_cache)
top_cache = cache;
TreeCache* focused_cache = nullptr;
ui::AXNode* focused_node = nullptr;
if (GetFocusInternal(top_cache, &focused_cache, &focused_node)) {
if (focused_cache == cache && focused_node == node) {
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, "focused"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
}
if (cache->tree.data().focus_id == node->id()) {
state->Set(CreateV8String(isolate, "focused"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, true));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct operand *op)
{
if (op->type == OP_MM)
read_mmx_reg(ctxt, &op->mm_val, op->addr.mm);
}
|
static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct operand *op)
{
if (op->type == OP_MM)
read_mmx_reg(ctxt, &op->mm_val, op->addr.mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::SendFailedProvisionalLoad(
const blink::WebURLRequest& request,
const blink::WebURLError& error,
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
bool show_repost_interstitial =
(error.reason == net::ERR_CACHE_MISS &&
base::EqualsASCII(base::StringPiece16(request.httpMethod()), "POST"));
FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params params;
params.error_code = error.reason;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
render_view_.get(), frame, request, error, NULL,
¶ms.error_description);
params.url = error.unreachableURL;
params.showing_repost_interstitial = show_repost_interstitial;
params.was_ignored_by_handler = error.wasIgnoredByHandler;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(routing_id_, params));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::SendFailedProvisionalLoad(
const blink::WebURLRequest& request,
const blink::WebURLError& error,
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
bool show_repost_interstitial =
(error.reason == net::ERR_CACHE_MISS &&
base::EqualsASCII(base::StringPiece16(request.httpMethod()), "POST"));
FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params params;
params.error_code = error.reason;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
render_view_.get(), frame, request, error, NULL,
¶ms.error_description);
params.url = error.unreachableURL;
params.showing_repost_interstitial = show_repost_interstitial;
params.was_ignored_by_handler = error.wasIgnoredByHandler;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(routing_id_, params));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
SpoolssEnumPrinterData_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
guint32 value_len, type;
char *value;
proto_item *value_item;
proto_tree *value_subtree;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
value_subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_printerdata_value, &value_item, "Value");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_len, &value_len);
if (value_len) {
dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, drep, &value, hf_value_name);
offset += value_len * 2;
if (value && value[0])
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s", value);
proto_item_append_text(value_item, ": %s", value);
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_string(
tree, hf_printerdata_value, tvb, offset, 0, value);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
g_free(value);
}
proto_item_set_len(value_item, value_len * 2 + 4);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_needed, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_printerdata_type, &type);
offset = dissect_printerdata_data(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, type);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_data_needed, NULL);
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
SpoolssEnumPrinterData_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
guint32 value_len, type;
char *value;
proto_item *value_item;
proto_tree *value_subtree;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
value_subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_printerdata_value, &value_item, "Value");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_len, &value_len);
if (value_len) {
dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, drep, &value, hf_value_name);
offset += value_len * 2;
if (value && value[0])
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s", value);
proto_item_append_text(value_item, ": %s", value);
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_string(
tree, hf_printerdata_value, tvb, offset, 0, value);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
g_free(value);
}
proto_item_set_len(value_item, value_len * 2 + 4);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, value_subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_needed, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_printerdata_type, &type);
offset = dissect_printerdata_data(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, type);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_data_needed, NULL);
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
|
mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
{
if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
}
|
C
|
src
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int asepcos_get_default_key(sc_card_t *card,
struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
static const u8 asepcos_def_key[] = {0x41,0x53,0x45,0x43,0x41,0x52,0x44,0x2b};
if (data->method != SC_AC_CHV && data->method != SC_AC_AUT)
return SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY;
if (data->key_data == NULL || data->len < sizeof(asepcos_def_key))
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
memcpy(data->key_data, asepcos_def_key, sizeof(asepcos_def_key));
data->len = sizeof(asepcos_def_key);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
|
static int asepcos_get_default_key(sc_card_t *card,
struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
static const u8 asepcos_def_key[] = {0x41,0x53,0x45,0x43,0x41,0x52,0x44,0x2b};
if (data->method != SC_AC_CHV && data->method != SC_AC_AUT)
return SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY;
if (data->key_data == NULL || data->len < sizeof(asepcos_def_key))
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
memcpy(data->key_data, asepcos_def_key, sizeof(asepcos_def_key));
data->len = sizeof(asepcos_def_key);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2019-9003
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-9003/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8
|
77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8
|
ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ipmi_user *user)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf = user->intf;
int i;
unsigned long flags;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvr;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvrs = NULL;
if (!acquire_ipmi_user(user, &i)) {
/*
* The user has already been cleaned up, just make sure
* nothing is using it and return.
*/
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
return;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(user->self, NULL);
release_ipmi_user(user, i);
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
if (user->handler->shutdown)
user->handler->shutdown(user->handler_data);
if (user->handler->ipmi_watchdog_pretimeout)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
if (user->gets_events)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
/* Remove the user from the interface's sequence table. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
list_del_rcu(&user->link);
for (i = 0; i < IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ; i++) {
if (intf->seq_table[i].inuse
&& (intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg->user == user)) {
intf->seq_table[i].inuse = 0;
ipmi_free_recv_msg(intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
/*
* Remove the user from the command receiver's table. First
* we build a list of everything (not using the standard link,
* since other things may be using it till we do
* synchronize_srcu()) then free everything in that list.
*/
mutex_lock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(rcvr, &intf->cmd_rcvrs, link) {
if (rcvr->user == user) {
list_del_rcu(&rcvr->link);
rcvr->next = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
synchronize_rcu();
while (rcvrs) {
rcvr = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr->next;
kfree(rcvr);
}
kref_put(&intf->refcount, intf_free);
}
|
static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ipmi_user *user)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf = user->intf;
int i;
unsigned long flags;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvr;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvrs = NULL;
if (!acquire_ipmi_user(user, &i)) {
/*
* The user has already been cleaned up, just make sure
* nothing is using it and return.
*/
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
return;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(user->self, NULL);
release_ipmi_user(user, i);
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
if (user->handler->shutdown)
user->handler->shutdown(user->handler_data);
if (user->handler->ipmi_watchdog_pretimeout)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
if (user->gets_events)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
/* Remove the user from the interface's sequence table. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
list_del_rcu(&user->link);
for (i = 0; i < IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ; i++) {
if (intf->seq_table[i].inuse
&& (intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg->user == user)) {
intf->seq_table[i].inuse = 0;
ipmi_free_recv_msg(intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
/*
* Remove the user from the command receiver's table. First
* we build a list of everything (not using the standard link,
* since other things may be using it till we do
* synchronize_srcu()) then free everything in that list.
*/
mutex_lock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(rcvr, &intf->cmd_rcvrs, link) {
if (rcvr->user == user) {
list_del_rcu(&rcvr->link);
rcvr->next = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
synchronize_rcu();
while (rcvrs) {
rcvr = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr->next;
kfree(rcvr);
}
kref_put(&intf->refcount, intf_free);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
Scheduler/child/TimeSource could be replaced with base/time/DefaultTickClock.
They both are totally same and TimeSource is removed.
BUG=494892
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1163143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333035}
|
internal::TaskQueue* TaskQueueManager::Queue(size_t queue_index) const {
DCHECK_LT(queue_index, queues_.size());
return queues_[queue_index].get();
}
|
internal::TaskQueue* TaskQueueManager::Queue(size_t queue_index) const {
DCHECK_LT(queue_index, queues_.size());
return queues_[queue_index].get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void perWorldMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->perWorldMethod();
}
|
static void perWorldMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->perWorldMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserActionButton::OnMousePressed(const views::MouseEvent& e) {
showing_context_menu_ = e.IsRightMouseButton();
if (showing_context_menu_) {
SetButtonPushed();
gfx::Point point = gfx::Point(0, 0);
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &point);
point.Offset(0, height());
if (!context_menu_.get())
context_menu_.reset(new ExtensionActionContextMenu());
context_menu_->Run(extension(), point);
SetButtonNotPushed();
return false;
} else if (IsPopup()) {
return MenuButton::OnMousePressed(e);
}
return TextButton::OnMousePressed(e);
}
|
bool BrowserActionButton::OnMousePressed(const views::MouseEvent& e) {
showing_context_menu_ = e.IsRightMouseButton();
if (showing_context_menu_) {
SetButtonPushed();
gfx::Point point = gfx::Point(0, 0);
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &point);
point.Offset(0, height());
if (!context_menu_.get())
context_menu_.reset(new ExtensionActionContextMenu());
context_menu_->Run(extension(), point);
SetButtonNotPushed();
return false;
} else if (IsPopup()) {
return MenuButton::OnMousePressed(e);
}
return TextButton::OnMousePressed(e);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::FrameData::AppendRenderPass(
std::unique_ptr<RenderPass> render_pass) {
render_passes.push_back(std::move(render_pass));
}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::FrameData::AppendRenderPass(
std::unique_ptr<RenderPass> render_pass) {
render_passes.push_back(std::move(render_pass));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
|
08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
| null |
json_lex_string(JsonLexContext *lex)
{
char *s;
int len;
int hi_surrogate = -1;
if (lex->strval != NULL)
resetStringInfo(lex->strval);
Assert(lex->input_length > 0);
s = lex->token_start;
len = lex->token_start - lex->input;
for (;;)
{
s++;
len++;
/* Premature end of the string. */
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s == '"')
break;
else if ((unsigned char) *s < 32)
{
/* Per RFC4627, these characters MUST be escaped. */
/* Since *s isn't printable, exclude it from the context string */
lex->token_terminator = s;
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Character with value 0x%02x must be escaped.",
(unsigned char) *s),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
else if (*s == '\\')
{
/* OK, we have an escape character. */
s++;
len++;
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s == 'u')
{
int i;
int ch = 0;
for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++)
{
s++;
len++;
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - '0');
else if (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - 'a') + 10;
else if (*s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - 'A') + 10;
else
{
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("\"\\u\" must be followed by four hexadecimal digits."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
char utf8str[5];
int utf8len;
if (ch >= 0xd800 && ch <= 0xdbff)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode high surrogate must not follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
hi_surrogate = (ch & 0x3ff) << 10;
continue;
}
else if (ch >= 0xdc00 && ch <= 0xdfff)
{
if (hi_surrogate == -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
ch = 0x10000 + hi_surrogate + (ch & 0x3ff);
hi_surrogate = -1;
}
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
/*
* For UTF8, replace the escape sequence by the actual
* utf8 character in lex->strval. Do this also for other
* encodings if the escape designates an ASCII character,
* otherwise raise an error.
*/
if (ch == 0)
{
/* We can't allow this, since our TEXT type doesn't */
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNTRANSLATABLE_CHARACTER),
errmsg("unsupported Unicode escape sequence"),
errdetail("\\u0000 cannot be converted to text."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
else if (GetDatabaseEncoding() == PG_UTF8)
{
unicode_to_utf8(ch, (unsigned char *) utf8str);
utf8len = pg_utf_mblen((unsigned char *) utf8str);
appendBinaryStringInfo(lex->strval, utf8str, utf8len);
}
else if (ch <= 0x007f)
{
/*
* This is the only way to designate things like a
* form feed character in JSON, so it's useful in all
* encodings.
*/
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, (char) ch);
}
else
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNTRANSLATABLE_CHARACTER),
errmsg("unsupported Unicode escape sequence"),
errdetail("Unicode escape values cannot be used for code point values above 007F when the server encoding is not UTF8."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
}
else if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
switch (*s)
{
case '"':
case '\\':
case '/':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, *s);
break;
case 'b':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\b');
break;
case 'f':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\f');
break;
case 'n':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\n');
break;
case 'r':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\r');
break;
case 't':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\t');
break;
default:
/* Not a valid string escape, so error out. */
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Escape sequence \"\\%s\" is invalid.",
extract_mb_char(s)),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
else if (strchr("\"\\/bfnrt", *s) == NULL)
{
/*
* Simpler processing if we're not bothered about de-escaping
*
* It's very tempting to remove the strchr() call here and
* replace it with a switch statement, but testing so far has
* shown it's not a performance win.
*/
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Escape sequence \"\\%s\" is invalid.",
extract_mb_char(s)),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
else if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, *s);
}
}
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
/* Hooray, we found the end of the string! */
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
}
|
json_lex_string(JsonLexContext *lex)
{
char *s;
int len;
int hi_surrogate = -1;
if (lex->strval != NULL)
resetStringInfo(lex->strval);
Assert(lex->input_length > 0);
s = lex->token_start;
len = lex->token_start - lex->input;
for (;;)
{
s++;
len++;
/* Premature end of the string. */
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s == '"')
break;
else if ((unsigned char) *s < 32)
{
/* Per RFC4627, these characters MUST be escaped. */
/* Since *s isn't printable, exclude it from the context string */
lex->token_terminator = s;
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Character with value 0x%02x must be escaped.",
(unsigned char) *s),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
else if (*s == '\\')
{
/* OK, we have an escape character. */
s++;
len++;
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s == 'u')
{
int i;
int ch = 0;
for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++)
{
s++;
len++;
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_terminator = s;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - '0');
else if (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - 'a') + 10;
else if (*s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F')
ch = (ch * 16) + (*s - 'A') + 10;
else
{
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("\"\\u\" must be followed by four hexadecimal digits."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
char utf8str[5];
int utf8len;
if (ch >= 0xd800 && ch <= 0xdbff)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode high surrogate must not follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
hi_surrogate = (ch & 0x3ff) << 10;
continue;
}
else if (ch >= 0xdc00 && ch <= 0xdfff)
{
if (hi_surrogate == -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
ch = 0x10000 + hi_surrogate + (ch & 0x3ff);
hi_surrogate = -1;
}
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
/*
* For UTF8, replace the escape sequence by the actual
* utf8 character in lex->strval. Do this also for other
* encodings if the escape designates an ASCII character,
* otherwise raise an error.
*/
if (ch == 0)
{
/* We can't allow this, since our TEXT type doesn't */
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNTRANSLATABLE_CHARACTER),
errmsg("unsupported Unicode escape sequence"),
errdetail("\\u0000 cannot be converted to text."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
else if (GetDatabaseEncoding() == PG_UTF8)
{
unicode_to_utf8(ch, (unsigned char *) utf8str);
utf8len = pg_utf_mblen((unsigned char *) utf8str);
appendBinaryStringInfo(lex->strval, utf8str, utf8len);
}
else if (ch <= 0x007f)
{
/*
* This is the only way to designate things like a
* form feed character in JSON, so it's useful in all
* encodings.
*/
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, (char) ch);
}
else
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNTRANSLATABLE_CHARACTER),
errmsg("unsupported Unicode escape sequence"),
errdetail("Unicode escape values cannot be used for code point values above 007F when the server encoding is not UTF8."),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
}
else if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
switch (*s)
{
case '"':
case '\\':
case '/':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, *s);
break;
case 'b':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\b');
break;
case 'f':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\f');
break;
case 'n':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\n');
break;
case 'r':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\r');
break;
case 't':
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, '\t');
break;
default:
/* Not a valid string escape, so error out. */
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Escape sequence \"\\%s\" is invalid.",
extract_mb_char(s)),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
else if (strchr("\"\\/bfnrt", *s) == NULL)
{
/*
* Simpler processing if we're not bothered about de-escaping
*
* It's very tempting to remove the strchr() call here and
* replace it with a switch statement, but testing so far has
* shown it's not a performance win.
*/
lex->token_terminator = s + pg_mblen(s);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Escape sequence \"\\%s\" is invalid.",
extract_mb_char(s)),
report_json_context(lex)));
}
}
else if (lex->strval != NULL)
{
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
appendStringInfoChar(lex->strval, *s);
}
}
if (hi_surrogate != -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type json"),
errdetail("Unicode low surrogate must follow a high surrogate."),
report_json_context(lex)));
/* Hooray, we found the end of the string! */
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::HavePotentialSourceChild() {
HTMLSourceElement* current_source_node = current_source_node_;
Node* next_node = next_child_node_to_consider_;
KURL next_url = SelectNextSourceChild(nullptr, kDoNothing);
current_source_node_ = current_source_node;
next_child_node_to_consider_ = next_node;
return next_url.IsValid();
}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::HavePotentialSourceChild() {
HTMLSourceElement* current_source_node = current_source_node_;
Node* next_node = next_child_node_to_consider_;
KURL next_url = SelectNextSourceChild(nullptr, kDoNothing);
current_source_node_ = current_source_node;
next_child_node_to_consider_ = next_node;
return next_url.IsValid();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2672
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2672/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
int ath_cabq_update(struct ath_softc *sc)
{
struct ath9k_tx_queue_info qi;
struct ath_beacon_config *cur_conf = &sc->cur_beacon_conf;
int qnum = sc->beacon.cabq->axq_qnum;
ath9k_hw_get_txq_props(sc->sc_ah, qnum, &qi);
qi.tqi_readyTime = (cur_conf->beacon_interval *
ATH_CABQ_READY_TIME) / 100;
ath_txq_update(sc, qnum, &qi);
return 0;
}
|
int ath_cabq_update(struct ath_softc *sc)
{
struct ath9k_tx_queue_info qi;
struct ath_beacon_config *cur_conf = &sc->cur_beacon_conf;
int qnum = sc->beacon.cabq->axq_qnum;
ath9k_hw_get_txq_props(sc->sc_ah, qnum, &qi);
qi.tqi_readyTime = (cur_conf->beacon_interval *
ATH_CABQ_READY_TIME) / 100;
ath_txq_update(sc, qnum, &qi);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
[email protected]
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
ash::SessionStateDelegate* ShellDelegateImpl::CreateSessionStateDelegate() {
return new SessionStateDelegateImpl;
}
|
ash::SessionStateDelegate* ShellDelegateImpl::CreateSessionStateDelegate() {
return new SessionStateDelegateImpl;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateTargetBounds(
const State& state,
TargetBounds* target_bounds) {
const gfx::Rect& available_bounds(
status_->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow()->bounds());
gfx::Rect status_bounds(status_->GetWindowScreenBounds());
gfx::Size launcher_size = launcher_ ?
launcher_widget()->GetContentsView()->GetPreferredSize() : gfx::Size();
int shelf_size = 0;
int shelf_width = 0, shelf_height = 0;
GetShelfSize(&shelf_width, &shelf_height);
if (state.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
(state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN)) {
shelf_size = std::max(shelf_width, shelf_height);
} else if (state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN) {
shelf_size = kAutoHideSize;
}
if (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM) {
int y = available_bounds.bottom();
y -= shelf_size;
target_bounds->status_bounds = gfx::Rect(
base::i18n::IsRTL() ? available_bounds.x() :
available_bounds.right() - status_bounds.width(),
y + shelf_height - status_bounds.height(),
status_bounds.width(), status_bounds.height());
if (launcher_widget()) {
target_bounds->launcher_bounds = gfx::Rect(
available_bounds.x(),
y + (shelf_height - launcher_size.height()) / 2,
available_bounds.width(),
launcher_size.height());
}
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, 0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_height), 0);
} else {
int x = (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT) ?
available_bounds.x() + shelf_size - shelf_width :
available_bounds.right() - shelf_size;
target_bounds->status_bounds = gfx::Rect(
x, available_bounds.bottom() - status_bounds.height(),
shelf_width, status_bounds.height());
if (launcher_widget()) {
target_bounds->launcher_bounds = gfx::Rect(
x,
available_bounds.y(),
launcher_size.width(),
available_bounds.height());
}
if (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT) {
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_width), 0, 0);
} else {
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, 0, 0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_width));
}
}
target_bounds->opacity =
(state.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE) ? 1.0f : 0.0f;
}
|
void ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateTargetBounds(
const State& state,
TargetBounds* target_bounds) {
const gfx::Rect& available_bounds(
status_->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow()->bounds());
gfx::Rect status_bounds(status_->GetWindowScreenBounds());
gfx::Size launcher_size = launcher_ ?
launcher_widget()->GetContentsView()->GetPreferredSize() : gfx::Size();
int shelf_size = 0;
int shelf_width = 0, shelf_height = 0;
GetShelfSize(&shelf_width, &shelf_height);
if (state.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
(state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN)) {
shelf_size = std::max(shelf_width, shelf_height);
} else if (state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN) {
shelf_size = kAutoHideSize;
}
if (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM) {
int y = available_bounds.bottom();
y -= shelf_size;
target_bounds->status_bounds = gfx::Rect(
base::i18n::IsRTL() ? available_bounds.x() :
available_bounds.right() - status_bounds.width(),
y + shelf_height - status_bounds.height(),
status_bounds.width(), status_bounds.height());
if (launcher_widget()) {
target_bounds->launcher_bounds = gfx::Rect(
available_bounds.x(),
y + (shelf_height - launcher_size.height()) / 2,
available_bounds.width(),
launcher_size.height());
}
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, 0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_height), 0);
} else {
int x = (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT) ?
available_bounds.x() + shelf_size - shelf_width :
available_bounds.right() - shelf_size;
target_bounds->status_bounds = gfx::Rect(
x, available_bounds.bottom() - status_bounds.height(),
shelf_width, status_bounds.height());
if (launcher_widget()) {
target_bounds->launcher_bounds = gfx::Rect(
x,
available_bounds.y(),
launcher_size.width(),
available_bounds.height());
}
if (alignment_ == SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT) {
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_width), 0, 0);
} else {
target_bounds->work_area_insets.Set(
0, 0, 0, GetWorkAreaSize(state, shelf_width));
}
}
target_bounds->opacity =
(state.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
state.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE) ? 1.0f : 0.0f;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
Access ChromotingHost::clients_ only on network thread.
Previously ChromotingHost was doing some work on the main thread and
some on the network thread. |clients_| and some other members were
accessed without lock on both of these threads. Moved most of the
ChromotingHost activity to the network thread to avoid possible
race conditions.
BUG=96325
TEST=Chromoting works
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ScreenRecorderTest() {
}
|
ScreenRecorderTest() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2220/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/LawnGnome/php-radius/commit/13c149b051f82b709e8d7cc32111e84b49d57234
|
13c149b051f82b709e8d7cc32111e84b49d57234
|
Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
|
PHP_FUNCTION(radius_acct_open)
{
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
raddesc = emalloc(sizeof(radius_descriptor));
raddesc->radh = rad_acct_open();
if (raddesc->radh != NULL) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, raddesc, le_radius);
raddesc->id = Z_LVAL_P(return_value);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(radius_acct_open)
{
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
raddesc = emalloc(sizeof(radius_descriptor));
raddesc->radh = rad_acct_open();
if (raddesc->radh != NULL) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, raddesc, le_radius);
raddesc->id = Z_LVAL_P(return_value);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
|
C
|
php-radius
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6060/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd6a5115103b3e6a52ce15858c5ad4956df29300
|
fd6a5115103b3e6a52ce15858c5ad4956df29300
|
Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
|
bool AudioNode::DisconnectFromOutputIfConnected(unsigned output_index,
AudioParam& param) {
AudioNodeOutput& output = Handler().Output(output_index);
if (!output.IsConnectedToAudioParam(param.Handler()))
return false;
output.DisconnectAudioParam(param.Handler());
connected_params_[output_index]->erase(¶m);
return true;
}
|
bool AudioNode::DisconnectFromOutputIfConnected(unsigned output_index,
AudioParam& param) {
AudioNodeOutput& output = Handler().Output(output_index);
if (!output.IsConnectedToAudioParam(param.Handler()))
return false;
output.DisconnectAudioParam(param.Handler());
connected_params_[output_index]->erase(¶m);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::SetFocus(WebTestProxyBase* proxy, bool focus) {
ProxyToRenderViewVisitor visitor(proxy);
RenderView::ForEach(&visitor);
if (!visitor.render_view()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!BlinkTestRunner::Get(focused_view_))
focused_view_ = NULL;
if (focus) {
if (focused_view_ != visitor.render_view()) {
if (focused_view_)
SetFocusAndActivate(focused_view_, false);
SetFocusAndActivate(visitor.render_view(), true);
focused_view_ = visitor.render_view();
}
} else {
if (focused_view_ == visitor.render_view()) {
SetFocusAndActivate(visitor.render_view(), false);
focused_view_ = NULL;
}
}
}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::SetFocus(WebTestProxyBase* proxy, bool focus) {
ProxyToRenderViewVisitor visitor(proxy);
RenderView::ForEach(&visitor);
if (!visitor.render_view()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!BlinkTestRunner::Get(focused_view_))
focused_view_ = NULL;
if (focus) {
if (focused_view_ != visitor.render_view()) {
if (focused_view_)
SetFocusAndActivate(focused_view_, false);
SetFocusAndActivate(visitor.render_view(), true);
focused_view_ = visitor.render_view();
}
} else {
if (focused_view_ == visitor.render_view()) {
SetFocusAndActivate(visitor.render_view(), false);
focused_view_ = NULL;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
void __weak ftrace_replace_code(int enable)
{
struct dyn_ftrace *rec;
struct ftrace_page *pg;
int failed;
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return;
do_for_each_ftrace_rec(pg, rec) {
failed = __ftrace_replace_code(rec, enable);
if (failed) {
ftrace_bug(failed, rec->ip);
/* Stop processing */
return;
}
} while_for_each_ftrace_rec();
}
|
void __weak ftrace_replace_code(int enable)
{
struct dyn_ftrace *rec;
struct ftrace_page *pg;
int failed;
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return;
do_for_each_ftrace_rec(pg, rec) {
failed = __ftrace_replace_code(rec, enable);
if (failed) {
ftrace_bug(failed, rec->ip);
/* Stop processing */
return;
}
} while_for_each_ftrace_rec();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8130/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
TIFFFdOpen(int fd, const char* name, const char* mode)
{
TIFF* tif;
tif = TIFFClientOpen(name, mode, ddd
(thandle_t) fd,
_tiffReadProc, _tiffWriteProc, _tiffSeekProc, _tiffCloseProc,
_tiffSizeProc, _tiffMapProc, _tiffUnmapProc);
if (tif)
tif->tif_fd = fd;
return (tif);
}
|
TIFFFdOpen(int fd, const char* name, const char* mode)
{
TIFF* tif;
tif = TIFFClientOpen(name, mode, ddd
(thandle_t) fd,
_tiffReadProc, _tiffWriteProc, _tiffSeekProc, _tiffCloseProc,
_tiffSizeProc, _tiffMapProc, _tiffUnmapProc);
if (tif)
tif->tif_fd = fd;
return (tif);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b96dd532af164a73f2aac757bafff58211aca2c
|
6b96dd532af164a73f2aac757bafff58211aca2c
|
Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
|
bool WebContentsAndroid::IsLoading(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) const {
return web_contents_->IsLoading();
}
|
bool WebContentsAndroid::IsLoading(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) const {
return web_contents_->IsLoading();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-5344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5344/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static long loop_control_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long parm)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
int ret = -ENOSYS;
mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_CTL_ADD:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret >= 0) {
ret = -EEXIST;
break;
}
ret = loop_add(&lo, parm);
break;
case LOOP_CTL_REMOVE:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
case LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, -1);
if (ret >= 0)
break;
ret = loop_add(&lo, -1);
}
mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
static long loop_control_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long parm)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
int ret = -ENOSYS;
mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_CTL_ADD:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret >= 0) {
ret = -EEXIST;
break;
}
ret = loop_add(&lo, parm);
break;
case LOOP_CTL_REMOVE:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
case LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, -1);
if (ret >= 0)
break;
ret = loop_add(&lo, -1);
}
mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4130/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
|
53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
| null |
int red_channel_client_is_connected(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
if (!rcc->dummy) {
return rcc->stream != NULL;
} else {
return rcc->dummy_connected;
}
}
|
int red_channel_client_is_connected(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
if (!rcc->dummy) {
return rcc->stream != NULL;
} else {
return rcc->dummy_connected;
}
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static bool client_has_openowners(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_openowner *oo;
list_for_each_entry(oo, &clp->cl_openowners, oo_perclient) {
if (!list_empty(&oo->oo_owner.so_stateids))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool client_has_openowners(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_openowner *oo;
list_for_each_entry(oo, &clp->cl_openowners, oo_perclient) {
if (!list_empty(&oo->oo_owner.so_stateids))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_cbc_encrypt_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk), desc,
dst, src, nbytes);
}
|
static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_cbc_encrypt_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk), desc,
dst, src, nbytes);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static void nfs_file_clear_open_context(struct file *filp)
{
struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct nfs_open_context *ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
if (ctx) {
filp->private_data = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &NFS_I(inode)->open_files);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
put_nfs_open_context_sync(ctx);
}
}
|
static void nfs_file_clear_open_context(struct file *filp)
{
struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct nfs_open_context *ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
if (ctx) {
filp->private_data = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &NFS_I(inode)->open_files);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
put_nfs_open_context_sync(ctx);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0820
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0820/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/8a3a2f6ea7defe1a81bb32b3c9f3537f84749b9d
|
8a3a2f6ea7defe1a81bb32b3c9f3537f84749b9d
|
Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
if (size < 6) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
ALOGE("b/62133227");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "62133227");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size < 6) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
if (size < 6) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
ALOGE("b/62133227");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "62133227");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size < 6) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16939
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16939/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2
|
1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2
|
ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
static int attach_aead(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr *rta)
{
struct xfrm_algo_aead *p, *ualg;
struct xfrm_algo_desc *algo;
if (!rta)
return 0;
ualg = nla_data(rta);
algo = xfrm_aead_get_byname(ualg->alg_name, ualg->alg_icv_len, 1);
if (!algo)
return -ENOSYS;
x->props.ealgo = algo->desc.sadb_alg_id;
p = kmemdup(ualg, aead_len(ualg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
strcpy(p->alg_name, algo->name);
x->aead = p;
x->geniv = algo->uinfo.aead.geniv;
return 0;
}
|
static int attach_aead(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr *rta)
{
struct xfrm_algo_aead *p, *ualg;
struct xfrm_algo_desc *algo;
if (!rta)
return 0;
ualg = nla_data(rta);
algo = xfrm_aead_get_byname(ualg->alg_name, ualg->alg_icv_len, 1);
if (!algo)
return -ENOSYS;
x->props.ealgo = algo->desc.sadb_alg_id;
p = kmemdup(ualg, aead_len(ualg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
strcpy(p->alg_name, algo->name);
x->aead = p;
x->geniv = algo->uinfo.aead.geniv;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API void zend_update_property_null(zend_class_entry *scope, zval *object, const char *name, int name_length TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
ALLOC_ZVAL(tmp);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(tmp);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(tmp, 0);
ZVAL_LONG(tmp, value);
zend_update_property(scope, object, name, name_length, tmp TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API void zend_update_property_null(zend_class_entry *scope, zval *object, const char *name, int name_length TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
ALLOC_ZVAL(tmp);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(tmp);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(tmp, 0);
ZVAL_LONG(tmp, value);
zend_update_property(scope, object, name, name_length, tmp TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::UpdateNavigationHistory(
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params =
navigation_state->request_params();
current_history_item_ = item;
current_history_item_.SetTarget(
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(unique_name_helper_.value()));
bool is_new_navigation = commit_type == blink::kWebStandardCommit;
if (request_params.should_clear_history_list) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = 0;
render_view_->history_list_length_ = 1;
} else if (is_new_navigation) {
DCHECK(!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry ||
render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0);
if (!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_++;
if (render_view_->history_list_offset_ >= kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
render_view_->history_list_length_ =
render_view_->history_list_offset_ + 1;
}
} else if (request_params.nav_entry_id != 0 &&
!request_params.intended_as_new_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ =
navigation_state->request_params().pending_history_list_offset;
}
if (commit_type == blink::WebHistoryCommitType::kWebBackForwardCommit)
render_view_->DidCommitProvisionalHistoryLoad();
return is_new_navigation;
}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::UpdateNavigationHistory(
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params =
navigation_state->request_params();
current_history_item_ = item;
current_history_item_.SetTarget(
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(unique_name_helper_.value()));
bool is_new_navigation = commit_type == blink::kWebStandardCommit;
if (request_params.should_clear_history_list) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = 0;
render_view_->history_list_length_ = 1;
} else if (is_new_navigation) {
DCHECK(!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry ||
render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0);
if (!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_++;
if (render_view_->history_list_offset_ >= kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
render_view_->history_list_length_ =
render_view_->history_list_offset_ + 1;
}
} else if (request_params.nav_entry_id != 0 &&
!request_params.intended_as_new_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ =
navigation_state->request_params().pending_history_list_offset;
}
if (commit_type == blink::WebHistoryCommitType::kWebBackForwardCommit)
render_view_->DidCommitProvisionalHistoryLoad();
return is_new_navigation;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/866dc26ad4a98cc835d075b627326e7d7e52ffa1
|
866dc26ad4a98cc835d075b627326e7d7e52ffa1
|
Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
|
StringBuilder& StringBuilder::append(const StringPiece16& str) {
if (!mError.empty()) {
return *this;
}
const char16_t* const end = str.end();
const char16_t* start = str.begin();
const char16_t* current = start;
while (current != end) {
if (mLastCharWasEscape) {
switch (*current) {
case u't':
mStr += u'\t';
break;
case u'n':
mStr += u'\n';
break;
case u'#':
mStr += u'#';
break;
case u'@':
mStr += u'@';
break;
case u'?':
mStr += u'?';
break;
case u'"':
mStr += u'"';
break;
case u'\'':
mStr += u'\'';
break;
case u'\\':
mStr += u'\\';
break;
case u'u': {
current++;
Maybe<char16_t> c = parseUnicodeCodepoint(¤t, end);
if (!c) {
mError = "invalid unicode escape sequence";
return *this;
}
mStr += c.value();
current -= 1;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
mLastCharWasEscape = false;
start = current + 1;
} else if (*current == u'"') {
if (!mQuote && mTrailingSpace) {
if (mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
}
mQuote = !mQuote;
mStr.append(start, current - start);
start = current + 1;
} else if (*current == u'\'' && !mQuote) {
mError = "unescaped apostrophe";
return *this;
} else if (*current == u'\\') {
if (!mQuote && mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
mStr.append(start, current - start);
start = current + 1;
mLastCharWasEscape = true;
} else if (!mQuote) {
if (isspace16(*current)) {
if (!mTrailingSpace) {
mTrailingSpace = true;
mStr.append(start, current - start);
}
start = current + 1;
} else if (mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
}
current++;
}
mStr.append(start, end - start);
return *this;
}
|
StringBuilder& StringBuilder::append(const StringPiece16& str) {
if (!mError.empty()) {
return *this;
}
const char16_t* const end = str.end();
const char16_t* start = str.begin();
const char16_t* current = start;
while (current != end) {
if (mLastCharWasEscape) {
switch (*current) {
case u't':
mStr += u'\t';
break;
case u'n':
mStr += u'\n';
break;
case u'#':
mStr += u'#';
break;
case u'@':
mStr += u'@';
break;
case u'?':
mStr += u'?';
break;
case u'"':
mStr += u'"';
break;
case u'\'':
mStr += u'\'';
break;
case u'\\':
mStr += u'\\';
break;
case u'u': {
current++;
Maybe<char16_t> c = parseUnicodeCodepoint(¤t, end);
if (!c) {
mError = "invalid unicode escape sequence";
return *this;
}
mStr += c.value();
current -= 1;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
mLastCharWasEscape = false;
start = current + 1;
} else if (*current == u'"') {
if (!mQuote && mTrailingSpace) {
if (mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
}
mQuote = !mQuote;
mStr.append(start, current - start);
start = current + 1;
} else if (*current == u'\'' && !mQuote) {
mError = "unescaped apostrophe";
return *this;
} else if (*current == u'\\') {
if (!mQuote && mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
mStr.append(start, current - start);
start = current + 1;
mLastCharWasEscape = true;
} else if (!mQuote) {
if (isspace16(*current)) {
if (!mTrailingSpace) {
mTrailingSpace = true;
mStr.append(start, current - start);
}
start = current + 1;
} else if (mTrailingSpace) {
if (!mStr.empty()) {
mStr += u' ';
}
mTrailingSpace = false;
}
}
current++;
}
mStr.append(start, end - start);
return *this;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool doDeserialize()
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!m_reader.read(&value, *this))
return false;
if (!value.IsEmpty())
push(value);
return true;
}
|
bool doDeserialize()
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!m_reader.read(&value, *this))
return false;
if (!value.IsEmpty())
push(value);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0131/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void skb_add_rx_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, int i, struct page *page, int off,
int size, unsigned int truesize)
{
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, off, size);
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += truesize;
}
|
void skb_add_rx_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, int i, struct page *page, int off,
int size, unsigned int truesize)
{
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, off, size);
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += truesize;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-1000380
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000380/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728
|
ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728
|
ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
|
static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19489
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19489/
|
CWE-362
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=1d20398694a3b67a388d955b7a945ba4aa90a8a8
|
1d20398694a3b67a388d955b7a945ba4aa90a8a8
| null |
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
{
ssize_t err;
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
uint32_t count;
int32_t len = 0;
int32_t total = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &count);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return;
}
offset += err;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset, count, true);
trace_v9fs_write(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, count, qiov_full.niov);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (fidp->fs.fd == -1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
/*
* setxattr operation
*/
err = v9fs_xattr_write(s, pdu, fidp, off, count,
qiov_full.iov, qiov_full.niov);
goto out;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, total, qiov_full.size - total);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_pwritev(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
total += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out_qiov;
}
} while (total < count && len > 0);
offset = 7;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_qiov;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);
out_qiov:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
{
ssize_t err;
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
uint32_t count;
int32_t len = 0;
int32_t total = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &count);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return;
}
offset += err;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset, count, true);
trace_v9fs_write(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, count, qiov_full.niov);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (fidp->fs.fd == -1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
/*
* setxattr operation
*/
err = v9fs_xattr_write(s, pdu, fidp, off, count,
qiov_full.iov, qiov_full.niov);
goto out;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, total, qiov_full.size - total);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_pwritev(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
total += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out_qiov;
}
} while (total < count && len > 0);
offset = 7;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_qiov;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);
out_qiov:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0871/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9899d11f654474d2d54ea52ceaa2a1f4db3abd68
|
9899d11f654474d2d54ea52ceaa2a1f4db3abd68
|
ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
unsigned long, data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(current);
goto out;
}
child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid);
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(child);
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put_task_struct;
ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
if (ret || request != PTRACE_DETACH)
ptrace_unfreeze_traced(child);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
unsigned long, data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(current);
goto out;
}
child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid);
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(child);
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put_task_struct;
ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18202
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18202/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/687cb0884a714ff484d038e9190edc874edcf146
|
687cb0884a714ff484d038e9190edc874edcf146
|
mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool __task_will_free_mem(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal;
/*
* A coredumping process may sleep for an extended period in exit_mm(),
* so the oom killer cannot assume that the process will promptly exit
* and release memory.
*/
if (sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_COREDUMP)
return false;
if (sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
return true;
if (thread_group_empty(task) && (task->flags & PF_EXITING))
return true;
return false;
}
|
static inline bool __task_will_free_mem(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal;
/*
* A coredumping process may sleep for an extended period in exit_mm(),
* so the oom killer cannot assume that the process will promptly exit
* and release memory.
*/
if (sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_COREDUMP)
return false;
if (sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
return true;
if (thread_group_empty(task) && (task->flags & PF_EXITING))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4177/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae
|
cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae
|
mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = user_path(dir_name, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (!retval && !may_mount())
retval = -EPERM;
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
/* The default atime for remount is preservation */
if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
((flags & (MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
MS_STRICTATIME)) == 0)) {
mnt_flags &= ~MNT_ATIME_MASK;
mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
}
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
|
long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = user_path(dir_name, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (!retval && !may_mount())
retval = -EPERM;
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
/* The default atime for remount is preservation */
if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
((flags & (MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
MS_STRICTATIME)) == 0)) {
mnt_flags &= ~MNT_ATIME_MASK;
mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
}
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PluginModule::InitAsLibrary(const FilePath& path) {
base::NativeLibrary library = base::LoadNativeLibrary(path, NULL);
if (!library)
return false;
EntryPoints entry_points;
if (!LoadEntryPointsFromLibrary(library, &entry_points) ||
!InitializeModule(entry_points)) {
base::UnloadNativeLibrary(library);
return false;
}
entry_points_ = entry_points;
library_ = library;
return true;
}
|
bool PluginModule::InitAsLibrary(const FilePath& path) {
base::NativeLibrary library = base::LoadNativeLibrary(path, NULL);
if (!library)
return false;
EntryPoints entry_points;
if (!LoadEntryPointsFromLibrary(library, &entry_points) ||
!InitializeModule(entry_points)) {
base::UnloadNativeLibrary(library);
return false;
}
entry_points_ = entry_points;
library_ = library;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/10c7ed8f076afd290fccf283d8bc416959722ca3
|
10c7ed8f076afd290fccf283d8bc416959722ca3
|
Fix bug 130606: Panels [WIN]: Alt-Tabbing to a minimized panel no longer restores it
BUG=130606
TEST=Manual test by minimizing panel and alt-tabbing to it
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10509011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
FindBar* PanelBrowserView::CreatePanelFindBar() {
return CreateFindBar();
}
|
FindBar* PanelBrowserView::CreatePanelFindBar() {
return CreateFindBar();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
Shutdown Timebomb - In canary, get a callstack if it takes longer than
10 minutes. In Dev, get callstack if it takes longer than 20 minutes.
In Beta (50 minutes) and Stable (100 minutes) it is same as before.
BUG=519321
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1409333005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355586}
|
void ThreadWatcherList::ParseCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
uint32* unresponsive_threshold,
CrashOnHangThreadMap* crash_on_hang_threads) {
*unresponsive_threshold = kUnresponsiveCount;
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
if (channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
*unresponsive_threshold *= 4;
} else if (channel == version_info::Channel::BETA) {
*unresponsive_threshold *= 2;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_XP)
*unresponsive_threshold *= 2;
#endif
uint32 crash_seconds = *unresponsive_threshold * kUnresponsiveSeconds;
std::string crash_on_hang_thread_names;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCrashOnHangThreads)) {
crash_on_hang_thread_names =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kCrashOnHangThreads);
} else if (channel != version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
crash_on_hang_thread_names = base::StringPrintf(
"UI:%d:%d,IO:%d:%d,FILE:%d:%d",
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds,
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds,
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds * 5);
}
ParseCommandLineCrashOnHangThreads(crash_on_hang_thread_names,
kLiveThreadsThreshold,
crash_seconds,
crash_on_hang_threads);
}
|
void ThreadWatcherList::ParseCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
uint32* unresponsive_threshold,
CrashOnHangThreadMap* crash_on_hang_threads) {
*unresponsive_threshold = kUnresponsiveCount;
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
if (channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
*unresponsive_threshold *= 4;
} else if (channel == version_info::Channel::BETA) {
*unresponsive_threshold *= 2;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_XP)
*unresponsive_threshold *= 2;
#endif
uint32 crash_seconds = *unresponsive_threshold * kUnresponsiveSeconds;
std::string crash_on_hang_thread_names;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCrashOnHangThreads)) {
crash_on_hang_thread_names =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kCrashOnHangThreads);
} else if (channel != version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
crash_on_hang_thread_names = base::StringPrintf(
"UI:%d:%d,IO:%d:%d,FILE:%d:%d",
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds,
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds,
kLiveThreadsThreshold, crash_seconds * 5);
}
ParseCommandLineCrashOnHangThreads(crash_on_hang_thread_names,
kLiveThreadsThreshold,
crash_seconds,
crash_on_hang_threads);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int kmem_ptr_validate(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object)
{
struct page *page;
page = get_object_page(object);
if (!page || s != page->slab)
/* No slab or wrong slab */
return 0;
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, object))
return 0;
/*
* We could also check if the object is on the slabs freelist.
* But this would be too expensive and it seems that the main
* purpose of kmem_ptr_valid() is to check if the object belongs
* to a certain slab.
*/
return 1;
}
|
int kmem_ptr_validate(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object)
{
struct page *page;
page = get_object_page(object);
if (!page || s != page->slab)
/* No slab or wrong slab */
return 0;
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, object))
return 0;
/*
* We could also check if the object is on the slabs freelist.
* But this would be too expensive and it seems that the main
* purpose of kmem_ptr_valid() is to check if the object belongs
* to a certain slab.
*/
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5547/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6d104af38b570d37aa32a5803b04c354f8ed513d
|
6d104af38b570d37aa32a5803b04c354f8ed513d
|
HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static int corsair_usage_to_gkey(unsigned int usage)
{
/* G1 (0xd0) to G16 (0xdf) */
if (usage >= 0xd0 && usage <= 0xdf)
return usage - 0xd0 + 1;
/* G17 (0xe8) to G18 (0xe9) */
if (usage >= 0xe8 && usage <= 0xe9)
return usage - 0xe8 + 17;
return 0;
}
|
static int corsair_usage_to_gkey(unsigned int usage)
{
/* G1 (0xd0) to G16 (0xdf) */
if (usage >= 0xd0 && usage <= 0xdf)
return usage - 0xd0 + 1;
/* G17 (0xe8) to G18 (0xe9) */
if (usage >= 0xe8 && usage <= 0xe9)
return usage - 0xe8 + 17;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2647/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
|
int user_match(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data)
|
int user_match(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
return strcmp(key->description, match_data->raw_data) == 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
static int anon_pipe_buf_steal(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct page *page = buf->page;
if (page_count(page) == 1) {
memcg_kmem_uncharge(page, 0);
__SetPageLocked(page);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
static int anon_pipe_buf_steal(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct page *page = buf->page;
if (page_count(page) == 1) {
memcg_kmem_uncharge(page, 0);
__SetPageLocked(page);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* resource) {
DidReceiveResourceResponse(identifier, loader, response, resource);
DidFinishLoading(identifier, loader, 0,
WebURLLoaderClient::kUnknownEncodedDataLength, 0);
}
|
void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* resource) {
DidReceiveResourceResponse(identifier, loader, response, resource);
DidFinishLoading(identifier, loader, 0,
WebURLLoaderClient::kUnknownEncodedDataLength, 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
void FS_FilenameCompletion( const char *dir, const char *ext,
qboolean stripExt, void(*callback)(const char *s), qboolean allowNonPureFilesOnDisk ) {
char **filenames;
int nfiles;
int i;
char filename[ MAX_STRING_CHARS ];
filenames = FS_ListFilteredFiles( dir, ext, NULL, &nfiles, allowNonPureFilesOnDisk );
FS_SortFileList( filenames, nfiles );
for( i = 0; i < nfiles; i++ ) {
FS_ConvertPath( filenames[ i ] );
Q_strncpyz( filename, filenames[ i ], MAX_STRING_CHARS );
if( stripExt ) {
COM_StripExtension(filename, filename, sizeof(filename));
}
callback( filename );
}
FS_FreeFileList( filenames );
}
|
void FS_FilenameCompletion( const char *dir, const char *ext,
qboolean stripExt, void(*callback)(const char *s), qboolean allowNonPureFilesOnDisk ) {
char **filenames;
int nfiles;
int i;
char filename[ MAX_STRING_CHARS ];
filenames = FS_ListFilteredFiles( dir, ext, NULL, &nfiles, allowNonPureFilesOnDisk );
FS_SortFileList( filenames, nfiles );
for( i = 0; i < nfiles; i++ ) {
FS_ConvertPath( filenames[ i ] );
Q_strncpyz( filename, filenames[ i ], MAX_STRING_CHARS );
if( stripExt ) {
COM_StripExtension(filename, filename, sizeof(filename));
}
callback( filename );
}
FS_FreeFileList( filenames );
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5220/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::ExecuteCommand(int command_id, int event_flags) {
DestroyTouchSelection();
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_PASTE_AND_GO:
model()->PasteAndGo(GetClipboardText());
return;
case IDS_SHOW_URL:
model()->Unelide(true /* exit_query_in_omnibox */);
return;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
return;
case IDC_SEND_TAB_TO_SELF:
send_tab_to_self::RecordSendTabToSelfClickResult(
send_tab_to_self::kOmniboxMenu, SendTabToSelfClickResult::kClickItem);
send_tab_to_self::CreateNewEntry(location_bar_view_->GetWebContents());
return;
case IDS_APP_PASTE:
ExecuteTextEditCommand(ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE);
return;
default:
if (Textfield::IsCommandIdEnabled(command_id)) {
Textfield::ExecuteCommand(command_id, event_flags);
return;
}
OnBeforePossibleChange();
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
OnAfterPossibleChange(true);
return;
}
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::ExecuteCommand(int command_id, int event_flags) {
DestroyTouchSelection();
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_PASTE_AND_GO:
model()->PasteAndGo(GetClipboardText());
return;
case IDS_SHOW_URL:
model()->Unelide(true /* exit_query_in_omnibox */);
return;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
return;
case IDC_SEND_TAB_TO_SELF:
send_tab_to_self::RecordSendTabToSelfClickResult(
send_tab_to_self::kOmniboxMenu, SendTabToSelfClickResult::kClickItem);
send_tab_to_self::CreateNewEntry(location_bar_view_->GetWebContents());
return;
case IDS_APP_PASTE:
ExecuteTextEditCommand(ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE);
return;
default:
if (Textfield::IsCommandIdEnabled(command_id)) {
Textfield::ExecuteCommand(command_id, event_flags);
return;
}
OnBeforePossibleChange();
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
OnAfterPossibleChange(true);
return;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.