CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2015-8839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8839/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static int ext4_quota_off(struct super_block *sb, int type)
{
struct inode *inode = sb_dqopt(sb)->files[type];
handle_t *handle;
/* Force all delayed allocation blocks to be allocated.
* Caller already holds s_umount sem */
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
sync_filesystem(sb);
if (!inode)
goto out;
/* Update modification times of quota files when userspace can
* start looking at them */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_QUOTA, 1);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
goto out;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return dquot_quota_off(sb, type);
}
|
static int ext4_quota_off(struct super_block *sb, int type)
{
struct inode *inode = sb_dqopt(sb)->files[type];
handle_t *handle;
/* Force all delayed allocation blocks to be allocated.
* Caller already holds s_umount sem */
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
sync_filesystem(sb);
if (!inode)
goto out;
/* Update modification times of quota files when userspace can
* start looking at them */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_QUOTA, 1);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
goto out;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return dquot_quota_off(sb, type);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3105
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3105/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d6cc2749d2f90acc2d92a526c1d2cbebbc101a19
|
d6cc2749d2f90acc2d92a526c1d2cbebbc101a19
|
sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCredentials(
const SyncCredentials& credentials) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_EQ(credentials.email, share_.name);
DCHECK(!credentials.email.empty());
DCHECK(!credentials.sync_token.empty());
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
if (connection_manager()->set_auth_token(credentials.sync_token)) {
sync_notifier_->UpdateCredentials(
credentials.email, credentials.sync_token);
if (!setup_for_test_mode_ && initialized_) {
if (scheduler())
scheduler()->OnCredentialsUpdated();
}
}
}
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCredentials(
const SyncCredentials& credentials) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_EQ(credentials.email, share_.name);
DCHECK(!credentials.email.empty());
DCHECK(!credentials.sync_token.empty());
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
if (connection_manager()->set_auth_token(credentials.sync_token)) {
sync_notifier_->UpdateCredentials(
credentials.email, credentials.sync_token);
if (!setup_for_test_mode_ && initialized_) {
if (scheduler())
scheduler()->OnCredentialsUpdated();
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6711
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6711/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/063be1485e0099bc81ace3a08b0ec9186dcad693
|
063be1485e0099bc81ace3a08b0ec9186dcad693
|
DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
|
static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_set_dbg_color_b_modes(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
va_list args) {
#if CONFIG_POSTPROC_VISUALIZER && CONFIG_POSTPROC
ctx->dbg_color_b_modes_flag = va_arg(args, int);
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
#else
(void)ctx;
(void)args;
return VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE;
#endif
}
|
static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_set_dbg_color_b_modes(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
va_list args) {
#if CONFIG_POSTPROC_VISUALIZER && CONFIG_POSTPROC
ctx->dbg_color_b_modes_flag = va_arg(args, int);
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
#else
(void)ctx;
(void)args;
return VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7520/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/14e606db148d6ebcaae20f1e1d6d71903ca4a556
|
14e606db148d6ebcaae20f1e1d6d71903ca4a556
|
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1537213
|
static Image *ReadHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
format[MagickPathExtent],
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
tag[MagickPathExtent],
value[MagickPathExtent];
double
gamma;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status,
value_expected;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*end,
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Decode image header.
*/
image->columns=0;
image->rows=0;
*format='\0';
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
while (isgraph(c) && (image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
if (c == (int) '#')
{
char
*comment;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment-- any text between # and end-of-line.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '\n'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) == MagickFalse)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
{
register char
*p;
/*
Determine a keyword and its value.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'));
*p='\0';
value_expected=MagickFalse;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0) || (c == '='))
{
if (c == '=')
value_expected=MagickTrue;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"Y") == 0)
value_expected=MagickTrue;
if (value_expected == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=value;
while ((c != '\n') && (c != '\0') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"format") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(format,value,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"primaries") == 0)
{
float
chromaticity[6],
white_point[2];
int
count;
count=sscanf(value,"%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g",&chromaticity[0],
&chromaticity[1],&chromaticity[2],&chromaticity[3],
&chromaticity[4],&chromaticity[5],&white_point[0],
&white_point[1]);
if (count == 8)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=white_point[0],
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=white_point[1];
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
char
target[] = "Y";
if (strcmp(keyword,target) == 0)
{
int
height,
width;
if (sscanf(value,"%d +X %d",&height,&width) == 2)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_rgbe") != 0) &&
(LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") == 0)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,XYZColorspace,exception);
image->compression=(image->columns < 8) || (image->columns > 0x7ffff) ?
NoCompression : RLECompression;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Read RGBE (red+green+blue+exponent) pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != 4)
break;
if ((size_t) ((((size_t) pixel[2]) << 8) | pixel[3]) != image->columns)
{
(void) memcpy(pixels,pixel,4*sizeof(*pixel));
count=ReadBlob(image,4*(image->columns-1)*sizeof(*pixels),pixels+4);
image->compression=NoCompression;
}
else
{
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
end=&pixels[(i+1)*image->columns];
while (p < end)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,2*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count < 1)
break;
if (pixel[0] > 128)
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0]-128;
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
while (count-- > 0)
*p++=pixel[1];
}
else
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0];
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
*p++=pixel[1];
if (--count > 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) count*sizeof(*p),p);
if (count < 1)
break;
p+=count;
}
}
}
}
}
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
pixel[0]=pixels[x];
pixel[1]=pixels[x+image->columns];
pixel[2]=pixels[x+2*image->columns];
pixel[3]=pixels[x+3*image->columns];
}
else
{
pixel[0]=pixels[i++];
pixel[1]=pixels[i++];
pixel[2]=pixels[i++];
pixel[3]=pixels[i++];
}
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
if (pixel[3] != 0)
{
gamma=pow(2.0,pixel[3]-(128.0+8.0));
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[0]),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[1]),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[2]),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
format[MagickPathExtent],
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
tag[MagickPathExtent],
value[MagickPathExtent];
double
gamma;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status,
value_expected;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*end,
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Decode image header.
*/
image->columns=0;
image->rows=0;
*format='\0';
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
while (isgraph(c) && (image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
if (c == (int) '#')
{
char
*comment;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment-- any text between # and end-of-line.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '\n'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) == MagickFalse)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
{
register char
*p;
/*
Determine a keyword and its value.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'));
*p='\0';
value_expected=MagickFalse;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0) || (c == '='))
{
if (c == '=')
value_expected=MagickTrue;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"Y") == 0)
value_expected=MagickTrue;
if (value_expected == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=value;
while ((c != '\n') && (c != '\0') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"format") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(format,value,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"primaries") == 0)
{
float
chromaticity[6],
white_point[2];
int
count;
count=sscanf(value,"%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g",&chromaticity[0],
&chromaticity[1],&chromaticity[2],&chromaticity[3],
&chromaticity[4],&chromaticity[5],&white_point[0],
&white_point[1]);
if (count == 8)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=white_point[0],
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=white_point[1];
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
char
target[] = "Y";
if (strcmp(keyword,target) == 0)
{
int
height,
width;
if (sscanf(value,"%d +X %d",&height,&width) == 2)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_rgbe") != 0) &&
(LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") == 0)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,XYZColorspace,exception);
image->compression=(image->columns < 8) || (image->columns > 0x7ffff) ?
NoCompression : RLECompression;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Read RGBE (red+green+blue+exponent) pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != 4)
break;
if ((size_t) ((((size_t) pixel[2]) << 8) | pixel[3]) != image->columns)
{
(void) memcpy(pixels,pixel,4*sizeof(*pixel));
count=ReadBlob(image,4*(image->columns-1)*sizeof(*pixels),pixels+4);
image->compression=NoCompression;
}
else
{
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
end=&pixels[(i+1)*image->columns];
while (p < end)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,2*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count < 1)
break;
if (pixel[0] > 128)
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0]-128;
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
while (count-- > 0)
*p++=pixel[1];
}
else
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0];
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
*p++=pixel[1];
if (--count > 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) count*sizeof(*p),p);
if (count < 1)
break;
p+=count;
}
}
}
}
}
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
pixel[0]=pixels[x];
pixel[1]=pixels[x+image->columns];
pixel[2]=pixels[x+2*image->columns];
pixel[3]=pixels[x+3*image->columns];
}
else
{
pixel[0]=pixels[i++];
pixel[1]=pixels[i++];
pixel[2]=pixels[i++];
pixel[3]=pixels[i++];
}
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
if (pixel[3] != 0)
{
gamma=pow(2.0,pixel[3]-(128.0+8.0));
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[0]),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[1]),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[2]),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-3730
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-3730/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/efbe126e3ebb9123ac9d058aa2bb044261342aaa
|
efbe126e3ebb9123ac9d058aa2bb044261342aaa
|
Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n = 0;
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
n = 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key))
|| !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
}
#endif
s2n(u, p);
n += u + 2;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
|
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n = 0;
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
n = 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key))
|| !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
}
#endif
s2n(u, p);
n += u + 2;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
Don't interpret embeded NULLs in a response header line as a line terminator.
BUG=95992
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100863 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool HttpUtil::ValuesIterator::GetNext() {
while (values_.GetNext()) {
value_begin_ = values_.token_begin();
value_end_ = values_.token_end();
TrimLWS(&value_begin_, &value_end_);
if (value_begin_ != value_end_)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool HttpUtil::ValuesIterator::GetNext() {
while (values_.GetNext()) {
value_begin_ = values_.token_begin();
value_end_ = values_.token_end();
TrimLWS(&value_begin_, &value_end_);
if (value_begin_ != value_end_)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
WebMediaPlayerMS::~WebMediaPlayerMS() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!web_stream_.IsNull())
web_stream_.RemoveObserver(this);
get_client()->SetCcLayer(nullptr);
if (video_layer_) {
DCHECK(!surface_layer_for_video_enabled_);
video_layer_->StopUsingProvider();
}
if (frame_deliverer_)
io_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, frame_deliverer_.release());
if (compositor_)
compositor_->StopUsingProvider();
if (video_frame_provider_)
video_frame_provider_->Stop();
if (audio_renderer_)
audio_renderer_->Stop();
media_log_->AddEvent(
media_log_->CreateEvent(media::MediaLogEvent::WEBMEDIAPLAYER_DESTROYED));
delegate_->PlayerGone(delegate_id_);
delegate_->RemoveObserver(delegate_id_);
}
|
WebMediaPlayerMS::~WebMediaPlayerMS() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!web_stream_.IsNull())
web_stream_.RemoveObserver(this);
get_client()->SetCcLayer(nullptr);
if (video_layer_) {
DCHECK(!surface_layer_for_video_enabled_);
video_layer_->StopUsingProvider();
}
if (frame_deliverer_)
io_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, frame_deliverer_.release());
if (compositor_)
compositor_->StopUsingProvider();
if (video_frame_provider_)
video_frame_provider_->Stop();
if (audio_renderer_)
audio_renderer_->Stop();
media_log_->AddEvent(
media_log_->CreateEvent(media::MediaLogEvent::WEBMEDIAPLAYER_DESTROYED));
delegate_->PlayerGone(delegate_id_);
delegate_->RemoveObserver(delegate_id_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
Extract generation logic from the accessory controller into a separate one
This change adds a controller that is responsible for mediating
communication between ChromePasswordManagerClient and
PasswordAccessoryController for password generation. It is also
responsible for managing the modal dialog used to present the generated
password.
In the future it will make it easier to add manual generation to the
password accessory.
Bug: 845458
Change-Id: I0adbb2de9b9f5012745ae3963154f7d3247b3051
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1448181
Commit-Queue: Ioana Pandele <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Friedrich [CET] <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629542}
|
void PrintTo(const UserInfo::Field& field, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "(display text: \"" << base::UTF16ToUTF8(field.display_text())
<< "\", a11y_description: \""
<< base::UTF16ToUTF8(field.a11y_description()) << "\", is "
<< (field.is_obfuscated() ? "" : "not ") << "obfuscated, is "
<< (field.selectable() ? "" : "not ") << "selectable)";
}
|
void PrintTo(const UserInfo::Field& field, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "(display text: \"" << base::UTF16ToUTF8(field.display_text())
<< "\", a11y_description: \""
<< base::UTF16ToUTF8(field.a11y_description()) << "\", is "
<< (field.is_obfuscated() ? "" : "not ") << "obfuscated, is "
<< (field.selectable() ? "" : "not ") << "selectable)";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0377
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0377/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350
|
665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350
|
Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
|
nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out)
{
node_t *node;
const char *id_digest;
int had_router = 0;
tor_assert(ri);
init_nodelist();
id_digest = ri->cache_info.identity_digest;
node = node_get_or_create(id_digest);
if (node->ri) {
if (!routers_have_same_or_addrs(node->ri, ri)) {
node_addrs_changed(node);
}
had_router = 1;
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = node->ri;
} else {
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = NULL;
}
node->ri = ri;
if (node->country == -1)
node_set_country(node);
if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && !had_router) {
const char *discard=NULL;
uint32_t status = dirserv_router_get_status(ri, &discard, LOG_INFO);
dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node, status);
}
return node;
}
|
nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out)
{
node_t *node;
const char *id_digest;
int had_router = 0;
tor_assert(ri);
init_nodelist();
id_digest = ri->cache_info.identity_digest;
node = node_get_or_create(id_digest);
if (node->ri) {
if (!routers_have_same_or_addrs(node->ri, ri)) {
node_addrs_changed(node);
}
had_router = 1;
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = node->ri;
} else {
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = NULL;
}
node->ri = ri;
if (node->country == -1)
node_set_country(node);
if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && !had_router) {
const char *discard=NULL;
uint32_t status = dirserv_router_get_status(ri, &discard, LOG_INFO);
dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node, status);
}
return node;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TabContents* AeroPeekManager::GetTabContents(int tab_id) const {
for (TabContentsIterator iterator; !iterator.done(); ++iterator) {
TabContents* target_contents = *iterator;
if (target_contents->controller().session_id().id() == tab_id)
return target_contents;
}
return NULL;
}
|
TabContents* AeroPeekManager::GetTabContents(int tab_id) const {
for (TabContentsIterator iterator; !iterator.done(); ++iterator) {
TabContents* target_contents = *iterator;
if (target_contents->controller().session_id().id() == tab_id)
return target_contents;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
struct crypto_aes_ctx gen_aes;
int cpu;
if (key_len % 8) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If the hardware is capable of generating the extended key
* itself we must supply the plain key for both encryption
* and decryption.
*/
ctx->D = ctx->E;
ctx->E[0] = le32_to_cpu(key[0]);
ctx->E[1] = le32_to_cpu(key[1]);
ctx->E[2] = le32_to_cpu(key[2]);
ctx->E[3] = le32_to_cpu(key[3]);
/* Prepare control words. */
memset(&ctx->cword, 0, sizeof(ctx->cword));
ctx->cword.decrypt.encdec = 1;
ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 16) / 4;
ctx->cword.decrypt.rounds = ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds;
ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize = (key_len - 16) / 8;
ctx->cword.decrypt.ksize = ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize;
/* Don't generate extended keys if the hardware can do it. */
if (aes_hw_extkey_available(key_len))
goto ok;
ctx->D = ctx->d_data;
ctx->cword.encrypt.keygen = 1;
ctx->cword.decrypt.keygen = 1;
if (crypto_aes_expand_key(&gen_aes, in_key, key_len)) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(ctx->E, gen_aes.key_enc, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
memcpy(ctx->D, gen_aes.key_dec, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
ok:
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
if (&ctx->cword.encrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) ||
&ctx->cword.decrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu))
per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) = NULL;
return 0;
}
|
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
struct crypto_aes_ctx gen_aes;
int cpu;
if (key_len % 8) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If the hardware is capable of generating the extended key
* itself we must supply the plain key for both encryption
* and decryption.
*/
ctx->D = ctx->E;
ctx->E[0] = le32_to_cpu(key[0]);
ctx->E[1] = le32_to_cpu(key[1]);
ctx->E[2] = le32_to_cpu(key[2]);
ctx->E[3] = le32_to_cpu(key[3]);
/* Prepare control words. */
memset(&ctx->cword, 0, sizeof(ctx->cword));
ctx->cword.decrypt.encdec = 1;
ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 16) / 4;
ctx->cword.decrypt.rounds = ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds;
ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize = (key_len - 16) / 8;
ctx->cword.decrypt.ksize = ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize;
/* Don't generate extended keys if the hardware can do it. */
if (aes_hw_extkey_available(key_len))
goto ok;
ctx->D = ctx->d_data;
ctx->cword.encrypt.keygen = 1;
ctx->cword.decrypt.keygen = 1;
if (crypto_aes_expand_key(&gen_aes, in_key, key_len)) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(ctx->E, gen_aes.key_enc, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
memcpy(ctx->D, gen_aes.key_dec, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
ok:
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
if (&ctx->cword.encrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) ||
&ctx->cword.decrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu))
per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) = NULL;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6712
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6712/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d
|
fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d
|
DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
|
void vp9_free_postproc_buffers(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_POSTPROC
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer);
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer_int);
#else
(void)cm;
#endif
}
|
void vp9_free_postproc_buffers(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_POSTPROC
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer);
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer_int);
#else
(void)cm;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5112/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void QuotaManager::GetAvailableSpace(const AvailableSpaceCallback& callback) {
if (is_incognito_) {
callback.Run(kQuotaStatusOk, kIncognitoDefaultTemporaryQuota);
return;
}
PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
db_thread_,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(get_disk_space_fn_, profile_path_),
base::Bind(&QuotaManager::DidGetAvailableSpace,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback));
}
|
void QuotaManager::GetAvailableSpace(const AvailableSpaceCallback& callback) {
if (is_incognito_) {
callback.Run(kQuotaStatusOk, kIncognitoDefaultTemporaryQuota);
return;
}
make_scoped_refptr(new AvailableSpaceQueryTask(this, callback))->Start();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei image_size,
const void* pixels) {
ScopedUnpackStateButAlignmentReset reset_unpack(
api(), image_size != 0 && feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_es3, false);
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glTexImage2DRobustANGLEFn(target, level, internalformat, width, height,
border, format, type, image_size, pixels);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
UpdateTextureSizeFromTarget(target);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei image_size,
const void* pixels) {
ScopedUnpackStateButAlignmentReset reset_unpack(
api(), image_size != 0 && feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_es3, false);
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glTexImage2DRobustANGLEFn(target, level, internalformat, width, height,
border, format, type, image_size, pixels);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
UpdateTextureSizeFromTarget(target);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5b51043c7c8e7e6b86e68e6d93d95ad24e11cf0e
|
5b51043c7c8e7e6b86e68e6d93d95ad24e11cf0e
|
[Payments] Prohibit opening payments UI in background tab.
Before this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() would bring the
background window to the foreground, which allows a page to open a
pop-under.
This patch adds a check for the browser window being active (in
foreground) in PaymentRequest.show(). If the window is not active (in
background), then PaymentRequest.show() promise is rejected with
"AbortError: User cancelled request." No UI is shown in that case.
After this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() does not bring the
background window to the foreground, thus preventing opening a pop-under.
Bug: 768230
Change-Id: I2b90f9086ceca5ed7b7bdf8045e44d7e99d566d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/681843
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504406}
|
PaymentRequestPaymentMethodIdentifierTest()
: PaymentRequestBrowserTestBase(
"/payment_request_payment_method_identifier_test.html") {}
|
PaymentRequestPaymentMethodIdentifierTest()
: PaymentRequestBrowserTestBase(
"/payment_request_payment_method_identifier_test.html") {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1874/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
}
|
int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
EventQueue* LocalDOMWindow::GetEventQueue() const {
return event_queue_.Get();
}
|
EventQueue* LocalDOMWindow::GetEventQueue() const {
return event_queue_.Get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9919
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9919/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79dc7e3f1cd323be4c81aa1a94faa1b3ed987fb2
|
79dc7e3f1cd323be4c81aa1a94faa1b3ed987fb2
|
net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct dst_entry *dst, *dst2;
struct flowi6 fl2;
int err;
err = ip6_dst_lookup(net, sk, &dst, fl6);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
/*
* We won't send icmp if the destination is known
* anycast.
*/
if (ipv6_anycast_destination(dst, &fl6->daddr)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: acast source\n");
dst_release(dst);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/* No need to clone since we're just using its address. */
dst2 = dst;
dst = xfrm_lookup(net, dst, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6), sk, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
if (dst != dst2)
return dst;
} else {
if (PTR_ERR(dst) == -EPERM)
dst = NULL;
else
return dst;
}
err = xfrm_decode_session_reverse(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl2), AF_INET6);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
err = ip6_dst_lookup(net, sk, &dst2, &fl2);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
dst2 = xfrm_lookup(net, dst2, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl2), sk, XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP);
if (!IS_ERR(dst2)) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = dst2;
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(dst2);
if (err == -EPERM) {
dst_release(dst);
return dst2;
} else
goto relookup_failed;
}
relookup_failed:
if (dst)
return dst;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct dst_entry *dst, *dst2;
struct flowi6 fl2;
int err;
err = ip6_dst_lookup(net, sk, &dst, fl6);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
/*
* We won't send icmp if the destination is known
* anycast.
*/
if (ipv6_anycast_destination(dst, &fl6->daddr)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: acast source\n");
dst_release(dst);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/* No need to clone since we're just using its address. */
dst2 = dst;
dst = xfrm_lookup(net, dst, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6), sk, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
if (dst != dst2)
return dst;
} else {
if (PTR_ERR(dst) == -EPERM)
dst = NULL;
else
return dst;
}
err = xfrm_decode_session_reverse(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl2), AF_INET6);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
err = ip6_dst_lookup(net, sk, &dst2, &fl2);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
dst2 = xfrm_lookup(net, dst2, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl2), sk, XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP);
if (!IS_ERR(dst2)) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = dst2;
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(dst2);
if (err == -EPERM) {
dst_release(dst);
return dst2;
} else
goto relookup_failed;
}
relookup_failed:
if (dst)
return dst;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5669/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=07bdb6e289c7954e2a533039dc93c1c136099d2d
|
07bdb6e289c7954e2a533039dc93c1c136099d2d
| null |
_bdf_parse_glyphs( char* line,
unsigned long linelen,
unsigned long lineno,
void* call_data,
void* client_data )
{
int c, mask_index;
char* s;
unsigned char* bp;
unsigned long i, slen, nibbles;
_bdf_parse_t* p;
bdf_glyph_t* glyph;
bdf_font_t* font;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
FT_UNUSED( call_data );
FT_UNUSED( lineno ); /* only used in debug mode */
p = (_bdf_parse_t *)client_data;
font = p->font;
memory = font->memory;
/* Check for a comment. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
linelen -= 7;
s = line + 7;
if ( *s != 0 )
{
s++;
linelen--;
}
error = _bdf_add_comment( p->font, s, linelen );
goto Exit;
}
/* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) )
{
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->cnt = font->glyphs_size = _bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Make sure the number of glyphs is non-zero. */
if ( p->cnt == 0 )
font->glyphs_size = 64;
/* Limit ourselves to 1,114,112 glyphs in the font (this is the */
/* number of code points available in Unicode). */
if ( p->cnt >= 0x110000UL )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size ) )
goto Exit;
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPHS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDFONT field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
/* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */
ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_used,
sizeof ( bdf_glyph_t ),
by_encoding );
p->flags &= ~_BDF_START;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 )
{
p->glyph_enc = 0;
p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check whether a glyph is being scanned but should be */
/* ignored because it is an unencoded glyph. */
if ( ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) &&
p->glyph_enc == -1 &&
p->opts->keep_unencoded == 0 )
goto Exit;
/* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 )
{
/* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */
/* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
_bdf_list_shift( &p->list, 1 );
s = _bdf_list_join( &p->list, ' ', &slen );
if ( !s )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG8, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( p->glyph_name, slen + 1 ) )
goto Exit;
FT_MEM_COPY( p->glyph_name, s, slen + 1 );
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH;
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG1, lineno, s ));
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENCODING field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
{
/* Missing STARTCHAR field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Startchar_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Normalize negative encoding values. The specification only */
/* allows -1, but we can be more generous here. */
if ( p->glyph_enc < -1 )
p->glyph_enc = -1;
/* Check for alternative encoding format. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->list.used > 2 )
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG2, p->glyph_enc ));
/* Check that the encoding is in the Unicode range because */
/* otherwise p->have (a bitmap with static size) overflows. */
if ( p->glyph_enc > 0 &&
(size_t)p->glyph_enc >= sizeof ( p->have ) /
sizeof ( unsigned long ) * 32 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
}
/* Check whether this encoding has already been encountered. */
/* If it has then change it to unencoded so it gets added if */
/* indicated. */
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
if ( _bdf_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ) )
{
/* Emit a message saying a glyph has been moved to the */
/* unencoded area. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG12,
p->glyph_enc, p->glyph_name ));
p->glyph_enc = -1;
font->modified = 1;
}
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc );
}
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
/* Make sure there are enough glyphs allocated in case the */
/* number of characters happen to be wrong. */
if ( font->glyphs_used == font->glyphs_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_size,
font->glyphs_size + 64 ) )
goto Exit;
font->glyphs_size += 64;
}
glyph = font->glyphs + font->glyphs_used++;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = p->glyph_enc;
/* Reset the initial glyph info. */
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded glyph. Check whether it should */
/* be added or not. */
if ( p->opts->keep_unencoded != 0 )
{
/* Allocate the next unencoded glyph. */
if ( font->unencoded_used == font->unencoded_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->unencoded ,
font->unencoded_size,
font->unencoded_size + 4 ) )
goto Exit;
font->unencoded_size += 4;
}
glyph = font->unencoded + font->unencoded_used;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = font->unencoded_used++;
}
else
/* Free up the glyph name if the unencoded shouldn't be */
/* kept. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
/* Clear the flags that might be added when width and height are */
/* checked for consistency. */
p->flags &= ~( _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK | _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK );
p->flags |= _BDF_ENCODING;
goto Exit;
}
/* Point at the glyph being constructed. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
glyph = font->unencoded + ( font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
glyph = font->glyphs + ( font->glyphs_used - 1 );
/* Check whether a bitmap is being constructed. */
if ( p->flags & _BDF_BITMAP )
{
/* If there are more rows than are specified in the glyph metrics, */
/* ignore the remaining lines. */
if ( p->row >= (unsigned long)glyph->bbx.height )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG13, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
goto Exit;
}
/* Only collect the number of nibbles indicated by the glyph */
/* metrics. If there are more columns, they are simply ignored. */
nibbles = glyph->bpr << 1;
bp = glyph->bitmap + p->row * glyph->bpr;
for ( i = 0; i < nibbles; i++ )
{
c = line[i];
if ( !sbitset( hdigits, c ) )
break;
*bp = (FT_Byte)( ( *bp << 4 ) + a2i[c] );
if ( i + 1 < nibbles && ( i & 1 ) )
*++bp = 0;
}
/* If any line has not enough columns, */
/* indicate they have been padded with zero bits. */
if ( i < nibbles &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG16, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
/* Remove possible garbage at the right. */
mask_index = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp ) & 7;
if ( glyph->bbx.width )
*bp &= nibble_mask[mask_index];
/* If any line has extra columns, indicate they have been removed. */
if ( i == nibbles &&
sbitset( hdigits, line[nibbles] ) &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG14, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
p->row++;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->dwidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing SWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the scalable width from the device width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG9, lineno ));
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
}
p->flags |= _BDF_DWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the BBX field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->bbx.width = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.height = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.x_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[3], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.y_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[4], 0, 10 );
/* Generate the ascent and descent of the character. */
glyph->bbx.ascent = (short)( glyph->bbx.height + glyph->bbx.y_offset );
glyph->bbx.descent = (short)( -glyph->bbx.y_offset );
/* Determine the overall font bounding box as the characters are */
/* loaded so corrections can be done later if indicated. */
p->maxas = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.ascent, p->maxas );
p->maxds = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.descent, p->maxds );
p->rbearing = (short)( glyph->bbx.width + glyph->bbx.x_offset );
p->maxrb = (short)FT_MAX( p->rbearing, p->maxrb );
p->minlb = (short)FT_MIN( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->minlb );
p->maxlb = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->maxlb );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_DWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing DWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the device width to the glyph width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG10, lineno ));
glyph->dwidth = glyph->bbx.width;
}
/* If the BDF_CORRECT_METRICS flag is set, then adjust the SWIDTH */
/* value if necessary. */
if ( p->opts->correct_metrics != 0 )
{
/* Determine the point size of the glyph. */
unsigned short sw = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
if ( sw != glyph->swidth )
{
glyph->swidth = sw;
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->umod,
font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->nmod, glyph->encoding );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH_ADJ;
font->modified = 1;
}
}
p->flags |= _BDF_BBX;
goto Exit;
}
/* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 )
{
unsigned long bitmap_size;
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_BBX ) )
{
/* Missing BBX field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "BBX" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Bbx_Field;
goto Exit;
}
/* Allocate enough space for the bitmap. */
glyph->bpr = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp + 7 ) >> 3;
bitmap_size = glyph->bpr * glyph->bbx.height;
if ( glyph->bpr > 0xFFFFU || bitmap_size > 0xFFFFU )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG4, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Bbx_Too_Big;
goto Exit;
}
else
glyph->bytes = (unsigned short)bitmap_size;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->bitmap, glyph->bytes ) )
goto Exit;
p->row = 0;
p->flags |= _BDF_BITMAP;
goto Exit;
}
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG9, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
Missing_Encoding:
/* Missing ENCODING field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Encoding_Field;
Exit:
if ( error && ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
return error;
}
|
_bdf_parse_glyphs( char* line,
unsigned long linelen,
unsigned long lineno,
void* call_data,
void* client_data )
{
int c, mask_index;
char* s;
unsigned char* bp;
unsigned long i, slen, nibbles;
_bdf_parse_t* p;
bdf_glyph_t* glyph;
bdf_font_t* font;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
FT_UNUSED( call_data );
FT_UNUSED( lineno ); /* only used in debug mode */
p = (_bdf_parse_t *)client_data;
font = p->font;
memory = font->memory;
/* Check for a comment. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
linelen -= 7;
s = line + 7;
if ( *s != 0 )
{
s++;
linelen--;
}
error = _bdf_add_comment( p->font, s, linelen );
goto Exit;
}
/* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) )
{
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->cnt = font->glyphs_size = _bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Make sure the number of glyphs is non-zero. */
if ( p->cnt == 0 )
font->glyphs_size = 64;
/* Limit ourselves to 1,114,112 glyphs in the font (this is the */
/* number of code points available in Unicode). */
if ( p->cnt >= 0x110000UL )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size ) )
goto Exit;
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPHS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDFONT field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
/* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */
ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_used,
sizeof ( bdf_glyph_t ),
by_encoding );
p->flags &= ~_BDF_START;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 )
{
p->glyph_enc = 0;
p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check whether a glyph is being scanned but should be */
/* ignored because it is an unencoded glyph. */
if ( ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) &&
p->glyph_enc == -1 &&
p->opts->keep_unencoded == 0 )
goto Exit;
/* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 )
{
/* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */
/* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
_bdf_list_shift( &p->list, 1 );
s = _bdf_list_join( &p->list, ' ', &slen );
if ( !s )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG8, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( p->glyph_name, slen + 1 ) )
goto Exit;
FT_MEM_COPY( p->glyph_name, s, slen + 1 );
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH;
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG1, lineno, s ));
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENCODING field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
{
/* Missing STARTCHAR field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Startchar_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Normalize negative encoding values. The specification only */
/* allows -1, but we can be more generous here. */
if ( p->glyph_enc < -1 )
p->glyph_enc = -1;
/* Check for alternative encoding format. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->list.used > 2 )
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG2, p->glyph_enc ));
/* Check that the encoding is in the Unicode range because */
/* otherwise p->have (a bitmap with static size) overflows. */
if ( p->glyph_enc > 0 &&
(size_t)p->glyph_enc >= sizeof ( p->have ) * 8 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
}
/* Check whether this encoding has already been encountered. */
/* If it has then change it to unencoded so it gets added if */
/* indicated. */
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
if ( _bdf_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ) )
{
/* Emit a message saying a glyph has been moved to the */
/* unencoded area. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG12,
p->glyph_enc, p->glyph_name ));
p->glyph_enc = -1;
font->modified = 1;
}
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc );
}
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
/* Make sure there are enough glyphs allocated in case the */
/* number of characters happen to be wrong. */
if ( font->glyphs_used == font->glyphs_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_size,
font->glyphs_size + 64 ) )
goto Exit;
font->glyphs_size += 64;
}
glyph = font->glyphs + font->glyphs_used++;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = p->glyph_enc;
/* Reset the initial glyph info. */
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded glyph. Check whether it should */
/* be added or not. */
if ( p->opts->keep_unencoded != 0 )
{
/* Allocate the next unencoded glyph. */
if ( font->unencoded_used == font->unencoded_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->unencoded ,
font->unencoded_size,
font->unencoded_size + 4 ) )
goto Exit;
font->unencoded_size += 4;
}
glyph = font->unencoded + font->unencoded_used;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = font->unencoded_used++;
}
else
/* Free up the glyph name if the unencoded shouldn't be */
/* kept. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
/* Clear the flags that might be added when width and height are */
/* checked for consistency. */
p->flags &= ~( _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK | _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK );
p->flags |= _BDF_ENCODING;
goto Exit;
}
/* Point at the glyph being constructed. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
glyph = font->unencoded + ( font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
glyph = font->glyphs + ( font->glyphs_used - 1 );
/* Check whether a bitmap is being constructed. */
if ( p->flags & _BDF_BITMAP )
{
/* If there are more rows than are specified in the glyph metrics, */
/* ignore the remaining lines. */
if ( p->row >= (unsigned long)glyph->bbx.height )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG13, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
goto Exit;
}
/* Only collect the number of nibbles indicated by the glyph */
/* metrics. If there are more columns, they are simply ignored. */
nibbles = glyph->bpr << 1;
bp = glyph->bitmap + p->row * glyph->bpr;
for ( i = 0; i < nibbles; i++ )
{
c = line[i];
if ( !sbitset( hdigits, c ) )
break;
*bp = (FT_Byte)( ( *bp << 4 ) + a2i[c] );
if ( i + 1 < nibbles && ( i & 1 ) )
*++bp = 0;
}
/* If any line has not enough columns, */
/* indicate they have been padded with zero bits. */
if ( i < nibbles &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG16, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
/* Remove possible garbage at the right. */
mask_index = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp ) & 7;
if ( glyph->bbx.width )
*bp &= nibble_mask[mask_index];
/* If any line has extra columns, indicate they have been removed. */
if ( i == nibbles &&
sbitset( hdigits, line[nibbles] ) &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG14, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
p->row++;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->dwidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing SWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the scalable width from the device width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG9, lineno ));
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
}
p->flags |= _BDF_DWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the BBX field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->bbx.width = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.height = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.x_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[3], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.y_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[4], 0, 10 );
/* Generate the ascent and descent of the character. */
glyph->bbx.ascent = (short)( glyph->bbx.height + glyph->bbx.y_offset );
glyph->bbx.descent = (short)( -glyph->bbx.y_offset );
/* Determine the overall font bounding box as the characters are */
/* loaded so corrections can be done later if indicated. */
p->maxas = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.ascent, p->maxas );
p->maxds = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.descent, p->maxds );
p->rbearing = (short)( glyph->bbx.width + glyph->bbx.x_offset );
p->maxrb = (short)FT_MAX( p->rbearing, p->maxrb );
p->minlb = (short)FT_MIN( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->minlb );
p->maxlb = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->maxlb );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_DWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing DWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the device width to the glyph width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG10, lineno ));
glyph->dwidth = glyph->bbx.width;
}
/* If the BDF_CORRECT_METRICS flag is set, then adjust the SWIDTH */
/* value if necessary. */
if ( p->opts->correct_metrics != 0 )
{
/* Determine the point size of the glyph. */
unsigned short sw = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
if ( sw != glyph->swidth )
{
glyph->swidth = sw;
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->umod,
font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->nmod, glyph->encoding );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH_ADJ;
font->modified = 1;
}
}
p->flags |= _BDF_BBX;
goto Exit;
}
/* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 )
{
unsigned long bitmap_size;
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_BBX ) )
{
/* Missing BBX field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "BBX" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Bbx_Field;
goto Exit;
}
/* Allocate enough space for the bitmap. */
glyph->bpr = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp + 7 ) >> 3;
bitmap_size = glyph->bpr * glyph->bbx.height;
if ( glyph->bpr > 0xFFFFU || bitmap_size > 0xFFFFU )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG4, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Bbx_Too_Big;
goto Exit;
}
else
glyph->bytes = (unsigned short)bitmap_size;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->bitmap, glyph->bytes ) )
goto Exit;
p->row = 0;
p->flags |= _BDF_BITMAP;
goto Exit;
}
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG9, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
Missing_Encoding:
/* Missing ENCODING field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Encoding_Field;
Exit:
if ( error && ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3913/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
|
void MediaPlayerService::removeMediaRecorderClient(wp<MediaRecorderClient> client)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mMediaRecorderClients.remove(client);
ALOGV("Delete media recorder client");
}
|
void MediaPlayerService::removeMediaRecorderClient(wp<MediaRecorderClient> client)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mMediaRecorderClients.remove(client);
ALOGV("Delete media recorder client");
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6302/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=e97763c92c655dcf4af2860b3abd2bc4c8a267f9
|
e97763c92c655dcf4af2860b3abd2bc4c8a267f9
| null |
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
|
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::CheckIfAudioSinkExistsAndIsAuthorized(
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
const blink::WebSecurityOrigin& security_origin,
blink::WebSetSinkIdCallbacks* web_callbacks) {
media::OutputDeviceStatusCB callback =
media::ConvertToOutputDeviceStatusCB(web_callbacks);
callback.Run(AudioDeviceFactory::GetOutputDeviceInfo(
GetRoutingID(), 0, sink_id.Utf8(), security_origin)
.device_status());
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::CheckIfAudioSinkExistsAndIsAuthorized(
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
const blink::WebSecurityOrigin& security_origin,
blink::WebSetSinkIdCallbacks* web_callbacks) {
media::OutputDeviceStatusCB callback =
media::ConvertToOutputDeviceStatusCB(web_callbacks);
callback.Run(AudioDeviceFactory::GetOutputDeviceInfo(
GetRoutingID(), 0, sink_id.Utf8(), security_origin)
.device_status());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14879/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
|
print_usage(void)
{
print_version();
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s [-aAbd" D_FLAG "efhH" I_FLAG J_FLAG "KlLnNOpqStu" U_FLAG "vxX#]" B_FLAG_USAGE " [ -c count ]\n", program_name);
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -C file_size ] [ -E algo:secret ] [ -F file ] [ -G seconds ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -i interface ]" j_FLAG_USAGE " [ -M secret ] [ --number ]\n");
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -Q in|out|inout ]\n");
#endif
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -r file ] [ -s snaplen ] ");
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_PRECISION
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ --time-stamp-precision precision ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t");
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_IMMEDIATE_MODE
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ --immediate-mode ] ");
#endif
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ -T type ] [ --version ] [ -V file ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -w file ] [ -W filecount ] [ -y datalinktype ] [ -z postrotate-command ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -Z user ] [ expression ]\n");
}
|
print_usage(void)
{
print_version();
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s [-aAbd" D_FLAG "efhH" I_FLAG J_FLAG "KlLnNOpqStu" U_FLAG "vxX#]" B_FLAG_USAGE " [ -c count ]\n", program_name);
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -C file_size ] [ -E algo:secret ] [ -F file ] [ -G seconds ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -i interface ]" j_FLAG_USAGE " [ -M secret ] [ --number ]\n");
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -Q in|out|inout ]\n");
#endif
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -r file ] [ -s snaplen ] ");
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_PRECISION
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ --time-stamp-precision precision ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t");
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_IMMEDIATE_MODE
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ --immediate-mode ] ");
#endif
(void)fprintf(stderr, "[ -T type ] [ --version ] [ -V file ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -w file ] [ -W filecount ] [ -y datalinktype ] [ -z postrotate-command ]\n");
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"\t\t[ -Z user ] [ expression ]\n");
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagAVCHandle));
mHandle->AVCObject = NULL;
mHandle->userData = this;
mHandle->CBAVC_DPBAlloc = DpbAllocWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_FrameBind = BindFrameWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_FrameUnbind = UnbindFrameWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_Malloc = MallocWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_Free = FreeWrapper;
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(*mEncParams));
mEncParams->rate_control = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->initQP = 0;
mEncParams->init_CBP_removal_delay = 1600;
mEncParams->intramb_refresh = 0;
mEncParams->auto_scd = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->out_of_band_param_set = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->poc_type = 2;
mEncParams->log2_max_poc_lsb_minus_4 = 12;
mEncParams->delta_poc_zero_flag = 0;
mEncParams->offset_poc_non_ref = 0;
mEncParams->offset_top_bottom = 0;
mEncParams->num_ref_in_cycle = 0;
mEncParams->offset_poc_ref = NULL;
mEncParams->num_ref_frame = 1;
mEncParams->num_slice_group = 1;
mEncParams->fmo_type = 0;
mEncParams->db_filter = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->disable_db_idc = 0;
mEncParams->alpha_offset = 0;
mEncParams->beta_offset = 0;
mEncParams->constrained_intra_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->data_par = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->fullsearch = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->search_range = 16;
mEncParams->sub_pel = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->submb_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->rdopt_mode = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->bidir_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->use_overrun_buffer = AVC_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
if (((uint64_t)mWidth * mHeight) > ((uint64_t)INT32_MAX / 3)) {
ALOGE("Buffer size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mEncParams->width = mWidth;
mEncParams->height = mHeight;
mEncParams->bitrate = mBitrate;
mEncParams->frame_rate = (1000 * mFramerate) >> 16; // In frames/ms!, mFramerate is in Q16
mEncParams->CPB_size = (uint32_t) (mBitrate >> 1);
int32_t nMacroBlocks = divUp(mWidth, 16) * divUp(mHeight, 16);
CHECK(mSliceGroup == NULL);
if ((size_t)nMacroBlocks > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGE("requested memory size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mSliceGroup = (uint32_t *) malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * nMacroBlocks);
CHECK(mSliceGroup != NULL);
for (int ii = 0, idx = 0; ii < nMacroBlocks; ++ii) {
mSliceGroup[ii] = idx++;
if (idx >= mEncParams->num_slice_group) {
idx = 0;
}
}
mEncParams->slice_group = mSliceGroup;
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->idr_period = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->idr_period = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->idr_period =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16
}
mEncParams->profile = mAVCEncProfile;
mEncParams->level = mAVCEncLevel;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagAVCHandle));
mHandle->AVCObject = NULL;
mHandle->userData = this;
mHandle->CBAVC_DPBAlloc = DpbAllocWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_FrameBind = BindFrameWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_FrameUnbind = UnbindFrameWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_Malloc = MallocWrapper;
mHandle->CBAVC_Free = FreeWrapper;
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(*mEncParams));
mEncParams->rate_control = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->initQP = 0;
mEncParams->init_CBP_removal_delay = 1600;
mEncParams->intramb_refresh = 0;
mEncParams->auto_scd = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->out_of_band_param_set = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->poc_type = 2;
mEncParams->log2_max_poc_lsb_minus_4 = 12;
mEncParams->delta_poc_zero_flag = 0;
mEncParams->offset_poc_non_ref = 0;
mEncParams->offset_top_bottom = 0;
mEncParams->num_ref_in_cycle = 0;
mEncParams->offset_poc_ref = NULL;
mEncParams->num_ref_frame = 1;
mEncParams->num_slice_group = 1;
mEncParams->fmo_type = 0;
mEncParams->db_filter = AVC_ON;
mEncParams->disable_db_idc = 0;
mEncParams->alpha_offset = 0;
mEncParams->beta_offset = 0;
mEncParams->constrained_intra_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->data_par = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->fullsearch = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->search_range = 16;
mEncParams->sub_pel = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->submb_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->rdopt_mode = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->bidir_pred = AVC_OFF;
mEncParams->use_overrun_buffer = AVC_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
if (((uint64_t)mWidth * mHeight) > ((uint64_t)INT32_MAX / 3)) {
ALOGE("Buffer size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mEncParams->width = mWidth;
mEncParams->height = mHeight;
mEncParams->bitrate = mBitrate;
mEncParams->frame_rate = (1000 * mFramerate) >> 16; // In frames/ms!, mFramerate is in Q16
mEncParams->CPB_size = (uint32_t) (mBitrate >> 1);
int32_t nMacroBlocks = divUp(mWidth, 16) * divUp(mHeight, 16);
CHECK(mSliceGroup == NULL);
if ((size_t)nMacroBlocks > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGE("requested memory size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mSliceGroup = (uint32_t *) malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * nMacroBlocks);
CHECK(mSliceGroup != NULL);
for (int ii = 0, idx = 0; ii < nMacroBlocks; ++ii) {
mSliceGroup[ii] = idx++;
if (idx >= mEncParams->num_slice_group) {
idx = 0;
}
}
mEncParams->slice_group = mSliceGroup;
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->idr_period = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->idr_period = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->idr_period =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16
}
mEncParams->profile = mAVCEncProfile;
mEncParams->level = mAVCEncLevel;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4da7eefcaad044a6f919947a2a0e3d4fed87834c
|
4da7eefcaad044a6f919947a2a0e3d4fed87834c
|
[Qt] Remove QOpenGL specific code from GraphicsSurfaceGLX.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100492
This patch removes most of the QOpenGLContext related code
from GraphicsSurfaceGLX. This allows sharing almost all
GraphicsSurfaceGLX code with EFL, by relying on pure GLX.
Patch by Zeno Albisser <[email protected]> on 2012-10-26
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
* platform/graphics/surfaces/qt/GraphicsSurfaceGLX.cpp:
(WebCore::OffScreenRootWindow::get):
(WebCore::OffScreenRootWindow::~OffScreenRootWindow):
(OffScreenRootWindow):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::GraphicsSurfacePrivate):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::createSurface):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::makeCurrent):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::doneCurrent):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::swapBuffers):
(WebCore::GraphicsSurfacePrivate::copyFromTexture):
(GraphicsSurfacePrivate):
(WebCore::resolveGLMethods):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@132628 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<Image> GraphicsSurface::createReadOnlyImage(const IntRect&)
{
notImplemented();
return 0;
}
|
PassRefPtr<Image> GraphicsSurface::createReadOnlyImage(const IntRect&)
{
notImplemented();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static void parse_new_commit(const char *arg)
{
static struct strbuf msg = STRBUF_INIT;
struct branch *b;
char *author = NULL;
char *committer = NULL;
struct hash_list *merge_list = NULL;
unsigned int merge_count;
unsigned char prev_fanout, new_fanout;
const char *v;
b = lookup_branch(arg);
if (!b)
b = new_branch(arg);
read_next_command();
parse_mark();
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "author ", &v)) {
author = parse_ident(v);
read_next_command();
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "committer ", &v)) {
committer = parse_ident(v);
read_next_command();
}
if (!committer)
die("Expected committer but didn't get one");
parse_data(&msg, 0, NULL);
read_next_command();
parse_from(b);
merge_list = parse_merge(&merge_count);
/* ensure the branch is active/loaded */
if (!b->branch_tree.tree || !max_active_branches) {
unload_one_branch();
load_branch(b);
}
prev_fanout = convert_num_notes_to_fanout(b->num_notes);
/* file_change* */
while (command_buf.len > 0) {
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "M ", &v))
file_change_m(v, b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "D ", &v))
file_change_d(v, b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "R ", &v))
file_change_cr(v, b, 1);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "C ", &v))
file_change_cr(v, b, 0);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "N ", &v))
note_change_n(v, b, &prev_fanout);
else if (!strcmp("deleteall", command_buf.buf))
file_change_deleteall(b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "ls ", &v))
parse_ls(v, b);
else {
unread_command_buf = 1;
break;
}
if (read_next_command() == EOF)
break;
}
new_fanout = convert_num_notes_to_fanout(b->num_notes);
if (new_fanout != prev_fanout)
b->num_notes = change_note_fanout(&b->branch_tree, new_fanout);
/* build the tree and the commit */
store_tree(&b->branch_tree);
hashcpy(b->branch_tree.versions[0].sha1,
b->branch_tree.versions[1].sha1);
strbuf_reset(&new_data);
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "tree %s\n",
sha1_to_hex(b->branch_tree.versions[1].sha1));
if (!is_null_sha1(b->sha1))
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "parent %s\n", sha1_to_hex(b->sha1));
while (merge_list) {
struct hash_list *next = merge_list->next;
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "parent %s\n", sha1_to_hex(merge_list->sha1));
free(merge_list);
merge_list = next;
}
strbuf_addf(&new_data,
"author %s\n"
"committer %s\n"
"\n",
author ? author : committer, committer);
strbuf_addbuf(&new_data, &msg);
free(author);
free(committer);
if (!store_object(OBJ_COMMIT, &new_data, NULL, b->sha1, next_mark))
b->pack_id = pack_id;
b->last_commit = object_count_by_type[OBJ_COMMIT];
}
|
static void parse_new_commit(const char *arg)
{
static struct strbuf msg = STRBUF_INIT;
struct branch *b;
char *author = NULL;
char *committer = NULL;
struct hash_list *merge_list = NULL;
unsigned int merge_count;
unsigned char prev_fanout, new_fanout;
const char *v;
b = lookup_branch(arg);
if (!b)
b = new_branch(arg);
read_next_command();
parse_mark();
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "author ", &v)) {
author = parse_ident(v);
read_next_command();
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "committer ", &v)) {
committer = parse_ident(v);
read_next_command();
}
if (!committer)
die("Expected committer but didn't get one");
parse_data(&msg, 0, NULL);
read_next_command();
parse_from(b);
merge_list = parse_merge(&merge_count);
/* ensure the branch is active/loaded */
if (!b->branch_tree.tree || !max_active_branches) {
unload_one_branch();
load_branch(b);
}
prev_fanout = convert_num_notes_to_fanout(b->num_notes);
/* file_change* */
while (command_buf.len > 0) {
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "M ", &v))
file_change_m(v, b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "D ", &v))
file_change_d(v, b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "R ", &v))
file_change_cr(v, b, 1);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "C ", &v))
file_change_cr(v, b, 0);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "N ", &v))
note_change_n(v, b, &prev_fanout);
else if (!strcmp("deleteall", command_buf.buf))
file_change_deleteall(b);
else if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "ls ", &v))
parse_ls(v, b);
else {
unread_command_buf = 1;
break;
}
if (read_next_command() == EOF)
break;
}
new_fanout = convert_num_notes_to_fanout(b->num_notes);
if (new_fanout != prev_fanout)
b->num_notes = change_note_fanout(&b->branch_tree, new_fanout);
/* build the tree and the commit */
store_tree(&b->branch_tree);
hashcpy(b->branch_tree.versions[0].sha1,
b->branch_tree.versions[1].sha1);
strbuf_reset(&new_data);
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "tree %s\n",
sha1_to_hex(b->branch_tree.versions[1].sha1));
if (!is_null_sha1(b->sha1))
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "parent %s\n", sha1_to_hex(b->sha1));
while (merge_list) {
struct hash_list *next = merge_list->next;
strbuf_addf(&new_data, "parent %s\n", sha1_to_hex(merge_list->sha1));
free(merge_list);
merge_list = next;
}
strbuf_addf(&new_data,
"author %s\n"
"committer %s\n"
"\n",
author ? author : committer, committer);
strbuf_addbuf(&new_data, &msg);
free(author);
free(committer);
if (!store_object(OBJ_COMMIT, &new_data, NULL, b->sha1, next_mark))
b->pack_id = pack_id;
b->last_commit = object_count_by_type[OBJ_COMMIT];
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8655
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8655/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
if (po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
|
static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
if (po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
bool Editor::findString(const String& target, FindOptions options) {
VisibleSelection selection =
frame().selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
Range* resultRange = findRangeOfString(
target, EphemeralRange(selection.start(), selection.end()),
static_cast<FindOptions>(options | FindAPICall));
if (!resultRange)
return false;
frame().selection().setSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.setBaseAndExtent(EphemeralRange(resultRange))
.build());
frame().selection().revealSelection();
return true;
}
|
bool Editor::findString(const String& target, FindOptions options) {
VisibleSelection selection =
frame().selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
Range* resultRange = findRangeOfString(
target, EphemeralRange(selection.start(), selection.end()),
static_cast<FindOptions>(options | FindAPICall));
if (!resultRange)
return false;
frame().selection().setSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.setBaseAndExtent(EphemeralRange(resultRange))
.build());
frame().selection().revealSelection();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5803
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5803/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0e3b0c22a5c596bdc24a391b3f02952c1c3e4f1b
|
0e3b0c22a5c596bdc24a391b3f02952c1c3e4f1b
|
Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
|
String Location::search() const {
return DOMURLUtilsReadOnly::search(Url());
}
|
String Location::search() const {
return DOMURLUtilsReadOnly::search(Url());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
SpoolssEnumForms_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
guint32 level;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
/* EnumForms() stores the level in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
dcv->se_data = GINT_TO_POINTER((int)level);
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
SpoolssEnumForms_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
guint32 level;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
/* EnumForms() stores the level in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
dcv->se_data = GINT_TO_POINTER((int)level);
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1698
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1698/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
[Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
|
v8::Local<v8::Object> V8SchemaRegistry::GetSchema(const std::string& api) {
if (schema_cache_ != NULL) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> cached_schema = schema_cache_->Get(api);
if (!cached_schema.IsEmpty()) {
return cached_schema;
}
}
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = GetOrCreateContext(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
const base::DictionaryValue* schema =
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetSchema(api);
CHECK(schema) << api;
std::unique_ptr<V8ValueConverter> v8_value_converter(
V8ValueConverter::create());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = v8_value_converter->ToV8Value(schema, context);
CHECK(!value.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_schema(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
DeepFreeze(v8_schema, context);
schema_cache_->Set(api, v8_schema);
return handle_scope.Escape(v8_schema);
}
|
v8::Local<v8::Object> V8SchemaRegistry::GetSchema(const std::string& api) {
if (schema_cache_ != NULL) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> cached_schema = schema_cache_->Get(api);
if (!cached_schema.IsEmpty()) {
return cached_schema;
}
}
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = GetOrCreateContext(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
const base::DictionaryValue* schema =
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetSchema(api);
CHECK(schema) << api;
std::unique_ptr<V8ValueConverter> v8_value_converter(
V8ValueConverter::create());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = v8_value_converter->ToV8Value(schema, context);
CHECK(!value.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_schema(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
v8_schema->SetIntegrityLevel(context, v8::IntegrityLevel::kFrozen);
schema_cache_->Set(api, v8_schema);
return handle_scope.Escape(v8_schema);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-4943
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4943/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf
|
3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf
|
net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit pppol2tp_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_L2TP_V3
l2tp_nl_unregister_ops(L2TP_PWTYPE_PPP);
#endif
unregister_pppox_proto(PX_PROTO_OL2TP);
proto_unregister(&pppol2tp_sk_proto);
unregister_pernet_device(&pppol2tp_net_ops);
}
|
static void __exit pppol2tp_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_L2TP_V3
l2tp_nl_unregister_ops(L2TP_PWTYPE_PPP);
#endif
unregister_pppox_proto(PX_PROTO_OL2TP);
proto_unregister(&pppol2tp_sk_proto);
unregister_pernet_device(&pppol2tp_net_ops);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
ssl_cb_info (SSL * s, int where, int ret)
{
/* char buf[128];*/
return; /* FIXME: make debug level adjustable in serverlist or settings */
/* snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%s (%d)", SSL_state_string_long (s), where);
if (g_sess)
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, g_sess, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
else
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", buf);*/
}
|
ssl_cb_info (SSL * s, int where, int ret)
{
/* char buf[128];*/
return; /* FIXME: make debug level adjustable in serverlist or settings */
/* snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%s (%d)", SSL_state_string_long (s), where);
if (g_sess)
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, g_sess, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
else
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", buf);*/
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4162/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void udpv6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
if (static_key_false(&udpv6_encap_needed) && up->encap_type) {
void (*encap_destroy)(struct sock *sk);
encap_destroy = ACCESS_ONCE(up->encap_destroy);
if (encap_destroy)
encap_destroy(sk);
}
inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
void udpv6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
if (static_key_false(&udpv6_encap_needed) && up->encap_type) {
void (*encap_destroy)(struct sock *sk);
encap_destroy = ACCESS_ONCE(up->encap_destroy);
if (encap_destroy)
encap_destroy(sk);
}
inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
bool DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::HasCanOfferSigninError() {
std::string error_msg;
bool can_offer =
CanOfferSignin(profile_, CAN_OFFER_SIGNIN_FOR_ALL_ACCOUNTS,
account_info_.gaia, account_info_.email, &error_msg);
if (can_offer)
return false;
delegate_->ShowLoginError(account_info_.email, error_msg);
return true;
}
|
bool DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::HasCanOfferSigninError() {
std::string error_msg;
bool can_offer =
CanOfferSignin(profile_, CAN_OFFER_SIGNIN_FOR_ALL_ACCOUNTS,
account_info_.gaia, account_info_.email, &error_msg);
if (can_offer)
return false;
delegate_->ShowLoginError(account_info_.email, error_msg);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11593
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11593/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/bed844f109b6c222816740555068de2e101e8018
|
bed844f109b6c222816740555068de2e101e8018
|
remove strncpy usage as it's effectively useless, replace with an assertion since fn is only used internally (fix #1426)
|
void jslFunctionCharAsString(unsigned char ch, char *str, size_t len) {
if (ch >= LEX_TOKEN_START) {
jslTokenAsString(ch, str, len);
} else {
str[0] = (char)ch;
str[1] = 0;
}
}
|
void jslFunctionCharAsString(unsigned char ch, char *str, size_t len) {
if (ch >= LEX_TOKEN_START) {
jslTokenAsString(ch, str, len);
} else {
str[0] = (char)ch;
str[1] = 0;
}
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17468/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsAdSubframe() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return GetFrame()->IsAdSubframe();
}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsAdSubframe() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return GetFrame()->IsAdSubframe();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int tipc_sk_rht_init(struct net *net)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
return rhashtable_init(&tn->sk_rht, &tsk_rht_params);
}
|
int tipc_sk_rht_init(struct net *net)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
return rhashtable_init(&tn->sk_rht, &tsk_rht_params);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2870/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
explicit TestURLRequestContextWithProxy(const std::string& proxy)
: TestURLRequestContext(true) {
context_storage_.set_proxy_service(ProxyService::CreateFixed(proxy));
Init();
}
|
explicit TestURLRequestContextWithProxy(const std::string& proxy)
: TestURLRequestContext(true) {
context_storage_.set_proxy_service(ProxyService::CreateFixed(proxy));
Init();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4127/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int multipath_busy(struct dm_target *ti)
{
int busy = 0, has_active = 0;
struct multipath *m = ti->private;
struct priority_group *pg;
struct pgpath *pgpath;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
/* Guess which priority_group will be used at next mapping time */
if (unlikely(!m->current_pgpath && m->next_pg))
pg = m->next_pg;
else if (likely(m->current_pg))
pg = m->current_pg;
else
/*
* We don't know which pg will be used at next mapping time.
* We don't call __choose_pgpath() here to avoid to trigger
* pg_init just by busy checking.
* So we don't know whether underlying devices we will be using
* at next mapping time are busy or not. Just try mapping.
*/
goto out;
/*
* If there is one non-busy active path at least, the path selector
* will be able to select it. So we consider such a pg as not busy.
*/
busy = 1;
list_for_each_entry(pgpath, &pg->pgpaths, list)
if (pgpath->is_active) {
has_active = 1;
if (!__pgpath_busy(pgpath)) {
busy = 0;
break;
}
}
if (!has_active)
/*
* No active path in this pg, so this pg won't be used and
* the current_pg will be changed at next mapping time.
* We need to try mapping to determine it.
*/
busy = 0;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return busy;
}
|
static int multipath_busy(struct dm_target *ti)
{
int busy = 0, has_active = 0;
struct multipath *m = ti->private;
struct priority_group *pg;
struct pgpath *pgpath;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
/* Guess which priority_group will be used at next mapping time */
if (unlikely(!m->current_pgpath && m->next_pg))
pg = m->next_pg;
else if (likely(m->current_pg))
pg = m->current_pg;
else
/*
* We don't know which pg will be used at next mapping time.
* We don't call __choose_pgpath() here to avoid to trigger
* pg_init just by busy checking.
* So we don't know whether underlying devices we will be using
* at next mapping time are busy or not. Just try mapping.
*/
goto out;
/*
* If there is one non-busy active path at least, the path selector
* will be able to select it. So we consider such a pg as not busy.
*/
busy = 1;
list_for_each_entry(pgpath, &pg->pgpaths, list)
if (pgpath->is_active) {
has_active = 1;
if (!__pgpath_busy(pgpath)) {
busy = 0;
break;
}
}
if (!has_active)
/*
* No active path in this pg, so this pg won't be used and
* the current_pg will be changed at next mapping time.
* We need to try mapping to determine it.
*/
busy = 0;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return busy;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10067/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/0474237508f39c4f783208123431815f1ededb76
|
0474237508f39c4f783208123431815f1ededb76
|
Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
MagickExport ExceptionInfo *AcquireExceptionInfo(void)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
exception=(ExceptionInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*exception));
if (exception == (ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
InitializeExceptionInfo(exception);
exception->relinquish=MagickTrue;
return(exception);
}
|
MagickExport ExceptionInfo *AcquireExceptionInfo(void)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
exception=(ExceptionInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*exception));
if (exception == (ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
InitializeExceptionInfo(exception);
exception->relinquish=MagickTrue;
return(exception);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6386/
|
CWE-772
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/?id=737c3350850ca4dbc5633b3bdb4118176ce59920
|
737c3350850ca4dbc5633b3bdb4118176ce59920
| null |
static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *lookup_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
GLuint vs_id, GLuint fs_id, GLuint gs_id, bool dual_src)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *ent;
LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(ent, &ctx->sub->programs, head) {
if (ent->dual_src_linked != dual_src)
continue;
if (ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX]->id == vs_id && ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT]->id == fs_id) {
if (!ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] && gs_id == 0)
return ent;
if (ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] && ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY]->id == gs_id)
return ent;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *lookup_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
GLuint vs_id, GLuint fs_id, GLuint gs_id, bool dual_src)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *ent;
LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(ent, &ctx->sub->programs, head) {
if (ent->dual_src_linked != dual_src)
continue;
if (ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX]->id == vs_id && ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT]->id == fs_id) {
if (!ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] && gs_id == 0)
return ent;
if (ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] && ent->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY]->id == gs_id)
return ent;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
virglrenderer
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0228
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0228/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int req_info(lua_State *L)
{
return req_log_at(L, APLOG_INFO);
}
|
static int req_info(lua_State *L)
{
return req_log_at(L, APLOG_INFO);
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static inline int cma_zero_addr(struct sockaddr *addr)
{
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return ipv4_is_zeronet(((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr);
case AF_INET6:
return ipv6_addr_any(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_addr);
case AF_IB:
return ib_addr_any(&((struct sockaddr_ib *) addr)->sib_addr);
default:
return 0;
}
}
|
static inline int cma_zero_addr(struct sockaddr *addr)
{
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return ipv4_is_zeronet(((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr);
case AF_INET6:
return ipv6_addr_any(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_addr);
case AF_IB:
return ib_addr_any(&((struct sockaddr_ib *) addr)->sib_addr);
default:
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5222/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e4ebe078840e65d673722e94f8251b334030b5e8
|
e4ebe078840e65d673722e94f8251b334030b5e8
|
Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
|
void NavigatorImpl::DidStartMainFrameNavigation(
const GURL& url,
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
NavigationEntryImpl* pending_entry = controller_->GetPendingEntry();
bool has_browser_initiated_pending_entry =
pending_entry && !pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated();
bool has_transient_entry = !!controller_->GetTransientEntry();
if (!has_browser_initiated_pending_entry && !has_transient_entry) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
controller_->CreateNavigationEntry(
url, content::Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */, std::string(),
controller_->GetBrowserContext()));
entry->set_site_instance(site_instance);
if (pending_entry) {
entry->set_transferred_global_request_id(
pending_entry->transferred_global_request_id());
entry->set_should_replace_entry(pending_entry->should_replace_entry());
entry->SetRedirectChain(pending_entry->GetRedirectChain());
}
if (navigation_handle)
navigation_handle->update_entry_id_for_transfer(entry->GetUniqueID());
controller_->SetPendingEntry(std::move(entry));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->NotifyChangedNavigationState(content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
}
|
void NavigatorImpl::DidStartMainFrameNavigation(
const GURL& url,
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
NavigationEntryImpl* pending_entry = controller_->GetPendingEntry();
bool has_browser_initiated_pending_entry =
pending_entry && !pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated();
bool has_transient_entry = !!controller_->GetTransientEntry();
if (!has_browser_initiated_pending_entry && !has_transient_entry) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
controller_->CreateNavigationEntry(
url, content::Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */, std::string(),
controller_->GetBrowserContext()));
entry->set_site_instance(site_instance);
if (pending_entry) {
entry->set_transferred_global_request_id(
pending_entry->transferred_global_request_id());
entry->set_should_replace_entry(pending_entry->should_replace_entry());
entry->SetRedirectChain(pending_entry->GetRedirectChain());
}
if (navigation_handle)
navigation_handle->update_entry_id_for_transfer(entry->GetUniqueID());
controller_->SetPendingEntry(std::move(entry));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->NotifyChangedNavigationState(content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2789/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceTracker::InstanceDeleted(PP_Instance instance) {
CleanupInstanceData(instance, true);
}
|
void ResourceTracker::InstanceDeleted(PP_Instance instance) {
CleanupInstanceData(instance, true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6787/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
|
static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
TemplateURL::AssociatedExtensionInfo::~AssociatedExtensionInfo() {
}
|
TemplateURL::AssociatedExtensionInfo::~AssociatedExtensionInfo() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5844
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5844/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
|
time_from_tm(struct tm *t)
{
#if HAVE_TIMEGM
/* Use platform timegm() if available. */
return (timegm(t));
#elif HAVE__MKGMTIME64
return (_mkgmtime64(t));
#else
/* Else use direct calculation using POSIX assumptions. */
/* First, fix up tm_yday based on the year/month/day. */
if (mktime(t) == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)-1);
/* Then we can compute timegm() from first principles. */
return (t->tm_sec
+ t->tm_min * 60
+ t->tm_hour * 3600
+ t->tm_yday * 86400
+ (t->tm_year - 70) * 31536000
+ ((t->tm_year - 69) / 4) * 86400
- ((t->tm_year - 1) / 100) * 86400
+ ((t->tm_year + 299) / 400) * 86400);
#endif
}
|
time_from_tm(struct tm *t)
{
#if HAVE_TIMEGM
/* Use platform timegm() if available. */
return (timegm(t));
#elif HAVE__MKGMTIME64
return (_mkgmtime64(t));
#else
/* Else use direct calculation using POSIX assumptions. */
/* First, fix up tm_yday based on the year/month/day. */
if (mktime(t) == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)-1);
/* Then we can compute timegm() from first principles. */
return (t->tm_sec
+ t->tm_min * 60
+ t->tm_hour * 3600
+ t->tm_yday * 86400
+ (t->tm_year - 70) * 31536000
+ ((t->tm_year - 69) / 4) * 86400
- ((t->tm_year - 1) / 100) * 86400
+ ((t->tm_year + 299) / 400) * 86400);
#endif
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cf563aba8f4b3bab68e9bfe43824d952241dcf7
|
7cf563aba8f4b3bab68e9bfe43824d952241dcf7
|
Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual ~Core() {}
|
virtual ~Core() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1097/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e
|
c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e
|
regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int write_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info,
struct file *file, loff_t *foffset)
{
bool first = 1;
struct elf_thread_core_info *t = info->thread;
do {
int i;
if (!writenote(&t->notes[0], file, foffset))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->psinfo, file, foffset))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->auxv, file, foffset))
return 0;
for (i = 1; i < info->thread_notes; ++i)
if (t->notes[i].data &&
!writenote(&t->notes[i], file, foffset))
return 0;
first = 0;
t = t->next;
} while (t);
return 1;
}
|
static int write_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info,
struct file *file, loff_t *foffset)
{
bool first = 1;
struct elf_thread_core_info *t = info->thread;
do {
int i;
if (!writenote(&t->notes[0], file, foffset))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->psinfo, file, foffset))
return 0;
if (first && !writenote(&info->auxv, file, foffset))
return 0;
for (i = 1; i < info->thread_notes; ++i)
if (t->notes[i].data &&
!writenote(&t->notes[i], file, foffset))
return 0;
first = 0;
t = t->next;
} while (t);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3107/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
89e4098439f73cb5c16996511cbfdb171a26e173
|
[Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static inline QString toQString(JSStringRef string)
{
return QString(reinterpret_cast<const QChar*>(JSStringGetCharactersPtr(string)), JSStringGetLength(string));
}
|
static inline QString toQString(JSStringRef string)
{
return QString(reinterpret_cast<const QChar*>(JSStringGetCharactersPtr(string)), JSStringGetLength(string));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3291
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3291/
|
CWE-119
|
http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/commitdiff/14cae65318d3ef1f7d449e463b72b6934e82f1c2
|
14cae65318d3ef1f7d449e463b72b6934e82f1c2
| null |
static int appendenv(const char *opt, const char *new)
{
char buf[1024];
char *old = getenv(opt);
buf[1023] = 0;
if (old)
snprintf(buf, 1023, "%s %s", old, new);
else
snprintf(buf, 1023, "%s", new);
return setenv(opt, buf, 1);
}
|
static int appendenv(const char *opt, const char *new)
{
char buf[1024];
char *old = getenv(opt);
buf[1023] = 0;
if (old)
snprintf(buf, 1023, "%s %s", old, new);
else
snprintf(buf, 1023, "%s", new);
return setenv(opt, buf, 1);
}
|
C
|
infradead
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1858/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
|
e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
|
userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline struct task_struct *alloc_task_struct_node(int node)
{
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, GFP_KERNEL, node);
}
|
static inline struct task_struct *alloc_task_struct_node(int node)
{
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, GFP_KERNEL, node);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long Tracks::ParseTrackEntry(long long track_start, long long track_size,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
Track*& pResult) const {
if (pResult)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = track_start;
const long long track_stop = track_start + track_size;
Track::Info info;
info.type = 0;
info.number = 0;
info.uid = 0;
info.defaultDuration = 0;
Track::Settings v;
v.start = -1;
v.size = -1;
Track::Settings a;
a.start = -1;
a.size = -1;
Track::Settings e; // content_encodings_settings;
e.start = -1;
e.size = -1;
long long lacing = 1; // default is true
while (pos < track_stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, track_stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long start = pos;
if (id == 0x60) { // VideoSettings ID
v.start = start;
v.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x61) { // AudioSettings ID
a.start = start;
a.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x2D80) { // ContentEncodings ID
e.start = start;
e.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x33C5) { // Track UID
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.uid = 0;
long long pos_ = start;
const long long pos_end = start + size;
while (pos_ != pos_end) {
unsigned char b;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos_, 1, &b);
if (status)
return status;
info.uid <<= 8;
info.uid |= b;
++pos_;
}
} else if (id == 0x57) { // Track Number
const long long num = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((num <= 0) || (num > 127))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.number = static_cast<long>(num);
} else if (id == 0x03) { // Track Type
const long long type = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((type <= 0) || (type > 254))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.type = static_cast<long>(type);
} else if (id == 0x136E) { // Track Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.nameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x02B59C) { // Track Language
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x03E383) { // Default Duration
const long long duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.defaultDuration = static_cast<unsigned long long>(duration);
} else if (id == 0x06) { // CodecID
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecId);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1C) { // lacing
lacing = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((lacing < 0) || (lacing > 1))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x23A2) { // Codec Private
delete[] info.codecPrivate;
info.codecPrivate = NULL;
info.codecPrivateSize = 0;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
if (buflen) {
unsigned char* buf = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, buflen);
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
info.codecPrivate = buf;
info.codecPrivateSize = buflen;
}
} else if (id == 0x058688) { // Codec Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecNameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x16AA) { // Codec Delay
info.codecDelay = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x16BB) { // Seek Pre Roll
info.seekPreRoll = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > track_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != track_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.number <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (GetTrackByNumber(info.number))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.lacing = (lacing > 0) ? true : false;
if (info.type == Track::kVideo) {
if (v.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = v;
VideoTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = VideoTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else if (info.type == Track::kAudio) {
if (a.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = a;
AudioTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = AudioTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else {
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type == Track::kMetadata && e.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings.start = -1;
info.settings.size = 0;
Track* pTrack = NULL;
const long status =
Track::Create(m_pSegment, info, element_start, element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
}
return 0; // success
}
|
long Tracks::ParseTrackEntry(long long track_start, long long track_size,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
Track*& pResult) const {
if (pResult)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = track_start;
const long long track_stop = track_start + track_size;
Track::Info info;
info.type = 0;
info.number = 0;
info.uid = 0;
info.defaultDuration = 0;
Track::Settings v;
v.start = -1;
v.size = -1;
Track::Settings a;
a.start = -1;
a.size = -1;
Track::Settings e; // content_encodings_settings;
e.start = -1;
e.size = -1;
long long lacing = 1; // default is true
while (pos < track_stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, track_stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long start = pos;
if (id == 0x60) { // VideoSettings ID
v.start = start;
v.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x61) { // AudioSettings ID
a.start = start;
a.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x2D80) { // ContentEncodings ID
e.start = start;
e.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x33C5) { // Track UID
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.uid = 0;
long long pos_ = start;
const long long pos_end = start + size;
while (pos_ != pos_end) {
unsigned char b;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos_, 1, &b);
if (status)
return status;
info.uid <<= 8;
info.uid |= b;
++pos_;
}
} else if (id == 0x57) { // Track Number
const long long num = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((num <= 0) || (num > 127))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.number = static_cast<long>(num);
} else if (id == 0x03) { // Track Type
const long long type = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((type <= 0) || (type > 254))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.type = static_cast<long>(type);
} else if (id == 0x136E) { // Track Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.nameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x02B59C) { // Track Language
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x03E383) { // Default Duration
const long long duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.defaultDuration = static_cast<unsigned long long>(duration);
} else if (id == 0x06) { // CodecID
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecId);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1C) { // lacing
lacing = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((lacing < 0) || (lacing > 1))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x23A2) { // Codec Private
delete[] info.codecPrivate;
info.codecPrivate = NULL;
info.codecPrivateSize = 0;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
if (buflen) {
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
info.codecPrivate = buf;
info.codecPrivateSize = buflen;
}
} else if (id == 0x058688) { // Codec Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecNameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x16AA) { // Codec Delay
info.codecDelay = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x16BB) { // Seek Pre Roll
info.seekPreRoll = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= track_stop);
}
assert(pos == track_stop);
if (info.number <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (GetTrackByNumber(info.number))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.lacing = (lacing > 0) ? true : false;
if (info.type == Track::kVideo) {
if (v.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = v;
VideoTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = VideoTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else if (info.type == Track::kAudio) {
if (a.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = a;
AudioTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = AudioTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else {
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type == Track::kMetadata && e.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings.start = -1;
info.settings.size = 0;
Track* pTrack = NULL;
const long status =
Track::Create(m_pSegment, info, element_start, element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
}
return 0; // success
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
bool CreateTable(sql::Database* db, const TableInfo& info) {
std::string sql("CREATE TABLE ");
sql += info.table_name;
sql += info.columns;
return db->Execute(sql.c_str());
}
|
bool CreateTable(sql::Database* db, const TableInfo& info) {
std::string sql("CREATE TABLE ");
sql += info.table_name;
sql += info.columns;
return db->Execute(sql.c_str());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6041/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
5cd363bc34f508c63b66e653bc41bd1783a4b711
|
Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
|
explicit RenderFrameHostDestructionObserver(RenderFrameHost* rfh)
: WebContentsObserver(WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(rfh)),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner),
deleted_(false),
render_frame_host_(rfh) {}
|
explicit RenderFrameHostDestructionObserver(RenderFrameHost* rfh)
: WebContentsObserver(WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(rfh)),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner),
deleted_(false),
render_frame_host_(rfh) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
void FS_Shutdown( qboolean closemfp ) {
searchpath_t *p, *next;
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_FILE_HANDLES; i++ ) {
if ( fsh[i].fileSize ) {
FS_FCloseFile( i );
}
}
for ( p = fs_searchpaths ; p ; p = next ) {
next = p->next;
if(p->pack)
FS_FreePak(p->pack);
if (p->dir)
Z_Free(p->dir);
Z_Free(p);
}
fs_searchpaths = NULL;
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "path" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "dir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "fdir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "touchFile" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "which" );
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if ( closemfp ) {
fclose( missingFiles );
}
#endif
}
|
void FS_Shutdown( qboolean closemfp ) {
searchpath_t *p, *next;
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_FILE_HANDLES; i++ ) {
if ( fsh[i].fileSize ) {
FS_FCloseFile( i );
}
}
for ( p = fs_searchpaths ; p ; p = next ) {
next = p->next;
if(p->pack)
FS_FreePak(p->pack);
if (p->dir)
Z_Free(p->dir);
Z_Free(p);
}
fs_searchpaths = NULL;
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "path" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "dir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "fdir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "touchFile" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "which" );
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if ( closemfp ) {
fclose( missingFiles );
}
#endif
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7969
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7969/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libass/libass/pull/240/commits/b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
|
ASS_Renderer *ass_renderer_init(ASS_Library *library)
{
int error;
FT_Library ft;
ASS_Renderer *priv = 0;
int vmajor, vminor, vpatch;
error = FT_Init_FreeType(&ft);
if (error) {
ass_msg(library, MSGL_FATAL, "%s failed", "FT_Init_FreeType");
goto ass_init_exit;
}
FT_Library_Version(ft, &vmajor, &vminor, &vpatch);
ass_msg(library, MSGL_V, "Raster: FreeType %d.%d.%d",
vmajor, vminor, vpatch);
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(ASS_Renderer));
if (!priv) {
FT_Done_FreeType(ft);
goto ass_init_exit;
}
priv->library = library;
priv->ftlibrary = ft;
#if (defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)) && CONFIG_ASM
if (has_avx2())
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_avx2;
else if (has_sse2())
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_sse2;
else
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_c;
#else
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_c;
#endif
#if CONFIG_RASTERIZER
rasterizer_init(&priv->rasterizer, 16);
#endif
priv->cache.font_cache = ass_font_cache_create();
priv->cache.bitmap_cache = ass_bitmap_cache_create();
priv->cache.composite_cache = ass_composite_cache_create();
priv->cache.outline_cache = ass_outline_cache_create();
priv->cache.glyph_max = GLYPH_CACHE_MAX;
priv->cache.bitmap_max_size = BITMAP_CACHE_MAX_SIZE;
priv->cache.composite_max_size = COMPOSITE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE;
priv->text_info.max_bitmaps = MAX_BITMAPS_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.max_glyphs = MAX_GLYPHS_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.max_lines = MAX_LINES_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.n_bitmaps = 0;
priv->text_info.combined_bitmaps = calloc(MAX_BITMAPS_INITIAL, sizeof(CombinedBitmapInfo));
priv->text_info.glyphs = calloc(MAX_GLYPHS_INITIAL, sizeof(GlyphInfo));
priv->text_info.lines = calloc(MAX_LINES_INITIAL, sizeof(LineInfo));
priv->settings.font_size_coeff = 1.;
priv->settings.selective_style_overrides = ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_SELECTIVE_FONT_SCALE;
priv->shaper = ass_shaper_new(0);
ass_shaper_info(library);
#ifdef CONFIG_HARFBUZZ
priv->settings.shaper = ASS_SHAPING_COMPLEX;
#else
priv->settings.shaper = ASS_SHAPING_SIMPLE;
#endif
ass_init_exit:
if (priv)
ass_msg(library, MSGL_V, "Initialized");
else
ass_msg(library, MSGL_ERR, "Initialization failed");
return priv;
}
|
ASS_Renderer *ass_renderer_init(ASS_Library *library)
{
int error;
FT_Library ft;
ASS_Renderer *priv = 0;
int vmajor, vminor, vpatch;
error = FT_Init_FreeType(&ft);
if (error) {
ass_msg(library, MSGL_FATAL, "%s failed", "FT_Init_FreeType");
goto ass_init_exit;
}
FT_Library_Version(ft, &vmajor, &vminor, &vpatch);
ass_msg(library, MSGL_V, "Raster: FreeType %d.%d.%d",
vmajor, vminor, vpatch);
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(ASS_Renderer));
if (!priv) {
FT_Done_FreeType(ft);
goto ass_init_exit;
}
priv->library = library;
priv->ftlibrary = ft;
#if (defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)) && CONFIG_ASM
if (has_avx2())
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_avx2;
else if (has_sse2())
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_sse2;
else
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_c;
#else
priv->engine = &ass_bitmap_engine_c;
#endif
#if CONFIG_RASTERIZER
rasterizer_init(&priv->rasterizer, 16);
#endif
priv->cache.font_cache = ass_font_cache_create();
priv->cache.bitmap_cache = ass_bitmap_cache_create();
priv->cache.composite_cache = ass_composite_cache_create();
priv->cache.outline_cache = ass_outline_cache_create();
priv->cache.glyph_max = GLYPH_CACHE_MAX;
priv->cache.bitmap_max_size = BITMAP_CACHE_MAX_SIZE;
priv->cache.composite_max_size = COMPOSITE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE;
priv->text_info.max_bitmaps = MAX_BITMAPS_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.max_glyphs = MAX_GLYPHS_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.max_lines = MAX_LINES_INITIAL;
priv->text_info.n_bitmaps = 0;
priv->text_info.combined_bitmaps = calloc(MAX_BITMAPS_INITIAL, sizeof(CombinedBitmapInfo));
priv->text_info.glyphs = calloc(MAX_GLYPHS_INITIAL, sizeof(GlyphInfo));
priv->text_info.lines = calloc(MAX_LINES_INITIAL, sizeof(LineInfo));
priv->settings.font_size_coeff = 1.;
priv->settings.selective_style_overrides = ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_SELECTIVE_FONT_SCALE;
priv->shaper = ass_shaper_new(0);
ass_shaper_info(library);
#ifdef CONFIG_HARFBUZZ
priv->settings.shaper = ASS_SHAPING_COMPLEX;
#else
priv->settings.shaper = ASS_SHAPING_SIMPLE;
#endif
ass_init_exit:
if (priv)
ass_msg(library, MSGL_V, "Initialized");
else
ass_msg(library, MSGL_ERR, "Initialization failed");
return priv;
}
|
C
|
libass
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void octetMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->octetMethod());
}
|
static void octetMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->octetMethod());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestObjReflectedCustomBooleanAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setBooleanAttribute(WebCore::HTMLNames::customContentBooleanAttrAttr, value.toBoolean(exec));
}
|
void setJSTestObjReflectedCustomBooleanAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setBooleanAttribute(WebCore::HTMLNames::customContentBooleanAttrAttr, value.toBoolean(exec));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9420/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d
|
f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d
|
isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static int check_sp(struct rock_ridge *rr, struct inode *inode)
{
if (rr->u.SP.magic[0] != 0xbe)
return -1;
if (rr->u.SP.magic[1] != 0xef)
return -1;
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset = rr->u.SP.skip;
return 0;
}
|
static int check_sp(struct rock_ridge *rr, struct inode *inode)
{
if (rr->u.SP.magic[0] != 0xbe)
return -1;
if (rr->u.SP.magic[1] != 0xef)
return -1;
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset = rr->u.SP.skip;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Framebuffer::UnbindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target, Renderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
bool done;
do {
done = true;
for (AttachmentMap::const_iterator it = attachments_.begin();
it != attachments_.end(); ++it) {
Attachment* attachment = it->second.get();
if (attachment->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer)) {
AttachRenderbuffer(it->first, NULL);
done = false;
break;
}
}
} while (!done);
}
|
void Framebuffer::UnbindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target, Renderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
bool done;
do {
done = true;
for (AttachmentMap::const_iterator it = attachments_.begin();
it != attachments_.end(); ++it) {
Attachment* attachment = it->second.get();
if (attachment->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer)) {
AttachRenderbuffer(it->first, NULL);
done = false;
break;
}
}
} while (!done);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int udp_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 dport)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udphdr *uh;
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)skb_dst(skb);
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
__wsum csum = 0;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = inet->inet_sport;
uh->dest = dport;
uh->len = htons(len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite) /* UDP-Lite */
csum = udplite_csum(skb);
else if (sk->sk_no_check == UDP_CSUM_NOXMIT) { /* UDP csum disabled */
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto send;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp4_hwcsum(skb, rt->rt_src, daddr);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum(skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_tcpudp_magic(rt->rt_src, daddr, len,
sk->sk_protocol, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip_send_skb(skb);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
return err;
}
|
static int udp_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 dport)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udphdr *uh;
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)skb_dst(skb);
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
__wsum csum = 0;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = inet->inet_sport;
uh->dest = dport;
uh->len = htons(len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite) /* UDP-Lite */
csum = udplite_csum(skb);
else if (sk->sk_no_check == UDP_CSUM_NOXMIT) { /* UDP csum disabled */
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto send;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp4_hwcsum(skb, rt->rt_src, daddr);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum(skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_tcpudp_magic(rt->rt_src, daddr, len,
sk->sk_protocol, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip_send_skb(skb);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int compat_udp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (level == SOL_UDP || level == SOL_UDPLITE)
return udp_lib_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen,
udp_push_pending_frames);
return compat_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
int compat_udp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (level == SOL_UDP || level == SOL_UDPLITE)
return udp_lib_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen,
udp_push_pending_frames);
return compat_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3140/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5a07975ad0a36708c6b0a5b9fea1ff811d0b0c1f
|
5a07975ad0a36708c6b0a5b9fea1ff811d0b0c1f
|
USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->interface->dev;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
int i;
/* check whether the device has the expected number of endpoints */
if (serial->num_port_pointers < serial->type->num_ports + 1) {
dev_err(dev, "OOB endpoints missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1 ; i++) {
if (!serial->port[i]->read_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-in endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!serial->port[i]->write_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-out endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
}
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
|
static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2141/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_tgsigqueueinfo, pid_t, tgid, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
return do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_tgsigqueueinfo, pid_t, tgid, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
return do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static void iw_restrict_to_range(int r1, int r2, int *pvar)
{
if(*pvar < r1) *pvar = r1;
else if(*pvar > r2) *pvar = r2;
}
|
static void iw_restrict_to_range(int r1, int r2, int *pvar)
{
if(*pvar < r1) *pvar = r1;
else if(*pvar > r2) *pvar = r2;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5366
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5366/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
unsigned long *bitmap,
struct sock *sk,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2),
unsigned int log)
{
struct sock *sk2;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &hslot->head) {
if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
sk2 != sk &&
(bitmap || udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
(!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if ||
sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuseport || !sk->sk_reuseport ||
!uid_eq(uid, sock_i_uid(sk2))) &&
saddr_comp(sk, sk2)) {
if (!bitmap)
return 1;
__set_bit(udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash >> log, bitmap);
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
unsigned long *bitmap,
struct sock *sk,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2),
unsigned int log)
{
struct sock *sk2;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &hslot->head) {
if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
sk2 != sk &&
(bitmap || udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
(!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if ||
sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuseport || !sk->sk_reuseport ||
!uid_eq(uid, sock_i_uid(sk2))) &&
saddr_comp(sk, sk2)) {
if (!bitmap)
return 1;
__set_bit(udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash >> log, bitmap);
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17294/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/liblouis/liblouis/commit/5e4089659bb49b3095fa541fa6387b4c40d7396e
|
5e4089659bb49b3095fa541fa6387b4c40d7396e
|
Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
|
brailleIndicatorDefined(TranslationTableOffset offset,
const TranslationTableHeader *table, const TranslationTableRule **indicRule) {
if (!offset) return 0;
*indicRule = (TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[offset];
return 1;
}
|
brailleIndicatorDefined(TranslationTableOffset offset,
const TranslationTableHeader *table, const TranslationTableRule **indicRule) {
if (!offset) return 0;
*indicRule = (TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[offset];
return 1;
}
|
C
|
liblouis
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17570
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17570/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/viabtc/viabtc_exchange_server/commit/4a7c27bfe98f409623d4d857894d017ff0672cc9#diff-515c81af848352583bff286d6224875f
|
4a7c27bfe98f409623d4d857894d017ff0672cc9#diff-515c81af848352583bff286d6224875f
|
Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
|
void nw_buf_list_release(nw_buf_list *list)
{
nw_buf *curr = list->head;
nw_buf *next = NULL;
while (curr) {
next = curr->next;
nw_buf_free(list->pool, curr);
curr = next;
}
free(list);
}
|
void nw_buf_list_release(nw_buf_list *list)
{
nw_buf *curr = list->head;
nw_buf *next = NULL;
while (curr) {
next = curr->next;
nw_buf_free(list->pool, curr);
curr = next;
}
free(list);
}
|
C
|
viabtc_exchange_server
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3956
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3956/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04915c26ea193247b8a29aa24bfa34578ef5d39e
|
04915c26ea193247b8a29aa24bfa34578ef5d39e
|
[Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
IntSize GraphicsContext3DPrivate::platformLayerSize() const
{
return IntSize(m_context->m_currentWidth, m_context->m_currentHeight);
}
|
IntSize GraphicsContext3DPrivate::platformLayerSize() const
{
return IntSize(m_context->m_currentWidth, m_context->m_currentHeight);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
|
void Con_Top( void ) {
con.display = con.totallines;
if ( con.current - con.display >= con.totallines ) {
con.display = con.current - con.totallines + 1;
}
}
|
void Con_Top( void ) {
con.display = con.totallines;
if ( con.current - con.display >= con.totallines ) {
con.display = con.current - con.totallines + 1;
}
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
String Element::textFromChildren()
{
Text* firstTextNode = 0;
bool foundMultipleTextNodes = false;
unsigned totalLength = 0;
for (Node* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!child->isTextNode())
continue;
Text* text = toText(child);
if (!firstTextNode)
firstTextNode = text;
else
foundMultipleTextNodes = true;
unsigned length = text->data().length();
if (length > std::numeric_limits<unsigned>::max() - totalLength)
return emptyString();
totalLength += length;
}
if (!firstTextNode)
return emptyString();
if (firstTextNode && !foundMultipleTextNodes) {
firstTextNode->atomize();
return firstTextNode->data();
}
StringBuilder content;
content.reserveCapacity(totalLength);
for (Node* child = firstTextNode; child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!child->isTextNode())
continue;
content.append(toText(child)->data());
}
ASSERT(content.length() == totalLength);
return content.toString();
}
|
String Element::textFromChildren()
{
Text* firstTextNode = 0;
bool foundMultipleTextNodes = false;
unsigned totalLength = 0;
for (Node* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!child->isTextNode())
continue;
Text* text = toText(child);
if (!firstTextNode)
firstTextNode = text;
else
foundMultipleTextNodes = true;
unsigned length = text->data().length();
if (length > std::numeric_limits<unsigned>::max() - totalLength)
return emptyString();
totalLength += length;
}
if (!firstTextNode)
return emptyString();
if (firstTextNode && !foundMultipleTextNodes) {
firstTextNode->atomize();
return firstTextNode->data();
}
StringBuilder content;
content.reserveCapacity(totalLength);
for (Node* child = firstTextNode; child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!child->isTextNode())
continue;
content.append(toText(child)->data());
}
ASSERT(content.length() == totalLength);
return content.toString();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2673
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2673/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/ivmai/bdwgc/commit/be9df82919960214ee4b9d3313523bff44fd99e1
|
be9df82919960214ee4b9d3313523bff44fd99e1
|
Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
|
STATIC void * GC_generic_or_special_malloc(size_t lb, int knd)
{
switch(knd) {
# ifdef STUBBORN_ALLOC
case STUBBORN:
return(GC_malloc_stubborn((size_t)lb));
# endif
case PTRFREE:
return(GC_malloc_atomic((size_t)lb));
case NORMAL:
return(GC_malloc((size_t)lb));
case UNCOLLECTABLE:
return(GC_malloc_uncollectable((size_t)lb));
# ifdef ATOMIC_UNCOLLECTABLE
case AUNCOLLECTABLE:
return(GC_malloc_atomic_uncollectable((size_t)lb));
# endif /* ATOMIC_UNCOLLECTABLE */
default:
return(GC_generic_malloc(lb,knd));
}
}
|
STATIC void * GC_generic_or_special_malloc(size_t lb, int knd)
{
switch(knd) {
# ifdef STUBBORN_ALLOC
case STUBBORN:
return(GC_malloc_stubborn((size_t)lb));
# endif
case PTRFREE:
return(GC_malloc_atomic((size_t)lb));
case NORMAL:
return(GC_malloc((size_t)lb));
case UNCOLLECTABLE:
return(GC_malloc_uncollectable((size_t)lb));
# ifdef ATOMIC_UNCOLLECTABLE
case AUNCOLLECTABLE:
return(GC_malloc_atomic_uncollectable((size_t)lb));
# endif /* ATOMIC_UNCOLLECTABLE */
default:
return(GC_generic_malloc(lb,knd));
}
}
|
C
|
bdwgc
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e
|
4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05
| null |
static void pdf_run_sc_pattern(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, pdf_pattern *pat, int n, float *color)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_FILLCOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_pattern(ctx, pr, PDF_FILL, pat, color);
}
|
static void pdf_run_sc_pattern(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, pdf_pattern *pat, int n, float *color)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_FILLCOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_pattern(ctx, pr, PDF_FILL, pat, color);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2429
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2429/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/flac/+/b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c
|
b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c
|
Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
|
void send_error_to_client_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus status)
{
if(!decoder->private_->is_seeking)
decoder->private_->error_callback(decoder, status, decoder->private_->client_data);
else if(status == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_UNPARSEABLE_STREAM)
decoder->private_->unparseable_frame_count++;
}
|
void send_error_to_client_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus status)
{
if(!decoder->private_->is_seeking)
decoder->private_->error_callback(decoder, status, decoder->private_->client_data);
else if(status == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_UNPARSEABLE_STREAM)
decoder->private_->unparseable_frame_count++;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5892/
| null |
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a
|
943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a
|
bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int transit_hash_key_make(void *p)
{
const struct transit *transit = p;
return jhash(transit->val, transit->length, 0);
}
|
static unsigned int transit_hash_key_make(void *p)
{
const struct transit *transit = p;
return jhash(transit->val, transit->length, 0);
}
|
C
|
frr
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0723
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0723/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static struct tty_struct *tty_pair_get_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
tty = tty->link;
return tty;
}
|
static struct tty_struct *tty_pair_get_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
tty = tty->link;
return tty;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8099/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
58a6fe94cb851f71214dbefac3f9bffee437d6fe
|
index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]>
|
static int index_reuc_on_dup(void **old, void *new)
{
index_entry_reuc_free(*old);
*old = new;
return GIT_EEXISTS;
}
|
static int index_reuc_on_dup(void **old, void *new)
{
index_entry_reuc_free(*old);
*old = new;
return GIT_EEXISTS;
}
|
C
|
libgit2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6086
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6086/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c9d673b54832afde658f214d7da7d0453fa89774
|
c9d673b54832afde658f214d7da7d0453fa89774
|
[MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
|
void MemBackendImpl::OnEntryInserted(MemEntryImpl* entry) {
lru_list_.Append(entry);
}
|
void MemBackendImpl::OnEntryInserted(MemEntryImpl* entry) {
lru_list_.Append(entry);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11810
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11810/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
megasas_transition_to_ready(struct megasas_instance *instance, int ocr)
{
int i;
u8 max_wait;
u32 fw_state;
u32 cur_state;
u32 abs_state, curr_abs_state;
abs_state = instance->instancet->read_fw_status_reg(instance);
fw_state = abs_state & MFI_STATE_MASK;
if (fw_state != MFI_STATE_READY)
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "Waiting for FW to come to ready"
" state\n");
while (fw_state != MFI_STATE_READY) {
switch (fw_state) {
case MFI_STATE_FAULT:
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "FW in FAULT state!!\n");
if (ocr) {
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FAULT;
break;
} else
return -ENODEV;
case MFI_STATE_WAIT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* Set the CLR bit in inbound doorbell
*/
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES))
writel(
MFI_INIT_CLEAR_HANDSHAKE|MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
else
writel(
MFI_INIT_CLEAR_HANDSHAKE|MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_WAIT_HANDSHAKE;
break;
case MFI_STATE_BOOT_MESSAGE_PENDING:
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES))
writel(MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
else
writel(MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_BOOT_MESSAGE_PENDING;
break;
case MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL:
/*
* Bring it to READY state; assuming max wait 10 secs
*/
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES)) {
writel(MFI_RESET_FLAGS,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
if (instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES) {
for (i = 0; i < (10 * 1000); i += 20) {
if (megasas_readl(
instance,
&instance->
reg_set->
doorbell) & 1)
msleep(20);
else
break;
}
}
} else
writel(MFI_RESET_FLAGS,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL;
break;
case MFI_STATE_UNDEFINED:
/*
* This state should not last for more than 2 seconds
*/
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_UNDEFINED;
break;
case MFI_STATE_BB_INIT:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_BB_INIT;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FW_INIT:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FW_INIT;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FW_INIT_2:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FW_INIT_2;
break;
case MFI_STATE_DEVICE_SCAN:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_DEVICE_SCAN;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FLUSH_CACHE:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FLUSH_CACHE;
break;
default:
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "Unknown state 0x%x\n",
fw_state);
return -ENODEV;
}
/*
* The cur_state should not last for more than max_wait secs
*/
for (i = 0; i < max_wait; i++) {
curr_abs_state = instance->instancet->
read_fw_status_reg(instance);
if (abs_state == curr_abs_state) {
msleep(1000);
} else
break;
}
/*
* Return error if fw_state hasn't changed after max_wait
*/
if (curr_abs_state == abs_state) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "FW state [%d] hasn't changed "
"in %d secs\n", fw_state, max_wait);
return -ENODEV;
}
abs_state = curr_abs_state;
fw_state = curr_abs_state & MFI_STATE_MASK;
}
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW now in Ready state\n");
return 0;
}
|
megasas_transition_to_ready(struct megasas_instance *instance, int ocr)
{
int i;
u8 max_wait;
u32 fw_state;
u32 cur_state;
u32 abs_state, curr_abs_state;
abs_state = instance->instancet->read_fw_status_reg(instance);
fw_state = abs_state & MFI_STATE_MASK;
if (fw_state != MFI_STATE_READY)
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "Waiting for FW to come to ready"
" state\n");
while (fw_state != MFI_STATE_READY) {
switch (fw_state) {
case MFI_STATE_FAULT:
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "FW in FAULT state!!\n");
if (ocr) {
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FAULT;
break;
} else
return -ENODEV;
case MFI_STATE_WAIT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* Set the CLR bit in inbound doorbell
*/
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES))
writel(
MFI_INIT_CLEAR_HANDSHAKE|MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
else
writel(
MFI_INIT_CLEAR_HANDSHAKE|MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_WAIT_HANDSHAKE;
break;
case MFI_STATE_BOOT_MESSAGE_PENDING:
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES))
writel(MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
else
writel(MFI_INIT_HOTPLUG,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_BOOT_MESSAGE_PENDING;
break;
case MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL:
/*
* Bring it to READY state; assuming max wait 10 secs
*/
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
if ((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0073SKINNY) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0071SKINNY) ||
(instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES)) {
writel(MFI_RESET_FLAGS,
&instance->reg_set->doorbell);
if (instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES) {
for (i = 0; i < (10 * 1000); i += 20) {
if (megasas_readl(
instance,
&instance->
reg_set->
doorbell) & 1)
msleep(20);
else
break;
}
}
} else
writel(MFI_RESET_FLAGS,
&instance->reg_set->inbound_doorbell);
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL;
break;
case MFI_STATE_UNDEFINED:
/*
* This state should not last for more than 2 seconds
*/
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_UNDEFINED;
break;
case MFI_STATE_BB_INIT:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_BB_INIT;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FW_INIT:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FW_INIT;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FW_INIT_2:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FW_INIT_2;
break;
case MFI_STATE_DEVICE_SCAN:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_DEVICE_SCAN;
break;
case MFI_STATE_FLUSH_CACHE:
max_wait = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
cur_state = MFI_STATE_FLUSH_CACHE;
break;
default:
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "Unknown state 0x%x\n",
fw_state);
return -ENODEV;
}
/*
* The cur_state should not last for more than max_wait secs
*/
for (i = 0; i < max_wait; i++) {
curr_abs_state = instance->instancet->
read_fw_status_reg(instance);
if (abs_state == curr_abs_state) {
msleep(1000);
} else
break;
}
/*
* Return error if fw_state hasn't changed after max_wait
*/
if (curr_abs_state == abs_state) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "FW state [%d] hasn't changed "
"in %d secs\n", fw_state, max_wait);
return -ENODEV;
}
abs_state = curr_abs_state;
fw_state = curr_abs_state & MFI_STATE_MASK;
}
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "FW now in Ready state\n");
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2881/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
88c4913f11967abfd08a8b22b4423710322ac49b
|
[chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void CCLayerTreeHost::commitToOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl* hostImpl)
{
ASSERT(CCProxy::isImplThread());
TRACE_EVENT("CCLayerTreeHost::commitTo", this, 0);
hostImpl->setSourceFrameNumber(frameNumber());
contentsTextureManager()->reduceMemoryToLimit(TextureManager::reclaimLimitBytes());
contentsTextureManager()->deleteEvictedTextures(hostImpl->contentsTextureAllocator());
updateCompositorResources(m_updateList, hostImpl->context(), hostImpl->contentsTextureAllocator());
hostImpl->setVisible(m_visible);
hostImpl->setZoomAnimatorTransform(m_zoomAnimatorTransform);
hostImpl->setViewport(viewportSize());
if (rootLayer())
hostImpl->setRootLayer(TreeSynchronizer::synchronizeTrees(rootLayer(), hostImpl->rootLayer()));
else
hostImpl->setRootLayer(0);
m_frameNumber++;
}
|
void CCLayerTreeHost::commitToOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl* hostImpl)
{
ASSERT(CCProxy::isImplThread());
TRACE_EVENT("CCLayerTreeHost::commitTo", this, 0);
hostImpl->setSourceFrameNumber(frameNumber());
contentsTextureManager()->reduceMemoryToLimit(TextureManager::reclaimLimitBytes());
contentsTextureManager()->deleteEvictedTextures(hostImpl->contentsTextureAllocator());
updateCompositorResources(m_updateList, hostImpl->context(), hostImpl->contentsTextureAllocator());
hostImpl->setVisible(m_visible);
hostImpl->setZoomAnimatorTransform(m_zoomAnimatorTransform);
hostImpl->setViewport(viewportSize());
if (rootLayer())
hostImpl->setRootLayer(TreeSynchronizer::synchronizeTrees(rootLayer(), hostImpl->rootLayer()));
else
hostImpl->setRootLayer(0);
m_frameNumber++;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d57ecffa058b2af3b0678c43dce75f731550bbce
|
d57ecffa058b2af3b0678c43dce75f731550bbce
|
drive: Stop calling OnChangeListLoadComplete() if DirectoryFetchInfo is not empty
Call LoadAfterLoadDirectory() instead.
BUG=333164
TEST=unit_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/132503004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChangeListLoader::LoadDirectoryFromServerAfterLoad(
const DirectoryFetchInfo& directory_fetch_info,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
FeedFetcher* fetcher,
FileError error,
ScopedVector<ChangeList> change_lists) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK(!directory_fetch_info.empty());
fast_fetch_feed_fetcher_set_.erase(fetcher);
delete fetcher;
if (error != FILE_ERROR_OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load directory: "
<< directory_fetch_info.local_id()
<< ": " << FileErrorToString(error);
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::FilePath* directory_path = new base::FilePath;
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
blocking_task_runner_,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChangeListProcessor::RefreshDirectory,
resource_metadata_,
directory_fetch_info,
base::Passed(&change_lists),
directory_path),
base::Bind(&ChangeListLoader::LoadDirectoryFromServerAfterRefresh,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
directory_fetch_info,
callback,
base::Owned(directory_path)));
}
|
void ChangeListLoader::LoadDirectoryFromServerAfterLoad(
const DirectoryFetchInfo& directory_fetch_info,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
FeedFetcher* fetcher,
FileError error,
ScopedVector<ChangeList> change_lists) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK(!directory_fetch_info.empty());
fast_fetch_feed_fetcher_set_.erase(fetcher);
delete fetcher;
if (error != FILE_ERROR_OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load directory: "
<< directory_fetch_info.local_id()
<< ": " << FileErrorToString(error);
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::FilePath* directory_path = new base::FilePath;
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
blocking_task_runner_,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChangeListProcessor::RefreshDirectory,
resource_metadata_,
directory_fetch_info,
base::Passed(&change_lists),
directory_path),
base::Bind(&ChangeListLoader::LoadDirectoryFromServerAfterRefresh,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
directory_fetch_info,
callback,
base::Owned(directory_path)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
net::NetLog* ContentBrowserClient::GetNetLog() {
return NULL;
}
|
net::NetLog* ContentBrowserClient::GetNetLog() {
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9756/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static int em_fnstsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u16 fsw;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
return emulate_nm(ctxt);
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
asm volatile("fnstsw %0": "+m"(fsw));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
ctxt->dst.val = fsw;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_fnstsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u16 fsw;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
return emulate_nm(ctxt);
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
asm volatile("fnstsw %0": "+m"(fsw));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
ctxt->dst.val = fsw;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetVertexAttribfv(
GLuint index, GLenum pname, GLfloat* params) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetVertexAttribfv", "index out of range");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING: {
BufferManager::BufferInfo* buffer = info->buffer();
if (buffer && !buffer->IsDeleted()) {
GLuint client_id;
buffer_manager()->GetClientId(buffer->service_id(), &client_id);
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(client_id);
}
break;
}
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_ENABLED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->enabled());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_SIZE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->size());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_STRIDE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->gl_stride());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_TYPE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->type());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_NORMALIZED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->normalized());
break;
case GL_CURRENT_VERTEX_ATTRIB:
params[0] = info->value().v[0];
params[1] = info->value().v[1];
params[2] = info->value().v[2];
params[3] = info->value().v[3];
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->divisor());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetVertexAttribfv(
GLuint index, GLenum pname, GLfloat* params) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetVertexAttribfv", "index out of range");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING: {
BufferManager::BufferInfo* buffer = info->buffer();
if (buffer && !buffer->IsDeleted()) {
GLuint client_id;
buffer_manager()->GetClientId(buffer->service_id(), &client_id);
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(client_id);
}
break;
}
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_ENABLED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->enabled());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_SIZE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->size());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_STRIDE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->gl_stride());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_TYPE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->type());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_NORMALIZED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->normalized());
break;
case GL_CURRENT_VERTEX_ATTRIB:
params[0] = info->value().v[0];
params[1] = info->value().v[1];
params[2] = info->value().v[2];
params[3] = info->value().v[3];
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->divisor());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13715/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a6e544b0a88b53114bfa5a57e21b7be7a8dfc9d0
|
a6e544b0a88b53114bfa5a57e21b7be7a8dfc9d0
|
flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline u32 ___skb_get_hash(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flow_keys *keys, u32 keyval)
{
if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys(skb, keys))
return 0;
return __flow_hash_from_keys(keys, keyval);
}
|
static inline u32 ___skb_get_hash(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flow_keys *keys, u32 keyval)
{
if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys(skb, keys))
return 0;
return __flow_hash_from_keys(keys, keyval);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7308
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7308/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda
|
d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda
|
bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old,
struct bpf_func_state *cur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
int i, spi;
/* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
* slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
* didn't use them
*/
for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
/* explored state didn't use this */
continue;
}
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
* and these slots were used
*/
if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
return false;
/* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
* it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
* The opposite is not true
*/
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
continue;
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
* this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
* this verifier states are not equivalent,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
continue;
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
&cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
idmap))
/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
* spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
* are the same as well.
* Ex: explored safe path could have stored
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
* but current path has stored:
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
* such verifier states are not equivalent.
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old,
struct bpf_func_state *cur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
int i, spi;
/* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
* slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
* didn't use them
*/
for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
/* explored state didn't use this */
continue;
}
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
* and these slots were used
*/
if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
return false;
/* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
* it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
* The opposite is not true
*/
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
continue;
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
* this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
* this verifier states are not equivalent,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
continue;
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
&cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
idmap))
/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
* spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
* are the same as well.
* Ex: explored safe path could have stored
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
* but current path has stored:
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
* such verifier states are not equivalent.
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14568
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14568/
| null |
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3428/commits/843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
|
void StreamTcpInitMemuse(void)
{
SC_ATOMIC_INIT(st_memuse);
}
|
void StreamTcpInitMemuse(void)
{
SC_ATOMIC_INIT(st_memuse);
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
CStarter::RemoteContinue(int)
{
int retval = this->Continue();
jic->Continue();
return retval;
}
|
CStarter::RemoteContinue(int)
{
int retval = this->Continue();
jic->Continue();
return retval;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ccd0226c79553e318657d6285c2feacebd105996
|
ccd0226c79553e318657d6285c2feacebd105996
|
Don't allow more than one pending print dialog per browser instance.
As a future TODO, it might be nice to limit it per-tab instead of per-app.
BUG=46575
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2848011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@50203 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnGetScreenInfo(gfx::NativeViewId view,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::BACKGROUND_X11, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::DoOnGetScreenInfo, view, reply_msg));
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnGetScreenInfo(gfx::NativeViewId view,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::BACKGROUND_X11, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::DoOnGetScreenInfo, view, reply_msg));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static TestSiteInstance* CreateTestSiteInstance(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
int* site_delete_counter,
int* browsing_delete_counter) {
TestBrowsingInstance* browsing_instance =
new TestBrowsingInstance(browser_context, browsing_delete_counter);
return new TestSiteInstance(browsing_instance, site_delete_counter);
}
|
static TestSiteInstance* CreateTestSiteInstance(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
int* site_delete_counter,
int* browsing_delete_counter) {
TestBrowsingInstance* browsing_instance =
new TestBrowsingInstance(browser_context, browsing_delete_counter);
return new TestSiteInstance(browsing_instance, site_delete_counter);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4014/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void iput(struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode) {
BUG_ON(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&inode->i_count, &inode->i_lock))
iput_final(inode);
}
}
|
void iput(struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode) {
BUG_ON(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&inode->i_count, &inode->i_lock))
iput_final(inode);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1474
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1474/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/38803268570f90e97452cd9a30ac831661829091
|
38803268570f90e97452cd9a30ac831661829091
|
Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
|
GraphicBuffer::GraphicBuffer(ANativeWindowBuffer* buffer, bool keepOwnership)
: BASE(), mOwner(keepOwnership ? ownHandle : ownNone),
mBufferMapper(GraphicBufferMapper::get()),
mInitCheck(NO_ERROR), mWrappedBuffer(buffer), mId(getUniqueId())
{
width = buffer->width;
height = buffer->height;
stride = buffer->stride;
format = buffer->format;
usage = buffer->usage;
handle = buffer->handle;
}
|
GraphicBuffer::GraphicBuffer(ANativeWindowBuffer* buffer, bool keepOwnership)
: BASE(), mOwner(keepOwnership ? ownHandle : ownNone),
mBufferMapper(GraphicBufferMapper::get()),
mInitCheck(NO_ERROR), mWrappedBuffer(buffer), mId(getUniqueId())
{
width = buffer->width;
height = buffer->height;
stride = buffer->stride;
format = buffer->format;
usage = buffer->usage;
handle = buffer->handle;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5757
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5757/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/032c3339bfb454c65ce38e7eafe49a54bac83073
|
032c3339bfb454c65ce38e7eafe49a54bac83073
|
Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
|
bool SVGElement::InstanceUpdatesBlocked() const {
return HasSVGRareData() && SvgRareData()->InstanceUpdatesBlocked();
}
|
bool SVGElement::InstanceUpdatesBlocked() const {
return HasSVGRareData() && SvgRareData()->InstanceUpdatesBlocked();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7157
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7157/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=65a8e1f6413a0f6f79894da710b5d6d43361d27d
|
65a8e1f6413a0f6f79894da710b5d6d43361d27d
| null |
size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"s16s8s16s16s16",
"QEMU MPT Fusion",
"2.5",
"QEMU MPT Fusion",
"QEMU",
"0000111122223333");
}
|
size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"s16s8s16s16s16",
"QEMU MPT Fusion",
"2.5",
"QEMU MPT Fusion",
"QEMU",
"0000111122223333");
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
|
void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RenderViewHostManager::~RenderViewHostManager() {
if (pending_render_view_host_)
CancelPending();
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host = render_view_host_;
render_view_host_ = NULL;
if (render_view_host)
render_view_host->Shutdown();
for (RenderViewHostMap::iterator iter = swapped_out_hosts_.begin();
iter != swapped_out_hosts_.end();
++iter) {
iter->second->Shutdown();
}
}
|
RenderViewHostManager::~RenderViewHostManager() {
if (pending_render_view_host_)
CancelPending();
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host = render_view_host_;
render_view_host_ = NULL;
if (render_view_host)
render_view_host->Shutdown();
for (RenderViewHostMap::iterator iter = swapped_out_hosts_.begin();
iter != swapped_out_hosts_.end();
++iter) {
iter->second->Shutdown();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType WritePCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table,
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pcx_colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0) ||
((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (scene=0; scene < 1024; scene++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
}
scene=0;
do
{
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table[scene]=TellBlob(image);
/*
Initialize PCX raster file header.
*/
pcx_info.identifier=0x0a;
pcx_info.version=5;
pcx_info.encoding=image_info->compression == NoCompression ? 0 : 1;
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
pcx_info.left=0;
pcx_info.top=0;
pcx_info.right=(unsigned short) (image->columns-1);
pcx_info.bottom=(unsigned short) (image->rows-1);
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
default:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short) image->x_resolution;
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short) image->y_resolution;
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->x_resolution+0.5);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->y_resolution+0.5);
break;
}
}
pcx_info.reserved=0;
pcx_info.planes=1;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
pcx_info.planes=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
pcx_info.planes++;
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=(unsigned short) (((size_t) image->columns*
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel+7)/8);
pcx_info.palette_info=1;
pcx_info.colormap_signature=0x0c;
/*
Write PCX header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.identifier);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.encoding);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.left);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.top);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.right);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.horizontal_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.vertical_resolution);
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256UL,
3*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
if (pcx_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pcx_colormap,0,3*256*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
q=pcx_colormap;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors <= 256))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*16,(const unsigned char *) pcx_colormap);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.reserved);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bytes_per_line);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.palette_info);
for (i=0; i < 58; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
length=(size_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,pcx_info.planes*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
q=pixels;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Convert DirectClass image to PCX raster pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x != 0; x--)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
if (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
register unsigned char
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a PCX monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=byte << (8-bit);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.colormap_signature);
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*256,pcx_colormap);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcx_colormap);
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (scene >= 1023)
break;
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
page_table[scene+1]=0;
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) scene; i++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) page_table[i]);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table,
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pcx_colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0) ||
((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (scene=0; scene < 1024; scene++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
}
scene=0;
do
{
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table[scene]=TellBlob(image);
/*
Initialize PCX raster file header.
*/
pcx_info.identifier=0x0a;
pcx_info.version=5;
pcx_info.encoding=image_info->compression == NoCompression ? 0 : 1;
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
pcx_info.left=0;
pcx_info.top=0;
pcx_info.right=(unsigned short) (image->columns-1);
pcx_info.bottom=(unsigned short) (image->rows-1);
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
default:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short) image->x_resolution;
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short) image->y_resolution;
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->x_resolution+0.5);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->y_resolution+0.5);
break;
}
}
pcx_info.reserved=0;
pcx_info.planes=1;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
pcx_info.planes=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
pcx_info.planes++;
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=(unsigned short) (((size_t) image->columns*
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel+7)/8);
pcx_info.palette_info=1;
pcx_info.colormap_signature=0x0c;
/*
Write PCX header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.identifier);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.encoding);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.left);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.top);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.right);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.horizontal_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.vertical_resolution);
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256UL,
3*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
if (pcx_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pcx_colormap,0,3*256*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
q=pcx_colormap;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors <= 256))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*16,(const unsigned char *) pcx_colormap);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.reserved);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bytes_per_line);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.palette_info);
for (i=0; i < 58; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
length=(size_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,pcx_info.planes*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
q=pixels;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Convert DirectClass image to PCX raster pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x != 0; x--)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
if (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
register unsigned char
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a PCX monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=byte << (8-bit);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.colormap_signature);
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*256,pcx_colormap);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcx_colormap);
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (scene >= 1023)
break;
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
page_table[scene+1]=0;
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) scene; i++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) page_table[i]);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
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