CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-6151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
|
ClearReportingCacheTester(TestingProfile* profile, bool create_service)
: profile_(profile) {
if (create_service)
service_ = std::make_unique<MockReportingService>();
net::URLRequestContext* request_context =
profile_->GetRequestContext()->GetURLRequestContext();
old_service_ = request_context->reporting_service();
request_context->set_reporting_service(service_.get());
}
|
ClearReportingCacheTester(TestingProfile* profile, bool create_service)
: profile_(profile) {
if (create_service)
service_ = std::make_unique<MockReportingService>();
net::URLRequestContext* request_context =
profile_->GetRequestContext()->GetURLRequestContext();
old_service_ = request_context->reporting_service();
request_context->set_reporting_service(service_.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0b53a1df69a39e0663c9e4d651de402fc3d1d10a
|
0b53a1df69a39e0663c9e4d651de402fc3d1d10a
|
Turn on SyncedNotifications for Dev, Canary, and Unknown channel
Turning it on in Dev and Canary will allow us to gather feedback during the development process.
BUG=22205
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12617010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@190089 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ProfileSyncComponentsFactoryImpl::CreateBookmarkSyncComponents(
ProfileSyncService* profile_sync_service,
DataTypeErrorHandler* error_handler) {
BookmarkModel* bookmark_model =
BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(profile_sync_service->profile());
syncer::UserShare* user_share = profile_sync_service->GetUserShare();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const bool kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder = true;
#else
const bool kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder = false;
#endif
BookmarkModelAssociator* model_associator =
new BookmarkModelAssociator(bookmark_model,
user_share,
error_handler,
kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder);
BookmarkChangeProcessor* change_processor =
new BookmarkChangeProcessor(model_associator,
error_handler);
return SyncComponents(model_associator, change_processor);
}
|
ProfileSyncComponentsFactoryImpl::CreateBookmarkSyncComponents(
ProfileSyncService* profile_sync_service,
DataTypeErrorHandler* error_handler) {
BookmarkModel* bookmark_model =
BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(profile_sync_service->profile());
syncer::UserShare* user_share = profile_sync_service->GetUserShare();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const bool kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder = true;
#else
const bool kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder = false;
#endif
BookmarkModelAssociator* model_associator =
new BookmarkModelAssociator(bookmark_model,
user_share,
error_handler,
kExpectMobileBookmarksFolder);
BookmarkChangeProcessor* change_processor =
new BookmarkChangeProcessor(model_associator,
error_handler);
return SyncComponents(model_associator, change_processor);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2550
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2550/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6
|
415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6
|
unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
struct sock *other)
{
unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
POLLOUT |
POLLWRNORM |
POLLWRBAND);
}
|
static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
struct sock *other)
{
unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
POLLOUT |
POLLWRNORM |
POLLWRBAND);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15922/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58ccd2d31e502c37e108b285bf3d343eb00c235b
|
58ccd2d31e502c37e108b285bf3d343eb00c235b
|
paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static void __init pf_init_units(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
pf_drive_count = 0;
for (unit = 0, pf = units; unit < PF_UNITS; unit++, pf++) {
struct gendisk *disk;
disk = alloc_disk(1);
if (!disk)
continue;
disk->queue = blk_mq_init_sq_queue(&pf->tag_set, &pf_mq_ops,
1, BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE);
if (IS_ERR(disk->queue)) {
put_disk(disk);
disk->queue = NULL;
continue;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pf->rq_list);
disk->queue->queuedata = pf;
blk_queue_max_segments(disk->queue, cluster);
blk_queue_bounce_limit(disk->queue, BLK_BOUNCE_HIGH);
pf->disk = disk;
pf->pi = &pf->pia;
pf->media_status = PF_NM;
pf->drive = (*drives[unit])[D_SLV];
pf->lun = (*drives[unit])[D_LUN];
snprintf(pf->name, PF_NAMELEN, "%s%d", name, unit);
disk->major = major;
disk->first_minor = unit;
strcpy(disk->disk_name, pf->name);
disk->fops = &pf_fops;
if (!(*drives[unit])[D_PRT])
pf_drive_count++;
}
}
|
static void __init pf_init_units(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
pf_drive_count = 0;
for (unit = 0, pf = units; unit < PF_UNITS; unit++, pf++) {
struct gendisk *disk;
disk = alloc_disk(1);
if (!disk)
continue;
disk->queue = blk_mq_init_sq_queue(&pf->tag_set, &pf_mq_ops,
1, BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE);
if (IS_ERR(disk->queue)) {
put_disk(disk);
disk->queue = NULL;
continue;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pf->rq_list);
disk->queue->queuedata = pf;
blk_queue_max_segments(disk->queue, cluster);
blk_queue_bounce_limit(disk->queue, BLK_BOUNCE_HIGH);
pf->disk = disk;
pf->pi = &pf->pia;
pf->media_status = PF_NM;
pf->drive = (*drives[unit])[D_SLV];
pf->lun = (*drives[unit])[D_LUN];
snprintf(pf->name, PF_NAMELEN, "%s%d", name, unit);
disk->major = major;
disk->first_minor = unit;
strcpy(disk->disk_name, pf->name);
disk->fops = &pf_fops;
if (!(*drives[unit])[D_PRT])
pf_drive_count++;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2920/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ca8e38ff57e83fcce76f9b54cd8f8bfa09c34ad
|
3ca8e38ff57e83fcce76f9b54cd8f8bfa09c34ad
|
Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DoResolveRelativePath(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
bool base_is_file,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
bool success = true;
url_parse::Component path, query, ref;
url_parse::ParsePathInternal(relative_url,
relative_component,
&path,
&query,
&ref);
output->Append(base_url, base_parsed.path.begin);
if (path.len > 0) {
int true_path_begin = output->length();
int base_path_begin = base_parsed.path.begin;
#ifdef WIN32
if (base_is_file) {
base_path_begin = CopyBaseDriveSpecIfNecessary(
base_url, base_parsed.path.begin, base_parsed.path.end(),
relative_url, relative_component.begin, relative_component.end(),
output);
}
#endif // WIN32
if (url_parse::IsURLSlash(relative_url[path.begin])) {
success &= CanonicalizePath(relative_url, path,
output, &out_parsed->path);
} else {
int path_begin = output->length();
CopyToLastSlash(base_url, base_path_begin, base_parsed.path.end(),
output);
success &= CanonicalizePartialPath(relative_url, path, path_begin,
output);
out_parsed->path = url_parse::MakeRange(path_begin, output->length());
}
CanonicalizeQuery(relative_url, query, query_converter,
output, &out_parsed->query);
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
out_parsed->path = url_parse::MakeRange(true_path_begin,
out_parsed->path.end());
return success;
}
CopyOneComponent(base_url, base_parsed.path, output, &out_parsed->path);
if (query.is_valid()) {
CanonicalizeQuery(relative_url, query, query_converter,
output, &out_parsed->query);
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
return success;
}
if (base_parsed.query.is_valid())
output->push_back('?');
CopyOneComponent(base_url, base_parsed.query, output, &out_parsed->query);
if (ref.is_valid()) {
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
return success;
}
DCHECK(false) << "Not reached";
return success;
}
|
bool DoResolveRelativePath(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
bool base_is_file,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
bool success = true;
url_parse::Component path, query, ref;
url_parse::ParsePathInternal(relative_url,
relative_component,
&path,
&query,
&ref);
output->Append(base_url, base_parsed.path.begin);
if (path.len > 0) {
int true_path_begin = output->length();
int base_path_begin = base_parsed.path.begin;
#ifdef WIN32
if (base_is_file) {
base_path_begin = CopyBaseDriveSpecIfNecessary(
base_url, base_parsed.path.begin, base_parsed.path.end(),
relative_url, relative_component.begin, relative_component.end(),
output);
}
#endif // WIN32
if (url_parse::IsURLSlash(relative_url[path.begin])) {
success &= CanonicalizePath(relative_url, path,
output, &out_parsed->path);
} else {
int path_begin = output->length();
CopyToLastSlash(base_url, base_path_begin, base_parsed.path.end(),
output);
success &= CanonicalizePartialPath(relative_url, path, path_begin,
output);
out_parsed->path = url_parse::MakeRange(path_begin, output->length());
}
CanonicalizeQuery(relative_url, query, query_converter,
output, &out_parsed->query);
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
out_parsed->path = url_parse::MakeRange(true_path_begin,
out_parsed->path.end());
return success;
}
CopyOneComponent(base_url, base_parsed.path, output, &out_parsed->path);
if (query.is_valid()) {
CanonicalizeQuery(relative_url, query, query_converter,
output, &out_parsed->query);
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
return success;
}
if (base_parsed.query.is_valid())
output->push_back('?');
CopyOneComponent(base_url, base_parsed.query, output, &out_parsed->query);
if (ref.is_valid()) {
CanonicalizeRef(relative_url, ref, output, &out_parsed->ref);
return success;
}
DCHECK(false) << "Not reached";
return success;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11590
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11590/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/a0d7f432abee692402c00e8b615ff5982dde9780
|
a0d7f432abee692402c00e8b615ff5982dde9780
|
Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
|
bool isWhitespace(char ch) {
return (ch==0x09) || // \t - tab
(ch==0x0B) || // vertical tab
(ch==0x0C) || // form feed
(ch==0x20) || // space
(ch=='\n') ||
(ch=='\r');
}
|
bool isWhitespace(char ch) {
return (ch==0x09) || // \t - tab
(ch==0x0B) || // vertical tab
(ch==0x0C) || // form feed
(ch==0x20) || // space
(ch=='\n') ||
(ch=='\r');
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5093/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484?w=1
|
97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484?w=1
|
Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_get_default)
{
RETURN_STRING( intl_locale_get_default( TSRMLS_C ), TRUE );
}
|
PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_get_default)
{
RETURN_STRING( intl_locale_get_default( TSRMLS_C ), TRUE );
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
|
PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1679
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1679/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
|
bool HasReachedMaxRecursionDepth() {
return max_recursion_depth_ < 0;
}
|
bool HasReachedMaxRecursionDepth() {
return max_recursion_depth_ < 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14395/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_write_trailer(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int res = 0;
int i;
int64_t moov_pos;
if (mov->need_rewrite_extradata) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
AVCodecParameters *par = track->par;
track->vos_len = par->extradata_size;
track->vos_data = av_malloc(track->vos_len);
if (!track->vos_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(track->vos_data, par->extradata, track->vos_len);
}
mov->need_rewrite_extradata = 0;
}
/*
* Before actually writing the trailer, make sure that there are no
* dangling subtitles, that need a terminating sample.
*/
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *trk = &mov->tracks[i];
if (trk->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MOV_TEXT &&
!trk->last_sample_is_subtitle_end) {
mov_write_subtitle_end_packet(s, i, trk->track_duration);
trk->last_sample_is_subtitle_end = 1;
}
}
if (!mov->chapter_track && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT)) {
if (mov->mode & (MODE_MP4|MODE_MOV|MODE_IPOD) && s->nb_chapters) {
mov->chapter_track = mov->nb_streams++;
if ((res = mov_create_chapter_track(s, mov->chapter_track)) < 0)
return res;
}
}
if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT)) {
moov_pos = avio_tell(pb);
/* Write size of mdat tag */
if (mov->mdat_size + 8 <= UINT32_MAX) {
avio_seek(pb, mov->mdat_pos, SEEK_SET);
avio_wb32(pb, mov->mdat_size + 8);
} else {
/* overwrite 'wide' placeholder atom */
avio_seek(pb, mov->mdat_pos - 8, SEEK_SET);
/* special value: real atom size will be 64 bit value after
* tag field */
avio_wb32(pb, 1);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mdat");
avio_wb64(pb, mov->mdat_size + 16);
}
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_moov_size > 0 ? mov->reserved_header_pos : moov_pos, SEEK_SET);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FASTSTART) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Starting second pass: moving the moov atom to the beginning of the file\n");
res = shift_data(s);
if (res < 0)
return res;
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_header_pos, SEEK_SET);
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
} else if (mov->reserved_moov_size > 0) {
int64_t size;
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
size = mov->reserved_moov_size - (avio_tell(pb) - mov->reserved_header_pos);
if (size < 8){
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "reserved_moov_size is too small, needed %"PRId64" additional\n", 8-size);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
avio_wb32(pb, size);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "free");
ffio_fill(pb, 0, size - 8);
avio_seek(pb, moov_pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
}
res = 0;
} else {
mov_auto_flush_fragment(s, 1);
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov->tracks[i].data_offset = 0;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX) {
int64_t end;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Starting second pass: inserting sidx atoms\n");
res = shift_data(s);
if (res < 0)
return res;
end = avio_tell(pb);
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_header_pos, SEEK_SET);
mov_write_sidx_tags(pb, mov, -1, 0);
avio_seek(pb, end, SEEK_SET);
avio_write_marker(s->pb, AV_NOPTS_VALUE, AVIO_DATA_MARKER_TRAILER);
mov_write_mfra_tag(pb, mov);
} else if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SKIP_TRAILER)) {
avio_write_marker(s->pb, AV_NOPTS_VALUE, AVIO_DATA_MARKER_TRAILER);
mov_write_mfra_tag(pb, mov);
}
}
return res;
}
|
static int mov_write_trailer(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int res = 0;
int i;
int64_t moov_pos;
if (mov->need_rewrite_extradata) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
AVCodecParameters *par = track->par;
track->vos_len = par->extradata_size;
track->vos_data = av_malloc(track->vos_len);
if (!track->vos_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(track->vos_data, par->extradata, track->vos_len);
}
mov->need_rewrite_extradata = 0;
}
/*
* Before actually writing the trailer, make sure that there are no
* dangling subtitles, that need a terminating sample.
*/
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *trk = &mov->tracks[i];
if (trk->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MOV_TEXT &&
!trk->last_sample_is_subtitle_end) {
mov_write_subtitle_end_packet(s, i, trk->track_duration);
trk->last_sample_is_subtitle_end = 1;
}
}
if (!mov->chapter_track && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT)) {
if (mov->mode & (MODE_MP4|MODE_MOV|MODE_IPOD) && s->nb_chapters) {
mov->chapter_track = mov->nb_streams++;
if ((res = mov_create_chapter_track(s, mov->chapter_track)) < 0)
return res;
}
}
if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT)) {
moov_pos = avio_tell(pb);
/* Write size of mdat tag */
if (mov->mdat_size + 8 <= UINT32_MAX) {
avio_seek(pb, mov->mdat_pos, SEEK_SET);
avio_wb32(pb, mov->mdat_size + 8);
} else {
/* overwrite 'wide' placeholder atom */
avio_seek(pb, mov->mdat_pos - 8, SEEK_SET);
/* special value: real atom size will be 64 bit value after
* tag field */
avio_wb32(pb, 1);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mdat");
avio_wb64(pb, mov->mdat_size + 16);
}
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_moov_size > 0 ? mov->reserved_header_pos : moov_pos, SEEK_SET);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FASTSTART) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Starting second pass: moving the moov atom to the beginning of the file\n");
res = shift_data(s);
if (res < 0)
return res;
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_header_pos, SEEK_SET);
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
} else if (mov->reserved_moov_size > 0) {
int64_t size;
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
size = mov->reserved_moov_size - (avio_tell(pb) - mov->reserved_header_pos);
if (size < 8){
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "reserved_moov_size is too small, needed %"PRId64" additional\n", 8-size);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
avio_wb32(pb, size);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "free");
ffio_fill(pb, 0, size - 8);
avio_seek(pb, moov_pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if ((res = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return res;
}
res = 0;
} else {
mov_auto_flush_fragment(s, 1);
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov->tracks[i].data_offset = 0;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX) {
int64_t end;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Starting second pass: inserting sidx atoms\n");
res = shift_data(s);
if (res < 0)
return res;
end = avio_tell(pb);
avio_seek(pb, mov->reserved_header_pos, SEEK_SET);
mov_write_sidx_tags(pb, mov, -1, 0);
avio_seek(pb, end, SEEK_SET);
avio_write_marker(s->pb, AV_NOPTS_VALUE, AVIO_DATA_MARKER_TRAILER);
mov_write_mfra_tag(pb, mov);
} else if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SKIP_TRAILER)) {
avio_write_marker(s->pb, AV_NOPTS_VALUE, AVIO_DATA_MARKER_TRAILER);
mov_write_mfra_tag(pb, mov);
}
}
return res;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline struct cpuacct *cgroup_ca(struct cgroup *cgrp)
{
return container_of(cgroup_subsys_state(cgrp, cpuacct_subsys_id),
struct cpuacct, css);
}
|
static inline struct cpuacct *cgroup_ca(struct cgroup *cgrp)
{
return container_of(cgroup_subsys_state(cgrp, cpuacct_subsys_id),
struct cpuacct, css);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9718
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9718/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
|
3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
| null |
static bool cmd_read_pio(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
bool lba48 = (cmd == WIN_READ_EXT);
if (s->drive_kind == IDE_CD) {
ide_set_signature(s); /* odd, but ATA4 8.27.5.2 requires it */
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
if (!s->blk) {
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
ide_cmd_lba48_transform(s, lba48);
s->req_nb_sectors = 1;
ide_sector_read(s);
return false;
}
|
static bool cmd_read_pio(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
bool lba48 = (cmd == WIN_READ_EXT);
if (s->drive_kind == IDE_CD) {
ide_set_signature(s); /* odd, but ATA4 8.27.5.2 requires it */
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
if (!s->blk) {
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
ide_cmd_lba48_transform(s, lba48);
s->req_nb_sectors = 1;
ide_sector_read(s);
return false;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDidUseTexImageIfNeeded(
Texture* texture, GLenum textarget) {
if (texture && !texture->IsAttachedToFramebuffer()) {
gfx::GLImage* image = texture->GetLevelImage(textarget, 0);
if (image) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDidUseTexImageIfNeeded",
GetErrorState());
glBindTexture(textarget, texture->service_id());
image->DidUseTexImage();
RestoreCurrentTextureBindings(&state_, textarget);
}
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDidUseTexImageIfNeeded(
Texture* texture, GLenum textarget) {
if (texture && !texture->IsAttachedToFramebuffer()) {
gfx::GLImage* image = texture->GetLevelImage(textarget, 0);
if (image) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDidUseTexImageIfNeeded",
GetErrorState());
glBindTexture(textarget, texture->service_id());
image->DidUseTexImage();
RestoreCurrentTextureBindings(&state_, textarget);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13225/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
|
expand_case_fold_make_rem_string(Node** rnode, UChar *s, UChar *end, regex_t* reg)
{
int r;
Node *node;
node = onig_node_new_str(s, end);
if (IS_NULL(node)) return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
r = update_string_node_case_fold(reg, node);
if (r != 0) {
onig_node_free(node);
return r;
}
NODE_STRING_SET_AMBIG(node);
NODE_STRING_SET_DONT_GET_OPT_INFO(node);
*rnode = node;
return 0;
}
|
expand_case_fold_make_rem_string(Node** rnode, UChar *s, UChar *end, regex_t* reg)
{
int r;
Node *node;
node = onig_node_new_str(s, end);
if (IS_NULL(node)) return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
r = update_string_node_case_fold(reg, node);
if (r != 0) {
onig_node_free(node);
return r;
}
NODE_STRING_SET_AMBIG(node);
NODE_STRING_SET_DONT_GET_OPT_INFO(node);
*rnode = node;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4516
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4516/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline void mp_update_mctrl(struct sb_uart_port *port, unsigned int set, unsigned int clear)
{
unsigned int old;
old = port->mctrl;
port->mctrl = (old & ~clear) | set;
if (old != port->mctrl)
port->ops->set_mctrl(port, port->mctrl);
}
|
static inline void mp_update_mctrl(struct sb_uart_port *port, unsigned int set, unsigned int clear)
{
unsigned int old;
old = port->mctrl;
port->mctrl = (old & ~clear) | set;
if (old != port->mctrl)
port->ops->set_mctrl(port, port->mctrl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static void ttwu_queue(struct task_struct *p, int cpu, int wake_flags)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct pin_cookie cookie;
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
if (sched_feat(TTWU_QUEUE) && !cpus_share_cache(smp_processor_id(), cpu)) {
sched_clock_cpu(cpu); /* sync clocks x-cpu */
ttwu_queue_remote(p, cpu, wake_flags);
return;
}
#endif
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
cookie = lockdep_pin_lock(&rq->lock);
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, wake_flags, cookie);
lockdep_unpin_lock(&rq->lock, cookie);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
|
static void ttwu_queue(struct task_struct *p, int cpu, int wake_flags)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct pin_cookie cookie;
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
if (sched_feat(TTWU_QUEUE) && !cpus_share_cache(smp_processor_id(), cpu)) {
sched_clock_cpu(cpu); /* sync clocks x-cpu */
ttwu_queue_remote(p, cpu, wake_flags);
return;
}
#endif
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
cookie = lockdep_pin_lock(&rq->lock);
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, wake_flags, cookie);
lockdep_unpin_lock(&rq->lock, cookie);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2793/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void HttpBridge::SetUserAgent(const char* user_agent) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), created_on_loop_);
if (DCHECK_IS_ON()) {
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
}
context_getter_for_request_->set_user_agent(user_agent);
}
|
void HttpBridge::SetUserAgent(const char* user_agent) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), created_on_loop_);
if (DCHECK_IS_ON()) {
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
}
context_getter_for_request_->set_user_agent(user_agent);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2351/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6
|
bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6
|
Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void DoneRunOnMainThread() {}
|
virtual void DoneRunOnMainThread() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
decode_fh(__be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
unsigned int size;
fh_init(fhp, NFS3_FHSIZE);
size = ntohl(*p++);
if (size > NFS3_FHSIZE)
return NULL;
memcpy(&fhp->fh_handle.fh_base, p, size);
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size = size;
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(size);
}
|
decode_fh(__be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
unsigned int size;
fh_init(fhp, NFS3_FHSIZE);
size = ntohl(*p++);
if (size > NFS3_FHSIZE)
return NULL;
memcpy(&fhp->fh_handle.fh_base, p, size);
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size = size;
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(size);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7456
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7456/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7a1aac3343af85b4af4df5f8844946eaa27394ab?w=1
|
7a1aac3343af85b4af4df5f8844946eaa27394ab?w=1
|
Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
|
gdImagePtr Scale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int src_width, const unsigned int src_height, const gdImagePtr dst, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr tmp_im;
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScaleHoriz(src, src_width, src_height, tmp_im, new_width, src_height);
_gdScaleVert(tmp_im, new_width, src_height, dst, new_width, new_height);
gdFree(tmp_im);
return dst;
}
|
gdImagePtr Scale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int src_width, const unsigned int src_height, const gdImagePtr dst, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr tmp_im;
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScaleHoriz(src, src_width, src_height, tmp_im, new_width, src_height);
_gdScaleVert(tmp_im, new_width, src_height, dst, new_width, new_height);
gdFree(tmp_im);
return dst;
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9922/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121
|
69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121
|
fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
|
static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
uid_t check_ruid;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data, &check_ruid);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (check_ruid && !uid_eq(path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid())) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
"requested user (uid: %d)\n",
i_uid_read(path.dentry->d_inode),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
* mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
* Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
s->s_stack_depth = path.dentry->d_sb->s_stack_depth + 1;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (s->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) {
pr_err("eCryptfs: maximum fs stacking depth exceeded\n");
goto out_free;
}
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
root_info->lower_path = path;
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
|
static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
uid_t check_ruid;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data, &check_ruid);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (check_ruid && !uid_eq(path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid())) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
"requested user (uid: %d)\n",
i_uid_read(path.dentry->d_inode),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
* mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
* Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
root_info->lower_path = path;
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-9016
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9016/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static void __blk_mq_free_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx, struct request *rq)
{
const int tag = rq->tag;
struct request_queue *q = rq->q;
if (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_MQ_INFLIGHT)
atomic_dec(&hctx->nr_active);
rq->cmd_flags = 0;
clear_bit(REQ_ATOM_STARTED, &rq->atomic_flags);
blk_mq_put_tag(hctx, tag, &ctx->last_tag);
blk_mq_queue_exit(q);
}
|
static void __blk_mq_free_request(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx, struct request *rq)
{
const int tag = rq->tag;
struct request_queue *q = rq->q;
if (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_MQ_INFLIGHT)
atomic_dec(&hctx->nr_active);
rq->cmd_flags = 0;
clear_bit(REQ_ATOM_STARTED, &rq->atomic_flags);
blk_mq_put_tag(hctx, tag, &ctx->last_tag);
blk_mq_queue_exit(q);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
AXLayoutObject::~AXLayoutObject() {
ASSERT(isDetached());
}
|
AXLayoutObject::~AXLayoutObject() {
ASSERT(isDetached());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
|
void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_process_id_),
nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-7277
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7277/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct sk_buff *alloc_skb_with_frags(unsigned long header_len,
unsigned long data_len,
int max_page_order,
int *errcode,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int npages = (data_len + (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct page *page;
gfp_t gfp_head;
int i;
*errcode = -EMSGSIZE;
/* Note this test could be relaxed, if we succeed to allocate
* high order pages...
*/
if (npages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return NULL;
gfp_head = gfp_mask;
if (gfp_head & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)
gfp_head |= __GFP_REPEAT;
*errcode = -ENOBUFS;
skb = alloc_skb(header_len, gfp_head);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
skb->truesize += npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
for (i = 0; npages > 0; i++) {
int order = max_page_order;
while (order) {
if (npages >= 1 << order) {
page = alloc_pages((gfp_mask & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM) |
__GFP_COMP |
__GFP_NOWARN |
__GFP_NORETRY,
order);
if (page)
goto fill_page;
/* Do not retry other high order allocations */
order = 1;
max_page_order = 0;
}
order--;
}
page = alloc_page(gfp_mask);
if (!page)
goto failure;
fill_page:
chunk = min_t(unsigned long, data_len,
PAGE_SIZE << order);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, 0, chunk);
data_len -= chunk;
npages -= 1 << order;
}
return skb;
failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
|
struct sk_buff *alloc_skb_with_frags(unsigned long header_len,
unsigned long data_len,
int max_page_order,
int *errcode,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int npages = (data_len + (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct page *page;
gfp_t gfp_head;
int i;
*errcode = -EMSGSIZE;
/* Note this test could be relaxed, if we succeed to allocate
* high order pages...
*/
if (npages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return NULL;
gfp_head = gfp_mask;
if (gfp_head & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)
gfp_head |= __GFP_REPEAT;
*errcode = -ENOBUFS;
skb = alloc_skb(header_len, gfp_head);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
skb->truesize += npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
for (i = 0; npages > 0; i++) {
int order = max_page_order;
while (order) {
if (npages >= 1 << order) {
page = alloc_pages((gfp_mask & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM) |
__GFP_COMP |
__GFP_NOWARN |
__GFP_NORETRY,
order);
if (page)
goto fill_page;
/* Do not retry other high order allocations */
order = 1;
max_page_order = 0;
}
order--;
}
page = alloc_page(gfp_mask);
if (!page)
goto failure;
fill_page:
chunk = min_t(unsigned long, data_len,
PAGE_SIZE << order);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, 0, chunk);
data_len -= chunk;
npages -= 1 << order;
}
return skb;
failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1613
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
void PrepareTabs(const char* url1 = kTestUrl,
const char* url2 = kTestUrl,
const char* url3 = kTestUrl) {
contents1_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents1_.get());
nav_handle1_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url1, contents1_.get());
contents2_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents2_.get());
nav_handle2_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url2, contents2_.get());
contents3_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents3_.get());
nav_handle3_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url3, contents3_.get());
contents1_->WasHidden();
contents2_->WasHidden();
contents3_->WasHidden();
throttle1_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle1_.get());
throttle2_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle2_.get());
throttle3_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle3_.get());
}
|
void PrepareTabs(const char* url1 = kTestUrl,
const char* url2 = kTestUrl,
const char* url3 = kTestUrl) {
contents1_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents1_.get());
nav_handle1_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url1, contents1_.get());
contents2_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents2_.get());
nav_handle2_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url2, contents2_.get());
contents3_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents3_.get());
nav_handle3_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url3, contents3_.get());
contents1_->WasHidden();
contents2_->WasHidden();
contents3_->WasHidden();
throttle1_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle1_.get());
throttle2_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle2_.get());
throttle3_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle3_.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9507
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9507/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/30cec963095366536ca0b1306089154e09bfe1a9
|
30cec963095366536ca0b1306089154e09bfe1a9
|
Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
|
tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
if (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111893951");
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
break;
}
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if (u16 != 1) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
|
tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if ((u16 != 1) || (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5)) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
nautilus_directory_force_reload_internal (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFileAttributes file_attributes)
{
nautilus_profile_start (NULL);
/* invalidate attributes that are getting reloaded for all files */
nautilus_directory_invalidate_file_attributes (directory, file_attributes);
/* Start a new directory load. */
file_list_cancel (directory);
directory->details->directory_loaded = FALSE;
/* Start a new directory count. */
nautilus_directory_invalidate_count_and_mime_list (directory);
add_all_files_to_work_queue (directory);
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
nautilus_profile_end (NULL);
}
|
nautilus_directory_force_reload_internal (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFileAttributes file_attributes)
{
nautilus_profile_start (NULL);
/* invalidate attributes that are getting reloaded for all files */
nautilus_directory_invalidate_file_attributes (directory, file_attributes);
/* Start a new directory load. */
file_list_cancel (directory);
directory->details->directory_loaded = FALSE;
/* Start a new directory count. */
nautilus_directory_invalidate_count_and_mime_list (directory);
add_all_files_to_work_queue (directory);
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
nautilus_profile_end (NULL);
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000524
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000524/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/fatcerberus/minisphere/commit/252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
|
layer_set_visible(int layer, bool visible)
{
s_map->layers[layer].is_visible = visible;
}
|
layer_set_visible(int layer, bool visible)
{
s_map->layers[layer].is_visible = visible;
}
|
C
|
minisphere
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5770
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5770/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
|
C
|
php-src
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
bool InputHandler::PointIsWithinContents(gfx::PointF point) const {
gfx::Rect bounds = host_->GetView()->GetViewBounds();
bounds -= bounds.OffsetFromOrigin(); // Translate the bounds to (0,0).
return bounds.Contains(point.x(), point.y());
}
|
bool InputHandler::PointIsWithinContents(gfx::PointF point) const {
gfx::Rect bounds = host_->GetView()->GetViewBounds();
bounds -= bounds.OffsetFromOrigin(); // Translate the bounds to (0,0).
return bounds.Contains(point.x(), point.y());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::ProcessAckedTouchEvent(
const WebKit::WebTouchEvent& touch_event, InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (content_view_core_)
content_view_core_->ConfirmTouchEvent(ack_result);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::ProcessAckedTouchEvent(
const WebKit::WebTouchEvent& touch_event, InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (content_view_core_)
content_view_core_->ConfirmTouchEvent(ack_result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15420/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
|
~ScopedPluginRegister() {
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> plugins;
plugin_service_->GetInternalPlugins(&plugins);
EXPECT_EQ(1u, plugins.size());
plugin_service_->UnregisterInternalPlugin(plugins[0].path);
plugin_service_->RefreshPlugins();
plugins.clear();
plugin_service_->GetInternalPlugins(&plugins);
EXPECT_TRUE(plugins.empty());
}
|
~ScopedPluginRegister() {
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> plugins;
plugin_service_->GetInternalPlugins(&plugins);
EXPECT_EQ(1u, plugins.size());
plugin_service_->UnregisterInternalPlugin(plugins[0].path);
plugin_service_->RefreshPlugins();
plugins.clear();
plugin_service_->GetInternalPlugins(&plugins);
EXPECT_TRUE(plugins.empty());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8898
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8898/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/5b4bebaa91849c592a8448bc353ab25a54ff8c44
|
5b4bebaa91849c592a8448bc353ab25a54ff8c44
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/34
|
MagickExport Image *ReadInlineImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
const char *content,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
unsigned char
*blob;
size_t
length;
register const char
*p;
/*
Skip over header (e.g. data:image/gif;base64,).
*/
image=NewImageList();
for (p=content; (*p != ',') && (*p != '\0'); p++) ;
if (*p == '\0')
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p++;
length=0;
blob=Base64Decode(p,&length);
if (length == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
*read_info->filename='\0';
*read_info->magick='\0';
image=BlobToImage(read_info,blob,length,exception);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(image);
}
|
MagickExport Image *ReadInlineImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
const char *content,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
unsigned char
*blob;
size_t
length;
register const char
*p;
/*
Skip over header (e.g. data:image/gif;base64,).
*/
image=NewImageList();
for (p=content; (*p != ',') && (*p != '\0'); p++) ;
if (*p == '\0')
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p++;
length=0;
blob=Base64Decode(p,&length);
if (length == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
*read_info->filename='\0';
*read_info->magick='\0';
image=BlobToImage(read_info,blob,length,exception);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1615/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnWindowDestroying(aura::Window* window) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_) {
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->set_host(NULL);
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->Destroy();
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_ = NULL;
}
#endif
DetachFromInputMethod();
if (overscroll_controller_)
overscroll_controller_->Reset();
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnWindowDestroying(aura::Window* window) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_) {
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->set_host(NULL);
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->Destroy();
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_ = NULL;
}
#endif
DetachFromInputMethod();
if (overscroll_controller_)
overscroll_controller_->Reset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6074
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6074/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4
|
5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4
|
dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO
In the current DCCP implementation an skb for a DCCP_PKT_REQUEST packet
is forcibly freed via __kfree_skb in dccp_rcv_state_process if
dccp_v6_conn_request successfully returns.
However, if IPV6_RECVPKTINFO is set on a socket, the address of the skb
is saved to ireq->pktopts and the ref count for skb is incremented in
dccp_v6_conn_request, so skb is still in use. Nevertheless, it gets freed
in dccp_rcv_state_process.
Fix by calling consume_skb instead of doing goto discard and therefore
calling __kfree_skb.
Similar fixes for TCP:
fb7e2399ec17f1004c0e0ccfd17439f8759ede01 [TCP]: skb is unexpectedly freed.
0aea76d35c9651d55bbaf746e7914e5f9ae5a25d tcp: SYN packets are now
simply consumed
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int dccp_rcv_respond_partopen_state_process(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct dccp_hdr *dh,
const unsigned int len)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
u32 sample = dp->dccps_options_received.dccpor_timestamp_echo;
int queued = 0;
switch (dh->dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_RESET:
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_DACK);
break;
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_RESPOND)
break;
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK:
case DCCP_PKT_ACK:
/*
* FIXME: we should be resetting the PARTOPEN (DELACK) timer
* here but only if we haven't used the DELACK timer for
* something else, like sending a delayed ack for a TIMESTAMP
* echo, etc, for now were not clearing it, sending an extra
* ACK when there is nothing else to do in DELACK is not a big
* deal after all.
*/
/* Stop the PARTOPEN timer */
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_PARTOPEN)
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_DACK);
/* Obtain usec RTT sample from SYN exchange (used by TFRC). */
if (likely(sample)) {
long delta = dccp_timestamp() - sample;
dp->dccps_syn_rtt = dccp_sample_rtt(sk, 10 * delta);
}
dp->dccps_osr = DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq;
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_OPEN);
if (dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_DATAACK ||
dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_DATA) {
__dccp_rcv_established(sk, skb, dh, len);
queued = 1; /* packet was queued
(by __dccp_rcv_established) */
}
break;
}
return queued;
}
|
static int dccp_rcv_respond_partopen_state_process(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct dccp_hdr *dh,
const unsigned int len)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
u32 sample = dp->dccps_options_received.dccpor_timestamp_echo;
int queued = 0;
switch (dh->dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_RESET:
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_DACK);
break;
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_RESPOND)
break;
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK:
case DCCP_PKT_ACK:
/*
* FIXME: we should be resetting the PARTOPEN (DELACK) timer
* here but only if we haven't used the DELACK timer for
* something else, like sending a delayed ack for a TIMESTAMP
* echo, etc, for now were not clearing it, sending an extra
* ACK when there is nothing else to do in DELACK is not a big
* deal after all.
*/
/* Stop the PARTOPEN timer */
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_PARTOPEN)
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_DACK);
/* Obtain usec RTT sample from SYN exchange (used by TFRC). */
if (likely(sample)) {
long delta = dccp_timestamp() - sample;
dp->dccps_syn_rtt = dccp_sample_rtt(sk, 10 * delta);
}
dp->dccps_osr = DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq;
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_OPEN);
if (dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_DATAACK ||
dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_DATA) {
__dccp_rcv_established(sk, skb, dh, len);
queued = 1; /* packet was queued
(by __dccp_rcv_established) */
}
break;
}
return queued;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2038/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/263b4509ec4d47e0da3e753f85a39ea12d1eff24
|
263b4509ec4d47e0da3e753f85a39ea12d1eff24
|
nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
void nfs_pageio_reset_write_mds(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio)
{
pgio->pg_ops = &nfs_pageio_write_ops;
pgio->pg_bsize = NFS_SERVER(pgio->pg_inode)->wsize;
}
|
void nfs_pageio_reset_write_mds(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio)
{
pgio->pg_ops = &nfs_pageio_write_ops;
pgio->pg_bsize = NFS_SERVER(pgio->pg_inode)->wsize;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7513/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a54fe0e8600eaf3dc6fe717d3c0398001507f723
|
a54fe0e8600eaf3dc6fe717d3c0398001507f723
| null |
static Cache GetImagePixelCache(Image *image,const MagickBooleanType clone,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
MagickBooleanType
destroy,
status;
static MagickSizeType
cpu_throttle = 0,
cycles = 0,
time_limit = 0;
static time_t
cache_timestamp = 0;
status=MagickTrue;
LockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
if (cpu_throttle == 0)
cpu_throttle=GetMagickResourceLimit(ThrottleResource);
if ((cpu_throttle != MagickResourceInfinity) && ((cycles++ % 32) == 0))
MagickDelay(cpu_throttle);
if (time_limit == 0)
{
/*
Set the expire time in seconds.
*/
time_limit=GetMagickResourceLimit(TimeResource);
cache_timestamp=time((time_t *) NULL);
}
if ((time_limit != MagickResourceInfinity) &&
((MagickSizeType) (time((time_t *) NULL)-cache_timestamp) >= time_limit))
{
#if defined(ECANCELED)
errno=ECANCELED;
#endif
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"TimeLimitExceeded");
}
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
destroy=MagickFalse;
if ((cache_info->reference_count > 1) || (cache_info->mode == ReadMode))
{
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
if ((cache_info->reference_count > 1) || (cache_info->mode == ReadMode))
{
CacheInfo
*clone_info;
Image
clone_image;
/*
Clone pixel cache.
*/
clone_image=(*image);
clone_image.semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
clone_image.reference_count=1;
clone_image.cache=ClonePixelCache(cache_info);
clone_info=(CacheInfo *) clone_image.cache;
status=OpenPixelCache(&clone_image,IOMode,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (clone != MagickFalse)
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(clone_info,cache_info,
exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (cache_info->reference_count == 1)
cache_info->nexus_info=(NexusInfo **) NULL;
destroy=MagickTrue;
image->cache=clone_image.cache;
}
}
DestroySemaphoreInfo(&clone_image.semaphore);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
}
if (destroy != MagickFalse)
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) DestroyPixelCache(cache_info);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Ensure the image matches the pixel cache morphology.
*/
image->type=UndefinedType;
if (ValidatePixelCacheMorphology(image) == MagickFalse)
{
status=OpenPixelCache(image,IOMode,exception);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info->type == DiskCache)
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
}
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Cache) NULL);
return(image->cache);
}
|
static Cache GetImagePixelCache(Image *image,const MagickBooleanType clone,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
MagickBooleanType
destroy,
status;
static MagickSizeType
cpu_throttle = 0,
cycles = 0,
time_limit = 0;
static time_t
cache_timestamp = 0;
status=MagickTrue;
LockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
if (cpu_throttle == 0)
cpu_throttle=GetMagickResourceLimit(ThrottleResource);
if ((cpu_throttle != MagickResourceInfinity) && ((cycles++ % 32) == 0))
MagickDelay(cpu_throttle);
if (time_limit == 0)
{
/*
Set the expire time in seconds.
*/
time_limit=GetMagickResourceLimit(TimeResource);
cache_timestamp=time((time_t *) NULL);
}
if ((time_limit != MagickResourceInfinity) &&
((MagickSizeType) (time((time_t *) NULL)-cache_timestamp) >= time_limit))
{
#if defined(ECANCELED)
errno=ECANCELED;
#endif
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"TimeLimitExceeded");
}
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
destroy=MagickFalse;
if ((cache_info->reference_count > 1) || (cache_info->mode == ReadMode))
{
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
if ((cache_info->reference_count > 1) || (cache_info->mode == ReadMode))
{
CacheInfo
*clone_info;
Image
clone_image;
/*
Clone pixel cache.
*/
clone_image=(*image);
clone_image.semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
clone_image.reference_count=1;
clone_image.cache=ClonePixelCache(cache_info);
clone_info=(CacheInfo *) clone_image.cache;
status=OpenPixelCache(&clone_image,IOMode,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (clone != MagickFalse)
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(clone_info,cache_info,
exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (cache_info->reference_count == 1)
cache_info->nexus_info=(NexusInfo **) NULL;
destroy=MagickTrue;
image->cache=clone_image.cache;
}
}
DestroySemaphoreInfo(&clone_image.semaphore);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
}
if (destroy != MagickFalse)
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) DestroyPixelCache(cache_info);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Ensure the image matches the pixel cache morphology.
*/
image->type=UndefinedType;
if (ValidatePixelCacheMorphology(image) == MagickFalse)
{
status=OpenPixelCache(image,IOMode,exception);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info->type == DiskCache)
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
}
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Cache) NULL);
return(image->cache);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int pid_delete_dentry(struct dentry * dentry)
{
/* Is the task we represent dead?
* If so, then don't put the dentry on the lru list,
* kill it immediately.
*/
return !proc_pid(dentry->d_inode)->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID].first;
}
|
static int pid_delete_dentry(struct dentry * dentry)
{
/* Is the task we represent dead?
* If so, then don't put the dentry on the lru list,
* kill it immediately.
*/
return !proc_pid(dentry->d_inode)->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID].first;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
bool Document::NextFrameHasPendingRAF() const {
return scripted_animation_controller_ &&
scripted_animation_controller_->NextFrameHasPendingRAF();
}
|
bool Document::NextFrameHasPendingRAF() const {
return scripted_animation_controller_ &&
scripted_animation_controller_->NextFrameHasPendingRAF();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::endQuery(GLenum target) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
switch (target) {
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED:
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_CONSERVATIVE: {
if (current_boolean_occlusion_query_ &&
current_boolean_occlusion_query_->GetTarget() == target) {
current_boolean_occlusion_query_->ResetCachedResult();
current_boolean_occlusion_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_PRIMITIVES_WRITTEN: {
if (current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_) {
current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_
->ResetCachedResult();
current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
case GL_TIME_ELAPSED_EXT: {
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryWebGL2Name)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "endQuery", "invalid target");
return;
}
if (current_elapsed_query_) {
current_elapsed_query_->ResetCachedResult();
current_elapsed_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "endQuery", "invalid target");
return;
}
ContextGL()->EndQueryEXT(target);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::endQuery(GLenum target) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
switch (target) {
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED:
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_CONSERVATIVE: {
if (current_boolean_occlusion_query_ &&
current_boolean_occlusion_query_->GetTarget() == target) {
current_boolean_occlusion_query_->ResetCachedResult();
current_boolean_occlusion_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_PRIMITIVES_WRITTEN: {
if (current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_) {
current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_
->ResetCachedResult();
current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
case GL_TIME_ELAPSED_EXT: {
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryWebGL2Name)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "endQuery", "invalid target");
return;
}
if (current_elapsed_query_) {
current_elapsed_query_->ResetCachedResult();
current_elapsed_query_ = nullptr;
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "endQuery",
"target query is not active");
return;
}
} break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "endQuery", "invalid target");
return;
}
ContextGL()->EndQueryEXT(target);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8323
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8323/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/commit/da087238963c1239fdabd47dc1b65279605aca70
|
da087238963c1239fdabd47dc1b65279605aca70
|
Buddy-ng: Fixed segmentation fault (Closes #15 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2418 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab
|
void usage()
{
printf("\n"
" %s - (C) 2007,2008 Andrea Bittau\n"
" http://www.aircrack-ng.org\n"
"\n"
" Usage: buddy-ng <options>\n"
"\n"
" Options:\n"
"\n"
" -h : This help screen\n"
" -p : Don't drop privileges\n"
"\n",
getVersion("Buddy-ng", _MAJ, _MIN, _SUB_MIN, _REVISION, _BETA, _RC));
exit(1);
}
|
void usage()
{
printf("\n"
" %s - (C) 2007,2008 Andrea Bittau\n"
" http://www.aircrack-ng.org\n"
"\n"
" Usage: buddy-ng <options>\n"
"\n"
" Options:\n"
"\n"
" -h : This help screen\n"
" -p : Don't drop privileges\n"
"\n",
getVersion("Buddy-ng", _MAJ, _MIN, _SUB_MIN, _REVISION, _BETA, _RC));
exit(1);
}
|
C
|
aircrack-ng
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1790/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
|
b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
| null |
void CCITTFaxStream::reset() {
int code1;
ccittReset(gFalse);
if (codingLine != NULL && refLine != NULL) {
eof = gFalse;
codingLine[0] = columns;
} else {
eof = gTrue;
}
while ((code1 = lookBits(12)) == 0) {
eatBits(1);
}
if (code1 == 0x001) {
eatBits(12);
endOfLine = gTrue;
}
if (encoding > 0) {
nextLine2D = !lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
}
|
void CCITTFaxStream::reset() {
int code1;
ccittReset(gFalse);
if (codingLine != NULL && refLine != NULL) {
eof = gFalse;
codingLine[0] = columns;
} else {
eof = gTrue;
}
while ((code1 = lookBits(12)) == 0) {
eatBits(1);
}
if (code1 == 0x001) {
eatBits(12);
endOfLine = gTrue;
}
if (encoding > 0) {
nextLine2D = !lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3102
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3102/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c46d7a5b0af9b7d320e709291b270ab7cf07e83
|
4c46d7a5b0af9b7d320e709291b270ab7cf07e83
|
Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPtrErr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int error,
const char * msg, const xmlChar *extra)
{
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->error = error;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->context == NULL)) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPOINTER, error,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) extra, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
msg, extra);
return;
}
ctxt->context->lastError.domain = XML_FROM_XPOINTER;
ctxt->context->lastError.code = error;
ctxt->context->lastError.level = XML_ERR_ERROR;
ctxt->context->lastError.str1 = (char *) xmlStrdup(ctxt->base);
ctxt->context->lastError.int1 = ctxt->cur - ctxt->base;
ctxt->context->lastError.node = ctxt->context->debugNode;
if (ctxt->context->error != NULL) {
ctxt->context->error(ctxt->context->userData,
&ctxt->context->lastError);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, ctxt->context->debugNode, XML_FROM_XPOINTER,
error, XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) extra, (const char *) ctxt->base, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
msg, extra);
}
}
|
xmlXPtrErr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int error,
const char * msg, const xmlChar *extra)
{
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->error = error;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->context == NULL)) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, XML_FROM_XPOINTER, error,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) extra, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
msg, extra);
return;
}
ctxt->context->lastError.domain = XML_FROM_XPOINTER;
ctxt->context->lastError.code = error;
ctxt->context->lastError.level = XML_ERR_ERROR;
ctxt->context->lastError.str1 = (char *) xmlStrdup(ctxt->base);
ctxt->context->lastError.int1 = ctxt->cur - ctxt->base;
ctxt->context->lastError.node = ctxt->context->debugNode;
if (ctxt->context->error != NULL) {
ctxt->context->error(ctxt->context->userData,
&ctxt->context->lastError);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, ctxt->context->debugNode, XML_FROM_XPOINTER,
error, XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) extra, (const char *) ctxt->base, NULL,
ctxt->cur - ctxt->base, 0,
msg, extra);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
static int list_keys(void)
{
int r, idx = 0;
sc_path_t path;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t keysize, i;
int mod_lens[] = { 512, 768, 1024, 2048 };
size_t sizes[] = { 167, 247, 327, 647 };
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I1012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, NULL);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
do {
int mod_len = -1;
r = sc_read_binary(card, idx, buf, 3, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
idx += keysize;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sizes)/sizeof(sizes[ 0]); i++)
if (sizes[i] == keysize)
mod_len = mod_lens[i];
if (mod_len < 0)
printf("Key %d -- unknown modulus length\n", p[2] & 0x0F);
else
printf("Key %d -- Modulus length %d\n", p[2] & 0x0F, mod_len);
} while (1);
return 0;
}
|
static int list_keys(void)
{
int r, idx = 0;
sc_path_t path;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t keysize, i;
int mod_lens[] = { 512, 768, 1024, 2048 };
size_t sizes[] = { 167, 247, 327, 647 };
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I1012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, NULL);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
do {
int mod_len = -1;
r = sc_read_binary(card, idx, buf, 3, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
idx += keysize;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sizes)/sizeof(sizes[ 0]); i++)
if (sizes[i] == keysize)
mod_len = mod_lens[i];
if (mod_len < 0)
printf("Key %d -- unknown modulus length\n", p[2] & 0x0F);
else
printf("Key %d -- Modulus length %d\n", p[2] & 0x0F, mod_len);
} while (1);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void DocumentLoader::addSubresourceLoader(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (!m_gotFirstByte)
return;
ASSERT(!m_subresourceLoaders.contains(loader));
ASSERT(!mainResourceLoader() || mainResourceLoader() != loader);
m_subresourceLoaders.add(loader);
}
|
void DocumentLoader::addSubresourceLoader(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (!m_gotFirstByte)
return;
ASSERT(!m_subresourceLoaders.contains(loader));
ASSERT(!mainResourceLoader() || mainResourceLoader() != loader);
m_subresourceLoaders.add(loader);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7492
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7492/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3069c6d33f6ae63a1668737bc78aaaa51bff7ca
|
f3069c6d33f6ae63a1668737bc78aaaa51bff7ca
|
rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void rds_rdma_drop_keys(struct rds_sock *rs)
{
struct rds_mr *mr;
struct rb_node *node;
unsigned long flags;
/* Release any MRs associated with this socket */
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
while ((node = rb_first(&rs->rs_rdma_keys))) {
mr = rb_entry(node, struct rds_mr, r_rb_node);
if (mr->r_trans == rs->rs_transport)
mr->r_invalidate = 0;
rb_erase(&mr->r_rb_node, &rs->rs_rdma_keys);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
rds_destroy_mr(mr);
rds_mr_put(mr);
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
if (rs->rs_transport && rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs)
rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs();
}
|
void rds_rdma_drop_keys(struct rds_sock *rs)
{
struct rds_mr *mr;
struct rb_node *node;
unsigned long flags;
/* Release any MRs associated with this socket */
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
while ((node = rb_first(&rs->rs_rdma_keys))) {
mr = rb_entry(node, struct rds_mr, r_rb_node);
if (mr->r_trans == rs->rs_transport)
mr->r_invalidate = 0;
rb_erase(&mr->r_rb_node, &rs->rs_rdma_keys);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
rds_destroy_mr(mr);
rds_mr_put(mr);
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
if (rs->rs_transport && rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs)
rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
dde871628c04863cf5992cb17e3e40f2ba576279
|
Add a setDebugDirtyRegion() feature to the client.
Calling remoting.clientSession.setDebugDirtyRegion(true) enables
rendering of each frame's dirty region with an purple, translucent
overlay.
Currently the dirty region is re-rendered immediately for each frame,
with no linger nor fade-out behaviour.
BUG=427659
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/932013002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#317496}
|
void ChromotingInstance::DeliverHostMessage(
const protocol::ExtensionMessage& message) {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> data(new base::DictionaryValue());
data->SetString("type", message.type());
data->SetString("data", message.data());
PostLegacyJsonMessage("extensionMessage", data.Pass());
}
|
void ChromotingInstance::DeliverHostMessage(
const protocol::ExtensionMessage& message) {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> data(new base::DictionaryValue());
data->SetString("type", message.type());
data->SetString("data", message.data());
PostLegacyJsonMessage("extensionMessage", data.Pass());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
static void ext4_init_journal_params(struct super_block *sb, journal_t *journal)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
journal->j_commit_interval = sbi->s_commit_interval;
journal->j_min_batch_time = sbi->s_min_batch_time;
journal->j_max_batch_time = sbi->s_max_batch_time;
spin_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (test_opt(sb, BARRIER))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_BARRIER;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_BARRIER;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
spin_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
}
|
static void ext4_init_journal_params(struct super_block *sb, journal_t *journal)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
journal->j_commit_interval = sbi->s_commit_interval;
journal->j_min_batch_time = sbi->s_min_batch_time;
journal->j_max_batch_time = sbi->s_max_batch_time;
spin_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (test_opt(sb, BARRIER))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_BARRIER;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_BARRIER;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
spin_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3186
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3186/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/844817e47eef14141cf59b8d5ac08dd11c0a9189
|
844817e47eef14141cf59b8d5ac08dd11c0a9189
|
HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static int picolcd_probe_bootloader(struct hid_device *hdev, struct picolcd_data *data)
{
picolcd_init_devfs(data, NULL, NULL,
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_BL_READ_MEMORY, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_BL_WRITE_MEMORY, hdev), NULL);
return 0;
}
|
static int picolcd_probe_bootloader(struct hid_device *hdev, struct picolcd_data *data)
{
picolcd_init_devfs(data, NULL, NULL,
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_BL_READ_MEMORY, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_BL_WRITE_MEMORY, hdev), NULL);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetExtensionPrefPermissionSet(
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& pref_key,
const ExtensionPermissionSet* new_value) {
ListValue* api_values = new ListValue();
ExtensionAPIPermissionSet apis = new_value->apis();
ExtensionPermissionsInfo* info = ExtensionPermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
std::string api_pref = JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefAPIs);
for (ExtensionAPIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
ExtensionAPIPermission* perm = info->GetByID(*i);
if (perm)
api_values->Append(Value::CreateStringValue(perm->name()));
}
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, api_pref, api_values);
if (!new_value->explicit_hosts().is_empty()) {
SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(extension_id,
JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefExplicitHosts),
new_value->explicit_hosts());
}
if (!new_value->scriptable_hosts().is_empty()) {
SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(extension_id,
JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefScriptableHosts),
new_value->scriptable_hosts());
}
}
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetExtensionPrefPermissionSet(
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& pref_key,
const ExtensionPermissionSet* new_value) {
ListValue* api_values = new ListValue();
ExtensionAPIPermissionSet apis = new_value->apis();
ExtensionPermissionsInfo* info = ExtensionPermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
std::string api_pref = JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefAPIs);
for (ExtensionAPIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
ExtensionAPIPermission* perm = info->GetByID(*i);
if (perm)
api_values->Append(Value::CreateStringValue(perm->name()));
}
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, api_pref, api_values);
if (!new_value->explicit_hosts().is_empty()) {
SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(extension_id,
JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefExplicitHosts),
new_value->explicit_hosts());
}
if (!new_value->scriptable_hosts().is_empty()) {
SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(extension_id,
JoinPrefs(pref_key, kPrefScriptableHosts),
new_value->scriptable_hosts());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4516
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4516/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
|
Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int multi_get_mctrl(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
struct mp_port *mtpt = (struct mp_port *)port;
unsigned char status;
unsigned int ret;
status = serial_in(mtpt, UART_MSR);
ret = 0;
if (status & UART_MSR_DCD)
ret |= TIOCM_CAR;
if (status & UART_MSR_RI)
ret |= TIOCM_RNG;
if (status & UART_MSR_DSR)
ret |= TIOCM_DSR;
if (status & UART_MSR_CTS)
ret |= TIOCM_CTS;
return ret;
}
|
static unsigned int multi_get_mctrl(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
struct mp_port *mtpt = (struct mp_port *)port;
unsigned char status;
unsigned int ret;
status = serial_in(mtpt, UART_MSR);
ret = 0;
if (status & UART_MSR_DCD)
ret |= TIOCM_CAR;
if (status & UART_MSR_RI)
ret |= TIOCM_RNG;
if (status & UART_MSR_DSR)
ret |= TIOCM_DSR;
if (status & UART_MSR_CTS)
ret |= TIOCM_CTS;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
String LocalFrame::GetLayerTreeAsTextForTesting(unsigned flags) const {
if (!ContentLayoutObject())
return String();
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> layers;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled()) {
layers = View()->CompositedLayersAsJSON(static_cast<LayerTreeFlags>(flags));
} else {
if (const auto* root_layer =
ContentLayoutObject()->Compositor()->RootGraphicsLayer()) {
if (flags & kLayerTreeIncludesRootLayer && IsMainFrame()) {
while (root_layer->Parent())
root_layer = root_layer->Parent();
}
layers = root_layer->LayerTreeAsJSON(static_cast<LayerTreeFlags>(flags));
}
}
if (flags & kLayerTreeIncludesPaintInvalidations) {
std::unique_ptr<JSONArray> object_paint_invalidations =
view_->TrackedObjectPaintInvalidationsAsJSON();
if (object_paint_invalidations && object_paint_invalidations->size()) {
if (!layers)
layers = JSONObject::Create();
layers->SetArray("objectPaintInvalidations",
std::move(object_paint_invalidations));
}
}
return layers ? layers->ToPrettyJSONString() : String();
}
|
String LocalFrame::GetLayerTreeAsTextForTesting(unsigned flags) const {
if (!ContentLayoutObject())
return String();
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> layers;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled()) {
layers = View()->CompositedLayersAsJSON(static_cast<LayerTreeFlags>(flags));
} else {
if (const auto* root_layer =
ContentLayoutObject()->Compositor()->RootGraphicsLayer()) {
if (flags & kLayerTreeIncludesRootLayer && IsMainFrame()) {
while (root_layer->Parent())
root_layer = root_layer->Parent();
}
layers = root_layer->LayerTreeAsJSON(static_cast<LayerTreeFlags>(flags));
}
}
if (flags & kLayerTreeIncludesPaintInvalidations) {
std::unique_ptr<JSONArray> object_paint_invalidations =
view_->TrackedObjectPaintInvalidationsAsJSON();
if (object_paint_invalidations && object_paint_invalidations->size()) {
if (!layers)
layers = JSONObject::Create();
layers->SetArray("objectPaintInvalidations",
std::move(object_paint_invalidations));
}
}
return layers ? layers->ToPrettyJSONString() : String();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14172/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8598a497e2d1f556a34458cf54b40ba40674734c
|
8598a497e2d1f556a34458cf54b40ba40674734c
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
|
static int MagickDLLCall PostscriptDelegateMessage(void *handle,
const char *message,int length)
{
char
**messages;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=0;
messages=(char **) handle;
if (*messages == (char *) NULL)
*messages=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(char *));
else
{
offset=strlen(*messages);
*messages=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(*messages,offset+length+1,
sizeof(char *));
}
(void) memcpy(*messages+offset,message,length);
(*messages)[length+offset] ='\0';
return(length);
}
|
static int MagickDLLCall PostscriptDelegateMessage(void *handle,
const char *message,int length)
{
char
**messages;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=0;
messages=(char **) handle;
if (*messages == (char *) NULL)
*messages=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(char *));
else
{
offset=strlen(*messages);
*messages=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(*messages,offset+length+1,
sizeof(char *));
}
(void) memcpy(*messages+offset,message,length);
(*messages)[length+offset] ='\0';
return(length);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrepareDragData(const DropData& drop_data,
ui::OSExchangeData::Provider* provider,
WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!drop_data.download_metadata.empty())
PrepareDragForDownload(drop_data, provider, web_contents);
if (!drop_data.file_contents.empty())
PrepareDragForFileContents(drop_data, provider);
#endif
if (!drop_data.text.string().empty())
provider->SetString(drop_data.text.string());
if (drop_data.url.is_valid())
provider->SetURL(drop_data.url, drop_data.url_title);
if (!drop_data.html.string().empty())
provider->SetHtml(drop_data.html.string(), drop_data.html_base_url);
if (!drop_data.filenames.empty()) {
std::vector<ui::OSExchangeData::FileInfo> filenames;
for (std::vector<DropData::FileInfo>::const_iterator it =
drop_data.filenames.begin();
it != drop_data.filenames.end(); ++it) {
filenames.push_back(
ui::OSExchangeData::FileInfo(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(base::UTF16ToUTF8(it->path)),
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(
base::UTF16ToUTF8(it->display_name))));
}
provider->SetFilenames(filenames);
}
if (!drop_data.custom_data.empty()) {
Pickle pickle;
ui::WriteCustomDataToPickle(drop_data.custom_data, &pickle);
provider->SetPickledData(ui::Clipboard::GetWebCustomDataFormatType(),
pickle);
}
}
|
void PrepareDragData(const DropData& drop_data,
ui::OSExchangeData::Provider* provider,
WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!drop_data.download_metadata.empty())
PrepareDragForDownload(drop_data, provider, web_contents);
if (!drop_data.file_contents.empty())
PrepareDragForFileContents(drop_data, provider);
#endif
if (!drop_data.text.string().empty())
provider->SetString(drop_data.text.string());
if (drop_data.url.is_valid())
provider->SetURL(drop_data.url, drop_data.url_title);
if (!drop_data.html.string().empty())
provider->SetHtml(drop_data.html.string(), drop_data.html_base_url);
if (!drop_data.filenames.empty()) {
std::vector<ui::OSExchangeData::FileInfo> filenames;
for (std::vector<DropData::FileInfo>::const_iterator it =
drop_data.filenames.begin();
it != drop_data.filenames.end(); ++it) {
filenames.push_back(
ui::OSExchangeData::FileInfo(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(base::UTF16ToUTF8(it->path)),
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(
base::UTF16ToUTF8(it->display_name))));
}
provider->SetFilenames(filenames);
}
if (!drop_data.custom_data.empty()) {
Pickle pickle;
ui::WriteCustomDataToPickle(drop_data.custom_data, &pickle);
provider->SetPickledData(ui::Clipboard::GetWebCustomDataFormatType(),
pickle);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/YanVugenfirer/kvm-guest-drivers-windows/commit/fbfa4d1083ea84c5429992ca3e996d7d4fbc8238
|
fbfa4d1083ea84c5429992ca3e996d7d4fbc8238
|
NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
|
VOID AnalyzeL3Proto(
USHORT L3Proto,
PNET_PACKET_INFO packetInfo)
{
packetInfo->isIP4 = (L3Proto == RtlUshortByteSwap(ETH_PROTO_IP4));
packetInfo->isIP6 = (L3Proto == RtlUshortByteSwap(ETH_PROTO_IP6));
}
|
VOID AnalyzeL3Proto(
USHORT L3Proto,
PNET_PACKET_INFO packetInfo)
{
packetInfo->isIP4 = (L3Proto == RtlUshortByteSwap(ETH_PROTO_IP4));
packetInfo->isIP6 = (L3Proto == RtlUshortByteSwap(ETH_PROTO_IP6));
}
|
C
|
kvm-guest-drivers-windows
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1667
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1667/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnStreamReset(const quic::QuicRstStreamFrame& frame) {
quic::QuicStream::OnStreamReset(frame);
delegate_->OnRemoteReset();
}
|
void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnStreamReset(const quic::QuicRstStreamFrame& frame) {
quic::QuicStream::OnStreamReset(frame);
delegate_->OnRemoteReset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void RegisterSideloadedTypefaces(SkFontMgr* fontmgr) {
std::vector<std::string> files = GetSideloadFontFiles();
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i(files.begin());
i != files.end();
++i) {
SkTypeface* typeface = fontmgr->createFromFile(i->c_str());
DoPreSandboxWarmupForTypeface(typeface);
blink::WebFontRendering::addSideloadedFontForTesting(typeface);
}
}
|
void RegisterSideloadedTypefaces(SkFontMgr* fontmgr) {
std::vector<std::string> files = GetSideloadFontFiles();
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i(files.begin());
i != files.end();
++i) {
SkTypeface* typeface = fontmgr->createFromFile(i->c_str());
DoPreSandboxWarmupForTypeface(typeface);
blink::WebFontRendering::addSideloadedFontForTesting(typeface);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8104/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d
|
cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d
|
KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int svm_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_instruction_info *info,
enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
int vmexit, ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
struct __x86_intercept icpt_info;
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
if (info->intercept >= ARRAY_SIZE(x86_intercept_map))
goto out;
icpt_info = x86_intercept_map[info->intercept];
if (stage != icpt_info.stage)
goto out;
switch (icpt_info.exit_code) {
case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0:
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_read)
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0: {
unsigned long cr0, val;
u64 intercept;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_write)
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
if (icpt_info.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_clts)
break;
intercept = svm->nested.intercept;
if (!(intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0)))
break;
cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
val = info->src_val & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_lmsw) {
cr0 &= 0xfUL;
val &= 0xfUL;
/* lmsw can't clear PE - catch this here */
if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
val |= X86_CR0_PE;
}
if (cr0 ^ val)
icpt_info.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
break;
}
case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0:
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0:
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_wrmsr)
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 1;
else
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_PAUSE:
/*
* We get this for NOP only, but pause
* is rep not, check this here
*/
if (info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX)
goto out;
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: {
u64 exit_info;
u32 bytes;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
exit_info = ((info->src_val & 0xffff) << 16) |
SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK;
bytes = info->dst_bytes;
} else {
exit_info = (info->dst_val & 0xffff) << 16;
bytes = info->src_bytes;
}
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_outs ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins)
exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK;
if (info->rep_prefix)
exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_REP_MASK;
bytes = min(bytes, 4u);
exit_info |= bytes << SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
exit_info |= (u32)info->ad_bytes << (SVM_IOIO_ASIZE_SHIFT - 1);
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = exit_info;
vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = info->next_rip;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/* TODO: Advertise NRIPS to guest hypervisor unconditionally */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb->control.next_rip = info->next_rip;
vmcb->control.exit_code = icpt_info.exit_code;
vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
ret = (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE) ? X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED
: X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int svm_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_instruction_info *info,
enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
int vmexit, ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
struct __x86_intercept icpt_info;
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
if (info->intercept >= ARRAY_SIZE(x86_intercept_map))
goto out;
icpt_info = x86_intercept_map[info->intercept];
if (stage != icpt_info.stage)
goto out;
switch (icpt_info.exit_code) {
case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0:
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_read)
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0: {
unsigned long cr0, val;
u64 intercept;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_write)
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
if (icpt_info.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_clts)
break;
intercept = svm->nested.intercept;
if (!(intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0)))
break;
cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
val = info->src_val & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_lmsw) {
cr0 &= 0xfUL;
val &= 0xfUL;
/* lmsw can't clear PE - catch this here */
if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
val |= X86_CR0_PE;
}
if (cr0 ^ val)
icpt_info.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
break;
}
case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0:
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0:
icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_wrmsr)
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 1;
else
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_PAUSE:
/*
* We get this for NOP only, but pause
* is rep not, check this here
*/
if (info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX)
goto out;
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: {
u64 exit_info;
u32 bytes;
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
exit_info = ((info->src_val & 0xffff) << 16) |
SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK;
bytes = info->dst_bytes;
} else {
exit_info = (info->dst_val & 0xffff) << 16;
bytes = info->src_bytes;
}
if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_outs ||
info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins)
exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK;
if (info->rep_prefix)
exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_REP_MASK;
bytes = min(bytes, 4u);
exit_info |= bytes << SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
exit_info |= (u32)info->ad_bytes << (SVM_IOIO_ASIZE_SHIFT - 1);
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = exit_info;
vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = info->next_rip;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/* TODO: Advertise NRIPS to guest hypervisor unconditionally */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb->control.next_rip = info->next_rip;
vmcb->control.exit_code = icpt_info.exit_code;
vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
ret = (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE) ? X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED
: X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_arch_unregister_noncoherent_dma(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_dec(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count);
}
|
void kvm_arch_unregister_noncoherent_dma(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_dec(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12981/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
static int addFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
int i;
for ( i=0; i<shape->nFills; ++i )
{
if ( SWFFillStyle_equals(fill, shape->fills[i]) )
return i;
}
if ( shape->isEnded )
return -1;
if ( shape->nFills%STYLE_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
int size = (shape->nFills+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFFillStyle);
shape->fills = (SWFFillStyle*)realloc(shape->fills, size);
}
shape->fills[shape->nFills] = fill;
++shape->nFills;
return shape->nFills;
}
|
static int addFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
int i;
for ( i=0; i<shape->nFills; ++i )
{
if ( SWFFillStyle_equals(fill, shape->fills[i]) )
return i;
}
if ( shape->isEnded )
return -1;
if ( shape->nFills%STYLE_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
int size = (shape->nFills+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFFillStyle);
shape->fills = (SWFFillStyle*)realloc(shape->fills, size);
}
shape->fills[shape->nFills] = fill;
++shape->nFills;
return shape->nFills;
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::speak()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::speak()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
trace_event_setup(struct ring_buffer_event *event,
int type, unsigned long flags, int pc)
{
struct trace_entry *ent = ring_buffer_event_data(event);
tracing_generic_entry_update(ent, flags, pc);
ent->type = type;
}
|
trace_event_setup(struct ring_buffer_event *event,
int type, unsigned long flags, int pc)
{
struct trace_entry *ent = ring_buffer_event_data(event);
tracing_generic_entry_update(ent, flags, pc);
ent->type = type;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target,
WebGLRenderbuffer* render_buffer) {
bool deleted;
if (!CheckObjectToBeBound("bindRenderbuffer", render_buffer, deleted))
return;
if (deleted) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindRenderbuffer",
"attempt to bind a deleted renderbuffer");
return;
}
if (target != GL_RENDERBUFFER) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "bindRenderbuffer", "invalid target");
return;
}
renderbuffer_binding_ = render_buffer;
ContextGL()->BindRenderbuffer(target, ObjectOrZero(render_buffer));
if (render_buffer)
render_buffer->SetHasEverBeenBound();
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target,
WebGLRenderbuffer* render_buffer) {
bool deleted;
if (!CheckObjectToBeBound("bindRenderbuffer", render_buffer, deleted))
return;
if (deleted) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindRenderbuffer",
"attempt to bind a deleted renderbuffer");
return;
}
if (target != GL_RENDERBUFFER) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "bindRenderbuffer", "invalid target");
return;
}
renderbuffer_binding_ = render_buffer;
ContextGL()->BindRenderbuffer(target, ObjectOrZero(render_buffer));
if (render_buffer)
render_buffer->SetHasEverBeenBound();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17407/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/TeX-Live/texlive-source/commit/6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
void writet1(PDF pdf, fd_entry * fd)
{
/*tex |fd_cur| is global inside |writet1.c|. */
fd_cur = fd;
assert(fd_cur->fm != NULL);
assert(is_type1(fd->fm));
assert(is_included(fd->fm));
t1_save_offset = 0;
if (!is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
/*tex Include entire font. */
if (!(fd->ff_found = t1_open_fontfile(filetype_font)))
return;
t1_include(pdf);
t1_close_font_file(filetype_font);
xfree(t1_buffer);
return;
}
/*tex Partial downloading. */
if (!(fd->ff_found = t1_open_fontfile(filetype_subset)))
return;
t1_subset_ascii_part(pdf);
t1_start_eexec(pdf);
cc_init();
cs_init();
t1_read_subrs(pdf);
t1_subset_charstrings(pdf);
t1_subset_end(pdf);
t1_close_font_file(filetype_subset);
xfree(t1_buffer);
}
|
void writet1(PDF pdf, fd_entry * fd)
{
/*tex |fd_cur| is global inside |writet1.c|. */
fd_cur = fd;
assert(fd_cur->fm != NULL);
assert(is_type1(fd->fm));
assert(is_included(fd->fm));
t1_save_offset = 0;
if (!is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
/*tex Include entire font. */
if (!(fd->ff_found = t1_open_fontfile(filetype_font)))
return;
t1_include(pdf);
t1_close_font_file(filetype_font);
xfree(t1_buffer);
return;
}
/*tex Partial downloading. */
if (!(fd->ff_found = t1_open_fontfile(filetype_subset)))
return;
t1_subset_ascii_part(pdf);
t1_start_eexec(pdf);
cc_init();
cs_init();
t1_read_subrs(pdf);
t1_subset_charstrings(pdf);
t1_subset_end(pdf);
t1_close_font_file(filetype_subset);
xfree(t1_buffer);
}
|
C
|
texlive-source
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/30f5bc981921d9c0221c82f38d80bd2d5c86a022
|
30f5bc981921d9c0221c82f38d80bd2d5c86a022
|
browser: Extract AutocompleteProvider from autocomplete.*
This is the first part of splitting autocomplete.* into small pieces, one for
each class.
BUG=94842
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10663015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144107 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
AutocompleteController* GetAutocompleteController() const {
return GetLocationBar()->GetLocationEntry()->model()->popup_model()->
autocomplete_controller();
}
|
AutocompleteController* GetAutocompleteController() const {
return GetLocationBar()->GetLocationEntry()->model()->popup_model()->
autocomplete_controller();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataFileSystem::OnFileDownloadedAndSpaceChecked(
const GetFileFromCacheParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
const GURL& content_url,
const FilePath& downloaded_file_path,
bool* has_enough_space) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (*has_enough_space) {
cache_->StoreOnUIThread(
params.resource_id,
params.md5,
downloaded_file_path,
GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnDownloadStoredToCache,
ui_weak_ptr_));
} else {
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTask(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&file_util::Delete),
downloaded_file_path,
false /* recursive*/));
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NO_SPACE;
}
}
if (!params.get_file_callback.is_null()) {
params.get_file_callback.Run(error,
downloaded_file_path,
params.mime_type,
REGULAR_FILE);
}
}
|
void GDataFileSystem::OnFileDownloadedAndSpaceChecked(
const GetFileFromCacheParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
const GURL& content_url,
const FilePath& downloaded_file_path,
bool* has_enough_space) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (*has_enough_space) {
cache_->StoreOnUIThread(
params.resource_id,
params.md5,
downloaded_file_path,
GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnDownloadStoredToCache,
ui_weak_ptr_));
} else {
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTask(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&file_util::Delete),
downloaded_file_path,
false /* recursive*/));
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NO_SPACE;
}
}
if (!params.get_file_callback.is_null()) {
params.get_file_callback.Run(error,
downloaded_file_path,
params.mime_type,
REGULAR_FILE);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3924/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6
|
Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::setOffloaded(bool offloaded, audio_io_handle_t io)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
status_t status = NO_ERROR;
if ((mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_OFFLOAD_SUPPORTED) != 0) {
status_t cmdStatus;
uint32_t size = sizeof(status_t);
effect_offload_param_t cmd;
cmd.isOffload = offloaded;
cmd.ioHandle = io;
status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_OFFLOAD,
sizeof(effect_offload_param_t),
&cmd,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
status = cmdStatus;
}
mOffloaded = (status == NO_ERROR) ? offloaded : false;
} else {
if (offloaded) {
status = INVALID_OPERATION;
}
mOffloaded = false;
}
ALOGV("setOffloaded() offloaded %d io %d status %d", offloaded, io, status);
return status;
}
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::setOffloaded(bool offloaded, audio_io_handle_t io)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
status_t status = NO_ERROR;
if ((mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_OFFLOAD_SUPPORTED) != 0) {
status_t cmdStatus;
uint32_t size = sizeof(status_t);
effect_offload_param_t cmd;
cmd.isOffload = offloaded;
cmd.ioHandle = io;
status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_OFFLOAD,
sizeof(effect_offload_param_t),
&cmd,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
status = cmdStatus;
}
mOffloaded = (status == NO_ERROR) ? offloaded : false;
} else {
if (offloaded) {
status = INVALID_OPERATION;
}
mOffloaded = false;
}
ALOGV("setOffloaded() offloaded %d io %d status %d", offloaded, io, status);
return status;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17470/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/385508dc888ef15d272cdd2705b17996abc519d6
|
385508dc888ef15d272cdd2705b17996abc519d6
|
Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::CopySubTextureHelper(const char* function_name,
GLuint source_id,
GLint source_level,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_id,
GLint dest_level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLboolean unpack_flip_y,
GLboolean unpack_premultiply_alpha,
GLboolean unpack_unmultiply_alpha,
GLboolean dither) {
TextureRef* source_texture_ref = GetTexture(source_id);
TextureRef* dest_texture_ref = GetTexture(dest_id);
if (!ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMTextures(
function_name, dest_target, source_texture_ref, dest_texture_ref)) {
return;
}
if (source_level < 0 || dest_level < 0 ||
(feature_info_->IsWebGL1OrES2Context() && source_level > 0)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source_level or dest_level out of range");
return;
}
Texture* source_texture = source_texture_ref->texture();
Texture* dest_texture = dest_texture_ref->texture();
GLenum source_target = source_texture->target();
GLenum dest_binding_target = dest_texture->target();
int source_width = 0;
int source_height = 0;
gl::GLImage* image =
source_texture->GetLevelImage(source_target, source_level);
if (image) {
gfx::Size size = image->GetSize();
source_width = size.width();
source_height = size.height();
if (source_width <= 0 || source_height <= 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid image size");
return;
}
int32_t max_x;
int32_t max_y;
if (!SafeAddInt32(x, width, &max_x) || !SafeAddInt32(y, height, &max_y) ||
x < 0 || y < 0 || max_x > source_width || max_y > source_height) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions");
return;
}
} else {
if (!source_texture->GetLevelSize(source_target, source_level,
&source_width, &source_height, nullptr)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture has no data for level");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->ValidForTarget(source_target, source_level,
source_width, source_height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions");
return;
}
if (!source_texture->ValidForTexture(source_target, source_level, x, y, 0,
width, height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions.");
return;
}
}
GLenum source_type = 0;
GLenum source_internal_format = 0;
source_texture->GetLevelType(source_target, source_level, &source_type,
&source_internal_format);
GLenum dest_type = 0;
GLenum dest_internal_format = 0;
bool dest_level_defined = dest_texture->GetLevelType(
dest_target, dest_level, &dest_type, &dest_internal_format);
if (!dest_level_defined) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"destination texture is not defined");
return;
}
if (!dest_texture->ValidForTexture(dest_target, dest_level, xoffset, yoffset,
0, width, height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"destination texture bad dimensions.");
return;
}
std::string output_error_msg;
if (!ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMInternalFormats(
GetFeatureInfo(), source_internal_format, dest_internal_format,
&output_error_msg)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
output_error_msg.c_str());
return;
}
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().desktop_srgb_support) {
bool enable_framebuffer_srgb =
GLES2Util::GetColorEncodingFromInternalFormat(source_internal_format) ==
GL_SRGB ||
GLES2Util::GetColorEncodingFromInternalFormat(dest_internal_format) ==
GL_SRGB;
state_.EnableDisableFramebufferSRGB(enable_framebuffer_srgb);
}
if (!texture_manager()->ClearTextureLevel(this, source_texture_ref,
source_target, source_level)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name,
"source texture dimensions too big");
return;
}
if (!InitializeCopyTextureCHROMIUM(function_name))
return;
int dest_width = 0;
int dest_height = 0;
bool ok = dest_texture->GetLevelSize(dest_target, dest_level, &dest_width,
&dest_height, nullptr);
DCHECK(ok);
if (xoffset != 0 || yoffset != 0 || width != dest_width ||
height != dest_height) {
gfx::Rect cleared_rect;
if (TextureManager::CombineAdjacentRects(
dest_texture->GetLevelClearedRect(dest_target, dest_level),
gfx::Rect(xoffset, yoffset, width, height), &cleared_rect)) {
DCHECK_GE(cleared_rect.size().GetArea(),
dest_texture->GetLevelClearedRect(dest_target, dest_level)
.size()
.GetArea());
texture_manager()->SetLevelClearedRect(dest_texture_ref, dest_target,
dest_level, cleared_rect);
} else {
if (!texture_manager()->ClearTextureLevel(this, dest_texture_ref,
dest_target, dest_level)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name,
"destination texture dimensions too big");
return;
}
}
} else {
texture_manager()->SetLevelCleared(dest_texture_ref, dest_target,
dest_level, true);
}
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha_change =
(unpack_premultiply_alpha ^ unpack_unmultiply_alpha) != 0;
if (image && dest_internal_format == source_internal_format &&
dest_level == 0 && !unpack_flip_y && !unpack_premultiply_alpha_change &&
!dither) {
ScopedTextureBinder binder(&state_, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_binding_target);
if (image->CopyTexSubImage(dest_target, gfx::Point(xoffset, yoffset),
gfx::Rect(x, y, width, height))) {
return;
}
}
DoBindOrCopyTexImageIfNeeded(source_texture, source_target, 0);
if (source_target == GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES) {
if (GLStreamTextureImage* image =
source_texture->GetLevelStreamTextureImage(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES,
source_level)) {
GLfloat transform_matrix[16];
image->GetTextureMatrix(transform_matrix);
copy_texture_chromium_->DoCopySubTextureWithTransform(
this, source_target, source_texture->service_id(), source_level,
source_internal_format, dest_target, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_level, dest_internal_format, xoffset, yoffset, x, y, width,
height, dest_width, dest_height, source_width, source_height,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE,
transform_matrix, copy_tex_image_blit_.get());
return;
}
}
CopyTextureMethod method = GetCopyTextureCHROMIUMMethod(
GetFeatureInfo(), source_target, source_level, source_internal_format,
source_type, dest_binding_target, dest_level, dest_internal_format,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
if (Texture::ColorRenderable(GetFeatureInfo(), dest_internal_format,
dest_texture->IsImmutable()) &&
method == CopyTextureMethod::DIRECT_COPY) {
method = CopyTextureMethod::DIRECT_DRAW;
}
#endif
copy_texture_chromium_->DoCopySubTexture(
this, source_target, source_texture->service_id(), source_level,
source_internal_format, dest_target, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_level, dest_internal_format, xoffset, yoffset, x, y, width, height,
dest_width, dest_height, source_width, source_height,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE, method,
copy_tex_image_blit_.get());
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::CopySubTextureHelper(const char* function_name,
GLuint source_id,
GLint source_level,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_id,
GLint dest_level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLboolean unpack_flip_y,
GLboolean unpack_premultiply_alpha,
GLboolean unpack_unmultiply_alpha,
GLboolean dither) {
TextureRef* source_texture_ref = GetTexture(source_id);
TextureRef* dest_texture_ref = GetTexture(dest_id);
if (!ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMTextures(
function_name, dest_target, source_texture_ref, dest_texture_ref)) {
return;
}
if (source_level < 0 || dest_level < 0 ||
(feature_info_->IsWebGL1OrES2Context() && source_level > 0)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source_level or dest_level out of range");
return;
}
Texture* source_texture = source_texture_ref->texture();
Texture* dest_texture = dest_texture_ref->texture();
GLenum source_target = source_texture->target();
GLenum dest_binding_target = dest_texture->target();
int source_width = 0;
int source_height = 0;
gl::GLImage* image =
source_texture->GetLevelImage(source_target, source_level);
if (image) {
gfx::Size size = image->GetSize();
source_width = size.width();
source_height = size.height();
if (source_width <= 0 || source_height <= 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid image size");
return;
}
int32_t max_x;
int32_t max_y;
if (!SafeAddInt32(x, width, &max_x) || !SafeAddInt32(y, height, &max_y) ||
x < 0 || y < 0 || max_x > source_width || max_y > source_height) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions");
return;
}
} else {
if (!source_texture->GetLevelSize(source_target, source_level,
&source_width, &source_height, nullptr)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture has no data for level");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->ValidForTarget(source_target, source_level,
source_width, source_height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions");
return;
}
if (!source_texture->ValidForTexture(source_target, source_level, x, y, 0,
width, height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"source texture bad dimensions.");
return;
}
}
GLenum source_type = 0;
GLenum source_internal_format = 0;
source_texture->GetLevelType(source_target, source_level, &source_type,
&source_internal_format);
GLenum dest_type = 0;
GLenum dest_internal_format = 0;
bool dest_level_defined = dest_texture->GetLevelType(
dest_target, dest_level, &dest_type, &dest_internal_format);
if (!dest_level_defined) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"destination texture is not defined");
return;
}
if (!dest_texture->ValidForTexture(dest_target, dest_level, xoffset, yoffset,
0, width, height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"destination texture bad dimensions.");
return;
}
std::string output_error_msg;
if (!ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMInternalFormats(
GetFeatureInfo(), source_internal_format, dest_internal_format,
&output_error_msg)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
output_error_msg.c_str());
return;
}
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().desktop_srgb_support) {
bool enable_framebuffer_srgb =
GLES2Util::GetColorEncodingFromInternalFormat(source_internal_format) ==
GL_SRGB ||
GLES2Util::GetColorEncodingFromInternalFormat(dest_internal_format) ==
GL_SRGB;
state_.EnableDisableFramebufferSRGB(enable_framebuffer_srgb);
}
if (!texture_manager()->ClearTextureLevel(this, source_texture_ref,
source_target, source_level)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name,
"source texture dimensions too big");
return;
}
if (!InitializeCopyTextureCHROMIUM(function_name))
return;
int dest_width = 0;
int dest_height = 0;
bool ok = dest_texture->GetLevelSize(dest_target, dest_level, &dest_width,
&dest_height, nullptr);
DCHECK(ok);
if (xoffset != 0 || yoffset != 0 || width != dest_width ||
height != dest_height) {
gfx::Rect cleared_rect;
if (TextureManager::CombineAdjacentRects(
dest_texture->GetLevelClearedRect(dest_target, dest_level),
gfx::Rect(xoffset, yoffset, width, height), &cleared_rect)) {
DCHECK_GE(cleared_rect.size().GetArea(),
dest_texture->GetLevelClearedRect(dest_target, dest_level)
.size()
.GetArea());
texture_manager()->SetLevelClearedRect(dest_texture_ref, dest_target,
dest_level, cleared_rect);
} else {
if (!texture_manager()->ClearTextureLevel(this, dest_texture_ref,
dest_target, dest_level)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name,
"destination texture dimensions too big");
return;
}
}
} else {
texture_manager()->SetLevelCleared(dest_texture_ref, dest_target,
dest_level, true);
}
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha_change =
(unpack_premultiply_alpha ^ unpack_unmultiply_alpha) != 0;
if (image && dest_internal_format == source_internal_format &&
dest_level == 0 && !unpack_flip_y && !unpack_premultiply_alpha_change &&
!dither) {
ScopedTextureBinder binder(&state_, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_binding_target);
if (image->CopyTexSubImage(dest_target, gfx::Point(xoffset, yoffset),
gfx::Rect(x, y, width, height))) {
return;
}
}
DoBindOrCopyTexImageIfNeeded(source_texture, source_target, 0);
if (source_target == GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES) {
if (GLStreamTextureImage* image =
source_texture->GetLevelStreamTextureImage(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES,
source_level)) {
GLfloat transform_matrix[16];
image->GetTextureMatrix(transform_matrix);
copy_texture_chromium_->DoCopySubTextureWithTransform(
this, source_target, source_texture->service_id(), source_level,
source_internal_format, dest_target, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_level, dest_internal_format, xoffset, yoffset, x, y, width,
height, dest_width, dest_height, source_width, source_height,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE,
transform_matrix, copy_tex_image_blit_.get());
return;
}
}
CopyTextureMethod method = GetCopyTextureCHROMIUMMethod(
GetFeatureInfo(), source_target, source_level, source_internal_format,
source_type, dest_binding_target, dest_level, dest_internal_format,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
if (Texture::ColorRenderable(GetFeatureInfo(), dest_internal_format,
dest_texture->IsImmutable()) &&
method == CopyTextureMethod::DIRECT_COPY) {
method = CopyTextureMethod::DIRECT_DRAW;
}
#endif
copy_texture_chromium_->DoCopySubTexture(
this, source_target, source_texture->service_id(), source_level,
source_internal_format, dest_target, dest_texture->service_id(),
dest_level, dest_internal_format, xoffset, yoffset, x, y, width, height,
dest_width, dest_height, source_width, source_height,
unpack_flip_y == GL_TRUE, unpack_premultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE,
unpack_unmultiply_alpha == GL_TRUE, dither == GL_TRUE, method,
copy_tex_image_blit_.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripModel::GetIndicesWithSameOpener(int index,
std::vector<int>* indices) {
NavigationController* opener = contents_data_[index]->group;
if (!opener) {
opener = &(GetTabContentsAt(index)->controller());
if (!opener)
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < count(); ++i) {
if (i == index)
continue;
if (contents_data_[i]->group == opener ||
&(GetTabContentsAt(i)->controller()) == opener) {
indices->push_back(i);
}
}
}
|
void TabStripModel::GetIndicesWithSameOpener(int index,
std::vector<int>* indices) {
NavigationController* opener = contents_data_[index]->group;
if (!opener) {
opener = &(GetTabContentsAt(index)->controller());
if (!opener)
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < count(); ++i) {
if (i == index)
continue;
if (contents_data_[i]->group == opener ||
&(GetTabContentsAt(i)->controller()) == opener) {
indices->push_back(i);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
gpu::gles2::ErrorState* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetErrorState() {
return nullptr;
}
|
gpu::gles2::ErrorState* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetErrorState() {
return nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9710
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9710/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
|
int btrfs_find_next_key(struct btrfs_root *root, struct btrfs_path *path,
struct btrfs_key *key, int level, u64 min_trans)
{
int slot;
struct extent_buffer *c;
WARN_ON(!path->keep_locks);
while (level < BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL) {
if (!path->nodes[level])
return 1;
slot = path->slots[level] + 1;
c = path->nodes[level];
next:
if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(c)) {
int ret;
int orig_lowest;
struct btrfs_key cur_key;
if (level + 1 >= BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL ||
!path->nodes[level + 1])
return 1;
if (path->locks[level + 1]) {
level++;
continue;
}
slot = btrfs_header_nritems(c) - 1;
if (level == 0)
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(c, &cur_key, slot);
else
btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(c, &cur_key, slot);
orig_lowest = path->lowest_level;
btrfs_release_path(path);
path->lowest_level = level;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &cur_key, path,
0, 0);
path->lowest_level = orig_lowest;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
c = path->nodes[level];
slot = path->slots[level];
if (ret == 0)
slot++;
goto next;
}
if (level == 0)
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(c, key, slot);
else {
u64 gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(c, slot);
if (gen < min_trans) {
slot++;
goto next;
}
btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(c, key, slot);
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
int btrfs_find_next_key(struct btrfs_root *root, struct btrfs_path *path,
struct btrfs_key *key, int level, u64 min_trans)
{
int slot;
struct extent_buffer *c;
WARN_ON(!path->keep_locks);
while (level < BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL) {
if (!path->nodes[level])
return 1;
slot = path->slots[level] + 1;
c = path->nodes[level];
next:
if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(c)) {
int ret;
int orig_lowest;
struct btrfs_key cur_key;
if (level + 1 >= BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL ||
!path->nodes[level + 1])
return 1;
if (path->locks[level + 1]) {
level++;
continue;
}
slot = btrfs_header_nritems(c) - 1;
if (level == 0)
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(c, &cur_key, slot);
else
btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(c, &cur_key, slot);
orig_lowest = path->lowest_level;
btrfs_release_path(path);
path->lowest_level = level;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &cur_key, path,
0, 0);
path->lowest_level = orig_lowest;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
c = path->nodes[level];
slot = path->slots[level];
if (ret == 0)
slot++;
goto next;
}
if (level == 0)
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(c, key, slot);
else {
u64 gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(c, slot);
if (gen < min_trans) {
slot++;
goto next;
}
btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(c, key, slot);
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2495
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2495/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51
|
proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_cwd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
task_lock(task);
if (task->fs) {
get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path);
result = 0;
}
task_unlock(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return result;
}
|
static int proc_cwd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
task_lock(task);
if (task->fs) {
get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path);
result = 0;
}
task_unlock(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0272
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0272/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/commit/?id=d5fc88e573fa58b93034b04d35a2454f5d28cad9
|
d5fc88e573fa58b93034b04d35a2454f5d28cad9
| null |
nm_ip4_config_new (int ifindex)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex >= -1, NULL);
return (NMIP4Config *) g_object_new (NM_TYPE_IP4_CONFIG,
NM_IP4_CONFIG_IFINDEX, ifindex,
NULL);
}
|
nm_ip4_config_new (int ifindex)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex >= -1, NULL);
return (NMIP4Config *) g_object_new (NM_TYPE_IP4_CONFIG,
NM_IP4_CONFIG_IFINDEX, ifindex,
NULL);
}
|
C
|
NetworkManager
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void BaseFetchContext::AddAdditionalRequestHeaders(ResourceRequest& request,
FetchResourceType type) {
bool is_main_resource = type == kFetchMainResource;
if (!is_main_resource) {
if (!request.DidSetHTTPReferrer()) {
request.SetHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
GetReferrerPolicy(), request.Url(), GetOutgoingReferrer()));
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(GetSecurityOrigin());
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(request.GetReferrerPolicy(),
request.Url(),
request.HttpReferrer())
.referrer,
request.HttpReferrer());
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(request.HttpReferrer());
}
}
auto address_space = GetAddressSpace();
if (address_space)
request.SetExternalRequestStateFromRequestorAddressSpace(*address_space);
}
|
void BaseFetchContext::AddAdditionalRequestHeaders(ResourceRequest& request,
FetchResourceType type) {
bool is_main_resource = type == kFetchMainResource;
if (!is_main_resource) {
if (!request.DidSetHTTPReferrer()) {
request.SetHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
GetReferrerPolicy(), request.Url(), GetOutgoingReferrer()));
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(GetSecurityOrigin());
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(request.GetReferrerPolicy(),
request.Url(),
request.HttpReferrer())
.referrer,
request.HttpReferrer());
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(request.HttpReferrer());
}
}
auto address_space = GetAddressSpace();
if (address_space)
request.SetExternalRequestStateFromRequestorAddressSpace(*address_space);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowPepperSocketAPI(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url,
bool private_api,
const content::SocketPermissionRequest* params) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS) && BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart::AllowPepperSocketAPI(
browser_context, url, private_api, params, allowed_socket_origins_);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowPepperSocketAPI(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url,
bool private_api,
const content::SocketPermissionRequest* params) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS) && BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart::AllowPepperSocketAPI(
browser_context, url, private_api, params, allowed_socket_origins_);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct iphdr *iph;
const struct net_protocol *ops;
int proto;
int ihl;
int id;
unsigned int offset = 0;
if (!(features & NETIF_F_V4_CSUM))
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
~(SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |
SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN |
0)))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph))))
goto out;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
if (ihl < sizeof(*iph))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl)))
goto out;
__skb_pull(skb, ihl);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
id = ntohs(iph->id);
proto = iph->protocol & (MAX_INET_PROTOS - 1);
segs = ERR_PTR(-EPROTONOSUPPORT);
rcu_read_lock();
ops = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]);
if (likely(ops && ops->gso_segment))
segs = ops->gso_segment(skb, features);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!segs || IS_ERR(segs))
goto out;
skb = segs;
do {
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
iph->id = htons(id);
iph->frag_off = htons(offset >> 3);
if (skb->next != NULL)
iph->frag_off |= htons(IP_MF);
offset += (skb->len - skb->mac_len - iph->ihl * 4);
} else
iph->id = htons(id++);
iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len - skb->mac_len);
iph->check = 0;
iph->check = ip_fast_csum(skb_network_header(skb), iph->ihl);
} while ((skb = skb->next));
out:
return segs;
}
|
static struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct iphdr *iph;
const struct net_protocol *ops;
int proto;
int ihl;
int id;
unsigned int offset = 0;
if (!(features & NETIF_F_V4_CSUM))
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
~(SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |
SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN |
0)))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph))))
goto out;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
if (ihl < sizeof(*iph))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl)))
goto out;
__skb_pull(skb, ihl);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
id = ntohs(iph->id);
proto = iph->protocol & (MAX_INET_PROTOS - 1);
segs = ERR_PTR(-EPROTONOSUPPORT);
rcu_read_lock();
ops = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]);
if (likely(ops && ops->gso_segment))
segs = ops->gso_segment(skb, features);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!segs || IS_ERR(segs))
goto out;
skb = segs;
do {
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
iph->id = htons(id);
iph->frag_off = htons(offset >> 3);
if (skb->next != NULL)
iph->frag_off |= htons(IP_MF);
offset += (skb->len - skb->mac_len - iph->ihl * 4);
} else
iph->id = htons(id++);
iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len - skb->mac_len);
iph->check = 0;
iph->check = ip_fast_csum(skb_network_header(skb), iph->ihl);
} while ((skb = skb->next));
out:
return segs;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NPError PluginInstance::NPP_SetWindow(NPWindow *window) {
DCHECK(npp_functions_ != 0);
DCHECK(npp_functions_->setwindow != 0);
if (npp_functions_->setwindow != 0) {
return npp_functions_->setwindow(npp_, window);
}
return NPERR_INVALID_FUNCTABLE_ERROR;
}
|
NPError PluginInstance::NPP_SetWindow(NPWindow *window) {
DCHECK(npp_functions_ != 0);
DCHECK(npp_functions_->setwindow != 0);
if (npp_functions_->setwindow != 0) {
return npp_functions_->setwindow(npp_, window);
}
return NPERR_INVALID_FUNCTABLE_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7912
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7912/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
|
static int _ffs_name_dev(struct ffs_dev *dev, const char *name)
{
struct ffs_dev *existing;
existing = _ffs_do_find_dev(name);
if (existing)
return -EBUSY;
dev->name = name;
return 0;
}
|
static int _ffs_name_dev(struct ffs_dev *dev, const char *name)
{
struct ffs_dev *existing;
existing = _ffs_do_find_dev(name);
if (existing)
return -EBUSY;
dev->name = name;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static __always_inline void vmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value)
{
vmcs_check16(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_write16(field, value);
__vmcs_writel(field, value);
}
|
static __always_inline void vmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value)
{
vmcs_check16(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_write16(field, value);
__vmcs_writel(field, value);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::hideFindUI()
{
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::HideFindUI(), m_pageID);
}
|
void WebPageProxy::hideFindUI()
{
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::HideFindUI(), m_pageID);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8767/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e
|
635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e
|
sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void sctp_generate_sack_event(unsigned long data)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = (struct sctp_association *) data;
sctp_generate_timeout_event(asoc, SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SACK);
}
|
static void sctp_generate_sack_event(unsigned long data)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = (struct sctp_association *) data;
sctp_generate_timeout_event(asoc, SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SACK);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6850/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/e96fc4fdd525fa0ede28074a7e2b1caf94b58b0d
|
e96fc4fdd525fa0ede28074a7e2b1caf94b58b0d
|
Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
|
long jas_stream_setrwcount(jas_stream_t *stream, long rwcnt)
{
int old;
old = stream->rwcnt_;
stream->rwcnt_ = rwcnt;
return old;
}
|
long jas_stream_setrwcount(jas_stream_t *stream, long rwcnt)
{
int old;
old = stream->rwcnt_;
stream->rwcnt_ = rwcnt;
return old;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2006-5331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2006-5331/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6c4841c2b6c32a134f9f36e5e08857138cc12b10
|
6c4841c2b6c32a134f9f36e5e08857138cc12b10
|
[POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
|
static int check_bug_trap(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct bug_entry *bug;
unsigned long addr;
if (regs->msr & MSR_PR)
return 0; /* not in kernel */
addr = regs->nip; /* address of trap instruction */
if (addr < PAGE_OFFSET)
return 0;
bug = find_bug(regs->nip);
if (bug == NULL)
return 0;
if (bug->line & BUG_WARNING_TRAP) {
/* this is a WARN_ON rather than BUG/BUG_ON */
printk(KERN_ERR "Badness in %s at %s:%ld\n",
bug->function, bug->file,
bug->line & ~BUG_WARNING_TRAP);
dump_stack();
return 1;
}
printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel BUG in %s at %s:%ld!\n",
bug->function, bug->file, bug->line);
return 0;
}
|
static int check_bug_trap(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct bug_entry *bug;
unsigned long addr;
if (regs->msr & MSR_PR)
return 0; /* not in kernel */
addr = regs->nip; /* address of trap instruction */
if (addr < PAGE_OFFSET)
return 0;
bug = find_bug(regs->nip);
if (bug == NULL)
return 0;
if (bug->line & BUG_WARNING_TRAP) {
/* this is a WARN_ON rather than BUG/BUG_ON */
printk(KERN_ERR "Badness in %s at %s:%ld\n",
bug->function, bug->file,
bug->line & ~BUG_WARNING_TRAP);
dump_stack();
return 1;
}
printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel BUG in %s at %s:%ld!\n",
bug->function, bug->file, bug->line);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3900/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/047eec456943dc082e33220d28abb7df4e089f69
|
047eec456943dc082e33220d28abb7df4e089f69
|
ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
|
int main()
{
struct binder_state *bs;
bs = binder_open(128*1024);
if (!bs) {
ALOGE("failed to open binder driver\n");
return -1;
}
if (binder_become_context_manager(bs)) {
ALOGE("cannot become context manager (%s)\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
selinux_enabled = is_selinux_enabled();
sehandle = selinux_android_service_context_handle();
selinux_status_open(true);
if (selinux_enabled > 0) {
if (sehandle == NULL) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to acquire sehandle. Aborting.\n");
abort();
}
if (getcon(&service_manager_context) != 0) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to acquire service_manager context. Aborting.\n");
abort();
}
}
union selinux_callback cb;
cb.func_audit = audit_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, cb);
cb.func_log = selinux_log_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, cb);
binder_loop(bs, svcmgr_handler);
return 0;
}
|
int main()
{
struct binder_state *bs;
bs = binder_open(128*1024);
if (!bs) {
ALOGE("failed to open binder driver\n");
return -1;
}
if (binder_become_context_manager(bs)) {
ALOGE("cannot become context manager (%s)\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
selinux_enabled = is_selinux_enabled();
sehandle = selinux_android_service_context_handle();
selinux_status_open(true);
if (selinux_enabled > 0) {
if (sehandle == NULL) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to acquire sehandle. Aborting.\n");
abort();
}
if (getcon(&service_manager_context) != 0) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to acquire service_manager context. Aborting.\n");
abort();
}
}
union selinux_callback cb;
cb.func_audit = audit_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, cb);
cb.func_log = selinux_log_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, cb);
binder_loop(bs, svcmgr_handler);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/51dfe5e3b332bcea02fb4d4c7493ae841106dd9b
|
51dfe5e3b332bcea02fb4d4c7493ae841106dd9b
|
Add ALSA support to volume keys
If PulseAudio is running, everything should behave as before, otherwise use ALSA API for adjusting volume. The previous PulseAudioMixer was split into AudioMixerBase and audioMixerPusle, then AudioMixerAlsa was added.
BUG=chromium-os:10470
TEST=Volume keys should work even if pulseaudio disabled
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/5859003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@71115 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PulseAudioMixer::GetVolumeDbAsync(GetVolumeCallback* callback,
bool AudioMixerPulse::GetVolumeLimits(double* vol_min, double* vol_max) {
if (vol_min)
*vol_min = kMinVolumeDb;
if (vol_max)
*vol_max = kMaxVolumeDb;
return true;
}
|
bool PulseAudioMixer::GetVolumeDbAsync(GetVolumeCallback* callback,
void* user) {
if (CheckState() != READY)
return false;
thread_->message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this,
&PulseAudioMixer::DoGetVolume,
callback, user));
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2882/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3fe224d430d863880df0050faaa037b0eb00d3c0
|
3fe224d430d863880df0050faaa037b0eb00d3c0
|
Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool destroyed() const { return destroyed_; }
|
bool destroyed() const { return destroyed_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
static const char *zend_parse_arg_impl(int arg_num, zval **arg, va_list *va, const char **spec, char **error, int *severity TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *spec_walk = *spec;
char c = *spec_walk++;
int check_null = 0;
/* scan through modifiers */
while (1) {
if (*spec_walk == '/') {
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(arg);
} else if (*spec_walk == '!') {
check_null = 1;
} else {
break;
}
spec_walk++;
}
switch (c) {
case 'l':
case 'L':
{
long *p = va_arg(*va, long *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
double d;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), p, &d, -1)) == 0) {
return "long";
} else if (type == IS_DOUBLE) {
if (c == 'L') {
if (d > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (d < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
*p = zend_dval_to_lval(d);
}
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
if (c == 'L') {
if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_long_ex(arg);
*p = Z_LVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "long";
}
}
break;
case 'd':
{
double *p = va_arg(*va, double *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
long l;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &l, p, -1)) == 0) {
return "double";
} else if (type == IS_LONG) {
*p = (double) l;
}
}
break;
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_double_ex(arg);
*p = Z_DVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "double";
}
}
break;
case 'p':
case 's':
{
char **p = va_arg(*va, char **);
int *pl = va_arg(*va, int *);
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
if (check_null) {
*p = NULL;
*pl = 0;
break;
}
/* break omitted intentionally */
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISREF_PP(arg) != 0)) {
/* it's dangerous to return pointers to string
buffer of referenced variable, because it can
be clobbered throug magic callbacks */
SEPARATE_ZVAL(arg);
}
*p = Z_STRVAL_PP(arg);
*pl = Z_STRLEN_PP(arg);
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
if (parse_arg_object_to_string(arg, p, pl, IS_STRING TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
}
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return c == 's' ? "string" : "a valid path";
}
}
break;
case 'b':
{
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_boolean_ex(arg);
*p = Z_BVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "boolean";
}
}
break;
case 'r':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_RESOURCE) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "resource";
}
}
break;
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY || (c == 'A' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT)) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
HashTable **p = va_arg(*va, HashTable **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY) {
*p = Z_ARRVAL_PP(arg);
} else if(c == 'H' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = HASH_OF(*arg);
if(*p == NULL) {
return "array";
}
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'o':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
break;
case 'O':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
zend_class_entry *ce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry *);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT &&
(!ce || instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_PP(arg), ce TSRMLS_CC))) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
if (ce) {
return ce->name;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
}
break;
case 'C':
{
zend_class_entry **lookup, **pce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry **);
zend_class_entry *ce_base = *pce;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*pce = NULL;
break;
}
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (zend_lookup_class(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &lookup TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
*pce = NULL;
} else {
*pce = *lookup;
}
if (ce_base) {
if ((!*pce || !instanceof_function(*pce, ce_base TSRMLS_CC))) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a class name derived from %s, '%s' given",
ce_base->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
*pce = NULL;
return "";
}
}
if (!*pce) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid class name, '%s' given",
Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
return "";
}
break;
}
break;
case 'f':
{
zend_fcall_info *fci = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info *);
zend_fcall_info_cache *fcc = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info_cache *);
char *is_callable_error = NULL;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
fci->size = 0;
fcc->initialized = 0;
break;
}
if (zend_fcall_info_init(*arg, 0, fci, fcc, NULL, &is_callable_error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_STRICT;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
*spec = spec_walk;
return "";
}
break;
} else {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_WARNING;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
return "";
} else {
return "valid callback";
}
}
}
case 'z':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = *arg;
}
}
break;
case 'Z':
{
zval ***p = va_arg(*va, zval ***);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = arg;
}
}
break;
default:
return "unknown";
}
*spec = spec_walk;
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
static const char *zend_parse_arg_impl(int arg_num, zval **arg, va_list *va, const char **spec, char **error, int *severity TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *spec_walk = *spec;
char c = *spec_walk++;
int check_null = 0;
/* scan through modifiers */
while (1) {
if (*spec_walk == '/') {
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(arg);
} else if (*spec_walk == '!') {
check_null = 1;
} else {
break;
}
spec_walk++;
}
switch (c) {
case 'l':
case 'L':
{
long *p = va_arg(*va, long *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
double d;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), p, &d, -1)) == 0) {
return "long";
} else if (type == IS_DOUBLE) {
if (c == 'L') {
if (d > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (d < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
*p = zend_dval_to_lval(d);
}
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
if (c == 'L') {
if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_long_ex(arg);
*p = Z_LVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "long";
}
}
break;
case 'd':
{
double *p = va_arg(*va, double *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
long l;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &l, p, -1)) == 0) {
return "double";
} else if (type == IS_LONG) {
*p = (double) l;
}
}
break;
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_double_ex(arg);
*p = Z_DVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "double";
}
}
break;
case 'p':
case 's':
{
char **p = va_arg(*va, char **);
int *pl = va_arg(*va, int *);
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
if (check_null) {
*p = NULL;
*pl = 0;
break;
}
/* break omitted intentionally */
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISREF_PP(arg) != 0)) {
/* it's dangerous to return pointers to string
buffer of referenced variable, because it can
be clobbered throug magic callbacks */
SEPARATE_ZVAL(arg);
}
*p = Z_STRVAL_PP(arg);
*pl = Z_STRLEN_PP(arg);
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
if (parse_arg_object_to_string(arg, p, pl, IS_STRING TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
}
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return c == 's' ? "string" : "a valid path";
}
}
break;
case 'b':
{
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_boolean_ex(arg);
*p = Z_BVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "boolean";
}
}
break;
case 'r':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_RESOURCE) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "resource";
}
}
break;
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY || (c == 'A' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT)) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
HashTable **p = va_arg(*va, HashTable **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY) {
*p = Z_ARRVAL_PP(arg);
} else if(c == 'H' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = HASH_OF(*arg);
if(*p == NULL) {
return "array";
}
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'o':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
break;
case 'O':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
zend_class_entry *ce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry *);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT &&
(!ce || instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_PP(arg), ce TSRMLS_CC))) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
if (ce) {
return ce->name;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
}
break;
case 'C':
{
zend_class_entry **lookup, **pce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry **);
zend_class_entry *ce_base = *pce;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*pce = NULL;
break;
}
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (zend_lookup_class(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &lookup TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
*pce = NULL;
} else {
*pce = *lookup;
}
if (ce_base) {
if ((!*pce || !instanceof_function(*pce, ce_base TSRMLS_CC))) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a class name derived from %s, '%s' given",
ce_base->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
*pce = NULL;
return "";
}
}
if (!*pce) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid class name, '%s' given",
Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
return "";
}
break;
}
break;
case 'f':
{
zend_fcall_info *fci = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info *);
zend_fcall_info_cache *fcc = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info_cache *);
char *is_callable_error = NULL;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
fci->size = 0;
fcc->initialized = 0;
break;
}
if (zend_fcall_info_init(*arg, 0, fci, fcc, NULL, &is_callable_error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_STRICT;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
*spec = spec_walk;
return "";
}
break;
} else {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_WARNING;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
return "";
} else {
return "valid callback";
}
}
}
case 'z':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = *arg;
}
}
break;
case 'Z':
{
zval ***p = va_arg(*va, zval ***);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = arg;
}
}
break;
default:
return "unknown";
}
*spec = spec_walk;
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err stsf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entries, i;
u32 nb_entries;
GF_StsfEntry *p;
GF_SampleFragmentBox *ptr = (GF_SampleFragmentBox *)s;
p = NULL;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
nb_entries = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p = NULL;
for ( entries = 0; entries < nb_entries; entries++ ) {
p = (GF_StsfEntry *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_StsfEntry));
if (!p) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
p->SampleNumber = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->fragmentCount = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->fragmentSizes = (u16*)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_StsfEntry) * p->fragmentCount);
for (i=0; i<p->fragmentCount; i++) {
p->fragmentSizes[i] = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->entryList, p);
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_WRITE
ptr->w_currentEntry = p;
ptr->w_currentEntryIndex = nb_entries-1;
#endif
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err stsf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entries, i;
u32 nb_entries;
GF_StsfEntry *p;
GF_SampleFragmentBox *ptr = (GF_SampleFragmentBox *)s;
p = NULL;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
nb_entries = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p = NULL;
for ( entries = 0; entries < nb_entries; entries++ ) {
p = (GF_StsfEntry *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_StsfEntry));
if (!p) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
p->SampleNumber = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->fragmentCount = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->fragmentSizes = (u16*)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_StsfEntry) * p->fragmentCount);
for (i=0; i<p->fragmentCount; i++) {
p->fragmentSizes[i] = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->entryList, p);
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_WRITE
ptr->w_currentEntry = p;
ptr->w_currentEntryIndex = nb_entries-1;
#endif
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5194
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782}
|
TestEntryInfo& SetPinned(bool is_pinned) {
pinned = is_pinned;
return *this;
}
|
TestEntryInfo& SetPinned(bool is_pinned) {
pinned = is_pinned;
return *this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9436
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9436/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/33509cc81ec5f2ba44eb6fd98bd5c1b5873e46bd
|
33509cc81ec5f2ba44eb6fd98bd5c1b5873e46bd
|
Fix uninitialised values for <i> and <dd>
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/16
|
AuthBasicCred(struct http_auth *ha, Str uname, Str pw, ParsedURL *pu,
HRequest *hr, FormList *request)
{
Str s = Strdup(uname);
Strcat_char(s, ':');
Strcat(s, pw);
return Strnew_m_charp("Basic ", encodeB(s->ptr)->ptr, NULL);
}
|
AuthBasicCred(struct http_auth *ha, Str uname, Str pw, ParsedURL *pu,
HRequest *hr, FormList *request)
{
Str s = Strdup(uname);
Strcat_char(s, ':');
Strcat(s, pw);
return Strnew_m_charp("Basic ", encodeB(s->ptr)->ptr, NULL);
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_credentials_add_from_user (DBusCredentials *credentials,
const DBusString *username)
{
return _dbus_credentials_add_windows_sid (credentials,
_dbus_string_get_const_data(username));
}
|
_dbus_credentials_add_from_user (DBusCredentials *credentials,
const DBusString *username)
{
return _dbus_credentials_add_windows_sid (credentials,
_dbus_string_get_const_data(username));
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16541/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
|
241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
| null |
gs_main_lib_open(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *file_name, ref * pfile)
{
/* This is a separate procedure only to avoid tying up */
/* extra stack space while running the file. */
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
#define maxfn 2048
char fn[maxfn];
uint len;
return lib_file_open(&minst->lib_path, imemory,
NULL, /* Don't check permissions here, because permlist
isn't ready running init files. */
file_name, strlen(file_name), fn, maxfn, &len, pfile);
}
|
gs_main_lib_open(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *file_name, ref * pfile)
{
/* This is a separate procedure only to avoid tying up */
/* extra stack space while running the file. */
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
#define maxfn 2048
char fn[maxfn];
uint len;
return lib_file_open(&minst->lib_path, imemory,
NULL, /* Don't check permissions here, because permlist
isn't ready running init files. */
file_name, strlen(file_name), fn, maxfn, &len, pfile);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1536
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1536/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
|
static void Bitmap_destructor(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
#ifdef USE_OPENGL_RENDERER
if (android::uirenderer::ResourceCache::hasInstance()) {
android::uirenderer::ResourceCache::getInstance().destructor(bitmap);
return;
}
#endif // USE_OPENGL_RENDERER
delete bitmap;
}
|
static void Bitmap_destructor(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
#ifdef USE_OPENGL_RENDERER
if (android::uirenderer::ResourceCache::hasInstance()) {
android::uirenderer::ResourceCache::getInstance().destructor(bitmap);
return;
}
#endif // USE_OPENGL_RENDERER
delete bitmap;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6136/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->fds[0] = fd1;
context->fds[1] = fd2;
}
|
void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->fds[0] = fd1;
context->fds[1] = fd2;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0881/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool RenderLayerCompositor::canRender3DTransforms() const
{
return hasAcceleratedCompositing() && (m_compositingTriggers & ChromeClient::ThreeDTransformTrigger);
}
|
bool RenderLayerCompositor::canRender3DTransforms() const
{
return hasAcceleratedCompositing() && (m_compositingTriggers & ChromeClient::ThreeDTransformTrigger);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2877
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2877/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d0947db40187f4708c58e64cbd6013faf9eddeed
|
d0947db40187f4708c58e64cbd6013faf9eddeed
|
libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) &&
(ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
goto error;
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while ((len > 0) && (buf[len - 1] == 0x20)) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
error:
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
|
xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while ((len > 0) && (buf[len - 1] == 0x20)) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
DownloadFileFactory* DownloadManagerImpl::GetDownloadFileFactoryForTesting() {
return file_factory_.get();
}
|
DownloadFileFactory* DownloadManagerImpl::GetDownloadFileFactoryForTesting() {
return file_factory_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
AXObject::AXRange AXLayoutObject::selection() const {
AXRange textSelection = textControlSelection();
if (textSelection.isValid())
return textSelection;
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getLayoutObject()->frame())
return AXRange();
VisibleSelection selection =
getLayoutObject()
->frame()
->selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
if (selection.isNone())
return AXRange();
VisiblePosition visibleStart = selection.visibleStart();
Position start = visibleStart.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity startAffinity = visibleStart.affinity();
VisiblePosition visibleEnd = selection.visibleEnd();
Position end = visibleEnd.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity endAffinity = visibleEnd.affinity();
Node* anchorNode = start.anchorNode();
ASSERT(anchorNode);
AXLayoutObject* anchorObject = nullptr;
while (anchorNode) {
anchorObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*anchorNode);
if (anchorObject)
break;
if (anchorNode->nextSibling())
anchorNode = anchorNode->nextSibling();
else
anchorNode = anchorNode->parentNode();
}
Node* focusNode = end.anchorNode();
ASSERT(focusNode);
AXLayoutObject* focusObject = nullptr;
while (focusNode) {
focusObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*focusNode);
if (focusObject)
break;
if (focusNode->previousSibling())
focusNode = focusNode->previousSibling();
else
focusNode = focusNode->parentNode();
}
if (!anchorObject || !focusObject)
return AXRange();
int anchorOffset = anchorObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleStart);
ASSERT(anchorOffset >= 0);
int focusOffset = focusObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleEnd);
ASSERT(focusOffset >= 0);
return AXRange(anchorObject, anchorOffset, startAffinity, focusObject,
focusOffset, endAffinity);
}
|
AXObject::AXRange AXLayoutObject::selection() const {
AXRange textSelection = textControlSelection();
if (textSelection.isValid())
return textSelection;
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getLayoutObject()->frame())
return AXRange();
VisibleSelection selection =
getLayoutObject()
->frame()
->selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
if (selection.isNone())
return AXRange();
VisiblePosition visibleStart = selection.visibleStart();
Position start = visibleStart.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity startAffinity = visibleStart.affinity();
VisiblePosition visibleEnd = selection.visibleEnd();
Position end = visibleEnd.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity endAffinity = visibleEnd.affinity();
Node* anchorNode = start.anchorNode();
ASSERT(anchorNode);
AXLayoutObject* anchorObject = nullptr;
while (anchorNode) {
anchorObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*anchorNode);
if (anchorObject)
break;
if (anchorNode->nextSibling())
anchorNode = anchorNode->nextSibling();
else
anchorNode = anchorNode->parentNode();
}
Node* focusNode = end.anchorNode();
ASSERT(focusNode);
AXLayoutObject* focusObject = nullptr;
while (focusNode) {
focusObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*focusNode);
if (focusObject)
break;
if (focusNode->previousSibling())
focusNode = focusNode->previousSibling();
else
focusNode = focusNode->parentNode();
}
if (!anchorObject || !focusObject)
return AXRange();
int anchorOffset = anchorObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleStart);
ASSERT(anchorOffset >= 0);
int focusOffset = focusObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleEnd);
ASSERT(focusOffset >= 0);
return AXRange(anchorObject, anchorOffset, startAffinity, focusObject,
focusOffset, endAffinity);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2100
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2100/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t *first_not_zeroed)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
int flexbg_flag = 0;
ext4_group_t i, grp = sbi->s_groups_count;
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
flexbg_flag = 1;
ext4_debug("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1 || flexbg_flag)
last_block = ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
if ((grp == sbi->s_groups_count) &&
!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
grp = i;
block_bitmap = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, block_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_bitmap = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_table);
return 0;
}
ext4_lock_group(sb, i);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sbi, i, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
i, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sbi, i,
gdp)), le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
return 0;
}
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
if (!flexbg_flag)
first_block += EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb);
}
if (NULL != first_not_zeroed)
*first_not_zeroed = grp;
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, ext4_count_free_clusters(sb)));
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count =cpu_to_le32(ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
return 1;
}
|
static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t *first_not_zeroed)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
int flexbg_flag = 0;
ext4_group_t i, grp = sbi->s_groups_count;
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
flexbg_flag = 1;
ext4_debug("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1 || flexbg_flag)
last_block = ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
if ((grp == sbi->s_groups_count) &&
!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
grp = i;
block_bitmap = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, block_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_bitmap = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_table);
return 0;
}
ext4_lock_group(sb, i);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sbi, i, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
i, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sbi, i,
gdp)), le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
return 0;
}
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
if (!flexbg_flag)
first_block += EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb);
}
if (NULL != first_not_zeroed)
*first_not_zeroed = grp;
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, ext4_count_free_clusters(sb)));
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count =cpu_to_le32(ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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