CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2012-1601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1601/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_pal_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
struct exit_ctl_data *p;
p = kvm_get_exit_data(vcpu);
if (p->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PAL_CALL)
return kvm_pal_emul(vcpu, kvm_run);
else {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
kvm_run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = 2;
return 0;
}
}
|
static int handle_pal_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
struct exit_ctl_data *p;
p = kvm_get_exit_data(vcpu);
if (p->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PAL_CALL)
return kvm_pal_emul(vcpu, kvm_run);
else {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
kvm_run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = 2;
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
do_bundle_commit(struct ofconn *ofconn, uint32_t id, uint16_t flags)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
ovs_version_t version = ofproto->tables_version + 1;
struct ofp_bundle *bundle;
struct ofp_bundle_entry *be;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofconn_get_bundle(ofconn, id);
if (!bundle) {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_ID;
}
if (bundle->flags != flags) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_FLAGS;
} else {
bool prev_is_port_mod = false;
error = 0;
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
/* 1. Begin. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Our port mods are not atomic. */
if (flags & OFPBF_ATOMIC) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
} else {
prev_is_port_mod = true;
error = port_mod_start(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, &be->opm.port);
}
} else {
/* Flow & group mods between port mods are applied as a single
* version, but the versions are published only after we know
* the commit is successful. */
if (prev_is_port_mod) {
prev_is_port_mod = false;
++version;
}
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ofm.version = version;
error = ofproto_flow_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ogm.version = version;
error = ofproto_group_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
be->opo.version = version;
error = ofproto_packet_out_start(ofproto, &be->opo);
} else {
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
if (error) {
break;
}
}
if (error) {
/* Send error referring to the original message. */
if (error) {
ofconn_send_error(ofconn, &be->ofp_msg, error);
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
}
/* 2. Revert. Undo all the changes made above. */
LIST_FOR_EACH_REVERSE_CONTINUE(be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_revert(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
/* Nothing needs to be reverted for a port mod. */
}
} else {
/* 4. Finish. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Perform the actual port mod. This is not atomic, i.e.,
* the effects will be immediately seen by upcall
* processing regardless of the lookup version. It should
* be noted that port configuration changes can originate
* also from OVSDB changes asynchronously to all upcall
* processing. */
port_mod_finish(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, be->opm.port);
} else {
version =
(be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) ? be->ofm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) ? be->ogm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) ? be->opo.version :
version;
/* Bump the lookup version to the one of the current
* message. This makes all the changes in the bundle at
* this version visible to lookups at once. */
if (ofproto->tables_version < version) {
ofproto->tables_version = version;
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_tables_version(
ofproto, ofproto->tables_version);
}
struct openflow_mod_requester req = { ofconn,
&be->ofp_msg };
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ofm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ogm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_finish(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
}
}
}
ofmonitor_flush(ofproto->connmgr);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
/* The bundle is discarded regardless the outcome. */
ofp_bundle_remove__(ofconn, bundle);
return error;
}
|
do_bundle_commit(struct ofconn *ofconn, uint32_t id, uint16_t flags)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
ovs_version_t version = ofproto->tables_version + 1;
struct ofp_bundle *bundle;
struct ofp_bundle_entry *be;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofconn_get_bundle(ofconn, id);
if (!bundle) {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_ID;
}
if (bundle->flags != flags) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_FLAGS;
} else {
bool prev_is_port_mod = false;
error = 0;
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
/* 1. Begin. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Our port mods are not atomic. */
if (flags & OFPBF_ATOMIC) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
} else {
prev_is_port_mod = true;
error = port_mod_start(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, &be->opm.port);
}
} else {
/* Flow & group mods between port mods are applied as a single
* version, but the versions are published only after we know
* the commit is successful. */
if (prev_is_port_mod) {
prev_is_port_mod = false;
++version;
}
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ofm.version = version;
error = ofproto_flow_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ogm.version = version;
error = ofproto_group_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
be->opo.version = version;
error = ofproto_packet_out_start(ofproto, &be->opo);
} else {
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
if (error) {
break;
}
}
if (error) {
/* Send error referring to the original message. */
if (error) {
ofconn_send_error(ofconn, &be->ofp_msg, error);
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
}
/* 2. Revert. Undo all the changes made above. */
LIST_FOR_EACH_REVERSE_CONTINUE(be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_revert(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
/* Nothing needs to be reverted for a port mod. */
}
} else {
/* 4. Finish. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Perform the actual port mod. This is not atomic, i.e.,
* the effects will be immediately seen by upcall
* processing regardless of the lookup version. It should
* be noted that port configuration changes can originate
* also from OVSDB changes asynchronously to all upcall
* processing. */
port_mod_finish(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, be->opm.port);
} else {
version =
(be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) ? be->ofm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) ? be->ogm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) ? be->opo.version :
version;
/* Bump the lookup version to the one of the current
* message. This makes all the changes in the bundle at
* this version visible to lookups at once. */
if (ofproto->tables_version < version) {
ofproto->tables_version = version;
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_tables_version(
ofproto, ofproto->tables_version);
}
struct openflow_mod_requester req = { ofconn,
&be->ofp_msg };
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ofm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ogm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_finish(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
}
}
}
ofmonitor_flush(ofproto->connmgr);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
/* The bundle is discarded regardless the outcome. */
ofp_bundle_remove__(ofconn, bundle);
return error;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.convertToSpecifiedUnits");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(args.Holder());
if (wrapper->role() == AnimValRole) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, unitType, toUInt32(args[0]));
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
imp.convertToSpecifiedUnits(unitType, lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
else
wrapper->commitChange();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.convertToSpecifiedUnits");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(args.Holder());
if (wrapper->role() == AnimValRole) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, unitType, toUInt32(args[0]));
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
imp.convertToSpecifiedUnits(unitType, lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
else
wrapper->commitChange();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1646
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1646/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/84fbaf8414b4911ef122557d1518b50f79c2eaef
|
84fbaf8414b4911ef122557d1518b50f79c2eaef
|
OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
|
void OomInterventionTabHelper::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() ||
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
return;
}
last_navigation_timestamp_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (!navigation_started_) {
navigation_started_ = true;
return;
}
ResetInterfaces();
if (!IsLastVisibleWebContents(navigation_handle->GetWebContents())) {
ResetInterventionState();
return;
}
if (near_oom_detected_time_) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - near_oom_detected_time_.value();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"NavigationAfterDetectionTime",
elapsed_time);
ResetInterventionState();
} else {
RecordNearOomDetectionEndReason(NearOomDetectionEndReason::NAVIGATION);
}
}
|
void OomInterventionTabHelper::DidStartNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() ||
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
return;
}
last_navigation_timestamp_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (!navigation_started_) {
navigation_started_ = true;
return;
}
ResetInterfaces();
if (!IsLastVisibleWebContents(navigation_handle->GetWebContents())) {
ResetInterventionState();
return;
}
if (near_oom_detected_time_) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - near_oom_detected_time_.value();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"NavigationAfterDetectionTime",
elapsed_time);
ResetInterventionState();
} else {
RecordNearOomDetectionEndReason(NearOomDetectionEndReason::NAVIGATION);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Proxy::callFunction(v8::Handle<v8::Function> function, v8::Handle<v8::Object> receiver, int argc, v8::Handle<v8::Value> args[])
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(frame());
return V8Proxy::instrumentedCallFunction(frame(), function, receiver, argc, args);
}
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Proxy::callFunction(v8::Handle<v8::Function> function, v8::Handle<v8::Object> receiver, int argc, v8::Handle<v8::Value> args[])
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(frame());
return V8Proxy::instrumentedCallFunction(frame(), function, receiver, argc, args);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int bnep_net_mc_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bnep_session *s)
{
struct ethhdr *eh = (void *) skb->data;
if ((eh->h_dest[0] & 1) && !test_bit(bnep_mc_hash(eh->h_dest), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter))
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
static inline int bnep_net_mc_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bnep_session *s)
{
struct ethhdr *eh = (void *) skb->data;
if ((eh->h_dest[0] & 1) && !test_bit(bnep_mc_hash(eh->h_dest), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter))
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int afiucv_hs_callback_rx(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (!iucv) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
/* write stuff from iucv_msg to skb cb */
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
IUCV_SKB_CB(skb)->offset = 0;
spin_lock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) {
/* handle rcv queue full */
skb_queue_tail(&iucv->backlog_skb_q, skb);
}
} else
skb_queue_tail(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q, skb);
spin_unlock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
|
static int afiucv_hs_callback_rx(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (!iucv) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
/* write stuff from iucv_msg to skb cb */
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
IUCV_SKB_CB(skb)->offset = 0;
spin_lock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) {
/* handle rcv queue full */
skb_queue_tail(&iucv->backlog_skb_q, skb);
}
} else
skb_queue_tail(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q, skb);
spin_unlock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnAutoscrollEnd() {
WebGestureEvent cancel_event = SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(
WebInputEvent::kGestureFlingCancel,
blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll);
cancel_event.data.fling_cancel.prevent_boosting = true;
ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(
cancel_event, ui::LatencyInfo(ui::SourceEventType::OTHER));
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnAutoscrollEnd() {
WebGestureEvent cancel_event = SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(
WebInputEvent::kGestureFlingCancel,
blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll);
cancel_event.data.fling_cancel.prevent_boosting = true;
ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(
cancel_event, ui::LatencyInfo(ui::SourceEventType::OTHER));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4467/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d
|
ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d
|
Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen,
unsigned int flags, struct timespec *timeout)
{
int fput_needed, err, datagrams;
struct socket *sock;
struct mmsghdr __user *entry;
struct compat_mmsghdr __user *compat_entry;
struct msghdr msg_sys;
struct timespec end_time;
if (timeout &&
poll_select_set_timeout(&end_time, timeout->tv_sec,
timeout->tv_nsec))
return -EINVAL;
datagrams = 0;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
return err;
err = sock_error(sock->sk);
if (err)
goto out_put;
entry = mmsg;
compat_entry = (struct compat_mmsghdr __user *)mmsg;
while (datagrams < vlen) {
/*
* No need to ask LSM for more than the first datagram.
*/
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry,
&msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE,
datagrams);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = __put_user(err, &compat_entry->msg_len);
++compat_entry;
} else {
err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)entry,
&msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE,
datagrams);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = put_user(err, &entry->msg_len);
++entry;
}
if (err)
break;
++datagrams;
/* MSG_WAITFORONE turns on MSG_DONTWAIT after one packet */
if (flags & MSG_WAITFORONE)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
if (timeout) {
ktime_get_ts(timeout);
*timeout = timespec_sub(end_time, *timeout);
if (timeout->tv_sec < 0) {
timeout->tv_sec = timeout->tv_nsec = 0;
break;
}
/* Timeout, return less than vlen datagrams */
if (timeout->tv_nsec == 0 && timeout->tv_sec == 0)
break;
}
/* Out of band data, return right away */
if (msg_sys.msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
break;
}
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
if (err == 0)
return datagrams;
if (datagrams != 0) {
/*
* We may return less entries than requested (vlen) if the
* sock is non block and there aren't enough datagrams...
*/
if (err != -EAGAIN) {
/*
* ... or if recvmsg returns an error after we
* received some datagrams, where we record the
* error to return on the next call or if the
* app asks about it using getsockopt(SO_ERROR).
*/
sock->sk->sk_err = -err;
}
return datagrams;
}
return err;
}
|
int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen,
unsigned int flags, struct timespec *timeout)
{
int fput_needed, err, datagrams;
struct socket *sock;
struct mmsghdr __user *entry;
struct compat_mmsghdr __user *compat_entry;
struct msghdr msg_sys;
struct timespec end_time;
if (timeout &&
poll_select_set_timeout(&end_time, timeout->tv_sec,
timeout->tv_nsec))
return -EINVAL;
datagrams = 0;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
return err;
err = sock_error(sock->sk);
if (err)
goto out_put;
entry = mmsg;
compat_entry = (struct compat_mmsghdr __user *)mmsg;
while (datagrams < vlen) {
/*
* No need to ask LSM for more than the first datagram.
*/
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry,
&msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE,
datagrams);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = __put_user(err, &compat_entry->msg_len);
++compat_entry;
} else {
err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)entry,
&msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE,
datagrams);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = put_user(err, &entry->msg_len);
++entry;
}
if (err)
break;
++datagrams;
/* MSG_WAITFORONE turns on MSG_DONTWAIT after one packet */
if (flags & MSG_WAITFORONE)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
if (timeout) {
ktime_get_ts(timeout);
*timeout = timespec_sub(end_time, *timeout);
if (timeout->tv_sec < 0) {
timeout->tv_sec = timeout->tv_nsec = 0;
break;
}
/* Timeout, return less than vlen datagrams */
if (timeout->tv_nsec == 0 && timeout->tv_sec == 0)
break;
}
/* Out of band data, return right away */
if (msg_sys.msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
break;
}
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
if (err == 0)
return datagrams;
if (datagrams != 0) {
/*
* We may return less entries than requested (vlen) if the
* sock is non block and there aren't enough datagrams...
*/
if (err != -EAGAIN) {
/*
* ... or if recvmsg returns an error after we
* received some datagrams, where we record the
* error to return on the next call or if the
* app asks about it using getsockopt(SO_ERROR).
*/
sock->sk->sk_err = -err;
}
return datagrams;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7398
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7398/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/m6w6/ext-http/commit/17137d4ab1ce81a2cee0fae842340a344ef3da83
|
17137d4ab1ce81a2cee0fae842340a344ef3da83
|
fix bug #73055
|
static size_t check_sep(php_http_params_state_t *state, php_http_params_token_t **separators)
{
php_http_params_token_t **sep = separators;
if (state->quotes || state->escape) {
return 0;
}
if (sep) while (*sep) {
if (check_str(state->input.str, state->input.len, (*sep)->str, (*sep)->len)) {
return (*sep)->len;
}
++sep;
}
return 0;
}
|
static size_t check_sep(php_http_params_state_t *state, php_http_params_token_t **separators)
{
php_http_params_token_t **sep = separators;
if (state->quotes || state->escape) {
return 0;
}
if (sep) while (*sep) {
if (check_str(state->input.str, state->input.len, (*sep)->str, (*sep)->len)) {
return (*sep)->len;
}
++sep;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ext-http
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15389
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15389/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5788690fb1395dc672ff9b3385dbfb1180ed710a
|
5788690fb1395dc672ff9b3385dbfb1180ed710a
|
mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
|
viz::FrameSinkId DelegatedFrameHost::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
|
viz::FrameSinkId DelegatedFrameHost::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ShouldForgetOpenersForTransition(content::PageTransition transition) {
return transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_BOOKMARK ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL;
}
|
bool ShouldForgetOpenersForTransition(content::PageTransition transition) {
return transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_BOOKMARK ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD ||
transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7374/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d
|
1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
|
int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
if (!dir->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(dir) ||
fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, iname->len,
&fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, &fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_')
bigname = 1;
if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
return -ENOENT;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (bigname) {
memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
errout:
fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname->crypto_buf);
return ret;
}
|
int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
if (!dir->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(dir) ||
fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
ret = fscrypt_get_crypt_info(dir);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, iname->len,
&fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, &fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_')
bigname = 1;
if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
return -ENOENT;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (bigname) {
memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
errout:
fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname->crypto_buf);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
static ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State ScrollState1() {
ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.container_rect = IntRect(3, 5, 11, 13);
state.contents_rect = IntRect(-3, -5, 27, 31);
state.user_scrollable_horizontal = true;
return state;
}
|
static ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State ScrollState1() {
ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.container_rect = IntRect(3, 5, 11, 13);
state.contents_rect = IntRect(-3, -5, 27, 31);
state.user_scrollable_horizontal = true;
return state;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16088
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16088/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4379a7fcff8190aa7ba72307b398161c32102c52
|
4379a7fcff8190aa7ba72307b398161c32102c52
|
Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
|
NavigationPolicy FrameLoader::ShouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(
const ResourceRequest& request,
Document* origin_document,
const SubstituteData& substitute_data,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy,
NavigationType type,
NavigationPolicy policy,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
bool is_client_redirect,
WebTriggeringEventInfo triggering_event_info,
HTMLFormElement* form,
mojom::blink::BlobURLTokenPtr blob_url_token,
bool check_with_client) {
if (request.Url().IsEmpty() || substitute_data.IsValid())
return kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
if (request.Url().PotentiallyDanglingMarkup() &&
request.Url().ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily()) {
Deprecation::CountDeprecation(
frame_, WebFeature::kCanRequestURLHTTPContainingNewline);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RestrictCanRequestURLCharacterSetEnabled())
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
if (MaybeCheckCSP(request, type, frame_, policy,
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy ==
kCheckContentSecurityPolicy,
ContentSecurityPolicy::CheckHeaderType::kCheckEnforce) ==
kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
bool replaces_current_history_item =
frame_load_type == kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
policy = Client()->DecidePolicyForNavigation(
request, origin_document, loader, type, policy,
replaces_current_history_item, is_client_redirect, triggering_event_info,
form, should_check_main_world_content_security_policy,
std::move(blob_url_token));
if (!check_with_client)
CHECK_EQ(kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab, policy);
DCHECK(policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClientForInitialHistory)
<< policy;
return policy;
}
|
NavigationPolicy FrameLoader::ShouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(
const ResourceRequest& request,
Document* origin_document,
const SubstituteData& substitute_data,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy,
NavigationType type,
NavigationPolicy policy,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
bool is_client_redirect,
WebTriggeringEventInfo triggering_event_info,
HTMLFormElement* form,
mojom::blink::BlobURLTokenPtr blob_url_token,
bool check_with_client) {
if (request.Url().IsEmpty() || substitute_data.IsValid())
return kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
if (request.Url().PotentiallyDanglingMarkup() &&
request.Url().ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily()) {
Deprecation::CountDeprecation(
frame_, WebFeature::kCanRequestURLHTTPContainingNewline);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RestrictCanRequestURLCharacterSetEnabled())
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
if (MaybeCheckCSP(request, type, frame_, policy,
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy ==
kCheckContentSecurityPolicy,
ContentSecurityPolicy::CheckHeaderType::kCheckEnforce) ==
kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
bool replaces_current_history_item =
frame_load_type == kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
policy = Client()->DecidePolicyForNavigation(
request, origin_document, loader, type, policy,
replaces_current_history_item, is_client_redirect, triggering_event_info,
form, should_check_main_world_content_security_policy,
std::move(blob_url_token));
if (!check_with_client)
CHECK_EQ(kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab, policy);
DCHECK(policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient ||
policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClientForInitialHistory)
<< policy;
return policy;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12436
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12436/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
|
int wc_ecc_rs_raw_to_sig(const byte* r, word32 rSz, const byte* s, word32 sSz,
byte* out, word32* outlen)
{
int err;
mp_int rtmp;
mp_int stmp;
if (r == NULL || s == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
err = mp_init_multi(&rtmp, &stmp, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rtmp, r, rSz);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&stmp, s, sSz);
/* convert mp_ints to ECDSA sig, initializes rtmp and stmp internally */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = StoreECC_DSA_Sig(out, outlen, &rtmp, &stmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(&rtmp) == MP_YES || mp_iszero(&stmp) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
mp_clear(&rtmp);
mp_clear(&stmp);
return err;
}
|
int wc_ecc_rs_raw_to_sig(const byte* r, word32 rSz, const byte* s, word32 sSz,
byte* out, word32* outlen)
{
int err;
mp_int rtmp;
mp_int stmp;
if (r == NULL || s == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
err = mp_init_multi(&rtmp, &stmp, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rtmp, r, rSz);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&stmp, s, sSz);
/* convert mp_ints to ECDSA sig, initializes rtmp and stmp internally */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = StoreECC_DSA_Sig(out, outlen, &rtmp, &stmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(&rtmp) == MP_YES || mp_iszero(&stmp) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
mp_clear(&rtmp);
mp_clear(&stmp);
return err;
}
|
C
|
wolfssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3212
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3212/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
|
2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
|
sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assoc_value params;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (len == sizeof(int)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited(DEPRECATED
"%s (pid %d) "
"Use of int in maxseg socket option.\n"
"Use struct sctp_assoc_value instead\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
params.assoc_id = 0;
} else if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value)) {
len = sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value);
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optval, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EINVAL;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.assoc_id);
if (!asoc && params.assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc)
params.assoc_value = asoc->frag_point;
else
params.assoc_value = sctp_sk(sk)->user_frag;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len == sizeof(int)) {
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms.assoc_value, len))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms, len))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assoc_value params;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (len == sizeof(int)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited(DEPRECATED
"%s (pid %d) "
"Use of int in maxseg socket option.\n"
"Use struct sctp_assoc_value instead\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
params.assoc_id = 0;
} else if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value)) {
len = sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value);
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optval, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EINVAL;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.assoc_id);
if (!asoc && params.assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc)
params.assoc_value = asoc->frag_point;
else
params.assoc_value = sctp_sk(sk)->user_frag;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len == sizeof(int)) {
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms.assoc_value, len))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms, len))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0076
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0076/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29
|
2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29
| null |
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
{
int i = a->top - 1;
bn_check_top(a);
if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0;
return ((i*BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
}
|
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
{
int i = a->top - 1;
bn_check_top(a);
if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0;
return ((i*BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len < 1 || len > 8) {
// Invalid: Negative payload size, negative or 0 length integer, or integer
// larger than 64 bits (libwebm cannot handle them).
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
// Avoid rolling over pos when very close to LONG_LONG_MAX.
const unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
|
long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5042
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5042/
|
CWE-311
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cde8513c12a6e8ec5d1d1eb1cfd078d9adad3ef
|
7cde8513c12a6e8ec5d1d1eb1cfd078d9adad3ef
|
Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
const gfx::ImageSkia PageInfoUI::GetPermissionIcon(const PermissionInfo& info,
SkColor related_text_color) {
const gfx::VectorIcon* icon = &gfx::kNoneIcon;
switch (info.type) {
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES:
icon = &kCookieIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_IMAGES:
icon = &kPhotoIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT:
icon = &kCodeIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_POPUPS:
icon = &kLaunchIcon;
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS:
icon = &kExtensionIcon;
break;
#endif
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION:
icon = &vector_icons::kLocationOnIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS:
icon = &vector_icons::kNotificationsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC:
icon = &vector_icons::kMicIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA:
icon = &vector_icons::kVideocamIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS:
icon = &kFileDownloadIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX:
icon = &vector_icons::kMidiIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC:
icon = &kSyncIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_ADS:
icon = &kAdsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND:
icon = &kVolumeUpIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_CLIPBOARD_READ:
icon = &kPageInfoContentPasteIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SENSORS:
icon = &kSensorsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kUsbIcon;
break;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SERIAL_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kSerialPortIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BLUETOOTH_SCANNING:
icon = &vector_icons::kBluetoothScanningIcon;
break;
#endif
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
ContentSetting setting = info.setting == CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT
? info.default_setting
: info.setting;
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
return gfx::CreateVectorIconWithBadge(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color),
kBlockedBadgeIcon);
}
return gfx::CreateVectorIcon(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color));
}
|
const gfx::ImageSkia PageInfoUI::GetPermissionIcon(const PermissionInfo& info,
SkColor related_text_color) {
const gfx::VectorIcon* icon = &gfx::kNoneIcon;
switch (info.type) {
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES:
icon = &kCookieIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_IMAGES:
icon = &kPhotoIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT:
icon = &kCodeIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_POPUPS:
icon = &kLaunchIcon;
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS:
icon = &kExtensionIcon;
break;
#endif
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION:
icon = &vector_icons::kLocationOnIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS:
icon = &vector_icons::kNotificationsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC:
icon = &vector_icons::kMicIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA:
icon = &vector_icons::kVideocamIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS:
icon = &kFileDownloadIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX:
icon = &vector_icons::kMidiIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC:
icon = &kSyncIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_ADS:
icon = &kAdsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND:
icon = &kVolumeUpIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_CLIPBOARD_READ:
icon = &kPageInfoContentPasteIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SENSORS:
icon = &kSensorsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kUsbIcon;
break;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SERIAL_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kSerialPortIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BLUETOOTH_SCANNING:
icon = &vector_icons::kBluetoothScanningIcon;
break;
#endif
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
ContentSetting setting = info.setting == CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT
? info.default_setting
: info.setting;
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
return gfx::CreateVectorIconWithBadge(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color),
kBlockedBadgeIcon);
}
return gfx::CreateVectorIcon(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2319
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2319/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6f24f892871acc47b40dd594c63606a17c714f77
|
6f24f892871acc47b40dd594c63606a17c714f77
|
hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <[email protected]>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
Cc: Eugene Teo <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int hfsplus_dir_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct hfsplus_readdir_data *rd = file->private_data;
if (rd) {
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
list_del(&rd->list);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
kfree(rd);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int hfsplus_dir_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct hfsplus_readdir_data *rd = file->private_data;
if (rd) {
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
list_del(&rd->list);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
kfree(rd);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06
|
5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06
|
2010-07-26 Tony Gentilcore <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Darin Fisher.
Move DocumentLoadTiming struct to a new file
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42917
Also makes DocumentLoadTiming Noncopyable.
No new tests because no new functionality.
* GNUmakefile.am:
* WebCore.gypi:
* WebCore.vcproj/WebCore.vcproj:
* WebCore.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
* loader/DocumentLoadTiming.h: Added.
(WebCore::DocumentLoadTiming::DocumentLoadTiming):
* loader/DocumentLoader.h:
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp:
* loader/FrameLoaderTypes.h:
* loader/MainResourceLoader.cpp:
* page/Timing.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64051 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::continueLoadAfterNavigationPolicy(const ResourceRequest&, PassRefPtr<FormState> formState, bool shouldContinue)
{
ASSERT(m_policyDocumentLoader || !m_provisionalDocumentLoader->unreachableURL().isEmpty());
bool isTargetItem = history()->provisionalItem() ? history()->provisionalItem()->isTargetItem() : false;
bool canContinue = shouldContinue && (!isLoadingMainFrame() || shouldClose());
if (!canContinue) {
if (m_quickRedirectComing)
clientRedirectCancelledOrFinished(false);
setPolicyDocumentLoader(0);
if ((isTargetItem || isLoadingMainFrame()) && isBackForwardLoadType(policyChecker()->loadType()))
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
Frame* mainFrame = page->mainFrame();
if (HistoryItem* resetItem = mainFrame->loader()->history()->currentItem()) {
page->backForwardList()->goToItem(resetItem);
Settings* settings = m_frame->settings();
page->setGlobalHistoryItem((!settings || settings->privateBrowsingEnabled()) ? 0 : resetItem);
}
}
return;
}
FrameLoadType type = policyChecker()->loadType();
stopAllLoaders();
if (!m_frame->page())
return;
#if ENABLE(JAVASCRIPT_DEBUGGER) && ENABLE(INSPECTOR) && USE(JSC)
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
if (page->mainFrame() == m_frame)
page->inspectorController()->resume();
}
#endif
setProvisionalDocumentLoader(m_policyDocumentLoader.get());
m_loadType = type;
setState(FrameStateProvisional);
setPolicyDocumentLoader(0);
if (isBackForwardLoadType(type) && history()->provisionalItem()->isInPageCache()) {
loadProvisionalItemFromCachedPage();
return;
}
if (formState)
m_client->dispatchWillSubmitForm(&PolicyChecker::continueLoadAfterWillSubmitForm, formState);
else
continueLoadAfterWillSubmitForm();
}
|
void FrameLoader::continueLoadAfterNavigationPolicy(const ResourceRequest&, PassRefPtr<FormState> formState, bool shouldContinue)
{
ASSERT(m_policyDocumentLoader || !m_provisionalDocumentLoader->unreachableURL().isEmpty());
bool isTargetItem = history()->provisionalItem() ? history()->provisionalItem()->isTargetItem() : false;
bool canContinue = shouldContinue && (!isLoadingMainFrame() || shouldClose());
if (!canContinue) {
if (m_quickRedirectComing)
clientRedirectCancelledOrFinished(false);
setPolicyDocumentLoader(0);
if ((isTargetItem || isLoadingMainFrame()) && isBackForwardLoadType(policyChecker()->loadType()))
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
Frame* mainFrame = page->mainFrame();
if (HistoryItem* resetItem = mainFrame->loader()->history()->currentItem()) {
page->backForwardList()->goToItem(resetItem);
Settings* settings = m_frame->settings();
page->setGlobalHistoryItem((!settings || settings->privateBrowsingEnabled()) ? 0 : resetItem);
}
}
return;
}
FrameLoadType type = policyChecker()->loadType();
stopAllLoaders();
if (!m_frame->page())
return;
#if ENABLE(JAVASCRIPT_DEBUGGER) && ENABLE(INSPECTOR) && USE(JSC)
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
if (page->mainFrame() == m_frame)
page->inspectorController()->resume();
}
#endif
setProvisionalDocumentLoader(m_policyDocumentLoader.get());
m_loadType = type;
setState(FrameStateProvisional);
setPolicyDocumentLoader(0);
if (isBackForwardLoadType(type) && history()->provisionalItem()->isInPageCache()) {
loadProvisionalItemFromCachedPage();
return;
}
if (formState)
m_client->dispatchWillSubmitForm(&PolicyChecker::continueLoadAfterWillSubmitForm, formState);
else
continueLoadAfterWillSubmitForm();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7443
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7443/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.kde.org/kauth.git/commit/?id=fc70fb0161c1b9144d26389434d34dd135cd3f4a
|
fc70fb0161c1b9144d26389434d34dd135cd3f4a
| null |
DBusHelperProxy::~DBusHelperProxy()
{
}
|
DBusHelperProxy::~DBusHelperProxy()
{
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void floatArrayAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::floatArrayAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void floatArrayAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::floatArrayAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
void FrameSelection::SetSelectionFromNone() {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated().IsNone() ||
!(blink::HasEditableStyle(*document)))
return;
Element* document_element = document->documentElement();
if (!document_element)
return;
if (HTMLBodyElement* body =
Traversal<HTMLBodyElement>::FirstChild(*document_element)) {
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.Collapse(FirstPositionInOrBeforeNode(body))
.Build());
}
}
|
void FrameSelection::SetSelectionFromNone() {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated().IsNone() ||
!(blink::HasEditableStyle(*document)))
return;
Element* document_element = document->documentElement();
if (!document_element)
return;
if (HTMLBodyElement* body =
Traversal<HTMLBodyElement>::FirstChild(*document_element)) {
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.Collapse(FirstPositionInOrBeforeNode(body))
.Build());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
auth_match_card(struct sc_card *card)
{
if (_sc_match_atr(card, oberthur_atrs, &card->type) < 0)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
|
auth_match_card(struct sc_card *card)
{
if (_sc_match_atr(card, oberthur_atrs, &card->type) < 0)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6501
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6501/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d31fec57e9dfb0516deead2053a856e3c71e9751
|
d31fec57e9dfb0516deead2053a856e3c71e9751
|
Check for image list before we destroy the last image in XCF coder (patch sent privately by Андрей Черный)
|
static MagickBooleanType load_level(Image *image,XCFDocInfo *inDocInfo,
XCFLayerInfo *inLayerInfo)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
destLeft = 0,
destTop = 0;
Image*
tile_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
saved_pos,
offset,
offset2;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
width,
height,
ntiles,
ntile_rows,
ntile_cols,
tile_image_width,
tile_image_height;
/* start reading the data */
exception=inDocInfo->exception;
width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/*
Read in the first tile offset. If it is '0', then this tile level is empty
and we can simply return.
*/
offset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (offset == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
/*
Initialize the reference for the in-memory tile-compression.
*/
ntile_rows=(height+TILE_HEIGHT-1)/TILE_HEIGHT;
ntile_cols=(width+TILE_WIDTH-1)/TILE_WIDTH;
ntiles=ntile_rows*ntile_cols;
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) ntiles; i++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
if (offset == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughTiles",image->filename);
/* save the current position as it is where the
* next tile offset is stored.
*/
saved_pos=TellBlob(image);
/* read in the offset of the next tile so we can calculate the amount
of data needed for this tile*/
offset2=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/* if the offset is 0 then we need to read in the maximum possible
allowing for negative compression */
if (offset2 == 0)
offset2=(MagickOffsetType) (offset + TILE_WIDTH * TILE_WIDTH * 4* 1.5);
/* seek to the tile offset */
if (SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile",
image->filename);
/* allocate the image for the tile
NOTE: the last tile in a row or column may not be a full tile!
*/
tile_image_width=(size_t) (destLeft == (int) ntile_cols-1 ?
(int) width % TILE_WIDTH : TILE_WIDTH);
if (tile_image_width == 0)
tile_image_width=TILE_WIDTH;
tile_image_height = (size_t) (destTop == (int) ntile_rows-1 ?
(int) height % TILE_HEIGHT : TILE_HEIGHT);
if (tile_image_height == 0)
tile_image_height=TILE_HEIGHT;
tile_image=CloneImage(inLayerInfo->image,tile_image_width,
tile_image_height,MagickTrue,exception);
/* read in the tile */
switch (inDocInfo->compression)
{
case COMPRESS_NONE:
if (load_tile(image,tile_image,inDocInfo,inLayerInfo,(size_t) (offset2-offset)) == 0)
status=MagickTrue;
break;
case COMPRESS_RLE:
if (load_tile_rle (image,tile_image,inDocInfo,inLayerInfo,
(int) (offset2-offset)) == 0)
status=MagickTrue;
break;
case COMPRESS_ZLIB:
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"ZipCompressNotSupported",
image->filename)
case COMPRESS_FRACTAL:
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"FractalCompressNotSupported",
image->filename)
}
/* composite the tile onto the layer's image, and then destroy it */
(void) CompositeImage(inLayerInfo->image,CopyCompositeOp,tile_image,
destLeft * TILE_WIDTH,destTop*TILE_HEIGHT);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
/* adjust tile position */
destLeft++;
if (destLeft >= (int) ntile_cols)
{
destLeft = 0;
destTop++;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
/* restore the saved position so we'll be ready to
* read the next offset.
*/
offset=SeekBlob(image, saved_pos, SEEK_SET);
/* read in the offset of the next tile */
offset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
if (offset != 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename)
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType load_level(Image *image,XCFDocInfo *inDocInfo,
XCFLayerInfo *inLayerInfo)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
destLeft = 0,
destTop = 0;
Image*
tile_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
saved_pos,
offset,
offset2;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
width,
height,
ntiles,
ntile_rows,
ntile_cols,
tile_image_width,
tile_image_height;
/* start reading the data */
exception=inDocInfo->exception;
width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/*
Read in the first tile offset. If it is '0', then this tile level is empty
and we can simply return.
*/
offset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (offset == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
/*
Initialize the reference for the in-memory tile-compression.
*/
ntile_rows=(height+TILE_HEIGHT-1)/TILE_HEIGHT;
ntile_cols=(width+TILE_WIDTH-1)/TILE_WIDTH;
ntiles=ntile_rows*ntile_cols;
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) ntiles; i++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
if (offset == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughTiles",image->filename);
/* save the current position as it is where the
* next tile offset is stored.
*/
saved_pos=TellBlob(image);
/* read in the offset of the next tile so we can calculate the amount
of data needed for this tile*/
offset2=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/* if the offset is 0 then we need to read in the maximum possible
allowing for negative compression */
if (offset2 == 0)
offset2=(MagickOffsetType) (offset + TILE_WIDTH * TILE_WIDTH * 4* 1.5);
/* seek to the tile offset */
if (SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile",
image->filename);
/* allocate the image for the tile
NOTE: the last tile in a row or column may not be a full tile!
*/
tile_image_width=(size_t) (destLeft == (int) ntile_cols-1 ?
(int) width % TILE_WIDTH : TILE_WIDTH);
if (tile_image_width == 0)
tile_image_width=TILE_WIDTH;
tile_image_height = (size_t) (destTop == (int) ntile_rows-1 ?
(int) height % TILE_HEIGHT : TILE_HEIGHT);
if (tile_image_height == 0)
tile_image_height=TILE_HEIGHT;
tile_image=CloneImage(inLayerInfo->image,tile_image_width,
tile_image_height,MagickTrue,exception);
/* read in the tile */
switch (inDocInfo->compression)
{
case COMPRESS_NONE:
if (load_tile(image,tile_image,inDocInfo,inLayerInfo,(size_t) (offset2-offset)) == 0)
status=MagickTrue;
break;
case COMPRESS_RLE:
if (load_tile_rle (image,tile_image,inDocInfo,inLayerInfo,
(int) (offset2-offset)) == 0)
status=MagickTrue;
break;
case COMPRESS_ZLIB:
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"ZipCompressNotSupported",
image->filename)
case COMPRESS_FRACTAL:
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"FractalCompressNotSupported",
image->filename)
}
/* composite the tile onto the layer's image, and then destroy it */
(void) CompositeImage(inLayerInfo->image,CopyCompositeOp,tile_image,
destLeft * TILE_WIDTH,destTop*TILE_HEIGHT);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
/* adjust tile position */
destLeft++;
if (destLeft >= (int) ntile_cols)
{
destLeft = 0;
destTop++;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
/* restore the saved position so we'll be ready to
* read the next offset.
*/
offset=SeekBlob(image, saved_pos, SEEK_SET);
/* read in the offset of the next tile */
offset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
if (offset != 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename)
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14230
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14230/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
|
mboxlist_sync_setacls(const char *name, const char *newacl)
{
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
int r;
struct txn *tid = NULL;
/* 1. Start Transaction */
/* lookup the mailbox to make sure it exists and get its acl */
do {
r = mboxlist_mylookup(name, &mbentry, &tid, 1);
} while(r == IMAP_AGAIN);
/* Can't do this to an in-transit or reserved mailbox */
if (!r && mbentry->mbtype & (MBTYPE_MOVING | MBTYPE_RESERVE | MBTYPE_DELETED)) {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NOTSUPPORTED;
}
/* 2. Set DB Entry */
if (!r) {
/* ok, change the database */
free(mbentry->acl);
mbentry->acl = xstrdupnull(newacl);
r = mboxlist_update_entry(name, mbentry, &tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error updating acl %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
}
/* 3. Commit transaction */
if (!r) {
r = cyrusdb_commit(mbdb, tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: failed on commit %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
tid = NULL;
}
/* 4. Change mupdate entry */
if (!r && config_mupdate_server) {
mupdate_handle *mupdate_h = NULL;
/* commit the update to MUPDATE */
char buf[MAX_PARTITION_LEN + HOSTNAME_SIZE + 2];
sprintf(buf, "%s!%s", config_servername, mbentry->partition);
r = mupdate_connect(config_mupdate_server, NULL, &mupdate_h, NULL);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"cannot connect to mupdate server for syncacl on '%s'",
name);
} else {
r = mupdate_activate(mupdate_h, name, buf, newacl);
if(r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"MUPDATE: can't update mailbox entry for '%s'",
name);
}
}
mupdate_disconnect(&mupdate_h);
}
if (r && tid) {
/* if we are mid-transaction, abort it! */
int r2 = cyrusdb_abort(mbdb, tid);
if (r2) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"DBERROR: error aborting txn in sync_setacls %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r2));
}
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
return r;
}
|
mboxlist_sync_setacls(const char *name, const char *newacl)
{
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
int r;
struct txn *tid = NULL;
/* 1. Start Transaction */
/* lookup the mailbox to make sure it exists and get its acl */
do {
r = mboxlist_mylookup(name, &mbentry, &tid, 1);
} while(r == IMAP_AGAIN);
/* Can't do this to an in-transit or reserved mailbox */
if (!r && mbentry->mbtype & (MBTYPE_MOVING | MBTYPE_RESERVE | MBTYPE_DELETED)) {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NOTSUPPORTED;
}
/* 2. Set DB Entry */
if (!r) {
/* ok, change the database */
free(mbentry->acl);
mbentry->acl = xstrdupnull(newacl);
r = mboxlist_update_entry(name, mbentry, &tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error updating acl %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
}
/* 3. Commit transaction */
if (!r) {
r = cyrusdb_commit(mbdb, tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: failed on commit %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
tid = NULL;
}
/* 4. Change mupdate entry */
if (!r && config_mupdate_server) {
mupdate_handle *mupdate_h = NULL;
/* commit the update to MUPDATE */
char buf[MAX_PARTITION_LEN + HOSTNAME_SIZE + 2];
sprintf(buf, "%s!%s", config_servername, mbentry->partition);
r = mupdate_connect(config_mupdate_server, NULL, &mupdate_h, NULL);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"cannot connect to mupdate server for syncacl on '%s'",
name);
} else {
r = mupdate_activate(mupdate_h, name, buf, newacl);
if(r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"MUPDATE: can't update mailbox entry for '%s'",
name);
}
}
mupdate_disconnect(&mupdate_h);
}
if (r && tid) {
/* if we are mid-transaction, abort it! */
int r2 = cyrusdb_abort(mbdb, tid);
if (r2) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"DBERROR: error aborting txn in sync_setacls %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r2));
}
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
return r;
}
|
C
|
cyrus-imapd
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_cgroup_settings(struct cgroup_mount_point *mp,
char *cgroup_path)
{
int r, saved_errno = 0;
char buf[2];
mp->need_cpuset_init = false;
/* If this is the memory cgroup, we want to enforce hierarchy.
* But don't fail if for some reason we can't.
*/
if (lxc_string_in_array("memory", (const char **)mp->hierarchy->subsystems)) {
char *cc_path = cgroup_to_absolute_path(mp, cgroup_path, "/memory.use_hierarchy");
if (cc_path) {
r = lxc_read_from_file(cc_path, buf, 1);
if (r < 1 || buf[0] != '1') {
r = lxc_write_to_file(cc_path, "1", 1, false);
if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("failed to set memory.use_hierarchy to 1; continuing");
}
free(cc_path);
}
}
/* if this is a cpuset hierarchy, we have to set cgroup.clone_children in
* the base cgroup, otherwise containers will start with an empty cpuset.mems
* and cpuset.cpus and then
*/
if (lxc_string_in_array("cpuset", (const char **)mp->hierarchy->subsystems)) {
char *cc_path = cgroup_to_absolute_path(mp, cgroup_path, "/cgroup.clone_children");
struct stat sb;
if (!cc_path)
return -1;
/* cgroup.clone_children is not available when running under
* older kernel versions; in this case, we'll initialize
* cpuset.cpus and cpuset.mems later, after the new cgroup
* was created
*/
if (stat(cc_path, &sb) != 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
mp->need_cpuset_init = true;
free(cc_path);
return 0;
}
r = lxc_read_from_file(cc_path, buf, 1);
if (r == 1 && buf[0] == '1') {
free(cc_path);
return 0;
}
r = lxc_write_to_file(cc_path, "1", 1, false);
saved_errno = errno;
free(cc_path);
errno = saved_errno;
return r < 0 ? -1 : 0;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int handle_cgroup_settings(struct cgroup_mount_point *mp,
char *cgroup_path)
{
int r, saved_errno = 0;
char buf[2];
mp->need_cpuset_init = false;
/* If this is the memory cgroup, we want to enforce hierarchy.
* But don't fail if for some reason we can't.
*/
if (lxc_string_in_array("memory", (const char **)mp->hierarchy->subsystems)) {
char *cc_path = cgroup_to_absolute_path(mp, cgroup_path, "/memory.use_hierarchy");
if (cc_path) {
r = lxc_read_from_file(cc_path, buf, 1);
if (r < 1 || buf[0] != '1') {
r = lxc_write_to_file(cc_path, "1", 1, false);
if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("failed to set memory.use_hierarchy to 1; continuing");
}
free(cc_path);
}
}
/* if this is a cpuset hierarchy, we have to set cgroup.clone_children in
* the base cgroup, otherwise containers will start with an empty cpuset.mems
* and cpuset.cpus and then
*/
if (lxc_string_in_array("cpuset", (const char **)mp->hierarchy->subsystems)) {
char *cc_path = cgroup_to_absolute_path(mp, cgroup_path, "/cgroup.clone_children");
struct stat sb;
if (!cc_path)
return -1;
/* cgroup.clone_children is not available when running under
* older kernel versions; in this case, we'll initialize
* cpuset.cpus and cpuset.mems later, after the new cgroup
* was created
*/
if (stat(cc_path, &sb) != 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
mp->need_cpuset_init = true;
free(cc_path);
return 0;
}
r = lxc_read_from_file(cc_path, buf, 1);
if (r == 1 && buf[0] == '1') {
free(cc_path);
return 0;
}
r = lxc_write_to_file(cc_path, "1", 1, false);
saved_errno = errno;
free(cc_path);
errno = saved_errno;
return r < 0 ? -1 : 0;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void V8Proxy::collectIsolatedContexts(Vector<std::pair<ScriptState*, SecurityOrigin*> >& result)
{
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
for (IsolatedWorldMap::iterator it = m_isolatedWorlds.begin(); it != m_isolatedWorlds.end(); ++it) {
V8IsolatedContext* isolatedContext = it->second;
if (!isolatedContext->securityOrigin())
continue;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = isolatedContext->context();
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
continue;
ScriptState* scriptState = ScriptState::forContext(v8::Local<v8::Context>::New(v8Context));
result.append(std::pair<ScriptState*, SecurityOrigin*>(scriptState, isolatedContext->securityOrigin()));
}
}
|
void V8Proxy::collectIsolatedContexts(Vector<std::pair<ScriptState*, SecurityOrigin*> >& result)
{
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
for (IsolatedWorldMap::iterator it = m_isolatedWorlds.begin(); it != m_isolatedWorlds.end(); ++it) {
V8IsolatedContext* isolatedContext = it->second;
if (!isolatedContext->securityOrigin())
continue;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = isolatedContext->context();
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
continue;
ScriptState* scriptState = ScriptState::forContext(v8::Local<v8::Context>::New(v8Context));
result.append(std::pair<ScriptState*, SecurityOrigin*>(scriptState, isolatedContext->securityOrigin()));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
void Document::setDomain(const String& newDomain, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DocumentSetDomain);
if (isSandboxed(SandboxDocumentDomain)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for sandboxed iframes.");
return;
}
if (SchemeRegistry::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(getSecurityOrigin()->protocol())) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for the '" + getSecurityOrigin()->protocol() + "' scheme.");
return;
}
if (newDomain.isEmpty()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is an empty domain.");
return;
}
OriginAccessEntry accessEntry(getSecurityOrigin()->protocol(), newDomain, OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains);
OriginAccessEntry::MatchResult result = accessEntry.matchesOrigin(*getSecurityOrigin());
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::DoesNotMatchOrigin) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is not a suffix of '" + domain() + "'.");
return;
}
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::MatchesOriginButIsPublicSuffix) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is a top-level domain.");
return;
}
getSecurityOrigin()->setDomainFromDOM(newDomain);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->script().updateSecurityOrigin(getSecurityOrigin());
}
|
void Document::setDomain(const String& newDomain, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DocumentSetDomain);
if (isSandboxed(SandboxDocumentDomain)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for sandboxed iframes.");
return;
}
if (SchemeRegistry::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(getSecurityOrigin()->protocol())) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for the '" + getSecurityOrigin()->protocol() + "' scheme.");
return;
}
if (newDomain.isEmpty()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is an empty domain.");
return;
}
OriginAccessEntry accessEntry(getSecurityOrigin()->protocol(), newDomain, OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains);
OriginAccessEntry::MatchResult result = accessEntry.matchesOrigin(*getSecurityOrigin());
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::DoesNotMatchOrigin) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is not a suffix of '" + domain() + "'.");
return;
}
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::MatchesOriginButIsPublicSuffix) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is a top-level domain.");
return;
}
getSecurityOrigin()->setDomainFromDOM(newDomain);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->script().updateSecurityOrigin(getSecurityOrigin());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1294/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
bool MessageLoopForUI::WatchFileDescriptor(
int fd,
bool persistent,
MessagePumpLibevent::Mode mode,
MessagePumpLibevent::FileDescriptorWatcher *controller,
MessagePumpLibevent::Watcher *delegate) {
return static_cast<MessagePumpLibevent*>(pump_.get())->WatchFileDescriptor(
fd,
persistent,
mode,
controller,
delegate);
}
|
bool MessageLoopForUI::WatchFileDescriptor(
int fd,
bool persistent,
MessagePumpLibevent::Mode mode,
MessagePumpLibevent::FileDescriptorWatcher *controller,
MessagePumpLibevent::Watcher *delegate) {
return static_cast<MessagePumpLibevent*>(pump_.get())->WatchFileDescriptor(
fd,
persistent,
mode,
controller,
delegate);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0879/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
APIPermission* APIPermissionInfo::CreateAPIPermission() const {
return api_permission_constructor_ ?
api_permission_constructor_(this) : new SimpleAPIPermission(this);
}
|
APIPermission* APIPermissionInfo::CreateAPIPermission() const {
return api_permission_constructor_ ?
api_permission_constructor_(this) : new SimpleAPIPermission(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010298
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010298/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/70697bf3c5dc3d201341b01a1a8e5bc6d2fb48f8
|
70697bf3c5dc3d201341b01a1a8e5bc6d2fb48f8
|
svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
static void op_attr_bignum_clear(void *attr)
{
struct bignum **bn = attr;
crypto_bignum_clear(*bn);
}
|
static void op_attr_bignum_clear(void *attr)
{
struct bignum **bn = attr;
crypto_bignum_clear(*bn);
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3824
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3824/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b351eabb428c7ca85a34513c64601f437923d576
|
b351eabb428c7ca85a34513c64601f437923d576
|
DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2016-10192
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10192/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156
|
a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156
|
ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sigaction sigact = { { 0 } };
int cfg_parsed;
int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
init_dynload();
config.filename = av_strdup("/etc/ffserver.conf");
parse_loglevel(argc, argv, options);
av_register_all();
avformat_network_init();
show_banner(argc, argv, options);
my_program_name = argv[0];
parse_options(NULL, argc, argv, options, NULL);
unsetenv("http_proxy"); /* Kill the http_proxy */
av_lfg_init(&random_state, av_get_random_seed());
sigact.sa_handler = handle_child_exit;
sigact.sa_flags = SA_NOCLDSTOP | SA_RESTART;
sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sigact, 0);
if ((cfg_parsed = ffserver_parse_ffconfig(config.filename, &config)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading configuration file '%s': %s\n",
config.filename, av_err2str(cfg_parsed));
goto bail;
}
/* open log file if needed */
if (config.logfilename[0] != '\0') {
if (!strcmp(config.logfilename, "-"))
logfile = stdout;
else
logfile = fopen(config.logfilename, "a");
av_log_set_callback(http_av_log);
}
build_file_streams();
if (build_feed_streams() < 0) {
http_log("Could not setup feed streams\n");
goto bail;
}
compute_bandwidth();
/* signal init */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (http_server() < 0) {
http_log("Could not start server\n");
goto bail;
}
ret=EXIT_SUCCESS;
bail:
av_freep (&config.filename);
avformat_network_deinit();
return ret;
}
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sigaction sigact = { { 0 } };
int cfg_parsed;
int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
init_dynload();
config.filename = av_strdup("/etc/ffserver.conf");
parse_loglevel(argc, argv, options);
av_register_all();
avformat_network_init();
show_banner(argc, argv, options);
my_program_name = argv[0];
parse_options(NULL, argc, argv, options, NULL);
unsetenv("http_proxy"); /* Kill the http_proxy */
av_lfg_init(&random_state, av_get_random_seed());
sigact.sa_handler = handle_child_exit;
sigact.sa_flags = SA_NOCLDSTOP | SA_RESTART;
sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sigact, 0);
if ((cfg_parsed = ffserver_parse_ffconfig(config.filename, &config)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading configuration file '%s': %s\n",
config.filename, av_err2str(cfg_parsed));
goto bail;
}
/* open log file if needed */
if (config.logfilename[0] != '\0') {
if (!strcmp(config.logfilename, "-"))
logfile = stdout;
else
logfile = fopen(config.logfilename, "a");
av_log_set_callback(http_av_log);
}
build_file_streams();
if (build_feed_streams() < 0) {
http_log("Could not setup feed streams\n");
goto bail;
}
compute_bandwidth();
/* signal init */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (http_server() < 0) {
http_log("Could not start server\n");
goto bail;
}
ret=EXIT_SUCCESS;
bail:
av_freep (&config.filename);
avformat_network_deinit();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5759
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5759/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5405341d5cc268a0b2ff0678bd78ddda0892e7ea
|
5405341d5cc268a0b2ff0678bd78ddda0892e7ea
|
Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loaders) {
DCHECK(loader_factories_);
DCHECK(loader_factories_->IsHostChildURLLoaderFactoryBundle());
static_cast<HostChildURLLoaderFactoryBundle*>(loader_factories_.get())
->UpdateThisAndAllClones(std::move(subresource_loaders));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loaders) {
DCHECK(loader_factories_);
DCHECK(loader_factories_->IsHostChildURLLoaderFactoryBundle());
static_cast<HostChildURLLoaderFactoryBundle*>(loader_factories_.get())
->UpdateThisAndAllClones(std::move(subresource_loaders));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7944
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7944/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfixes/commit/?id=61c1039ee23a2d1de712843bed3480654d7ef42e
|
61c1039ee23a2d1de712843bed3480654d7ef42e
| null |
XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap (Display *dpy, Pixmap bitmap)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesCreateRegionFromBitmapReq *req;
XserverRegion region;
XFixesCheckExtension (dpy, info, 0);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap;
region = req->region = XAllocID (dpy);
req->bitmap = bitmap;
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return region;
}
|
XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap (Display *dpy, Pixmap bitmap)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesCreateRegionFromBitmapReq *req;
XserverRegion region;
XFixesCheckExtension (dpy, info, 0);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesCreateRegionFromBitmap;
region = req->region = XAllocID (dpy);
req->bitmap = bitmap;
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return region;
}
|
C
|
libXfixes
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4119
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
static void freerdp_peer_disconnect(freerdp_peer* client)
{
transport_disconnect(client->context->rdp->transport);
}
|
static void freerdp_peer_disconnect(freerdp_peer* client)
{
transport_disconnect(client->context->rdp->transport);
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12981/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
SWFShape_getScaledPenY(SWFShape shape)
{
return shape->ypos;
}
|
SWFShape_getScaledPenY(SWFShape shape)
{
return shape->ypos;
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0850/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/bluetooth/bluedroid/+/c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
|
BOOLEAN BTM_SetSecurityLevel (BOOLEAN is_originator, char *p_name, UINT8 service_id,
UINT16 sec_level, UINT16 psm, UINT32 mx_proto_id,
UINT32 mx_chan_id)
{
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type;
if (is_originator)
conn_type = CONN_ORIENT_ORIG;
else
conn_type = CONN_ORIENT_TERM;
return(btm_sec_set_security_level (conn_type, p_name, service_id,
sec_level, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id));
#else
return(btm_sec_set_security_level (is_originator, p_name, service_id,
sec_level, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id));
#endif
}
|
BOOLEAN BTM_SetSecurityLevel (BOOLEAN is_originator, char *p_name, UINT8 service_id,
UINT16 sec_level, UINT16 psm, UINT32 mx_proto_id,
UINT32 mx_chan_id)
{
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type;
if (is_originator)
conn_type = CONN_ORIENT_ORIG;
else
conn_type = CONN_ORIENT_TERM;
return(btm_sec_set_security_level (conn_type, p_name, service_id,
sec_level, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id));
#else
return(btm_sec_set_security_level (is_originator, p_name, service_id,
sec_level, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5892/
| null |
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a
|
943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a
|
bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]>
|
void bgp_attr_unintern_sub(struct attr *attr)
{
/* aspath refcount shoud be decrement. */
if (attr->aspath)
aspath_unintern(&attr->aspath);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH));
if (attr->community)
community_unintern(&attr->community);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->ecommunity)
ecommunity_unintern(&attr->ecommunity);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->lcommunity)
lcommunity_unintern(&attr->lcommunity);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->cluster)
cluster_unintern(attr->cluster);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST));
if (attr->transit)
transit_unintern(attr->transit);
if (attr->encap_subtlvs)
encap_unintern(&attr->encap_subtlvs, ENCAP_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
if (attr->vnc_subtlvs)
encap_unintern(&attr->vnc_subtlvs, VNC_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#endif
}
|
void bgp_attr_unintern_sub(struct attr *attr)
{
/* aspath refcount shoud be decrement. */
if (attr->aspath)
aspath_unintern(&attr->aspath);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH));
if (attr->community)
community_unintern(&attr->community);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->ecommunity)
ecommunity_unintern(&attr->ecommunity);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->lcommunity)
lcommunity_unintern(&attr->lcommunity);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->cluster)
cluster_unintern(attr->cluster);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST));
if (attr->transit)
transit_unintern(attr->transit);
if (attr->encap_subtlvs)
encap_unintern(&attr->encap_subtlvs, ENCAP_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
if (attr->vnc_subtlvs)
encap_unintern(&attr->vnc_subtlvs, VNC_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#endif
}
|
C
|
frr
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void calc_load_account_idle(struct rq *this_rq)
{
long delta;
delta = calc_load_fold_active(this_rq);
if (delta)
atomic_long_add(delta, &calc_load_tasks_idle);
}
|
static void calc_load_account_idle(struct rq *this_rq)
{
long delta;
delta = calc_load_fold_active(this_rq);
if (delta)
atomic_long_add(delta, &calc_load_tasks_idle);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4503
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4503/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/sgminer-dev/sgminer/commit/910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c
|
910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c
|
stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
|
void cgtimer_time(cgtimer_t *ts_start)
{
struct timeval tv;
cgtime(&tv);
ts_start->tv_sec = tv->tv_sec;
ts_start->tv_nsec = tv->tv_usec * 1000;
}
|
void cgtimer_time(cgtimer_t *ts_start)
{
struct timeval tv;
cgtime(&tv);
ts_start->tv_sec = tv->tv_sec;
ts_start->tv_nsec = tv->tv_usec * 1000;
}
|
C
|
sgminer
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6711
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6711/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5
|
863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5
| null |
programming_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
programming_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
char *h;
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
give_terminal_to (shell_pgrp, 0);
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
#if defined (HISTORY)
if (remember_on_history)
{
h = last_history_line ();
fprintf (stderr, _("last command: %s\n"), h ? h : "(null)");
}
#endif
#if 0
fprintf (stderr, "Report this to %s\n", the_current_maintainer);
#endif
fprintf (stderr, _("Aborting..."));
fflush (stderr);
abort ();
}
|
programming_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
programming_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
char *h;
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
give_terminal_to (shell_pgrp, 0);
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
#if defined (HISTORY)
if (remember_on_history)
{
h = last_history_line ();
fprintf (stderr, _("last command: %s\n"), h ? h : "(null)");
}
#endif
#if 0
fprintf (stderr, "Report this to %s\n", the_current_maintainer);
#endif
fprintf (stderr, _("Aborting..."));
fflush (stderr);
abort ();
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9756/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
/* General purpose registers */
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors. This is important because CPL checks will
* use CS.RPL.
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
/*
* If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
* sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
* that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
*/
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
cpl = 3;
} else {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
}
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happenes at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR,
cpl, X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
return ret;
}
|
static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
/* General purpose registers */
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors. This is important because CPL checks will
* use CS.RPL.
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
/*
* If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
* sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
* that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
*/
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
cpl = 3;
} else {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
}
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happenes at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR,
cpl, X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16358/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
|
R_API void r_bin_load_filter(RBin *bin, ut64 rules) {
bin->filter_rules = rules;
}
|
R_API void r_bin_load_filter(RBin *bin, ut64 rules) {
bin->filter_rules = rules;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14323
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14323/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/troglobit/ssdp-responder/commit/ce04b1f29a137198182f60bbb628d5ceb8171765
|
ce04b1f29a137198182f60bbb628d5ceb8171765
|
Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <[email protected]>
|
static int open_socket(char *ifname, struct sockaddr *addr, int port)
{
int sd, val, rc;
char loop;
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct sockaddr_in sin, *address = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
if (sd < 0)
return -1;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(port);
sin.sin_addr = address->sin_addr;
if (bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed binding to %s:%d: %s", inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr), port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
#if 0
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR);
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT);
#endif
#endif
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_address = address->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(MC_SSDP_GROUP);
if (setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq))) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed joining group %s: %s", MC_SSDP_GROUP, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
val = 2; /* Default 2, but should be configurable */
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL, &val, sizeof(val));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast TTL: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
loop = 0;
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP, &loop, sizeof(loop));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed disabing multicast loop: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_IF, &address->sin_addr, sizeof(address->sin_addr));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast interface: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Adding new interface %s with address %s", ifname, inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr));
return sd;
}
|
static int open_socket(char *ifname, struct sockaddr *addr, int port)
{
int sd, val, rc;
char loop;
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct sockaddr_in sin, *address = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
if (sd < 0)
return -1;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(port);
sin.sin_addr = address->sin_addr;
if (bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed binding to %s:%d: %s", inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr), port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
#if 0
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR);
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT);
#endif
#endif
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_address = address->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(MC_SSDP_GROUP);
if (setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq))) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed joining group %s: %s", MC_SSDP_GROUP, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
val = 2; /* Default 2, but should be configurable */
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL, &val, sizeof(val));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast TTL: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
loop = 0;
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP, &loop, sizeof(loop));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed disabing multicast loop: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_IF, &address->sin_addr, sizeof(address->sin_addr));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast interface: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Adding new interface %s with address %s", ifname, inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr));
return sd;
}
|
C
|
ssdp-responder
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3198/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9b04ffd8e7a07e9b2947fe5b71acf85dff38a63f
|
9b04ffd8e7a07e9b2947fe5b71acf85dff38a63f
|
Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
|
void Instance::InvalidateWidget(pp::Widget_Dev widget,
const pp::Rect& dirty_rect) {
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && *v_scrollbar_ == widget) {
if (!image_data_.is_null())
v_scrollbar_->Paint(dirty_rect.pp_rect(), &image_data_);
} else if (h_scrollbar_.get() && *h_scrollbar_ == widget) {
if (!image_data_.is_null())
h_scrollbar_->Paint(dirty_rect.pp_rect(), &image_data_);
} else {
return;
}
pp::Rect dirty_rect_scaled = dirty_rect;
ScaleRect(device_scale_, &dirty_rect_scaled);
paint_manager_.InvalidateRect(dirty_rect_scaled);
}
|
void Instance::InvalidateWidget(pp::Widget_Dev widget,
const pp::Rect& dirty_rect) {
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && *v_scrollbar_ == widget) {
if (!image_data_.is_null())
v_scrollbar_->Paint(dirty_rect.pp_rect(), &image_data_);
} else if (h_scrollbar_.get() && *h_scrollbar_ == widget) {
if (!image_data_.is_null())
h_scrollbar_->Paint(dirty_rect.pp_rect(), &image_data_);
} else {
return;
}
pp::Rect dirty_rect_scaled = dirty_rect;
ScaleRect(device_scale_, &dirty_rect_scaled);
paint_manager_.InvalidateRect(dirty_rect_scaled);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sock *dn_socket_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *n)
{
struct dn_iter_state *state = seq->private;
n = sk_next(n);
try_again:
if (n)
goto out;
if (++state->bucket >= DN_SK_HASH_SIZE)
goto out;
n = sk_head(&dn_sk_hash[state->bucket]);
goto try_again;
out:
return n;
}
|
static struct sock *dn_socket_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *n)
{
struct dn_iter_state *state = seq->private;
n = sk_next(n);
try_again:
if (n)
goto out;
if (++state->bucket >= DN_SK_HASH_SIZE)
goto out;
n = sk_head(&dn_sk_hash[state->bucket]);
goto try_again;
out:
return n;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6780
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6780/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
int cert_id() { return cert_id_; }
|
int cert_id() { return cert_id_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11232/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void etm_event_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct etm_event_data *event_data;
struct perf_output_handle *handle = this_cpu_ptr(&ctx_handle);
struct coresight_device *sink, *csdev = per_cpu(csdev_src, cpu);
if (!csdev)
goto fail;
/*
* Deal with the ring buffer API and get a handle on the
* session's information.
*/
event_data = perf_aux_output_begin(handle, event);
if (!event_data)
goto fail;
/* We need a sink, no need to continue without one */
sink = coresight_get_sink(event_data->path[cpu]);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sink || !sink_ops(sink)->set_buffer))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Configure the sink */
if (sink_ops(sink)->set_buffer(sink, handle,
event_data->snk_config))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Nothing will happen without a path */
if (coresight_enable_path(event_data->path[cpu], CS_MODE_PERF))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Tell the perf core the event is alive */
event->hw.state = 0;
/* Finally enable the tracer */
if (source_ops(csdev)->enable(csdev, event, CS_MODE_PERF))
goto fail_end_stop;
out:
return;
fail_end_stop:
perf_aux_output_end(handle, 0, true);
fail:
event->hw.state = PERF_HES_STOPPED;
goto out;
}
|
static void etm_event_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct etm_event_data *event_data;
struct perf_output_handle *handle = this_cpu_ptr(&ctx_handle);
struct coresight_device *sink, *csdev = per_cpu(csdev_src, cpu);
if (!csdev)
goto fail;
/*
* Deal with the ring buffer API and get a handle on the
* session's information.
*/
event_data = perf_aux_output_begin(handle, event);
if (!event_data)
goto fail;
/* We need a sink, no need to continue without one */
sink = coresight_get_sink(event_data->path[cpu]);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sink || !sink_ops(sink)->set_buffer))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Configure the sink */
if (sink_ops(sink)->set_buffer(sink, handle,
event_data->snk_config))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Nothing will happen without a path */
if (coresight_enable_path(event_data->path[cpu], CS_MODE_PERF))
goto fail_end_stop;
/* Tell the perf core the event is alive */
event->hw.state = 0;
/* Finally enable the tracer */
if (source_ops(csdev)->enable(csdev, event, CS_MODE_PERF))
goto fail_end_stop;
out:
return;
fail_end_stop:
perf_aux_output_end(handle, 0, true);
fail:
event->hw.state = PERF_HES_STOPPED;
goto out;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2865/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/26160ce25e305d686ca5df192378d2f5310ca0ee
|
26160ce25e305d686ca5df192378d2f5310ca0ee
|
shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Shell::PlatformExit() {
CHECK(platform_);
delete platform_;
platform_ = NULL;
aura::Env::DeleteInstance();
}
|
void Shell::PlatformExit() {
CHECK(platform_);
delete platform_;
platform_ = NULL;
aura::Env::DeleteInstance();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12818/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58bdd544e2933a21a51eecf17c3f5f94038261b5
|
58bdd544e2933a21a51eecf17c3f5f94038261b5
|
net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int nfc_llcp_send_i_frame(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *pdu;
struct sock *sk = &sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
size_t frag_len = 0, remaining_len;
u8 *msg_data, *msg_ptr;
u16 remote_miu;
pr_debug("Send I frame len %zd\n", len);
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
/* Remote is ready but has not acknowledged our frames */
if((sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue) >= sock->remote_rw &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Pending queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
/* Remote is not ready and we've been queueing enough frames */
if ((!sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Tx queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
msg_data = kmalloc(len, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (msg_data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (memcpy_from_msg(msg_data, msg, len)) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -EFAULT;
}
remaining_len = len;
msg_ptr = msg_data;
do {
remote_miu = sock->remote_miu > LLCP_MAX_MIU ?
LLCP_DEFAULT_MIU : sock->remote_miu;
frag_len = min_t(size_t, remote_miu, remaining_len);
pr_debug("Fragment %zd bytes remaining %zd",
frag_len, remaining_len);
pdu = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_I,
frag_len + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (pdu == NULL) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_put(pdu, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (likely(frag_len > 0))
skb_put_data(pdu, msg_ptr, frag_len);
skb_queue_tail(&sock->tx_queue, pdu);
lock_sock(sk);
nfc_llcp_queue_i_frames(sock);
release_sock(sk);
remaining_len -= frag_len;
msg_ptr += frag_len;
} while (remaining_len > 0);
kfree(msg_data);
return len;
}
|
int nfc_llcp_send_i_frame(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *pdu;
struct sock *sk = &sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
size_t frag_len = 0, remaining_len;
u8 *msg_data, *msg_ptr;
u16 remote_miu;
pr_debug("Send I frame len %zd\n", len);
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
/* Remote is ready but has not acknowledged our frames */
if((sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue) >= sock->remote_rw &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Pending queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
/* Remote is not ready and we've been queueing enough frames */
if ((!sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Tx queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
msg_data = kmalloc(len, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (msg_data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (memcpy_from_msg(msg_data, msg, len)) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -EFAULT;
}
remaining_len = len;
msg_ptr = msg_data;
do {
remote_miu = sock->remote_miu > LLCP_MAX_MIU ?
LLCP_DEFAULT_MIU : sock->remote_miu;
frag_len = min_t(size_t, remote_miu, remaining_len);
pr_debug("Fragment %zd bytes remaining %zd",
frag_len, remaining_len);
pdu = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_I,
frag_len + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (pdu == NULL) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_put(pdu, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (likely(frag_len > 0))
skb_put_data(pdu, msg_ptr, frag_len);
skb_queue_tail(&sock->tx_queue, pdu);
lock_sock(sk);
nfc_llcp_queue_i_frames(sock);
release_sock(sk);
remaining_len -= frag_len;
msg_ptr += frag_len;
} while (remaining_len > 0);
kfree(msg_data);
return len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(bool allowed) {
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(GetWebContents()) &&
GetBrowserPluginGuest())
return GetBrowserPluginGuest()->LockMouse(allowed);
if (mouse_lock_widget_) {
if (mouse_lock_widget_->delegate()->GetAsWebContents() != this) {
return mouse_lock_widget_->delegate()
->GetAsWebContents()
->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(allowed);
}
if (mouse_lock_widget_->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(allowed))
return true;
}
for (WebContentsImpl* current = this; current;
current = current->GetOuterWebContents()) {
current->mouse_lock_widget_ = nullptr;
}
return false;
}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(bool allowed) {
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(GetWebContents()) &&
GetBrowserPluginGuest())
return GetBrowserPluginGuest()->LockMouse(allowed);
if (mouse_lock_widget_) {
if (mouse_lock_widget_->delegate()->GetAsWebContents() != this) {
return mouse_lock_widget_->delegate()
->GetAsWebContents()
->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(allowed);
}
if (mouse_lock_widget_->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(allowed))
return true;
}
for (WebContentsImpl* current = this; current;
current = current->GetOuterWebContents()) {
current->mouse_lock_widget_ = nullptr;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2790/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
adb3498ca0b69561d8c6b60bab641de4b0e37dbf
|
Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PlatformGraphicsContext* GraphicsContext::platformContext() const
{
return (PlatformGraphicsContext*)m_data->context;
}
|
PlatformGraphicsContext* GraphicsContext::platformContext() const
{
return (PlatformGraphicsContext*)m_data->context;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5296/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
|
a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
| null |
struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_session *src)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
session->conn = src->conn;
*session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
return session;
}
|
struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_session *src)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
session->conn = src->conn;
*session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
return session;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2900/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bd3392a1f8b95bf0b0ee3821bc3245d743fb1337
|
bd3392a1f8b95bf0b0ee3821bc3245d743fb1337
|
AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void DateTimeChooserImpl::setValue(const String& value)
{
m_client->didChooseValue(value);
}
|
void DateTimeChooserImpl::setValue(const String& value)
{
m_client->didChooseValue(value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/acae973ac6297404fe3c9b389b69bf3c7e62cd19
|
acae973ac6297404fe3c9b389b69bf3c7e62cd19
|
2009-07-24 Jian Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
[V8] More V8 bindings changes to use ErrorEvent.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27630
* bindings/v8/DOMObjectsInclude.h:
* bindings/v8/DerivedSourcesAllInOne.cpp:
* bindings/v8/V8DOMWrapper.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DOMWrapper::convertEventToV8Object):
* bindings/v8/V8Index.cpp:
* bindings/v8/V8Index.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@46360 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(void* object, v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapper)
{
ASSERT(V8DOMWrapper::maybeDOMWrapper(wrapper));
#ifndef NDEBUG
V8ClassIndex::V8WrapperType type = V8DOMWrapper::domWrapperType(wrapper);
switch (type) {
#define MAKE_CASE(TYPE, NAME) case V8ClassIndex::TYPE: break;
ACTIVE_DOM_OBJECT_TYPES(MAKE_CASE)
default:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
#undef MAKE_CASE
}
#endif
getActiveDOMObjectMap().set(object, wrapper);
}
|
void V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(void* object, v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapper)
{
ASSERT(V8DOMWrapper::maybeDOMWrapper(wrapper));
#ifndef NDEBUG
V8ClassIndex::V8WrapperType type = V8DOMWrapper::domWrapperType(wrapper);
switch (type) {
#define MAKE_CASE(TYPE, NAME) case V8ClassIndex::TYPE: break;
ACTIVE_DOM_OBJECT_TYPES(MAKE_CASE)
default:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
#undef MAKE_CASE
}
#endif
getActiveDOMObjectMap().set(object, wrapper);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/30f5bc981921d9c0221c82f38d80bd2d5c86a022
|
30f5bc981921d9c0221c82f38d80bd2d5c86a022
|
browser: Extract AutocompleteProvider from autocomplete.*
This is the first part of splitting autocomplete.* into small pieces, one for
each class.
BUG=94842
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10663015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144107 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
string16 AutocompleteResultAsString(const AutocompleteResult& result) {
std::string output(base::StringPrintf("{%" PRIuS "} ", result.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < result.size(); ++i) {
AutocompleteMatch match = result.match_at(i);
std::string provider_name = match.provider->name();
output.append(base::StringPrintf("[\"%s\" by \"%s\"] ",
UTF16ToUTF8(match.contents).c_str(),
provider_name.c_str()));
}
return UTF8ToUTF16(output);
}
|
string16 AutocompleteResultAsString(const AutocompleteResult& result) {
std::string output(base::StringPrintf("{%" PRIuS "} ", result.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < result.size(); ++i) {
AutocompleteMatch match = result.match_at(i);
std::string provider_name = match.provider->name();
output.append(base::StringPrintf("[\"%s\" by \"%s\"] ",
UTF16ToUTF8(match.contents).c_str(),
provider_name.c_str()));
}
return UTF8ToUTF16(output);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1066/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
|
_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
__u32 capabilities;
char *bcc_ptr;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB;
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support\n");
return -ENOSYS;
}
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if ((sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp);
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
return 0;
}
|
_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
__u32 capabilities;
char *bcc_ptr;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB;
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support\n");
return -ENOSYS;
}
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if ((sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp);
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20456
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20456/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185
|
9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185
|
Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
|
static int opsmsw(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( a->bits == 64 ) {
data[l++] = 0x48;
}
data[l++] = 0x0f;
data[l++] = 0x01;
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
data[l++] = 0x20 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
data[l++] = 0xe0 | op->operands[0].reg;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
|
static int opsmsw(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( a->bits == 64 ) {
data[l++] = 0x48;
}
data[l++] = 0x0f;
data[l++] = 0x01;
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
data[l++] = 0x20 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
data[l++] = 0xe0 | op->operands[0].reg;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
|
0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd
| null |
bool ldb_dn_add_base_fmt(struct ldb_dn *dn, const char *base_fmt, ...)
{
struct ldb_dn *base;
char *base_str;
va_list ap;
bool ret;
if ( !dn || dn->invalid) {
return false;
}
va_start(ap, base_fmt);
base_str = talloc_vasprintf(dn, base_fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (base_str == NULL) {
return false;
}
base = ldb_dn_new(base_str, dn->ldb, base_str);
ret = ldb_dn_add_base(dn, base);
talloc_free(base_str);
return ret;
}
|
bool ldb_dn_add_base_fmt(struct ldb_dn *dn, const char *base_fmt, ...)
{
struct ldb_dn *base;
char *base_str;
va_list ap;
bool ret;
if ( !dn || dn->invalid) {
return false;
}
va_start(ap, base_fmt);
base_str = talloc_vasprintf(dn, base_fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (base_str == NULL) {
return false;
}
base = ldb_dn_new(base_str, dn->ldb, base_str);
ret = ldb_dn_add_base(dn, base);
talloc_free(base_str);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebView::close()
{
m_undoClient.initialize(0);
::RevokeDragDrop(m_window);
setParentWindow(0);
m_page->close();
}
|
void WebView::close()
{
m_undoClient.initialize(0);
::RevokeDragDrop(m_window);
setParentWindow(0);
m_page->close();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
bool omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::get_buffer_req
(unsigned int &buffer_size)
{
bool status = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&omx->c_lock);
if (!enabled)
buffer_size = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size;
else {
if (!c2d.get_buffer_size(C2D_OUTPUT,buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get buffer size failed");
status = false;
goto fail_get_buffer_size;
}
}
if (buffer_size < omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size)
buffer_size = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size;
if (buffer_alignment_req < omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.alignment)
buffer_alignment_req = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.alignment;
fail_get_buffer_size:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&omx->c_lock);
return status;
}
|
bool omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::get_buffer_req
(unsigned int &buffer_size)
{
bool status = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&omx->c_lock);
if (!enabled)
buffer_size = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size;
else {
if (!c2d.get_buffer_size(C2D_OUTPUT,buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get buffer size failed");
status = false;
goto fail_get_buffer_size;
}
}
if (buffer_size < omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size)
buffer_size = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size;
if (buffer_alignment_req < omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.alignment)
buffer_alignment_req = omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.alignment;
fail_get_buffer_size:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&omx->c_lock);
return status;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3168/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Element* SVGDocumentExtensions::removeElementFromPendingResourcesForRemoval(const AtomicString& id)
{
if (id.isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements* resourceSet = m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.get(id);
if (!resourceSet || resourceSet->isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements::iterator firstElement = resourceSet->begin();
Element* element = *firstElement;
resourceSet->remove(firstElement);
if (resourceSet->isEmpty())
removePendingResourceForRemoval(id);
return element;
}
|
Element* SVGDocumentExtensions::removeElementFromPendingResourcesForRemoval(const AtomicString& id)
{
if (id.isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements* resourceSet = m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.get(id);
if (!resourceSet || resourceSet->isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements::iterator firstElement = resourceSet->begin();
Element* element = *firstElement;
resourceSet->remove(firstElement);
if (resourceSet->isEmpty())
removePendingResourceForRemoval(id);
return element;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void masked_increment(ulong *reg, ulong mask, int inc)
{
assign_masked(reg, *reg + inc, mask);
}
|
static void masked_increment(ulong *reg, ulong mask, int inc)
{
assign_masked(reg, *reg + inc, mask);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4579
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4579/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commit;h=a7eed17a0b2a1c09ef986f3b4b323cd31cea2b64
|
a7eed17a0b2a1c09ef986f3b4b323cd31cea2b64
| null |
ksba_ocsp_get_cert (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, int idx)
{
struct ocsp_certlist_s *cl;
if (!ocsp || idx < 0)
return NULL;
for (cl=ocsp->received_certs; cl && idx; cl = cl->next, idx--)
;
if (!cl)
return NULL;
ksba_cert_ref (cl->cert);
return cl->cert;
}
|
ksba_ocsp_get_cert (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, int idx)
{
struct ocsp_certlist_s *cl;
if (!ocsp || idx < 0)
return NULL;
for (cl=ocsp->received_certs; cl && idx; cl = cl->next, idx--)
;
if (!cl)
return NULL;
ksba_cert_ref (cl->cert);
return cl->cert;
}
|
C
|
gnupg
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ClearCookies(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(
rvh->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
BrowsingDataRemover* remover =
BrowsingDataRemover::CreateForUnboundedRange(profile);
int remove_mask = BrowsingDataRemover::REMOVE_SITE_DATA;
remover->Remove(remove_mask, BrowsingDataHelper::UNPROTECTED_WEB);
}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ClearCookies(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(
rvh->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
BrowsingDataRemover* remover =
BrowsingDataRemover::CreateForUnboundedRange(profile);
int remove_mask = BrowsingDataRemover::REMOVE_SITE_DATA;
remover->Remove(remove_mask, BrowsingDataHelper::UNPROTECTED_WEB);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
HRESULT DataObjectImpl::EnumFormatEtc(
DWORD direction, IEnumFORMATETC** enumerator) {
if (direction == DATADIR_GET) {
FormatEtcEnumerator* e =
new FormatEtcEnumerator(contents_.begin(), contents_.end());
e->AddRef();
*enumerator = e;
return S_OK;
}
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
|
HRESULT DataObjectImpl::EnumFormatEtc(
DWORD direction, IEnumFORMATETC** enumerator) {
if (direction == DATADIR_GET) {
FormatEtcEnumerator* e =
new FormatEtcEnumerator(contents_.begin(), contents_.end());
e->AddRef();
*enumerator = e;
return S_OK;
}
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::ShouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(
const blink::WebString& source) {
return GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(
source.Utf16());
}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::ShouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(
const blink::WebString& source) {
return GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(
source.Utf16());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6144/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
|
void OfflinePageModelImpl::MarkPageAccessedWhenLoadDone(int64_t offline_id) {
DCHECK(is_loaded_);
auto iter = offline_pages_.find(offline_id);
if (iter == offline_pages_.end())
return;
OfflinePageItem offline_page_item = iter->second;
ReportPageHistogramsAfterAccess(offline_page_item, GetCurrentTime());
offline_page_item.last_access_time = GetCurrentTime();
offline_page_item.access_count++;
std::vector<OfflinePageItem> items = {offline_page_item};
store_->UpdateOfflinePages(
items, base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnMarkPageAccesseDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), offline_page_item));
}
|
void OfflinePageModelImpl::MarkPageAccessedWhenLoadDone(int64_t offline_id) {
DCHECK(is_loaded_);
auto iter = offline_pages_.find(offline_id);
if (iter == offline_pages_.end())
return;
OfflinePageItem offline_page_item = iter->second;
ReportPageHistogramsAfterAccess(offline_page_item, GetCurrentTime());
offline_page_item.last_access_time = GetCurrentTime();
offline_page_item.access_count++;
std::vector<OfflinePageItem> items = {offline_page_item};
store_->UpdateOfflinePages(
items, base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnMarkPageAccesseDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), offline_page_item));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4503
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4503/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/sgminer-dev/sgminer/commit/910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c
|
910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c
|
stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
|
void cgsleep_us_r(cgtimer_t *ts_start, int64_t us)
{
struct timespec ts_end;
us_to_timespec(&ts_end, us);
timeraddspec(&ts_end, ts_start);
nanosleep_abstime(&ts_end);
}
|
void cgsleep_us_r(cgtimer_t *ts_start, int64_t us)
{
struct timespec ts_end;
us_to_timespec(&ts_end, us);
timeraddspec(&ts_end, ts_start);
nanosleep_abstime(&ts_end);
}
|
C
|
sgminer
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9560
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9560/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/1abc2e5a401a4bf1d5ca4df91358ce5df111f495
|
1abc2e5a401a4bf1d5ca4df91358ce5df111f495
|
Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
|
static jpc_dec_importopts_t *jpc_dec_opts_create(const char *optstr)
{
jpc_dec_importopts_t *opts;
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
opts = 0;
if (!(opts = jas_malloc(sizeof(jpc_dec_importopts_t)))) {
goto error;
}
opts->debug = 0;
opts->maxlyrs = JPC_MAXLYRS;
opts->maxpkts = -1;
opts->max_samples = JAS_DEC_DEFAULT_MAX_SAMPLES;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(optstr ? optstr : ""))) {
goto error;
}
while (!jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(decopts,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case OPT_MAXLYRS:
opts->maxlyrs = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_DEBUG:
opts->debug = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_MAXPKTS:
opts->maxpkts = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_MAXSAMPLES:
opts->max_samples = strtoull(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp), 0, 10);
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring invalid option %s\n",
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp));
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return opts;
error:
if (opts) {
jpc_dec_opts_destroy(opts);
}
return 0;
}
|
static jpc_dec_importopts_t *jpc_dec_opts_create(const char *optstr)
{
jpc_dec_importopts_t *opts;
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
opts = 0;
if (!(opts = jas_malloc(sizeof(jpc_dec_importopts_t)))) {
goto error;
}
opts->debug = 0;
opts->maxlyrs = JPC_MAXLYRS;
opts->maxpkts = -1;
opts->max_samples = JAS_DEC_DEFAULT_MAX_SAMPLES;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(optstr ? optstr : ""))) {
goto error;
}
while (!jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(decopts,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case OPT_MAXLYRS:
opts->maxlyrs = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_DEBUG:
opts->debug = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_MAXPKTS:
opts->maxpkts = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_MAXSAMPLES:
opts->max_samples = strtoull(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp), 0, 10);
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring invalid option %s\n",
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp));
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return opts;
error:
if (opts) {
jpc_dec_opts_destroy(opts);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_write_bKGD(png_structp png_ptr, png_color_16p back, int color_type)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_bKGD;
#endif
png_byte buf[6];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_bKGD");
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->num_palette ||
(!(png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_EMPTY_PLTE))) &&
#endif
back->index >= png_ptr->num_palette)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid background palette index");
return;
}
buf[0] = back->index;
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)1);
}
else if (color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
png_save_uint_16(buf, back->red);
png_save_uint_16(buf + 2, back->green);
png_save_uint_16(buf + 4, back->blue);
if (png_ptr->bit_depth == 8 && (buf[0] | buf[2] | buf[4]))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring attempt to write 16-bit bKGD chunk when bit_depth is 8");
return;
}
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)6);
}
else
{
if (back->gray >= (1 << png_ptr->bit_depth))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring attempt to write bKGD chunk out-of-range for bit_depth");
return;
}
png_save_uint_16(buf, back->gray);
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)2);
}
}
|
png_write_bKGD(png_structp png_ptr, png_color_16p back, int color_type)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_bKGD;
#endif
png_byte buf[6];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_bKGD");
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->num_palette ||
(!(png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_EMPTY_PLTE))) &&
#endif
back->index >= png_ptr->num_palette)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid background palette index");
return;
}
buf[0] = back->index;
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)1);
}
else if (color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
png_save_uint_16(buf, back->red);
png_save_uint_16(buf + 2, back->green);
png_save_uint_16(buf + 4, back->blue);
if (png_ptr->bit_depth == 8 && (buf[0] | buf[2] | buf[4]))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring attempt to write 16-bit bKGD chunk when bit_depth is 8");
return;
}
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)6);
}
else
{
if (back->gray >= (1 << png_ptr->bit_depth))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring attempt to write bKGD chunk out-of-range for bit_depth");
return;
}
png_save_uint_16(buf, back->gray);
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_bKGD, buf, (png_size_t)2);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2839/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void GetQuotaLimitHeuristics(
QuotaLimitHeuristics* heuristics) const {
heuristics->push_back(new SustainedLimit(TimeDelta::FromMinutes(5),
k2PerMinute, new Mapper()));
heuristics->push_back(new TimedLimit(k20PerHour, new Mapper()));
}
|
virtual void GetQuotaLimitHeuristics(
QuotaLimitHeuristics* heuristics) const {
heuristics->push_back(new SustainedLimit(TimeDelta::FromMinutes(5),
k2PerMinute, new Mapper()));
heuristics->push_back(new TimedLimit(k20PerHour, new Mapper()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7c28e7988fef9bb3e03027226bd199736d99abc3
|
7c28e7988fef9bb3e03027226bd199736d99abc3
|
Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
|
void HostCache::ClearForHosts(
const base::Callback<bool(const std::string&)>& host_filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (host_filter.is_null()) {
clear();
return;
}
bool changed = false;
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
for (EntryMap::iterator it = entries_.begin(); it != entries_.end();) {
EntryMap::iterator next_it = std::next(it);
if (host_filter.Run(it->first.hostname)) {
RecordErase(ERASE_CLEAR, now, it->second);
entries_.erase(it);
changed = true;
}
it = next_it;
}
if (delegate_ && changed)
delegate_->ScheduleWrite();
}
|
void HostCache::ClearForHosts(
const base::Callback<bool(const std::string&)>& host_filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (host_filter.is_null()) {
clear();
return;
}
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
for (EntryMap::iterator it = entries_.begin(); it != entries_.end();) {
EntryMap::iterator next_it = std::next(it);
if (host_filter.Run(it->first.hostname)) {
RecordErase(ERASE_CLEAR, now, it->second);
entries_.erase(it);
}
it = next_it;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::Initialize(const GURL& url,
const std::vector<std::string>& arg_names,
const std::vector<std::string>& arg_values,
webkit_glue::WebPlugin* plugin,
bool load_manually) {
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
if (!RenderThread::current()->Send(new ViewHostMsg_OpenChannelToPlugin(
url, mime_type_, webkit_glue::GetWebKitLocale(),
&channel_handle, &info_))) {
return false;
}
if (channel_handle.name.empty()) {
if (!info_.path.empty()) {
render_view_->PluginCrashed(info_.path);
return true;
}
return false;
}
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (channel_handle.socket.fd >= 0)
IPC::AddChannelSocket(channel_handle.name, channel_handle.socket.fd);
#endif
scoped_refptr<PluginChannelHost> channel_host =
PluginChannelHost::GetPluginChannelHost(
channel_handle.name, ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop());
if (!channel_host.get())
return false;
int instance_id;
bool result = channel_host->Send(new PluginMsg_CreateInstance(
mime_type_, &instance_id));
if (!result)
return false;
channel_host_ = channel_host;
instance_id_ = instance_id;
channel_host_->AddRoute(instance_id_, this, false);
PluginMsg_Init_Params params;
params.containing_window = render_view_->host_window();
params.url = url;
params.page_url = page_url_;
params.arg_names = arg_names;
params.arg_values = arg_values;
params.host_render_view_routing_id = render_view_->routing_id();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arg_names.size(); ++i) {
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(arg_names[i], "wmode") &&
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(arg_values[i], "transparent")) {
transparent_ = true;
}
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!transparent_ && mime_type_ == "application/x-shockwave-flash") {
params.arg_names.push_back("wmode");
params.arg_values.push_back("opaque");
}
#endif
params.load_manually = load_manually;
plugin_ = plugin;
result = false;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_Init(instance_id_, params, &result);
Send(msg);
return result;
}
|
bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::Initialize(const GURL& url,
const std::vector<std::string>& arg_names,
const std::vector<std::string>& arg_values,
webkit_glue::WebPlugin* plugin,
bool load_manually) {
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
if (!RenderThread::current()->Send(new ViewHostMsg_OpenChannelToPlugin(
url, mime_type_, webkit_glue::GetWebKitLocale(),
&channel_handle, &info_))) {
return false;
}
if (channel_handle.name.empty()) {
if (!info_.path.empty()) {
render_view_->PluginCrashed(info_.path);
return true;
}
return false;
}
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (channel_handle.socket.fd >= 0)
IPC::AddChannelSocket(channel_handle.name, channel_handle.socket.fd);
#endif
scoped_refptr<PluginChannelHost> channel_host =
PluginChannelHost::GetPluginChannelHost(
channel_handle.name, ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop());
if (!channel_host.get())
return false;
int instance_id;
bool result = channel_host->Send(new PluginMsg_CreateInstance(
mime_type_, &instance_id));
if (!result)
return false;
channel_host_ = channel_host;
instance_id_ = instance_id;
channel_host_->AddRoute(instance_id_, this, false);
PluginMsg_Init_Params params;
params.containing_window = render_view_->host_window();
params.url = url;
params.page_url = page_url_;
params.arg_names = arg_names;
params.arg_values = arg_values;
params.host_render_view_routing_id = render_view_->routing_id();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arg_names.size(); ++i) {
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(arg_names[i], "wmode") &&
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(arg_values[i], "transparent")) {
transparent_ = true;
}
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!transparent_ && mime_type_ == "application/x-shockwave-flash") {
params.arg_names.push_back("wmode");
params.arg_values.push_back("opaque");
}
#endif
params.load_manually = load_manually;
plugin_ = plugin;
result = false;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_Init(instance_id_, params, &result);
Send(msg);
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
bool ACodec::ExecutingToIdleState::onMessageReceived(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
bool handled = false;
switch (msg->what()) {
case kWhatFlush:
{
ALOGW("Ignoring flush request in ExecutingToIdleState");
break;
}
case kWhatShutdown:
{
handled = true;
break;
}
default:
handled = BaseState::onMessageReceived(msg);
break;
}
return handled;
}
|
bool ACodec::ExecutingToIdleState::onMessageReceived(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
bool handled = false;
switch (msg->what()) {
case kWhatFlush:
{
ALOGW("Ignoring flush request in ExecutingToIdleState");
break;
}
case kWhatShutdown:
{
handled = true;
break;
}
default:
handled = BaseState::onMessageReceived(msg);
break;
}
return handled;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
Desist libxml from continuing the parse after a SAX callback has stopped the
parse.
Attempt 2 -- now with less compile fail on Mac / Clang.
BUG=95465
TBR=cdn
TEST=covered by existing tests under ASAN
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7892003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100953 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlHasFeature(xmlFeature feature)
{
switch (feature) {
case XML_WITH_THREAD:
#ifdef LIBXML_THREAD_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_TREE:
#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_OUTPUT:
#ifdef LIBXML_OUTPUT_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PUSH:
#ifdef LIBXML_PUSH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_READER:
#ifdef LIBXML_READER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PATTERN:
#ifdef LIBXML_PATTERN_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_WRITER:
#ifdef LIBXML_WRITER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SAX1:
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_FTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_FTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_VALID:
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTML:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_LEGACY:
#ifdef LIBXML_LEGACY_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_C14N:
#ifdef LIBXML_C14N_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_CATALOG:
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPATH:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPATH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPTR:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XINCLUDE:
#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICONV:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICONV_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ISO8859X:
#ifdef LIBXML_ISO8859X_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_UNICODE:
#ifdef LIBXML_UNICODE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_REGEXP:
#ifdef LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_AUTOMATA:
#ifdef LIBXML_AUTOMATA_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_EXPR:
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMAS:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMATRON:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMATRON_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_MODULES:
#ifdef LIBXML_MODULES_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_MEM:
#ifdef DEBUG_MEMORY_LOCATION
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_RUN:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_RUNTIME
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ZLIB:
#ifdef LIBXML_ZLIB_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICU:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICU_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
default:
break;
}
return(0);
}
|
xmlHasFeature(xmlFeature feature)
{
switch (feature) {
case XML_WITH_THREAD:
#ifdef LIBXML_THREAD_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_TREE:
#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_OUTPUT:
#ifdef LIBXML_OUTPUT_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PUSH:
#ifdef LIBXML_PUSH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_READER:
#ifdef LIBXML_READER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_PATTERN:
#ifdef LIBXML_PATTERN_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_WRITER:
#ifdef LIBXML_WRITER_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SAX1:
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_FTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_FTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTTP:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTTP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_VALID:
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_HTML:
#ifdef LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_LEGACY:
#ifdef LIBXML_LEGACY_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_C14N:
#ifdef LIBXML_C14N_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_CATALOG:
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPATH:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPATH_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XPTR:
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_XINCLUDE:
#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICONV:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICONV_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ISO8859X:
#ifdef LIBXML_ISO8859X_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_UNICODE:
#ifdef LIBXML_UNICODE_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_REGEXP:
#ifdef LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_AUTOMATA:
#ifdef LIBXML_AUTOMATA_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_EXPR:
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPR_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMAS:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_SCHEMATRON:
#ifdef LIBXML_SCHEMATRON_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_MODULES:
#ifdef LIBXML_MODULES_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_MEM:
#ifdef DEBUG_MEMORY_LOCATION
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_DEBUG_RUN:
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_RUNTIME
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ZLIB:
#ifdef LIBXML_ZLIB_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
case XML_WITH_ICU:
#ifdef LIBXML_ICU_ENABLED
return(1);
#else
return(0);
#endif
default:
break;
}
return(0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15427/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16c719e0e275d2ee5d5c69e4962b744bcaf0fe40
|
16c719e0e275d2ee5d5c69e4962b744bcaf0fe40
|
Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::UpdateContextMenu(ui::SimpleMenuModel* menu_contents) {
int paste_position = menu_contents->GetIndexOfCommandId(IDS_APP_PASTE);
DCHECK_GE(paste_position, 0);
menu_contents->InsertItemWithStringIdAt(
paste_position + 1, IDS_PASTE_AND_GO, IDS_PASTE_AND_GO);
menu_contents->AddSeparator(ui::NORMAL_SEPARATOR);
menu_contents->AddItemWithStringId(IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES,
IDS_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES);
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::UpdateContextMenu(ui::SimpleMenuModel* menu_contents) {
int paste_position = menu_contents->GetIndexOfCommandId(IDS_APP_PASTE);
DCHECK_GE(paste_position, 0);
menu_contents->InsertItemWithStringIdAt(
paste_position + 1, IDS_PASTE_AND_GO, IDS_PASTE_AND_GO);
menu_contents->AddSeparator(ui::NORMAL_SEPARATOR);
menu_contents->AddItemWithStringId(IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES,
IDS_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149
|
41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149
|
chromeos: Send 'keypress' for the content when composing a character with dead keys
This change leaves characters outside BMP unable to be typed on docs.google.com, but surely fixes the problem for most use cases.
BUG=132668
TEST=Create a document on docs.google.com and try typing a character with dead keys (e.g. type '^'+'a' with keyboard layout "English - US international")
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10565032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142705 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void InputMethodIBus::CreateContext() {
DCHECK(!context_);
DCHECK(GetBus());
DCHECK(ibus_client_->IsConnected(GetBus()));
DCHECK(!pending_create_ic_request_);
pending_create_ic_request_ = new PendingCreateICRequestImpl(
this, ibus_client_.get(), &pending_create_ic_request_);
ibus_client_->CreateContext(GetBus(), pending_create_ic_request_);
}
|
void InputMethodIBus::CreateContext() {
DCHECK(!context_);
DCHECK(GetBus());
DCHECK(ibus_client_->IsConnected(GetBus()));
DCHECK(!pending_create_ic_request_);
pending_create_ic_request_ = new PendingCreateICRequestImpl(
this, ibus_client_.get(), &pending_create_ic_request_);
ibus_client_->CreateContext(GetBus(), pending_create_ic_request_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6768
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6768/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01
|
4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01
|
Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
|
void Document::didInsertText(Node* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length)
{
for (Range* range : m_ranges)
range->didInsertText(text, offset, length);
m_markers->shiftMarkers(text, offset, length);
}
|
void Document::didInsertText(Node* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length)
{
for (Range* range : m_ranges)
range->didInsertText(text, offset, length);
m_markers->shiftMarkers(text, offset, length);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5797
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
Fixing BadMessageCallback usage by SessionStorage
TBR: [email protected]
Bug: 916523
Change-Id: I027cc818cfba917906844ad2ec0edd7fa4761bd1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401604
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621772}
|
void OnQuotaManagedOriginDeleted(const url::Origin& origin,
blink::mojom::StorageType type,
size_t* deletion_task_count,
base::OnceClosure callback,
blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode status) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK_GT(*deletion_task_count, 0u);
if (status != blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode::kOk) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't remove data of type " << static_cast<int>(type)
<< " for origin " << origin
<< ". Status: " << static_cast<int>(status);
}
(*deletion_task_count)--;
CheckQuotaManagedDataDeletionStatus(deletion_task_count, std::move(callback));
}
|
void OnQuotaManagedOriginDeleted(const url::Origin& origin,
blink::mojom::StorageType type,
size_t* deletion_task_count,
base::OnceClosure callback,
blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode status) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK_GT(*deletion_task_count, 0u);
if (status != blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode::kOk) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't remove data of type " << static_cast<int>(type)
<< " for origin " << origin
<< ". Status: " << static_cast<int>(status);
}
(*deletion_task_count)--;
CheckQuotaManagedDataDeletionStatus(deletion_task_count, std::move(callback));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
void TestNavigationManager::ResumeNavigation() {
DCHECK(current_state_ == NavigationState::STARTED ||
current_state_ == NavigationState::RESPONSE);
DCHECK_EQ(current_state_, desired_state_);
DCHECK(navigation_paused_);
navigation_paused_ = false;
handle_->CallResumeForTesting();
}
|
void TestNavigationManager::ResumeNavigation() {
DCHECK(current_state_ == NavigationState::STARTED ||
current_state_ == NavigationState::RESPONSE);
DCHECK_EQ(current_state_, desired_state_);
DCHECK(navigation_paused_);
navigation_paused_ = false;
handle_->CallResumeForTesting();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
XineramaXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
int result, i;
PanoramiXRes *draw, *port;
REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq);
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
return (result == BadValue) ? BadDrawable : result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
result = ProcXvStopVideo(client);
}
}
return result;
}
|
XineramaXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
int result, i;
PanoramiXRes *draw, *port;
REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq);
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
return (result == BadValue) ? BadDrawable : result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
result = ProcXvStopVideo(client);
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5105
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5105/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/536f72f4eeb63af895ee489c7244ccf2437cd157
|
536f72f4eeb63af895ee489c7244ccf2437cd157
|
Disallow Arabic/Hebrew NSMs to come after an unrelated base char.
Arabic NSM(non-spacing mark)s and Hebrew NSMs are allowed to mix with
Latin with the current 'moderately restrictive script mixing policy'.
They're not blocked by BiDi check either because both LTR and RTL labels
can have an NSM.
Block them from coming after an unrelated script (e.g. Latin + Arabic
NSM).
Bug: chromium:729979
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: I5b93fbcf76d17121bf1baaa480ef3624424b3317
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/528348
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478205}
|
void CheckAdjustedOffsets(const std::string& url_string,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
const size_t* output_offsets) {
GURL url(url_string);
size_t url_length = url_string.length();
std::vector<size_t> offsets;
for (size_t i = 0; i <= url_length + 1; ++i)
offsets.push_back(i);
offsets.push_back(500000); // Something larger than any input length.
offsets.push_back(std::string::npos);
base::string16 formatted_url = FormatUrlWithOffsets(url, format_types,
unescape_rules, nullptr, nullptr, &offsets);
for (size_t i = 0; i < url_length; ++i)
VerboseExpect(output_offsets[i], offsets[i], url_string, i, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(formatted_url.length(), offsets[url_length], url_string,
url_length, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(base::string16::npos, offsets[url_length + 1], url_string,
500000, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(base::string16::npos, offsets[url_length + 2], url_string,
std::string::npos, formatted_url);
}
|
void CheckAdjustedOffsets(const std::string& url_string,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
const size_t* output_offsets) {
GURL url(url_string);
size_t url_length = url_string.length();
std::vector<size_t> offsets;
for (size_t i = 0; i <= url_length + 1; ++i)
offsets.push_back(i);
offsets.push_back(500000); // Something larger than any input length.
offsets.push_back(std::string::npos);
base::string16 formatted_url = FormatUrlWithOffsets(url, format_types,
unescape_rules, nullptr, nullptr, &offsets);
for (size_t i = 0; i < url_length; ++i)
VerboseExpect(output_offsets[i], offsets[i], url_string, i, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(formatted_url.length(), offsets[url_length], url_string,
url_length, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(base::string16::npos, offsets[url_length + 1], url_string,
500000, formatted_url);
VerboseExpect(base::string16::npos, offsets[url_length + 2], url_string,
std::string::npos, formatted_url);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1066/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
|
build_encrypt_ctxt(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *pneg_ctxt)
{
pneg_ctxt->ContextType = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_CAPABILITIES;
pneg_ctxt->DataLength = cpu_to_le16(6);
pneg_ctxt->CipherCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[0] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM;
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[1] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM;
}
|
build_encrypt_ctxt(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *pneg_ctxt)
{
pneg_ctxt->ContextType = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_CAPABILITIES;
pneg_ctxt->DataLength = cpu_to_le16(6);
pneg_ctxt->CipherCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[0] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM;
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[1] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int macvlan_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct macvlan_dev *vlan,
const struct ethhdr *eth, bool local)
{
struct net_device *dev = vlan->dev;
if (!skb)
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (local)
return vlan->forward(dev, skb);
skb->dev = dev;
if (!compare_ether_addr_64bits(eth->h_dest,
dev->broadcast))
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_BROADCAST;
else
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_MULTICAST;
return vlan->receive(skb);
}
|
static int macvlan_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct macvlan_dev *vlan,
const struct ethhdr *eth, bool local)
{
struct net_device *dev = vlan->dev;
if (!skb)
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (local)
return vlan->forward(dev, skb);
skb->dev = dev;
if (!compare_ether_addr_64bits(eth->h_dest,
dev->broadcast))
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_BROADCAST;
else
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_MULTICAST;
return vlan->receive(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8a50f99c25fb70ff43aaa82b6f9569db383f0ca8
|
8a50f99c25fb70ff43aaa82b6f9569db383f0ca8
|
[Sync] Rework unit tests for ChromeInvalidationClient
In particular, add unit tests that would have caught bug 139424.
Dep-inject InvalidationClient into ChromeInvalidationClient.
Use the function name 'UpdateRegisteredIds' consistently.
Replace some mocks with fakes.
BUG=139424
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10827133
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RegistrationManager::MarkAllRegistrationsLost() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
for (RegistrationStatusMap::const_iterator it =
registration_statuses_.begin();
it != registration_statuses_.end(); ++it) {
if (IsIdRegistered(it->first)) {
MarkRegistrationLost(it->first);
}
}
}
|
void RegistrationManager::MarkAllRegistrationsLost() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
for (RegistrationStatusMap::const_iterator it =
registration_statuses_.begin();
it != registration_statuses_.end(); ++it) {
if (IsIdRegistered(it->first)) {
MarkRegistrationLost(it->first);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0380
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0380/
|
CWE-532
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
|
rend_add_service(smartlist_t *service_list, rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
tor_assert(service);
smartlist_t *s_list = rend_get_service_list_mutable(service_list);
/* We must have a service list, even if it's a temporary one, so we can
* check for duplicate services */
if (BUG(!s_list)) {
return -1;
}
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
service->expiring_nodes = smartlist_new();
if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
"streams per circuit.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
"max streams handling.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
(!service->clients ||
smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no "
"clients.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (!service->ports || !smartlist_len(service->ports)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with no ports configured.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
} else {
int dupe = 0;
/* XXX This duplicate check has two problems:
*
* a) It's O(n^2), but the same comment from the bottom of
* rend_config_services() should apply.
*
* b) We only compare directory paths as strings, so we can't
* detect two distinct paths that specify the same directory
* (which can arise from symlinks, case-insensitivity, bind
* mounts, etc.).
*
* It also can't detect that two separate Tor instances are trying
* to use the same HiddenServiceDir; for that, we would need a
* lock file. But this is enough to detect a simple mistake that
* at least one person has actually made.
*/
tor_assert(s_list);
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(service)) {
/* Skip dupe for ephemeral services. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
dupe = dupe ||
!strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory));
if (dupe) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for "
"directory %s.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
}
log_debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory %s",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (!(p->is_unix_addr)) {
log_debug(LD_REND,
"Service maps port %d to %s",
p->virtual_port,
fmt_addrport(&p->real_addr, p->real_port));
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
log_debug(LD_REND,
"Service maps port %d to socket at \"%s\"",
p->virtual_port, p->unix_addr);
#else
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Service maps port %d to an AF_UNIX socket, but we "
"have no AF_UNIX support on this platform. This is "
"probably a bug.",
p->virtual_port);
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
}
}
/* The service passed all the checks */
tor_assert(s_list);
smartlist_add(s_list, service);
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
|
rend_add_service(smartlist_t *service_list, rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
tor_assert(service);
smartlist_t *s_list = rend_get_service_list_mutable(service_list);
/* We must have a service list, even if it's a temporary one, so we can
* check for duplicate services */
if (BUG(!s_list)) {
return -1;
}
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
service->expiring_nodes = smartlist_new();
if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
"streams per circuit.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
"max streams handling.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
(!service->clients ||
smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no "
"clients.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
if (!service->ports || !smartlist_len(service->ports)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with no ports configured.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
} else {
int dupe = 0;
/* XXX This duplicate check has two problems:
*
* a) It's O(n^2), but the same comment from the bottom of
* rend_config_services() should apply.
*
* b) We only compare directory paths as strings, so we can't
* detect two distinct paths that specify the same directory
* (which can arise from symlinks, case-insensitivity, bind
* mounts, etc.).
*
* It also can't detect that two separate Tor instances are trying
* to use the same HiddenServiceDir; for that, we would need a
* lock file. But this is enough to detect a simple mistake that
* at least one person has actually made.
*/
tor_assert(s_list);
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(service)) {
/* Skip dupe for ephemeral services. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
dupe = dupe ||
!strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory));
if (dupe) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for "
"directory %s.",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
}
log_debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory %s",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
if (!(p->is_unix_addr)) {
log_debug(LD_REND,
"Service maps port %d to %s",
p->virtual_port,
fmt_addrport(&p->real_addr, p->real_port));
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
log_debug(LD_REND,
"Service maps port %d to socket at \"%s\"",
p->virtual_port, p->unix_addr);
#else
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Service maps port %d to an AF_UNIX socket, but we "
"have no AF_UNIX support on this platform. This is "
"probably a bug.",
p->virtual_port);
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
}
}
/* The service passed all the checks */
tor_assert(s_list);
smartlist_add(s_list, service);
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6057/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
bool PlatformSensorWin::CheckSensorConfiguration(
const PlatformSensorConfiguration& configuration) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
double minimal_reporting_interval_ms =
sensor_reader_->GetMinimalReportingIntervalMs();
if (minimal_reporting_interval_ms == 0)
return true;
double max_frequency =
base::Time::kMillisecondsPerSecond / minimal_reporting_interval_ms;
return configuration.frequency() <= max_frequency;
}
|
bool PlatformSensorWin::CheckSensorConfiguration(
const PlatformSensorConfiguration& configuration) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
double minimal_reporting_interval_ms =
sensor_reader_->GetMinimalReportingIntervalMs();
if (minimal_reporting_interval_ms == 0)
return true;
double max_frequency =
base::Time::kMillisecondsPerSecond / minimal_reporting_interval_ms;
return configuration.frequency() <= max_frequency;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int iasecc_parse_ef_atr(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_private_data *pdata = (struct iasecc_private_data *) card->drv_data;
struct iasecc_version *version = &pdata->version;
struct iasecc_io_buffer_sizes *sizes = &pdata->max_sizes;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
rv = sc_parse_ef_atr(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "MF selection error");
if (card->ef_atr->pre_issuing_len < 4)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid pre-issuing data");
version->ic_manufacturer = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[0];
version->ic_type = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[1];
version->os_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[2];
version->iasecc_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[3];
sc_log(ctx, "EF.ATR: IC manufacturer/type %X/%X, OS/IasEcc versions %X/%X",
version->ic_manufacturer, version->ic_type, version->os_version, version->iasecc_version);
if (card->ef_atr->issuer_data_len < 16)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid issuer data");
sizes->send = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[2] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[3];
sizes->send_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[6] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[7];
sizes->recv = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[10] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[11];
sizes->recv_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[14] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[15];
card->max_send_size = sizes->send;
card->max_recv_size = sizes->recv;
/* Most of the card producers interpret 'send' values as "maximum APDU data size".
* Oberthur strictly follows specification and interpret these values as "maximum APDU command size".
* Here we need 'data size'.
*/
if (card->max_send_size > 0xFF)
card->max_send_size -= 5;
sc_log(ctx,
"EF.ATR: max send/recv sizes %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X/%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X",
card->max_send_size, card->max_recv_size);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
static int iasecc_parse_ef_atr(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_private_data *pdata = (struct iasecc_private_data *) card->drv_data;
struct iasecc_version *version = &pdata->version;
struct iasecc_io_buffer_sizes *sizes = &pdata->max_sizes;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
rv = sc_parse_ef_atr(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "MF selection error");
if (card->ef_atr->pre_issuing_len < 4)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid pre-issuing data");
version->ic_manufacturer = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[0];
version->ic_type = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[1];
version->os_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[2];
version->iasecc_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[3];
sc_log(ctx, "EF.ATR: IC manufacturer/type %X/%X, OS/IasEcc versions %X/%X",
version->ic_manufacturer, version->ic_type, version->os_version, version->iasecc_version);
if (card->ef_atr->issuer_data_len < 16)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid issuer data");
sizes->send = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[2] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[3];
sizes->send_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[6] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[7];
sizes->recv = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[10] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[11];
sizes->recv_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[14] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[15];
card->max_send_size = sizes->send;
card->max_recv_size = sizes->recv;
/* Most of the card producers interpret 'send' values as "maximum APDU data size".
* Oberthur strictly follows specification and interpret these values as "maximum APDU command size".
* Here we need 'data size'.
*/
if (card->max_send_size > 0xFF)
card->max_send_size -= 5;
sc_log(ctx,
"EF.ATR: max send/recv sizes %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X/%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X",
card->max_send_size, card->max_recv_size);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int em_cmpxchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* Save real source value, then compare EAX against destination. */
ctxt->dst.orig_val = ctxt->dst.val;
ctxt->dst.val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->src.orig_val = ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
fastop(ctxt, em_cmp);
if (ctxt->eflags & EFLG_ZF) {
/* Success: write back to memory. */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
} else {
/* Failure: write the value we saw to EAX. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_cmpxchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* Save real source value, then compare EAX against destination. */
ctxt->dst.orig_val = ctxt->dst.val;
ctxt->dst.val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->src.orig_val = ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
fastop(ctxt, em_cmp);
if (ctxt->eflags & EFLG_ZF) {
/* Success: write back to memory. */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
} else {
/* Failure: write the value we saw to EAX. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& BaseNode::GetEntitySpecifics() const {
return GetUnencryptedSpecifics(GetEntry());
}
|
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& BaseNode::GetEntitySpecifics() const {
return GetUnencryptedSpecifics(GetEntry());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2927/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4d77eed905ce1d00361282e8822a2a3be61d25c0
|
4d77eed905ce1d00361282e8822a2a3be61d25c0
|
Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormElement::defaultButton() const
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_associatedElements.size(); ++i) {
if (!m_associatedElements[i]->isFormControlElement())
continue;
HTMLFormControlElement* control = toHTMLFormControlElement(m_associatedElements[i]);
if (control->isSuccessfulSubmitButton())
return control;
}
return 0;
}
|
HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormElement::defaultButton() const
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_associatedElements.size(); ++i) {
if (!m_associatedElements[i]->isFormControlElement())
continue;
HTMLFormControlElement* control = toHTMLFormControlElement(m_associatedElements[i]);
if (control->isSuccessfulSubmitButton())
return control;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::load() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "load(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (isLockedPendingUserGesture() &&
UserGestureIndicator::utilizeUserGesture()) {
unlockUserGesture();
}
m_ignorePreloadNone = true;
invokeLoadAlgorithm();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::load() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "load(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (isLockedPendingUserGesture() &&
UserGestureIndicator::utilizeUserGesture()) {
unlockUserGesture();
}
m_ignorePreloadNone = true;
invokeLoadAlgorithm();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static netdev_features_t harmonize_features(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
int tmp;
__be16 type;
type = skb_network_protocol(skb, &tmp);
features = net_mpls_features(skb, features, type);
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_NONE &&
!can_checksum_protocol(features, type)) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK;
} else if (illegal_highdma(skb->dev, skb)) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
}
return features;
}
|
static netdev_features_t harmonize_features(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
int tmp;
__be16 type;
type = skb_network_protocol(skb, &tmp);
features = net_mpls_features(skb, features, type);
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_NONE &&
!can_checksum_protocol(features, type)) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK;
} else if (illegal_highdma(skb->dev, skb)) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
}
return features;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.