CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
HTMLMediaElement::DirectionOfPlayback HTMLMediaElement::GetDirectionOfPlayback()
const {
return playback_rate_ >= 0 ? kForward : kBackward;
}
|
HTMLMediaElement::DirectionOfPlayback HTMLMediaElement::GetDirectionOfPlayback()
const {
return playback_rate_ >= 0 ? kForward : kBackward;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
DeliverOneGrabbedEvent(InternalEvent *event, DeviceIntPtr dev,
enum InputLevel level)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
int rc;
xEvent *xE = NULL;
int count = 0;
int deliveries = 0;
Mask mask;
GrabInfoPtr grabinfo = &dev->deviceGrab;
GrabPtr grab = grabinfo->grab;
Mask filter;
if (grab->grabtype != level)
return 0;
switch (level) {
case XI2:
rc = EventToXI2(event, &xE);
count = 1;
if (rc == Success) {
int evtype = xi2_get_type(xE);
mask = GetXI2MaskByte(grab->xi2mask, dev, evtype);
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
}
break;
case XI:
if (grabinfo->fromPassiveGrab && grabinfo->implicitGrab)
mask = grab->deviceMask;
else
mask = grab->eventMask;
rc = EventToXI(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc == Success)
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
break;
case CORE:
rc = EventToCore(event, &xE, &count);
mask = grab->eventMask;
if (rc == Success)
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
break;
default:
BUG_WARN_MSG(1, "Invalid input level %d\n", level);
return 0;
}
if (rc == Success) {
FixUpEventFromWindow(pSprite, xE, grab->window, None, TRUE);
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, 0, dev,
grab->window, xE, count) ||
XaceHook(XACE_RECEIVE_ACCESS, rClient(grab),
grab->window, xE, count))
deliveries = 1; /* don't send, but pretend we did */
else if (level != CORE || !IsInterferingGrab(rClient(grab), dev, xE)) {
deliveries = TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), dev,
xE, count, mask, filter, grab);
}
}
else
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch,
"%s: conversion to mode %d failed on %d with %d\n",
dev->name, level, event->any.type, rc);
free(xE);
return deliveries;
}
|
DeliverOneGrabbedEvent(InternalEvent *event, DeviceIntPtr dev,
enum InputLevel level)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
int rc;
xEvent *xE = NULL;
int count = 0;
int deliveries = 0;
Mask mask;
GrabInfoPtr grabinfo = &dev->deviceGrab;
GrabPtr grab = grabinfo->grab;
Mask filter;
if (grab->grabtype != level)
return 0;
switch (level) {
case XI2:
rc = EventToXI2(event, &xE);
count = 1;
if (rc == Success) {
int evtype = xi2_get_type(xE);
mask = GetXI2MaskByte(grab->xi2mask, dev, evtype);
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
}
break;
case XI:
if (grabinfo->fromPassiveGrab && grabinfo->implicitGrab)
mask = grab->deviceMask;
else
mask = grab->eventMask;
rc = EventToXI(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc == Success)
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
break;
case CORE:
rc = EventToCore(event, &xE, &count);
mask = grab->eventMask;
if (rc == Success)
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
break;
default:
BUG_WARN_MSG(1, "Invalid input level %d\n", level);
return 0;
}
if (rc == Success) {
FixUpEventFromWindow(pSprite, xE, grab->window, None, TRUE);
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, 0, dev,
grab->window, xE, count) ||
XaceHook(XACE_RECEIVE_ACCESS, rClient(grab),
grab->window, xE, count))
deliveries = 1; /* don't send, but pretend we did */
else if (level != CORE || !IsInterferingGrab(rClient(grab), dev, xE)) {
deliveries = TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), dev,
xE, count, mask, filter, grab);
}
}
else
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch,
"%s: conversion to mode %d failed on %d with %d\n",
dev->name, level, event->any.type, rc);
free(xE);
return deliveries;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6634
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6634/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OneClickSigninHelper::RedirectToSignin() {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::RedirectToSignin";
signin::Source source = signin::GetSourceForPromoURL(continue_url_);
if (source == signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
source = signin::SOURCE_MENU;
GURL page = signin::GetPromoURL(source, false);
content::WebContents* contents = web_contents();
contents->GetController().LoadURL(page,
content::Referrer(),
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
}
|
void OneClickSigninHelper::RedirectToSignin() {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::RedirectToSignin";
signin::Source source = signin::GetSourceForPromoURL(continue_url_);
if (source == signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
source = signin::SOURCE_MENU;
GURL page = signin::GetPromoURL(source, false);
content::WebContents* contents = web_contents();
contents->GetController().LoadURL(page,
content::Referrer(),
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2538/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fe3c546c5ff2a6210f9a4d8561cc64051ca8603e
|
fe3c546c5ff2a6210f9a4d8561cc64051ca8603e
| null |
static int ndis_query(USBNetState *s, uint32_t oid,
uint8_t *inbuf, unsigned int inlen, uint8_t *outbuf,
size_t outlen)
{
unsigned int i;
switch (oid) {
/* general oids (table 4-1) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_SUPPORTED_LIST:
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(oid_supported_list); i++)
((le32 *) outbuf)[i] = cpu_to_le32(oid_supported_list[i]);
return sizeof(oid_supported_list);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_HARDWARE_STATUS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_SUPPORTED:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->medium);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_IN_USE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->medium);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MAXIMUM_FRAME_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_LINK_SPEED:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->speed);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_TRANSMIT_BLOCK_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RECEIVE_BLOCK_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_ID:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->vendorid);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_DESCRIPTION:
pstrcpy((char *)outbuf, outlen, "QEMU USB RNDIS Net");
return strlen((char *)outbuf) + 1;
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_DRIVER_VERSION:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(1);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTER:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->filter);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MAXIMUM_TOTAL_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_CONNECT_STATUS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->media_state);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_GEN_PHYSICAL_MEDIUM:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_GEN_MAC_OPTIONS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(
NDIS_MAC_OPTION_RECEIVE_SERIALIZED |
NDIS_MAC_OPTION_FULL_DUPLEX);
return sizeof(le32);
/* statistics OIDs (table 4-2) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_XMIT_OK:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_OK:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_XMIT_ERROR:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_ERROR:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_NO_BUFFER:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* ieee802.3 OIDs (table 4-3) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS:
memcpy(outbuf, s->conf.macaddr.a, 6);
return 6;
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_CURRENT_ADDRESS:
memcpy(outbuf, s->conf.macaddr.a, 6);
return 6;
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_MULTICAST_LIST:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0xe0000000);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_MAXIMUM_LIST_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(1);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_802_3_MAC_OPTIONS:
return 0;
/* ieee802.3 statistics OIDs (table 4-4) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_RCV_ERROR_ALIGNMENT:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_XMIT_ONE_COLLISION:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_XMIT_MORE_COLLISIONS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "usbnet: unknown OID 0x%08x\n", oid);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
|
static int ndis_query(USBNetState *s, uint32_t oid,
uint8_t *inbuf, unsigned int inlen, uint8_t *outbuf,
size_t outlen)
{
unsigned int i;
switch (oid) {
/* general oids (table 4-1) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_SUPPORTED_LIST:
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(oid_supported_list); i++)
((le32 *) outbuf)[i] = cpu_to_le32(oid_supported_list[i]);
return sizeof(oid_supported_list);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_HARDWARE_STATUS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_SUPPORTED:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->medium);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_IN_USE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->medium);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MAXIMUM_FRAME_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_LINK_SPEED:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->speed);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_TRANSMIT_BLOCK_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RECEIVE_BLOCK_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(ETH_FRAME_LEN);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_ID:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->vendorid);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_DESCRIPTION:
pstrcpy((char *)outbuf, outlen, "QEMU USB RNDIS Net");
return strlen((char *)outbuf) + 1;
case OID_GEN_VENDOR_DRIVER_VERSION:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(1);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTER:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->filter);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MAXIMUM_TOTAL_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_MEDIA_CONNECT_STATUS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(s->media_state);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_GEN_PHYSICAL_MEDIUM:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_GEN_MAC_OPTIONS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(
NDIS_MAC_OPTION_RECEIVE_SERIALIZED |
NDIS_MAC_OPTION_FULL_DUPLEX);
return sizeof(le32);
/* statistics OIDs (table 4-2) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_XMIT_OK:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_OK:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_XMIT_ERROR:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_ERROR:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_GEN_RCV_NO_BUFFER:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* ieee802.3 OIDs (table 4-3) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS:
memcpy(outbuf, s->conf.macaddr.a, 6);
return 6;
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_CURRENT_ADDRESS:
memcpy(outbuf, s->conf.macaddr.a, 6);
return 6;
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_MULTICAST_LIST:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0xe0000000);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_MAXIMUM_LIST_SIZE:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(1);
return sizeof(le32);
case OID_802_3_MAC_OPTIONS:
return 0;
/* ieee802.3 statistics OIDs (table 4-4) */
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_RCV_ERROR_ALIGNMENT:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_XMIT_ONE_COLLISION:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
/* mandatory */
case OID_802_3_XMIT_MORE_COLLISIONS:
*((le32 *) outbuf) = cpu_to_le32(0);
return sizeof(le32);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "usbnet: unknown OID 0x%08x\n", oid);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
base::HistogramBase::Sample GetSwitchUMAId(const std::string& switch_name) {
return static_cast<base::HistogramBase::Sample>(
base::HashMetricName(switch_name));
}
|
base::HistogramBase::Sample GetSwitchUMAId(const std::string& switch_name) {
return static_cast<base::HistogramBase::Sample>(
base::HashMetricName(switch_name));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14230
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14230/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
|
static int mboxlist_have_admin_rights(const char *rights) {
int access, have_admin_access;
cyrus_acl_strtomask(rights, &access);
have_admin_access = access & ACL_ADMIN;
return have_admin_access;
}
|
static int mboxlist_have_admin_rights(const char *rights) {
int access, have_admin_access;
cyrus_acl_strtomask(rights, &access);
have_admin_access = access & ACL_ADMIN;
return have_admin_access;
}
|
C
|
cyrus-imapd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1691
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1691/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
net::EmbeddedTestServer* embedded_test_server2() {
return &embedded_test_server2_;
}
|
net::EmbeddedTestServer* embedded_test_server2() {
return &embedded_test_server2_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static int iwbmp_read(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx,
iw_byte *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
size_t bytesread = 0;
ret = (*rctx->iodescr->read_fn)(rctx->ctx,rctx->iodescr,
buf,buflen,&bytesread);
if(!ret || bytesread!=buflen) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
static int iwbmp_read(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx,
iw_byte *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
size_t bytesread = 0;
ret = (*rctx->iodescr->read_fn)(rctx->ctx,rctx->iodescr,
buf,buflen,&bytesread);
if(!ret || bytesread!=buflen) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1698
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1698/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
5fb2548448bd1b76a59d941b729d7a7f90d53bc8
|
[Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
|
V8SchemaRegistry::V8SchemaRegistry() {
}
|
V8SchemaRegistry::V8SchemaRegistry() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1296/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508
|
c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508
|
Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutomationProvider::LoadExpandedExtension(
const FilePath& extension_dir,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (profile_->GetExtensionService()) {
new ExtensionInstallNotificationObserver(
this,
AutomationMsg_LoadExpandedExtension::ID,
reply_message);
profile_->GetExtensionService()->LoadExtension(extension_dir);
} else {
AutomationMsg_LoadExpandedExtension::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, AUTOMATION_MSG_EXTENSION_INSTALL_FAILED);
Send(reply_message);
}
}
|
void AutomationProvider::LoadExpandedExtension(
const FilePath& extension_dir,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (profile_->GetExtensionService()) {
new ExtensionInstallNotificationObserver(
this,
AutomationMsg_LoadExpandedExtension::ID,
reply_message);
profile_->GetExtensionService()->LoadExtension(extension_dir);
} else {
AutomationMsg_LoadExpandedExtension::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, AUTOMATION_MSG_EXTENSION_INSTALL_FAILED);
Send(reply_message);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12178/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821
|
859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821
| null |
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(int flags[MAXDEVICES])
{
xXIHierarchyEvent *ev;
xXIHierarchyInfo *info;
DeviceIntRec dummyDev;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
int i;
if (!flags)
return;
ev = calloc(1, sizeof(xXIHierarchyEvent) +
MAXDEVICES * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
if (!ev)
return;
ev->type = GenericEvent;
ev->extension = IReqCode;
ev->evtype = XI_HierarchyChanged;
ev->time = GetTimeInMillis();
ev->flags = 0;
ev->num_info = inputInfo.numDevices;
info = (xXIHierarchyInfo *) &ev[1];
for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAXDEVICES; i++) {
if (flags[i] & (XIMasterRemoved | XISlaveRemoved)) {
info->deviceid = i;
info->enabled = FALSE;
info->flags = flags[i];
info->use = 0;
ev->flags |= info->flags;
ev->num_info++;
info++;
}
}
ev->length = bytes_to_int32(ev->num_info * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
memset(&dummyDev, 0, sizeof(dummyDev));
dummyDev.id = XIAllDevices;
dummyDev.type = SLAVE;
SendEventToAllWindows(&dummyDev, (XI_HierarchyChangedMask >> 8),
(xEvent *) ev, 1);
free(ev);
}
|
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(int flags[MAXDEVICES])
{
xXIHierarchyEvent *ev;
xXIHierarchyInfo *info;
DeviceIntRec dummyDev;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
int i;
if (!flags)
return;
ev = calloc(1, sizeof(xXIHierarchyEvent) +
MAXDEVICES * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
if (!ev)
return;
ev->type = GenericEvent;
ev->extension = IReqCode;
ev->evtype = XI_HierarchyChanged;
ev->time = GetTimeInMillis();
ev->flags = 0;
ev->num_info = inputInfo.numDevices;
info = (xXIHierarchyInfo *) &ev[1];
for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAXDEVICES; i++) {
if (flags[i] & (XIMasterRemoved | XISlaveRemoved)) {
info->deviceid = i;
info->enabled = FALSE;
info->flags = flags[i];
info->use = 0;
ev->flags |= info->flags;
ev->num_info++;
info++;
}
}
ev->length = bytes_to_int32(ev->num_info * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
memset(&dummyDev, 0, sizeof(dummyDev));
dummyDev.id = XIAllDevices;
dummyDev.type = SLAVE;
SendEventToAllWindows(&dummyDev, (XI_HierarchyChangedMask >> 8),
(xEvent *) ev, 1);
free(ev);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
void TabStrip::RemovedFromWidget() {
GetWidget()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
void TabStrip::RemovedFromWidget() {
GetWidget()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1703
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1703/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
Direction ConvertDirectionToApi(const UsbEndpointDirection& input) {
switch (input) {
case device::USB_DIRECTION_INBOUND:
return usb::DIRECTION_IN;
case device::USB_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND:
return usb::DIRECTION_OUT;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return usb::DIRECTION_NONE;
}
}
|
Direction ConvertDirectionToApi(const UsbEndpointDirection& input) {
switch (input) {
case device::USB_DIRECTION_INBOUND:
return usb::DIRECTION_IN;
case device::USB_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND:
return usb::DIRECTION_OUT;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return usb::DIRECTION_NONE;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::SetPlayerPreload() {
if (web_media_player_)
web_media_player_->SetPreload(EffectivePreloadType());
if (LoadIsDeferred() &&
EffectivePreloadType() != WebMediaPlayer::kPreloadNone)
StartDeferredLoad();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::SetPlayerPreload() {
if (web_media_player_)
web_media_player_->SetPreload(EffectivePreloadType());
if (LoadIsDeferred() &&
EffectivePreloadType() != WebMediaPlayer::kPreloadNone)
StartDeferredLoad();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::Size TabStrip::GetPreferredSize() {
int needed_width;
if (touch_layout_.get() || adjust_layout_) {
needed_width = Tab::GetTouchWidth() +
(2 * kStackedPadding * kMaxStackedCount);
} else {
needed_width = Tab::GetMinimumSelectedSize().width();
}
needed_width += new_tab_button_width();
if (immersive_style_)
return gfx::Size(needed_width, Tab::GetImmersiveHeight());
return gfx::Size(needed_width, Tab::GetMinimumUnselectedSize().height());
}
|
gfx::Size TabStrip::GetPreferredSize() {
int needed_width;
if (touch_layout_.get() || adjust_layout_) {
needed_width = Tab::GetTouchWidth() +
(2 * kStackedPadding * kMaxStackedCount);
} else {
needed_width = Tab::GetMinimumSelectedSize().width();
}
needed_width += new_tab_button_width();
if (immersive_style_)
return gfx::Size(needed_width, Tab::GetImmersiveHeight());
return gfx::Size(needed_width, Tab::GetMinimumUnselectedSize().height());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void InspectorTraceEvents::Did(const probe::CallFunction& probe) {
if (probe.depth)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_END0("devtools.timeline", "FunctionCall");
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"),
"UpdateCounters", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD, "data",
InspectorUpdateCountersEvent::Data());
}
|
void InspectorTraceEvents::Did(const probe::CallFunction& probe) {
if (probe.depth)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_END0("devtools.timeline", "FunctionCall");
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"),
"UpdateCounters", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD, "data",
InspectorUpdateCountersEvent::Data());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1908/
|
CWE-254
|
https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c
|
ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c
| null |
mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
Buffer in, out;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int type, rid, have, i;
int ret = -1;
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* Send hello */
buffer_init(&out);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER);
/* no extensions */
buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
buffer_len(&out));
buffer_free(&out);
debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
return 0;
}
buffer_init(&in);
buffer_init(&out);
/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) {
malf:
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
goto out;
}
buffer_append(&in, ptr, have);
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0)
goto malf;
debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u",
__func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in));
if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
rid = 0;
else {
if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
"received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0)
goto malf;
}
for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out);
break;
}
}
if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&out, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request");
ret = 0;
}
/* Enqueue reply packet */
if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) {
buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
buffer_len(&out));
}
out:
buffer_free(&in);
buffer_free(&out);
return ret;
}
|
mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
Buffer in, out;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int type, rid, have, i;
int ret = -1;
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* Send hello */
buffer_init(&out);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER);
/* no extensions */
buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
buffer_len(&out));
buffer_free(&out);
debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
return 0;
}
buffer_init(&in);
buffer_init(&out);
/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) {
malf:
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
goto out;
}
buffer_append(&in, ptr, have);
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0)
goto malf;
debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u",
__func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in));
if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
rid = 0;
else {
if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
"received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0)
goto malf;
}
for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out);
break;
}
}
if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&out, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request");
ret = 0;
}
/* Enqueue reply packet */
if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) {
buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
buffer_len(&out));
}
out:
buffer_free(&in);
buffer_free(&out);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
mindrot
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
MojoResult Core::Close(MojoHandle handle) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher;
{
base::AutoLock lock(handles_->GetLock());
MojoResult rv = handles_->GetAndRemoveDispatcher(handle, &dispatcher);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return rv;
}
dispatcher->Close();
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
|
MojoResult Core::Close(MojoHandle handle) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher;
{
base::AutoLock lock(handles_->GetLock());
MojoResult rv = handles_->GetAndRemoveDispatcher(handle, &dispatcher);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return rv;
}
dispatcher->Close();
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API int zend_get_parameters_ex(int param_count, ...) /* {{{ */
{
void **p;
int arg_count;
va_list ptr;
zval ***param;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
p = zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1;
arg_count = (int)(zend_uintptr_t) *p;
if (param_count>arg_count) {
return FAILURE;
}
va_start(ptr, param_count);
while (param_count-->0) {
param = va_arg(ptr, zval ***);
*param = (zval **) p-(arg_count--);
}
va_end(ptr);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API int zend_get_parameters_ex(int param_count, ...) /* {{{ */
{
void **p;
int arg_count;
va_list ptr;
zval ***param;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
p = zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1;
arg_count = (int)(zend_uintptr_t) *p;
if (param_count>arg_count) {
return FAILURE;
}
va_start(ptr, param_count);
while (param_count-->0) {
param = va_arg(ptr, zval ***);
*param = (zval **) p-(arg_count--);
}
va_end(ptr);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
UDPSocketWin::Core::~Core() {
read_watcher_.StopWatching();
write_watcher_.StopWatching();
WSACloseEvent(read_overlapped_.hEvent);
memset(&read_overlapped_, 0xaf, sizeof(read_overlapped_));
WSACloseEvent(write_overlapped_.hEvent);
memset(&write_overlapped_, 0xaf, sizeof(write_overlapped_));
}
|
UDPSocketWin::Core::~Core() {
read_watcher_.StopWatching();
write_watcher_.StopWatching();
WSACloseEvent(read_overlapped_.hEvent);
memset(&read_overlapped_, 0xaf, sizeof(read_overlapped_));
WSACloseEvent(write_overlapped_.hEvent);
memset(&write_overlapped_, 0xaf, sizeof(write_overlapped_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripGtk::TabBlockedStateChanged(WebContents* contents, int index) {
GetTabAt(index)->SetBlocked(model_->IsTabBlocked(index));
}
|
void TabStripGtk::TabBlockedStateChanged(WebContents* contents, int index) {
GetTabAt(index)->SetBlocked(model_->IsTabBlocked(index));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6621/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebElement RenderFrameImpl::GetFocusedElement() {
WebDocument doc = frame_->document();
if (!doc.isNull())
return doc.focusedElement();
return WebElement();
}
|
WebElement RenderFrameImpl::GetFocusedElement() {
WebDocument doc = frame_->document();
if (!doc.isNull())
return doc.focusedElement();
return WebElement();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5077/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa
|
1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa
|
net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void sctp_assoc_free_asconf_queue(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(asconf, tmp, &asoc->addip_chunk_list, list) {
list_del_init(&asconf->list);
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
}
}
|
static void sctp_assoc_free_asconf_queue(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(asconf, tmp, &asoc->addip_chunk_list, list) {
list_del_init(&asconf->list);
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5232/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/01org/opa-fm/commit/c5759e7b76f5bf844be6c6641cc1b356bbc83869
|
c5759e7b76f5bf844be6c6641cc1b356bbc83869
|
Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
res = HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return res;
cleanup:
close(fd);
return res;
}
|
unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
return HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return HSM_COM_OK;
}
|
C
|
opa-ff
| 1 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void __d_lookup_done(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct hlist_bl_head *b = in_lookup_hash(dentry->d_parent,
dentry->d_name.hash);
hlist_bl_lock(b);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_PAR_LOOKUP;
__hlist_bl_del(&dentry->d_u.d_in_lookup_hash);
wake_up_all(dentry->d_wait);
dentry->d_wait = NULL;
hlist_bl_unlock(b);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&dentry->d_u.d_alias);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dentry->d_lru);
}
|
void __d_lookup_done(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct hlist_bl_head *b = in_lookup_hash(dentry->d_parent,
dentry->d_name.hash);
hlist_bl_lock(b);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_PAR_LOOKUP;
__hlist_bl_del(&dentry->d_u.d_in_lookup_hash);
wake_up_all(dentry->d_wait);
dentry->d_wait = NULL;
hlist_bl_unlock(b);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&dentry->d_u.d_alias);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dentry->d_lru);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2878
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2878/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<Range> TextIterator::subrange(Range* entireRange, int characterOffset, int characterCount)
{
CharacterIterator entireRangeIterator(entireRange);
return characterSubrange(entireRangeIterator, characterOffset, characterCount);
}
|
PassRefPtr<Range> TextIterator::subrange(Range* entireRange, int characterOffset, int characterCount)
{
CharacterIterator entireRangeIterator(entireRange);
return characterSubrange(entireRangeIterator, characterOffset, characterCount);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
UINT8 btif_is_dut_mode(void)
{
return (btif_dut_mode == 1);
}
|
UINT8 btif_is_dut_mode(void)
{
return (btif_dut_mode == 1);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUseProgram(GLuint program_id) {
GLuint service_id = 0;
Program* program = NULL;
if (program_id) {
program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, "glUseProgram");
if (!program) {
return;
}
if (!program->IsValid()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glUseProgram", "program not linked");
return;
}
service_id = program->service_id();
}
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UnuseProgram(shader_manager(),
state_.current_program.get());
}
state_.current_program = program;
LogClientServiceMapping("glUseProgram", program_id, service_id);
glUseProgram(service_id);
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UseProgram(state_.current_program.get());
if (workarounds().clear_uniforms_before_first_program_use)
program_manager()->ClearUniforms(program);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUseProgram(GLuint program_id) {
GLuint service_id = 0;
Program* program = NULL;
if (program_id) {
program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, "glUseProgram");
if (!program) {
return;
}
if (!program->IsValid()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glUseProgram", "program not linked");
return;
}
service_id = program->service_id();
}
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UnuseProgram(shader_manager(),
state_.current_program.get());
}
state_.current_program = program;
LogClientServiceMapping("glUseProgram", program_id, service_id);
glUseProgram(service_id);
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UseProgram(state_.current_program.get());
if (workarounds().clear_uniforms_before_first_program_use)
program_manager()->ClearUniforms(program);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
OutOfProcessProxy() {}
|
OutOfProcessProxy() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5822/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f81d000fdb5331121cba7ff81dfaaec25b520a5
|
2f81d000fdb5331121cba7ff81dfaaec25b520a5
|
When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
void SetFilterCallback(const FilterCallback& callback) {
callback_ = callback;
}
|
void SetFilterCallback(const FilterCallback& callback) {
callback_ = callback;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11399
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11399/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static inline int ape_decode_value_3900(APEContext *ctx, APERice *rice)
{
unsigned int x, overflow;
int tmpk;
overflow = range_get_symbol(ctx, counts_3970, counts_diff_3970);
if (overflow == (MODEL_ELEMENTS - 1)) {
tmpk = range_decode_bits(ctx, 5);
overflow = 0;
} else
tmpk = (rice->k < 1) ? 0 : rice->k - 1;
if (tmpk <= 16 || ctx->fileversion < 3910) {
if (tmpk > 23) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many bits: %d\n", tmpk);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
x = range_decode_bits(ctx, tmpk);
} else if (tmpk <= 31) {
x = range_decode_bits(ctx, 16);
x |= (range_decode_bits(ctx, tmpk - 16) << 16);
} else {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many bits: %d\n", tmpk);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
x += overflow << tmpk;
update_rice(rice, x);
/* Convert to signed */
return ((x >> 1) ^ ((x & 1) - 1)) + 1;
}
|
static inline int ape_decode_value_3900(APEContext *ctx, APERice *rice)
{
unsigned int x, overflow;
int tmpk;
overflow = range_get_symbol(ctx, counts_3970, counts_diff_3970);
if (overflow == (MODEL_ELEMENTS - 1)) {
tmpk = range_decode_bits(ctx, 5);
overflow = 0;
} else
tmpk = (rice->k < 1) ? 0 : rice->k - 1;
if (tmpk <= 16 || ctx->fileversion < 3910) {
if (tmpk > 23) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many bits: %d\n", tmpk);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
x = range_decode_bits(ctx, tmpk);
} else if (tmpk <= 31) {
x = range_decode_bits(ctx, 16);
x |= (range_decode_bits(ctx, tmpk - 16) << 16);
} else {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many bits: %d\n", tmpk);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
x += overflow << tmpk;
update_rice(rice, x);
/* Convert to signed */
return ((x >> 1) ^ ((x & 1) - 1)) + 1;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
[email protected]
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
PaletteTool::~PaletteTool() {}
|
PaletteTool::~PaletteTool() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4544
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4544/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=9878d173f574df74bde0ff50b2f81009fbee81bb
|
9878d173f574df74bde0ff50b2f81009fbee81bb
| null |
static int vmxnet3_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
if (s->msix_used) {
if (!vmxnet3_use_msix_vectors(s, VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS)) {
VMW_WRPRN("Failed to re-use MSI-X vectors");
msix_uninit(d, &s->msix_bar, &s->msix_bar);
s->msix_used = false;
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int vmxnet3_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
if (s->msix_used) {
if (!vmxnet3_use_msix_vectors(s, VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS)) {
VMW_WRPRN("Failed to re-use MSI-X vectors");
msix_uninit(d, &s->msix_bar, &s->msix_bar);
s->msix_used = false;
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int direct_pte_prefetch_many(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 *start, u64 *end)
{
struct page *pages[PTE_PREFETCH_NUM];
unsigned access = sp->role.access;
int i, ret;
gfn_t gfn;
gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, start - sp->spt);
if (!gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, gfn, access & ACC_WRITE_MASK))
return -1;
ret = gfn_to_page_many_atomic(vcpu->kvm, gfn, pages, end - start);
if (ret <= 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ret; i++, gfn++, start++)
mmu_set_spte(vcpu, start, access, 0, NULL,
sp->role.level, gfn, page_to_pfn(pages[i]),
true, true);
return 0;
}
|
static int direct_pte_prefetch_many(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 *start, u64 *end)
{
struct page *pages[PTE_PREFETCH_NUM];
unsigned access = sp->role.access;
int i, ret;
gfn_t gfn;
gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, start - sp->spt);
if (!gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, gfn, access & ACC_WRITE_MASK))
return -1;
ret = gfn_to_page_many_atomic(vcpu->kvm, gfn, pages, end - start);
if (ret <= 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ret; i++, gfn++, start++)
mmu_set_spte(vcpu, start, access, 0, NULL,
sp->role.level, gfn, page_to_pfn(pages[i]),
true, true);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10150/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
struct page *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
kvm_pfn_t pfn;
pfn = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(vcpu, gfn);
return kvm_pfn_to_page(pfn);
}
|
struct page *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
kvm_pfn_t pfn;
pfn = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(vcpu, gfn);
return kvm_pfn_to_page(pfn);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnSetRendererPrefs(
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs) {
std::string old_accept_languages = renderer_preferences_.accept_languages;
renderer_preferences_ = renderer_prefs;
renderer_preference_watchers_.ForAllPtrs(
[&renderer_prefs](mojom::RendererPreferenceWatcher* watcher) {
watcher->NotifyUpdate(renderer_prefs);
});
UpdateFontRenderingFromRendererPrefs();
UpdateThemePrefs();
blink::SetCaretBlinkInterval(renderer_prefs.caret_blink_interval);
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME)
if (renderer_prefs.use_custom_colors) {
blink::SetFocusRingColor(renderer_prefs.focus_ring_color);
if (webview()) {
webview()->SetSelectionColors(renderer_prefs.active_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.active_selection_fg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_fg_color);
webview()->ThemeChanged();
}
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME)
if (webview() &&
old_accept_languages != renderer_preferences_.accept_languages) {
webview()->AcceptLanguagesChanged();
}
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnSetRendererPrefs(
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs) {
std::string old_accept_languages = renderer_preferences_.accept_languages;
renderer_preferences_ = renderer_prefs;
renderer_preference_watchers_.ForAllPtrs(
[&renderer_prefs](mojom::RendererPreferenceWatcher* watcher) {
watcher->NotifyUpdate(renderer_prefs);
});
UpdateFontRenderingFromRendererPrefs();
UpdateThemePrefs();
blink::SetCaretBlinkInterval(renderer_prefs.caret_blink_interval);
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME)
if (renderer_prefs.use_custom_colors) {
blink::SetFocusRingColor(renderer_prefs.focus_ring_color);
if (webview()) {
webview()->SetSelectionColors(renderer_prefs.active_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.active_selection_fg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_fg_color);
webview()->ThemeChanged();
}
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME)
if (webview() &&
old_accept_languages != renderer_preferences_.accept_languages) {
webview()->AcceptLanguagesChanged();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2493
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2493/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0449641130f5652b344ef6fa39fa019d7e94660a
|
0449641130f5652b344ef6fa39fa019d7e94660a
|
ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
__releases(kernel_lock)
__acquires(kernel_lock)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
char *cp;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_mount_opt = 0;
sbi->s_resuid = EXT4_DEF_RESUID;
sbi->s_resgid = EXT4_DEF_RESGID;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
for (cp = sb->s_id; (cp = strchr(cp, '/'));)
*cp = '!';
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, "bsdgroups",
"2.6.38");
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
}
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
set_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY)
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid);
sbi->s_resgid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid);
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, NULL, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, NULL, 0))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
sb->s_dirt = 1;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
ret = err;
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data"
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc(db_count * sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (ext4_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
#endif
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
init_timer(&sbi->s_err_report);
sbi->s_err_report.function = print_daily_error_info;
sbi->s_err_report.data = (unsigned long) sb;
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
}
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_max_writeback_mb_bump = 128;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
else
sb->s_op = &ext4_nojournal_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
mutex_init(&sbi->s_resize_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER));
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_blocks_count(es) > 0xffffffffULL &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0, 0);
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else {
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
/*
* The journal may have updated the bg summary counts, so we
* need to update the global counters.
*/
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
no_journal:
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-dio-unwritten", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create DIO workqueue\n");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_alloc_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_EXTRA_ISIZE)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring delalloc option - "
"requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
if (sb->s_blocksize < PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - block size is too small");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
}
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb, needs_recovery);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount4;
sbi->s_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &ext4_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err) {
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
goto failed_mount4;
};
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount4:
iput(root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3:
del_timer(&sbi->s_err_report);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(sbi->s_flex_groups))
vfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
else
kfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return ret;
}
|
__releases(kernel_lock)
__acquires(kernel_lock)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
char *cp;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_mount_opt = 0;
sbi->s_resuid = EXT4_DEF_RESUID;
sbi->s_resgid = EXT4_DEF_RESGID;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
for (cp = sb->s_id; (cp = strchr(cp, '/'));)
*cp = '!';
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, "bsdgroups",
"2.6.38");
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
}
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
set_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY)
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid);
sbi->s_resgid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid);
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, NULL, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, NULL, 0))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
sb->s_dirt = 1;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
ret = err;
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data"
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc(db_count * sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (ext4_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
#endif
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
}
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_max_writeback_mb_bump = 128;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
else
sb->s_op = &ext4_nojournal_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
mutex_init(&sbi->s_resize_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER));
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_blocks_count(es) > 0xffffffffULL &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0, 0);
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else {
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
/*
* The journal may have updated the bg summary counts, so we
* need to update the global counters.
*/
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
no_journal:
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-dio-unwritten", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create DIO workqueue\n");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_alloc_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_EXTRA_ISIZE)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring delalloc option - "
"requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
if (sb->s_blocksize < PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - block size is too small");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
}
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb, needs_recovery);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount4;
sbi->s_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &ext4_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err) {
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
goto failed_mount4;
};
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
init_timer(&sbi->s_err_report);
sbi->s_err_report.function = print_daily_error_info;
sbi->s_err_report.data = (unsigned long) sb;
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount4:
iput(root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3:
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(sbi->s_flex_groups))
vfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
else
kfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::DisableAutomaticTextTrackSelection() {
should_perform_automatic_track_selection_ = false;
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::DisableAutomaticTextTrackSelection() {
should_perform_automatic_track_selection_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void DidChooseColorInColorChooser(SkColor color) {
client_->DidChooseColor(color);
}
|
void DidChooseColorInColorChooser(SkColor color) {
client_->DidChooseColor(color);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8866
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8866/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
|
de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
| null |
static xmlParserInputPtr _php_libxml_external_entity_loader(const char *URL,
const char *ID, xmlParserCtxtPtr context)
{
xmlParserInputPtr ret = NULL;
const char *resource = NULL;
zval *public = NULL,
*system = NULL,
*ctxzv = NULL,
**params[] = {&public, &system, &ctxzv},
*retval_ptr = NULL;
int retval;
zend_fcall_info *fci;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
fci = &LIBXML(entity_loader).fci;
if (fci->size == 0) {
/* no custom user-land callback set up; delegate to original loader */
return _php_libxml_default_entity_loader(URL, ID, context);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(public);
if (ID != NULL) {
ZVAL_STRING(public, ID, 1);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(system);
if (URL != NULL) {
ZVAL_STRING(system, URL, 1);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ctxzv);
array_init_size(ctxzv, 4);
#define ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(memb) \
if (context->memb == NULL) { \
add_assoc_null_ex(ctxzv, #memb, sizeof(#memb)); \
} else { \
add_assoc_string_ex(ctxzv, #memb, sizeof(#memb), \
(char *)context->memb, 1); \
}
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(directory)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(intSubName)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(extSubURI)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(extSubSystem)
#undef ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY
fci->retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
fci->params = params;
fci->param_count = sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params);
fci->no_separation = 1;
retval = zend_call_function(fci, &LIBXML(entity_loader).fcc TSRMLS_CC);
if (retval != SUCCESS || fci->retval_ptr_ptr == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Call to user entity loader callback '%s' has failed",
fci->function_name);
} else {
retval_ptr = *fci->retval_ptr_ptr;
if (retval_ptr == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Call to user entity loader callback '%s' has failed; "
"probably it has thrown an exception",
fci->function_name);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) == IS_STRING) {
is_string:
resource = Z_STRVAL_P(retval_ptr);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) == IS_RESOURCE) {
php_stream *stream;
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream, &retval_ptr);
if (stream == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"The user entity loader callback '%s' has returned a "
"resource, but it is not a stream",
fci->function_name);
} else {
/* TODO: allow storing the encoding in the stream context? */
xmlCharEncoding enc = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr pib = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (pib == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context, "Could not allocate parser "
"input buffer");
} else {
/* make stream not being closed when the zval is freed */
zend_list_addref(stream->rsrc_id);
pib->context = stream;
pib->readcallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_read;
pib->closecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_close;
ret = xmlNewIOInputStream(context, pib, enc);
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(pib);
}
}
}
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) != IS_NULL) {
/* retval not string nor resource nor null; convert to string */
SEPARATE_ZVAL(&retval_ptr);
convert_to_string(retval_ptr);
goto is_string;
} /* else is null; don't try anything */
}
if (ret == NULL) {
if (resource == NULL) {
if (ID == NULL) {
ID = "NULL";
}
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Failed to load external entity \"%s\"\n", ID);
} else {
/* we got the resource in the form of a string; open it */
ret = xmlNewInputFromFile(context, resource);
}
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&public);
zval_ptr_dtor(&system);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ctxzv);
if (retval_ptr != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
return ret;
}
|
static xmlParserInputPtr _php_libxml_external_entity_loader(const char *URL,
const char *ID, xmlParserCtxtPtr context)
{
xmlParserInputPtr ret = NULL;
const char *resource = NULL;
zval *public = NULL,
*system = NULL,
*ctxzv = NULL,
**params[] = {&public, &system, &ctxzv},
*retval_ptr = NULL;
int retval;
zend_fcall_info *fci;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
fci = &LIBXML(entity_loader).fci;
if (fci->size == 0) {
/* no custom user-land callback set up; delegate to original loader */
return _php_libxml_default_entity_loader(URL, ID, context);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(public);
if (ID != NULL) {
ZVAL_STRING(public, ID, 1);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(system);
if (URL != NULL) {
ZVAL_STRING(system, URL, 1);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ctxzv);
array_init_size(ctxzv, 4);
#define ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(memb) \
if (context->memb == NULL) { \
add_assoc_null_ex(ctxzv, #memb, sizeof(#memb)); \
} else { \
add_assoc_string_ex(ctxzv, #memb, sizeof(#memb), \
(char *)context->memb, 1); \
}
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(directory)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(intSubName)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(extSubURI)
ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY(extSubSystem)
#undef ADD_NULL_OR_STRING_KEY
fci->retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
fci->params = params;
fci->param_count = sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params);
fci->no_separation = 1;
retval = zend_call_function(fci, &LIBXML(entity_loader).fcc TSRMLS_CC);
if (retval != SUCCESS || fci->retval_ptr_ptr == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Call to user entity loader callback '%s' has failed",
fci->function_name);
} else {
retval_ptr = *fci->retval_ptr_ptr;
if (retval_ptr == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Call to user entity loader callback '%s' has failed; "
"probably it has thrown an exception",
fci->function_name);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) == IS_STRING) {
is_string:
resource = Z_STRVAL_P(retval_ptr);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) == IS_RESOURCE) {
php_stream *stream;
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream, &retval_ptr);
if (stream == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"The user entity loader callback '%s' has returned a "
"resource, but it is not a stream",
fci->function_name);
} else {
/* TODO: allow storing the encoding in the stream context? */
xmlCharEncoding enc = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr pib = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (pib == NULL) {
php_libxml_ctx_error(context, "Could not allocate parser "
"input buffer");
} else {
/* make stream not being closed when the zval is freed */
zend_list_addref(stream->rsrc_id);
pib->context = stream;
pib->readcallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_read;
pib->closecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_close;
ret = xmlNewIOInputStream(context, pib, enc);
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(pib);
}
}
}
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr) != IS_NULL) {
/* retval not string nor resource nor null; convert to string */
SEPARATE_ZVAL(&retval_ptr);
convert_to_string(retval_ptr);
goto is_string;
} /* else is null; don't try anything */
}
if (ret == NULL) {
if (resource == NULL) {
if (ID == NULL) {
ID = "NULL";
}
php_libxml_ctx_error(context,
"Failed to load external entity \"%s\"\n", ID);
} else {
/* we got the resource in the form of a string; open it */
ret = xmlNewInputFromFile(context, resource);
}
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&public);
zval_ptr_dtor(&system);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ctxzv);
if (retval_ptr != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16300/
|
CWE-674
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/af2cf04a9394c1a56227c2289ae8da262828294a
|
af2cf04a9394c1a56227c2289ae8da262828294a
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
|
bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len, const unsigned attr_set_level)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)
&& EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 3 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)
&& EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* The protocol encoding per se allows ATTR_SET to be nested as many times
* as the message can accommodate. This printer used to be able to recurse
* into ATTR_SET contents until the stack exhaustion, but now there is a
* limit on that (if live protocol exchange goes that many levels deep,
* something is probably wrong anyway). Feel free to refine this value if
* you can find the spec with respective normative text.
*/
if (attr_set_level == 10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(too many nested levels, not recursing)"));
else if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen, attr_set_level + 1))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
|
bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)
&& EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (tlen == BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 3 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)
&& EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18248
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18248/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apple/cups/commit/49fa4983f25b64ec29d548ffa3b9782426007df3
|
49fa4983f25b64ec29d548ffa3b9782426007df3
|
DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
|
cancel_job(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
ipp_attribute_t *uri) /* I - Job or Printer URI */
{
ipp_attribute_t *attr; /* Current attribute */
int jobid; /* Job ID */
char scheme[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Scheme portion of URI */
username[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Username portion of URI */
host[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Host portion of URI */
resource[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Resource portion of URI */
int port; /* Port portion of URI */
cupsd_job_t *job; /* Job information */
cups_ptype_t dtype; /* Destination type (printer/class) */
cupsd_printer_t *printer; /* Printer data */
cupsd_jobaction_t purge; /* Purge the job? */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "cancel_job(%p[%d], %s)", con,
con->number, uri->values[0].string.text);
/*
* See if we have a job URI or a printer URI...
*/
if (!strcmp(uri->name, "printer-uri"))
{
/*
* Got a printer URI; see if we also have a job-id attribute...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-id",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) == NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Got a printer-uri attribute but no job-id."));
return;
}
if ((jobid = attr->values[0].integer) == 0)
{
/*
* Find the current job on the specified printer...
*/
if (!cupsdValidateDest(uri->values[0].string.text, &dtype, &printer))
{
/*
* Bad URI...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_FOUND,
_("The printer or class does not exist."));
return;
}
/*
* See if there are any pending jobs...
*/
for (job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayFirst(ActiveJobs);
job;
job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayNext(ActiveJobs))
if (job->state_value <= IPP_JOB_PROCESSING &&
!_cups_strcasecmp(job->dest, printer->name))
break;
if (job)
jobid = job->id;
else
{
/*
* No, try stopped jobs...
*/
for (job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayFirst(ActiveJobs);
job;
job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayNext(ActiveJobs))
if (job->state_value == IPP_JOB_STOPPED &&
!_cups_strcasecmp(job->dest, printer->name))
break;
if (job)
jobid = job->id;
else
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("No active jobs on %s."),
printer->name);
return;
}
}
}
}
else
{
/*
* Got a job URI; parse it to get the job ID...
*/
httpSeparateURI(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, uri->values[0].string.text, scheme,
sizeof(scheme), username, sizeof(username), host,
sizeof(host), &port, resource, sizeof(resource));
if (strncmp(resource, "/jobs/", 6))
{
/*
* Not a valid URI!
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-uri \"%s\"."),
uri->values[0].string.text);
return;
}
jobid = atoi(resource + 6);
}
/*
* Look for the "purge-job" attribute...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "purge-job",
IPP_TAG_BOOLEAN)) != NULL)
purge = attr->values[0].boolean ? CUPSD_JOB_PURGE : CUPSD_JOB_DEFAULT;
else
purge = CUPSD_JOB_DEFAULT;
/*
* See if the job exists...
*/
if ((job = cupsdFindJob(jobid)) == NULL)
{
/*
* Nope - return a "not found" error...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_FOUND, _("Job #%d does not exist."), jobid);
return;
}
/*
* See if the job is owned by the requesting user...
*/
if (!validate_user(job, con, job->username, username, sizeof(username)))
{
send_http_error(con, con->username[0] ? HTTP_FORBIDDEN : HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED,
cupsdFindDest(job->dest));
return;
}
/*
* See if the job is already completed, canceled, or aborted; if so,
* we can't cancel...
*/
if (job->state_value >= IPP_JOB_CANCELED && purge != CUPSD_JOB_PURGE)
{
switch (job->state_value)
{
case IPP_JOB_CANCELED :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already canceled - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
case IPP_JOB_ABORTED :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already aborted - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
default :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already completed - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
}
return;
}
/*
* Cancel the job and return...
*/
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_CANCELED, purge,
purge == CUPSD_JOB_PURGE ? "Job purged by \"%s\"" :
"Job canceled by \"%s\"",
username);
cupsdCheckJobs();
if (purge == CUPSD_JOB_PURGE)
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "[Job %d] Purged by \"%s\".", jobid,
username);
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "[Job %d] Canceled by \"%s\".", jobid,
username);
con->response->request.status.status_code = IPP_OK;
}
|
cancel_job(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
ipp_attribute_t *uri) /* I - Job or Printer URI */
{
ipp_attribute_t *attr; /* Current attribute */
int jobid; /* Job ID */
char scheme[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Scheme portion of URI */
username[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Username portion of URI */
host[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Host portion of URI */
resource[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Resource portion of URI */
int port; /* Port portion of URI */
cupsd_job_t *job; /* Job information */
cups_ptype_t dtype; /* Destination type (printer/class) */
cupsd_printer_t *printer; /* Printer data */
cupsd_jobaction_t purge; /* Purge the job? */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "cancel_job(%p[%d], %s)", con,
con->number, uri->values[0].string.text);
/*
* See if we have a job URI or a printer URI...
*/
if (!strcmp(uri->name, "printer-uri"))
{
/*
* Got a printer URI; see if we also have a job-id attribute...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-id",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) == NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Got a printer-uri attribute but no job-id."));
return;
}
if ((jobid = attr->values[0].integer) == 0)
{
/*
* Find the current job on the specified printer...
*/
if (!cupsdValidateDest(uri->values[0].string.text, &dtype, &printer))
{
/*
* Bad URI...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_FOUND,
_("The printer or class does not exist."));
return;
}
/*
* See if there are any pending jobs...
*/
for (job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayFirst(ActiveJobs);
job;
job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayNext(ActiveJobs))
if (job->state_value <= IPP_JOB_PROCESSING &&
!_cups_strcasecmp(job->dest, printer->name))
break;
if (job)
jobid = job->id;
else
{
/*
* No, try stopped jobs...
*/
for (job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayFirst(ActiveJobs);
job;
job = (cupsd_job_t *)cupsArrayNext(ActiveJobs))
if (job->state_value == IPP_JOB_STOPPED &&
!_cups_strcasecmp(job->dest, printer->name))
break;
if (job)
jobid = job->id;
else
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("No active jobs on %s."),
printer->name);
return;
}
}
}
}
else
{
/*
* Got a job URI; parse it to get the job ID...
*/
httpSeparateURI(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, uri->values[0].string.text, scheme,
sizeof(scheme), username, sizeof(username), host,
sizeof(host), &port, resource, sizeof(resource));
if (strncmp(resource, "/jobs/", 6))
{
/*
* Not a valid URI!
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-uri \"%s\"."),
uri->values[0].string.text);
return;
}
jobid = atoi(resource + 6);
}
/*
* Look for the "purge-job" attribute...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "purge-job",
IPP_TAG_BOOLEAN)) != NULL)
purge = attr->values[0].boolean ? CUPSD_JOB_PURGE : CUPSD_JOB_DEFAULT;
else
purge = CUPSD_JOB_DEFAULT;
/*
* See if the job exists...
*/
if ((job = cupsdFindJob(jobid)) == NULL)
{
/*
* Nope - return a "not found" error...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_FOUND, _("Job #%d does not exist."), jobid);
return;
}
/*
* See if the job is owned by the requesting user...
*/
if (!validate_user(job, con, job->username, username, sizeof(username)))
{
send_http_error(con, con->username[0] ? HTTP_FORBIDDEN : HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED,
cupsdFindDest(job->dest));
return;
}
/*
* See if the job is already completed, canceled, or aborted; if so,
* we can't cancel...
*/
if (job->state_value >= IPP_JOB_CANCELED && purge != CUPSD_JOB_PURGE)
{
switch (job->state_value)
{
case IPP_JOB_CANCELED :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already canceled - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
case IPP_JOB_ABORTED :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already aborted - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
default :
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Job #%d is already completed - can\'t cancel."),
jobid);
break;
}
return;
}
/*
* Cancel the job and return...
*/
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_CANCELED, purge,
purge == CUPSD_JOB_PURGE ? "Job purged by \"%s\"" :
"Job canceled by \"%s\"",
username);
cupsdCheckJobs();
if (purge == CUPSD_JOB_PURGE)
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "[Job %d] Purged by \"%s\".", jobid,
username);
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "[Job %d] Canceled by \"%s\".", jobid,
username);
con->response->request.status.status_code = IPP_OK;
}
|
C
|
cups
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18339/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
[scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
|
bool RendererSchedulerImpl::ShouldPrioritizeInputEvent(
const blink::WebInputEvent& web_input_event) {
if ((web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown ||
web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseMove) &&
(web_input_event.GetModifiers() &
blink::WebInputEvent::kLeftButtonDown)) {
return true;
}
if (blink::WebInputEvent::IsMouseEventType(web_input_event.GetType()) ||
blink::WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(web_input_event.GetType())) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool RendererSchedulerImpl::ShouldPrioritizeInputEvent(
const blink::WebInputEvent& web_input_event) {
if ((web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown ||
web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseMove) &&
(web_input_event.GetModifiers() &
blink::WebInputEvent::kLeftButtonDown)) {
return true;
}
if (blink::WebInputEvent::IsMouseEventType(web_input_event.GetType()) ||
blink::WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(web_input_event.GetType())) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void DocumentLoader::addAllArchiveResources(Archive* archive)
{
if (!m_archiveResourceCollection)
m_archiveResourceCollection = adoptPtr(new ArchiveResourceCollection);
ASSERT(archive);
if (!archive)
return;
m_archiveResourceCollection->addAllResources(archive);
}
|
void DocumentLoader::addAllArchiveResources(Archive* archive)
{
if (!m_archiveResourceCollection)
m_archiveResourceCollection = adoptPtr(new ArchiveResourceCollection);
ASSERT(archive);
if (!archive)
return;
m_archiveResourceCollection->addAllResources(archive);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6123
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6123/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a261ea1c56ef16fc0fc4af1e440feb302d577716
|
a261ea1c56ef16fc0fc4af1e440feb302d577716
|
Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
|
FileReaderLoader::~FileReaderLoader() {
Cleanup();
UnadjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8();
}
|
FileReaderLoader::~FileReaderLoader() {
Cleanup();
UnadjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __init xfrm_user_init(void)
{
int rv;
printk(KERN_INFO "Initializing XFRM netlink socket\n");
rv = register_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
rv = xfrm_register_km(&netlink_mgr);
if (rv < 0)
unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
return rv;
}
|
static int __init xfrm_user_init(void)
{
int rv;
printk(KERN_INFO "Initializing XFRM netlink socket\n");
rv = register_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
rv = xfrm_register_km(&netlink_mgr);
if (rv < 0)
unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
return rv;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0228
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0228/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
643f0fcf3b8ab09a68f0ecd2aa37aafeda3e63ef
|
*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static int lua_ap_add_input_filter(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *filterName;
ap_filter_rec_t *filter;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
filterName = lua_tostring(L, 2);
filter = ap_get_input_filter_handle(filterName);
if (filter) {
ap_add_input_filter_handle(filter, NULL, r, r->connection);
lua_pushboolean(L, 1);
} else
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return 1;
}
|
static int lua_ap_add_input_filter(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *filterName;
ap_filter_rec_t *filter;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
filterName = lua_tostring(L, 2);
filter = ap_get_input_filter_handle(filterName);
if (filter) {
ap_add_input_filter_handle(filter, NULL, r, r->connection);
lua_pushboolean(L, 1);
} else
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17805/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e
|
ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e
|
crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - (walk.nbytes % 64));
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % 64);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
return err;
}
|
static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes))
{
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes);
return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - (walk.nbytes % 64));
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % 64);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
Avoid excessive nesting / recursion in browser URL handling.
BUG=31517
TEST=ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/525038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35585 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::Add(int renderer_id) {
AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (security_state_.count(renderer_id) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Add renderers at most once.";
return;
}
security_state_[renderer_id] = new SecurityState();
}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::Add(int renderer_id) {
AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (security_state_.count(renderer_id) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Add renderers at most once.";
return;
}
security_state_[renderer_id] = new SecurityState();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnAccessibilityLocationChanges(
const std::vector<AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams>& params) {
if (accessibility_reset_token_)
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView());
if (view && is_active()) {
AccessibilityMode accessibility_mode = delegate_->GetAccessibilityMode();
if (accessibility_mode.has_mode(AccessibilityMode::kNativeAPIs)) {
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
GetOrCreateBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnLocationChanges(params);
}
std::vector<AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails> details;
details.reserve(params.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.size(); ++i) {
const AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams& param = params[i];
AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails detail;
detail.id = param.id;
detail.ax_tree_id = GetAXTreeID();
detail.new_location = param.new_location;
details.push_back(detail);
}
delegate_->AccessibilityLocationChangesReceived(details);
}
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnAccessibilityLocationChanges(
const std::vector<AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams>& params) {
if (accessibility_reset_token_)
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView());
if (view && is_active()) {
AccessibilityMode accessibility_mode = delegate_->GetAccessibilityMode();
if (accessibility_mode.has_mode(AccessibilityMode::kNativeAPIs)) {
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
GetOrCreateBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnLocationChanges(params);
}
std::vector<AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails> details;
details.reserve(params.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.size(); ++i) {
const AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams& param = params[i];
AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails detail;
detail.id = param.id;
detail.ax_tree_id = GetAXTreeID();
detail.new_location = param.new_location;
details.push_back(detail);
}
delegate_->AccessibilityLocationChangesReceived(details);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5130/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
xmlBufWriteCHAR(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar *string) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error))
return(-1);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)
return(-1);
return(xmlBufCat(buf, string));
}
|
xmlBufWriteCHAR(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar *string) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error))
return(-1);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)
return(-1);
return(xmlBufCat(buf, string));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3091/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
cc7cde43832b547cdab856fe1bedc9514ca38e13
|
Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnVersionChange(int32 thread_id,
int32 database_id,
const string16& newVersion) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_id, CurrentWorkerId());
WebIDBDatabaseCallbacks* callbacks =
pending_database_callbacks_.Lookup(database_id);
if (!callbacks)
return;
callbacks->onVersionChange(newVersion);
}
|
void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnVersionChange(int32 thread_id,
int32 database_id,
const string16& newVersion) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_id, CurrentWorkerId());
WebIDBDatabaseCallbacks* callbacks =
pending_database_callbacks_.Lookup(database_id);
if (!callbacks)
return;
callbacks->onVersionChange(newVersion);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
Split infobars.{cc,h} into separate pieces for the different classes defined within, so that each piece is shorter and clearer.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6250057
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73235 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AfterTranslateInfoBar::OriginalLanguageChanged() {
UpdateLanguageButtonText(LanguagesMenuModel::ORIGINAL);
}
|
void AfterTranslateInfoBar::OriginalLanguageChanged() {
UpdateLanguageButtonText(LanguagesMenuModel::ORIGINAL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __inline__ void isdn_net_dec_frame_cnt(isdn_net_local *lp)
{
atomic_dec(&lp->frame_cnt);
if (!(isdn_net_device_busy(lp))) {
if (!skb_queue_empty(&lp->super_tx_queue)) {
schedule_work(&lp->tqueue);
} else {
isdn_net_device_wake_queue(lp);
}
}
}
|
static __inline__ void isdn_net_dec_frame_cnt(isdn_net_local *lp)
{
atomic_dec(&lp->frame_cnt);
if (!(isdn_net_device_busy(lp))) {
if (!skb_queue_empty(&lp->super_tx_queue)) {
schedule_work(&lp->tqueue);
} else {
isdn_net_device_wake_queue(lp);
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8816/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void usb_queue_reset_device(struct usb_interface *iface)
{
if (schedule_work(&iface->reset_ws))
usb_get_intf(iface);
}
|
void usb_queue_reset_device(struct usb_interface *iface)
{
if (schedule_work(&iface->reset_ws))
usb_get_intf(iface);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
void mehd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free(s);
}
|
void mehd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free(s);
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4119
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY QueryContextAttributesW(PCtxtHandle phContext, ULONG ulAttribute, void* pBuffer)
{
SEC_CHAR* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableW* table;
Name = (SEC_CHAR*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableWByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->QueryContextAttributesW == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->QueryContextAttributesW(phContext, ulAttribute, pBuffer);
return status;
}
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY QueryContextAttributesW(PCtxtHandle phContext, ULONG ulAttribute, void* pBuffer)
{
SEC_CHAR* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableW* table;
Name = (SEC_CHAR*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableWByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->QueryContextAttributesW == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->QueryContextAttributesW(phContext, ulAttribute, pBuffer);
return status;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
|
static void pmcraid_ioa_shutdown_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
unsigned long lock_flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
pmcraid_ioa_reset(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
}
|
static void pmcraid_ioa_shutdown_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
unsigned long lock_flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
pmcraid_ioa_reset(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
bool MockContentSettingsClient::allowImage(bool enabled_per_settings,
const blink::WebURL& image_url) {
bool allowed = enabled_per_settings && flags_->images_allowed();
if (flags_->dump_web_content_settings_client_callbacks() && delegate_) {
delegate_->PrintMessage(
std::string("MockContentSettingsClient: allowImage(") +
NormalizeLayoutTestURL(image_url.string().utf8()) +
"): " + (allowed ? "true" : "false") + "\n");
}
return allowed;
}
|
bool MockContentSettingsClient::allowImage(bool enabled_per_settings,
const blink::WebURL& image_url) {
bool allowed = enabled_per_settings && flags_->images_allowed();
if (flags_->dump_web_content_settings_client_callbacks() && delegate_) {
delegate_->PrintMessage(
std::string("MockContentSettingsClient: allowImage(") +
NormalizeLayoutTestURL(image_url.string().utf8()) +
"): " + (allowed ? "true" : "false") + "\n");
}
return allowed;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2059/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/libidn.git/commit/?id=2e97c279
|
2e97c2796581c27213962c77f5a8571a598f9a2e
| null |
g_unicode_canonical_ordering (gunichar * string, gsize len)
{
gsize i;
int swap = 1;
while (swap)
{
int last;
swap = 0;
last = COMBINING_CLASS (string[0]);
for (i = 0; i < len - 1; ++i)
{
int next = COMBINING_CLASS (string[i + 1]);
if (next != 0 && last > next)
{
gsize j;
/* Percolate item leftward through string. */
for (j = i + 1; j > 0; --j)
{
gunichar t;
if (COMBINING_CLASS (string[j - 1]) <= next)
break;
t = string[j];
string[j] = string[j - 1];
string[j - 1] = t;
swap = 1;
}
/* We're re-entering the loop looking at the old
character again. */
next = last;
}
last = next;
}
}
}
|
g_unicode_canonical_ordering (gunichar * string, gsize len)
{
gsize i;
int swap = 1;
while (swap)
{
int last;
swap = 0;
last = COMBINING_CLASS (string[0]);
for (i = 0; i < len - 1; ++i)
{
int next = COMBINING_CLASS (string[i + 1]);
if (next != 0 && last > next)
{
gsize j;
/* Percolate item leftward through string. */
for (j = i + 1; j > 0; --j)
{
gunichar t;
if (COMBINING_CLASS (string[j - 1]) <= next)
break;
t = string[j];
string[j] = string[j - 1];
string[j - 1] = t;
swap = 1;
}
/* We're re-entering the loop looking at the old
character again. */
next = last;
}
last = next;
}
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static const struct exception_table_entry *search_dbe_tables(unsigned long addr)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
e = search_extable(__start___dbe_table, __stop___dbe_table - 1, addr);
if (!e)
e = search_module_dbetables(addr);
return e;
}
|
static const struct exception_table_entry *search_dbe_tables(unsigned long addr)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
e = search_extable(__start___dbe_table, __stop___dbe_table - 1, addr);
if (!e)
e = search_module_dbetables(addr);
return e;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void atl2_write_pci_cfg(struct atl2_hw *hw, u32 reg, u16 *value)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = hw->back;
pci_write_config_word(adapter->pdev, reg, *value);
}
|
static void atl2_write_pci_cfg(struct atl2_hw *hw, u32 reg, u16 *value)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = hw->back;
pci_write_config_word(adapter->pdev, reg, *value);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/364fb6e517fc4fbc8196a4afba4f77b3d5300c3e
|
364fb6e517fc4fbc8196a4afba4f77b3d5300c3e
|
Add InputMethodObserver support into InputMethodBase
This is a preparation CL to fix issue 164964.
Following observer callbacks are defined but not yet
supported by ui::InputMethodBase and its sub classes.
- InputMethodObserver::OnCaretBoundsChanged
- InputMethodObserver::OnInputLocaleChanged
This CL makes these callbacks functional for each
sub class of ui::InputMethodBase.
BUG=164964
TEST=ui_unittests --gtest_filter=InputMethodBaseTest.*
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/48393003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@231563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
InputMethodBase::InputMethodBase()
: delegate_(NULL),
text_input_client_(NULL),
is_sticky_text_input_client_(false),
system_toplevel_window_focused_(false) {
}
|
InputMethodBase::InputMethodBase()
: delegate_(NULL),
text_input_client_(NULL),
is_sticky_text_input_client_(false),
system_toplevel_window_focused_(false) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6836/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
|
fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
| null |
static inline size_t vmxnet3_ring_curr_cell_idx(Vmxnet3Ring *ring)
{
return ring->next;
}
|
static inline size_t vmxnet3_ring_curr_cell_idx(Vmxnet3Ring *ring)
{
return ring->next;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4653
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4653/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fd9f26e4eca5d08a27d12c0933fceef76ed9663d
|
fd9f26e4eca5d08a27d12c0933fceef76ed9663d
|
ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
|
int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < kcontrol->count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4127/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5
|
dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5
|
vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void vhost_net_exit(void)
{
misc_deregister(&vhost_net_misc);
}
|
static void vhost_net_exit(void)
{
misc_deregister(&vhost_net_misc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err hnti_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err hnti_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0885/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f335421145bb7f82c60fb9d61babcd6ce2e4b21e
|
f335421145bb7f82c60fb9d61babcd6ce2e4b21e
|
Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Extension::LoadThemeFeatures(string16* error) {
if (!manifest_->HasKey(keys::kTheme))
return true;
DictionaryValue* theme_value = NULL;
if (!manifest_->GetDictionary(keys::kTheme, &theme_value)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidTheme);
return false;
}
if (!LoadThemeImages(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeColors(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeTints(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeDisplayProperties(theme_value, error))
return false;
return true;
}
|
bool Extension::LoadThemeFeatures(string16* error) {
if (!manifest_->HasKey(keys::kTheme))
return true;
DictionaryValue* theme_value = NULL;
if (!manifest_->GetDictionary(keys::kTheme, &theme_value)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidTheme);
return false;
}
if (!LoadThemeImages(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeColors(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeTints(theme_value, error))
return false;
if (!LoadThemeDisplayProperties(theme_value, error))
return false;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static void bmpw_convert_row_4(const iw_byte *srcrow, iw_byte *dstrow, int width)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<width;i++) {
if(i%2==0)
dstrow[i/2] = srcrow[i]<<4;
else
dstrow[i/2] |= srcrow[i];
}
}
|
static void bmpw_convert_row_4(const iw_byte *srcrow, iw_byte *dstrow, int width)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<width;i++) {
if(i%2==0)
dstrow[i/2] = srcrow[i]<<4;
else
dstrow[i/2] |= srcrow[i];
}
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
AXObject* AXLayoutObject::remoteSVGElementHitTest(const IntPoint& point) const {
AXObject* remote = remoteSVGRootElement();
if (!remote)
return 0;
IntSize offset =
point - roundedIntPoint(getBoundsInFrameCoordinates().location());
return remote->accessibilityHitTest(IntPoint(offset));
}
|
AXObject* AXLayoutObject::remoteSVGElementHitTest(const IntPoint& point) const {
AXObject* remote = remoteSVGRootElement();
if (!remote)
return 0;
IntSize offset =
point - roundedIntPoint(getBoundsInFrameCoordinates().location());
return remote->accessibilityHitTest(IntPoint(offset));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
const config_section_node_t *config_section_next(const config_section_node_t *node) {
assert(node != NULL);
return (const config_section_node_t *)list_next((const list_node_t *)node);
}
|
const config_section_node_t *config_section_next(const config_section_node_t *node) {
assert(node != NULL);
return (const config_section_node_t *)list_next((const list_node_t *)node);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripModel::NotifyIfTabDeactivated(TabContents* contents) {
if (contents) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDeactivated(contents));
}
}
|
void TabStripModel::NotifyIfTabDeactivated(TabContents* contents) {
if (contents) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDeactivated(contents));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16932/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
xmlReadDoc(const xmlChar * cur, const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
if (cur == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlInitParser();
ctxt = xmlCreateDocParserCtxt(cur);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 0));
}
|
xmlReadDoc(const xmlChar * cur, const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
if (cur == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlInitParser();
ctxt = xmlCreateDocParserCtxt(cur);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 0));
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
Make Surface creation lazy for OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl
This CL shifts the SurfaceFactory pointer and SurfaceFactoryClient implementation
from OffscreenCanvasSurfaceImpl to OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl to
facilitate resource handling after compositor frame is submitted. As a result,
surface on browser is lazily created (only happened on the first commit()).
BUG=563852
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2333133003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418402}
|
void CanvasSurfaceLayerBridge::satisfyCallback(const cc::SurfaceSequence& sequence)
{
m_client->asyncSatisfy(sequence);
}
|
void CanvasSurfaceLayerBridge::satisfyCallback(const cc::SurfaceSequence& sequence)
{
m_client->asyncSatisfy(sequence);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2383
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2383/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a1b14d27ed0965838350f1377ff97c93ee383492
|
a1b14d27ed0965838350f1377ff97c93ee383492
|
bpf: fix branch offset adjustment on backjumps after patching ctx expansion
When ctx access is used, the kernel often needs to expand/rewrite
instructions, so after that patching, branch offsets have to be
adjusted for both forward and backward jumps in the new eBPF program,
but for backward jumps it fails to account the delta. Meaning, for
example, if the expansion happens exactly on the insn that sits at
the jump target, it doesn't fix up the back jump offset.
Analysis on what the check in adjust_branches() is currently doing:
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
insn->off -= delta;
First condition (forward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[1] <--- i/insn
insns[2] <--- pos insns[P] <--- pos
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- target_X insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- target_X
insns[5]
First case is if we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was
before pos. This is handeled correctly. I.e. if i == pos, then this
would mean our jump that we currently check was the patchlet itself
that we just injected. Since such patchlets are self-contained and
have no awareness of any insns before or after the patched one, the
delta is correctly not adjusted. Also, for the second condition in
case of i + insn->off + 1 == pos, means we jump to that newly patched
instruction, so no offset adjustment are needed. That part is correct.
Second condition (backward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- target_X insns[1] <--- target_X
insns[2] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[P] <--- pos <-- target_Y
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- i/insn
insns[5]
Second interesting case is where we cross pos-boundary and the jump
instruction was after pos. Backward jump with i == pos would be
impossible and pose a bug somewhere in the patchlet, so the first
condition checking i > pos is okay only by itself. However, i +
insn->off + 1 < pos does not always work as intended to trigger the
adjustment. It works when jump targets would be far off where the
delta wouldn't matter. But, for example, where the fixed insn->off
before pointed to pos (target_Y), it now points to pos + delta, so
that additional room needs to be taken into account for the check.
This means that i) both tests here need to be adjusted into pos + delta,
and ii) for the second condition, the test needs to be <= as pos
itself can be a target in the backjump, too.
Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env,
int regno, int access_size)
{
struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK)
return -EACCES;
off = regs[regno].imm;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size <= 0) {
verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env,
int regno, int access_size)
{
struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK)
return -EACCES;
off = regs[regno].imm;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size <= 0) {
verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3615/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=ab9509cceabef28071e41bdfa073083859c949a7
|
ab9509cceabef28071e41bdfa073083859c949a7
| null |
static void interface_set_compression_level(QXLInstance *sin, int level)
{
dprint(1, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, sin->id);
/* nothing to do */
}
|
static void interface_set_compression_level(QXLInstance *sin, int level)
{
dprint(1, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, sin->id);
/* nothing to do */
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3885/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
|
ushort CLASS get2()
{
uchar str[2] = { 0xff,0xff };
fread (str, 1, 2, ifp);
return sget2(str);
}
|
ushort CLASS get2()
{
uchar str[2] = { 0xff,0xff };
fread (str, 1, 2, ifp);
return sget2(str);
}
|
C
|
rawstudio
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17407/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/TeX-Live/texlive-source/commit/6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
static void cs_fail(const char *cs_name, int subr, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char buf[SMALL_BUF_SIZE];
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsprintf(buf, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (cs_name == NULL)
pdftex_fail("Subr (%i): %s", (int) subr, buf);
else
pdftex_fail("CharString (/%s): %s", cs_name, buf);
}
|
static void cs_fail(const char *cs_name, int subr, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char buf[SMALL_BUF_SIZE];
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsprintf(buf, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (cs_name == NULL)
pdftex_fail("Subr (%i): %s", (int) subr, buf);
else
pdftex_fail("CharString (/%s): %s", cs_name, buf);
}
|
C
|
texlive-source
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11523
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11523/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/83e0f8ffd7eeb7661b0ff83257da23d24ca7f078
|
83e0f8ffd7eeb7661b0ff83257da23d24ca7f078
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/591
|
static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
text[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
PixelInfo
pixel;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) type,exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
alpha,
black,
blue,
green,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
black=0.0;
alpha=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&alpha);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
black*=0.01*range;
alpha*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.black=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (black+0.5),
range);
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (alpha+0.5),
range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
text[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
PixelInfo
pixel;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) type,exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
alpha,
black,
blue,
green,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
black=0.0;
alpha=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&alpha);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
black*=0.01*range;
alpha*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.black=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (black+0.5),
range);
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (alpha+0.5),
range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static inline void enqueue_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
update_rq_clock(rq);
if (!(flags & ENQUEUE_RESTORE))
sched_info_queued(rq, p);
p->sched_class->enqueue_task(rq, p, flags);
}
|
static inline void enqueue_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
update_rq_clock(rq);
if (!(flags & ENQUEUE_RESTORE))
sched_info_queued(rq, p);
p->sched_class->enqueue_task(rq, p, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17178/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/akallabeth/FreeRDP/commit/fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
int region16_n_rects(const REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
assert(region->data);
return region->data->nbRects;
}
|
int region16_n_rects(const REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
assert(region->data);
return region->data->nbRects;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1874/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
{
int i, rc;
int lenp, seqno = 0;
struct cond_node *cur;
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EFAULT;
lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (len != lenp)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
!!values[i],
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
if (values[i])
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
else
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
}
for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
seqno = ++latest_granting;
rc = 0;
out:
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
if (!rc) {
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
}
return rc;
}
|
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
{
int i, rc;
int lenp, seqno = 0;
struct cond_node *cur;
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EFAULT;
lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (len != lenp)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
!!values[i],
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
if (values[i])
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
else
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
}
for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
seqno = ++latest_granting;
rc = 0;
out:
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
if (!rc) {
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3920/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/6d0249be2275fd4086783f259f4e2c54722a7c55
|
6d0249be2275fd4086783f259f4e2c54722a7c55
|
better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
|
const uint8_t *ID3::Iterator::getData(size_t *length) const {
*length = 0;
if (mFrameData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength()) {
return NULL;
}
*length = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength();
return mFrameData;
}
|
const uint8_t *ID3::Iterator::getData(size_t *length) const {
*length = 0;
if (mFrameData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength()) {
return NULL;
}
*length = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength();
return mFrameData;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18710
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18710/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e4f3aa2e1e67bb48dfbaaf1cad59013d5a5bc276
|
e4f3aa2e1e67bb48dfbaaf1cad59013d5a5bc276
|
cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static int dvd_read_manufact(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, dvd_struct *s,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
int ret = 0, size;
u_char *buf;
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
size = sizeof(s->manufact.value) + 4;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
init_cdrom_command(cgc, buf, size, CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_DVD_STRUCTURE;
cgc->cmd[7] = s->type;
cgc->cmd[8] = size >> 8;
cgc->cmd[9] = size & 0xff;
ret = cdo->generic_packet(cdi, cgc);
if (ret)
goto out;
s->manufact.len = buf[0] << 8 | buf[1];
if (s->manufact.len < 0) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d)\n",
s->manufact.len);
ret = -EIO;
} else {
if (s->manufact.len > 2048) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d): truncating to 2048\n",
s->manufact.len);
s->manufact.len = 2048;
}
memcpy(s->manufact.value, &buf[4], s->manufact.len);
}
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
|
static int dvd_read_manufact(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, dvd_struct *s,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
int ret = 0, size;
u_char *buf;
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
size = sizeof(s->manufact.value) + 4;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
init_cdrom_command(cgc, buf, size, CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_DVD_STRUCTURE;
cgc->cmd[7] = s->type;
cgc->cmd[8] = size >> 8;
cgc->cmd[9] = size & 0xff;
ret = cdo->generic_packet(cdi, cgc);
if (ret)
goto out;
s->manufact.len = buf[0] << 8 | buf[1];
if (s->manufact.len < 0) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d)\n",
s->manufact.len);
ret = -EIO;
} else {
if (s->manufact.len > 2048) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d): truncating to 2048\n",
s->manufact.len);
s->manufact.len = 2048;
}
memcpy(s->manufact.value, &buf[4], s->manufact.len);
}
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateDetailsContainer() {
details_container_ = new DetailsContainerView(
base::Bind(&AutofillDialogViews::DetailsContainerBoundsChanged,
base::Unretained(this)));
details_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
for (DetailGroupMap::iterator iter = detail_groups_.begin();
iter != detail_groups_.end(); ++iter) {
CreateDetailsSection(iter->second.section);
details_container_->AddChildView(iter->second.container);
}
return details_container_;
}
|
views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateDetailsContainer() {
details_container_ = new DetailsContainerView(
base::Bind(&AutofillDialogViews::DetailsContainerBoundsChanged,
base::Unretained(this)));
details_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
for (DetailGroupMap::iterator iter = detail_groups_.begin();
iter != detail_groups_.end(); ++iter) {
CreateDetailsSection(iter->second.section);
details_container_->AddChildView(iter->second.container);
}
return details_container_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetMHTMLGenerationManager() {
return g_browser_process->mhtml_generation_manager();
}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetMHTMLGenerationManager() {
return g_browser_process->mhtml_generation_manager();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
PannerNode* BaseAudioContext::createPanner(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
return PannerNode::Create(*this, exception_state);
}
|
PannerNode* BaseAudioContext::createPanner(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
return PannerNode::Create(*this, exception_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2038/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/263b4509ec4d47e0da3e753f85a39ea12d1eff24
|
263b4509ec4d47e0da3e753f85a39ea12d1eff24
|
nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
void nfs_pageio_init_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,
struct inode *inode, int ioflags,
const struct nfs_pgio_completion_ops *compl_ops)
{
nfs_pageio_init(pgio, inode, &nfs_pageio_write_ops, compl_ops,
NFS_SERVER(inode)->wsize, ioflags);
}
|
void nfs_pageio_init_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,
struct inode *inode, int ioflags,
const struct nfs_pgio_completion_ops *compl_ops)
{
nfs_pageio_init(pgio, inode, &nfs_pageio_write_ops, compl_ops,
NFS_SERVER(inode)->wsize, ioflags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f883f2b12f68fed993671dce7fb5fb91f2229aa
|
8f883f2b12f68fed993671dce7fb5fb91f2229aa
|
Add more non client Windows messages to the list of messages not being sent to the renderer.
Turns out we get WM_NCLBUTTONDOWN/UP messages at times which go to the renderer and are not acked causing the
unresponsive renderer dialog to show up in Desktop Chrome Aura.
BUG=335248
[email protected]
TBR=jam
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141103004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@245949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent");
if ((event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_END) && !ShouldSendPinchGesture()) {
event->SetHandled();
return;
}
if (touch_editing_client_ && touch_editing_client_->HandleInputEvent(event))
return;
RenderViewHostDelegate* delegate = NULL;
if (popup_type_ == blink::WebPopupTypeNone && !is_fullscreen_)
delegate = RenderViewHost::From(host_)->GetDelegate();
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureBegin();
}
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture = MakeWebGestureEvent(event);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN) {
blink::WebGestureEvent fling_cancel = gesture;
fling_cancel.type = blink::WebInputEvent::GestureFlingCancel;
fling_cancel.sourceDevice = blink::WebGestureEvent::Touchscreen;
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(fling_cancel);
}
if (gesture.type != blink::WebInputEvent::Undefined) {
host_->ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(gesture, *event->latency());
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END) {
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScroll"));
} else if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START) {
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScrollFling"));
}
}
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_END &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureEnd();
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent");
if ((event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_END) && !ShouldSendPinchGesture()) {
event->SetHandled();
return;
}
if (touch_editing_client_ && touch_editing_client_->HandleInputEvent(event))
return;
RenderViewHostDelegate* delegate = NULL;
if (popup_type_ == blink::WebPopupTypeNone && !is_fullscreen_)
delegate = RenderViewHost::From(host_)->GetDelegate();
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureBegin();
}
blink::WebGestureEvent gesture = MakeWebGestureEvent(event);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN) {
blink::WebGestureEvent fling_cancel = gesture;
fling_cancel.type = blink::WebInputEvent::GestureFlingCancel;
fling_cancel.sourceDevice = blink::WebGestureEvent::Touchscreen;
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(fling_cancel);
}
if (gesture.type != blink::WebInputEvent::Undefined) {
host_->ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(gesture, *event->latency());
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END) {
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScroll"));
} else if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START) {
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScrollFling"));
}
}
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_END &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureEnd();
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2301/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b2cf3f064b8f5efef89bb084521b61318c71781b
|
b2cf3f064b8f5efef89bb084521b61318c71781b
| null |
static void phar_mung_server_vars(char *fname, char *entry, int entry_len, char *basename, int request_uri_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *_SERVER;
zval **stuff;
char *path_info;
int basename_len = strlen(basename);
int code;
zval *temp;
/* "tweak" $_SERVER variables requested in earlier call to Phar::mungServer() */
if (!PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]) {
return;
}
_SERVER = Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]);
/* PATH_INFO and PATH_TRANSLATED should always be munged */
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PATH_INFO", sizeof("PATH_INFO"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > entry_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), entry, entry_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + entry_len, request_uri_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PATH_INFO", sizeof("PHAR_PATH_INFO"), &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PATH_TRANSLATED", sizeof("PATH_TRANSLATED"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) = spprintf(&(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff)), 4096, "phar://%s%s", fname, entry);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PATH_TRANSLATED", sizeof("PHAR_PATH_TRANSLATED"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
if (!PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_REQUEST_URI) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "REQUEST_URI", sizeof("REQUEST_URI"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > basename_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), basename, basename_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + basename_len, Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) - basename_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_REQUEST_URI", sizeof("PHAR_REQUEST_URI"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_PHP_SELF) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHP_SELF"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > basename_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), basename, basename_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + basename_len, Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) - basename_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHAR_PHP_SELF"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_NAME) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, entry, entry_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("PHAR_SCRIPT_NAME"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_FILENAME) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) = spprintf(&(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff)), 4096, "phar://%s%s", fname, entry);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("PHAR_SCRIPT_FILENAME"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
|
static void phar_mung_server_vars(char *fname, char *entry, int entry_len, char *basename, int request_uri_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *_SERVER;
zval **stuff;
char *path_info;
int basename_len = strlen(basename);
int code;
zval *temp;
/* "tweak" $_SERVER variables requested in earlier call to Phar::mungServer() */
if (!PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]) {
return;
}
_SERVER = Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]);
/* PATH_INFO and PATH_TRANSLATED should always be munged */
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PATH_INFO", sizeof("PATH_INFO"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > entry_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), entry, entry_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + entry_len, request_uri_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PATH_INFO", sizeof("PHAR_PATH_INFO"), &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PATH_TRANSLATED", sizeof("PATH_TRANSLATED"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) = spprintf(&(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff)), 4096, "phar://%s%s", fname, entry);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PATH_TRANSLATED", sizeof("PHAR_PATH_TRANSLATED"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
if (!PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_REQUEST_URI) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "REQUEST_URI", sizeof("REQUEST_URI"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > basename_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), basename, basename_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + basename_len, Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) - basename_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_REQUEST_URI", sizeof("PHAR_REQUEST_URI"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_PHP_SELF) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHP_SELF"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) > basename_len && !memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff), basename, basename_len)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff) + basename_len, Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) - basename_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHAR_PHP_SELF"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_NAME) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*stuff, entry, entry_len, 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("PHAR_SCRIPT_NAME"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list & PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_FILENAME) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_SERVER, "SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME"), (void **) &stuff)) {
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff);
code = Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff);
Z_STRLEN_PP(stuff) = spprintf(&(Z_STRVAL_PP(stuff)), 4096, "phar://%s%s", fname, entry);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(temp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(temp, path_info, code, 0);
zend_hash_update(_SERVER, "PHAR_SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("PHAR_SCRIPT_FILENAME"), (void *) &temp, sizeof(zval **), NULL);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14166/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71
|
fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71
|
Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
|
atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
if (char_cnt == 0)
return (0);
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
|
atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::UpdateCommandsForTabState() {
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
TabContentsWrapper* current_tab_wrapper = GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
if (!current_tab || !current_tab_wrapper) // May be NULL during tab restore.
return;
NavigationController& nc = current_tab->controller();
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_BACK, nc.CanGoBack());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FORWARD, nc.CanGoForward());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD,
CanReloadContents(current_tab));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE,
CanReloadContents(current_tab));
bool non_app_window = !(type() & TYPE_APP);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB,
non_app_window && CanDuplicateContentsAt(active_index()));
window_->SetStarredState(current_tab_wrapper->is_starred());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_VIEW_SOURCE,
current_tab->controller().CanViewSource());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION,
current_tab->ShouldDisplayURL() && current_tab->GetURL().is_valid());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = nc.GetActiveEntry();
bool is_chrome_internal = (active_entry ?
active_entry->url().SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) : false);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ENCODING_MENU,
!is_chrome_internal && SavePackage::IsSavableContents(
current_tab->contents_mime_type()));
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS,
web_app::IsValidUrl(current_tab->GetURL()));
#endif
UpdateCommandsForContentRestrictionState();
UpdateCommandsForBookmarkEditing();
}
|
void Browser::UpdateCommandsForTabState() {
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
TabContentsWrapper* current_tab_wrapper = GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
if (!current_tab || !current_tab_wrapper) // May be NULL during tab restore.
return;
NavigationController& nc = current_tab->controller();
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_BACK, nc.CanGoBack());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FORWARD, nc.CanGoForward());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD,
CanReloadContents(current_tab));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE,
CanReloadContents(current_tab));
bool non_app_window = !(type() & TYPE_APP);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB,
non_app_window && CanDuplicateContentsAt(active_index()));
window_->SetStarredState(current_tab_wrapper->is_starred());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_VIEW_SOURCE,
current_tab->controller().CanViewSource());
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION,
current_tab->ShouldDisplayURL() && current_tab->GetURL().is_valid());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = nc.GetActiveEntry();
bool is_chrome_internal = (active_entry ?
active_entry->url().SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) : false);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ENCODING_MENU,
!is_chrome_internal && SavePackage::IsSavableContents(
current_tab->contents_mime_type()));
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS,
web_app::IsValidUrl(current_tab->GetURL()));
#endif
UpdateCommandsForContentRestrictionState();
UpdateCommandsForBookmarkEditing();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10911
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10911/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/089bc0143f489bd3a4578bdff5f4ca68fb26f341
|
089bc0143f489bd3a4578bdff5f4ca68fb26f341
|
xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
|
static int xen_blkbk_parse_indirect(struct blkif_request *req,
struct pending_req *pending_req,
struct seg_buf seg[],
struct phys_req *preq)
{
struct grant_page **pages = pending_req->indirect_pages;
struct xen_blkif_ring *ring = pending_req->ring;
int indirect_grefs, rc, n, nseg, i;
struct blkif_request_segment *segments = NULL;
nseg = pending_req->nr_segs;
indirect_grefs = INDIRECT_PAGES(nseg);
BUG_ON(indirect_grefs > BLKIF_MAX_INDIRECT_PAGES_PER_REQUEST);
for (i = 0; i < indirect_grefs; i++)
pages[i]->gref = req->u.indirect.indirect_grefs[i];
rc = xen_blkbk_map(ring, pages, indirect_grefs, true);
if (rc)
goto unmap;
for (n = 0, i = 0; n < nseg; n++) {
uint8_t first_sect, last_sect;
if ((n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME) == 0) {
/* Map indirect segments */
if (segments)
kunmap_atomic(segments);
segments = kmap_atomic(pages[n/SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME]->page);
}
i = n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME;
pending_req->segments[n]->gref = segments[i].gref;
first_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].first_sect);
last_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].last_sect);
if (last_sect >= (XEN_PAGE_SIZE >> 9) || last_sect < first_sect) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto unmap;
}
seg[n].nsec = last_sect - first_sect + 1;
seg[n].offset = first_sect << 9;
preq->nr_sects += seg[n].nsec;
}
unmap:
if (segments)
kunmap_atomic(segments);
xen_blkbk_unmap(ring, pages, indirect_grefs);
return rc;
}
|
static int xen_blkbk_parse_indirect(struct blkif_request *req,
struct pending_req *pending_req,
struct seg_buf seg[],
struct phys_req *preq)
{
struct grant_page **pages = pending_req->indirect_pages;
struct xen_blkif_ring *ring = pending_req->ring;
int indirect_grefs, rc, n, nseg, i;
struct blkif_request_segment *segments = NULL;
nseg = pending_req->nr_segs;
indirect_grefs = INDIRECT_PAGES(nseg);
BUG_ON(indirect_grefs > BLKIF_MAX_INDIRECT_PAGES_PER_REQUEST);
for (i = 0; i < indirect_grefs; i++)
pages[i]->gref = req->u.indirect.indirect_grefs[i];
rc = xen_blkbk_map(ring, pages, indirect_grefs, true);
if (rc)
goto unmap;
for (n = 0, i = 0; n < nseg; n++) {
uint8_t first_sect, last_sect;
if ((n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME) == 0) {
/* Map indirect segments */
if (segments)
kunmap_atomic(segments);
segments = kmap_atomic(pages[n/SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME]->page);
}
i = n % SEGS_PER_INDIRECT_FRAME;
pending_req->segments[n]->gref = segments[i].gref;
first_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].first_sect);
last_sect = READ_ONCE(segments[i].last_sect);
if (last_sect >= (XEN_PAGE_SIZE >> 9) || last_sect < first_sect) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto unmap;
}
seg[n].nsec = last_sect - first_sect + 1;
seg[n].offset = first_sect << 9;
preq->nr_sects += seg[n].nsec;
}
unmap:
if (segments)
kunmap_atomic(segments);
xen_blkbk_unmap(ring, pages, indirect_grefs);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0812/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
|
static size_t adev_get_input_buffer_size(const struct audio_hw_device *dev,
const struct audio_config *config)
{
(void)dev;
/* NOTE: we default to built in mic which may cause a mismatch between what we
* report here and the actual buffer size
*/
return get_input_buffer_size(config->sample_rate,
config->format,
audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(config->channel_mask),
PCM_CAPTURE /* usecase_type */,
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BUILTIN_MIC);
}
|
static size_t adev_get_input_buffer_size(const struct audio_hw_device *dev,
const struct audio_config *config)
{
(void)dev;
/* NOTE: we default to built in mic which may cause a mismatch between what we
* report here and the actual buffer size
*/
return get_input_buffer_size(config->sample_rate,
config->format,
audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(config->channel_mask),
PCM_CAPTURE /* usecase_type */,
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BUILTIN_MIC);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
123e68f88fd0ed4f7447ba81148f9b619b947c47
|
Clipboard: Opt out of PNG Encoding filters.
Set the PNG encoder's FilterFlag to kNone from the default kAll.
The clipboard should prefer faster encode time over encode size for image/png,
so set all clipboard image decoding to skip testing of different PNG encoding
filters, which takes a lot of time for not too much compression ratio benefit
in the common case.
Benchmarking with a random-pixel 8k by 4k px image
(https://www.photopea.com/clipboard_img.html), and fZLibLevel = 1, here's some
encode times (seconds) varying flags:
* kNone: 2.98 (trials: 3.00814, 2.98265, 2.99636, 2.9877, 2.96517, 2.99467)
* kSub: 3.03 (trials: 3.02345, 3.04085, 3.00886, 3.0587, 3.03992, 3.02549)
* kAll: 4.12 (trials: 4.12813, 4.12552, 4.08524, 4.13283, 4.15013, 4.11719)
Using kNone would save ~28% encode time over the current kAll.
This will be most visible for pasting of extremely large photos.
Bug: 1004867
Change-Id: I37a848498da425249e57171ae2ca3f0595c6b793
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1827953
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#700598}
|
DataObjectItem* DataObjectItem::CreateFromHTML(const String& html,
const KURL& base_url) {
DataObjectItem* item =
MakeGarbageCollected<DataObjectItem>(kStringKind, kMimeTypeTextHTML);
item->data_ = html;
item->base_url_ = base_url;
return item;
}
|
DataObjectItem* DataObjectItem::CreateFromHTML(const String& html,
const KURL& base_url) {
DataObjectItem* item =
MakeGarbageCollected<DataObjectItem>(kStringKind, kMimeTypeTextHTML);
item->data_ = html;
item->base_url_ = base_url;
return item;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18358/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
DataReductionProxyInterceptorWithServerTest()
: scoped_task_environment_(
base::test::ScopedTaskEnvironment::MainThreadType::IO),
context_(true) {
context_.set_network_delegate(&network_delegate_);
}
|
DataReductionProxyInterceptorWithServerTest()
: scoped_task_environment_(
base::test::ScopedTaskEnvironment::MainThreadType::IO),
context_(true) {
context_.set_network_delegate(&network_delegate_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
CSSStyleSheet* Document::elementSheet()
{
if (!m_elemSheet)
m_elemSheet = CSSStyleSheet::createInline(this, m_baseURL);
return m_elemSheet.get();
}
|
CSSStyleSheet* Document::elementSheet()
{
if (!m_elemSheet)
m_elemSheet = CSSStyleSheet::createInline(this, m_baseURL);
return m_elemSheet.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1563
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1563/
|
CWE-311
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=631f94db0065c78181ca9ba5546ebc8bb3884b97
|
631f94db0065c78181ca9ba5546ebc8bb3884b97
| null |
int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
switch (ri->type) {
case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(cms, ri);
case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK:
return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(cms, ri);
case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0);
default:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT,
CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE);
return 0;
}
}
|
int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
switch (ri->type) {
case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(cms, ri);
case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK:
return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(cms, ri);
case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0);
default:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT,
CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE);
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8130/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
_TIFFmemcpy(tdata_t d, const tdata_t s, tsize_t c)
{
memcpy(d, s, (size_t) c);
}
|
_TIFFmemcpy(tdata_t d, const tdata_t s, tsize_t c)
{
memcpy(d, s, (size_t) c);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.