CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2015-6779
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6779/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1eefa26e1795192c5a347a1e1e7a99e88c47f9c4
|
1eefa26e1795192c5a347a1e1e7a99e88c47f9c4
|
This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
|
void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::PepperInstanceCreated() {
ProcessManager* const process_manager = ProcessManager::Get(browser_context_);
const Extension* const extension =
process_manager->GetExtensionForWebContents(web_contents());
if (extension)
process_manager->IncrementLazyKeepaliveCount(extension);
}
|
void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::PepperInstanceCreated() {
ProcessManager* const process_manager = ProcessManager::Get(browser_context_);
const Extension* const extension =
process_manager->GetExtensionForWebContents(web_contents());
if (extension)
process_manager->IncrementLazyKeepaliveCount(extension);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void __cpuinit init_idle_bootup_task(struct task_struct *idle)
{
idle->sched_class = &idle_sched_class;
}
|
void __cpuinit init_idle_bootup_task(struct task_struct *idle)
{
idle->sched_class = &idle_sched_class;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12818/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58bdd544e2933a21a51eecf17c3f5f94038261b5
|
58bdd544e2933a21a51eecf17c3f5f94038261b5
|
net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void nfc_llcp_recv_ui(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock;
struct nfc_llcp_ui_cb *ui_cb;
u8 dsap, ssap;
dsap = nfc_llcp_dsap(skb);
ssap = nfc_llcp_ssap(skb);
ui_cb = nfc_llcp_ui_skb_cb(skb);
ui_cb->dsap = dsap;
ui_cb->ssap = ssap;
pr_debug("%d %d\n", dsap, ssap);
/* We're looking for a bound socket, not a client one */
llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock_get(local, dsap, LLCP_SAP_SDP);
if (llcp_sock == NULL || llcp_sock->sk.sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
return;
/* There is no sequence with UI frames */
skb_pull(skb, LLCP_HEADER_SIZE);
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(&llcp_sock->sk, skb)) {
/*
* UI frames will be freed from the socket layer, so we
* need to keep them alive until someone receives them.
*/
skb_get(skb);
} else {
pr_err("Receive queue is full\n");
}
nfc_llcp_sock_put(llcp_sock);
}
|
static void nfc_llcp_recv_ui(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock;
struct nfc_llcp_ui_cb *ui_cb;
u8 dsap, ssap;
dsap = nfc_llcp_dsap(skb);
ssap = nfc_llcp_ssap(skb);
ui_cb = nfc_llcp_ui_skb_cb(skb);
ui_cb->dsap = dsap;
ui_cb->ssap = ssap;
pr_debug("%d %d\n", dsap, ssap);
/* We're looking for a bound socket, not a client one */
llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock_get(local, dsap, LLCP_SAP_SDP);
if (llcp_sock == NULL || llcp_sock->sk.sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
return;
/* There is no sequence with UI frames */
skb_pull(skb, LLCP_HEADER_SIZE);
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(&llcp_sock->sk, skb)) {
/*
* UI frames will be freed from the socket layer, so we
* need to keep them alive until someone receives them.
*/
skb_get(skb);
} else {
pr_err("Receive queue is full\n");
}
nfc_llcp_sock_put(llcp_sock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13454
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13454/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/4f31d78716ac94c85c244efcea368fea202e2ed4
|
4f31d78716ac94c85c244efcea368fea202e2ed4
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
|
static inline void CompositeCanvas(Image *destination,
const CompositeOperator compose, Image *source,ssize_t x_offset,
ssize_t y_offset )
{
x_offset+=source->page.x-destination->page.x;
y_offset+=source->page.y-destination->page.y;
(void) CompositeImage(destination,compose,source,x_offset,y_offset);
}
|
static inline void CompositeCanvas(Image *destination,
const CompositeOperator compose, Image *source,ssize_t x_offset,
ssize_t y_offset )
{
x_offset+=source->page.x-destination->page.x;
y_offset+=source->page.y-destination->page.y;
(void) CompositeImage(destination,compose,source,x_offset,y_offset);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16541/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
|
241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
| null |
gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL &&
gx_device_is_null(i_ctx_p->pgs->device)) {
/* if the job replaced the device with the nulldevice, we we need to grestore
away that device, so the block below can properly dispense
with the default device.
*/
int code = gs_grestoreall(i_ctx_p->pgs);
if (code < 0) return_error(gs_error_Fatal);
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
|
gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4539/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=dccda88f27a084bcbbb30198ace12b4e7ae961cc
|
dccda88f27a084bcbbb30198ace12b4e7ae961cc
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(utf8_encode)
{
char *arg;
XML_Char *encoded;
int arg_len, len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &arg, &arg_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
encoded = xml_utf8_encode(arg, arg_len, &len, "ISO-8859-1");
if (encoded == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(encoded, len, 0);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(utf8_encode)
{
char *arg;
XML_Char *encoded;
int arg_len, len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &arg, &arg_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
encoded = xml_utf8_encode(arg, arg_len, &len, "ISO-8859-1");
if (encoded == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(encoded, len, 0);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9756/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
unsigned *max_size, unsigned size,
bool write, bool fetch,
enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
bool usable;
ulong la;
u32 lim;
u16 sel;
la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea;
*max_size = 0;
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
*linear = la;
if (is_noncanonical_address(la))
goto bad;
*max_size = min_t(u64, ~0u, (1ull << 48) - la);
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
break;
default:
*linear = la = (u32)la;
usable = ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, NULL,
addr.seg);
if (!usable)
goto bad;
/* code segment in protected mode or read-only data segment */
if ((((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) && (desc.type & 8))
|| !(desc.type & 2)) && write)
goto bad;
/* unreadable code segment */
if (!fetch && (desc.type & 8) && !(desc.type & 2))
goto bad;
lim = desc_limit_scaled(&desc);
if (!(desc.type & 8) && (desc.type & 4)) {
/* expand-down segment */
if (addr.ea <= lim)
goto bad;
lim = desc.d ? 0xffffffff : 0xffff;
}
if (addr.ea > lim)
goto bad;
if (lim == 0xffffffff)
*max_size = ~0u;
else {
*max_size = (u64)lim + 1 - addr.ea;
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
}
break;
}
if (insn_aligned(ctxt, size) && ((la & (size - 1)) != 0))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
bad:
if (addr.seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
return emulate_ss(ctxt, 0);
else
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
|
static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
unsigned *max_size, unsigned size,
bool write, bool fetch,
enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
bool usable;
ulong la;
u32 lim;
u16 sel;
la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea;
*max_size = 0;
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
*linear = la;
if (is_noncanonical_address(la))
goto bad;
*max_size = min_t(u64, ~0u, (1ull << 48) - la);
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
break;
default:
*linear = la = (u32)la;
usable = ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, NULL,
addr.seg);
if (!usable)
goto bad;
/* code segment in protected mode or read-only data segment */
if ((((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) && (desc.type & 8))
|| !(desc.type & 2)) && write)
goto bad;
/* unreadable code segment */
if (!fetch && (desc.type & 8) && !(desc.type & 2))
goto bad;
lim = desc_limit_scaled(&desc);
if (!(desc.type & 8) && (desc.type & 4)) {
/* expand-down segment */
if (addr.ea <= lim)
goto bad;
lim = desc.d ? 0xffffffff : 0xffff;
}
if (addr.ea > lim)
goto bad;
if (lim == 0xffffffff)
*max_size = ~0u;
else {
*max_size = (u64)lim + 1 - addr.ea;
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
}
break;
}
if (insn_aligned(ctxt, size) && ((la & (size - 1)) != 0))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
bad:
if (addr.seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
return emulate_ss(ctxt, 0);
else
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b96dd532af164a73f2aac757bafff58211aca2c
|
6b96dd532af164a73f2aac757bafff58211aca2c
|
Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
|
ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::GetJavaScriptDialogManager(
WebContents* source) {
return app_modal::JavaScriptDialogManager::GetInstance();
}
|
ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::GetJavaScriptDialogManager(
WebContents* source) {
return app_modal::JavaScriptDialogManager::GetInstance();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXObject::lastKnownIsIgnoredValue() {
if (m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue == DefaultBehavior)
m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue =
accessibilityIsIgnored() ? IgnoreObject : IncludeObject;
return m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue == IgnoreObject;
}
|
bool AXObject::lastKnownIsIgnoredValue() {
if (m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue == DefaultBehavior)
m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue =
accessibilityIsIgnored() ? IgnoreObject : IncludeObject;
return m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue == IgnoreObject;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-1000251
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000251/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe
|
f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe
|
Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
|
static inline int l2cap_conless_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __le16 psm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
sk = l2cap_get_sock_by_psm(0, psm, conn->src);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("sk %p, len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu < skb->len)
goto drop;
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto done;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
done:
if (sk)
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
|
static inline int l2cap_conless_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __le16 psm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
sk = l2cap_get_sock_by_psm(0, psm, conn->src);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("sk %p, len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu < skb->len)
goto drop;
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto done;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
done:
if (sk)
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14230
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14230/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
|
int parseentry_cb(int type, struct dlistsax_data *d)
{
struct parseentry_rock *rock = (struct parseentry_rock *)d->rock;
switch(type) {
case DLISTSAX_KVLISTSTART:
if (!strcmp(buf_cstring(&d->kbuf), "A")) {
rock->doingacl = 1;
}
break;
case DLISTSAX_KVLISTEND:
rock->doingacl = 0;
break;
case DLISTSAX_STRING:
if (rock->doingacl) {
buf_append(rock->aclbuf, &d->kbuf);
buf_putc(rock->aclbuf, '\t');
buf_append(rock->aclbuf, &d->buf);
buf_putc(rock->aclbuf, '\t');
}
else {
const char *key = buf_cstring(&d->kbuf);
if (!strcmp(key, "F")) {
rock->mbentry->foldermodseq = atoll(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "I")) {
rock->mbentry->uniqueid = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "M")) {
rock->mbentry->mtime = atoi(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "P")) {
rock->mbentry->partition = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "S")) {
rock->mbentry->server = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "T")) {
rock->mbentry->mbtype = mboxlist_string_to_mbtype(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "V")) {
rock->mbentry->uidvalidity = atol(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
int parseentry_cb(int type, struct dlistsax_data *d)
{
struct parseentry_rock *rock = (struct parseentry_rock *)d->rock;
switch(type) {
case DLISTSAX_KVLISTSTART:
if (!strcmp(buf_cstring(&d->kbuf), "A")) {
rock->doingacl = 1;
}
break;
case DLISTSAX_KVLISTEND:
rock->doingacl = 0;
break;
case DLISTSAX_STRING:
if (rock->doingacl) {
buf_append(rock->aclbuf, &d->kbuf);
buf_putc(rock->aclbuf, '\t');
buf_append(rock->aclbuf, &d->buf);
buf_putc(rock->aclbuf, '\t');
}
else {
const char *key = buf_cstring(&d->kbuf);
if (!strcmp(key, "F")) {
rock->mbentry->foldermodseq = atoll(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "I")) {
rock->mbentry->uniqueid = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "M")) {
rock->mbentry->mtime = atoi(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "P")) {
rock->mbentry->partition = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "S")) {
rock->mbentry->server = buf_newcstring(&d->buf);
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "T")) {
rock->mbentry->mbtype = mboxlist_string_to_mbtype(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "V")) {
rock->mbentry->uidvalidity = atol(buf_cstring(&d->buf));
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
cyrus-imapd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
XineramaXvShmPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvShmPutImageReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw, *gc, *port;
Bool send_event;
Bool isRoot;
int result, i, x, y;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvShmPutImageReq);
send_event = stuff->send_event;
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &gc, stuff->gc,
XRT_GC, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
isRoot = (draw->type == XRT_WINDOW) && draw->u.win.root;
x = stuff->drw_x;
y = stuff->drw_y;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
stuff->gc = gc->info[i].id;
stuff->drw_x = x;
stuff->drw_y = y;
if (isRoot) {
stuff->drw_x -= screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
stuff->drw_y -= screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
}
stuff->send_event = (send_event && !i) ? 1 : 0;
result = ProcXvShmPutImage(client);
}
}
return result;
}
|
XineramaXvShmPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvShmPutImageReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw, *gc, *port;
Bool send_event = stuff->send_event;
Bool isRoot;
int result, i, x, y;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvShmPutImageReq);
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &gc, stuff->gc,
XRT_GC, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
isRoot = (draw->type == XRT_WINDOW) && draw->u.win.root;
x = stuff->drw_x;
y = stuff->drw_y;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
stuff->gc = gc->info[i].id;
stuff->drw_x = x;
stuff->drw_y = y;
if (isRoot) {
stuff->drw_x -= screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
stuff->drw_y -= screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
}
stuff->send_event = (send_event && !i) ? 1 : 0;
result = ProcXvShmPutImage(client);
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 1 |
CVE-2017-14222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14222/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
|
9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
|
avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_read_vpcc(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
int version, color_range, color_primaries, color_trc, color_space;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams - 1];
if (atom.size < 5) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Empty VP Codec Configuration box\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
version = avio_r8(pb);
if (version != 1) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported VP Codec Configuration box version %d\n", version);
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 3); /* flags */
avio_skip(pb, 2); /* profile + level */
color_range = avio_r8(pb); /* bitDepth, chromaSubsampling, videoFullRangeFlag */
color_primaries = avio_r8(pb);
color_trc = avio_r8(pb);
color_space = avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_rb16(pb)) /* codecIntializationDataSize */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!av_color_primaries_name(color_primaries))
color_primaries = AVCOL_PRI_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!av_color_transfer_name(color_trc))
color_trc = AVCOL_TRC_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!av_color_space_name(color_space))
color_space = AVCOL_SPC_UNSPECIFIED;
st->codecpar->color_range = (color_range & 1) ? AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG : AVCOL_RANGE_MPEG;
st->codecpar->color_primaries = color_primaries;
st->codecpar->color_trc = color_trc;
st->codecpar->color_space = color_space;
return 0;
}
|
static int mov_read_vpcc(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
int version, color_range, color_primaries, color_trc, color_space;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams - 1];
if (atom.size < 5) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Empty VP Codec Configuration box\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
version = avio_r8(pb);
if (version != 1) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported VP Codec Configuration box version %d\n", version);
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 3); /* flags */
avio_skip(pb, 2); /* profile + level */
color_range = avio_r8(pb); /* bitDepth, chromaSubsampling, videoFullRangeFlag */
color_primaries = avio_r8(pb);
color_trc = avio_r8(pb);
color_space = avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_rb16(pb)) /* codecIntializationDataSize */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!av_color_primaries_name(color_primaries))
color_primaries = AVCOL_PRI_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!av_color_transfer_name(color_trc))
color_trc = AVCOL_TRC_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!av_color_space_name(color_space))
color_space = AVCOL_SPC_UNSPECIFIED;
st->codecpar->color_range = (color_range & 1) ? AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG : AVCOL_RANGE_MPEG;
st->codecpar->color_primaries = color_primaries;
st->codecpar->color_trc = color_trc;
st->codecpar->color_space = color_space;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6761/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
FrameLoader& DocumentLoader::GetFrameLoader() const {
DCHECK(frame_);
return frame_->Loader();
}
|
FrameLoader& DocumentLoader::GetFrameLoader() const {
DCHECK(frame_);
return frame_->Loader();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetHasReceivedUserGesture() {
if (GetFrame())
GetFrame()->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGesture();
}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetHasReceivedUserGesture() {
if (GetFrame())
GetFrame()->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGesture();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
get_pixel(png_uint_32 format))(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
/* The color-map flag is irrelevant here - the caller of the function
* returned must either pass the buffer or, for a color-mapped image, the
* correct entry in the color-map.
*/
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_abgr16;
else
# endif
return gp_bgra16;
}
else
return gp_bgr16;
}
else
# endif
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_argb16;
else
# endif
return gp_rgba16;
}
else
return gp_rgb16;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_ag16;
else
# endif
return gp_ga16;
}
else
return gp_g16;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_abgr8;
else
# endif
return gp_bgra8;
}
else
return gp_bgr8;
}
else
# endif
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_argb8;
else
# endif
return gp_rgba8;
}
else
return gp_rgb8;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_ag8;
else
# endif
return gp_ga8;
}
else
return gp_g8;
}
}
}
|
get_pixel(png_uint_32 format))(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
/* The color-map flag is irrelevant here - the caller of the function
* returned must either pass the buffer or, for a color-mapped image, the
* correct entry in the color-map.
*/
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_abgr16;
else
# endif
return gp_bgra16;
}
else
return gp_bgr16;
}
else
# endif
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_argb16;
else
# endif
return gp_rgba16;
}
else
return gp_rgb16;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_ag16;
else
# endif
return gp_ga16;
}
else
return gp_g16;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR)
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_abgr8;
else
# endif
return gp_bgra8;
}
else
return gp_bgr8;
}
else
# endif
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_argb8;
else
# endif
return gp_rgba8;
}
else
return gp_rgb8;
}
}
else
{
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
return gp_ag8;
else
# endif
return gp_ga8;
}
else
return gp_g8;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::NewPage() {
if (abort_printing_)
return CANCEL;
DCHECK(in_print_job_);
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#ifndef NDEBUG
++page_number_;
#endif
return FAILED;
}
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::NewPage() {
if (abort_printing_)
return CANCEL;
DCHECK(in_print_job_);
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#ifndef NDEBUG
++page_number_;
#endif
return FAILED;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1624/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7716418a27d561ee295a99f11fd3865580748de2
|
7716418a27d561ee295a99f11fd3865580748de2
|
Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
|
BrotliResult BrotliDecompressBufferStreaming(size_t* available_in,
const uint8_t** next_in,
int finish,
size_t* available_out,
uint8_t** next_out,
size_t* total_out,
BrotliState* s) {
BrotliResult result = BrotliDecompressStream(available_in, next_in,
available_out, next_out, total_out, s);
if (finish && result == BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT) {
result = BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
return result;
}
|
BrotliResult BrotliDecompressBufferStreaming(size_t* available_in,
const uint8_t** next_in,
int finish,
size_t* available_out,
uint8_t** next_out,
size_t* total_out,
BrotliState* s) {
BrotliResult result = BrotliDecompressStream(available_in, next_in,
available_out, next_out, total_out, s);
if (finish && result == BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT) {
result = BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0143
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0143/
|
CWE-190
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
|
8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
| null |
static void bdrv_dev_change_media_cb(BlockDriverState *bs, bool load)
{
if (bs->dev_ops && bs->dev_ops->change_media_cb) {
bool tray_was_closed = !bdrv_dev_is_tray_open(bs);
bs->dev_ops->change_media_cb(bs->dev_opaque, load);
if (tray_was_closed) {
/* tray open */
bdrv_emit_qmp_eject_event(bs, true);
}
if (load) {
/* tray close */
bdrv_emit_qmp_eject_event(bs, false);
}
}
}
|
static void bdrv_dev_change_media_cb(BlockDriverState *bs, bool load)
{
if (bs->dev_ops && bs->dev_ops->change_media_cb) {
bool tray_was_closed = !bdrv_dev_is_tray_open(bs);
bs->dev_ops->change_media_cb(bs->dev_opaque, load);
if (tray_was_closed) {
/* tray open */
bdrv_emit_qmp_eject_event(bs, true);
}
if (load) {
/* tray close */
bdrv_emit_qmp_eject_event(bs, false);
}
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
base::FilePath WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperPath(
const char* sub_dir,
const wallpaper::WallpaperFilesId& wallpaper_files_id,
const std::string& file) {
base::FilePath custom_wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(sub_dir);
return custom_wallpaper_path.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id()).Append(file);
}
|
base::FilePath WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperPath(
const char* sub_dir,
const wallpaper::WallpaperFilesId& wallpaper_files_id,
const std::string& file) {
base::FilePath custom_wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(sub_dir);
return custom_wallpaper_path.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id()).Append(file);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0879/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string ProfileDependencyManager::DumpGraphvizDependency() {
std::string result("digraph {\n");
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*> components;
std::copy(all_components_.begin(),
all_components_.end(),
std::back_inserter(components));
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::iterator components_end =
components.end();
result.append(" /* Dependencies */\n");
for (EdgeMap::const_iterator it = edges_.begin(); it != edges_.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(it->second->name());
result.append(" -> ");
result.append(it->first->name());
result.append(";\n");
components_end = std::remove(components.begin(), components_end,
it->second);
}
components.erase(components_end, components.end());
result.append("\n /* Toplevel attachments */\n");
for (std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::const_iterator it =
components.begin(); it != components.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append((*it)->name());
result.append(" -> Profile;\n");
}
result.append("\n /* Toplevel profile */\n");
result.append(" Profile [shape=box];\n");
result.append("}\n");
return result;
}
|
std::string ProfileDependencyManager::DumpGraphvizDependency() {
std::string result("digraph {\n");
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*> components;
std::copy(all_components_.begin(),
all_components_.end(),
std::back_inserter(components));
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::iterator components_end =
components.end();
result.append(" /* Dependencies */\n");
for (EdgeMap::const_iterator it = edges_.begin(); it != edges_.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(it->second->name());
result.append(" -> ");
result.append(it->first->name());
result.append(";\n");
components_end = std::remove(components.begin(), components_end,
it->second);
}
components.erase(components_end, components.end());
result.append("\n /* Toplevel attachments */\n");
for (std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::const_iterator it =
components.begin(); it != components.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append((*it)->name());
result.append(" -> Profile;\n");
}
result.append("\n /* Toplevel profile */\n");
result.append(" Profile [shape=box];\n");
result.append("}\n");
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::WillSendRequest(blink::WebURLRequest& request) {
WebDocumentLoader* provisional_document_loader =
frame_->GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = provisional_document_loader
? provisional_document_loader
: frame_->GetDocumentLoader();
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
DCHECK(document_state);
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
ui::PageTransition transition_type = navigation_state->GetTransitionType();
if (provisional_document_loader &&
provisional_document_loader->IsClientRedirect()) {
transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
transition_type | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_CLIENT_REDIRECT);
}
GURL new_url;
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->WillSendRequest(
frame_, transition_type, request.Url(), &new_url)) {
request.SetURL(WebURL(new_url));
}
if (internal_data->is_cache_policy_override_set())
request.SetCacheMode(internal_data->cache_policy_override());
WebString custom_user_agent;
WebString requested_with;
std::unique_ptr<StreamOverrideParameters> stream_override;
if (request.GetExtraData()) {
RequestExtraData* old_extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
custom_user_agent = old_extra_data->custom_user_agent();
if (!custom_user_agent.IsNull()) {
if (custom_user_agent.IsEmpty())
request.ClearHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent");
else
request.SetHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent", custom_user_agent);
}
requested_with = old_extra_data->requested_with();
if (!requested_with.IsNull()) {
if (requested_with.IsEmpty())
request.ClearHTTPHeaderField("X-Requested-With");
else
request.SetHTTPHeaderField("X-Requested-With", requested_with);
}
stream_override = old_extra_data->TakeStreamOverrideOwnership();
}
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(WebSecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
bool should_replace_current_entry =
document_loader->ReplacesCurrentHistoryItem();
WebFrame* parent = frame_->Parent();
ResourceType resource_type = WebURLRequestToResourceType(request);
WebDocument frame_document = frame_->GetDocument();
RequestExtraData* extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
if (!extra_data)
extra_data = new RequestExtraData();
extra_data->set_visibility_state(VisibilityState());
extra_data->set_custom_user_agent(custom_user_agent);
extra_data->set_requested_with(requested_with);
extra_data->set_render_frame_id(routing_id_);
extra_data->set_is_main_frame(!parent);
extra_data->set_frame_origin(url::Origin(frame_document.GetSecurityOrigin()));
extra_data->set_allow_download(
navigation_state->common_params().allow_download);
extra_data->set_transition_type(transition_type);
extra_data->set_should_replace_current_entry(should_replace_current_entry);
extra_data->set_stream_override(std::move(stream_override));
bool is_prefetch =
GetContentClient()->renderer()->IsPrefetchOnly(this, request);
extra_data->set_is_prefetch(is_prefetch);
extra_data->set_download_to_network_cache_only(
is_prefetch && resource_type != RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME);
extra_data->set_initiated_in_secure_context(frame_document.IsSecureContext());
bool is_navigational_request =
request.GetFrameType() != network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNone;
if (is_navigational_request) {
RequestExtraData* current_request_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
if (current_request_data) {
extra_data->set_navigation_initiated_by_renderer(
current_request_data->navigation_initiated_by_renderer());
}
}
RenderThreadImpl* render_thread = RenderThreadImpl::current();
if (render_thread && render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()) {
extra_data->set_url_loader_throttles(
render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()->CreateThrottles(
routing_id_, request.Url(), resource_type));
}
request.SetExtraData(extra_data);
if (request.GetPreviewsState() == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified) {
if (is_main_frame_ && !navigation_state->request_committed()) {
request.SetPreviewsState(static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(
navigation_state->common_params().previews_state));
} else {
WebURLRequest::PreviewsState request_previews_state =
static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(previews_state_);
request_previews_state &= ~(WebURLRequest::kClientLoFiOn);
if (request_previews_state == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified)
request_previews_state = WebURLRequest::kPreviewsOff;
request.SetPreviewsState(request_previews_state);
}
}
request.SetRequestorID(render_view_->GetRoutingID());
request.SetHasUserGesture(
WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame_));
if (!render_view_->renderer_preferences_.enable_referrers)
request.SetHTTPReferrer(WebString(), blink::kWebReferrerPolicyDefault);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::WillSendRequest(blink::WebURLRequest& request) {
WebDocumentLoader* provisional_document_loader =
frame_->GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = provisional_document_loader
? provisional_document_loader
: frame_->GetDocumentLoader();
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
DCHECK(document_state);
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
ui::PageTransition transition_type = navigation_state->GetTransitionType();
if (provisional_document_loader &&
provisional_document_loader->IsClientRedirect()) {
transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
transition_type | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_CLIENT_REDIRECT);
}
GURL new_url;
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->WillSendRequest(
frame_, transition_type, request.Url(), &new_url)) {
request.SetURL(WebURL(new_url));
}
if (internal_data->is_cache_policy_override_set())
request.SetCacheMode(internal_data->cache_policy_override());
WebString custom_user_agent;
WebString requested_with;
std::unique_ptr<StreamOverrideParameters> stream_override;
if (request.GetExtraData()) {
RequestExtraData* old_extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
custom_user_agent = old_extra_data->custom_user_agent();
if (!custom_user_agent.IsNull()) {
if (custom_user_agent.IsEmpty())
request.ClearHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent");
else
request.SetHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent", custom_user_agent);
}
requested_with = old_extra_data->requested_with();
if (!requested_with.IsNull()) {
if (requested_with.IsEmpty())
request.ClearHTTPHeaderField("X-Requested-With");
else
request.SetHTTPHeaderField("X-Requested-With", requested_with);
}
stream_override = old_extra_data->TakeStreamOverrideOwnership();
}
request.AddHTTPOriginIfNeeded(WebSecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
bool should_replace_current_entry =
document_loader->ReplacesCurrentHistoryItem();
WebFrame* parent = frame_->Parent();
ResourceType resource_type = WebURLRequestToResourceType(request);
WebDocument frame_document = frame_->GetDocument();
RequestExtraData* extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
if (!extra_data)
extra_data = new RequestExtraData();
extra_data->set_visibility_state(VisibilityState());
extra_data->set_custom_user_agent(custom_user_agent);
extra_data->set_requested_with(requested_with);
extra_data->set_render_frame_id(routing_id_);
extra_data->set_is_main_frame(!parent);
extra_data->set_frame_origin(url::Origin(frame_document.GetSecurityOrigin()));
extra_data->set_allow_download(
navigation_state->common_params().allow_download);
extra_data->set_transition_type(transition_type);
extra_data->set_should_replace_current_entry(should_replace_current_entry);
extra_data->set_stream_override(std::move(stream_override));
bool is_prefetch =
GetContentClient()->renderer()->IsPrefetchOnly(this, request);
extra_data->set_is_prefetch(is_prefetch);
extra_data->set_download_to_network_cache_only(
is_prefetch && resource_type != RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME);
extra_data->set_initiated_in_secure_context(frame_document.IsSecureContext());
bool is_navigational_request =
request.GetFrameType() != network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNone;
if (is_navigational_request) {
RequestExtraData* current_request_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
if (current_request_data) {
extra_data->set_navigation_initiated_by_renderer(
current_request_data->navigation_initiated_by_renderer());
}
}
RenderThreadImpl* render_thread = RenderThreadImpl::current();
if (render_thread && render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()) {
extra_data->set_url_loader_throttles(
render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()->CreateThrottles(
routing_id_, request.Url(), resource_type));
}
request.SetExtraData(extra_data);
if (request.GetPreviewsState() == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified) {
if (is_main_frame_ && !navigation_state->request_committed()) {
request.SetPreviewsState(static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(
navigation_state->common_params().previews_state));
} else {
WebURLRequest::PreviewsState request_previews_state =
static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(previews_state_);
request_previews_state &= ~(WebURLRequest::kClientLoFiOn);
if (request_previews_state == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified)
request_previews_state = WebURLRequest::kPreviewsOff;
request.SetPreviewsState(request_previews_state);
}
}
request.SetRequestorID(render_view_->GetRoutingID());
request.SetHasUserGesture(
WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame_));
if (!render_view_->renderer_preferences_.enable_referrers)
request.SetHTTPReferrer(WebString(), blink::kWebReferrerPolicyDefault);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
void ACodec::LoadedState::onSetInputSurface(
const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
ALOGV("onSetInputSurface");
sp<AMessage> notify = mCodec->mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatInputSurfaceAccepted);
sp<RefBase> obj;
CHECK(msg->findObject("input-surface", &obj));
sp<PersistentSurface> surface = static_cast<PersistentSurface *>(obj.get());
status_t err = mCodec->mOMX->setInputSurface(
mCodec->mNode, kPortIndexInput, surface->getBufferConsumer(),
&mCodec->mInputMetadataType);
if (err == OK) {
err = setupInputSurface();
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] onSetInputSurface returning error %d",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
notify->setInt32("err", err);
}
notify->post();
}
|
void ACodec::LoadedState::onSetInputSurface(
const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
ALOGV("onSetInputSurface");
sp<AMessage> notify = mCodec->mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatInputSurfaceAccepted);
sp<RefBase> obj;
CHECK(msg->findObject("input-surface", &obj));
sp<PersistentSurface> surface = static_cast<PersistentSurface *>(obj.get());
status_t err = mCodec->mOMX->setInputSurface(
mCodec->mNode, kPortIndexInput, surface->getBufferConsumer(),
&mCodec->mInputMetadataType);
if (err == OK) {
err = setupInputSurface();
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] onSetInputSurface returning error %d",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
notify->setInt32("err", err);
}
notify->post();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool RenderFlexibleBox::isHorizontalFlow() const
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return !isColumnFlow();
return isColumnFlow();
}
|
bool RenderFlexibleBox::isHorizontalFlow() const
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return !isColumnFlow();
return isColumnFlow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-0011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-0011/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl/commit/1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
|
create_browser () {
GUI *g = &uzbl.gui;
g->web_view = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW (webkit_web_view_new ());
g_object_connect((GObject*)g->web_view,
"signal::key-press-event", (GCallback)key_press_cb, NULL,
"signal::key-release-event", (GCallback)key_release_cb, NULL,
"signal::button-press-event", (GCallback)button_press_cb, NULL,
"signal::button-release-event", (GCallback)button_release_cb, NULL,
"signal::title-changed", (GCallback)title_change_cb, NULL,
"signal::selection-changed", (GCallback)selection_changed_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-progress-changed", (GCallback)progress_change_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-committed", (GCallback)load_commit_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-started", (GCallback)load_start_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-finished", (GCallback)load_finish_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-error", (GCallback)load_error_cb, NULL,
"signal::hovering-over-link", (GCallback)link_hover_cb, NULL,
"signal::navigation-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)navigation_decision_cb, NULL,
"signal::new-window-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)new_window_cb, NULL,
"signal::download-requested", (GCallback)download_cb, NULL,
"signal::create-web-view", (GCallback)create_web_view_cb, NULL,
"signal::mime-type-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)mime_policy_cb, NULL,
"signal::populate-popup", (GCallback)populate_popup_cb, NULL,
"signal::focus-in-event", (GCallback)focus_cb, NULL,
"signal::focus-out-event", (GCallback)focus_cb, NULL,
NULL);
}
|
create_browser () {
GUI *g = &uzbl.gui;
g->web_view = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW (webkit_web_view_new ());
g_object_connect((GObject*)g->web_view,
"signal::key-press-event", (GCallback)key_press_cb, NULL,
"signal::key-release-event", (GCallback)key_release_cb, NULL,
"signal::button-press-event", (GCallback)button_press_cb, NULL,
"signal::button-release-event", (GCallback)button_release_cb, NULL,
"signal::title-changed", (GCallback)title_change_cb, NULL,
"signal::selection-changed", (GCallback)selection_changed_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-progress-changed", (GCallback)progress_change_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-committed", (GCallback)load_commit_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-started", (GCallback)load_start_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-finished", (GCallback)load_finish_cb, NULL,
"signal::load-error", (GCallback)load_error_cb, NULL,
"signal::hovering-over-link", (GCallback)link_hover_cb, NULL,
"signal::navigation-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)navigation_decision_cb, NULL,
"signal::new-window-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)new_window_cb, NULL,
"signal::download-requested", (GCallback)download_cb, NULL,
"signal::create-web-view", (GCallback)create_web_view_cb, NULL,
"signal::mime-type-policy-decision-requested", (GCallback)mime_policy_cb, NULL,
"signal::populate-popup", (GCallback)populate_popup_cb, NULL,
"signal::focus-in-event", (GCallback)focus_cb, NULL,
"signal::focus-out-event", (GCallback)focus_cb, NULL,
NULL);
}
|
C
|
uzbl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
Replaces the % character with \x when generating Windows shortcuts via
File->"Create application shortcuts." The \x is converted back to % in
handling the --app switch.
BUG=23693
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/515028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35377 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::LaunchWithProfile(
const std::wstring& cur_dir,
const CommandLine& command_line)
: cur_dir_(cur_dir),
command_line_(command_line),
profile_(NULL),
browser_init_(NULL) {
}
|
BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::LaunchWithProfile(
const std::wstring& cur_dir,
const CommandLine& command_line)
: cur_dir_(cur_dir),
command_line_(command_line),
profile_(NULL),
browser_init_(NULL) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void iowarrior_write_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct iowarrior *dev;
int status = urb->status;
dev = urb->context;
/* sync/async unlink faults aren't errors */
if (status &&
!(status == -ENOENT ||
status == -ECONNRESET || status == -ESHUTDOWN)) {
dev_dbg(&dev->interface->dev,
"nonzero write bulk status received: %d\n", status);
}
/* free up our allocated buffer */
usb_free_coherent(urb->dev, urb->transfer_buffer_length,
urb->transfer_buffer, urb->transfer_dma);
/* tell a waiting writer the interrupt-out-pipe is available again */
atomic_dec(&dev->write_busy);
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait);
}
|
static void iowarrior_write_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct iowarrior *dev;
int status = urb->status;
dev = urb->context;
/* sync/async unlink faults aren't errors */
if (status &&
!(status == -ENOENT ||
status == -ECONNRESET || status == -ESHUTDOWN)) {
dev_dbg(&dev->interface->dev,
"nonzero write bulk status received: %d\n", status);
}
/* free up our allocated buffer */
usb_free_coherent(urb->dev, urb->transfer_buffer_length,
urb->transfer_buffer, urb->transfer_dma);
/* tell a waiting writer the interrupt-out-pipe is available again */
atomic_dec(&dev->write_busy);
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=ba5dbda6d0174a59d221c45cca52ecd232820d48
|
ba5dbda6d0174a59d221c45cca52ecd232820d48
| null |
_PUBLIC_ bool strhaslower_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *string)
{
while (*string) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t s;
codepoint_t t;
s = next_codepoint_handle(ic, string, &c_size);
string += c_size;
t = toupper_m(s);
if (s != t) {
return true; /* that means it has lower case chars */
}
}
return false;
}
|
_PUBLIC_ bool strhaslower_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *string)
{
while (*string) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t s;
codepoint_t t;
s = next_codepoint_handle(ic, string, &c_size);
string += c_size;
t = toupper_m(s);
if (s != t) {
return true; /* that means it has lower case chars */
}
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1618
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1618/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d
|
0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d
|
Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
|
MockSurfaceFactory() : m_createSurfaceCount(0) { }
|
MockSurfaceFactory() : m_createSurfaceCount(0) { }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4594/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
CC: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CC: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void sock_unregister(int family)
{
BUG_ON(family < 0 || family >= NPROTO);
spin_lock(&net_family_lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(net_families[family], NULL);
spin_unlock(&net_family_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
printk(KERN_INFO "NET: Unregistered protocol family %d\n", family);
}
|
void sock_unregister(int family)
{
BUG_ON(family < 0 || family >= NPROTO);
spin_lock(&net_family_lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(net_families[family], NULL);
spin_unlock(&net_family_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
printk(KERN_INFO "NET: Unregistered protocol family %d\n", family);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2452
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2452/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/44749eb4f273f0eb681d0fa013e3beef754fa687
|
44749eb4f273f0eb681d0fa013e3beef754fa687
|
SoftAMR: check output buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I7b26892c41d6f2e690e77478ab855c2fed1ff6b0
|
android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftAMR(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
|
android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftAMR(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static WTF::String lastFileURLPathComponent(const WTF::String& path)
{
size_t pos = path.find("file://");
ASSERT(WTF::notFound != pos);
WTF::String tmpPath = path.substring(pos + 7);
if (tmpPath.length() < 2) // Keep the lone slash to avoid empty output.
return tmpPath;
if (tmpPath[tmpPath.length() - 1] == '/')
tmpPath.remove(tmpPath.length() - 1);
pos = tmpPath.reverseFind('/');
if (WTF::notFound != pos)
return tmpPath.substring(pos + 1);
return tmpPath;
}
|
static WTF::String lastFileURLPathComponent(const WTF::String& path)
{
size_t pos = path.find("file://");
ASSERT(WTF::notFound != pos);
WTF::String tmpPath = path.substring(pos + 7);
if (tmpPath.length() < 2) // Keep the lone slash to avoid empty output.
return tmpPath;
if (tmpPath[tmpPath.length() - 1] == '/')
tmpPath.remove(tmpPath.length() - 1);
pos = tmpPath.reverseFind('/');
if (WTF::notFound != pos)
return tmpPath.substring(pos + 1);
return tmpPath;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
void TypingCommand::closeTyping(LocalFrame* frame) {
if (TypingCommand* lastTypingCommand =
lastTypingCommandIfStillOpenForTyping(frame))
lastTypingCommand->closeTyping();
}
|
void TypingCommand::closeTyping(LocalFrame* frame) {
if (TypingCommand* lastTypingCommand =
lastTypingCommandIfStillOpenForTyping(frame))
lastTypingCommand->closeTyping();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11379
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11379/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c
|
4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c
|
Fix crash in pe
|
static void bin_pe_store_tls_callbacks(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin, PE_DWord callbacks) {
PE_DWord paddr, haddr;
int count = 0;
PE_DWord addressOfTLSCallback = 1;
char* key;
while (addressOfTLSCallback != 0) {
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, callbacks, (ut8*) &addressOfTLSCallback, sizeof(addressOfTLSCallback)) != sizeof (addressOfTLSCallback)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (tls_callback)\n");
return;
}
if (!addressOfTLSCallback) {
break;
}
if (bin->optional_header->SizeOfImage) {
int rva_callback = bin_pe_va_to_rva (bin, (PE_DWord) addressOfTLSCallback);
if (rva_callback > bin->optional_header->SizeOfImage) {
break;
}
}
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_vaddr", count);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, addressOfTLSCallback, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_paddr", count);
paddr = bin_pe_rva_to_paddr (bin, bin_pe_va_to_rva (bin, (PE_DWord) addressOfTLSCallback));
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, paddr, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_haddr", count);
haddr = callbacks;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, haddr, 0);
count++;
callbacks += sizeof (addressOfTLSCallback);
}
}
|
static void bin_pe_store_tls_callbacks(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin, PE_DWord callbacks) {
PE_DWord paddr, haddr;
int count = 0;
PE_DWord addressOfTLSCallback = 1;
char* key;
while (addressOfTLSCallback != 0) {
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, callbacks, (ut8*) &addressOfTLSCallback, sizeof(addressOfTLSCallback)) != sizeof (addressOfTLSCallback)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (tls_callback)\n");
return;
}
if (!addressOfTLSCallback) {
break;
}
if (bin->optional_header->SizeOfImage) {
int rva_callback = bin_pe_va_to_rva (bin, (PE_DWord) addressOfTLSCallback);
if (rva_callback > bin->optional_header->SizeOfImage) {
break;
}
}
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_vaddr", count);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, addressOfTLSCallback, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_paddr", count);
paddr = bin_pe_rva_to_paddr (bin, bin_pe_va_to_rva (bin, (PE_DWord) addressOfTLSCallback));
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, paddr, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("pe.tls_callback%d_haddr", count);
haddr = callbacks;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, key, haddr, 0);
count++;
callbacks += sizeof (addressOfTLSCallback);
}
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static bool is_not(const char *str)
{
switch (str[1]) {
case '=':
case '~':
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool is_not(const char *str)
{
switch (str[1]) {
case '=':
case '~':
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
|
unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
{
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5508/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/c073a7712d82476b5fbee74856c46b88af9c3175
|
c073a7712d82476b5fbee74856c46b88af9c3175
|
https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
|
static void TIFFTagExtender(TIFF *tiff)
{
static const TIFFFieldInfo
TIFFExtensions[] =
{
{ 37724, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "PhotoshopLayerData" },
{ 34118, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "Microscope" }
};
TIFFMergeFieldInfo(tiff,TIFFExtensions,sizeof(TIFFExtensions)/
sizeof(*TIFFExtensions));
if (tag_extender != (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
(*tag_extender)(tiff);
TIFFIgnoreTags(tiff);
}
|
static void TIFFTagExtender(TIFF *tiff)
{
static const TIFFFieldInfo
TIFFExtensions[] =
{
{ 37724, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "PhotoshopLayerData" },
{ 34118, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "Microscope" }
};
TIFFMergeFieldInfo(tiff,TIFFExtensions,sizeof(TIFFExtensions)/
sizeof(*TIFFExtensions));
if (tag_extender != (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
(*tag_extender)(tiff);
TIFFIgnoreTags(tiff);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GetAllTabsInWindowFunction::RunImpl() {
Browser* browser;
int window_id = -1;
if (HasOptionalArgument(0)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &window_id));
browser = GetBrowserInProfileWithId(profile(), window_id,
include_incognito(), &error_);
} else {
browser = GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser)
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
}
if (!browser)
return false;
result_.reset(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabList(browser));
return true;
}
|
bool GetAllTabsInWindowFunction::RunImpl() {
Browser* browser;
int window_id = -1;
if (HasOptionalArgument(0)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &window_id));
browser = GetBrowserInProfileWithId(profile(), window_id,
include_incognito(), &error_);
} else {
browser = GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser)
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
}
if (!browser)
return false;
result_.reset(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabList(browser));
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static void deflate_decomp_exit(struct deflate_ctx *ctx)
{
zlib_inflateEnd(&ctx->decomp_stream);
vfree(ctx->decomp_stream.workspace);
}
|
static void deflate_decomp_exit(struct deflate_ctx *ctx)
{
zlib_inflateEnd(&ctx->decomp_stream);
vfree(ctx->decomp_stream.workspace);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0fb75f1e468fe9054be3b3d3d5b9bf9a66e4199d
|
0fb75f1e468fe9054be3b3d3d5b9bf9a66e4199d
|
StackSamplingProfiler: walk a copy of the stack
Changes the stack walking strategy to copy the stack while the target
thread is suspended, then walk the copy of the stack after the thread
has been resumed. This avoids deadlock on locks taken by
RtlLookupFunctionEntry when walking the actual stack while the target
thread is suspended.
BUG=528129
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1367633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353004}
|
std::string GetBuildIDForModule(HMODULE module_handle) {
GUID guid;
DWORD age;
win::PEImage(module_handle).GetDebugId(&guid, &age);
const int kGUIDSize = 39;
std::wstring build_id;
int result =
::StringFromGUID2(guid, WriteInto(&build_id, kGUIDSize), kGUIDSize);
if (result != kGUIDSize)
return std::string();
RemoveChars(build_id, L"{}-", &build_id);
build_id += StringPrintf(L"%d", age);
return WideToUTF8(build_id);
}
|
std::string GetBuildIDForModule(HMODULE module_handle) {
GUID guid;
DWORD age;
win::PEImage(module_handle).GetDebugId(&guid, &age);
const int kGUIDSize = 39;
std::wstring build_id;
int result =
::StringFromGUID2(guid, WriteInto(&build_id, kGUIDSize), kGUIDSize);
if (result != kGUIDSize)
return std::string();
RemoveChars(build_id, L"{}-", &build_id);
build_id += StringPrintf(L"%d", age);
return WideToUTF8(build_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltExtensionInstructionResultFinalize(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt)
{
xmlDocPtr cur;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (ctxt->localRVTBase == NULL)
return(0);
/*
* Enable remaining local tree fragments to be freed
* by the fragment garbage collector.
*/
cur = ctxt->localRVTBase;
do {
cur->psvi = NULL;
cur = (xmlDocPtr) cur->next;
} while (cur != NULL);
return(0);
}
|
xsltExtensionInstructionResultFinalize(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt)
{
xmlDocPtr cur;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (ctxt->localRVTBase == NULL)
return(0);
/*
* Enable remaining local tree fragments to be freed
* by the fragment garbage collector.
*/
cur = ctxt->localRVTBase;
do {
cur->psvi = NULL;
cur = (xmlDocPtr) cur->next;
} while (cur != NULL);
return(0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBlock::markForPaginationRelayoutIfNeeded(SubtreeLayoutScope& layoutScope)
{
ASSERT(!needsLayout());
if (needsLayout())
return;
if (view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeightChanged() || (view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeight() && view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalOffset(*this, logicalTop()) != pageLogicalOffset()))
layoutScope.setChildNeedsLayout(this);
}
|
void RenderBlock::markForPaginationRelayoutIfNeeded(SubtreeLayoutScope& layoutScope)
{
ASSERT(!needsLayout());
if (needsLayout())
return;
if (view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeightChanged() || (view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeight() && view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalOffset(*this, logicalTop()) != pageLogicalOffset()))
layoutScope.setChildNeedsLayout(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5011/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
void DevToolsToolboxDelegate::WebContentsDestroyed() {
delete this;
}
|
void DevToolsToolboxDelegate::WebContentsDestroyed() {
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5792
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5792/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/227851d714bdc081de4c7e81669420380fa6c000
|
227851d714bdc081de4c7e81669420380fa6c000
|
arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
|
void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::SetVoiceInteractionState(
arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState voice_interaction_state) {
ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState state =
mojo::ConvertTo<ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState>(
voice_interaction_state);
DCHECK_NE(state_, state);
if (state_ == ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::NOT_READY) {
PrefService* prefs = Profile::FromBrowserContext(context_)->GetPrefs();
bool value_prop_accepted =
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kArcVoiceInteractionValuePropAccepted);
bool enable_voice_interaction =
value_prop_accepted &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kVoiceInteractionEnabled);
SetVoiceInteractionEnabled(enable_voice_interaction,
base::BindOnce(&DoNothing<bool>));
SetVoiceInteractionContextEnabled(
enable_voice_interaction &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kVoiceInteractionContextEnabled));
}
if (state_ == ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::RUNNING)
highlighter_client_->Exit();
state_ = state;
arc::VoiceInteractionControllerClient::Get()->NotifyStatusChanged(state);
}
|
void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::SetVoiceInteractionState(
arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState voice_interaction_state) {
ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState state =
mojo::ConvertTo<ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState>(
voice_interaction_state);
DCHECK_NE(state_, state);
if (state_ == ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::NOT_READY) {
PrefService* prefs = Profile::FromBrowserContext(context_)->GetPrefs();
bool value_prop_accepted =
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kArcVoiceInteractionValuePropAccepted);
bool enable_voice_interaction =
value_prop_accepted &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kVoiceInteractionEnabled);
SetVoiceInteractionEnabled(enable_voice_interaction,
base::BindOnce(&DoNothing<bool>));
SetVoiceInteractionContextEnabled(
enable_voice_interaction &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kVoiceInteractionContextEnabled));
}
if (state_ == ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::RUNNING)
highlighter_client_->Exit();
state_ = state;
arc::VoiceInteractionControllerClient::Get()->NotifyStatusChanged(state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5138
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5138/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8083841913b8eb8018ae52f67c923f0b3d66c466
|
8083841913b8eb8018ae52f67c923f0b3d66c466
|
Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterPseudoScheme(
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DCHECK(pseudo_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Add schemes at most once.";
DCHECK(web_safe_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) <<
"Pseudo implies not web-safe.";
pseudo_schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterPseudoScheme(
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DCHECK(pseudo_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) << "Add schemes at most once.";
DCHECK(web_safe_schemes_.count(scheme) == 0) <<
"Pseudo implies not web-safe.";
pseudo_schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
AuthenticatorAlreadyRegisteredErrorModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnErrorDarkIcon
: kWebauthnErrorIcon;
}
|
AuthenticatorAlreadyRegisteredErrorModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnErrorDarkIcon
: kWebauthnErrorIcon;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
enqueue_runnable_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
cfs_rq->runnable_weight += se->runnable_weight;
cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_avg += se->avg.runnable_load_avg;
cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_sum += se_runnable(se) * se->avg.runnable_load_sum;
}
|
enqueue_runnable_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
cfs_rq->runnable_weight += se->runnable_weight;
cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_avg += se->avg.runnable_load_avg;
cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_sum += se_runnable(se) * se->avg.runnable_load_sum;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
std::string SerializeOrigin(const url::Origin& origin) {
return origin.GetURL().spec();
}
|
std::string SerializeOrigin(const url::Origin& origin) {
return origin.GetURL().spec();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidChangeLoadProgress(double load_progress) {
delegate_->DidChangeLoadProgress(load_progress);
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidChangeLoadProgress(double load_progress) {
delegate_->DidChangeLoadProgress(load_progress);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1828/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_rtoinfo(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen) {
struct sctp_rtoinfo rtoinfo;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (len < sizeof (struct sctp_rtoinfo))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_rtoinfo);
if (copy_from_user(&rtoinfo, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, rtoinfo.srto_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && rtoinfo.srto_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Values corresponding to the specific association. */
if (asoc) {
rtoinfo.srto_initial = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_initial);
rtoinfo.srto_max = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_max);
rtoinfo.srto_min = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_min);
} else {
/* Values corresponding to the endpoint. */
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
rtoinfo.srto_initial = sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial;
rtoinfo.srto_max = sp->rtoinfo.srto_max;
rtoinfo.srto_min = sp->rtoinfo.srto_min;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &rtoinfo, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_rtoinfo(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen) {
struct sctp_rtoinfo rtoinfo;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (len < sizeof (struct sctp_rtoinfo))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_rtoinfo);
if (copy_from_user(&rtoinfo, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, rtoinfo.srto_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && rtoinfo.srto_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Values corresponding to the specific association. */
if (asoc) {
rtoinfo.srto_initial = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_initial);
rtoinfo.srto_max = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_max);
rtoinfo.srto_min = jiffies_to_msecs(asoc->rto_min);
} else {
/* Values corresponding to the endpoint. */
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
rtoinfo.srto_initial = sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial;
rtoinfo.srto_max = sp->rtoinfo.srto_max;
rtoinfo.srto_min = sp->rtoinfo.srto_min;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &rtoinfo, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13009/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f
|
db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f
|
CVE-2017-13009/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it:
Add a comment giving the RFC for IPv6 mobility headers.
Clean up some bounds checks to make it clearer what they're checking, by
matching the subsequent EXTRACT_ calls or memcpy.
For the binding update, if none of the flag bits are set, don't check
the individual flag bits.
|
mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
}
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[1]);
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[hlen], 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
|
mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18017/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901
|
2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901
|
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool find_syn_match(const struct xt_entry_match *m)
{
const struct xt_tcp *tcpinfo = (const struct xt_tcp *)m->data;
if (strcmp(m->u.kernel.match->name, "tcp") == 0 &&
tcpinfo->flg_cmp & TCPHDR_SYN &&
!(tcpinfo->invflags & XT_TCP_INV_FLAGS))
return true;
return false;
}
|
static inline bool find_syn_match(const struct xt_entry_match *m)
{
const struct xt_tcp *tcpinfo = (const struct xt_tcp *)m->data;
if (strcmp(m->u.kernel.match->name, "tcp") == 0 &&
tcpinfo->flg_cmp & TCPHDR_SYN &&
!(tcpinfo->invflags & XT_TCP_INV_FLAGS))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6663
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6663/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c21d7ac13d69cbadbbb5b2dc147be1933d52147a
|
c21d7ac13d69cbadbbb5b2dc147be1933d52147a
|
Use the host coordinate when comparing to host window bounds.
I somehow overlooked this and the test was not strict enough to catch this.
BUG=521919
TEST=Updated ScreenPositionControllerTest.ConvertHostPointToScreenHiDPI so that it fails without the patch.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344186}
|
ConvertToScreenEventHandler() : could_convert_to_screen_(true) {
aura::Env::GetInstance()->AddPreTargetHandler(this);
}
|
ConvertToScreenEventHandler() : could_convert_to_screen_(true) {
aura::Env::GetInstance()->AddPreTargetHandler(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NPError WebPluginDelegatePepper::DeviceAudioInitializeContext(
const NPDeviceContextAudioConfig* config,
NPDeviceContextAudio* context) {
if (!render_view_) {
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioDeviceContext> audio(new AudioDeviceContext());
NPError status = audio->Initialize(render_view_->audio_message_filter(),
config, context);
if (NPERR_NO_ERROR == status) {
context->reserved =
reinterpret_cast<void *>(audio_contexts_.Add(audio.release()));
}
return status;
}
|
NPError WebPluginDelegatePepper::DeviceAudioInitializeContext(
const NPDeviceContextAudioConfig* config,
NPDeviceContextAudio* context) {
if (!render_view_) {
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioDeviceContext> audio(new AudioDeviceContext());
NPError status = audio->Initialize(render_view_->audio_message_filter(),
config, context);
if (NPERR_NO_ERROR == status) {
context->reserved =
reinterpret_cast<void *>(audio_contexts_.Add(audio.release()));
}
return status;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9425/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
|
2bcf69d073190e4f032d883f3416dea1b027a39e
| null |
ZEND_API zval *_zend_ts_hash_add_or_update(TsHashTable *ht, zend_string *key, zval *pData, int flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zval *retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = _zend_hash_add_or_update(TS_HASH(ht), key, pData, flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
|
ZEND_API zval *_zend_ts_hash_add_or_update(TsHashTable *ht, zend_string *key, zval *pData, int flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zval *retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = _zend_hash_add_or_update(TS_HASH(ht), key, pData, flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8617
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8617/
|
CWE-134
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e
|
Use format string
|
ZEND_API int zval_update_constant_ex(zval *p, zend_bool inline_change, zend_class_entry *scope) /* {{{ */
{
zval *const_value;
char *colon;
if (IS_CONSTANT_VISITED(p)) {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Cannot declare self-referencing constant '%s'", Z_STRVAL_P(p));
return FAILURE;
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(p) == IS_CONSTANT) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL_NOREF(p);
MARK_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
if (Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_CLASS) {
ZEND_ASSERT(EG(current_execute_data));
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(Z_STR_P(p));
}
if (EG(scope) && EG(scope)->name) {
ZVAL_STR_COPY(p, EG(scope)->name);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(p);
}
} else if (UNEXPECTED((const_value = zend_get_constant_ex(Z_STR_P(p), scope, Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p))) == NULL)) {
char *actual = Z_STRVAL_P(p);
if (UNEXPECTED(EG(exception))) {
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else if ((colon = (char*)zend_memrchr(Z_STRVAL_P(p), ':', Z_STRLEN_P(p)))) {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined class constant '%s'", Z_STRVAL_P(p));
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else {
zend_string *save = Z_STR_P(p);
char *slash;
size_t actual_len = Z_STRLEN_P(p);
if ((Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_UNQUALIFIED) && (slash = (char *)zend_memrchr(actual, '\\', actual_len))) {
actual = slash + 1;
actual_len -= (actual - Z_STRVAL_P(p));
if (inline_change) {
zend_string *s = zend_string_init(actual, actual_len, 0);
Z_STR_P(p) = s;
Z_TYPE_FLAGS_P(p) = IS_TYPE_REFCOUNTED | IS_TYPE_COPYABLE;
}
}
if (actual[0] == '\\') {
if (inline_change) {
memmove(Z_STRVAL_P(p), Z_STRVAL_P(p)+1, Z_STRLEN_P(p));
--Z_STRLEN_P(p);
} else {
++actual;
}
--actual_len;
}
if ((Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_UNQUALIFIED) == 0) {
if (ZSTR_VAL(save)[0] == '\\') {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined constant '%s'", ZSTR_VAL(save) + 1);
} else {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined constant '%s'", ZSTR_VAL(save));
}
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(save);
}
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else {
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Use of undefined constant %s - assumed '%s'", actual, actual);
if (!inline_change) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(p, actual, actual_len);
} else {
Z_TYPE_INFO_P(p) = Z_REFCOUNTED_P(p) ?
IS_STRING_EX : IS_INTERNED_STRING_EX;
if (save && ZSTR_VAL(save) != actual) {
zend_string_release(save);
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(Z_STR_P(p));
}
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(p, const_value);
if (Z_OPT_CONSTANT_P(p)) {
if (UNEXPECTED(zval_update_constant_ex(p, 1, NULL) != SUCCESS)) {
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zval_opt_copy_ctor(p);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(p) == IS_CONSTANT_AST) {
zval tmp;
if (UNEXPECTED(zend_ast_evaluate(&tmp, Z_ASTVAL_P(p), scope) != SUCCESS)) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (inline_change) {
zval_ptr_dtor(p);
}
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(p, &tmp);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API int zval_update_constant_ex(zval *p, zend_bool inline_change, zend_class_entry *scope) /* {{{ */
{
zval *const_value;
char *colon;
if (IS_CONSTANT_VISITED(p)) {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Cannot declare self-referencing constant '%s'", Z_STRVAL_P(p));
return FAILURE;
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(p) == IS_CONSTANT) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL_NOREF(p);
MARK_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
if (Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_CLASS) {
ZEND_ASSERT(EG(current_execute_data));
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(Z_STR_P(p));
}
if (EG(scope) && EG(scope)->name) {
ZVAL_STR_COPY(p, EG(scope)->name);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(p);
}
} else if (UNEXPECTED((const_value = zend_get_constant_ex(Z_STR_P(p), scope, Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p))) == NULL)) {
char *actual = Z_STRVAL_P(p);
if (UNEXPECTED(EG(exception))) {
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else if ((colon = (char*)zend_memrchr(Z_STRVAL_P(p), ':', Z_STRLEN_P(p)))) {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined class constant '%s'", Z_STRVAL_P(p));
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else {
zend_string *save = Z_STR_P(p);
char *slash;
size_t actual_len = Z_STRLEN_P(p);
if ((Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_UNQUALIFIED) && (slash = (char *)zend_memrchr(actual, '\\', actual_len))) {
actual = slash + 1;
actual_len -= (actual - Z_STRVAL_P(p));
if (inline_change) {
zend_string *s = zend_string_init(actual, actual_len, 0);
Z_STR_P(p) = s;
Z_TYPE_FLAGS_P(p) = IS_TYPE_REFCOUNTED | IS_TYPE_COPYABLE;
}
}
if (actual[0] == '\\') {
if (inline_change) {
memmove(Z_STRVAL_P(p), Z_STRVAL_P(p)+1, Z_STRLEN_P(p));
--Z_STRLEN_P(p);
} else {
++actual;
}
--actual_len;
}
if ((Z_CONST_FLAGS_P(p) & IS_CONSTANT_UNQUALIFIED) == 0) {
if (ZSTR_VAL(save)[0] == '\\') {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined constant '%s'", ZSTR_VAL(save) + 1);
} else {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Undefined constant '%s'", ZSTR_VAL(save));
}
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(save);
}
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
} else {
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Use of undefined constant %s - assumed '%s'", actual, actual);
if (!inline_change) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(p, actual, actual_len);
} else {
Z_TYPE_INFO_P(p) = Z_REFCOUNTED_P(p) ?
IS_STRING_EX : IS_INTERNED_STRING_EX;
if (save && ZSTR_VAL(save) != actual) {
zend_string_release(save);
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (inline_change) {
zend_string_release(Z_STR_P(p));
}
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(p, const_value);
if (Z_OPT_CONSTANT_P(p)) {
if (UNEXPECTED(zval_update_constant_ex(p, 1, NULL) != SUCCESS)) {
RESET_CONSTANT_VISITED(p);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zval_opt_copy_ctor(p);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(p) == IS_CONSTANT_AST) {
zval tmp;
if (UNEXPECTED(zend_ast_evaluate(&tmp, Z_ASTVAL_P(p), scope) != SUCCESS)) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (inline_change) {
zval_ptr_dtor(p);
}
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(p, &tmp);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void sync_entity_load_avg(struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
u64 last_update_time;
last_update_time = cfs_rq_last_update_time(cfs_rq);
__update_load_avg_blocked_se(last_update_time, cpu_of(rq_of(cfs_rq)), se);
}
|
void sync_entity_load_avg(struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
u64 last_update_time;
last_update_time = cfs_rq_last_update_time(cfs_rq);
__update_load_avg_blocked_se(last_update_time, cpu_of(rq_of(cfs_rq)), se);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void longArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(imp->longArrayMethod(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
|
static void longArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(imp->longArrayMethod(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5340
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5340/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12
|
4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12
|
Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
|
ZEND_API HashPosition ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_iterators_lower_pos(HashTable *ht, HashPosition start)
{
HashTableIterator *iter = EG(ht_iterators);
HashTableIterator *end = iter + EG(ht_iterators_used);
HashPosition res = HT_INVALID_IDX;
while (iter != end) {
if (iter->ht == ht) {
if (iter->pos >= start && iter->pos < res) {
res = iter->pos;
}
}
iter++;
}
return res;
}
|
ZEND_API HashPosition ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_iterators_lower_pos(HashTable *ht, HashPosition start)
{
HashTableIterator *iter = EG(ht_iterators);
HashTableIterator *end = iter + EG(ht_iterators_used);
HashPosition res = HT_INVALID_IDX;
while (iter != end) {
if (iter->ht == ht) {
if (iter->pos >= start && iter->pos < res) {
res = iter->pos;
}
}
iter++;
}
return res;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9084/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
|
static void vfio_intx_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
{
vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[0].unmask);
vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[0].mask);
vfio_intx_set_signal(vdev, -1);
vdev->irq_type = VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS;
vdev->num_ctx = 0;
kfree(vdev->ctx);
}
|
static void vfio_intx_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
{
vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[0].unmask);
vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[0].mask);
vfio_intx_set_signal(vdev, -1);
vdev->irq_type = VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS;
vdev->num_ctx = 0;
kfree(vdev->ctx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7909/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2571533bbb5b554ff47205c8ef1513ccc0817c3e
|
2571533bbb5b554ff47205c8ef1513ccc0817c3e
|
DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
|
Document& DocumentThreadableLoader::document() const
{
ASSERT(m_document);
return *m_document;
}
|
Document& DocumentThreadableLoader::document() const
{
ASSERT(m_document);
return *m_document;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6165/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4391ff2884fe15b8d609bd6d3af61aacf8ad52a1
|
4391ff2884fe15b8d609bd6d3af61aacf8ad52a1
|
Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::Reload(ReloadType reload_type,
bool check_for_repost) {
DCHECK_NE(ReloadType::NONE, reload_type);
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1) {
NavigationEntryImpl* transient_entry = GetTransientEntry();
if (!transient_entry)
return;
LoadURL(transient_entry->GetURL(),
Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD,
transient_entry->extra_headers());
return;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = nullptr;
int current_index = -1;
if (IsInitialNavigation() && pending_entry_) {
entry = pending_entry_;
current_index = pending_entry_index_;
} else {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
if (current_index != -1) {
entry = GetEntryAtIndex(current_index);
}
}
if (!entry)
return;
if (last_committed_reload_type_ != ReloadType::NONE) {
DCHECK(!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null());
base::Time now =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DCHECK_GT(now, last_committed_reload_time_);
if (!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null() &&
now > last_committed_reload_time_) {
base::TimeDelta delta = now - last_committed_reload_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("Navigation.Reload.ReloadToReloadDuration",
delta);
if (last_committed_reload_type_ == ReloadType::NORMAL) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Reload.ReloadMainResourceToReloadDuration", delta);
}
}
}
entry->set_reload_type(reload_type);
if (g_check_for_repost && check_for_repost &&
entry->GetHasPostData()) {
delegate_->NotifyBeforeFormRepostWarningShow();
pending_reload_ = reload_type;
delegate_->ActivateAndShowRepostFormWarningDialog();
} else {
if (!IsInitialNavigation())
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = entry->site_instance();
bool is_for_guests_only = site_instance && site_instance->HasProcess() &&
site_instance->GetProcess()->IsForGuestsOnly();
if (!is_for_guests_only && site_instance &&
site_instance->HasWrongProcessForURL(entry->GetURL())) {
NavigationEntryImpl* nav_entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
CreateNavigationEntry(entry->GetURL(), entry->GetReferrer(),
entry->GetTransitionType(), false,
entry->extra_headers(), browser_context_,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */)
.release());
reload_type = ReloadType::NONE;
nav_entry->set_should_replace_entry(true);
nav_entry->set_is_renderer_initiated(entry->is_renderer_initiated());
pending_entry_ = nav_entry;
DCHECK_EQ(-1, pending_entry_index_);
} else {
pending_entry_ = entry;
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
pending_entry_->SetTransitionType(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD);
}
NavigateToPendingEntry(reload_type, nullptr /* navigation_ui_data */);
}
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::Reload(ReloadType reload_type,
bool check_for_repost) {
DCHECK_NE(ReloadType::NONE, reload_type);
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1) {
NavigationEntryImpl* transient_entry = GetTransientEntry();
if (!transient_entry)
return;
LoadURL(transient_entry->GetURL(),
Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD,
transient_entry->extra_headers());
return;
}
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = nullptr;
int current_index = -1;
if (IsInitialNavigation() && pending_entry_) {
entry = pending_entry_;
current_index = pending_entry_index_;
} else {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
if (current_index != -1) {
entry = GetEntryAtIndex(current_index);
}
}
if (!entry)
return;
if (last_committed_reload_type_ != ReloadType::NONE) {
DCHECK(!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null());
base::Time now =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DCHECK_GT(now, last_committed_reload_time_);
if (!last_committed_reload_time_.is_null() &&
now > last_committed_reload_time_) {
base::TimeDelta delta = now - last_committed_reload_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("Navigation.Reload.ReloadToReloadDuration",
delta);
if (last_committed_reload_type_ == ReloadType::NORMAL) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Reload.ReloadMainResourceToReloadDuration", delta);
}
}
}
entry->set_reload_type(reload_type);
if (g_check_for_repost && check_for_repost &&
entry->GetHasPostData()) {
delegate_->NotifyBeforeFormRepostWarningShow();
pending_reload_ = reload_type;
delegate_->ActivateAndShowRepostFormWarningDialog();
} else {
if (!IsInitialNavigation())
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = entry->site_instance();
bool is_for_guests_only = site_instance && site_instance->HasProcess() &&
site_instance->GetProcess()->IsForGuestsOnly();
if (!is_for_guests_only && site_instance &&
site_instance->HasWrongProcessForURL(entry->GetURL())) {
NavigationEntryImpl* nav_entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
CreateNavigationEntry(entry->GetURL(), entry->GetReferrer(),
entry->GetTransitionType(), false,
entry->extra_headers(), browser_context_,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */)
.release());
reload_type = ReloadType::NONE;
nav_entry->set_should_replace_entry(true);
pending_entry_ = nav_entry;
DCHECK_EQ(-1, pending_entry_index_);
} else {
pending_entry_ = entry;
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
pending_entry_->SetTransitionType(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD);
}
NavigateToPendingEntry(reload_type, nullptr /* navigation_ui_data */);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-11592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11592/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/8a44b04b584b3d3ab1cb68fed410f7ecb165e50e
|
8a44b04b584b3d3ab1cb68fed410f7ecb165e50e
|
Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
|
void jswrap_graphics_drawCircle(JsVar *parent, int x, int y, int rad) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
graphicsDrawCircle(&gfx, (short)x,(short)y,(short)rad);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx); // gfx data changed because modified area
}
|
void jswrap_graphics_drawCircle(JsVar *parent, int x, int y, int rad) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
graphicsDrawCircle(&gfx, (short)x,(short)y,(short)rad);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx); // gfx data changed because modified area
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeShaderTranslator() {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeShaderTranslator");
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2 &&
(feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_webglsl ||
force_webgl_glsl_validation_) &&
!use_shader_translator_) {
use_shader_translator_ = true;
}
if (!use_shader_translator_) {
return true;
}
ShBuiltInResources resources;
ShInitBuiltInResources(&resources);
resources.MaxVertexAttribs = group_->max_vertex_attribs();
resources.MaxVertexUniformVectors =
group_->max_vertex_uniform_vectors();
resources.MaxVaryingVectors = group_->max_varying_vectors();
resources.MaxVertexTextureImageUnits =
group_->max_vertex_texture_image_units();
resources.MaxCombinedTextureImageUnits = group_->max_texture_units();
resources.MaxTextureImageUnits = group_->max_texture_image_units();
resources.MaxFragmentUniformVectors =
group_->max_fragment_uniform_vectors();
resources.MaxDrawBuffers = 1;
if (force_webgl_glsl_validation_) {
resources.OES_standard_derivatives = derivatives_explicitly_enabled_;
} else {
resources.OES_standard_derivatives =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_standard_derivatives ? 1 : 0;
resources.ARB_texture_rectangle =
feature_info_->feature_flags().arb_texture_rectangle ? 1 : 0;
}
ShShaderSpec shader_spec = force_webgl_glsl_validation_ ||
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_webglsl ?
SH_WEBGL_SPEC : SH_GLES2_SPEC;
ShaderTranslatorInterface::GlslImplementationType implementation_type =
gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2 ?
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslES : ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlsl;
ShaderTranslatorInterface::GlslBuiltInFunctionBehavior function_behavior =
needs_glsl_built_in_function_emulation_ ?
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslBuiltInFunctionEmulated :
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslBuiltInFunctionOriginal;
ShaderTranslatorCache* cache = ShaderTranslatorCache::GetInstance();
vertex_translator_ = cache->GetTranslator(
SH_VERTEX_SHADER, shader_spec, &resources,
implementation_type, function_behavior);
if (!vertex_translator_.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize vertex shader translator.";
Destroy(true);
return false;
}
fragment_translator_ = cache->GetTranslator(
SH_FRAGMENT_SHADER, shader_spec, &resources,
implementation_type, function_behavior);
if (!fragment_translator_.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize fragment shader translator.";
Destroy(true);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeShaderTranslator() {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeShaderTranslator");
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2 &&
(feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_webglsl ||
force_webgl_glsl_validation_) &&
!use_shader_translator_) {
use_shader_translator_ = true;
}
if (!use_shader_translator_) {
return true;
}
ShBuiltInResources resources;
ShInitBuiltInResources(&resources);
resources.MaxVertexAttribs = group_->max_vertex_attribs();
resources.MaxVertexUniformVectors =
group_->max_vertex_uniform_vectors();
resources.MaxVaryingVectors = group_->max_varying_vectors();
resources.MaxVertexTextureImageUnits =
group_->max_vertex_texture_image_units();
resources.MaxCombinedTextureImageUnits = group_->max_texture_units();
resources.MaxTextureImageUnits = group_->max_texture_image_units();
resources.MaxFragmentUniformVectors =
group_->max_fragment_uniform_vectors();
resources.MaxDrawBuffers = 1;
if (force_webgl_glsl_validation_) {
resources.OES_standard_derivatives = derivatives_explicitly_enabled_;
} else {
resources.OES_standard_derivatives =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_standard_derivatives ? 1 : 0;
resources.ARB_texture_rectangle =
feature_info_->feature_flags().arb_texture_rectangle ? 1 : 0;
}
ShShaderSpec shader_spec = force_webgl_glsl_validation_ ||
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_webglsl ?
SH_WEBGL_SPEC : SH_GLES2_SPEC;
ShaderTranslatorInterface::GlslImplementationType implementation_type =
gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2 ?
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslES : ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlsl;
ShaderTranslatorInterface::GlslBuiltInFunctionBehavior function_behavior =
needs_glsl_built_in_function_emulation_ ?
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslBuiltInFunctionEmulated :
ShaderTranslatorInterface::kGlslBuiltInFunctionOriginal;
ShaderTranslatorCache* cache = ShaderTranslatorCache::GetInstance();
vertex_translator_ = cache->GetTranslator(
SH_VERTEX_SHADER, shader_spec, &resources,
implementation_type, function_behavior);
if (!vertex_translator_.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize vertex shader translator.";
Destroy(true);
return false;
}
fragment_translator_ = cache->GetTranslator(
SH_FRAGMENT_SHADER, shader_spec, &resources,
implementation_type, function_behavior);
if (!fragment_translator_.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize fragment shader translator.";
Destroy(true);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0349/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static int hidp_setup_input(struct hidp_session *session,
struct hidp_connadd_req *req)
{
struct input_dev *input;
int i;
input = input_allocate_device();
if (!input)
return -ENOMEM;
session->input = input;
input_set_drvdata(input, session);
input->name = "Bluetooth HID Boot Protocol Device";
input->id.bustype = BUS_BLUETOOTH;
input->id.vendor = req->vendor;
input->id.product = req->product;
input->id.version = req->version;
if (req->subclass & 0x40) {
set_bit(EV_KEY, input->evbit);
set_bit(EV_LED, input->evbit);
set_bit(EV_REP, input->evbit);
set_bit(LED_NUML, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_CAPSL, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_SCROLLL, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_COMPOSE, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_KANA, input->ledbit);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hidp_keycode); i++)
set_bit(hidp_keycode[i], input->keybit);
clear_bit(0, input->keybit);
}
if (req->subclass & 0x80) {
input->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL);
input->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_LEFT) |
BIT_MASK(BTN_RIGHT) | BIT_MASK(BTN_MIDDLE);
input->relbit[0] = BIT_MASK(REL_X) | BIT_MASK(REL_Y);
input->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] |= BIT_MASK(BTN_SIDE) |
BIT_MASK(BTN_EXTRA);
input->relbit[0] |= BIT_MASK(REL_WHEEL);
}
input->dev.parent = &session->conn->dev;
input->event = hidp_input_event;
return 0;
}
|
static int hidp_setup_input(struct hidp_session *session,
struct hidp_connadd_req *req)
{
struct input_dev *input;
int i;
input = input_allocate_device();
if (!input)
return -ENOMEM;
session->input = input;
input_set_drvdata(input, session);
input->name = "Bluetooth HID Boot Protocol Device";
input->id.bustype = BUS_BLUETOOTH;
input->id.vendor = req->vendor;
input->id.product = req->product;
input->id.version = req->version;
if (req->subclass & 0x40) {
set_bit(EV_KEY, input->evbit);
set_bit(EV_LED, input->evbit);
set_bit(EV_REP, input->evbit);
set_bit(LED_NUML, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_CAPSL, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_SCROLLL, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_COMPOSE, input->ledbit);
set_bit(LED_KANA, input->ledbit);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hidp_keycode); i++)
set_bit(hidp_keycode[i], input->keybit);
clear_bit(0, input->keybit);
}
if (req->subclass & 0x80) {
input->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL);
input->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_LEFT) |
BIT_MASK(BTN_RIGHT) | BIT_MASK(BTN_MIDDLE);
input->relbit[0] = BIT_MASK(REL_X) | BIT_MASK(REL_Y);
input->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] |= BIT_MASK(BTN_SIDE) |
BIT_MASK(BTN_EXTRA);
input->relbit[0] |= BIT_MASK(REL_WHEEL);
}
input->dev.parent = &session->conn->dev;
input->event = hidp_input_event;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
int snd_card_file_add(struct snd_card *card, struct file *file)
{
struct snd_monitor_file *mfile;
mfile = kmalloc(sizeof(*mfile), GFP_KERNEL);
if (mfile == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
mfile->file = file;
mfile->disconnected_f_op = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mfile->shutdown_list);
spin_lock(&card->files_lock);
if (card->shutdown) {
spin_unlock(&card->files_lock);
kfree(mfile);
return -ENODEV;
}
list_add(&mfile->list, &card->files_list);
get_device(&card->card_dev);
spin_unlock(&card->files_lock);
return 0;
}
|
int snd_card_file_add(struct snd_card *card, struct file *file)
{
struct snd_monitor_file *mfile;
mfile = kmalloc(sizeof(*mfile), GFP_KERNEL);
if (mfile == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
mfile->file = file;
mfile->disconnected_f_op = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mfile->shutdown_list);
spin_lock(&card->files_lock);
if (card->shutdown) {
spin_unlock(&card->files_lock);
kfree(mfile);
return -ENODEV;
}
list_add(&mfile->list, &card->files_list);
get_device(&card->card_dev);
spin_unlock(&card->files_lock);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
fixed T36302429
|
const ZSTD_CDict* ZSTD_initStaticCDict(
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize,
const void* dict, size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_dictLoadMethod_e dictLoadMethod,
ZSTD_dictContentType_e dictContentType,
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams)
{
size_t const matchStateSize = ZSTD_sizeof_matchState(&cParams, /* forCCtx */ 0);
size_t const neededSize = sizeof(ZSTD_CDict) + (dictLoadMethod == ZSTD_dlm_byRef ? 0 : dictSize)
+ HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE + matchStateSize;
ZSTD_CDict* const cdict = (ZSTD_CDict*) workspace;
void* ptr;
if ((size_t)workspace & 7) return NULL; /* 8-aligned */
DEBUGLOG(4, "(workspaceSize < neededSize) : (%u < %u) => %u",
(U32)workspaceSize, (U32)neededSize, (U32)(workspaceSize < neededSize));
if (workspaceSize < neededSize) return NULL;
if (dictLoadMethod == ZSTD_dlm_byCopy) {
memcpy(cdict+1, dict, dictSize);
dict = cdict+1;
ptr = (char*)workspace + sizeof(ZSTD_CDict) + dictSize;
} else {
ptr = cdict+1;
}
cdict->workspace = ptr;
cdict->workspaceSize = HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE + matchStateSize;
if (ZSTD_isError( ZSTD_initCDict_internal(cdict,
dict, dictSize,
ZSTD_dlm_byRef, dictContentType,
cParams) ))
return NULL;
return cdict;
}
|
const ZSTD_CDict* ZSTD_initStaticCDict(
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize,
const void* dict, size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_dictLoadMethod_e dictLoadMethod,
ZSTD_dictContentType_e dictContentType,
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams)
{
size_t const matchStateSize = ZSTD_sizeof_matchState(&cParams, /* forCCtx */ 0);
size_t const neededSize = sizeof(ZSTD_CDict) + (dictLoadMethod == ZSTD_dlm_byRef ? 0 : dictSize)
+ HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE + matchStateSize;
ZSTD_CDict* const cdict = (ZSTD_CDict*) workspace;
void* ptr;
if ((size_t)workspace & 7) return NULL; /* 8-aligned */
DEBUGLOG(4, "(workspaceSize < neededSize) : (%u < %u) => %u",
(U32)workspaceSize, (U32)neededSize, (U32)(workspaceSize < neededSize));
if (workspaceSize < neededSize) return NULL;
if (dictLoadMethod == ZSTD_dlm_byCopy) {
memcpy(cdict+1, dict, dictSize);
dict = cdict+1;
ptr = (char*)workspace + sizeof(ZSTD_CDict) + dictSize;
} else {
ptr = cdict+1;
}
cdict->workspace = ptr;
cdict->workspaceSize = HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE + matchStateSize;
if (ZSTD_isError( ZSTD_initCDict_internal(cdict,
dict, dictSize,
ZSTD_dlm_byRef, dictContentType,
cParams) ))
return NULL;
return cdict;
}
|
C
|
zstd
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
Revert "OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder"
This reverts commit e656908dbda6ced2f4743a9b5c2ed926dc6b5b67.
Reason for revert: Appears to cause build failure on Android
[71296/78273] ACTION //content/public/android:content_java__process_prebuilt__bytecode_rewrite(//build/toolchain/android:android_clang_arm)
FAILED: obj/content/public/android/content_java__process_prebuilt-bytecode-rewritten.jar
python ../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py --script bin/helper/java_bytecode_rewriter [...removed for brevity, see link...]
Missing 2 classes missing in direct classpath. To fix, add GN deps for:
gen/third_party/blink/public/mojom/android_mojo_bindings_java.javac.jar
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 76, in <module>
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 72, in main
subprocess.check_call(cmd)
File "/b/swarming/w/ir/cipd_bin_packages/lib/python2.7/subprocess.py", line 186, in check_call
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, cmd)
(https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/android-rel/9664)
Original change's description:
> OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder
>
> This CL moves window_features.mojom, commit_result.mojom,
> devtools_frontend.mojom, selection_menu_behavior.mojom and
> remote_objects.mojom from public/platform/web to public/mojom/
> to gather mojom files to mojom folder and updates paths for these
> mojom files.
>
> Bug: 919393
> Change-Id: If6df031ed39d70e700986bd13a40d0598257e009
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1514434
> Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Julie Jeongeun Kim <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640633}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I5744072dbaeffba5706f329838e37d74c065ae27
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 919393
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1523386
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640688}
|
void FrameLoader::MarkAsLoading() {
DCHECK(!provisional_document_loader_);
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument()->IsLoadCompleted());
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument()->HasFinishedParsing());
progress_tracker_->ProgressStarted();
}
|
void FrameLoader::MarkAsLoading() {
DCHECK(!provisional_document_loader_);
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument()->IsLoadCompleted());
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument()->HasFinishedParsing());
progress_tracker_->ProgressStarted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static void clearSelect(sqlite3 *db, Select *p, int bFree){
while( p ){
Select *pPrior = p->pPrior;
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pEList);
sqlite3SrcListDelete(db, p->pSrc);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pWhere);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pGroupBy);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pHaving);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pOrderBy);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pLimit);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_WINDOWFUNC
if( OK_IF_ALWAYS_TRUE(p->pWinDefn) ){
sqlite3WindowListDelete(db, p->pWinDefn);
}
#endif
if( OK_IF_ALWAYS_TRUE(p->pWith) ) sqlite3WithDelete(db, p->pWith);
if( bFree ) sqlite3DbFreeNN(db, p);
p = pPrior;
bFree = 1;
}
}
|
static void clearSelect(sqlite3 *db, Select *p, int bFree){
while( p ){
Select *pPrior = p->pPrior;
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pEList);
sqlite3SrcListDelete(db, p->pSrc);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pWhere);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pGroupBy);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pHaving);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, p->pOrderBy);
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, p->pLimit);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_WINDOWFUNC
if( OK_IF_ALWAYS_TRUE(p->pWinDefn) ){
sqlite3WindowListDelete(db, p->pWinDefn);
}
#endif
if( OK_IF_ALWAYS_TRUE(p->pWith) ) sqlite3WithDelete(db, p->pWith);
if( bFree ) sqlite3DbFreeNN(db, p);
p = pPrior;
bFree = 1;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12897/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
|
CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
llc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
uint8_t dsap_field, dsap, ssap_field, ssap;
uint16_t control;
int hdrlen;
int is_u;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
dsap_field = *p;
ssap_field = *(p + 1);
/*
* OK, what type of LLC frame is this? The length
* of the control field depends on that - I frames
* have a two-byte control field, and U frames have
* a one-byte control field.
*/
control = *(p + 2);
if ((control & LLC_U_FMT) == LLC_U_FMT) {
/*
* U frame.
*/
is_u = 1;
hdrlen = 3; /* DSAP, SSAP, 1-byte control field */
} else {
/*
* The control field in I and S frames is
* 2 bytes...
*/
if (caplen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
/*
* ...and is little-endian.
*/
control = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2);
is_u = 0;
hdrlen = 4; /* DSAP, SSAP, 2-byte control field */
}
if (ssap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL && dsap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.3 IPX frame; it has an
* 802.3 header (i.e., an Ethernet header where the
* type/length field is <= ETHERMTU, i.e. it's a length
* field, not a type field), but has no 802.2 header -
* the IPX packet starts right after the Ethernet header,
* with a signature of two bytes of 0xFF (which is
* LLCSAP_GLOBAL).
*
* (It might also have been an Ethernet_802.3 IPX at
* one time, but got bridged onto another network,
* such as an 802.11 network; this has appeared in at
* least one capture file.)
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.3: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (0); /* no LLC header */
}
dsap = dsap_field & ~LLC_IG;
ssap = ssap_field & ~LLC_GSAP;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LLC, dsap %s (0x%02x) %s, ssap %s (0x%02x) %s",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", dsap),
dsap,
tok2str(llc_ig_flag_values, "Unknown", dsap_field & LLC_IG),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", ssap),
ssap,
tok2str(llc_flag_values, "Unknown", ssap_field & LLC_GSAP)));
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%02x: ", control));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%04x: ", control));
}
}
/*
* Skip LLC header.
*/
p += hdrlen;
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
if (ssap == LLCSAP_SNAP && dsap == LLCSAP_SNAP
&& control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* XXX - what *is* the right bridge pad value here?
* Does anybody ever bridge one form of LAN traffic
* over a networking type that uses 802.2 LLC?
*/
if (!snap_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst, 2)) {
/*
* Unknown packet type; tell our caller, by
* returning a negative value, so they
* can print the raw packet.
*/
return (-(hdrlen + 5)); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
} else
return (hdrlen + 5); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_8021D && dsap == LLCSAP_8021D &&
control == LLC_UI) {
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IP && dsap == LLCSAP_IP &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an RFC 948-style IP packet, with
* an 802.3 header and an 802.2 LLC header
* with the source and destination SAPs being
* the IP SAP.
*/
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IPX && dsap == LLCSAP_IPX &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.2 IPX frame, with an 802.3
* header and an 802.2 LLC header with the source and
* destination SAPs being the IPX SAP.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.2: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SMB
if (ssap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI && dsap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI
&& (!(control & LLC_S_FMT) || control == LLC_U_FMT)) {
/*
* we don't actually have a full netbeui parser yet, but the
* smb parser can handle many smb-in-netbeui packets, which
* is very useful, so we call that
*
* We don't call it for S frames, however, just I frames
* (which are frames that don't have the low-order bit,
* LLC_S_FMT, set in the first byte of the control field)
* and UI frames (whose control field is just 3, LLC_U_FMT).
*/
netbeui_print(ndo, control, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#endif
if (ssap == LLCSAP_ISONS && dsap == LLCSAP_ISONS
&& control == LLC_UI) {
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (ssap == dsap) {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
} else {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
}
}
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unnumbered, %s, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_cmd_values, "%02x", LLC_U_CMD(control)),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_U_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
if ((control & ~LLC_U_POLL) == LLC_XID) {
if (length == 0) {
/*
* XID with no payload.
* This could, for example, be an SNA
* "short form" XID.
*/
return (hdrlen);
}
if (caplen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (*p == LLC_XID_FI) {
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %02x %02x", p[1], p[2]));
return (hdrlen);
}
}
} else {
if ((control & LLC_S_FMT) == LLC_S_FMT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Supervisory, %s, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_supervisory_values,"?",LLC_S_CMD(control)),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
return (hdrlen); /* no payload to print */
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Information, send seq %u, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
LLC_I_NS(control),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
}
}
return (-hdrlen);
}
|
llc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
uint8_t dsap_field, dsap, ssap_field, ssap;
uint16_t control;
int hdrlen;
int is_u;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
dsap_field = *p;
ssap_field = *(p + 1);
/*
* OK, what type of LLC frame is this? The length
* of the control field depends on that - I frames
* have a two-byte control field, and U frames have
* a one-byte control field.
*/
control = *(p + 2);
if ((control & LLC_U_FMT) == LLC_U_FMT) {
/*
* U frame.
*/
is_u = 1;
hdrlen = 3; /* DSAP, SSAP, 1-byte control field */
} else {
/*
* The control field in I and S frames is
* 2 bytes...
*/
if (caplen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
/*
* ...and is little-endian.
*/
control = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2);
is_u = 0;
hdrlen = 4; /* DSAP, SSAP, 2-byte control field */
}
if (ssap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL && dsap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.3 IPX frame; it has an
* 802.3 header (i.e., an Ethernet header where the
* type/length field is <= ETHERMTU, i.e. it's a length
* field, not a type field), but has no 802.2 header -
* the IPX packet starts right after the Ethernet header,
* with a signature of two bytes of 0xFF (which is
* LLCSAP_GLOBAL).
*
* (It might also have been an Ethernet_802.3 IPX at
* one time, but got bridged onto another network,
* such as an 802.11 network; this has appeared in at
* least one capture file.)
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.3: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (0); /* no LLC header */
}
dsap = dsap_field & ~LLC_IG;
ssap = ssap_field & ~LLC_GSAP;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LLC, dsap %s (0x%02x) %s, ssap %s (0x%02x) %s",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", dsap),
dsap,
tok2str(llc_ig_flag_values, "Unknown", dsap_field & LLC_IG),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", ssap),
ssap,
tok2str(llc_flag_values, "Unknown", ssap_field & LLC_GSAP)));
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%02x: ", control));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%04x: ", control));
}
}
/*
* Skip LLC header.
*/
p += hdrlen;
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
if (ssap == LLCSAP_SNAP && dsap == LLCSAP_SNAP
&& control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* XXX - what *is* the right bridge pad value here?
* Does anybody ever bridge one form of LAN traffic
* over a networking type that uses 802.2 LLC?
*/
if (!snap_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst, 2)) {
/*
* Unknown packet type; tell our caller, by
* returning a negative value, so they
* can print the raw packet.
*/
return (-(hdrlen + 5)); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
} else
return (hdrlen + 5); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_8021D && dsap == LLCSAP_8021D &&
control == LLC_UI) {
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IP && dsap == LLCSAP_IP &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an RFC 948-style IP packet, with
* an 802.3 header and an 802.2 LLC header
* with the source and destination SAPs being
* the IP SAP.
*/
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IPX && dsap == LLCSAP_IPX &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.2 IPX frame, with an 802.3
* header and an 802.2 LLC header with the source and
* destination SAPs being the IPX SAP.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.2: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SMB
if (ssap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI && dsap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI
&& (!(control & LLC_S_FMT) || control == LLC_U_FMT)) {
/*
* we don't actually have a full netbeui parser yet, but the
* smb parser can handle many smb-in-netbeui packets, which
* is very useful, so we call that
*
* We don't call it for S frames, however, just I frames
* (which are frames that don't have the low-order bit,
* LLC_S_FMT, set in the first byte of the control field)
* and UI frames (whose control field is just 3, LLC_U_FMT).
*/
netbeui_print(ndo, control, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#endif
if (ssap == LLCSAP_ISONS && dsap == LLCSAP_ISONS
&& control == LLC_UI) {
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (ssap == dsap) {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
} else {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
}
}
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unnumbered, %s, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_cmd_values, "%02x", LLC_U_CMD(control)),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_U_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
if ((control & ~LLC_U_POLL) == LLC_XID) {
if (length == 0) {
/*
* XID with no payload.
* This could, for example, be an SNA
* "short form" XID.
*/
return (hdrlen);
}
if (caplen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (*p == LLC_XID_FI) {
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %02x %02x", p[1], p[2]));
return (hdrlen);
}
}
} else {
if ((control & LLC_S_FMT) == LLC_S_FMT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Supervisory, %s, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_supervisory_values,"?",LLC_S_CMD(control)),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
return (hdrlen); /* no payload to print */
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Information, send seq %u, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
LLC_I_NS(control),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
}
}
return (-hdrlen);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5067/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/83588d6ed473f923a46484958d440da0b8a51b1b
|
83588d6ed473f923a46484958d440da0b8a51b1b
|
media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
|
size_t ImageProcessorClient::GetNumOfProcessedImages() const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(output_lock_);
return num_processed_frames_;
}
|
size_t ImageProcessorClient::GetNumOfProcessedImages() const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(output_lock_);
return num_processed_frames_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/59f5e0204cbc0e524b2687fb1beddda82047d16d
|
59f5e0204cbc0e524b2687fb1beddda82047d16d
|
AutoFill: Record whether the user initiated the form submission and don't save form data if the form was not user-submitted.
BUG=48225
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2842062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@53350 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutoFillManager::OnHeuristicsRequestError(
const std::string& form_signature,
AutoFillDownloadManager::AutoFillRequestType request_type,
int http_error) {
}
|
void AutoFillManager::OnHeuristicsRequestError(
const std::string& form_signature,
AutoFillDownloadManager::AutoFillRequestType request_type,
int http_error) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnGraphicsInfoCollected(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
TRACE_EVENT0("test_gpu", "OnGraphicsInfoCollected");
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuInfo(gpu_info);
}
|
void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnGraphicsInfoCollected(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
TRACE_EVENT0("test_gpu", "OnGraphicsInfoCollected");
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuInfo(gpu_info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16528
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16528/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57
|
fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57
|
ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int __init alsa_seq_device_init(void)
{
int err;
err = bus_register(&snd_seq_bus_type);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = seq_dev_proc_init();
if (err < 0)
bus_unregister(&snd_seq_bus_type);
return err;
}
|
static int __init alsa_seq_device_init(void)
{
int err;
err = bus_register(&snd_seq_bus_type);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = seq_dev_proc_init();
if (err < 0)
bus_unregister(&snd_seq_bus_type);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2801
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2801/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f837b6744eb9ca9d8e4f2e93d9118bf787ca5e24
|
f837b6744eb9ca9d8e4f2e93d9118bf787ca5e24
|
Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::GetSyncIdForTaggedNode(const std::string& tag,
int64* sync_id) {
sync_api::ReadTransaction trans(sync_service_->GetUserShare());
sync_api::ReadNode sync_node(&trans);
if (!sync_node.InitByTagLookup(tag.c_str()))
return false;
*sync_id = sync_node.GetId();
return true;
}
|
bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::GetSyncIdForTaggedNode(const std::string& tag,
int64* sync_id) {
sync_api::ReadTransaction trans(sync_service_->GetUserShare());
sync_api::ReadNode sync_node(&trans);
if (!sync_node.InitByTagLookup(tag.c_str()))
return false;
*sync_id = sync_node.GetId();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4611
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4611/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36
|
206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36
|
lz4: ensure length does not wrap
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int lz4_decompress(const unsigned char *src, size_t *src_len,
unsigned char *dest, size_t actual_dest_len)
{
int ret = -1;
int input_len = 0;
input_len = lz4_uncompress(src, dest, actual_dest_len);
if (input_len < 0)
goto exit_0;
*src_len = input_len;
return 0;
exit_0:
return ret;
}
|
int lz4_decompress(const unsigned char *src, size_t *src_len,
unsigned char *dest, size_t actual_dest_len)
{
int ret = -1;
int input_len = 0;
input_len = lz4_uncompress(src, dest, actual_dest_len);
if (input_len < 0)
goto exit_0;
*src_len = input_len;
return 0;
exit_0:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<Touch> Document::createTouch(DOMWindow* window, EventTarget* target, int identifier, int pageX, int pageY, int screenX, int screenY, int radiusX, int radiusY, float rotationAngle, float force, ExceptionCode&) const
{
Frame* frame = window ? window->frame() : this->frame();
return Touch::create(frame, target, identifier, screenX, screenY, pageX, pageY, radiusX, radiusY, rotationAngle, force);
}
|
PassRefPtr<Touch> Document::createTouch(DOMWindow* window, EventTarget* target, int identifier, int pageX, int pageY, int screenX, int screenY, int radiusX, int radiusY, float rotationAngle, float force, ExceptionCode&) const
{
Frame* frame = window ? window->frame() : this->frame();
return Touch::create(frame, target, identifier, screenX, screenY, pageX, pageY, radiusX, radiusY, rotationAngle, force);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void free_sched_group_rcu(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
/* now it should be safe to free those cfs_rqs */
free_sched_group(container_of(rhp, struct task_group, rcu));
}
|
static void free_sched_group_rcu(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
/* now it should be safe to free those cfs_rqs */
free_sched_group(container_of(rhp, struct task_group, rcu));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20961
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20961/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
|
USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void f_midi_transmit(struct f_midi *midi)
{
struct usb_ep *ep = midi->in_ep;
int ret;
unsigned long flags;
/* We only care about USB requests if IN endpoint is enabled */
if (!ep || !ep->enabled)
goto drop_out;
spin_lock_irqsave(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
do {
ret = f_midi_do_transmit(midi, ep);
if (ret < 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
goto drop_out;
}
} while (ret);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
return;
drop_out:
f_midi_drop_out_substreams(midi);
}
|
static void f_midi_transmit(struct f_midi *midi)
{
struct usb_ep *ep = midi->in_ep;
int ret;
unsigned long flags;
/* We only care about USB requests if IN endpoint is enabled */
if (!ep || !ep->enabled)
goto drop_out;
spin_lock_irqsave(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
do {
ret = f_midi_do_transmit(midi, ep);
if (ret < 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
goto drop_out;
}
} while (ret);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&midi->transmit_lock, flags);
return;
drop_out:
f_midi_drop_out_substreams(midi);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_unescape_bytea)
{
char *from = NULL, *to = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
size_t to_len;
int from_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if HAVE_PQUNESCAPEBYTEA
tmp = (char *)PQunescapeBytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
to = estrndup(tmp, to_len);
PQfreemem(tmp);
#else
to = (char *)php_pgsql_unescape_bytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
#endif
if (!to) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(to, to_len, 0);
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_unescape_bytea)
{
char *from = NULL, *to = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
size_t to_len;
int from_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if HAVE_PQUNESCAPEBYTEA
tmp = (char *)PQunescapeBytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
to = estrndup(tmp, to_len);
PQfreemem(tmp);
#else
to = (char *)php_pgsql_unescape_bytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
#endif
if (!to) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(to, to_len, 0);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4344/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc
|
a7886f0ed1277c69142b14a2c6629175a6331edc
|
Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
|
spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8866
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8866/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
|
de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
| null |
static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
php_libxml_initialize();
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_VERSION", LIBXML_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION", LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_LOADED_VERSION", (char *)xmlParserVersion, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* For use with loading xml */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOENT", XML_PARSE_NOENT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDLOAD", XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDATTR", XML_PARSE_DTDATTR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDVALID", XML_PARSE_DTDVALID, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOERROR", XML_PARSE_NOERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOWARNING", XML_PARSE_NOWARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOBLANKS", XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_XINCLUDE", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NSCLEAN", XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOCDATA", XML_PARSE_NOCDATA, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NONET", XML_PARSE_NONET, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PEDANTIC", XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20621
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_COMPACT", XML_PARSE_COMPACT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOXMLDECL", XML_SAVE_NO_DECL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PARSEHUGE", XML_PARSE_HUGE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOEMPTYTAG", LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Schema validation options */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED) && LIBXML_VERSION >= 20614
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_SCHEMA_CREATE", XML_SCHEMA_VAL_VC_I_CREATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Additional constants for use with loading html */
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20707
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED", HTML_PARSE_NOIMPLIED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20708
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD", HTML_PARSE_NODEFDTD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Error levels */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_NONE", XML_ERR_NONE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_WARNING", XML_ERR_WARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_ERROR", XML_ERR_ERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_FATAL", XML_ERR_FATAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "LibXMLError", NULL);
libxmlerror_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
if (sapi_module.name) {
static const char * const supported_sapis[] = {
"cgi-fcgi",
"fpm-fcgi",
"litespeed",
NULL
};
const char * const *sapi_name;
for (sapi_name = supported_sapis; *sapi_name; sapi_name++) {
if (strcmp(sapi_module.name, *sapi_name) == 0) {
_php_libxml_per_request_initialization = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (!_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
php_libxml_initialize();
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_VERSION", LIBXML_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION", LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_LOADED_VERSION", (char *)xmlParserVersion, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* For use with loading xml */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOENT", XML_PARSE_NOENT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDLOAD", XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDATTR", XML_PARSE_DTDATTR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDVALID", XML_PARSE_DTDVALID, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOERROR", XML_PARSE_NOERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOWARNING", XML_PARSE_NOWARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOBLANKS", XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_XINCLUDE", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NSCLEAN", XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOCDATA", XML_PARSE_NOCDATA, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NONET", XML_PARSE_NONET, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PEDANTIC", XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20621
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_COMPACT", XML_PARSE_COMPACT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOXMLDECL", XML_SAVE_NO_DECL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PARSEHUGE", XML_PARSE_HUGE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOEMPTYTAG", LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Schema validation options */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED) && LIBXML_VERSION >= 20614
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_SCHEMA_CREATE", XML_SCHEMA_VAL_VC_I_CREATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Additional constants for use with loading html */
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20707
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED", HTML_PARSE_NOIMPLIED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20708
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD", HTML_PARSE_NODEFDTD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Error levels */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_NONE", XML_ERR_NONE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_WARNING", XML_ERR_WARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_ERROR", XML_ERR_ERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_FATAL", XML_ERR_FATAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "LibXMLError", NULL);
libxmlerror_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
if (sapi_module.name) {
static const char * const supported_sapis[] = {
"cgi-fcgi",
"fpm-fcgi",
"litespeed",
NULL
};
const char * const *sapi_name;
for (sapi_name = supported_sapis; *sapi_name; sapi_name++) {
if (strcmp(sapi_module.name, *sapi_name) == 0) {
_php_libxml_per_request_initialization = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (!_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t shrink_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return 0;
}
|
static ssize_t shrink_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void LayoutTestContentRendererClient::WebTestProxyCreated(
RenderView* render_view,
WebTestProxyBase* proxy) {
BlinkTestRunner* test_runner = new BlinkTestRunner(render_view);
test_runner->set_proxy(proxy);
if (!LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_delegate()) {
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->SetTestDelegate(
test_runner);
}
proxy->SetInterfaces(
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_interfaces());
test_runner->proxy()->SetDelegate(
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_delegate());
}
|
void LayoutTestContentRendererClient::WebTestProxyCreated(
RenderView* render_view,
WebTestProxyBase* proxy) {
BlinkTestRunner* test_runner = new BlinkTestRunner(render_view);
test_runner->set_proxy(proxy);
if (!LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_delegate()) {
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->SetTestDelegate(
test_runner);
}
proxy->SetInterfaces(
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_interfaces());
test_runner->proxy()->SetDelegate(
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_delegate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static int instance_rmdir(const char *name)
{
struct trace_array *tr;
int found = 0;
int ret;
int i;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
ret = -ENODEV;
list_for_each_entry(tr, &ftrace_trace_arrays, list) {
if (tr->name && strcmp(tr->name, name) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
goto out_unlock;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (tr->ref || (tr->current_trace && tr->current_trace->ref))
goto out_unlock;
list_del(&tr->list);
/* Disable all the flags that were enabled coming in */
for (i = 0; i < TRACE_FLAGS_MAX_SIZE; i++) {
if ((1 << i) & ZEROED_TRACE_FLAGS)
set_tracer_flag(tr, 1 << i, 0);
}
tracing_set_nop(tr);
clear_ftrace_function_probes(tr);
event_trace_del_tracer(tr);
ftrace_clear_pids(tr);
ftrace_destroy_function_files(tr);
tracefs_remove_recursive(tr->dir);
free_trace_buffers(tr);
for (i = 0; i < tr->nr_topts; i++) {
kfree(tr->topts[i].topts);
}
kfree(tr->topts);
free_cpumask_var(tr->tracing_cpumask);
kfree(tr->name);
kfree(tr);
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
static int instance_rmdir(const char *name)
{
struct trace_array *tr;
int found = 0;
int ret;
int i;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
ret = -ENODEV;
list_for_each_entry(tr, &ftrace_trace_arrays, list) {
if (tr->name && strcmp(tr->name, name) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
goto out_unlock;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (tr->ref || (tr->current_trace && tr->current_trace->ref))
goto out_unlock;
list_del(&tr->list);
/* Disable all the flags that were enabled coming in */
for (i = 0; i < TRACE_FLAGS_MAX_SIZE; i++) {
if ((1 << i) & ZEROED_TRACE_FLAGS)
set_tracer_flag(tr, 1 << i, 0);
}
tracing_set_nop(tr);
clear_ftrace_function_probes(tr);
event_trace_del_tracer(tr);
ftrace_clear_pids(tr);
ftrace_destroy_function_files(tr);
tracefs_remove_recursive(tr->dir);
free_trace_buffers(tr);
for (i = 0; i < tr->nr_topts; i++) {
kfree(tr->topts[i].topts);
}
kfree(tr->topts);
free_cpumask_var(tr->tracing_cpumask);
kfree(tr->name);
kfree(tr);
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
Don't interpret embeded NULLs in a response header line as a line terminator.
BUG=95992
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100863 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool HttpResponseHeaders::HasHeaderValue(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value) const {
void* iter = NULL;
std::string temp;
while (EnumerateHeader(&iter, name, &temp)) {
if (value.size() == temp.size() &&
std::equal(temp.begin(), temp.end(), value.begin(),
base::CaseInsensitiveCompare<char>()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool HttpResponseHeaders::HasHeaderValue(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value) const {
void* iter = NULL;
std::string temp;
while (EnumerateHeader(&iter, name, &temp)) {
if (value.size() == temp.size() &&
std::equal(temp.begin(), temp.end(), value.begin(),
base::CaseInsensitiveCompare<char>()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8633
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8633/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <[email protected]>
|
static void set_carrier_state(struct fwnet_device *dev)
{
if (dev->peer_count > 1)
netif_carrier_on(dev->netdev);
else
netif_carrier_off(dev->netdev);
}
|
static void set_carrier_state(struct fwnet_device *dev)
{
if (dev->peer_count > 1)
netif_carrier_on(dev->netdev);
else
netif_carrier_off(dev->netdev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const AutocompleteResult& AutocompleteEditModel::result() const {
return autocomplete_controller_->result();
}
|
const AutocompleteResult& AutocompleteEditModel::result() const {
return autocomplete_controller_->result();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3160
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3160/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee281f7cac9df44fe241a37f188b28be8845ded0
|
ee281f7cac9df44fe241a37f188b28be8845ded0
|
Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ResourceFetcher::addAdditionalRequestHeaders(ResourceRequest& request, Resource::Type type)
{
if (!frame())
return;
if (request.cachePolicy() == UseProtocolCachePolicy)
request.setCachePolicy(resourceRequestCachePolicy(request, type));
if (request.targetType() == ResourceRequest::TargetIsUnspecified)
determineTargetType(request, type);
if (type == Resource::LinkPrefetch || type == Resource::LinkSubresource)
request.setHTTPHeaderField("Purpose", "prefetch");
context().addAdditionalRequestHeaders(document(), request, (type == Resource::MainResource) ? FetchMainResource : FetchSubresource);
}
|
void ResourceFetcher::addAdditionalRequestHeaders(ResourceRequest& request, Resource::Type type)
{
if (!frame())
return;
if (request.cachePolicy() == UseProtocolCachePolicy)
request.setCachePolicy(resourceRequestCachePolicy(request, type));
if (request.targetType() == ResourceRequest::TargetIsUnspecified)
determineTargetType(request, type);
if (type == Resource::LinkPrefetch || type == Resource::LinkSubresource)
request.setHTTPHeaderField("Purpose", "prefetch");
context().addAdditionalRequestHeaders(document(), request, (type == Resource::MainResource) ? FetchMainResource : FetchSubresource);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int sparc_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct perf_event *evts[MAX_HWEVENTS];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
unsigned long events[MAX_HWEVENTS];
int current_idx_dmy[MAX_HWEVENTS];
const struct perf_event_map *pmap;
int n;
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
switch (attr->type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
if (attr->config >= sparc_pmu->max_events)
return -EINVAL;
pmap = sparc_pmu->event_map(attr->config);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
pmap = sparc_map_cache_event(attr->config);
if (IS_ERR(pmap))
return PTR_ERR(pmap);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
pmap = NULL;
break;
default:
return -ENOENT;
}
if (pmap) {
hwc->event_base = perf_event_encode(pmap);
} else {
/*
* User gives us "(encoding << 16) | pic_mask" for
* PERF_TYPE_RAW events.
*/
hwc->event_base = attr->config;
}
/* We save the enable bits in the config_base. */
hwc->config_base = sparc_pmu->irq_bit;
if (!attr->exclude_user)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_UTRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_STRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_hv)
hwc->config_base |= sparc_pmu->hv_bit;
n = 0;
if (event->group_leader != event) {
n = collect_events(event->group_leader,
MAX_HWEVENTS - 1,
evts, events, current_idx_dmy);
if (n < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
events[n] = hwc->event_base;
evts[n] = event;
if (check_excludes(evts, n, 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (sparc_check_constraints(evts, events, n + 1))
return -EINVAL;
hwc->idx = PIC_NO_INDEX;
/* Try to do all error checking before this point, as unwinding
* state after grabbing the PMC is difficult.
*/
perf_event_grab_pmc();
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
if (!hwc->sample_period) {
hwc->sample_period = MAX_PERIOD;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int sparc_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct perf_event *evts[MAX_HWEVENTS];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
unsigned long events[MAX_HWEVENTS];
int current_idx_dmy[MAX_HWEVENTS];
const struct perf_event_map *pmap;
int n;
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
switch (attr->type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
if (attr->config >= sparc_pmu->max_events)
return -EINVAL;
pmap = sparc_pmu->event_map(attr->config);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
pmap = sparc_map_cache_event(attr->config);
if (IS_ERR(pmap))
return PTR_ERR(pmap);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
pmap = NULL;
break;
default:
return -ENOENT;
}
if (pmap) {
hwc->event_base = perf_event_encode(pmap);
} else {
/*
* User gives us "(encoding << 16) | pic_mask" for
* PERF_TYPE_RAW events.
*/
hwc->event_base = attr->config;
}
/* We save the enable bits in the config_base. */
hwc->config_base = sparc_pmu->irq_bit;
if (!attr->exclude_user)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_UTRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_STRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_hv)
hwc->config_base |= sparc_pmu->hv_bit;
n = 0;
if (event->group_leader != event) {
n = collect_events(event->group_leader,
MAX_HWEVENTS - 1,
evts, events, current_idx_dmy);
if (n < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
events[n] = hwc->event_base;
evts[n] = event;
if (check_excludes(evts, n, 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (sparc_check_constraints(evts, events, n + 1))
return -EINVAL;
hwc->idx = PIC_NO_INDEX;
/* Try to do all error checking before this point, as unwinding
* state after grabbing the PMC is difficult.
*/
perf_event_grab_pmc();
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
if (!hwc->sample_period) {
hwc->sample_period = MAX_PERIOD;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::LoadProgressChanged(double progress) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
load_progress_ = progress * 100;
emit q->loadProgressChanged();
}
|
void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::LoadProgressChanged(double progress) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
load_progress_ = progress * 100;
emit q->loadProgressChanged();
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
double GfxState::getTransformedFontSize() {
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
x1 = textMat[2] * fontSize;
y1 = textMat[3] * fontSize;
x2 = ctm[0] * x1 + ctm[2] * y1;
y2 = ctm[1] * x1 + ctm[3] * y1;
return sqrt(x2 * x2 + y2 * y2);
}
|
double GfxState::getTransformedFontSize() {
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
x1 = textMat[2] * fontSize;
y1 = textMat[3] * fontSize;
x2 = ctm[0] * x1 + ctm[2] * y1;
y2 = ctm[1] * x1 + ctm[3] * y1;
return sqrt(x2 * x2 + y2 * y2);
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err edts_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_EditBox *p;
p = (GF_EditBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "EditBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->editList, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ELST);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("EditBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err edts_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_EditBox *p;
p = (GF_EditBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "EditBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->editList, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ELST);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("EditBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2859
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2859/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const ExtensionList* ExtensionService::terminated_extensions() const {
return &terminated_extensions_;
}
|
const ExtensionList* ExtensionService::terminated_extensions() const {
return &terminated_extensions_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7916/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
set_nlink(inode, 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff)));
d_set_d_op(dentry, &pid_dentry_operations);
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* Close the race of the process dying before we return the dentry */
if (pid_revalidate(dentry, 0))
return 0;
out:
return -ENOENT;
}
|
static int proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
set_nlink(inode, 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff)));
d_set_d_op(dentry, &pid_dentry_operations);
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* Close the race of the process dying before we return the dentry */
if (pid_revalidate(dentry, 0))
return 0;
out:
return -ENOENT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1613
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
void TestTransitionFromActiveToPendingFreeze() {
content::SetupCrossSiteRedirector(embedded_test_server());
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->Start());
GURL main_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/iframe_cross_site.html"));
OpenTwoTabs(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIAboutURL), main_url);
constexpr int kFreezingIndex = 1;
LifecycleUnit* const lifecycle_unit = GetLifecycleUnitAt(kFreezingIndex);
content::WebContents* const content = GetWebContentsAt(kFreezingIndex);
content::RenderFrameHost* main_frame = content->GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_EQ(3u, content->GetAllFrames().size());
content::RenderFrameHost* child_frame = content->GetAllFrames()[1];
EXPECT_FALSE(content::SiteInstance::IsSameWebSite(
browser()->profile(), main_frame->GetLastCommittedURL(),
child_frame->GetLastCommittedURL()));
if (content::AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
child_frame->GetProcess()->GetID());
}
bool hidden_state_result;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
main_frame,
"window.domAutomationController.send("
"window.document.hidden);",
&hidden_state_result));
EXPECT_TRUE(hidden_state_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
main_frame,
"if (window.location.pathname != '/iframe_cross_site.html')"
" throw 'Incorrect frame';"
"mainFrameFreezeCount = 0;"
"window.document.onfreeze = function(){ mainFrameFreezeCount++; };"));
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
child_frame,
"if (window.location.pathname != '/title1.html') throw 'Incorrect "
"frame';"
"childFrameFreezeCount = 0;"
"window.document.onfreeze = function(){ childFrameFreezeCount++; };"));
int freeze_count_result;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
main_frame, kMainFrameFrozenStateJS, &freeze_count_result));
EXPECT_EQ(0, freeze_count_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
child_frame, kChildFrameFrozenStateJS, &freeze_count_result));
EXPECT_EQ(0, freeze_count_result);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(lifecycle_unit->Freeze());
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::PENDING_FREEZE, lifecycle_unit->GetState());
}
|
void TestTransitionFromActiveToPendingFreeze() {
content::SetupCrossSiteRedirector(embedded_test_server());
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->Start());
GURL main_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/iframe_cross_site.html"));
OpenTwoTabs(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIAboutURL), main_url);
constexpr int kFreezingIndex = 1;
LifecycleUnit* const lifecycle_unit = GetLifecycleUnitAt(kFreezingIndex);
content::WebContents* const content = GetWebContentsAt(kFreezingIndex);
content::RenderFrameHost* main_frame = content->GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_EQ(3u, content->GetAllFrames().size());
content::RenderFrameHost* child_frame = content->GetAllFrames()[1];
EXPECT_FALSE(content::SiteInstance::IsSameWebSite(
browser()->profile(), main_frame->GetLastCommittedURL(),
child_frame->GetLastCommittedURL()));
if (content::AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
child_frame->GetProcess()->GetID());
}
bool hidden_state_result;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
main_frame,
"window.domAutomationController.send("
"window.document.hidden);",
&hidden_state_result));
EXPECT_TRUE(hidden_state_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
main_frame,
"if (window.location.pathname != '/iframe_cross_site.html')"
" throw 'Incorrect frame';"
"mainFrameFreezeCount = 0;"
"window.document.onfreeze = function(){ mainFrameFreezeCount++; };"));
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
child_frame,
"if (window.location.pathname != '/title1.html') throw 'Incorrect "
"frame';"
"childFrameFreezeCount = 0;"
"window.document.onfreeze = function(){ childFrameFreezeCount++; };"));
int freeze_count_result;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
main_frame, kMainFrameFrozenStateJS, &freeze_count_result));
EXPECT_EQ(0, freeze_count_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
child_frame, kChildFrameFrozenStateJS, &freeze_count_result));
EXPECT_EQ(0, freeze_count_result);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(lifecycle_unit->Freeze());
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::PENDING_FREEZE, lifecycle_unit->GetState());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texStorage3D(GLenum target,
GLsizei levels,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateTexStorage("texStorage3D", target, levels, internalformat, width,
height, depth, kTexStorageType3D))
return;
ContextGL()->TexStorage3D(target, levels, internalformat, width, height,
depth);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texStorage3D(GLenum target,
GLsizei levels,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateTexStorage("texStorage3D", target, levels, internalformat, width,
height, depth, kTexStorageType3D))
return;
ContextGL()->TexStorage3D(target, levels, internalformat, width, height,
depth);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6905
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6905/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/01c61f8ab110a77ae64b5ca67c244c728c506f03
|
01c61f8ab110a77ae64b5ca67c244c728c506f03
|
Proper fix for #248
|
int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & !TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) >= image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size);
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) >= image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
|
int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & 127 ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if (encoded_pixels != 0) {
if (!((buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) < image_block_size)) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
}
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if (encoded_pixels != 0) {
if (!((buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) < image_block_size)) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for( j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++ ) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
}
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16435
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16435/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/768f70ca405cd3159d990e962d54456773bb8cf8
|
768f70ca405cd3159d990e962d54456773bb8cf8
|
Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
|
void Skip(cmsIT8* it8, SYMBOL sy)
{
if (it8->sy == sy && it8->sy != SEOF)
InSymbol(it8);
}
|
void Skip(cmsIT8* it8, SYMBOL sy)
{
if (it8->sy == sy && it8->sy != SEOF)
InSymbol(it8);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.