CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> FillLocation(const String& url,
const TextPosition& text_position) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("url", url);
value->SetInteger("lineNumber", text_position.line_.OneBasedInt());
value->SetInteger("columnNumber", text_position.column_.OneBasedInt());
return value;
}
|
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> FillLocation(const String& url,
const TextPosition& text_position) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("url", url);
value->SetInteger("lineNumber", text_position.line_.OneBasedInt());
value->SetInteger("columnNumber", text_position.column_.OneBasedInt());
return value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
GapRects LayoutBlockFlow::selectionGapRectsForPaintInvalidation(const LayoutBoxModelObject* paintInvalidationContainer) const
{
ASSERT(!needsLayout());
if (!shouldPaintSelectionGaps())
return GapRects();
TransformState transformState(TransformState::ApplyTransformDirection, FloatPoint());
mapLocalToContainer(paintInvalidationContainer, transformState, ApplyContainerFlip | UseTransforms);
LayoutPoint offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer = roundedLayoutPoint(transformState.mappedPoint());
if (hasOverflowClip())
offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer -= scrolledContentOffset();
LayoutUnit lastTop = 0;
LayoutUnit lastLeft = logicalLeftSelectionOffset(this, lastTop);
LayoutUnit lastRight = logicalRightSelectionOffset(this, lastTop);
return selectionGaps(this, offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer, LayoutSize(), lastTop, lastLeft, lastRight);
}
|
GapRects LayoutBlockFlow::selectionGapRectsForPaintInvalidation(const LayoutBoxModelObject* paintInvalidationContainer) const
{
ASSERT(!needsLayout());
if (!shouldPaintSelectionGaps())
return GapRects();
TransformState transformState(TransformState::ApplyTransformDirection, FloatPoint());
mapLocalToContainer(paintInvalidationContainer, transformState, ApplyContainerFlip | UseTransforms);
LayoutPoint offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer = roundedLayoutPoint(transformState.mappedPoint());
if (hasOverflowClip())
offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer -= scrolledContentOffset();
LayoutUnit lastTop = 0;
LayoutUnit lastLeft = logicalLeftSelectionOffset(this, lastTop);
LayoutUnit lastRight = logicalRightSelectionOffset(this, lastTop);
return selectionGaps(this, offsetFromPaintInvalidationContainer, LayoutSize(), lastTop, lastLeft, lastRight);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
|
Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN)
{
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
|
static inline int32_t utf32_at_internal(const char* cur, size_t *num_read)
{
const char first_char = *cur;
if ((first_char & 0x80) == 0) { // ASCII
*num_read = 1;
return *cur;
}
cur++;
char32_t mask, to_ignore_mask;
size_t num_to_read = 0;
char32_t utf32 = first_char;
for (num_to_read = 1, mask = 0x40, to_ignore_mask = 0xFFFFFF80;
(first_char & mask);
num_to_read++, to_ignore_mask |= mask, mask >>= 1) {
utf32 = (utf32 << 6) + (*cur++ & 0x3F);
}
to_ignore_mask |= mask;
utf32 &= ~(to_ignore_mask << (6 * (num_to_read - 1)));
*num_read = num_to_read;
return static_cast<int32_t>(utf32);
}
|
static inline int32_t utf32_at_internal(const char* cur, size_t *num_read)
{
const char first_char = *cur;
if ((first_char & 0x80) == 0) { // ASCII
*num_read = 1;
return *cur;
}
cur++;
char32_t mask, to_ignore_mask;
size_t num_to_read = 0;
char32_t utf32 = first_char;
for (num_to_read = 1, mask = 0x40, to_ignore_mask = 0xFFFFFF80;
(first_char & mask);
num_to_read++, to_ignore_mask |= mask, mask >>= 1) {
utf32 = (utf32 << 6) + (*cur++ & 0x3F);
}
to_ignore_mask |= mask;
utf32 &= ~(to_ignore_mask << (6 * (num_to_read - 1)));
*num_read = num_to_read;
return static_cast<int32_t>(utf32);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
}
|
static inline void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9203/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
a4f247707f08e322f0b41e82c3e06e224240a654
|
Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1U<<(unsigned int)i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1U<<(unsigned int)i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void readonlyDOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, static_cast<double>(imp->readonlyDOMTimeStampAttribute()));
}
|
static void readonlyDOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, static_cast<double>(imp->readonlyDOMTimeStampAttribute()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2517/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
void nl80211_send_unprot_disassoc(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, const u8 *buf,
size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
{
nl80211_send_mlme_event(rdev, netdev, buf, len,
NL80211_CMD_UNPROT_DISASSOCIATE, gfp);
}
|
void nl80211_send_unprot_disassoc(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, const u8 *buf,
size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
{
nl80211_send_mlme_event(rdev, netdev, buf, len,
NL80211_CMD_UNPROT_DISASSOCIATE, gfp);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2060/
| null |
https://github.com/kr/beanstalkd/commit/2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
|
do_list_tubes(conn c, ms l)
{
char *buf;
tube t;
size_t i, resp_z;
/* first, measure how big a buffer we will need */
resp_z = 6; /* initial "---\n" and final "\r\n" */
for (i = 0; i < l->used; i++) {
t = l->items[i];
resp_z += 3 + strlen(t->name); /* including "- " and "\n" */
}
c->out_job = allocate_job(resp_z); /* fake job to hold response data */
if (!c->out_job) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
/* Mark this job as a copy so it can be appropriately freed later on */
c->out_job->state = JOB_STATE_COPY;
/* now actually format the response */
buf = c->out_job->body;
buf += snprintf(buf, 5, "---\n");
for (i = 0; i < l->used; i++) {
t = l->items[i];
buf += snprintf(buf, 4 + strlen(t->name), "- %s\n", t->name);
}
buf[0] = '\r';
buf[1] = '\n';
c->out_job_sent = 0;
return reply_line(c, STATE_SENDJOB, "OK %d\r\n", resp_z - 2);
}
|
do_list_tubes(conn c, ms l)
{
char *buf;
tube t;
size_t i, resp_z;
/* first, measure how big a buffer we will need */
resp_z = 6; /* initial "---\n" and final "\r\n" */
for (i = 0; i < l->used; i++) {
t = l->items[i];
resp_z += 3 + strlen(t->name); /* including "- " and "\n" */
}
c->out_job = allocate_job(resp_z); /* fake job to hold response data */
if (!c->out_job) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
/* Mark this job as a copy so it can be appropriately freed later on */
c->out_job->state = JOB_STATE_COPY;
/* now actually format the response */
buf = c->out_job->body;
buf += snprintf(buf, 5, "---\n");
for (i = 0; i < l->used; i++) {
t = l->items[i];
buf += snprintf(buf, 4 + strlen(t->name), "- %s\n", t->name);
}
buf[0] = '\r';
buf[1] = '\n';
c->out_job_sent = 0;
return reply_line(c, STATE_SENDJOB, "OK %d\r\n", resp_z - 2);
}
|
C
|
beanstalkd
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7281/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69
|
bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69
|
inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sock *__udp4_lib_demux_lookup(struct net *net,
__be16 loc_port, __be32 loc_addr,
__be16 rmt_port, __be32 rmt_addr,
int dif)
{
struct sock *sk, *result;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
unsigned short hnum = ntohs(loc_port);
unsigned int hash2 = udp4_portaddr_hash(net, loc_addr, hnum);
unsigned int slot2 = hash2 & udp_table.mask;
struct udp_hslot *hslot2 = &udp_table.hash2[slot2];
INET_ADDR_COOKIE(acookie, rmt_addr, loc_addr)
const __portpair ports = INET_COMBINED_PORTS(rmt_port, hnum);
rcu_read_lock();
result = NULL;
udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(sk, node, &hslot2->head) {
if (INET_MATCH(sk, net, acookie,
rmt_addr, loc_addr, ports, dif))
result = sk;
/* Only check first socket in chain */
break;
}
if (result) {
if (unlikely(!atomic_inc_not_zero_hint(&result->sk_refcnt, 2)))
result = NULL;
else if (unlikely(!INET_MATCH(sk, net, acookie,
rmt_addr, loc_addr,
ports, dif))) {
sock_put(result);
result = NULL;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
|
static struct sock *__udp4_lib_demux_lookup(struct net *net,
__be16 loc_port, __be32 loc_addr,
__be16 rmt_port, __be32 rmt_addr,
int dif)
{
struct sock *sk, *result;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
unsigned short hnum = ntohs(loc_port);
unsigned int hash2 = udp4_portaddr_hash(net, loc_addr, hnum);
unsigned int slot2 = hash2 & udp_table.mask;
struct udp_hslot *hslot2 = &udp_table.hash2[slot2];
INET_ADDR_COOKIE(acookie, rmt_addr, loc_addr)
const __portpair ports = INET_COMBINED_PORTS(rmt_port, hnum);
rcu_read_lock();
result = NULL;
udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(sk, node, &hslot2->head) {
if (INET_MATCH(sk, net, acookie,
rmt_addr, loc_addr, ports, dif))
result = sk;
/* Only check first socket in chain */
break;
}
if (result) {
if (unlikely(!atomic_inc_not_zero_hint(&result->sk_refcnt, 2)))
result = NULL;
else if (unlikely(!INET_MATCH(sk, net, acookie,
rmt_addr, loc_addr,
ports, dif))) {
sock_put(result);
result = NULL;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int UDPSocketLibevent::SetMulticastLoopbackMode(bool loopback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (is_connected())
return ERR_SOCKET_IS_CONNECTED;
if (loopback)
socket_options_ |= SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
else
socket_options_ &= ~SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
return OK;
}
|
int UDPSocketLibevent::SetMulticastLoopbackMode(bool loopback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (is_connected())
return ERR_SOCKET_IS_CONNECTED;
if (loopback)
socket_options_ |= SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
else
socket_options_ &= ~SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static inline u32 nfsd4_open_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size + op_encode_stateid_maxsz
+ op_encode_change_info_maxsz + 1
+ nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz
+ op_encode_delegation_maxsz) * sizeof(__be32);
}
|
static inline u32 nfsd4_open_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size + op_encode_stateid_maxsz
+ op_encode_change_info_maxsz + 1
+ nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz
+ op_encode_delegation_maxsz) * sizeof(__be32);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5787/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
bool OffscreenCanvas::OriginClean() const {
return origin_clean_ && !disable_reading_from_canvas_;
}
|
bool OffscreenCanvas::OriginClean() const {
return origin_clean_ && !disable_reading_from_canvas_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3897/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::Print(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, WebKit::WebNode* node) {
if (print_web_view_)
return;
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(frame, node, &prepare)) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return; // Failed to init print page settings.
}
int expected_page_count = 0;
bool use_browser_overlays = true;
expected_page_count = prepare->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (expected_page_count)
use_browser_overlays = prepare->ShouldUseBrowserOverlays();
prepare.reset();
if (!expected_page_count) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!GetPrintSettingsFromUser(frame, expected_page_count,
use_browser_overlays)) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(frame, node, NULL)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
ResetScriptedPrintCount();
}
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::Print(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, WebKit::WebNode* node) {
if (print_web_view_)
return;
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(frame, node, &prepare))
return; // Failed to init print page settings.
int expected_page_count = 0;
bool use_browser_overlays = true;
expected_page_count = prepare->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (expected_page_count)
use_browser_overlays = prepare->ShouldUseBrowserOverlays();
prepare.reset();
if (!expected_page_count) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!GetPrintSettingsFromUser(frame, expected_page_count,
use_browser_overlays)) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(frame, node, NULL)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
ResetScriptedPrintCount();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
preempt_disable();
if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, fsr))
ret = 1;
preempt_enable();
}
return ret;
}
|
static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
preempt_disable();
if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, fsr))
ret = 1;
preempt_enable();
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int __init sha256_ssse3_mod_init(void)
{
/* test for SSSE3 first */
if (cpu_has_ssse3)
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_ssse3;
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
/* allow AVX to override SSSE3, it's a little faster */
if (avx_usable()) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2))
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_rorx;
else
#endif
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_avx;
}
#endif
if (sha256_transform_asm) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
if (sha256_transform_asm == sha256_transform_avx)
pr_info("Using AVX optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
else if (sha256_transform_asm == sha256_transform_rorx)
pr_info("Using AVX2 optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
#endif
else
#endif
pr_info("Using SSSE3 optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
return crypto_register_shashes(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
pr_info("Neither AVX nor SSSE3 is available/usable.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
|
static int __init sha256_ssse3_mod_init(void)
{
/* test for SSSE3 first */
if (cpu_has_ssse3)
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_ssse3;
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
/* allow AVX to override SSSE3, it's a little faster */
if (avx_usable()) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2))
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_rorx;
else
#endif
sha256_transform_asm = sha256_transform_avx;
}
#endif
if (sha256_transform_asm) {
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
if (sha256_transform_asm == sha256_transform_avx)
pr_info("Using AVX optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
else if (sha256_transform_asm == sha256_transform_rorx)
pr_info("Using AVX2 optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
#endif
else
#endif
pr_info("Using SSSE3 optimized SHA-256 implementation\n");
return crypto_register_shashes(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
pr_info("Neither AVX nor SSSE3 is available/usable.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
__perf_remove_from_context(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx,
void *info)
{
unsigned long flags = (unsigned long)info;
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
if (flags & DETACH_GROUP)
perf_group_detach(event);
list_del_event(event, ctx);
if (!ctx->nr_events && ctx->is_active) {
ctx->is_active = 0;
if (ctx->task) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx);
cpuctx->task_ctx = NULL;
}
}
}
|
__perf_remove_from_context(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx,
void *info)
{
unsigned long flags = (unsigned long)info;
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
if (flags & DETACH_GROUP)
perf_group_detach(event);
list_del_event(event, ctx);
if (!ctx->nr_events && ctx->is_active) {
ctx->is_active = 0;
if (ctx->task) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx);
cpuctx->task_ctx = NULL;
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7495
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7495/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/06bd3c36a733ac27962fea7d6f47168841376824
|
06bd3c36a733ac27962fea7d6f47168841376824
|
ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: [email protected]
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
int ext4_filemap_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
int err;
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
err = filemap_fault(vma, vmf);
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
return err;
}
|
int ext4_filemap_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
int err;
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
err = filemap_fault(vma, vmf);
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ProfileSyncService::HasSyncSetupCompleted() const {
return sync_prefs_.HasSyncSetupCompleted();
}
|
bool ProfileSyncService::HasSyncSetupCompleted() const {
return sync_prefs_.HasSyncSetupCompleted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_save_uint_32(png_bytep buf, png_uint_32 i)
{
buf[0] = (png_byte)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
buf[1] = (png_byte)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
buf[2] = (png_byte)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
buf[3] = (png_byte)(i & 0xff);
}
|
png_save_uint_32(png_bytep buf, png_uint_32 i)
{
buf[0] = (png_byte)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
buf[1] = (png_byte)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
buf[2] = (png_byte)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
buf[3] = (png_byte)(i & 0xff);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5122
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5122/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f8675cbb337440a11bf9afb10ea11bae42bb92cb
|
f8675cbb337440a11bf9afb10ea11bae42bb92cb
|
cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
|
void RunTest(AshTestBase* test_base) {
std::unique_ptr<aura::Window> window(
test_base->CreateTestWindowInShellWithDelegate(
this, 0, gfx::Rect(0, 0, 100, 100)));
window->Show();
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(2, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(3, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(4, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(10, gesture_event_count_);
Reset();
views::Widget* widget = views::Widget::CreateWindowWithContextAndBounds(
new TestWindow(true), Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(),
gfx::Rect(200, 200, 100, 100));
widget->Show();
EXPECT_TRUE(ShellPort::Get()->IsSystemModalWindowOpen());
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(0, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, gesture_event_count_);
Reset();
widget->Close();
EXPECT_FALSE(ShellPort::Get()->IsSystemModalWindowOpen());
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(2, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(3, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(4, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(10, gesture_event_count_);
}
|
void RunTest(AshTestBase* test_base) {
std::unique_ptr<aura::Window> window(
test_base->CreateTestWindowInShellWithDelegate(
this, 0, gfx::Rect(0, 0, 100, 100)));
window->Show();
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(2, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(3, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(4, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(10, gesture_event_count_);
Reset();
views::Widget* widget = views::Widget::CreateWindowWithContextAndBounds(
new TestWindow(true), Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(),
gfx::Rect(200, 200, 100, 100));
widget->Show();
EXPECT_TRUE(ShellPort::Get()->IsSystemModalWindowOpen());
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(0, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, gesture_event_count_);
Reset();
widget->Close();
EXPECT_FALSE(ShellPort::Get()->IsSystemModalWindowOpen());
GenerateEvents(window.get());
EXPECT_EQ(2, mouse_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(3, scroll_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(4, touch_event_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(10, gesture_event_count_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
void tkhd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TrackHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_TrackHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
return;
}
|
void tkhd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TrackHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_TrackHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
return;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool Textfield::HasSelection() const {
return !GetSelectedRange().is_empty();
}
|
bool Textfield::HasSelection() const {
return !GetSelectedRange().is_empty();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void byteAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::byteAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void byteAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::byteAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/a6981567e8e215acc1ef690c8dbb30f2d9b00a19
|
a6981567e8e215acc1ef690c8dbb30f2d9b00a19
|
disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
|
attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
{
static struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
return tv;
}
|
attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
{
static struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
return tv;
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3418
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3418/
|
CWE-369
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
|
dc777c346d5d452a53b13b917c45f6a1bad2f20b
| null |
ProcFreeColors(ClientPtr client)
{
ColormapPtr pcmp;
int rc;
REQUEST(xFreeColorsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xFreeColorsReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pcmp, stuff->cmap, RT_COLORMAP,
client, DixRemoveAccess);
if (rc == Success) {
int count;
if (pcmp->flags & AllAllocated)
return BadAccess;
count = bytes_to_int32((client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xFreeColorsReq));
return FreeColors(pcmp, client->index, count,
(Pixel *) &stuff[1], (Pixel) stuff->planeMask);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->cmap;
return rc;
}
}
|
ProcFreeColors(ClientPtr client)
{
ColormapPtr pcmp;
int rc;
REQUEST(xFreeColorsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xFreeColorsReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pcmp, stuff->cmap, RT_COLORMAP,
client, DixRemoveAccess);
if (rc == Success) {
int count;
if (pcmp->flags & AllAllocated)
return BadAccess;
count = bytes_to_int32((client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xFreeColorsReq));
return FreeColors(pcmp, client->index, count,
(Pixel *) &stuff[1], (Pixel) stuff->planeMask);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->cmap;
return rc;
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16910/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/298a43a77ec0ed2c19a8c924ddd8571ef3e65dfd
|
298a43a77ec0ed2c19a8c924ddd8571ef3e65dfd
|
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
|
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
|
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnExecuteEditCommand(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value) {
if (!webview() || !webview()->focusedFrame())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(
WebString::fromUTF8(name), WebString::fromUTF8(value));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnExecuteEditCommand(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value) {
if (!webview() || !webview()->focusedFrame())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(
WebString::fromUTF8(name), WebString::fromUTF8(value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6161
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6161/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/761c75d2d607638ff53c764b4925bcca9be601d8
|
761c75d2d607638ff53c764b4925bcca9be601d8
|
Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
BaseAudioContext::~BaseAudioContext() {
GetDeferredTaskHandler().ContextWillBeDestroyed();
DCHECK(!active_source_nodes_.size());
DCHECK(!is_resolving_resume_promises_);
DCHECK(!resume_resolvers_.size());
DCHECK(!autoplay_status_.has_value());
}
|
BaseAudioContext::~BaseAudioContext() {
GetDeferredTaskHandler().ContextWillBeDestroyed();
DCHECK(!active_source_nodes_.size());
DCHECK(!is_resolving_resume_promises_);
DCHECK(!resume_resolvers_.size());
DCHECK(!autoplay_status_.has_value());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
void CairoOutputDev::type3D0(GfxState *state, double wx, double wy) {
t3_glyph_wx = wx;
t3_glyph_wy = wy;
}
|
void CairoOutputDev::type3D0(GfxState *state, double wx, double wy) {
t3_glyph_wx = wx;
t3_glyph_wy = wy;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void SameObjectAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value(WTF::GetPtr(impl->sameObjectAttribute()));
if (cpp_value && DOMDataStore::SetReturnValue(info.GetReturnValue(), cpp_value))
return;
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value(ToV8(cpp_value, holder, info.GetIsolate()));
static const V8PrivateProperty::SymbolKey kKeepAliveKey;
V8PrivateProperty::GetSymbol(info.GetIsolate(), kKeepAliveKey)
.Set(holder, v8_value);
V8SetReturnValue(info, v8_value);
}
|
static void SameObjectAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value(WTF::GetPtr(impl->sameObjectAttribute()));
if (cpp_value && DOMDataStore::SetReturnValue(info.GetReturnValue(), cpp_value))
return;
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value(ToV8(cpp_value, holder, info.GetIsolate()));
static const V8PrivateProperty::SymbolKey kKeepAliveKey;
V8PrivateProperty::GetSymbol(info.GetIsolate(), kKeepAliveKey)
.Set(holder, v8_value);
V8SetReturnValue(info, v8_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3899
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3899/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
|
void setCodec(const sp<OMXCodec> &target) {
mTarget = target;
}
|
void setCodec(const sp<OMXCodec> &target) {
mTarget = target;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8130/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
Win32WarningHandler(const char* module, const char* fmt, va_list ap)
{
#ifndef TIF_PLATFORM_CONSOLE
LPTSTR szTitle;
LPTSTR szTmp;
LPCTSTR szTitleText = "%s Warning";
LPCTSTR szDefaultModule = "LIBTIFF";
LPCTSTR szTmpModule = (module == NULL) ? szDefaultModule : module;
SIZE_T nBufSize = (strlen(szTmpModule) +
strlen(szTitleText) + strlen(fmt) + 256)*sizeof(char);
if ((szTitle = (LPTSTR)LocalAlloc(LMEM_FIXED, nBufSize)) == NULL)
return;
sprintf(szTitle, szTitleText, szTmpModule);
szTmp = szTitle + (strlen(szTitle)+2)*sizeof(char);
vsnprintf(szTmp, nBufSize-(strlen(szTitle)+2)*sizeof(char), fmt, ap);
MessageBoxA(GetFocus(), szTmp, szTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
LocalFree(szTitle);
return;
#else
if (module != NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", module);
fprintf(stderr, "Warning, ");
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fprintf(stderr, ".\n");
#endif
}
|
Win32WarningHandler(const char* module, const char* fmt, va_list ap)
{
#ifndef TIF_PLATFORM_CONSOLE
LPTSTR szTitle;
LPTSTR szTmp;
LPCTSTR szTitleText = "%s Warning";
LPCTSTR szDefaultModule = "LIBTIFF";
LPCTSTR szTmpModule = (module == NULL) ? szDefaultModule : module;
SIZE_T nBufSize = (strlen(szTmpModule) +
strlen(szTitleText) + strlen(fmt) + 256)*sizeof(char);
if ((szTitle = (LPTSTR)LocalAlloc(LMEM_FIXED, nBufSize)) == NULL)
return;
sprintf(szTitle, szTitleText, szTmpModule);
szTmp = szTitle + (strlen(szTitle)+2)*sizeof(char);
vsnprintf(szTmp, nBufSize-(strlen(szTitle)+2)*sizeof(char), fmt, ap);
MessageBoxA(GetFocus(), szTmp, szTitle, MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
LocalFree(szTitle);
return;
#else
if (module != NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", module);
fprintf(stderr, "Warning, ");
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fprintf(stderr, ".\n");
#endif
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2060
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2060/
| null |
https://github.com/kr/beanstalkd/commit/2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
2e8e8c6387ecdf5923dfc4d7718d18eba1b0873d
|
Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
|
prot_replay_binlog(job binlog_jobs)
{
job j, nj;
usec delay;
int r;
for (j = binlog_jobs->next ; j != binlog_jobs ; j = nj) {
nj = j->next;
job_remove(j);
binlog_reserve_space_update(j); /* reserve space for a delete */
delay = 0;
switch (j->state) {
case JOB_STATE_BURIED:
bury_job(j, 0);
break;
case JOB_STATE_DELAYED:
if (started_at < j->deadline_at) {
delay = j->deadline_at - started_at;
}
/* fall through */
default:
r = enqueue_job(j, delay, 0);
if (r < 1) twarnx("error processing binlog job %llu", j->id);
}
}
}
|
prot_replay_binlog(job binlog_jobs)
{
job j, nj;
usec delay;
int r;
for (j = binlog_jobs->next ; j != binlog_jobs ; j = nj) {
nj = j->next;
job_remove(j);
binlog_reserve_space_update(j); /* reserve space for a delete */
delay = 0;
switch (j->state) {
case JOB_STATE_BURIED:
bury_job(j, 0);
break;
case JOB_STATE_DELAYED:
if (started_at < j->deadline_at) {
delay = j->deadline_at - started_at;
}
/* fall through */
default:
r = enqueue_job(j, delay, 0);
if (r < 1) twarnx("error processing binlog job %llu", j->id);
}
}
}
|
C
|
beanstalkd
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::handleKeyboardEvent(const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event)
{
if (!isValid())
return;
m_keyEventQueue.append(event);
process()->responsivenessTimer()->start();
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::KeyEvent(event), m_pageID);
}
|
void WebPageProxy::handleKeyboardEvent(const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event)
{
if (!isValid())
return;
m_keyEventQueue.append(event);
process()->responsivenessTimer()->start();
process()->send(Messages::WebPage::KeyEvent(event), m_pageID);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_get_tRNS(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_bytep *trans, int *num_trans, png_color_16p *trans_values)
{
png_uint_32 retval = 0;
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s retrieval function", "tRNS");
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (trans != NULL)
{
*trans = info_ptr->trans;
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
if (trans_values != NULL)
*trans_values = &(info_ptr->trans_values);
}
else /* if (info_ptr->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) */
{
if (trans_values != NULL)
{
*trans_values = &(info_ptr->trans_values);
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
if (trans != NULL)
*trans = NULL;
}
if (num_trans != NULL)
{
*num_trans = info_ptr->num_trans;
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
}
return (retval);
}
|
png_get_tRNS(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_bytep *trans, int *num_trans, png_color_16p *trans_values)
{
png_uint_32 retval = 0;
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s retrieval function", "tRNS");
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (trans != NULL)
{
*trans = info_ptr->trans;
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
if (trans_values != NULL)
*trans_values = &(info_ptr->trans_values);
}
else /* if (info_ptr->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) */
{
if (trans_values != NULL)
{
*trans_values = &(info_ptr->trans_values);
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
if (trans != NULL)
*trans = NULL;
}
if (num_trans != NULL)
{
*num_trans = info_ptr->num_trans;
retval |= PNG_INFO_tRNS;
}
}
return (retval);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static STGMEDIUM* GetStorageForBytes(const void* data, size_t bytes) {
HANDLE handle = GlobalAlloc(GPTR, static_cast<int>(bytes));
if (handle) {
base::win::ScopedHGlobal<uint8> scoped(handle);
memcpy(scoped.get(), data, bytes);
}
STGMEDIUM* storage = new STGMEDIUM;
storage->hGlobal = handle;
storage->tymed = TYMED_HGLOBAL;
storage->pUnkForRelease = NULL;
return storage;
}
|
static STGMEDIUM* GetStorageForBytes(const void* data, size_t bytes) {
HANDLE handle = GlobalAlloc(GPTR, static_cast<int>(bytes));
if (handle) {
base::win::ScopedHGlobal<uint8> scoped(handle);
memcpy(scoped.get(), data, bytes);
}
STGMEDIUM* storage = new STGMEDIUM;
storage->hGlobal = handle;
storage->tymed = TYMED_HGLOBAL;
storage->pUnkForRelease = NULL;
return storage;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7943
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7943/
|
CWE-787
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libX11/commit/?id=8c29f1607a31dac0911e45a0dd3d74173822b3c9
|
8c29f1607a31dac0911e45a0dd3d74173822b3c9
| null |
XFreeModifiermap(XModifierKeymap *map)
{
if (map) {
Xfree(map->modifiermap);
Xfree(map);
}
return 1;
}
|
XFreeModifiermap(XModifierKeymap *map)
{
if (map) {
Xfree(map->modifiermap);
Xfree(map);
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
libx11
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static u32 rt_peer_genid(void)
{
return atomic_read(&__rt_peer_genid);
}
|
static u32 rt_peer_genid(void)
{
return atomic_read(&__rt_peer_genid);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2806/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static PassRefPtr<CSSPrimitiveValue> fontStyleFromStyle(RenderStyle* style)
{
if (style->fontDescription().italic())
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueItalic);
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNormal);
}
|
static PassRefPtr<CSSPrimitiveValue> fontStyleFromStyle(RenderStyle* style)
{
if (style->fontDescription().italic())
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueItalic);
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNormal);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4656
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4656/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id = kctl->id;
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
|
static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id = kctl->id;
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
const char* ResourcePriorityString(ResourceLoadPriority priority) {
const char* priority_string = 0;
switch (priority) {
case kResourceLoadPriorityVeryLow:
priority_string = "VeryLow";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityLow:
priority_string = "Low";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityMedium:
priority_string = "Medium";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityHigh:
priority_string = "High";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityVeryHigh:
priority_string = "VeryHigh";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityUnresolved:
break;
}
return priority_string;
}
|
const char* ResourcePriorityString(ResourceLoadPriority priority) {
const char* priority_string = 0;
switch (priority) {
case kResourceLoadPriorityVeryLow:
priority_string = "VeryLow";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityLow:
priority_string = "Low";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityMedium:
priority_string = "Medium";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityHigh:
priority_string = "High";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityVeryHigh:
priority_string = "VeryHigh";
break;
case kResourceLoadPriorityUnresolved:
break;
}
return priority_string;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3070
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3070/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/42cb14b110a5698ccf26ce59c4441722605a3743
|
42cb14b110a5698ccf26ce59c4441722605a3743
|
mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void copy_huge_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src)
{
int i;
int nr_pages;
if (PageHuge(src)) {
/* hugetlbfs page */
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(src);
nr_pages = pages_per_huge_page(h);
if (unlikely(nr_pages > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES)) {
__copy_gigantic_page(dst, src, nr_pages);
return;
}
} else {
/* thp page */
BUG_ON(!PageTransHuge(src));
nr_pages = hpage_nr_pages(src);
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
cond_resched();
copy_highpage(dst + i, src + i);
}
}
|
static void copy_huge_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src)
{
int i;
int nr_pages;
if (PageHuge(src)) {
/* hugetlbfs page */
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(src);
nr_pages = pages_per_huge_page(h);
if (unlikely(nr_pages > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES)) {
__copy_gigantic_page(dst, src, nr_pages);
return;
}
} else {
/* thp page */
BUG_ON(!PageTransHuge(src));
nr_pages = hpage_nr_pages(src);
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
cond_resched();
copy_highpage(dst + i, src + i);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1774/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int i2c_type_bootmode(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status;
u8 *data;
data = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - out of memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Try to read type 2 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_II\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto out;
}
/* Try to read type 3 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 3 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_III\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III;
goto out;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Unknown\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(data);
return status;
}
|
static int i2c_type_bootmode(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status;
u8 *data;
data = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - out of memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Try to read type 2 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_II\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto out;
}
/* Try to read type 3 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 3 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_III\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III;
goto out;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Unknown\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(data);
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8963/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count)
{
u64 read_format = event->attr.read_format;
int ret;
/*
* Return end-of-file for a read on a event that is in
* error state (i.e. because it was pinned but it couldn't be
* scheduled on to the CPU at some point).
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR)
return 0;
if (count < event->read_size)
return -ENOSPC;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP)
ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf);
else
ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf);
return ret;
}
|
__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count)
{
u64 read_format = event->attr.read_format;
int ret;
/*
* Return end-of-file for a read on a event that is in
* error state (i.e. because it was pinned but it couldn't be
* scheduled on to the CPU at some point).
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR)
return 0;
if (count < event->read_size)
return -ENOSPC;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP)
ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf);
else
ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3104/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
[i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ExtensionGlobalError::HasBubbleView() {
return true;
}
|
bool ExtensionGlobalError::HasBubbleView() {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int multicast_event(struct snd_seq_client *client, struct snd_seq_event *event,
int atomic, int hop)
{
pr_debug("ALSA: seq: multicast not supported yet.\n");
return 0; /* ignored */
}
|
static int multicast_event(struct snd_seq_client *client, struct snd_seq_event *event,
int atomic, int hop)
{
pr_debug("ALSA: seq: multicast not supported yet.\n");
return 0; /* ignored */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void dumpFrameText(WKBundleFrameRef frame, StringBuilder& stringBuilder)
{
if (!hasDocumentElement(frame))
return;
WKRetainPtr<WKStringRef> text(AdoptWK, WKBundleFrameCopyInnerText(frame));
stringBuilder.append(toWTFString(text));
stringBuilder.append('\n');
}
|
static void dumpFrameText(WKBundleFrameRef frame, StringBuilder& stringBuilder)
{
if (!hasDocumentElement(frame))
return;
WKRetainPtr<WKStringRef> text(AdoptWK, WKBundleFrameCopyInnerText(frame));
stringBuilder.append(toWTFString(text));
stringBuilder.append('\n');
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6508/
|
CWE-93
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=4d729e322fae359a1aefaafec1144764a54e8ad4
|
4d729e322fae359a1aefaafec1144764a54e8ad4
| null |
url_escape_1 (const char *s, unsigned char mask, bool allow_passthrough)
{
const char *p1;
char *p2, *newstr;
int newlen;
int addition = 0;
for (p1 = s; *p1; p1++)
if (urlchr_test (*p1, mask))
addition += 2; /* Two more characters (hex digits) */
if (!addition)
return allow_passthrough ? (char *)s : xstrdup (s);
newlen = (p1 - s) + addition;
newstr = xmalloc (newlen + 1);
p1 = s;
p2 = newstr;
while (*p1)
{
/* Quote the characters that match the test mask. */
if (urlchr_test (*p1, mask))
{
unsigned char c = *p1++;
*p2++ = '%';
*p2++ = XNUM_TO_DIGIT (c >> 4);
*p2++ = XNUM_TO_DIGIT (c & 0xf);
}
else
*p2++ = *p1++;
}
assert (p2 - newstr == newlen);
*p2 = '\0';
return newstr;
}
|
url_escape_1 (const char *s, unsigned char mask, bool allow_passthrough)
{
const char *p1;
char *p2, *newstr;
int newlen;
int addition = 0;
for (p1 = s; *p1; p1++)
if (urlchr_test (*p1, mask))
addition += 2; /* Two more characters (hex digits) */
if (!addition)
return allow_passthrough ? (char *)s : xstrdup (s);
newlen = (p1 - s) + addition;
newstr = xmalloc (newlen + 1);
p1 = s;
p2 = newstr;
while (*p1)
{
/* Quote the characters that match the test mask. */
if (urlchr_test (*p1, mask))
{
unsigned char c = *p1++;
*p2++ = '%';
*p2++ = XNUM_TO_DIGIT (c >> 4);
*p2++ = XNUM_TO_DIGIT (c & 0xf);
}
else
*p2++ = *p1++;
}
assert (p2 - newstr == newlen);
*p2 = '\0';
return newstr;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(imagecopyresampled)
{
zval *SIM, *DIM;
long SX, SY, SW, SH, DX, DY, DW, DH;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
int srcH, srcW, dstH, dstW, srcY, srcX, dstY, dstX;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rrllllllll", &DIM, &SIM, &DX, &DY, &SX, &SY, &DW, &DH, &SW, &SH) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_dst, gdImagePtr, &DIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
srcX = SX;
srcY = SY;
srcH = SH;
srcW = SW;
dstX = DX;
dstY = DY;
dstH = DH;
dstW = DW;
gdImageCopyResampled(im_dst, im_src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, dstW, dstH, srcW, srcH);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(imagecopyresampled)
{
zval *SIM, *DIM;
long SX, SY, SW, SH, DX, DY, DW, DH;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
int srcH, srcW, dstH, dstW, srcY, srcX, dstY, dstX;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rrllllllll", &DIM, &SIM, &DX, &DY, &SX, &SY, &DW, &DH, &SW, &SH) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_dst, gdImagePtr, &DIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
srcX = SX;
srcY = SY;
srcH = SH;
srcW = SW;
dstX = DX;
dstY = DY;
dstH = DH;
dstW = DW;
gdImageCopyResampled(im_dst, im_src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, dstW, dstH, srcW, srcH);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
status_t CameraSource::read(
MediaBuffer **buffer, const ReadOptions *options) {
ALOGV("read");
*buffer = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
sp<IMemory> frame;
int64_t frameTime;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
while (mStarted && mFramesReceived.empty()) {
if (NO_ERROR !=
mFrameAvailableCondition.waitRelative(mLock,
mTimeBetweenFrameCaptureUs * 1000LL + CAMERA_SOURCE_TIMEOUT_NS)) {
if (mCameraRecordingProxy != 0 &&
!IInterface::asBinder(mCameraRecordingProxy)->isBinderAlive()) {
ALOGW("camera recording proxy is gone");
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGW("Timed out waiting for incoming camera video frames: %" PRId64 " us",
mLastFrameTimestampUs);
}
}
if (!mStarted) {
return OK;
}
frame = *mFramesReceived.begin();
mFramesReceived.erase(mFramesReceived.begin());
frameTime = *mFrameTimes.begin();
mFrameTimes.erase(mFrameTimes.begin());
mFramesBeingEncoded.push_back(frame);
*buffer = new MediaBuffer(frame->pointer(), frame->size());
(*buffer)->setObserver(this);
(*buffer)->add_ref();
(*buffer)->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, frameTime);
}
return OK;
}
|
status_t CameraSource::read(
MediaBuffer **buffer, const ReadOptions *options) {
ALOGV("read");
*buffer = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
sp<IMemory> frame;
int64_t frameTime;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
while (mStarted && mFramesReceived.empty()) {
if (NO_ERROR !=
mFrameAvailableCondition.waitRelative(mLock,
mTimeBetweenFrameCaptureUs * 1000LL + CAMERA_SOURCE_TIMEOUT_NS)) {
if (mCameraRecordingProxy != 0 &&
!IInterface::asBinder(mCameraRecordingProxy)->isBinderAlive()) {
ALOGW("camera recording proxy is gone");
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGW("Timed out waiting for incoming camera video frames: %" PRId64 " us",
mLastFrameTimestampUs);
}
}
if (!mStarted) {
return OK;
}
frame = *mFramesReceived.begin();
mFramesReceived.erase(mFramesReceived.begin());
frameTime = *mFrameTimes.begin();
mFrameTimes.erase(mFrameTimes.begin());
mFramesBeingEncoded.push_back(frame);
*buffer = new MediaBuffer(frame->pointer(), frame->size());
(*buffer)->setObserver(this);
(*buffer)->add_ref();
(*buffer)->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, frameTime);
}
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int compat_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (level != SOL_TCP)
return inet_csk_compat_setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return do_tcp_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
int compat_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
if (level != SOL_TCP)
return inet_csk_compat_setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return do_tcp_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
allocate_vpid(vmx);
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!vmx->guest_msrs) {
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
err = vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
if (vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(kvm)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept) {
if (!kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr)
kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr =
VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
allocate_vpid(vmx);
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!vmx->guest_msrs) {
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
err = vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
if (vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(kvm)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept) {
if (!kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr)
kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr =
VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8294/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/83d799804648c2a0895d40a19835d9b757c6fa4e
|
83d799804648c2a0895d40a19835d9b757c6fa4e
|
Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
|
int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
0,
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
|
int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
|
C
|
yara
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/183f4bcddd821b4af3f6234ad2e8c371694a9ffb
|
183f4bcddd821b4af3f6234ad2e8c371694a9ffb
|
Add a histogram (Net.PacResultForStrippedUrl) that estimates how often PAC scripts depend on the URL path.
BUG=593759
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1797313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#382644}
|
void Job::Alert(const base::string16& message) {
HandleAlertOrError(true, -1, message);
}
|
void Job::Alert(const base::string16& message) {
HandleAlertOrError(true, -1, message);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5400
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5400/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848
|
aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848
|
media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int airspy_g_fmt_sdr_cap(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_format *f)
{
struct airspy *s = video_drvdata(file);
f->fmt.sdr.pixelformat = s->pixelformat;
f->fmt.sdr.buffersize = s->buffersize;
memset(f->fmt.sdr.reserved, 0, sizeof(f->fmt.sdr.reserved));
return 0;
}
|
static int airspy_g_fmt_sdr_cap(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_format *f)
{
struct airspy *s = video_drvdata(file);
f->fmt.sdr.pixelformat = s->pixelformat;
f->fmt.sdr.buffersize = s->buffersize;
memset(f->fmt.sdr.reserved, 0, sizeof(f->fmt.sdr.reserved));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9317
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9317/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyMergeGray (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h, int pct)
{
int c, dc;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ncR, ncG, ncB;
float g;
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + w)); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/*
* If it's the same image, mapping is NOT trivial since we
* merge with greyscale target, but if pct is 100, the grey
* value is not used, so it becomes trivial. pjw 2.0.12.
*/
if (dst == src && pct == 100) {
nc = c;
} else {
dc = gdImageGetPixel (dst, tox, toy);
g = 0.29900 * gdImageRed(dst, dc)
+ 0.58700 * gdImageGreen(dst, dc) + 0.11400 * gdImageBlue(dst, dc);
ncR = gdImageRed (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncG = gdImageGreen (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncB = gdImageBlue (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
/* First look for an exact match */
nc = gdImageColorExact (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
if (nc == (-1)) {
/* No, so try to allocate it */
nc = gdImageColorAllocate (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
/* If we're out of colors, go for the
closest color */
if (nc == (-1)) {
nc = gdImageColorClosest (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
}
}
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyMergeGray (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h, int pct)
{
int c, dc;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ncR, ncG, ncB;
float g;
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + w)); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/*
* If it's the same image, mapping is NOT trivial since we
* merge with greyscale target, but if pct is 100, the grey
* value is not used, so it becomes trivial. pjw 2.0.12.
*/
if (dst == src && pct == 100) {
nc = c;
} else {
dc = gdImageGetPixel (dst, tox, toy);
g = 0.29900 * gdImageRed(dst, dc)
+ 0.58700 * gdImageGreen(dst, dc) + 0.11400 * gdImageBlue(dst, dc);
ncR = gdImageRed (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncG = gdImageGreen (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncB = gdImageBlue (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
/* First look for an exact match */
nc = gdImageColorExact (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
if (nc == (-1)) {
/* No, so try to allocate it */
nc = gdImageColorAllocate (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
/* If we're out of colors, go for the
closest color */
if (nc == (-1)) {
nc = gdImageColorClosest (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
}
}
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0910/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Cancel() {
delete this;
}
|
void Cancel() {
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void register_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
{
}
|
static void register_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2517/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static int nl80211_tx_mgmt_cancel_wait(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
u64 cookie;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE])
return -EINVAL;
if (!rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
cookie = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE]);
return rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait(&rdev->wiphy, dev, cookie);
}
|
static int nl80211_tx_mgmt_cancel_wait(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
u64 cookie;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE])
return -EINVAL;
if (!rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
cookie = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE]);
return rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait(&rdev->wiphy, dev, cookie);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0836/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void createColorTransform(const ColorProfile& colorProfile, bool hasAlpha)
{
if (m_transform)
qcms_transform_release(m_transform);
m_transform = 0;
if (colorProfile.isEmpty())
return;
qcms_profile* deviceProfile = ImageDecoder::qcmsOutputDeviceProfile();
if (!deviceProfile)
return;
qcms_profile* inputProfile = qcms_profile_from_memory(colorProfile.data(), colorProfile.size());
if (!inputProfile)
return;
ASSERT(icSigRgbData == qcms_profile_get_color_space(inputProfile));
qcms_data_type dataFormat = hasAlpha ? QCMS_DATA_RGBA_8 : QCMS_DATA_RGB_8;
m_transform = qcms_transform_create(inputProfile, dataFormat, deviceProfile, dataFormat, QCMS_INTENT_PERCEPTUAL);
qcms_profile_release(inputProfile);
}
|
void createColorTransform(const ColorProfile& colorProfile, bool hasAlpha)
{
if (m_transform)
qcms_transform_release(m_transform);
m_transform = 0;
if (colorProfile.isEmpty())
return;
qcms_profile* deviceProfile = ImageDecoder::qcmsOutputDeviceProfile();
if (!deviceProfile)
return;
qcms_profile* inputProfile = qcms_profile_from_memory(colorProfile.data(), colorProfile.size());
if (!inputProfile)
return;
ASSERT(icSigRgbData == qcms_profile_get_color_space(inputProfile));
qcms_data_type dataFormat = hasAlpha ? QCMS_DATA_RGBA_8 : QCMS_DATA_RGB_8;
m_transform = qcms_transform_create(inputProfile, dataFormat, deviceProfile, dataFormat, QCMS_INTENT_PERCEPTUAL);
qcms_profile_release(inputProfile);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DidGetLRUOrigin(const GURL& origin) {
lru_origin_ = origin;
}
|
void DidGetLRUOrigin(const GURL& origin) {
lru_origin_ = origin;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-3702
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-3702/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
|
e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
| null |
void Gfx::opSetFillRGBColor(Object args[], int numArgs) {
GfxColor color;
int i;
if (textHaveCSPattern && drawText) {
GBool needFill = out->deviceHasTextClip(state);
out->endTextObject(state);
if (needFill) {
doPatternFill(gTrue);
}
out->restoreState(state);
}
state->setFillPattern(NULL);
state->setFillColorSpace(new GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace());
out->updateFillColorSpace(state);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
color.c[i] = dblToCol(args[i].getNum());
}
state->setFillColor(&color);
out->updateFillColor(state);
if (textHaveCSPattern) {
out->beginTextObject(state);
out->updateRender(state);
out->updateTextMat(state);
out->updateTextPos(state);
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
}
}
|
void Gfx::opSetFillRGBColor(Object args[], int numArgs) {
GfxColor color;
int i;
if (textHaveCSPattern && drawText) {
GBool needFill = out->deviceHasTextClip(state);
out->endTextObject(state);
if (needFill) {
doPatternFill(gTrue);
}
out->restoreState(state);
}
state->setFillPattern(NULL);
state->setFillColorSpace(new GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace());
out->updateFillColorSpace(state);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
color.c[i] = dblToCol(args[i].getNum());
}
state->setFillColor(&color);
out->updateFillColor(state);
if (textHaveCSPattern) {
out->beginTextObject(state);
out->updateRender(state);
out->updateTextMat(state);
out->updateTextPos(state);
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
}
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnRemotePlaybackEnded() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ended_ = true;
client_->TimeChanged();
}
|
void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnRemotePlaybackEnded() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ended_ = true;
client_->TimeChanged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8675
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8675/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/libav/libav/commit/e5b019725f53b79159931d3a7317107cbbfd0860
|
e5b019725f53b79159931d3a7317107cbbfd0860
|
m4vdec: Check for non-startcode 00 00 00 sequences in probe
This makes the m4v detection less trigger-happy.
Bug-Id: 949
Signed-off-by: Diego Biurrun <[email protected]>
|
static int mpeg4video_probe(AVProbeData *probe_packet)
{
uint32_t temp_buffer = -1;
int VO = 0, VOL = 0, VOP = 0, VISO = 0, res = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < probe_packet->buf_size; i++) {
temp_buffer = (temp_buffer << 8) + probe_packet->buf[i];
if (temp_buffer & 0xfffffe00)
continue;
if (temp_buffer < 2)
continue;
if (temp_buffer == VOP_START_CODE)
VOP++;
else if (temp_buffer == VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE)
VISO++;
else if (temp_buffer >= 0x100 && temp_buffer < 0x120)
VO++;
else if (temp_buffer >= 0x120 && temp_buffer < 0x130)
VOL++;
else if (!(0x1AF < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1B7) &&
!(0x1B9 < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1C4))
res++;
}
if (VOP >= VISO && VOP >= VOL && VO >= VOL && VOL > 0 && res == 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
|
static int mpeg4video_probe(AVProbeData *probe_packet)
{
uint32_t temp_buffer = -1;
int VO = 0, VOL = 0, VOP = 0, VISO = 0, res = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < probe_packet->buf_size; i++) {
temp_buffer = (temp_buffer << 8) + probe_packet->buf[i];
if ((temp_buffer & 0xffffff00) != 0x100)
continue;
if (temp_buffer == VOP_START_CODE)
VOP++;
else if (temp_buffer == VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE)
VISO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x120)
VO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x130)
VOL++;
else if (!(0x1AF < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1B7) &&
!(0x1B9 < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1C4))
res++;
}
if (VOP >= VISO && VOP >= VOL && VO >= VOL && VOL > 0 && res == 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
libav
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
int RenderLayerScrollableArea::pixelSnappedScrollWidth() const
{
return snapSizeToPixel(scrollWidth(), box().clientLeft() + box().x());
}
|
int RenderLayerScrollableArea::pixelSnappedScrollWidth() const
{
return snapSizeToPixel(scrollWidth(), box().clientLeft() + box().x());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6611
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6611/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/61fc6d3030a4d4283105cb5fb46b27b42fa5575e
|
61fc6d3030a4d4283105cb5fb46b27b42fa5575e
|
[Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
CSoundFile::ProbeResult CSoundFile::ProbeFileHeaderSTP(MemoryFileReader file, const uint64 *pfilesize)
{
STPFileHeader fileHeader;
if(!file.ReadStruct(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeWantMoreData;
}
if(!ValidateHeader(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeFailure;
}
MPT_UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pfilesize);
return ProbeSuccess;
}
|
CSoundFile::ProbeResult CSoundFile::ProbeFileHeaderSTP(MemoryFileReader file, const uint64 *pfilesize)
{
STPFileHeader fileHeader;
if(!file.ReadStruct(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeWantMoreData;
}
if(!ValidateHeader(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeFailure;
}
MPT_UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pfilesize);
return ProbeSuccess;
}
|
C
|
openmpt
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Box *trpy_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TRPYBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TRPY);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
GF_Box *trpy_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TRPYBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TRPY);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5818/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35
|
929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35
|
Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by [email protected].
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
|
static bool CheckH261(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 16);
int offset = 0;
bool seen_start_code = false;
while (true) {
if (!AdvanceToStartCode(buffer, buffer_size, &offset, 4, 20, 0x10)) {
return seen_start_code;
}
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, buffer_size - offset);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 20) == 0x10);
reader.SkipBits(5 + 6);
int extra = ReadBits(&reader, 1);
while (extra == 1) {
if (!reader.SkipBits(8))
return seen_start_code;
if (!reader.ReadBits(1, &extra))
return seen_start_code;
}
int next;
if (!reader.ReadBits(16, &next))
return seen_start_code;
RCHECK(next == 1);
seen_start_code = true;
offset += 4;
}
}
|
static bool CheckH261(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 16);
int offset = 0;
bool seen_start_code = false;
while (true) {
if (!AdvanceToStartCode(buffer, buffer_size, &offset, 4, 20, 0x10)) {
return seen_start_code;
}
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, buffer_size - offset);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 20) == 0x10);
reader.SkipBits(5 + 6);
int extra = ReadBits(&reader, 1);
while (extra == 1) {
if (!reader.SkipBits(8))
return seen_start_code;
if (!reader.ReadBits(1, &extra))
return seen_start_code;
}
int next;
if (!reader.ReadBits(16, &next))
return seen_start_code;
RCHECK(next == 1);
seen_start_code = true;
offset += 4;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10190
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10190/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa
|
2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa
|
http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>.
|
int ff_http_do_new_request(URLContext *h, const char *uri)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
AVDictionary *options = NULL;
int ret;
s->off = 0;
s->icy_data_read = 0;
av_free(s->location);
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = http_open_cnx(h, &options);
av_dict_free(&options);
return ret;
}
|
int ff_http_do_new_request(URLContext *h, const char *uri)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
AVDictionary *options = NULL;
int ret;
s->off = 0;
s->icy_data_read = 0;
av_free(s->location);
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = http_open_cnx(h, &options);
av_dict_free(&options);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5337
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5337/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6
|
844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6
| null |
static int megasas_handle_io(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
uint32_t lba_count, lba_start_hi, lba_start_lo;
uint64_t lba_start;
bool is_write = (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd == MFI_CMD_LD_WRITE);
uint8_t cdb[16];
int len;
struct SCSIDevice *sdev = NULL;
lba_count = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.header.data_len);
lba_start_lo = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_lo);
lba_start_hi = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_hi);
lba_start = ((uint64_t)lba_start_hi << 32) | lba_start_lo;
if (cmd->frame->header.target_id < MFI_MAX_LD &&
cmd->frame->header.lun_id == 0) {
sdev = scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
}
trace_megasas_handle_io(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
(unsigned long)lba_start, (unsigned long)lba_count);
if (!sdev) {
trace_megasas_io_target_not_present(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
return MFI_STAT_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (cmd->frame->header.cdb_len > 16) {
trace_megasas_scsi_invalid_cdb_len(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd], 1,
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
cmd->frame->header.cdb_len);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
cmd->iov_size = lba_count * sdev->blocksize;
if (megasas_map_sgl(s, cmd, &cmd->frame->io.sgl)) {
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(TARGET_FAILURE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
megasas_encode_lba(cdb, lba_start, lba_count, is_write);
cmd->req = scsi_req_new(sdev, cmd->index,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id, cdb, cmd);
if (!cmd->req) {
trace_megasas_scsi_req_alloc_failed(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(NO_SENSE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = BUSY;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
len = megasas_enqueue_req(cmd, is_write);
if (len > 0) {
if (is_write) {
trace_megasas_io_write_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
} else {
trace_megasas_io_read_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
}
}
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
}
|
static int megasas_handle_io(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
uint32_t lba_count, lba_start_hi, lba_start_lo;
uint64_t lba_start;
bool is_write = (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd == MFI_CMD_LD_WRITE);
uint8_t cdb[16];
int len;
struct SCSIDevice *sdev = NULL;
lba_count = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.header.data_len);
lba_start_lo = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_lo);
lba_start_hi = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_hi);
lba_start = ((uint64_t)lba_start_hi << 32) | lba_start_lo;
if (cmd->frame->header.target_id < MFI_MAX_LD &&
cmd->frame->header.lun_id == 0) {
sdev = scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
}
trace_megasas_handle_io(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
(unsigned long)lba_start, (unsigned long)lba_count);
if (!sdev) {
trace_megasas_io_target_not_present(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
return MFI_STAT_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (cmd->frame->header.cdb_len > 16) {
trace_megasas_scsi_invalid_cdb_len(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd], 1,
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
cmd->frame->header.cdb_len);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
cmd->iov_size = lba_count * sdev->blocksize;
if (megasas_map_sgl(s, cmd, &cmd->frame->io.sgl)) {
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(TARGET_FAILURE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
megasas_encode_lba(cdb, lba_start, lba_count, is_write);
cmd->req = scsi_req_new(sdev, cmd->index,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id, cdb, cmd);
if (!cmd->req) {
trace_megasas_scsi_req_alloc_failed(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(NO_SENSE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = BUSY;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
len = megasas_enqueue_req(cmd, is_write);
if (len > 0) {
if (is_write) {
trace_megasas_io_write_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
} else {
trace_megasas_io_read_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
}
}
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseCurrent() {
if (context_.get())
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseCurrent() {
if (context_.get())
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e49d943e9f5f90411313e64d0ae6b646edc85043
|
e49d943e9f5f90411313e64d0ae6b646edc85043
|
Use document referrer policy when preloading
Previously, preload requests used the referrer policy from meta tags
encountered during scanning, but not from headers delivered with the
page. This CL uses the document's current referrer policy when the
preload scan starts.
BUG=605451
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1913983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390264}
|
void TokenPreloadScanner::scan(const HTMLToken& token, const SegmentedString& source, PreloadRequestStream& requests, ViewportDescriptionWrapper* viewport)
{
scanCommon(token, source, requests, viewport, nullptr);
}
|
void TokenPreloadScanner::scan(const HTMLToken& token, const SegmentedString& source, PreloadRequestStream& requests, ViewportDescriptionWrapper* viewport)
{
scanCommon(token, source, requests, viewport, nullptr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodVariadicStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodVariadicStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodVariadicStringArgMethod(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodVariadicStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodVariadicStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodVariadicStringArgMethod(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long Cues::GetCount() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return -1;
return m_count; // TODO: really ignore preload count?
}
|
long Cues::GetCount() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return -1;
return m_count; // TODO: really ignore preload count?
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10162/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/8d2539fa0faf3f63e1d1e7635347c5b9e777d47b
|
8d2539fa0faf3f63e1d1e7635347c5b9e777d47b
|
Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object
|
int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(const char *value, size_t vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate((XML_Char *) "UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
/* XXX value should be parsed in the loop to exhaust size_t */
XML_Parse(parser, (const XML_Char *) value, (int)vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
if (Z_ISUNDEF(ent->data)) {
retval = FAILURE;
} else {
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, &ent->data);
retval = SUCCESS;
}
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
|
int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(const char *value, size_t vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate((XML_Char *) "UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
/* XXX value should be parsed in the loop to exhaust size_t */
XML_Parse(parser, (const XML_Char *) value, (int)vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
if (Z_ISUNDEF(ent->data)) {
retval = FAILURE;
} else {
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, &ent->data);
retval = SUCCESS;
}
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5125
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5125/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
|
base::string16 PushMessagingServiceImpl::GetName() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_NOTIFICATIONS_BACKGROUND_SERVICE_NAME);
}
|
base::string16 PushMessagingServiceImpl::GetName() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_NOTIFICATIONS_BACKGROUND_SERVICE_NAME);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17470/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/385508dc888ef15d272cdd2705b17996abc519d6
|
385508dc888ef15d272cdd2705b17996abc519d6
|
Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSamplerParameterf(
GLuint client_id, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
Sampler* sampler = GetSampler(client_id);
if (!sampler) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glSamplerParameterf", "unknown sampler");
return;
}
sampler_manager()->SetParameterf(
"glSamplerParameterf", GetErrorState(), sampler, pname, param);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSamplerParameterf(
GLuint client_id, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
Sampler* sampler = GetSampler(client_id);
if (!sampler) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glSamplerParameterf", "unknown sampler");
return;
}
sampler_manager()->SetParameterf(
"glSamplerParameterf", GetErrorState(), sampler, pname, param);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0216/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/48856286b64e4b66ec62b94e504d0b29c1ade664
|
48856286b64e4b66ec62b94e504d0b29c1ade664
|
xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void xen_netbk_tx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
unsigned nr_gops;
nr_gops = xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(netbk);
if (nr_gops == 0)
return;
gnttab_batch_copy(netbk->tx_copy_ops, nr_gops);
xen_netbk_tx_submit(netbk);
}
|
static void xen_netbk_tx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
unsigned nr_gops;
nr_gops = xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(netbk);
if (nr_gops == 0)
return;
gnttab_batch_copy(netbk->tx_copy_ops, nr_gops);
xen_netbk_tx_submit(netbk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1172/
|
CWE-264
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus-glib/commit/?h=rhel5&id=9a6bce9b615abca6068348c1606ba8eaf13d9ae0
|
9a6bce9b615abca6068348c1606ba8eaf13d9ae0
| null |
my_object_emit_signals (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
|
my_object_emit_signals (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
GValue val = {0, };
g_signal_emit (obj, signals[SIG0], 0, "foo", 22, "moo");
g_value_init (&val, G_TYPE_STRING);
g_value_set_string (&val, "bar");
g_signal_emit (obj, signals[SIG1], 0, "baz", &val);
g_value_unset (&val);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 1 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
process_running(const char *pid_file)
{
FILE *pidfile = fopen(pid_file, "r");
pid_t pid = 0;
int ret;
/* No pidfile */
if (!pidfile)
return 0;
ret = fscanf(pidfile, "%d", &pid);
fclose(pidfile);
if (ret != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Error reading pid file %s", pid_file);
pid = 0;
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
}
/* What should we return - we don't know if it is running or not. */
if (!pid)
return 1;
/* If no process is attached to pidfile, remove it */
if (kill(pid, 0)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Remove a zombie pid file %s", pid_file);
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
process_running(const char *pid_file)
{
FILE *pidfile = fopen(pid_file, "r");
pid_t pid = 0;
int ret;
/* No pidfile */
if (!pidfile)
return 0;
ret = fscanf(pidfile, "%d", &pid);
fclose(pidfile);
if (ret != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Error reading pid file %s", pid_file);
pid = 0;
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
}
/* What should we return - we don't know if it is running or not. */
if (!pid)
return 1;
/* If no process is attached to pidfile, remove it */
if (kill(pid, 0)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Remove a zombie pid file %s", pid_file);
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int do_migrate_pages(struct mm_struct *mm,
const nodemask_t *from_nodes, const nodemask_t *to_nodes, int flags)
{
int busy = 0;
int err;
nodemask_t tmp;
err = migrate_prep();
if (err)
return err;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
err = migrate_vmas(mm, from_nodes, to_nodes, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Find a 'source' bit set in 'tmp' whose corresponding 'dest'
* bit in 'to' is not also set in 'tmp'. Clear the found 'source'
* bit in 'tmp', and return that <source, dest> pair for migration.
* The pair of nodemasks 'to' and 'from' define the map.
*
* If no pair of bits is found that way, fallback to picking some
* pair of 'source' and 'dest' bits that are not the same. If the
* 'source' and 'dest' bits are the same, this represents a node
* that will be migrating to itself, so no pages need move.
*
* If no bits are left in 'tmp', or if all remaining bits left
* in 'tmp' correspond to the same bit in 'to', return false
* (nothing left to migrate).
*
* This lets us pick a pair of nodes to migrate between, such that
* if possible the dest node is not already occupied by some other
* source node, minimizing the risk of overloading the memory on a
* node that would happen if we migrated incoming memory to a node
* before migrating outgoing memory source that same node.
*
* A single scan of tmp is sufficient. As we go, we remember the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved (s != d). If we find a pair
* that not only moved, but what's better, moved to an empty slot
* (d is not set in tmp), then we break out then, with that pair.
* Otherwise when we finish scanning from_tmp, we at least have the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved. If we get all the way through
* the scan of tmp without finding any node that moved, much less
* moved to an empty node, then there is nothing left worth migrating.
*/
tmp = *from_nodes;
while (!nodes_empty(tmp)) {
int s,d;
int source = -1;
int dest = 0;
for_each_node_mask(s, tmp) {
d = node_remap(s, *from_nodes, *to_nodes);
if (s == d)
continue;
source = s; /* Node moved. Memorize */
dest = d;
/* dest not in remaining from nodes? */
if (!node_isset(dest, tmp))
break;
}
if (source == -1)
break;
node_clear(source, tmp);
err = migrate_to_node(mm, source, dest, flags);
if (err > 0)
busy += err;
if (err < 0)
break;
}
out:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return busy;
}
|
int do_migrate_pages(struct mm_struct *mm,
const nodemask_t *from_nodes, const nodemask_t *to_nodes, int flags)
{
int busy = 0;
int err;
nodemask_t tmp;
err = migrate_prep();
if (err)
return err;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
err = migrate_vmas(mm, from_nodes, to_nodes, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Find a 'source' bit set in 'tmp' whose corresponding 'dest'
* bit in 'to' is not also set in 'tmp'. Clear the found 'source'
* bit in 'tmp', and return that <source, dest> pair for migration.
* The pair of nodemasks 'to' and 'from' define the map.
*
* If no pair of bits is found that way, fallback to picking some
* pair of 'source' and 'dest' bits that are not the same. If the
* 'source' and 'dest' bits are the same, this represents a node
* that will be migrating to itself, so no pages need move.
*
* If no bits are left in 'tmp', or if all remaining bits left
* in 'tmp' correspond to the same bit in 'to', return false
* (nothing left to migrate).
*
* This lets us pick a pair of nodes to migrate between, such that
* if possible the dest node is not already occupied by some other
* source node, minimizing the risk of overloading the memory on a
* node that would happen if we migrated incoming memory to a node
* before migrating outgoing memory source that same node.
*
* A single scan of tmp is sufficient. As we go, we remember the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved (s != d). If we find a pair
* that not only moved, but what's better, moved to an empty slot
* (d is not set in tmp), then we break out then, with that pair.
* Otherwise when we finish scanning from_tmp, we at least have the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved. If we get all the way through
* the scan of tmp without finding any node that moved, much less
* moved to an empty node, then there is nothing left worth migrating.
*/
tmp = *from_nodes;
while (!nodes_empty(tmp)) {
int s,d;
int source = -1;
int dest = 0;
for_each_node_mask(s, tmp) {
d = node_remap(s, *from_nodes, *to_nodes);
if (s == d)
continue;
source = s; /* Node moved. Memorize */
dest = d;
/* dest not in remaining from nodes? */
if (!node_isset(dest, tmp))
break;
}
if (source == -1)
break;
node_clear(source, tmp);
err = migrate_to_node(mm, source, dest, flags);
if (err > 0)
busy += err;
if (err < 0)
break;
}
out:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return busy;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6214
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6214/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ccf7abb93af09ad0868ae9033d1ca8108bdaec82
|
ccf7abb93af09ad0868ae9033d1ca8108bdaec82
|
tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
tp->out_of_order_queue = RB_ROOT;
tcp_init_xmit_timers(sk);
tcp_prequeue_init(tp);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->tsq_node);
icsk->icsk_rto = TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
tp->mdev_us = jiffies_to_usecs(TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
minmax_reset(&tp->rtt_min, tcp_time_stamp, ~0U);
/* So many TCP implementations out there (incorrectly) count the
* initial SYN frame in their delayed-ACK and congestion control
* algorithms that we must have the following bandaid to talk
* efficiently to them. -DaveM
*/
tp->snd_cwnd = TCP_INIT_CWND;
/* There's a bubble in the pipe until at least the first ACK. */
tp->app_limited = ~0U;
/* See draft-stevens-tcpca-spec-01 for discussion of the
* initialization of these values.
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering;
tcp_enable_early_retrans(tp);
tcp_assign_congestion_control(sk);
tp->tsoffset = 0;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_write_space = sk_stream_write_space;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE);
icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss;
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[1];
sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tcp_rmem[1];
local_bh_disable();
sk_sockets_allocated_inc(sk);
local_bh_enable();
}
|
void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
tp->out_of_order_queue = RB_ROOT;
tcp_init_xmit_timers(sk);
tcp_prequeue_init(tp);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->tsq_node);
icsk->icsk_rto = TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
tp->mdev_us = jiffies_to_usecs(TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
minmax_reset(&tp->rtt_min, tcp_time_stamp, ~0U);
/* So many TCP implementations out there (incorrectly) count the
* initial SYN frame in their delayed-ACK and congestion control
* algorithms that we must have the following bandaid to talk
* efficiently to them. -DaveM
*/
tp->snd_cwnd = TCP_INIT_CWND;
/* There's a bubble in the pipe until at least the first ACK. */
tp->app_limited = ~0U;
/* See draft-stevens-tcpca-spec-01 for discussion of the
* initialization of these values.
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering;
tcp_enable_early_retrans(tp);
tcp_assign_congestion_control(sk);
tp->tsoffset = 0;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_write_space = sk_stream_write_space;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE);
icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss;
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[1];
sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tcp_rmem[1];
local_bh_disable();
sk_sockets_allocated_inc(sk);
local_bh_enable();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetStepDescription() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_PIN_ENTRY_DESCRIPTION);
}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetStepDescription() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_PIN_ENTRY_DESCRIPTION);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5330/
|
CWE-78
|
https://cgit.kde.org/ark.git/commit/?id=82fdfd24d46966a117fa625b68784735a40f9065
|
82fdfd24d46966a117fa625b68784735a40f9065
| null |
void Part::slotActivated(const QModelIndex &index)
{
Q_UNUSED(index)
if (QGuiApplication::keyboardModifiers() != Qt::ShiftModifier &&
QGuiApplication::keyboardModifiers() != Qt::ControlModifier) {
ArkSettings::defaultOpenAction() == ArkSettings::EnumDefaultOpenAction::Preview ? slotOpenEntry(Preview) : slotOpenEntry(OpenFile);
}
}
|
void Part::slotActivated(const QModelIndex &index)
{
Q_UNUSED(index)
if (QGuiApplication::keyboardModifiers() != Qt::ShiftModifier &&
QGuiApplication::keyboardModifiers() != Qt::ControlModifier) {
ArkSettings::defaultOpenAction() == ArkSettings::EnumDefaultOpenAction::Preview ? slotOpenEntry(Preview) : slotOpenEntry(OpenFile);
}
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11596
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11596/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
fix jsvGetString regression
|
JsVar *jsvAsString(JsVar *v, bool unlockVar) {
JsVar *str = 0;
if (jsvHasCharacterData(v) && jsvIsName(v)) {
str = jsvNewFromStringVar(v,0,JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
} else if (jsvIsString(v)) { // If it is a string - just return a reference
str = jsvLockAgain(v);
} else if (jsvIsObject(v)) { // If it is an object and we can call toString on it
JsVar *toStringFn = jspGetNamedField(v, "toString", false);
if (toStringFn && toStringFn->varData.native.ptr != (void (*)(void))jswrap_object_toString) {
JsVar *result = jspExecuteFunction(toStringFn,v,0,0);
jsvUnLock(toStringFn);
str = jsvAsString(result, true);
} else {
jsvUnLock(toStringFn);
str = jsvNewFromString("[object Object]");
}
} else {
const char *constChar = jsvGetConstString(v);
assert(JS_NUMBER_BUFFER_SIZE>=10);
char buf[JS_NUMBER_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (constChar) {
str = jsvNewFromString(constChar);
} else if (jsvIsPin(v)) {
jshGetPinString(buf, (Pin)v->varData.integer);
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsInt(v)) {
itostr(v->varData.integer, buf, 10);
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsFloat(v)) {
ftoa_bounded(v->varData.floating, buf, sizeof(buf));
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsArray(v) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(v)) {
JsVar *filler = jsvNewFromString(",");
str = jsvArrayJoin(v, filler);
jsvUnLock(filler);
} else if (jsvIsFunction(v)) {
str = jsvNewFromEmptyString();
if (str) jsfGetJSON(v, str, JSON_NONE);
} else {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_INTERNALERROR, "Variable type cannot be converted to string");
str = 0;
}
}
if (unlockVar) jsvUnLock(v);
return str;
}
|
JsVar *jsvAsString(JsVar *v, bool unlockVar) {
JsVar *str = 0;
if (jsvHasCharacterData(v) && jsvIsName(v)) {
str = jsvNewFromStringVar(v,0,JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
} else if (jsvIsString(v)) { // If it is a string - just return a reference
str = jsvLockAgain(v);
} else if (jsvIsObject(v)) { // If it is an object and we can call toString on it
JsVar *toStringFn = jspGetNamedField(v, "toString", false);
if (toStringFn && toStringFn->varData.native.ptr != (void (*)(void))jswrap_object_toString) {
JsVar *result = jspExecuteFunction(toStringFn,v,0,0);
jsvUnLock(toStringFn);
str = jsvAsString(result, true);
} else {
jsvUnLock(toStringFn);
str = jsvNewFromString("[object Object]");
}
} else {
const char *constChar = jsvGetConstString(v);
assert(JS_NUMBER_BUFFER_SIZE>=10);
char buf[JS_NUMBER_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (constChar) {
str = jsvNewFromString(constChar);
} else if (jsvIsPin(v)) {
jshGetPinString(buf, (Pin)v->varData.integer);
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsInt(v)) {
itostr(v->varData.integer, buf, 10);
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsFloat(v)) {
ftoa_bounded(v->varData.floating, buf, sizeof(buf));
str = jsvNewFromString(buf);
} else if (jsvIsArray(v) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(v)) {
JsVar *filler = jsvNewFromString(",");
str = jsvArrayJoin(v, filler);
jsvUnLock(filler);
} else if (jsvIsFunction(v)) {
str = jsvNewFromEmptyString();
if (str) jsfGetJSON(v, str, JSON_NONE);
} else {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_INTERNALERROR, "Variable type cannot be converted to string");
str = 0;
}
}
if (unlockVar) jsvUnLock(v);
return str;
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4072/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
|
1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
| null |
static void phar_mkdir(phar_archive_data **pphar, char *dirname, int dirname_len)
{
char *error;
phar_entry_data *data;
if (!(data = phar_get_or_create_entry_data((*pphar)->fname, (*pphar)->fname_len, dirname, dirname_len, "w+b", 2, &error, 1))) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Directory %s does not exist and cannot be created: %s", dirname, error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Directory %s does not exist and cannot be created", dirname);
}
return;
} else {
if (error) {
efree(error);
}
/* check for copy on write */
if (data->phar != *pphar) {
*pphar = data->phar;
}
phar_entry_delref(data);
phar_flush(*pphar, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
}
}
|
static void phar_mkdir(phar_archive_data **pphar, char *dirname, int dirname_len)
{
char *error;
phar_entry_data *data;
if (!(data = phar_get_or_create_entry_data((*pphar)->fname, (*pphar)->fname_len, dirname, dirname_len, "w+b", 2, &error, 1))) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Directory %s does not exist and cannot be created: %s", dirname, error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Directory %s does not exist and cannot be created", dirname);
}
return;
} else {
if (error) {
efree(error);
}
/* check for copy on write */
if (data->phar != *pphar) {
*pphar = data->phar;
}
phar_entry_delref(data);
phar_flush(*pphar, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void PlatformCancel() {}
|
virtual void PlatformCancel() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8933
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8933/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.lxde.org/gitweb/?p=lxde/menu-cache.git;a=commit;h=56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce
|
56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce
| null |
const char* menu_cache_item_get_id( MenuCacheItem* item )
{
return item->id;
}
|
const char* menu_cache_item_get_id( MenuCacheItem* item )
{
return item->id;
}
|
C
|
lxde
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4129
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4129/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1
|
c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1
|
bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <[email protected]>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *__br_mdb_ip_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, struct br_ip *dst, int hash)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[hash], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (br_ip_equal(&mp->addr, dst))
return mp;
}
return NULL;
}
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *__br_mdb_ip_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, struct br_ip *dst, int hash)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[hash], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (br_ip_equal(&mp->addr, dst))
return mp;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13041/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/f4b9e24c7384d882a7f434cc7413925bf871d63e
|
f4b9e24c7384d882a7f434cc7413925bf871d63e
|
CVE-2017-13041/ICMP6: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
mldv2_query_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int mrc;
int mrt, qqi;
u_int nsrcs;
register u_int i;
/* Minimum len is 28 */
if (len < 28) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
mrc = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
if (mrc < 32768) {
mrt = mrc;
} else {
mrt = ((mrc & 0x0fff) | 0x1000) << (((mrc & 0x7000) >> 12) + 3);
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [max resp delay=%d]", mrt));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[25]);
if (bp[24] & 0x08) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," sflag"));
}
if (bp[24] & 0x07) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," robustness=%d", bp[24] & 0x07));
}
if (bp[25] < 128) {
qqi = bp[25];
} else {
qqi = ((bp[25] & 0x0f) | 0x10) << (((bp[25] & 0x70) >> 4) + 3);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," qqi=%d", qqi));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[26], 2);
nsrcs = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[26]);
if (nsrcs > 0) {
if (len < 28 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources]"));
else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (i = 0; i < nsrcs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
return;
}
|
mldv2_query_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int mrc;
int mrt, qqi;
u_int nsrcs;
register u_int i;
/* Minimum len is 28 */
if (len < 28) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
mrc = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
if (mrc < 32768) {
mrt = mrc;
} else {
mrt = ((mrc & 0x0fff) | 0x1000) << (((mrc & 0x7000) >> 12) + 3);
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [max resp delay=%d]", mrt));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[25]);
if (bp[24] & 0x08) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," sflag"));
}
if (bp[24] & 0x07) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," robustness=%d", bp[24] & 0x07));
}
if (bp[25] < 128) {
qqi = bp[25];
} else {
qqi = ((bp[25] & 0x0f) | 0x10) << (((bp[25] & 0x70) >> 4) + 3);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," qqi=%d", qqi));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[26], 2);
nsrcs = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[26]);
if (nsrcs > 0) {
if (len < 28 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources]"));
else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (i = 0; i < nsrcs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
return;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static int convertCompoundSelectToSubquery(Walker *pWalker, Select *p){
int i;
Select *pNew;
Select *pX;
sqlite3 *db;
struct ExprList_item *a;
SrcList *pNewSrc;
Parse *pParse;
Token dummy;
if( p->pPrior==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
if( p->pOrderBy==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
for(pX=p; pX && (pX->op==TK_ALL || pX->op==TK_SELECT); pX=pX->pPrior){}
if( pX==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
a = p->pOrderBy->a;
for(i=p->pOrderBy->nExpr-1; i>=0; i--){
if( a[i].pExpr->flags & EP_Collate ) break;
}
if( i<0 ) return WRC_Continue;
/* If we reach this point, that means the transformation is required. */
pParse = pWalker->pParse;
db = pParse->db;
pNew = sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(*pNew) );
if( pNew==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
memset(&dummy, 0, sizeof(dummy));
pNewSrc = sqlite3SrcListAppendFromTerm(pParse,0,0,0,&dummy,pNew,0,0);
if( pNewSrc==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
*pNew = *p;
p->pSrc = pNewSrc;
p->pEList = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, 0, sqlite3Expr(db, TK_ASTERISK, 0));
p->op = TK_SELECT;
p->pWhere = 0;
pNew->pGroupBy = 0;
pNew->pHaving = 0;
pNew->pOrderBy = 0;
p->pPrior = 0;
p->pNext = 0;
p->pWith = 0;
p->selFlags &= ~SF_Compound;
assert( (p->selFlags & SF_Converted)==0 );
p->selFlags |= SF_Converted;
assert( pNew->pPrior!=0 );
pNew->pPrior->pNext = pNew;
pNew->pLimit = 0;
return WRC_Continue;
}
|
static int convertCompoundSelectToSubquery(Walker *pWalker, Select *p){
int i;
Select *pNew;
Select *pX;
sqlite3 *db;
struct ExprList_item *a;
SrcList *pNewSrc;
Parse *pParse;
Token dummy;
if( p->pPrior==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
if( p->pOrderBy==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
for(pX=p; pX && (pX->op==TK_ALL || pX->op==TK_SELECT); pX=pX->pPrior){}
if( pX==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
a = p->pOrderBy->a;
for(i=p->pOrderBy->nExpr-1; i>=0; i--){
if( a[i].pExpr->flags & EP_Collate ) break;
}
if( i<0 ) return WRC_Continue;
/* If we reach this point, that means the transformation is required. */
pParse = pWalker->pParse;
db = pParse->db;
pNew = sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(*pNew) );
if( pNew==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
memset(&dummy, 0, sizeof(dummy));
pNewSrc = sqlite3SrcListAppendFromTerm(pParse,0,0,0,&dummy,pNew,0,0);
if( pNewSrc==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
*pNew = *p;
p->pSrc = pNewSrc;
p->pEList = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, 0, sqlite3Expr(db, TK_ASTERISK, 0));
p->op = TK_SELECT;
p->pWhere = 0;
pNew->pGroupBy = 0;
pNew->pHaving = 0;
pNew->pOrderBy = 0;
p->pPrior = 0;
p->pNext = 0;
p->pWith = 0;
p->selFlags &= ~SF_Compound;
assert( (p->selFlags & SF_Converted)==0 );
p->selFlags |= SF_Converted;
assert( pNew->pPrior!=0 );
pNew->pPrior->pNext = pNew;
pNew->pLimit = 0;
return WRC_Continue;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
encode_NAT(const struct ofpact_nat *nat,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct nx_action_nat *nan;
const size_t ofs = out->size;
uint16_t range_present = 0;
nan = put_NXAST_NAT(out);
nan->flags = htons(nat->flags);
if (nat->range_af == AF_INET) {
if (nat->range.addr.ipv4.min) {
ovs_be32 *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = nat->range.addr.ipv4.min;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MIN;
}
if (nat->range.addr.ipv4.max) {
ovs_be32 *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = nat->range.addr.ipv4.max;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX;
}
} else if (nat->range_af == AF_INET6) {
if (!ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min)) {
struct in6_addr *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = nat->range.addr.ipv6.min;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN;
}
if (!ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max)) {
struct in6_addr *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = nat->range.addr.ipv6.max;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX;
}
}
if (nat->range_af != AF_UNSPEC) {
if (nat->range.proto.min) {
ovs_be16 *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = htons(nat->range.proto.min);
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MIN;
}
if (nat->range.proto.max) {
ovs_be16 *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = htons(nat->range.proto.max);
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX;
}
}
pad_ofpat(out, ofs);
nan = ofpbuf_at(out, ofs, sizeof *nan);
nan->range_present = htons(range_present);
}
|
encode_NAT(const struct ofpact_nat *nat,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct nx_action_nat *nan;
const size_t ofs = out->size;
uint16_t range_present = 0;
nan = put_NXAST_NAT(out);
nan->flags = htons(nat->flags);
if (nat->range_af == AF_INET) {
if (nat->range.addr.ipv4.min) {
ovs_be32 *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = nat->range.addr.ipv4.min;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MIN;
}
if (nat->range.addr.ipv4.max) {
ovs_be32 *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = nat->range.addr.ipv4.max;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX;
}
} else if (nat->range_af == AF_INET6) {
if (!ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min)) {
struct in6_addr *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = nat->range.addr.ipv6.min;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN;
}
if (!ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max)) {
struct in6_addr *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = nat->range.addr.ipv6.max;
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX;
}
}
if (nat->range_af != AF_UNSPEC) {
if (nat->range.proto.min) {
ovs_be16 *min = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *min);
*min = htons(nat->range.proto.min);
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MIN;
}
if (nat->range.proto.max) {
ovs_be16 *max = ofpbuf_put_uninit(out, sizeof *max);
*max = htons(nat->range.proto.max);
range_present |= NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX;
}
}
pad_ofpat(out, ofs);
nan = ofpbuf_at(out, ofs, sizeof *nan);
nan->range_present = htons(range_present);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodShortArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodShortArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodShortArgMethod(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodShortArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodShortArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodShortArgMethod(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1674/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
[Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
void PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (render_frame) {
render_frame->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_ResponseAck(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), args[0]->Int32Value()));
}
}
|
void PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (render_frame) {
render_frame->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_ResponseAck(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), args[0]->Int32Value()));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6140/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
[DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {}
|
void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
void InitPrefMembers() {
|
void InitPrefMembers() {
settings_->InitPrefMembers();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
7c88b498fda1c2b608a9dd73960a2fd4d7b7e3f7
|
IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mSailed) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mSailed) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7375/
|
CWE-611
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa
|
DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
|
xmlParseMarkupDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
GROW;
if (CUR == '<') {
if (NXT(1) == '!') {
switch (NXT(2)) {
case 'E':
if (NXT(3) == 'L')
xmlParseElementDecl(ctxt);
else if (NXT(3) == 'N')
xmlParseEntityDecl(ctxt);
break;
case 'A':
xmlParseAttributeListDecl(ctxt);
break;
case 'N':
xmlParseNotationDecl(ctxt);
break;
case '-':
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
break;
default:
/* there is an error but it will be detected later */
break;
}
} else if (NXT(1) == '?') {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
}
}
/*
* detect requirement to exit there and act accordingly
* and avoid having instate overriden later on
*/
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
/*
* This is only for internal subset. On external entities,
* the replacement is done before parsing stage
*/
if ((ctxt->external == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Conditional sections are allowed from entities included
* by PE References in the internal subset.
*/
if ((ctxt->external == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1)) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!') && (NXT(2) == '[')) {
xmlParseConditionalSections(ctxt);
}
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
}
|
xmlParseMarkupDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
GROW;
if (CUR == '<') {
if (NXT(1) == '!') {
switch (NXT(2)) {
case 'E':
if (NXT(3) == 'L')
xmlParseElementDecl(ctxt);
else if (NXT(3) == 'N')
xmlParseEntityDecl(ctxt);
break;
case 'A':
xmlParseAttributeListDecl(ctxt);
break;
case 'N':
xmlParseNotationDecl(ctxt);
break;
case '-':
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
break;
default:
/* there is an error but it will be detected later */
break;
}
} else if (NXT(1) == '?') {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
}
}
/*
* detect requirement to exit there and act accordingly
* and avoid having instate overriden later on
*/
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
/*
* This is only for internal subset. On external entities,
* the replacement is done before parsing stage
*/
if ((ctxt->external == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Conditional sections are allowed from entities included
* by PE References in the internal subset.
*/
if ((ctxt->external == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1)) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!') && (NXT(2) == '[')) {
xmlParseConditionalSections(ctxt);
}
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, KMC_TDEA_192_DECRYPT, &walk);
}
|
static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, KMC_TDEA_192_DECRYPT, &walk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.