CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2019-11922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
fixed T36302429
|
ZSTD_parameters ZSTD_getParams(int compressionLevel, unsigned long long srcSizeHint, size_t dictSize) {
ZSTD_parameters params;
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, srcSizeHint, dictSize);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_getParams (cLevel=%i)", compressionLevel);
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
params.cParams = cParams;
params.fParams.contentSizeFlag = 1;
return params;
}
|
ZSTD_parameters ZSTD_getParams(int compressionLevel, unsigned long long srcSizeHint, size_t dictSize) {
ZSTD_parameters params;
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, srcSizeHint, dictSize);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_getParams (cLevel=%i)", compressionLevel);
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
params.cParams = cParams;
params.fParams.contentSizeFlag = 1;
return params;
}
|
C
|
zstd
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0922/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/28aaa72a03df96fa1934876b0efbbc7e6b4b38af
|
28aaa72a03df96fa1934876b0efbbc7e6b4b38af
|
Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::AcceptAuthRequest(
ResourceLoader* loader,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(loader->request(), auth_info))
return false;
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type =
HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(loader->request());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
// TODO(tsepez): Return false on HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS.
// The code once did this, but was changed due to http://crbug.com/174129.
// http://crbug.com/174179 has been filed to track this issue.
}
return true;
}
|
bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::AcceptAuthRequest(
ResourceLoader* loader,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(loader->request(), auth_info))
return false;
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type =
HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(loader->request());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
if (resource_type == HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS)
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
KURL Document::CompleteURLWithOverride(const String& url,
const KURL& base_url_override) const {
DCHECK(base_url_override.IsEmpty() || base_url_override.IsValid());
if (url.IsNull())
return KURL();
if (!Encoding().IsValid())
return KURL(base_url_override, url);
return KURL(base_url_override, url, Encoding());
}
|
KURL Document::CompleteURLWithOverride(const String& url,
const KURL& base_url_override) const {
DCHECK(base_url_override.IsEmpty() || base_url_override.IsValid());
if (url.IsNull())
return KURL();
if (!Encoding().IsValid())
return KURL(base_url_override, url);
return KURL(base_url_override, url, Encoding());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltFreeStackElemList(xsltStackElemPtr elem) {
xsltStackElemPtr next;
while (elem != NULL) {
next = elem->next;
xsltFreeStackElem(elem);
elem = next;
}
}
|
xsltFreeStackElemList(xsltStackElemPtr elem) {
xsltStackElemPtr next;
while (elem != NULL) {
next = elem->next;
xsltFreeStackElem(elem);
elem = next;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10046
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10046/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/989f9f88ea6db09b99d25586e912c921c0da8d3f
|
989f9f88ea6db09b99d25586e912c921c0da8d3f
|
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawPrimitive(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickStatusType
status;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-primitive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" affine: %g,%g,%g,%g,%g,%g",draw_info->affine.sx,
draw_info->affine.rx,draw_info->affine.ry,draw_info->affine.sy,
draw_info->affine.tx,draw_info->affine.ty);
}
exception=(&image->exception);
if ((IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((IsPixelGray(&draw_info->fill) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPixelGray(&draw_info->stroke) == MagickFalse)))
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=MagickTrue;
x=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.x-0.5);
y=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.y-0.5);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
switch (primitive_info->primitive)
{
case PointPrimitive:
{
PixelPacket
fill_color;
PixelPacket
*q;
if ((y < 0) || (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
break;
if ((x < 0) || (x >= (ssize_t) image->columns))
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&fill_color);
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,(MagickRealType) fill_color.opacity,q,
(MagickRealType) q->opacity,q);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ColorPrimitive:
{
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelPacket
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
target;
status&=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(image_view,x,y,&target,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsColorSimilar(image,q,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q++;
continue;
}
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
MagickPixelPacket
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(image,x,y,&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,DefaultChannels,draw_info,&target,x,
y,primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case MattePrimitive:
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelPacket
pixel;
PixelPacket
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
pixel,
target;
status&=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(image_view,x,y,&target,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsColorSimilar(image,q,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q++;
continue;
}
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
MagickPixelPacket
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(image,x,y,&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,OpacityChannel,draw_info,&target,x,
y,primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
pixel;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case TextPrimitive:
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent];
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->text,primitive_info->text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+f%+f",
primitive_info->point.x,primitive_info->point.y);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->geometry,geometry);
status&=AnnotateImage(image,clone_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
break;
}
case ImagePrimitive:
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
composite_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*composite_image;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
ssize_t
x1,
y1;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=AcquireImageInfo();
if (LocaleNCompare(primitive_info->text,"data:",5) == 0)
composite_image=ReadInlineImage(clone_info,primitive_info->text,
&image->exception);
else
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename,primitive_info->text,
MaxTextExtent);
composite_image=ReadImage(clone_info,&image->exception);
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(composite_image,(MagickProgressMonitor)
NULL,(void *) NULL);
x1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.x-0.5);
y1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.y-0.5);
if (((x1 != 0L) && (x1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->columns)) ||
((y1 != 0L) && (y1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->rows)))
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Resize image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g!",
primitive_info[1].point.x,primitive_info[1].point.y);
composite_image->filter=image->filter;
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,geometry);
}
if (composite_image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(composite_image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
if (draw_info->opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
(void) SetImageOpacity(composite_image,draw_info->opacity);
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
image->gravity=draw_info->gravity;
geometry.x=x;
geometry.y=y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) composite_image->columns,(double)
composite_image->rows,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,composite_geometry,&geometry,
&image->exception);
affine=draw_info->affine;
affine.tx=(double) geometry.x;
affine.ty=(double) geometry.y;
composite_image->interpolate=image->interpolate;
if (draw_info->compose == OverCompositeOp)
(void) DrawAffineImage(image,composite_image,&affine);
else
(void) CompositeImage(image,draw_info->compose,composite_image,
geometry.x,geometry.y);
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
break;
}
default:
{
double
mid,
scale;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (IsEventLogging() != MagickFalse)
LogPrimitiveInfo(primitive_info);
scale=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine);
if ((draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL) &&
(fabs(draw_info->dash_pattern[0]) >= DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(scale*draw_info->stroke_width) >= DrawEpsilon) &&
(draw_info->stroke.opacity != (Quantum) TransparentOpacity))
{
/*
Draw dash polygon.
*/
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
(void) DrawDashPolygon(draw_info,primitive_info,image);
break;
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
if ((mid > 1.0) &&
((draw_info->stroke.opacity != (Quantum) TransparentOpacity) ||
(draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)))
{
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
/*
Draw strokes while respecting line cap/join attributes.
*/
for (i=0; primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; i++) ;
closed_path=
(primitive_info[i-1].point.x == primitive_info[0].point.x) &&
(primitive_info[i-1].point.y == primitive_info[0].point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
if (((closed_path != MagickFalse) &&
(draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin)) ||
(primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive))
{
(void) DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
if (draw_info->linecap == RoundCap)
{
(void) DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
status&=DrawStrokePolygon(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end draw-primitive");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawPrimitive(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickStatusType
status;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-primitive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" affine: %g,%g,%g,%g,%g,%g",draw_info->affine.sx,
draw_info->affine.rx,draw_info->affine.ry,draw_info->affine.sy,
draw_info->affine.tx,draw_info->affine.ty);
}
exception=(&image->exception);
if ((IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((IsPixelGray(&draw_info->fill) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPixelGray(&draw_info->stroke) == MagickFalse)))
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=MagickTrue;
x=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.x-0.5);
y=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.y-0.5);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
switch (primitive_info->primitive)
{
case PointPrimitive:
{
PixelPacket
fill_color;
PixelPacket
*q;
if ((y < 0) || (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
break;
if ((x < 0) || (x >= (ssize_t) image->columns))
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&fill_color);
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,(MagickRealType) fill_color.opacity,q,
(MagickRealType) q->opacity,q);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ColorPrimitive:
{
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelPacket
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
target;
status&=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(image_view,x,y,&target,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsColorSimilar(image,q,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q++;
continue;
}
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
MagickPixelPacket
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(image,x,y,&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,DefaultChannels,draw_info,&target,x,
y,primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,q);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case MattePrimitive:
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelPacket
pixel;
PixelPacket
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
status&=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
pixel,
target;
status&=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(image_view,x,y,&target,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsColorSimilar(image,q,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q++;
continue;
}
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
MagickPixelPacket
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(image,x,y,&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(MagickRealType) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,OpacityChannel,draw_info,&target,x,
y,primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelPacket
pixel;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
(void) GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case TextPrimitive:
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent];
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->text,primitive_info->text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+f%+f",
primitive_info->point.x,primitive_info->point.y);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->geometry,geometry);
status&=AnnotateImage(image,clone_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
break;
}
case ImagePrimitive:
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
composite_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*composite_image;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
ssize_t
x1,
y1;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=AcquireImageInfo();
if (LocaleNCompare(primitive_info->text,"data:",5) == 0)
composite_image=ReadInlineImage(clone_info,primitive_info->text,
&image->exception);
else
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename,primitive_info->text,
MaxTextExtent);
composite_image=ReadImage(clone_info,&image->exception);
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(composite_image,(MagickProgressMonitor)
NULL,(void *) NULL);
x1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.x-0.5);
y1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.y-0.5);
if (((x1 != 0L) && (x1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->columns)) ||
((y1 != 0L) && (y1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->rows)))
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Resize image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g!",
primitive_info[1].point.x,primitive_info[1].point.y);
composite_image->filter=image->filter;
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,geometry);
}
if (composite_image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(composite_image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
if (draw_info->opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
(void) SetImageOpacity(composite_image,draw_info->opacity);
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
image->gravity=draw_info->gravity;
geometry.x=x;
geometry.y=y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) composite_image->columns,(double)
composite_image->rows,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,composite_geometry,&geometry,
&image->exception);
affine=draw_info->affine;
affine.tx=(double) geometry.x;
affine.ty=(double) geometry.y;
composite_image->interpolate=image->interpolate;
if (draw_info->compose == OverCompositeOp)
(void) DrawAffineImage(image,composite_image,&affine);
else
(void) CompositeImage(image,draw_info->compose,composite_image,
geometry.x,geometry.y);
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
break;
}
default:
{
double
mid,
scale;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (IsEventLogging() != MagickFalse)
LogPrimitiveInfo(primitive_info);
scale=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine);
if ((draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL) &&
(fabs(draw_info->dash_pattern[0]) >= DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(scale*draw_info->stroke_width) >= DrawEpsilon) &&
(draw_info->stroke.opacity != (Quantum) TransparentOpacity))
{
/*
Draw dash polygon.
*/
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
(void) DrawDashPolygon(draw_info,primitive_info,image);
break;
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
if ((mid > 1.0) &&
((draw_info->stroke.opacity != (Quantum) TransparentOpacity) ||
(draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)))
{
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
/*
Draw strokes while respecting line cap/join attributes.
*/
for (i=0; primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; i++) ;
closed_path=
(primitive_info[i-1].point.x == primitive_info[0].point.x) &&
(primitive_info[i-1].point.y == primitive_info[0].point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
if (((closed_path != MagickFalse) &&
(draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin)) ||
(primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive))
{
(void) DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
if (draw_info->linecap == RoundCap)
{
(void) DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
status&=DrawStrokePolygon(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info);
break;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end draw-primitive");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5592/
|
CWE-346
|
https://github.com/boothj5/profanity/commit/8e75437a7e43d4c55e861691f74892e666e29b0b
|
8e75437a7e43d4c55e861691f74892e666e29b0b
|
Add carbons from check
|
_handle_error(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza)
{
const char *id = xmpp_stanza_get_id(stanza);
const char *jid = xmpp_stanza_get_from(stanza);
xmpp_stanza_t *error_stanza = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(stanza, STANZA_NAME_ERROR);
const char *type = NULL;
if (error_stanza) {
type = xmpp_stanza_get_type(error_stanza);
}
char *err_msg = stanza_get_error_message(stanza);
GString *log_msg = g_string_new("message stanza error received");
if (id) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " id=");
g_string_append(log_msg, id);
}
if (jid) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " from=");
g_string_append(log_msg, jid);
}
if (type) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " type=");
g_string_append(log_msg, type);
}
g_string_append(log_msg, " error=");
g_string_append(log_msg, err_msg);
log_info(log_msg->str);
g_string_free(log_msg, TRUE);
if (!jid) {
ui_handle_error(err_msg);
} else if (type && (strcmp(type, "cancel") == 0)) {
log_info("Recipient %s not found: %s", jid, err_msg);
Jid *jidp = jid_create(jid);
chat_session_remove(jidp->barejid);
jid_destroy(jidp);
} else {
ui_handle_recipient_error(jid, err_msg);
}
free(err_msg);
}
|
_handle_error(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza)
{
const char *id = xmpp_stanza_get_id(stanza);
const char *jid = xmpp_stanza_get_from(stanza);
xmpp_stanza_t *error_stanza = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(stanza, STANZA_NAME_ERROR);
const char *type = NULL;
if (error_stanza) {
type = xmpp_stanza_get_type(error_stanza);
}
char *err_msg = stanza_get_error_message(stanza);
GString *log_msg = g_string_new("message stanza error received");
if (id) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " id=");
g_string_append(log_msg, id);
}
if (jid) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " from=");
g_string_append(log_msg, jid);
}
if (type) {
g_string_append(log_msg, " type=");
g_string_append(log_msg, type);
}
g_string_append(log_msg, " error=");
g_string_append(log_msg, err_msg);
log_info(log_msg->str);
g_string_free(log_msg, TRUE);
if (!jid) {
ui_handle_error(err_msg);
} else if (type && (strcmp(type, "cancel") == 0)) {
log_info("Recipient %s not found: %s", jid, err_msg);
Jid *jidp = jid_create(jid);
chat_session_remove(jidp->barejid);
jid_destroy(jidp);
} else {
ui_handle_recipient_error(jid, err_msg);
}
free(err_msg);
}
|
C
|
profanity
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/52f6eb4221430b6248fd5a59bec53bfef9fdd9a7
|
52f6eb4221430b6248fd5a59bec53bfef9fdd9a7
|
[md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
|
void AddLanguagesStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"languagesPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_PAGE_TITLE},
{"languagesListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_TITLE},
{"languagesExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"orderLanguagesInstructions",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_ORDERING_INSTRUCTIONS},
{"moveToTop", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_TO_TOP},
{"moveUp", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_UP},
{"moveDown", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_DOWN},
{"removeLanguage", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_REMOVE},
{"addLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_ADD},
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
{"inputMethodsListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_LIST_TITLE},
{"inputMethodEnabled", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHOD_ENABLED},
{"inputMethodsExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"manageInputMethods", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_MANAGE},
{"manageInputMethodsPageTitle",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_MANAGE_INPUT_METHODS_TITLE},
{"showImeMenu", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SHOW_IME_MENU},
#endif
{"addLanguagesDialogTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_MANAGE_LANGUAGES_TITLE},
{"allLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ALL_LANGUAGES},
{"enabledLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ENABLED_LANGUAGES},
{"isDisplayedInThisLanguage",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_IS_DISPLAYED_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"displayInThisLanguage", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DISPLAY_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"offerToTranslateInThisLanguage",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_OFFER_TO_TRANSLATE_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"offerToEnableTranslate",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_OFFER_TO_ENABLE_TRANSLATE},
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
{"spellCheckListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_LIST_TITLE},
{"spellCheckExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"spellCheckSummaryTwoLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_TWO_LANGUAGES},
{"spellCheckSummaryThreeLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_THREE_LANGUAGES},
{"spellCheckSummaryMultipleLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_MULTIPLE_LANGUAGES},
{"manageSpellCheck", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_MANAGE},
{"editDictionaryPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_EDIT_DICTIONARY_TITLE},
{"addDictionaryWordLabel", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD},
{"addDictionaryWordButton",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_BUTTON},
{"addDictionaryWordDuplicateError",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_DUPLICATE_ERROR},
{"addDictionaryWordLengthError",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_LENGTH_ERROR},
{"customDictionaryWords", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DICTIONARY_WORDS},
{"noCustomDictionaryWordsFound",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DICTIONARY_WORDS_NONE},
{"spellCheckDisabled", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_DISABLED},
#endif
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
html_source->AddString(
"languagesLearnMoreURL",
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kLanguageSettingsLearnMoreUrl));
#endif
}
|
void AddLanguagesStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"languagesPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_PAGE_TITLE},
{"languagesListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_TITLE},
{"languagesExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"orderLanguagesInstructions",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_ORDERING_INSTRUCTIONS},
{"moveToTop", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_TO_TOP},
{"moveUp", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_UP},
{"moveDown", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_MOVE_DOWN},
{"removeLanguage", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_LIST_REMOVE},
{"addLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_LANGUAGES_ADD},
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
{"inputMethodsListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_LIST_TITLE},
{"inputMethodEnabled", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHOD_ENABLED},
{"inputMethodsExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"manageInputMethods", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_INPUT_METHODS_MANAGE},
{"manageInputMethodsPageTitle",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_MANAGE_INPUT_METHODS_TITLE},
{"showImeMenu", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SHOW_IME_MENU},
#endif
{"addLanguagesDialogTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_MANAGE_LANGUAGES_TITLE},
{"allLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ALL_LANGUAGES},
{"enabledLanguages", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ENABLED_LANGUAGES},
{"isDisplayedInThisLanguage",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_IS_DISPLAYED_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"displayInThisLanguage", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DISPLAY_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"offerToTranslateInThisLanguage",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_OFFER_TO_TRANSLATE_IN_THIS_LANGUAGE},
{"offerToEnableTranslate",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_OFFER_TO_ENABLE_TRANSLATE},
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
{"spellCheckListTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_LIST_TITLE},
{"spellCheckExpandA11yLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_EXPAND_ACCESSIBILITY_LABEL},
{"spellCheckSummaryTwoLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_TWO_LANGUAGES},
{"spellCheckSummaryThreeLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_THREE_LANGUAGES},
{"spellCheckSummaryMultipleLanguages",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_SUMMARY_MULTIPLE_LANGUAGES},
{"manageSpellCheck", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_MANAGE},
{"editDictionaryPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_EDIT_DICTIONARY_TITLE},
{"addDictionaryWordLabel", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD},
{"addDictionaryWordButton",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_BUTTON},
{"addDictionaryWordDuplicateError",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_DUPLICATE_ERROR},
{"addDictionaryWordLengthError",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_ADD_DICTIONARY_WORD_LENGTH_ERROR},
{"customDictionaryWords", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DICTIONARY_WORDS},
{"noCustomDictionaryWordsFound",
IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_DICTIONARY_WORDS_NONE},
{"spellCheckDisabled", IDS_SETTINGS_LANGUAGES_SPELL_CHECK_DISABLED},
#endif
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
html_source->AddString(
"languagesLearnMoreURL",
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kLanguageSettingsLearnMoreUrl));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int rfcomm_connect_ind(struct rfcomm_session *s, u8 channel, struct rfcomm_dlc **d)
{
struct sock *sk, *parent;
bdaddr_t src, dst;
int result = 0;
BT_DBG("session %p channel %d", s, channel);
rfcomm_session_getaddr(s, &src, &dst);
/* Check if we have socket listening on channel */
parent = rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel(BT_LISTEN, channel, &src);
if (!parent)
return 0;
bh_lock_sock(parent);
/* Check for backlog size */
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) {
BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog);
goto done;
}
sk = rfcomm_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL, BTPROTO_RFCOMM, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk)
goto done;
bt_sock_reclassify_lock(sk, BTPROTO_RFCOMM);
rfcomm_sock_init(sk, parent);
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &src);
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->dst, &dst);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, sk);
/* Accept connection and return socket DLC */
*d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
result = 1;
done:
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
if (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags))
parent->sk_state_change(parent);
return result;
}
|
int rfcomm_connect_ind(struct rfcomm_session *s, u8 channel, struct rfcomm_dlc **d)
{
struct sock *sk, *parent;
bdaddr_t src, dst;
int result = 0;
BT_DBG("session %p channel %d", s, channel);
rfcomm_session_getaddr(s, &src, &dst);
/* Check if we have socket listening on channel */
parent = rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel(BT_LISTEN, channel, &src);
if (!parent)
return 0;
bh_lock_sock(parent);
/* Check for backlog size */
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) {
BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog);
goto done;
}
sk = rfcomm_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL, BTPROTO_RFCOMM, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk)
goto done;
bt_sock_reclassify_lock(sk, BTPROTO_RFCOMM);
rfcomm_sock_init(sk, parent);
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &src);
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->dst, &dst);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, sk);
/* Accept connection and return socket DLC */
*d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
result = 1;
done:
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
if (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags))
parent->sk_state_change(parent);
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::Session::Session()
: id(kSessionIDInvalid), abort_requested(false) {}
|
SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::Session::Session()
: id(kSessionIDInvalid), abort_requested(false) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c
|
tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tipc_listen(struct socket *sock, int len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
res = -EINVAL;
else {
sock->state = SS_LISTENING;
res = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
static int tipc_listen(struct socket *sock, int len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
res = -EINVAL;
else {
sock->state = SS_LISTENING;
res = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
Replaces the % character with \x when generating Windows shortcuts via
File->"Create application shortcuts." The \x is converted back to % in
handling the --app switch.
BUG=23693
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/515028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35377 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual bool ShouldExpire(
const NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails& details) const {
return should_expire_;
}
|
virtual bool ShouldExpire(
const NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails& details) const {
return should_expire_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
Don't interpret embeded NULLs in a response header line as a line terminator.
BUG=95992
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100863 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void HttpResponseHeaders::Parse(const std::string& raw_input) {
raw_headers_.reserve(raw_input.size());
std::string::const_iterator line_begin = raw_input.begin();
std::string::const_iterator line_end =
std::find(line_begin, raw_input.end(), '\0');
bool has_headers = (line_end != raw_input.end() &&
(line_end + 1) != raw_input.end() &&
*(line_end + 1) != '\0');
ParseStatusLine(line_begin, line_end, has_headers);
if (line_end == raw_input.end()) {
raw_headers_.push_back('\0');
return;
}
size_t status_line_len = raw_headers_.size();
raw_headers_.append(line_end + 1, raw_input.end());
line_end = raw_headers_.begin() + status_line_len - 1;
HttpUtil::HeadersIterator headers(line_end + 1, raw_headers_.end(),
std::string(1, '\0'));
while (headers.GetNext()) {
AddHeader(headers.name_begin(),
headers.name_end(),
headers.values_begin(),
headers.values_end());
}
}
|
void HttpResponseHeaders::Parse(const std::string& raw_input) {
raw_headers_.reserve(raw_input.size());
std::string::const_iterator line_begin = raw_input.begin();
std::string::const_iterator line_end =
std::find(line_begin, raw_input.end(), '\0');
bool has_headers = (line_end != raw_input.end() &&
(line_end + 1) != raw_input.end() &&
*(line_end + 1) != '\0');
ParseStatusLine(line_begin, line_end, has_headers);
if (line_end == raw_input.end()) {
raw_headers_.push_back('\0');
return;
}
size_t status_line_len = raw_headers_.size();
raw_headers_.append(line_end + 1, raw_input.end());
line_end = raw_headers_.begin() + status_line_len - 1;
HttpUtil::HeadersIterator headers(line_end + 1, raw_headers_.end(),
std::string(1, '\0'));
while (headers.GetNext()) {
AddHeader(headers.name_begin(),
headers.name_end(),
headers.values_begin(),
headers.values_end());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5787/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
void OffscreenCanvas::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(context_);
visitor->Trace(execution_context_);
EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
}
|
void OffscreenCanvas::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(context_);
visitor->Trace(execution_context_);
EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2889/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a03ffcf873fe0f2565386ca8ef832144c42e67fa
|
a03ffcf873fe0f2565386ca8ef832144c42e67fa
|
net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.
In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.
Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
{
if (len == 1)
*ptr = bytes;
else if (len == 2)
*(u16 *)ptr = bytes;
else {
*(u32 *)ptr = bytes;
barrier();
}
return ptr + len;
}
|
static inline u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
{
if (len == 1)
*ptr = bytes;
else if (len == 2)
*(u16 *)ptr = bytes;
else {
*(u32 *)ptr = bytes;
barrier();
}
return ptr + len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9389
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9389/
| null |
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/dee11ec440d7908d1daf69f40a3324b27cf213ba
|
dee11ec440d7908d1daf69f40a3324b27cf213ba
|
The component domains must be the same for the ICT/RCT in the JPC codec.
This was previously enforced with an assertion.
Now, it is handled in a more graceful manner.
|
static int jpc_dec_tiledecode(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
int i;
int j;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
int bandno;
int adjust;
int v;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
if (jpc_dec_decodecblks(dec, tile)) {
jas_eprintf("jpc_dec_decodecblks failed\n");
return -1;
}
/* Perform dequantization. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl->bands) {
continue;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
jpc_undo_roi(band->data, band->roishift, ccp->roishift -
band->roishift, band->numbps);
if (tile->realmode) {
jas_matrix_asl(band->data, JPC_FIX_FRACBITS);
jpc_dequantize(band->data, band->absstepsize);
}
}
}
}
/* Apply an inverse wavelet transform if necessary. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
jpc_tsfb_synthesize(tcomp->tsfb, tcomp->data);
}
/* Apply an inverse intercomponent transform if necessary. */
switch (tile->cp->mctid) {
case JPC_MCT_RCT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
if (!jas_image_cmpt_domains_same(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires all components have the same domain\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_irct(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
case JPC_MCT_ICT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("ICT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
if (!jas_image_cmpt_domains_same(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires all components have the same domain\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_iict(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
}
/* Perform rounding and convert to integer values. */
if (tile->realmode) {
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
v = jas_matrix_get(tcomp->data, i, j);
v = jpc_fix_round(v);
jas_matrix_set(tcomp->data, i, j, jpc_fixtoint(v));
}
}
}
}
/* Perform level shift. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
adjust = cmpt->sgnd ? 0 : (1 << (cmpt->prec - 1));
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(tcomp->data, i, j) += adjust;
}
}
}
/* Perform clipping. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
jpc_fix_t mn;
jpc_fix_t mx;
mn = cmpt->sgnd ? (-(1 << (cmpt->prec - 1))) : (0);
mx = cmpt->sgnd ? ((1 << (cmpt->prec - 1)) - 1) : ((1 <<
cmpt->prec) - 1);
jas_matrix_clip(tcomp->data, mn, mx);
}
/* XXX need to free tsfb struct */
/* Write the data for each component of the image. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(dec->image, compno, tcomp->xstart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep), tcomp->ystart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep), jas_matrix_numcols(
tcomp->data), jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data), tcomp->data)) {
jas_eprintf("write component failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int jpc_dec_tiledecode(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
int i;
int j;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
int bandno;
int adjust;
int v;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
if (jpc_dec_decodecblks(dec, tile)) {
jas_eprintf("jpc_dec_decodecblks failed\n");
return -1;
}
/* Perform dequantization. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl->bands) {
continue;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
jpc_undo_roi(band->data, band->roishift, ccp->roishift -
band->roishift, band->numbps);
if (tile->realmode) {
jas_matrix_asl(band->data, JPC_FIX_FRACBITS);
jpc_dequantize(band->data, band->absstepsize);
}
}
}
}
/* Apply an inverse wavelet transform if necessary. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
jpc_tsfb_synthesize(tcomp->tsfb, tcomp->data);
}
/* Apply an inverse intercomponent transform if necessary. */
switch (tile->cp->mctid) {
case JPC_MCT_RCT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_irct(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
case JPC_MCT_ICT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("ICT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_iict(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
}
/* Perform rounding and convert to integer values. */
if (tile->realmode) {
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
v = jas_matrix_get(tcomp->data, i, j);
v = jpc_fix_round(v);
jas_matrix_set(tcomp->data, i, j, jpc_fixtoint(v));
}
}
}
}
/* Perform level shift. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
adjust = cmpt->sgnd ? 0 : (1 << (cmpt->prec - 1));
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(tcomp->data, i, j) += adjust;
}
}
}
/* Perform clipping. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
jpc_fix_t mn;
jpc_fix_t mx;
mn = cmpt->sgnd ? (-(1 << (cmpt->prec - 1))) : (0);
mx = cmpt->sgnd ? ((1 << (cmpt->prec - 1)) - 1) : ((1 <<
cmpt->prec) - 1);
jas_matrix_clip(tcomp->data, mn, mx);
}
/* XXX need to free tsfb struct */
/* Write the data for each component of the image. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(dec->image, compno, tcomp->xstart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep), tcomp->ystart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep), jas_matrix_numcols(
tcomp->data), jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data), tcomp->data)) {
jas_eprintf("write component failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 1 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
void ap_flush_queue(struct ap_device *ap_dev)
{
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
__ap_flush_queue(ap_dev);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
}
|
void ap_flush_queue(struct ap_device *ap_dev)
{
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
__ap_flush_queue(ap_dev);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRunJavaScriptDialog(
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (IsWaitingForUnloadACK()) {
SendJavaScriptDialogReply(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
GetProcess()->SetBlocked(true);
delegate_->RunJavaScriptDialog(this, message, default_prompt, dialog_type,
reply_msg);
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRunJavaScriptDialog(
const base::string16& message,
const base::string16& default_prompt,
JavaScriptDialogType dialog_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (IsWaitingForUnloadACK()) {
SendJavaScriptDialogReply(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
GetProcess()->SetBlocked(true);
delegate_->RunJavaScriptDialog(this, message, default_prompt, dialog_type,
reply_msg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorController::processGPUEvent(double timestamp, int phase, bool foreign, size_t usedGPUMemoryBytes)
{
if (InspectorTimelineAgent* timelineAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorTimelineAgent())
timelineAgent->processGPUEvent(InspectorTimelineAgent::GPUEvent(timestamp, phase, foreign, usedGPUMemoryBytes));
}
|
void InspectorController::processGPUEvent(double timestamp, int phase, bool foreign, size_t usedGPUMemoryBytes)
{
if (InspectorTimelineAgent* timelineAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorTimelineAgent())
timelineAgent->processGPUEvent(InspectorTimelineAgent::GPUEvent(timestamp, phase, foreign, usedGPUMemoryBytes));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2583/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/33ab91103b3415e12457e3104f0e4517ce12d0f3
|
33ab91103b3415e12457e3104f0e4517ce12d0f3
|
KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
int rc;
ulong linear;
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
}
|
static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
int rc;
ulong linear;
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderView::CheckPreferredSize() {
if (!send_preferred_size_changes_ || !webview())
return;
gfx::Size size(webview()->mainFrame()->contentsPreferredWidth(),
webview()->mainFrame()->documentElementScrollHeight());
if (size == preferred_size_)
return;
preferred_size_ = size;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidContentsPreferredSizeChange(routing_id_,
preferred_size_));
}
|
void RenderView::CheckPreferredSize() {
if (!send_preferred_size_changes_ || !webview())
return;
gfx::Size size(webview()->mainFrame()->contentsPreferredWidth(),
webview()->mainFrame()->documentElementScrollHeight());
if (size == preferred_size_)
return;
preferred_size_ = size;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidContentsPreferredSizeChange(routing_id_,
preferred_size_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5296/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
|
a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
| null |
void smb2cli_req_set_credit_charge(struct tevent_req *req, uint16_t charge)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
state->smb2.credit_charge = charge;
}
|
void smb2cli_req_set_credit_charge(struct tevent_req *req, uint16_t charge)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
state->smb2.credit_charge = charge;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
cmp_txid(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
txid a = *(const txid *) aa;
txid b = *(const txid *) bb;
if (a < b)
return -1;
if (a > b)
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
cmp_txid(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
txid a = *(const txid *) aa;
txid b = *(const txid *) bb;
if (a < b)
return -1;
if (a > b)
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6768
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6768/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01
|
4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01
|
Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
|
bool Document::haveImportsLoaded() const
{
if (!m_importsController)
return true;
return !m_importsController->shouldBlockScriptExecution(*this);
}
|
bool Document::haveImportsLoaded() const
{
if (!m_importsController)
return true;
return !m_importsController->shouldBlockScriptExecution(*this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4818/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit?id=3f0d3f4d97bce75c1828635c322b6560a45a037f
|
3f0d3f4d97bce75c1828635c322b6560a45a037f
| null |
int __glXDisp_QueryExtensionsString(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReq *req = (xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReq *) pc;
xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReply reply;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
size_t n, length;
char *buf;
int err;
if (!validGlxScreen(client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
n = strlen(pGlxScreen->GLXextensions) + 1;
length = __GLX_PAD(n) >> 2;
reply.type = X_Reply;
reply.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
reply.length = length;
reply.n = n;
/* Allocate buffer to make sure it's a multiple of 4 bytes big.*/
buf = (char *) malloc(length << 2);
if (buf == NULL)
return BadAlloc;
memcpy(buf, pGlxScreen->GLXextensions, n);
if (client->swapped) {
glxSwapQueryExtensionsStringReply(client, &reply, buf);
} else {
WriteToClient(client, sz_xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReply,(char *)&reply);
WriteToClient(client, (int)(length << 2), (char *)buf);
}
free(buf);
return Success;
}
|
int __glXDisp_QueryExtensionsString(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReq *req = (xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReq *) pc;
xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReply reply;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
size_t n, length;
char *buf;
int err;
if (!validGlxScreen(client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
n = strlen(pGlxScreen->GLXextensions) + 1;
length = __GLX_PAD(n) >> 2;
reply.type = X_Reply;
reply.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
reply.length = length;
reply.n = n;
/* Allocate buffer to make sure it's a multiple of 4 bytes big.*/
buf = (char *) malloc(length << 2);
if (buf == NULL)
return BadAlloc;
memcpy(buf, pGlxScreen->GLXextensions, n);
if (client->swapped) {
glxSwapQueryExtensionsStringReply(client, &reply, buf);
} else {
WriteToClient(client, sz_xGLXQueryExtensionsStringReply,(char *)&reply);
WriteToClient(client, (int)(length << 2), (char *)buf);
}
free(buf);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5366
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5366/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0
|
udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, unsigned int hnum, int dif,
struct udp_hslot *hslot2, unsigned int slot2)
{
struct sock *sk, *result;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
int score, badness, matches = 0, reuseport = 0;
u32 hash = 0;
begin:
result = NULL;
badness = -1;
udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(sk, node, &hslot2->head) {
score = compute_score2(sk, net, saddr, sport,
daddr, hnum, dif);
if (score > badness) {
result = sk;
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
hash = udp6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
} else if (score == SCORE2_MAX)
goto exact_match;
} else if (score == badness && reuseport) {
matches++;
if (reciprocal_scale(hash, matches) == 0)
result = sk;
hash = next_pseudo_random32(hash);
}
}
/*
* if the nulls value we got at the end of this lookup is
* not the expected one, we must restart lookup.
* We probably met an item that was moved to another chain.
*/
if (get_nulls_value(node) != slot2)
goto begin;
if (result) {
exact_match:
if (unlikely(!atomic_inc_not_zero_hint(&result->sk_refcnt, 2)))
result = NULL;
else if (unlikely(compute_score2(result, net, saddr, sport,
daddr, hnum, dif) < badness)) {
sock_put(result);
goto begin;
}
}
return result;
}
|
static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, unsigned int hnum, int dif,
struct udp_hslot *hslot2, unsigned int slot2)
{
struct sock *sk, *result;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
int score, badness, matches = 0, reuseport = 0;
u32 hash = 0;
begin:
result = NULL;
badness = -1;
udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(sk, node, &hslot2->head) {
score = compute_score2(sk, net, saddr, sport,
daddr, hnum, dif);
if (score > badness) {
result = sk;
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
hash = udp6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
} else if (score == SCORE2_MAX)
goto exact_match;
} else if (score == badness && reuseport) {
matches++;
if (reciprocal_scale(hash, matches) == 0)
result = sk;
hash = next_pseudo_random32(hash);
}
}
/*
* if the nulls value we got at the end of this lookup is
* not the expected one, we must restart lookup.
* We probably met an item that was moved to another chain.
*/
if (get_nulls_value(node) != slot2)
goto begin;
if (result) {
exact_match:
if (unlikely(!atomic_inc_not_zero_hint(&result->sk_refcnt, 2)))
result = NULL;
else if (unlikely(compute_score2(result, net, saddr, sport,
daddr, hnum, dif) < badness)) {
sock_put(result);
goto begin;
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0273
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0273/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
|
71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
| null |
static int date_object_compare_date(zval *d1, zval *d2 TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_date_obj *o1 = zend_object_store_get_object(d1 TSRMLS_CC);
php_date_obj *o2 = zend_object_store_get_object(d2 TSRMLS_CC);
if (!o1->time || !o2->time) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to compare an incomplete DateTime or DateTimeImmutable object");
return 1;
}
if (!o1->time->sse_uptodate) {
timelib_update_ts(o1->time, o1->time->tz_info);
}
if (!o2->time->sse_uptodate) {
timelib_update_ts(o2->time, o2->time->tz_info);
}
return (o1->time->sse == o2->time->sse) ? 0 : ((o1->time->sse < o2->time->sse) ? -1 : 1);
}
|
static int date_object_compare_date(zval *d1, zval *d2 TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_date_obj *o1 = zend_object_store_get_object(d1 TSRMLS_CC);
php_date_obj *o2 = zend_object_store_get_object(d2 TSRMLS_CC);
if (!o1->time || !o2->time) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to compare an incomplete DateTime or DateTimeImmutable object");
return 1;
}
if (!o1->time->sse_uptodate) {
timelib_update_ts(o1->time, o1->time->tz_info);
}
if (!o2->time->sse_uptodate) {
timelib_update_ts(o2->time, o2->time->tz_info);
}
return (o1->time->sse == o2->time->sse) ? 0 : ((o1->time->sse < o2->time->sse) ? -1 : 1);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5773/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
f6aef68089221c5ea047d4a74224ee3deead99a6?w=1
|
Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
|
static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(renameName)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
char *name, *new_name;
int name_len, new_name_len;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &name, &name_len, &new_name, &new_name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (new_name_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Empty string as new entry name");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, name, name_len, 0, sb);
if (zip_rename(intern, sb.index, (const char *)new_name)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(renameName)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
char *name, *new_name;
int name_len, new_name_len;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &name, &name_len, &new_name, &new_name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (new_name_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Empty string as new entry name");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, name, name_len, 0, sb);
if (zip_rename(intern, sb.index, (const char *)new_name)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6198/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
|
static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
while (1) {
if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
break;
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
unsigned seq;
inode = parent->d_inode;
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
nd->path.dentry = parent;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(!path_connected(&nd->path)))
return -ENOENT;
break;
} else {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
struct mount *mparent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
struct inode *inode2 = mountpoint->d_inode;
unsigned seq = read_seqcount_begin(&mountpoint->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
inode = inode2;
nd->seq = seq;
}
}
while (unlikely(d_mountpoint(nd->path.dentry))) {
struct mount *mounted;
mounted = __lookup_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
}
nd->inode = inode;
return 0;
}
|
static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
while (1) {
if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
break;
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
unsigned seq;
inode = parent->d_inode;
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
nd->path.dentry = parent;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(!path_connected(&nd->path)))
return -ENOENT;
break;
} else {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
struct mount *mparent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
struct inode *inode2 = mountpoint->d_inode;
unsigned seq = read_seqcount_begin(&mountpoint->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
inode = inode2;
nd->seq = seq;
}
}
while (unlikely(d_mountpoint(nd->path.dentry))) {
struct mount *mounted;
mounted = __lookup_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
}
nd->inode = inode;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void* WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::mapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(
WGC3Denum target,
WGC3Dintptr offset,
WGC3Dsizeiptr size,
WGC3Denum access) {
return gl_->MapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(target, offset, size, access);
}
|
void* WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::mapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(
WGC3Denum target,
WGC3Dintptr offset,
WGC3Dsizeiptr size,
WGC3Denum access) {
return gl_->MapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(target, offset, size, access);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err url_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_DataEntryURLBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURLBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if ( !(ptr->flags & 1)) {
if (ptr->location) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->location, (u32)strlen(ptr->location) + 1);
}
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err url_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_DataEntryURLBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURLBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if ( !(ptr->flags & 1)) {
if (ptr->location) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->location, (u32)strlen(ptr->location) + 1);
}
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11599
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11599/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end)
{
struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point;
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL;
insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
vma->vm_prev = NULL;
do {
vma_rb_erase(vma, &mm->mm_rb);
mm->map_count--;
tail_vma = vma;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
*insertion_point = vma;
if (vma) {
vma->vm_prev = prev;
vma_gap_update(vma);
} else
mm->highest_vm_end = prev ? vm_end_gap(prev) : 0;
tail_vma->vm_next = NULL;
/* Kill the cache */
vmacache_invalidate(mm);
}
|
detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end)
{
struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point;
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL;
insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
vma->vm_prev = NULL;
do {
vma_rb_erase(vma, &mm->mm_rb);
mm->map_count--;
tail_vma = vma;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
*insertion_point = vma;
if (vma) {
vma->vm_prev = prev;
vma_gap_update(vma);
} else
mm->highest_vm_end = prev ? vm_end_gap(prev) : 0;
tail_vma->vm_next = NULL;
/* Kill the cache */
vmacache_invalidate(mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10270
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10270/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018
|
9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018
|
* libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
|
TIFFReadDirectoryFindFieldInfo(TIFF* tif, uint16 tagid, uint32* fii)
{
int32 ma,mb,mc;
ma=-1;
mc=(int32)tif->tif_nfields;
while (1)
{
if (ma+1==mc)
{
*fii = FAILED_FII;
return;
}
mb=(ma+mc)/2;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb]->field_tag==(uint32)tagid)
break;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb]->field_tag<(uint32)tagid)
ma=mb;
else
mc=mb;
}
while (1)
{
if (mb==0)
break;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb-1]->field_tag!=(uint32)tagid)
break;
mb--;
}
*fii=mb;
}
|
TIFFReadDirectoryFindFieldInfo(TIFF* tif, uint16 tagid, uint32* fii)
{
int32 ma,mb,mc;
ma=-1;
mc=(int32)tif->tif_nfields;
while (1)
{
if (ma+1==mc)
{
*fii = FAILED_FII;
return;
}
mb=(ma+mc)/2;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb]->field_tag==(uint32)tagid)
break;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb]->field_tag<(uint32)tagid)
ma=mb;
else
mc=mb;
}
while (1)
{
if (mb==0)
break;
if (tif->tif_fields[mb-1]->field_tag!=(uint32)tagid)
break;
mb--;
}
*fii=mb;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SessionModelAssociator::DisassociateForeignSession(
const std::string& foreign_session_tag) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
synced_session_tracker_.DeleteSession(foreign_session_tag);
}
|
void SessionModelAssociator::DisassociateForeignSession(
const std::string& foreign_session_tag) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
synced_session_tracker_.DeleteSession(foreign_session_tag);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6125
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ac149a8d4371c0e01e0934fdd57b09e86f96b5b9
|
ac149a8d4371c0e01e0934fdd57b09e86f96b5b9
|
Remove libusb-Windows support for HID devices
This patch removes the Windows-specific support in libusb that provided
a translation between the WinUSB API and the HID API. Applications
currently depending on this using the chrome.usb API should switch to
using the chrome.hid API.
Bug: 818592
Change-Id: I82ee6ccdcbccc21d2910dc62845c7785e78b64f6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/951635
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541265}
|
static unsigned long get_ancestor_session_id(DWORD devinst, unsigned level)
{
DWORD parent_devinst;
unsigned long session_id = 0;
char* sanitized_path = NULL;
char path[MAX_PATH_LENGTH];
unsigned i;
if (level < 1) return 0;
for (i = 0; i<level; i++) {
if (CM_Get_Parent(&parent_devinst, devinst, 0) != CR_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
devinst = parent_devinst;
}
if (CM_Get_Device_IDA(devinst, path, MAX_PATH_LENGTH, 0) != CR_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
sanitized_path = sanitize_path(path);
if (sanitized_path == NULL) {
return 0;
}
session_id = htab_hash(sanitized_path);
safe_free(sanitized_path);
return session_id;
}
|
static unsigned long get_ancestor_session_id(DWORD devinst, unsigned level)
{
DWORD parent_devinst;
unsigned long session_id = 0;
char* sanitized_path = NULL;
char path[MAX_PATH_LENGTH];
unsigned i;
if (level < 1) return 0;
for (i = 0; i<level; i++) {
if (CM_Get_Parent(&parent_devinst, devinst, 0) != CR_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
devinst = parent_devinst;
}
if (CM_Get_Device_IDA(devinst, path, MAX_PATH_LENGTH, 0) != CR_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
sanitized_path = sanitize_path(path);
if (sanitized_path == NULL) {
return 0;
}
session_id = htab_hash(sanitized_path);
safe_free(sanitized_path);
return session_id;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_disconnect_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
|
static int snd_disconnect_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy() {
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_)
view_->Destroy();
delete this;
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy() {
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_)
view_->Destroy();
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
string16 DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::GetMessageText() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_INFOBAR_SHORT_TEXT);
}
|
string16 DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::GetMessageText() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_INFOBAR_SHORT_TEXT);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
|
ofputil_append_table_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_table_desc *td,
struct ovs_list *replies,
enum ofp_version version)
{
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpbuf_from_list(ovs_list_back(replies));
size_t start_otd;
struct ofp14_table_desc *otd;
start_otd = reply->size;
ofpbuf_put_zeros(reply, sizeof *otd);
if (td->eviction_flags != UINT32_MAX) {
ofpprop_put_u32(reply, OFPTMPT14_EVICTION, td->eviction_flags);
}
if (td->vacancy == OFPUTIL_TABLE_VACANCY_ON) {
struct ofp14_table_mod_prop_vacancy *otv;
otv = ofpprop_put_zeros(reply, OFPTMPT14_VACANCY, sizeof *otv);
otv->vacancy_down = td->table_vacancy.vacancy_down;
otv->vacancy_up = td->table_vacancy.vacancy_up;
otv->vacancy = td->table_vacancy.vacancy;
}
otd = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_otd, sizeof *otd);
otd->length = htons(reply->size - start_otd);
otd->table_id = td->table_id;
otd->config = ofputil_encode_table_config(OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_DEFAULT,
td->eviction, td->vacancy,
version);
ofpmp_postappend(replies, start_otd);
}
|
ofputil_append_table_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_table_desc *td,
struct ovs_list *replies,
enum ofp_version version)
{
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpbuf_from_list(ovs_list_back(replies));
size_t start_otd;
struct ofp14_table_desc *otd;
start_otd = reply->size;
ofpbuf_put_zeros(reply, sizeof *otd);
if (td->eviction_flags != UINT32_MAX) {
ofpprop_put_u32(reply, OFPTMPT14_EVICTION, td->eviction_flags);
}
if (td->vacancy == OFPUTIL_TABLE_VACANCY_ON) {
struct ofp14_table_mod_prop_vacancy *otv;
otv = ofpprop_put_zeros(reply, OFPTMPT14_VACANCY, sizeof *otv);
otv->vacancy_down = td->table_vacancy.vacancy_down;
otv->vacancy_up = td->table_vacancy.vacancy_up;
otv->vacancy = td->table_vacancy.vacancy;
}
otd = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_otd, sizeof *otd);
otd->length = htons(reply->size - start_otd);
otd->table_id = td->table_id;
otd->config = ofputil_encode_table_config(OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_DEFAULT,
td->eviction, td->vacancy,
version);
ofpmp_postappend(replies, start_otd);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int WebPluginDelegateImpl::GetProcessId() {
return base::GetCurrentProcId();
}
|
int WebPluginDelegateImpl::GetProcessId() {
return base::GetCurrentProcId();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2141/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int kill_proc_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
int error;
rcu_read_lock();
error = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
}
|
int kill_proc_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
int error;
rcu_read_lock();
error = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
void CL_MapLoading( void ) {
if ( com_dedicated->integer ) {
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED;
Key_SetCatcher( KEYCATCH_CONSOLE );
return;
}
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
Con_Close();
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
if ( clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED && !Q_stricmp( clc.servername, "localhost" ) ) {
clc.state = CA_CONNECTED; // so the connect screen is drawn
Com_Memset( cls.updateInfoString, 0, sizeof( cls.updateInfoString ) );
Com_Memset( clc.serverMessage, 0, sizeof( clc.serverMessage ) );
Com_Memset( &cl.gameState, 0, sizeof( cl.gameState ) );
clc.lastPacketSentTime = -9999;
SCR_UpdateScreen();
} else {
Cvar_Set( "nextmap", "" );
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
Q_strncpyz( clc.servername, "localhost", sizeof(clc.servername) );
clc.state = CA_CHALLENGING; // so the connect screen is drawn
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
SCR_UpdateScreen();
clc.connectTime = -RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT;
NET_StringToAdr( clc.servername, &clc.serverAddress, NA_UNSPEC);
CL_CheckForResend();
}
}
|
void CL_MapLoading( void ) {
if ( com_dedicated->integer ) {
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED;
Key_SetCatcher( KEYCATCH_CONSOLE );
return;
}
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
Con_Close();
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
if ( clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED && !Q_stricmp( clc.servername, "localhost" ) ) {
clc.state = CA_CONNECTED; // so the connect screen is drawn
Com_Memset( cls.updateInfoString, 0, sizeof( cls.updateInfoString ) );
Com_Memset( clc.serverMessage, 0, sizeof( clc.serverMessage ) );
Com_Memset( &cl.gameState, 0, sizeof( cl.gameState ) );
clc.lastPacketSentTime = -9999;
SCR_UpdateScreen();
} else {
Cvar_Set( "nextmap", "" );
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
Q_strncpyz( clc.servername, "localhost", sizeof(clc.servername) );
clc.state = CA_CHALLENGING; // so the connect screen is drawn
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
SCR_UpdateScreen();
clc.connectTime = -RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT;
NET_StringToAdr( clc.servername, &clc.serverAddress, NA_UNSPEC);
CL_CheckForResend();
}
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7008
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7008/
| null |
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/29ffeef5e73b8f41ff3a3f2242d356759c66f91f
|
29ffeef5e73b8f41ff3a3f2242d356759c66f91f
|
avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void clone_tables(H264Context *dst, H264Context *src, int i)
{
dst->intra4x4_pred_mode = src->intra4x4_pred_mode + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->non_zero_count = src->non_zero_count;
dst->slice_table = src->slice_table;
dst->cbp_table = src->cbp_table;
dst->mb2b_xy = src->mb2b_xy;
dst->mb2br_xy = src->mb2br_xy;
dst->chroma_pred_mode_table = src->chroma_pred_mode_table;
dst->mvd_table[0] = src->mvd_table[0] + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->mvd_table[1] = src->mvd_table[1] + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->direct_table = src->direct_table;
dst->list_counts = src->list_counts;
dst->DPB = src->DPB;
dst->cur_pic_ptr = src->cur_pic_ptr;
dst->cur_pic = src->cur_pic;
dst->bipred_scratchpad = NULL;
dst->edge_emu_buffer = NULL;
dst->me.scratchpad = NULL;
ff_h264_pred_init(&dst->hpc, src->avctx->codec_id, src->sps.bit_depth_luma,
src->sps.chroma_format_idc);
}
|
static void clone_tables(H264Context *dst, H264Context *src, int i)
{
dst->intra4x4_pred_mode = src->intra4x4_pred_mode + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->non_zero_count = src->non_zero_count;
dst->slice_table = src->slice_table;
dst->cbp_table = src->cbp_table;
dst->mb2b_xy = src->mb2b_xy;
dst->mb2br_xy = src->mb2br_xy;
dst->chroma_pred_mode_table = src->chroma_pred_mode_table;
dst->mvd_table[0] = src->mvd_table[0] + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->mvd_table[1] = src->mvd_table[1] + i * 8 * 2 * src->mb_stride;
dst->direct_table = src->direct_table;
dst->list_counts = src->list_counts;
dst->DPB = src->DPB;
dst->cur_pic_ptr = src->cur_pic_ptr;
dst->cur_pic = src->cur_pic;
dst->bipred_scratchpad = NULL;
dst->edge_emu_buffer = NULL;
dst->me.scratchpad = NULL;
ff_h264_pred_init(&dst->hpc, src->avctx->codec_id, src->sps.bit_depth_luma,
src->sps.chroma_format_idc);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
{
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
if (!options)
return 1;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
args[0].to = args[0].from = NULL;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_gid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
break;
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
pid->hide_pid = option;
break;
default:
pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
"or missing value\n", p);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
{
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
if (!options)
return 1;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
args[0].to = args[0].from = NULL;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_gid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
break;
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
pid->hide_pid = option;
break;
default:
pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
"or missing value\n", p);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1615/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetInsets(const gfx::Insets& insets) {
if (insets != insets_) {
insets_ = insets;
host_->WasResized();
}
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetInsets(const gfx::Insets& insets) {
if (insets != insets_) {
insets_ = insets;
host_->WasResized();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void AXObjectCacheImpl::labelChanged(Element* element) {
textChanged(toHTMLLabelElement(element)->control());
}
|
void AXObjectCacheImpl::labelChanged(Element* element) {
textChanged(toHTMLLabelElement(element)->control());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1415
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1415/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
|
pkinit_create_td_trusted_certifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, e_data_out);
return retval;
}
|
pkinit_create_td_trusted_certifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, e_data_out);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickStatusType ReadPSDLayer(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
LayerInfo* layer_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MaxTextExtent];
MagickStatusType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
ssize_t
j;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" setting up new layer image");
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(layer_info->image);
layer_info->image->compose=PSDBlendModeToCompositeOperator(
layer_info->blendkey);
if (layer_info->visible == MagickFalse)
layer_info->image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
if (psd_info->mode == CMYKMode)
SetImageColorspace(layer_info->image,CMYKColorspace);
if ((psd_info->mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info->mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info->mode == DuotoneMode))
SetImageColorspace(layer_info->image,GRAYColorspace);
/*
Set up some hidden attributes for folks that need them.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gld",
(double) layer_info->page.x);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.x",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.y);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.y",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",(double)
layer_info->opacity);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.opacity",message);
(void) SetImageProperty(layer_info->image,"label",(char *) layer_info->name);
status=MagickTrue;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info->channels; j++)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for channel %.20g",(double) j);
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(layer_info->image);
layer_info->image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (layer_info->channel_info[j].type == -1)
layer_info->image->matte=MagickTrue;
status=ReadPSDChannel(layer_info->image,psd_info,layer_info,j,
compression,exception);
InheritException(exception,&layer_info->image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=CorrectPSDOpacity(layer_info,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse && layer_info->image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(layer_info->image,MagickFalse);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickStatusType ReadPSDLayer(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
LayerInfo* layer_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MaxTextExtent];
MagickStatusType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
ssize_t
j;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" setting up new layer image");
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(layer_info->image);
layer_info->image->compose=PSDBlendModeToCompositeOperator(
layer_info->blendkey);
if (layer_info->visible == MagickFalse)
layer_info->image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
if (psd_info->mode == CMYKMode)
SetImageColorspace(layer_info->image,CMYKColorspace);
if ((psd_info->mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info->mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info->mode == DuotoneMode))
SetImageColorspace(layer_info->image,GRAYColorspace);
/*
Set up some hidden attributes for folks that need them.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gld",
(double) layer_info->page.x);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.x",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.y);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.y",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",(double)
layer_info->opacity);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.opacity",message);
(void) SetImageProperty(layer_info->image,"label",(char *) layer_info->name);
status=MagickTrue;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info->channels; j++)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for channel %.20g",(double) j);
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(layer_info->image);
layer_info->image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (layer_info->channel_info[j].type == -1)
layer_info->image->matte=MagickTrue;
status=ReadPSDChannel(layer_info->image,psd_info,layer_info,j,
compression,exception);
InheritException(exception,&layer_info->image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=CorrectPSDOpacity(layer_info,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse && layer_info->image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(layer_info->image,MagickFalse);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
ext4_fsblk_t ext_pblock(struct ext4_extent *ex)
{
ext4_fsblk_t block;
block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_start_lo);
block |= ((ext4_fsblk_t) le16_to_cpu(ex->ee_start_hi) << 31) << 1;
return block;
}
|
ext4_fsblk_t ext_pblock(struct ext4_extent *ex)
{
ext4_fsblk_t block;
block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_start_lo);
block |= ((ext4_fsblk_t) le16_to_cpu(ex->ee_start_hi) << 31) << 1;
return block;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8d4d589fc7d0a8f2fbb7a468e00f264fe54c7981
|
8d4d589fc7d0a8f2fbb7a468e00f264fe54c7981
|
2008-03-25 Antti Koivisto <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Oliver.
Fix http://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=18082
REGRESSION (r31287): GMail does not work if user stylesheet is set
Oops, my cache refactoring patch was missing these rather essential lines for
user stylesheets. They would get reloaded repeatedly.
* loader/Cache.cpp:
(WebCore::Cache::requestUserCSSStyleSheet):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@31307 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Cache::dumpLRULists(bool includeLive) const
{
printf("LRU-SP lists in eviction order (Kilobytes decoded, Kilobytes encoded, Access count, Referenced):\n");
int size = m_allResources.size();
for (int i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
printf("\n\nList %d: ", i);
CachedResource* current = m_allResources[i].m_tail;
while (current) {
CachedResource* prev = current->m_prevInAllResourcesList;
if (includeLive || !current->referenced())
printf("(%.1fK, %.1fK, %uA, %dR); ", current->decodedSize() / 1024.0f, current->encodedSize() / 1024.0f, current->accessCount(), current->referenced());
current = prev;
}
}
}
|
void Cache::dumpLRULists(bool includeLive) const
{
printf("LRU-SP lists in eviction order (Kilobytes decoded, Kilobytes encoded, Access count, Referenced):\n");
int size = m_allResources.size();
for (int i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
printf("\n\nList %d: ", i);
CachedResource* current = m_allResources[i].m_tail;
while (current) {
CachedResource* prev = current->m_prevInAllResourcesList;
if (includeLive || !current->referenced())
printf("(%.1fK, %.1fK, %uA, %dR); ", current->decodedSize() / 1024.0f, current->encodedSize() / 1024.0f, current->accessCount(), current->referenced());
current = prev;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err pdin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox *ptr = (GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox*)s;
ptr->count = (u32) (ptr->size) / 8;
ptr->rates = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
ptr->times = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
for (i=0; i<ptr->count; i++) {
ptr->rates[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->times[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err pdin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox *ptr = (GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox*)s;
ptr->count = (u32) (ptr->size) / 8;
ptr->rates = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
ptr->times = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
for (i=0; i<ptr->count; i++) {
ptr->rates[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->times[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7376/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4
|
51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4
|
DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
|
xmlParse3986PathAbEmpty(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur;
int ret;
cur = *str;
while (*cur == '/') {
cur++;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, 0, 1);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
}
if (uri != NULL) {
if (uri->path != NULL) xmlFree(uri->path);
if (*str != cur) {
if (uri->cleanup & 2)
uri->path = STRNDUP(*str, cur - *str);
else
uri->path = xmlURIUnescapeString(*str, cur - *str, NULL);
} else {
uri->path = NULL;
}
}
*str = cur;
return (0);
}
|
xmlParse3986PathAbEmpty(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur;
int ret;
cur = *str;
while (*cur == '/') {
cur++;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, 0, 1);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
}
if (uri != NULL) {
if (uri->path != NULL) xmlFree(uri->path);
if (*str != cur) {
if (uri->cleanup & 2)
uri->path = STRNDUP(*str, cur - *str);
else
uri->path = xmlURIUnescapeString(*str, cur - *str, NULL);
} else {
uri->path = NULL;
}
}
*str = cur;
return (0);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7421/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d251157ac1928191af851d199a9ff255d330bec9
|
d251157ac1928191af851d199a9ff255d330bec9
| null |
pvscsi_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&pvscsi_info);
}
|
pvscsi_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&pvscsi_info);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9191/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939
|
93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939
|
sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
|
static void next_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead, struct ctl_table **pentry)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head = *phead;
struct ctl_table *entry = *pentry;
struct ctl_node *ctl_node = &head->node[entry - head->ctl_table];
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
ctl_node = first_usable_entry(rb_next(&ctl_node->node));
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
head = NULL;
if (ctl_node) {
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
}
*phead = head;
*pentry = entry;
}
|
static void next_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead, struct ctl_table **pentry)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head = *phead;
struct ctl_table *entry = *pentry;
struct ctl_node *ctl_node = &head->node[entry - head->ctl_table];
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
ctl_node = first_usable_entry(rb_next(&ctl_node->node));
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
head = NULL;
if (ctl_node) {
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
}
*phead = head;
*pentry = entry;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBlock::updateFirstLetterStyle(RenderObject* firstLetterBlock, RenderObject* currentChild)
{
RenderObject* firstLetter = currentChild->parent();
RenderObject* firstLetterContainer = firstLetter->parent();
RenderStyle* pseudoStyle = styleForFirstLetter(firstLetterBlock, firstLetterContainer);
ASSERT(firstLetter->isFloating() || firstLetter->isInline());
if (RenderStyle::stylePropagationDiff(firstLetter->style(), pseudoStyle) == Reattach) {
RenderBoxModelObject* newFirstLetter;
if (pseudoStyle->display() == INLINE)
newFirstLetter = RenderInline::createAnonymous(&document());
else
newFirstLetter = RenderBlockFlow::createAnonymous(&document());
newFirstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
LayoutStateDisabler layoutStateDisabler(*this);
while (RenderObject* child = firstLetter->firstChild()) {
if (child->isText())
toRenderText(child)->removeAndDestroyTextBoxes();
firstLetter->removeChild(child);
newFirstLetter->addChild(child, 0);
}
RenderObject* nextSibling = firstLetter->nextSibling();
if (RenderTextFragment* remainingText = toRenderBoxModelObject(firstLetter)->firstLetterRemainingText()) {
ASSERT(remainingText->isAnonymous() || remainingText->node()->renderer() == remainingText);
remainingText->setFirstLetter(newFirstLetter);
newFirstLetter->setFirstLetterRemainingText(remainingText);
}
firstLetterContainer->virtualChildren()->removeChildNode(firstLetterContainer, firstLetter);
firstLetter->destroy();
firstLetter = newFirstLetter;
firstLetterContainer->addChild(firstLetter, nextSibling);
} else
firstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
for (RenderObject* genChild = firstLetter->firstChild(); genChild; genChild = genChild->nextSibling()) {
if (genChild->isText())
genChild->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
}
}
|
void RenderBlock::updateFirstLetterStyle(RenderObject* firstLetterBlock, RenderObject* currentChild)
{
RenderObject* firstLetter = currentChild->parent();
RenderObject* firstLetterContainer = firstLetter->parent();
RenderStyle* pseudoStyle = styleForFirstLetter(firstLetterBlock, firstLetterContainer);
ASSERT(firstLetter->isFloating() || firstLetter->isInline());
if (RenderStyle::stylePropagationDiff(firstLetter->style(), pseudoStyle) == Reattach) {
RenderBoxModelObject* newFirstLetter;
if (pseudoStyle->display() == INLINE)
newFirstLetter = RenderInline::createAnonymous(&document());
else
newFirstLetter = RenderBlockFlow::createAnonymous(&document());
newFirstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
LayoutStateDisabler layoutStateDisabler(*this);
while (RenderObject* child = firstLetter->firstChild()) {
if (child->isText())
toRenderText(child)->removeAndDestroyTextBoxes();
firstLetter->removeChild(child);
newFirstLetter->addChild(child, 0);
}
RenderObject* nextSibling = firstLetter->nextSibling();
if (RenderTextFragment* remainingText = toRenderBoxModelObject(firstLetter)->firstLetterRemainingText()) {
ASSERT(remainingText->isAnonymous() || remainingText->node()->renderer() == remainingText);
remainingText->setFirstLetter(newFirstLetter);
newFirstLetter->setFirstLetterRemainingText(remainingText);
}
firstLetterContainer->virtualChildren()->removeChildNode(firstLetterContainer, firstLetter);
firstLetter->destroy();
firstLetter = newFirstLetter;
firstLetterContainer->addChild(firstLetter, nextSibling);
} else
firstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
for (RenderObject* genChild = firstLetter->firstChild(); genChild; genChild = genChild->nextSibling()) {
if (genChild->isText())
genChild->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowAvatarBubbleFromAvatarButton() {
if (titlebar_->avatar_button())
titlebar_->avatar_button()->ShowAvatarBubble();
}
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowAvatarBubbleFromAvatarButton() {
if (titlebar_->avatar_button())
titlebar_->avatar_button()->ShowAvatarBubble();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6345/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sock *llc_lookup_listener(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct llc_addr *laddr)
{
static struct llc_addr null_addr;
struct sock *rc = __llc_lookup_listener(sap, laddr);
if (!rc)
rc = __llc_lookup_listener(sap, &null_addr);
return rc;
}
|
static struct sock *llc_lookup_listener(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct llc_addr *laddr)
{
static struct llc_addr null_addr;
struct sock *rc = __llc_lookup_listener(sap, laddr);
if (!rc)
rc = __llc_lookup_listener(sap, &null_addr);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5083
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5083/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba7ddcc38946b51a38ab017afaeb013fb038d61c
|
ba7ddcc38946b51a38ab017afaeb013fb038d61c
|
Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
|
bool SkipConditionalFeatureEntry(const FeatureEntry& entry) {
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!strcmp("mash", entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
if (!strcmp(ui_devtools::switches::kEnableUiDevTools, entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((!strcmp("data-reduction-proxy-lo-fi", entry.internal_name) ||
!strcmp("enable-data-reduction-proxy-lite-page", entry.internal_name)) &&
channel != version_info::Channel::BETA &&
channel != version_info::Channel::DEV &&
channel != version_info::Channel::CANARY &&
channel != version_info::Channel::UNKNOWN) {
return true;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!strcmp("enable-hdr", entry.internal_name) &&
base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN10) {
return true;
}
#endif // OS_WIN
if (!strcmp("dns-over-https", entry.internal_name) &&
chrome_browser_net::ShouldDisableDohForManaged()) {
return true;
}
if (flags::IsFlagExpired(entry.internal_name))
return true;
return false;
}
|
bool SkipConditionalFeatureEntry(const FeatureEntry& entry) {
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!strcmp("mash", entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
if (!strcmp(ui_devtools::switches::kEnableUiDevTools, entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((!strcmp("data-reduction-proxy-lo-fi", entry.internal_name) ||
!strcmp("enable-data-reduction-proxy-lite-page", entry.internal_name)) &&
channel != version_info::Channel::BETA &&
channel != version_info::Channel::DEV &&
channel != version_info::Channel::CANARY &&
channel != version_info::Channel::UNKNOWN) {
return true;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!strcmp("enable-hdr", entry.internal_name) &&
base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN10) {
return true;
}
#endif // OS_WIN
if (!strcmp("dns-over-https", entry.internal_name) &&
chrome_browser_net::ShouldDisableDohForManaged()) {
return true;
}
if (flags::IsFlagExpired(entry.internal_name))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18339/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
e34e01b1b0987e418bc22e3ef1cf2e4ecaead264
|
[scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
|
RendererSchedulerImpl::InputTaskRunner() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
return input_task_queue_;
}
|
RendererSchedulerImpl::InputTaskRunner() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
return input_task_queue_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
array_size_store(struct mddev *mddev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
sector_t sectors;
int err;
err = mddev_lock(mddev);
if (err)
return err;
if (strncmp(buf, "default", 7) == 0) {
if (mddev->pers)
sectors = mddev->pers->size(mddev, 0, 0);
else
sectors = mddev->array_sectors;
mddev->external_size = 0;
} else {
if (strict_blocks_to_sectors(buf, §ors) < 0)
err = -EINVAL;
else if (mddev->pers && mddev->pers->size(mddev, 0, 0) < sectors)
err = -E2BIG;
else
mddev->external_size = 1;
}
if (!err) {
mddev->array_sectors = sectors;
if (mddev->pers) {
set_capacity(mddev->gendisk, mddev->array_sectors);
revalidate_disk(mddev->gendisk);
}
}
mddev_unlock(mddev);
return err ?: len;
}
|
array_size_store(struct mddev *mddev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
sector_t sectors;
int err;
err = mddev_lock(mddev);
if (err)
return err;
if (strncmp(buf, "default", 7) == 0) {
if (mddev->pers)
sectors = mddev->pers->size(mddev, 0, 0);
else
sectors = mddev->array_sectors;
mddev->external_size = 0;
} else {
if (strict_blocks_to_sectors(buf, §ors) < 0)
err = -EINVAL;
else if (mddev->pers && mddev->pers->size(mddev, 0, 0) < sectors)
err = -E2BIG;
else
mddev->external_size = 1;
}
if (!err) {
mddev->array_sectors = sectors;
if (mddev->pers) {
set_capacity(mddev->gendisk, mddev->array_sectors);
revalidate_disk(mddev->gendisk);
}
}
mddev_unlock(mddev);
return err ?: len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5216/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
[pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
|
pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetPageContentsRect(int index) {
return GetScreenRect(pages_[index]->rect());
}
|
pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetPageContentsRect(int index) {
return GetScreenRect(pages_[index]->rect());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
Improve handling and testing of reparse points.
BUG=28804
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553080
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37286 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
DWORD IsReparsePoint(const std::wstring& full_path, bool* result) {
std::wstring path = full_path;
if (0 == path.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix))
path = path.substr(kNTPrefixLen);
if (IsPipe(path)) {
*result = FALSE;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
std::wstring::size_type last_pos = std::wstring::npos;
do {
path = path.substr(0, last_pos);
DWORD attributes = ::GetFileAttributes(path.c_str());
if (INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES == attributes) {
DWORD error = ::GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND &&
error != ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND &&
error != ERROR_INVALID_NAME) {
NOTREACHED();
return error;
}
} else if (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT & attributes) {
*result = true;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
last_pos = path.rfind(L'\\');
} while (last_pos != std::wstring::npos);
*result = false;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
|
DWORD IsReparsePoint(const std::wstring& full_path, bool* result) {
std::wstring path = full_path;
if (0 == path.compare(0, kNTPrefixLen, kNTPrefix))
path = path.substr(kNTPrefixLen);
const wchar_t kPipe[] = L"pipe\\";
if (0 == path.compare(0, arraysize(kPipe) - 1, kPipe)) {
*result = FALSE;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
std::wstring::size_type last_pos = std::wstring::npos;
do {
path = path.substr(0, last_pos);
DWORD attributes = ::GetFileAttributes(path.c_str());
if (INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES == attributes) {
DWORD error = ::GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND &&
error != ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND &&
error != ERROR_INVALID_NAME) {
NOTREACHED();
return error;
}
} else if (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT & attributes) {
*result = true;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
last_pos = path.rfind(L'\\');
} while (last_pos != std::wstring::npos);
*result = false;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
cmsTagTypeSignature DecideCurveType(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
cmsToneCurve* Curve = (cmsToneCurve*) Data;
if (ICCVersion < 4.0) return cmsSigCurveType;
if (Curve ->nSegments != 1) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only 1-segment curves can be saved as parametric
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type < 0) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only non-inverted curves
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type > 5) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only ICC parametric curves
return cmsSigParametricCurveType;
}
|
cmsTagTypeSignature DecideCurveType(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
cmsToneCurve* Curve = (cmsToneCurve*) Data;
if (ICCVersion < 4.0) return cmsSigCurveType;
if (Curve ->nSegments != 1) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only 1-segment curves can be saved as parametric
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type < 0) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only non-inverted curves
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type > 5) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only ICC parametric curves
return cmsSigParametricCurveType;
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7
|
Make Surface creation lazy for OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl
This CL shifts the SurfaceFactory pointer and SurfaceFactoryClient implementation
from OffscreenCanvasSurfaceImpl to OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl to
facilitate resource handling after compositor frame is submitted. As a result,
surface on browser is lazily created (only happened on the first commit()).
BUG=563852
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2333133003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418402}
|
CanvasSurfaceLayerBridge* surfaceLayerBridge() const { return m_surfaceLayerBridge.get(); }
|
CanvasSurfaceLayerBridge* surfaceLayerBridge() const { return m_surfaceLayerBridge.get(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2857
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2857/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7d085fbb43b21e959900b94f191588fd10546a94
|
7d085fbb43b21e959900b94f191588fd10546a94
|
Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ImageLoader::dispatchPendingLoadEvent()
{
if (!m_hasPendingLoadEvent)
return;
if (!m_image)
return;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
if (element()->document()->attached())
dispatchLoadEvent();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
|
void ImageLoader::dispatchPendingLoadEvent()
{
if (!m_hasPendingLoadEvent)
return;
if (!m_image)
return;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
if (element()->document()->attached())
dispatchLoadEvent();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceValue(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(thisObject);
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* impl = static_cast<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setValue(SerializedScriptValue::create(exec, value));
}
|
void setJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceValue(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(thisObject);
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* impl = static_cast<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setValue(SerializedScriptValue::create(exec, value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
Implement NPN_RemoveProperty
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43315
Reviewed by Sam Weinig.
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Plugins/NPJSObject.cpp:
(WebKit::NPJSObject::removeProperty):
Try to remove the property.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::npClass):
Add NP_RemoveProperty.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::NP_RemoveProperty):
Call NPJSObject::removeProperty.
* WebProcess/Plugins/Netscape/NetscapeBrowserFuncs.cpp:
(WebKit::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Call the NPClass::removeProperty function.
WebKitTools:
* DumpRenderTree/DumpRenderTree.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.cpp:
(PluginTest::NPN_GetStringIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_GetIntIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Add NPN_ helpers.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.h:
Support more NPClass functions.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/Tests/NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp: Added.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPRuntimeRemoveProperty):
Test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::hasMethod):
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::invoke):
Add a testRemoveProperty method.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPP_GetValue):
Return the test object.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/win/TestNetscapePlugin.vcproj:
* DumpRenderTree/qt/TestNetscapePlugin/TestNetscapePlugin.pro:
* GNUmakefile.am:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
LayoutTests:
Add a test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property-expected.txt: Added.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static NPError NPN_GetURL(NPP npp, const char* url, const char* target)
{
if (!url)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
RefPtr<NetscapePlugin> plugin = NetscapePlugin::fromNPP(npp);
plugin->loadURL("GET", makeURLString(url), target, HTTPHeaderMap(), Vector<char>(), false, 0);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
|
static NPError NPN_GetURL(NPP npp, const char* url, const char* target)
{
if (!url)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
RefPtr<NetscapePlugin> plugin = NetscapePlugin::fromNPP(npp);
plugin->loadURL("GET", makeURLString(url), target, HTTPHeaderMap(), Vector<char>(), false, 0);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3101
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3101/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f0b86c2fc77fca1508d81314f864011abe25f04
|
8f0b86c2fc77fca1508d81314f864011abe25f04
|
Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(params[0]))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameterfv: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameterfv(target, pname, params);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(params[0]))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameterfv: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameterfv(target, pname, params);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
IntPoint FrameView::convertFromRenderer(const RenderObject& renderer, const IntPoint& rendererPoint) const
{
IntPoint point = roundedIntPoint(renderer.localToAbsolute(rendererPoint, UseTransforms));
point.moveBy(-scrollPosition());
return point;
}
|
IntPoint FrameView::convertFromRenderer(const RenderObject& renderer, const IntPoint& rendererPoint) const
{
IntPoint point = roundedIntPoint(renderer.localToAbsolute(rendererPoint, UseTransforms));
point.moveBy(-scrollPosition());
return point;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline void register_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, int cpu)
{
list_add_rcu(&tg->rt_rq[cpu]->leaf_rt_rq_list,
&cpu_rq(cpu)->leaf_rt_rq_list);
}
|
static inline void register_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, int cpu)
{
list_add_rcu(&tg->rt_rq[cpu]->leaf_rt_rq_list,
&cpu_rq(cpu)->leaf_rt_rq_list);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
SerializedScriptValue::~SerializedScriptValue()
{
if (m_externallyAllocatedMemory) {
ASSERT(v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->AdjustAmountOfExternalAllocatedMemory(-m_externallyAllocatedMemory);
}
}
|
SerializedScriptValue::~SerializedScriptValue()
{
if (m_externallyAllocatedMemory) {
ASSERT(v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->AdjustAmountOfExternalAllocatedMemory(-m_externallyAllocatedMemory);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2633
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2633/
|
CWE-125
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7
|
9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7
| null |
static void vnc_queue_clear(VncJobQueue *q)
{
qemu_cond_destroy(&queue->cond);
qemu_mutex_destroy(&queue->mutex);
buffer_free(&queue->buffer);
g_free(q);
queue = NULL; /* Unset global queue */
}
|
static void vnc_queue_clear(VncJobQueue *q)
{
qemu_cond_destroy(&queue->cond);
qemu_mutex_destroy(&queue->mutex);
buffer_free(&queue->buffer);
g_free(q);
queue = NULL; /* Unset global queue */
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType IsSIXEL(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
const unsigned char
*end = magick + length;
if (length < 3)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*magick == 0x90 || (*magick == 0x1b && *++magick == 'P')) {
while (++magick != end) {
if (*magick == 'q')
return(MagickTrue);
if (!(*magick >= '0' && *magick <= '9') && *magick != ';')
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType IsSIXEL(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
const unsigned char
*end = magick + length;
if (length < 3)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*magick == 0x90 || (*magick == 0x1b && *++magick == 'P')) {
while (++magick != end) {
if (*magick == 'q')
return(MagickTrue);
if (!(*magick >= '0' && *magick <= '9') && *magick != ';')
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Response TargetHandler::SetDiscoverTargets(bool discover) {
if (discover_ == discover)
return Response::OK();
discover_ = discover;
if (discover_) {
DevToolsAgentHost::AddObserver(this);
} else {
DevToolsAgentHost::RemoveObserver(this);
reported_hosts_.clear();
}
return Response::OK();
}
|
Response TargetHandler::SetDiscoverTargets(bool discover) {
if (discover_ == discover)
return Response::OK();
discover_ = discover;
if (discover_) {
DevToolsAgentHost::AddObserver(this);
} else {
DevToolsAgentHost::RemoveObserver(this);
reported_hosts_.clear();
}
return Response::OK();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18445
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18445/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
int err;
if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg, is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ?
"context" : "packet");
return -EACCES;
}
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
|
static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
int err;
if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg, is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ?
"context" : "packet");
return -EACCES;
}
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
CheckedRadioButtons* HTMLInputElement::checkedRadioButtons() const
{
if (!isRadioButton())
return 0;
if (HTMLFormElement* formElement = form())
return &formElement->checkedRadioButtons();
if (inDocument())
return &document()->formController()->checkedRadioButtons();
return 0;
}
|
CheckedRadioButtons* HTMLInputElement::checkedRadioButtons() const
{
if (!isRadioButton())
return 0;
if (HTMLFormElement* formElement = form())
return &formElement->checkedRadioButtons();
if (inDocument())
return &document()->formController()->checkedRadioButtons();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0273
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0273/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
|
71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
| null |
static zend_object_value date_object_clone_timezone(zval *this_ptr TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_timezone_obj *new_obj = NULL;
php_timezone_obj *old_obj = (php_timezone_obj *) zend_object_store_get_object(this_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
zend_object_value new_ov = date_object_new_timezone_ex(old_obj->std.ce, &new_obj TSRMLS_CC);
zend_objects_clone_members(&new_obj->std, new_ov, &old_obj->std, Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(this_ptr) TSRMLS_CC);
if (!old_obj->initialized) {
return new_ov;
}
new_obj->type = old_obj->type;
new_obj->initialized = 1;
switch (new_obj->type) {
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ID:
new_obj->tzi.tz = old_obj->tzi.tz;
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET:
new_obj->tzi.utc_offset = old_obj->tzi.utc_offset;
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR:
new_obj->tzi.z.utc_offset = old_obj->tzi.z.utc_offset;
new_obj->tzi.z.dst = old_obj->tzi.z.dst;
new_obj->tzi.z.abbr = strdup(old_obj->tzi.z.abbr);
break;
}
return new_ov;
}
|
static zend_object_value date_object_clone_timezone(zval *this_ptr TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_timezone_obj *new_obj = NULL;
php_timezone_obj *old_obj = (php_timezone_obj *) zend_object_store_get_object(this_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
zend_object_value new_ov = date_object_new_timezone_ex(old_obj->std.ce, &new_obj TSRMLS_CC);
zend_objects_clone_members(&new_obj->std, new_ov, &old_obj->std, Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(this_ptr) TSRMLS_CC);
if (!old_obj->initialized) {
return new_ov;
}
new_obj->type = old_obj->type;
new_obj->initialized = 1;
switch (new_obj->type) {
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ID:
new_obj->tzi.tz = old_obj->tzi.tz;
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET:
new_obj->tzi.utc_offset = old_obj->tzi.utc_offset;
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR:
new_obj->tzi.z.utc_offset = old_obj->tzi.z.utc_offset;
new_obj->tzi.z.dst = old_obj->tzi.z.dst;
new_obj->tzi.z.abbr = strdup(old_obj->tzi.z.abbr);
break;
}
return new_ov;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
fixed T36302429
|
static size_t ZSTD_estimateCStreamSize_internal(int compressionLevel)
{
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, 0, 0);
return ZSTD_estimateCStreamSize_usingCParams(cParams);
}
|
static size_t ZSTD_estimateCStreamSize_internal(int compressionLevel)
{
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, 0, 0);
return ZSTD_estimateCStreamSize_usingCParams(cParams);
}
|
C
|
zstd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7374/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d
|
1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
|
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
struct fscrypt_info *prev;
if (ci == NULL)
ci = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
if (ci == NULL)
return;
prev = cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, ci, NULL);
if (prev != ci)
return;
put_crypt_info(ci);
}
|
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
struct fscrypt_info *prev;
if (ci == NULL)
ci = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
if (ci == NULL)
return;
prev = cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, ci, NULL);
if (prev != ci)
return;
put_crypt_info(ci);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10130/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/9a64e62f0f20c9cf9b2e1609f037060eb2d8eb22
|
9a64e62f0f20c9cf9b2e1609f037060eb2d8eb22
|
http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
|
static int on_headers_complete(http_parser *parser)
{
parser_context *ctx = (parser_context *) parser->data;
http_subtransport *t = ctx->t;
http_stream *s = ctx->s;
git_buf buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
int error = 0, no_callback = 0, allowed_auth_types = 0;
/* Both parse_header_name and parse_header_value are populated
* and ready for consumption. */
if (VALUE == t->last_cb)
if (on_header_ready(t) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Capture authentication headers which may be a 401 (authentication
* is not complete) or a 200 (simply informing us that auth *is*
* complete.)
*/
if (parse_authenticate_response(&t->www_authenticate, t,
&allowed_auth_types) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Check for an authentication failure. */
if (parser->status_code == 401 && get_verb == s->verb) {
if (!t->owner->cred_acquire_cb) {
no_callback = 1;
} else {
if (allowed_auth_types) {
if (t->cred) {
t->cred->free(t->cred);
t->cred = NULL;
}
error = t->owner->cred_acquire_cb(&t->cred,
t->owner->url,
t->connection_data.user,
allowed_auth_types,
t->owner->cred_acquire_payload);
if (error == GIT_PASSTHROUGH) {
no_callback = 1;
} else if (error < 0) {
t->error = error;
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_EXT;
} else {
assert(t->cred);
if (!(t->cred->credtype & allowed_auth_types)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "credentials callback returned an invalid cred type");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* Successfully acquired a credential. */
t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_REPLAY;
return 0;
}
}
}
if (no_callback) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "authentication required but no callback set");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
}
/* Check for a redirect.
* Right now we only permit a redirect to the same hostname. */
if ((parser->status_code == 301 ||
parser->status_code == 302 ||
(parser->status_code == 303 && get_verb == s->verb) ||
parser->status_code == 307) &&
t->location) {
if (s->redirect_count >= 7) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Too many redirects");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
if (gitno_connection_data_from_url(&t->connection_data, t->location, s->service_url) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Set the redirect URL on the stream. This is a transfer of
* ownership of the memory. */
if (s->redirect_url)
git__free(s->redirect_url);
s->redirect_url = t->location;
t->location = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
s->redirect_count++;
t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_REPLAY;
return 0;
}
/* Check for a 200 HTTP status code. */
if (parser->status_code != 200) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET,
"Unexpected HTTP status code: %d",
parser->status_code);
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* The response must contain a Content-Type header. */
if (!t->content_type) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "No Content-Type header in response");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* The Content-Type header must match our expectation. */
if (get_verb == s->verb)
git_buf_printf(&buf,
"application/x-git-%s-advertisement",
ctx->s->service);
else
git_buf_printf(&buf,
"application/x-git-%s-result",
ctx->s->service);
if (git_buf_oom(&buf))
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
if (strcmp(t->content_type, git_buf_cstr(&buf))) {
git_buf_free(&buf);
giterr_set(GITERR_NET,
"Invalid Content-Type: %s",
t->content_type);
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
git_buf_free(&buf);
return 0;
}
|
static int on_headers_complete(http_parser *parser)
{
parser_context *ctx = (parser_context *) parser->data;
http_subtransport *t = ctx->t;
http_stream *s = ctx->s;
git_buf buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
int error = 0, no_callback = 0, allowed_auth_types = 0;
/* Both parse_header_name and parse_header_value are populated
* and ready for consumption. */
if (VALUE == t->last_cb)
if (on_header_ready(t) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Capture authentication headers which may be a 401 (authentication
* is not complete) or a 200 (simply informing us that auth *is*
* complete.)
*/
if (parse_authenticate_response(&t->www_authenticate, t,
&allowed_auth_types) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Check for an authentication failure. */
if (parser->status_code == 401 && get_verb == s->verb) {
if (!t->owner->cred_acquire_cb) {
no_callback = 1;
} else {
if (allowed_auth_types) {
if (t->cred) {
t->cred->free(t->cred);
t->cred = NULL;
}
error = t->owner->cred_acquire_cb(&t->cred,
t->owner->url,
t->connection_data.user,
allowed_auth_types,
t->owner->cred_acquire_payload);
if (error == GIT_PASSTHROUGH) {
no_callback = 1;
} else if (error < 0) {
t->error = error;
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_EXT;
} else {
assert(t->cred);
if (!(t->cred->credtype & allowed_auth_types)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "credentials callback returned an invalid cred type");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* Successfully acquired a credential. */
t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_REPLAY;
return 0;
}
}
}
if (no_callback) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "authentication required but no callback set");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
}
/* Check for a redirect.
* Right now we only permit a redirect to the same hostname. */
if ((parser->status_code == 301 ||
parser->status_code == 302 ||
(parser->status_code == 303 && get_verb == s->verb) ||
parser->status_code == 307) &&
t->location) {
if (s->redirect_count >= 7) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Too many redirects");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
if (gitno_connection_data_from_url(&t->connection_data, t->location, s->service_url) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
/* Set the redirect URL on the stream. This is a transfer of
* ownership of the memory. */
if (s->redirect_url)
git__free(s->redirect_url);
s->redirect_url = t->location;
t->location = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
s->redirect_count++;
t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_REPLAY;
return 0;
}
/* Check for a 200 HTTP status code. */
if (parser->status_code != 200) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET,
"Unexpected HTTP status code: %d",
parser->status_code);
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* The response must contain a Content-Type header. */
if (!t->content_type) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "No Content-Type header in response");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
/* The Content-Type header must match our expectation. */
if (get_verb == s->verb)
git_buf_printf(&buf,
"application/x-git-%s-advertisement",
ctx->s->service);
else
git_buf_printf(&buf,
"application/x-git-%s-result",
ctx->s->service);
if (git_buf_oom(&buf))
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
if (strcmp(t->content_type, git_buf_cstr(&buf))) {
git_buf_free(&buf);
giterr_set(GITERR_NET,
"Invalid Content-Type: %s",
t->content_type);
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
git_buf_free(&buf);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
libgit2
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
ConstructResourceBytesByResource(XID aboutClient, ConstructResourceBytesCtx *ctx)
{
int specIdx;
for (specIdx = 0; specIdx < ctx->numSpecs; ++specIdx) {
xXResResourceIdSpec *spec = ctx->specs + specIdx;
if (spec->resource) {
int cid = CLIENT_ID(spec->resource);
if (cid < currentMaxClients &&
(aboutClient == None || cid == aboutClient)) {
ClientPtr client = clients[cid];
if (client) {
ctx->curSpec = spec;
FindAllClientResources(client,
AddResourceSizeValueByResource,
ctx);
}
}
}
}
}
|
ConstructResourceBytesByResource(XID aboutClient, ConstructResourceBytesCtx *ctx)
{
int specIdx;
for (specIdx = 0; specIdx < ctx->numSpecs; ++specIdx) {
xXResResourceIdSpec *spec = ctx->specs + specIdx;
if (spec->resource) {
int cid = CLIENT_ID(spec->resource);
if (cid < currentMaxClients &&
(aboutClient == None || cid == aboutClient)) {
ClientPtr client = clients[cid];
if (client) {
ctx->curSpec = spec;
FindAllClientResources(client,
AddResourceSizeValueByResource,
ctx);
}
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static long __tun_chr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, int ifreq_len)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun;
void __user* argp = (void __user*)arg;
struct sock_fprog fprog;
struct ifreq ifr;
int sndbuf;
int vnet_hdr_sz;
int ret;
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF || _IOC_TYPE(cmd) == 0x89)
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, argp, ifreq_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == TUNGETFEATURES) {
/* Currently this just means: "what IFF flags are valid?".
* This is needed because we never checked for invalid flags on
* TUNSETIFF. */
return put_user(IFF_TUN | IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI | IFF_ONE_QUEUE |
IFF_VNET_HDR,
(unsigned int __user*)argp);
}
rtnl_lock();
tun = __tun_get(tfile);
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF && !tun) {
ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ-1] = '\0';
ret = tun_set_iff(tfile->net, file, &ifr);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
ret = -EBADFD;
if (!tun)
goto unlock;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_ioctl cmd %d\n", cmd);
ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case TUNGETIFF:
ret = tun_get_iff(current->nsproxy->net_ns, tun, &ifr);
if (ret)
break;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETNOCSUM:
/* Disable/Enable checksum */
/* [unimplemented] */
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "ignored: set checksum %s\n",
arg ? "disabled" : "enabled");
break;
case TUNSETPERSIST:
/* Disable/Enable persist mode */
if (arg)
tun->flags |= TUN_PERSIST;
else
tun->flags &= ~TUN_PERSIST;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "persist %s\n",
arg ? "enabled" : "disabled");
break;
case TUNSETOWNER:
/* Set owner of the device */
tun->owner = (uid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "owner set to %d\n", tun->owner);
break;
case TUNSETGROUP:
/* Set group of the device */
tun->group= (gid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "group set to %d\n", tun->group);
break;
case TUNSETLINK:
/* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun,
"Linktype set failed because interface is up\n");
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "linktype set to %d\n",
tun->dev->type);
ret = 0;
}
break;
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
case TUNSETDEBUG:
tun->debug = arg;
break;
#endif
case TUNSETOFFLOAD:
ret = set_offload(tun, arg);
break;
case TUNSETTXFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = update_filter(&tun->txflt, (void __user *)arg);
break;
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
/* Get hw address */
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, tun->dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = tun->dev->type;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
/* Set hw address */
tun_debug(KERN_DEBUG, tun, "set hw address: %pM\n",
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data);
ret = dev_set_mac_address(tun->dev, &ifr.ifr_hwaddr);
break;
case TUNGETSNDBUF:
sndbuf = tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sndbuf, sizeof(sndbuf)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETSNDBUF:
if (copy_from_user(&sndbuf, argp, sizeof(sndbuf))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf = sndbuf;
break;
case TUNGETVNETHDRSZ:
vnet_hdr_sz = tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &vnet_hdr_sz, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETVNETHDRSZ:
if (copy_from_user(&vnet_hdr_sz, argp, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (vnet_hdr_sz < (int)sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = vnet_hdr_sz;
break;
case TUNATTACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, argp, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, tun->socket.sk);
break;
case TUNDETACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = sk_detach_filter(tun->socket.sk);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
if (tun)
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
}
|
static long __tun_chr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, int ifreq_len)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun;
void __user* argp = (void __user*)arg;
struct sock_fprog fprog;
struct ifreq ifr;
int sndbuf;
int vnet_hdr_sz;
int ret;
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF || _IOC_TYPE(cmd) == 0x89)
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, argp, ifreq_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == TUNGETFEATURES) {
/* Currently this just means: "what IFF flags are valid?".
* This is needed because we never checked for invalid flags on
* TUNSETIFF. */
return put_user(IFF_TUN | IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI | IFF_ONE_QUEUE |
IFF_VNET_HDR,
(unsigned int __user*)argp);
}
rtnl_lock();
tun = __tun_get(tfile);
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF && !tun) {
ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ-1] = '\0';
ret = tun_set_iff(tfile->net, file, &ifr);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
ret = -EBADFD;
if (!tun)
goto unlock;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_ioctl cmd %d\n", cmd);
ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case TUNGETIFF:
ret = tun_get_iff(current->nsproxy->net_ns, tun, &ifr);
if (ret)
break;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETNOCSUM:
/* Disable/Enable checksum */
/* [unimplemented] */
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "ignored: set checksum %s\n",
arg ? "disabled" : "enabled");
break;
case TUNSETPERSIST:
/* Disable/Enable persist mode */
if (arg)
tun->flags |= TUN_PERSIST;
else
tun->flags &= ~TUN_PERSIST;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "persist %s\n",
arg ? "enabled" : "disabled");
break;
case TUNSETOWNER:
/* Set owner of the device */
tun->owner = (uid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "owner set to %d\n", tun->owner);
break;
case TUNSETGROUP:
/* Set group of the device */
tun->group= (gid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "group set to %d\n", tun->group);
break;
case TUNSETLINK:
/* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun,
"Linktype set failed because interface is up\n");
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "linktype set to %d\n",
tun->dev->type);
ret = 0;
}
break;
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
case TUNSETDEBUG:
tun->debug = arg;
break;
#endif
case TUNSETOFFLOAD:
ret = set_offload(tun, arg);
break;
case TUNSETTXFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = update_filter(&tun->txflt, (void __user *)arg);
break;
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
/* Get hw address */
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, tun->dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = tun->dev->type;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
/* Set hw address */
tun_debug(KERN_DEBUG, tun, "set hw address: %pM\n",
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data);
ret = dev_set_mac_address(tun->dev, &ifr.ifr_hwaddr);
break;
case TUNGETSNDBUF:
sndbuf = tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sndbuf, sizeof(sndbuf)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETSNDBUF:
if (copy_from_user(&sndbuf, argp, sizeof(sndbuf))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf = sndbuf;
break;
case TUNGETVNETHDRSZ:
vnet_hdr_sz = tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &vnet_hdr_sz, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETVNETHDRSZ:
if (copy_from_user(&vnet_hdr_sz, argp, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (vnet_hdr_sz < (int)sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = vnet_hdr_sz;
break;
case TUNATTACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, argp, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, tun->socket.sk);
break;
case TUNDETACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = sk_detach_filter(tun->socket.sk);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
if (tun)
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
|
0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
|
NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
kvp_send_key(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
struct cn_msg *msg;
int index = kvp_transaction.index;
msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg) + sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg) , GFP_ATOMIC);
if (msg) {
msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
msg->seq = KVP_KERNEL_GET;
((struct hv_ku_msg *)msg->data)->kvp_index = index;
msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_ku_msg);
cn_netlink_send(msg, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(msg);
}
return;
}
|
kvp_send_key(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
struct cn_msg *msg;
int index = kvp_transaction.index;
msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg) + sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg) , GFP_ATOMIC);
if (msg) {
msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
msg->seq = KVP_KERNEL_GET;
((struct hv_ku_msg *)msg->data)->kvp_index = index;
msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_ku_msg);
cn_netlink_send(msg, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(msg);
}
return;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebWorker* RenderView::createWorker(WebFrame* frame, WebWorkerClient* client) {
WebApplicationCacheHostImpl* appcache_host =
WebApplicationCacheHostImpl::FromFrame(frame);
int appcache_host_id = appcache_host ? appcache_host->host_id() : 0;
return new WebWorkerProxy(client, RenderThread::current(), routing_id_,
appcache_host_id);
}
|
WebWorker* RenderView::createWorker(WebFrame* frame, WebWorkerClient* client) {
WebApplicationCacheHostImpl* appcache_host =
WebApplicationCacheHostImpl::FromFrame(frame);
int appcache_host_id = appcache_host ? appcache_host->host_id() : 0;
return new WebWorkerProxy(client, RenderThread::current(), routing_id_,
appcache_host_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SyncSessionSnapshot SyncBackendHost::GetLastSessionSnapshot() const {
return last_snapshot_;
}
|
SyncSessionSnapshot SyncBackendHost::GetLastSessionSnapshot() const {
return last_snapshot_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6094/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
bool HeapAllocator::expandHashTableBacking(void* address, size_t newSize) {
return backingExpand(address, newSize);
}
|
bool HeapAllocator::expandHashTableBacking(void* address, size_t newSize) {
return backingExpand(address, newSize);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5222/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e4ebe078840e65d673722e94f8251b334030b5e8
|
e4ebe078840e65d673722e94f8251b334030b5e8
|
Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
|
void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(render_frame_host->navigation_handle());
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
render_frame_host, validated_url, params.error_code,
params.error_description, params.was_ignored_by_handler);
}
}
|
void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(render_frame_host->navigation_handle());
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
render_frame_host, validated_url, params.error_code,
params.error_description, params.was_ignored_by_handler);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool RenderBlock::hasPercentHeightContainerMap()
{
return gPercentHeightContainerMap;
}
|
bool RenderBlock::hasPercentHeightContainerMap()
{
return gPercentHeightContainerMap;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static u64 compute_guest_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 kernel_ns)
{
u64 tsc = pvclock_scale_delta(kernel_ns-vcpu->arch.last_tsc_nsec,
vcpu->kvm->arch.virtual_tsc_mult,
vcpu->kvm->arch.virtual_tsc_shift);
tsc += vcpu->arch.last_tsc_write;
return tsc;
}
|
static u64 compute_guest_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 kernel_ns)
{
u64 tsc = pvclock_scale_delta(kernel_ns-vcpu->arch.last_tsc_nsec,
vcpu->kvm->arch.virtual_tsc_mult,
vcpu->kvm->arch.virtual_tsc_shift);
tsc += vcpu->arch.last_tsc_write;
return tsc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0500
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0500/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ba1dbd78e5f1ed67c1b8d37ac89d90e5e330b628
|
ba1dbd78e5f1ed67c1b8d37ac89d90e5e330b628
|
smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
|
static CURLcode smtp_perform_command(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
/* Send the command */
if(smtp->rcpt)
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s %s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "VRFY",
smtp->rcpt->data);
else
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "HELP");
if(!result)
state(conn, SMTP_COMMAND);
return result;
}
|
static CURLcode smtp_perform_command(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
/* Send the command */
if(smtp->rcpt)
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s %s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "VRFY",
smtp->rcpt->data);
else
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "HELP");
if(!result)
state(conn, SMTP_COMMAND);
return result;
}
|
C
|
curl
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t snd_disconnect_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
|
static ssize_t snd_disconnect_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats::FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats()
: num_regular_files(0),
num_hosted_documents(0) {
}
|
FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats::FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats()
: num_regular_files(0),
num_hosted_documents(0) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2133
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2133/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/90481622d75715bfcb68501280a917dbfe516029
|
90481622d75715bfcb68501280a917dbfe516029
|
hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void hugetlbfs_inc_free_inodes(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo)
{
if (sbinfo->free_inodes >= 0) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->free_inodes++;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
}
|
static void hugetlbfs_inc_free_inodes(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo)
{
if (sbinfo->free_inodes >= 0) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->free_inodes++;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::AcceptLanguagesChanged() {
if (navigator_)
navigator_->SetLanguagesChanged();
DispatchEvent(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::languagechange));
}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::AcceptLanguagesChanged() {
if (navigator_)
navigator_->SetLanguagesChanged();
DispatchEvent(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::languagechange));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2793/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RunDelegate() {
net::URLRequestStatus status;
status.set_status(success_ ? net::URLRequestStatus::SUCCESS :
net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED);
delegate()->OnURLFetchComplete(this, url_, status, success_ ? 200 : 500,
net::ResponseCookies(), response_data_);
}
|
void RunDelegate() {
net::URLRequestStatus status;
status.set_status(success_ ? net::URLRequestStatus::SUCCESS :
net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED);
delegate()->OnURLFetchComplete(this, url_, status, success_ ? 200 : 500,
net::ResponseCookies(), response_data_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4482/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static long usbdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *p)
{
struct usb_dev_state *ps = file->private_data;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct usb_device *dev = ps->dev;
int ret = -ENOTTY;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
usb_lock_device(dev);
/* Reap operations are allowed even after disconnection */
switch (cmd) {
case USBDEVFS_REAPURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURB\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurb(ps, p);
goto done;
case USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURBNDELAY\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurbnonblock(ps, p);
goto done;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
case USBDEVFS_REAPURB32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURB32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurb_compat(ps, p);
goto done;
case USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURBNDELAY32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurbnonblock_compat(ps, p);
goto done;
#endif
}
if (!connected(ps)) {
usb_unlock_device(dev);
return -ENODEV;
}
switch (cmd) {
case USBDEVFS_CONTROL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONTROL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_control(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_BULK:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: BULK\n", __func__);
ret = proc_bulk(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_RESETEP:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RESETEP\n", __func__);
ret = proc_resetep(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_RESET:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RESET\n", __func__);
ret = proc_resetdevice(ps);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLEAR_HALT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLEAR_HALT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_clearhalt(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_GETDRIVER:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: GETDRIVER\n", __func__);
ret = proc_getdriver(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CONNECTINFO:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONNECTINFO\n", __func__);
ret = proc_connectinfo(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SETINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SETINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_setintf(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SETCONFIGURATION:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SETCONFIGURATION\n", __func__);
ret = proc_setconfig(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SUBMITURB\n", __func__);
ret = proc_submiturb(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
case USBDEVFS_CONTROL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONTROL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_control_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_BULK32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: BULK32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_bulk_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCSIGNAL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_disconnectsignal_compat(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SUBMITURB32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_submiturb_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_IOCTL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: IOCTL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_ioctl_compat(ps, ptr_to_compat(p));
break;
#endif
case USBDEVFS_DISCARDURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCARDURB %p\n", __func__, p);
ret = proc_unlinkurb(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCSIGNAL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_disconnectsignal(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLAIMINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLAIMINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_claiminterface(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_RELEASEINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RELEASEINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_releaseinterface(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_IOCTL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: IOCTL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_ioctl_default(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLAIM_PORT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLAIM_PORT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_claim_port(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_RELEASE_PORT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RELEASE_PORT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_release_port(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_GET_CAPABILITIES:
ret = proc_get_capabilities(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCONNECT_CLAIM:
ret = proc_disconnect_claim(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_ALLOC_STREAMS:
ret = proc_alloc_streams(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_FREE_STREAMS:
ret = proc_free_streams(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DROP_PRIVILEGES:
ret = proc_drop_privileges(ps, p);
break;
}
done:
usb_unlock_device(dev);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_atime = CURRENT_TIME;
return ret;
}
|
static long usbdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *p)
{
struct usb_dev_state *ps = file->private_data;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct usb_device *dev = ps->dev;
int ret = -ENOTTY;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
usb_lock_device(dev);
/* Reap operations are allowed even after disconnection */
switch (cmd) {
case USBDEVFS_REAPURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURB\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurb(ps, p);
goto done;
case USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURBNDELAY\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurbnonblock(ps, p);
goto done;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
case USBDEVFS_REAPURB32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURB32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurb_compat(ps, p);
goto done;
case USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: REAPURBNDELAY32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_reapurbnonblock_compat(ps, p);
goto done;
#endif
}
if (!connected(ps)) {
usb_unlock_device(dev);
return -ENODEV;
}
switch (cmd) {
case USBDEVFS_CONTROL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONTROL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_control(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_BULK:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: BULK\n", __func__);
ret = proc_bulk(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_RESETEP:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RESETEP\n", __func__);
ret = proc_resetep(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_RESET:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RESET\n", __func__);
ret = proc_resetdevice(ps);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLEAR_HALT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLEAR_HALT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_clearhalt(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_GETDRIVER:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: GETDRIVER\n", __func__);
ret = proc_getdriver(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CONNECTINFO:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONNECTINFO\n", __func__);
ret = proc_connectinfo(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SETINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SETINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_setintf(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SETCONFIGURATION:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SETCONFIGURATION\n", __func__);
ret = proc_setconfig(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SUBMITURB\n", __func__);
ret = proc_submiturb(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
case USBDEVFS_CONTROL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CONTROL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_control_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_BULK32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: BULK32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_bulk_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCSIGNAL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_disconnectsignal_compat(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: SUBMITURB32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_submiturb_compat(ps, p);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
break;
case USBDEVFS_IOCTL32:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: IOCTL32\n", __func__);
ret = proc_ioctl_compat(ps, ptr_to_compat(p));
break;
#endif
case USBDEVFS_DISCARDURB:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCARDURB %p\n", __func__, p);
ret = proc_unlinkurb(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCSIGNAL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: DISCSIGNAL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_disconnectsignal(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLAIMINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLAIMINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_claiminterface(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_RELEASEINTERFACE:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RELEASEINTERFACE\n", __func__);
ret = proc_releaseinterface(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_IOCTL:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: IOCTL\n", __func__);
ret = proc_ioctl_default(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_CLAIM_PORT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: CLAIM_PORT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_claim_port(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_RELEASE_PORT:
snoop(&dev->dev, "%s: RELEASE_PORT\n", __func__);
ret = proc_release_port(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_GET_CAPABILITIES:
ret = proc_get_capabilities(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DISCONNECT_CLAIM:
ret = proc_disconnect_claim(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_ALLOC_STREAMS:
ret = proc_alloc_streams(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_FREE_STREAMS:
ret = proc_free_streams(ps, p);
break;
case USBDEVFS_DROP_PRIVILEGES:
ret = proc_drop_privileges(ps, p);
break;
}
done:
usb_unlock_device(dev);
if (ret >= 0)
inode->i_atime = CURRENT_TIME;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStrip::CalculateBoundsForDraggedTabs(const std::vector<Tab*>& tabs,
std::vector<gfx::Rect>* bounds) {
int x = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tabs.size(); ++i) {
Tab* tab = tabs[i];
if (i > 0 && tab->data().mini != tabs[i - 1]->data().mini)
x += kMiniToNonMiniGap;
gfx::Rect new_bounds = tab->bounds();
new_bounds.set_origin(gfx::Point(x, 0));
bounds->push_back(new_bounds);
x += tab->width() + tab_h_offset();
}
}
|
void TabStrip::CalculateBoundsForDraggedTabs(const std::vector<Tab*>& tabs,
std::vector<gfx::Rect>* bounds) {
int x = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tabs.size(); ++i) {
Tab* tab = tabs[i];
if (i > 0 && tab->data().mini != tabs[i - 1]->data().mini)
x += kMiniToNonMiniGap;
gfx::Rect new_bounds = tab->bounds();
new_bounds.set_origin(gfx::Point(x, 0));
bounds->push_back(new_bounds);
x += tab->width() + tab_h_offset();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1573
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1573/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2f18db0c68fec96631c10cad9384c196e9008ac
|
a2f18db0c68fec96631c10cad9384c196e9008ac
|
netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static int nf_tables_table_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return 0;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
err = nf_tables_fill_table_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq,
event, 0, ctx->afi->family, ctx->table);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto err;
}
err = nfnetlink_send(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES,
ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL);
err:
if (err < 0) {
nfnetlink_set_err(ctx->net, ctx->portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES,
err);
}
return err;
}
|
static int nf_tables_table_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return 0;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
err = nf_tables_fill_table_info(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, ctx->seq,
event, 0, ctx->afi->family, ctx->table);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto err;
}
err = nfnetlink_send(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES,
ctx->report, GFP_KERNEL);
err:
if (err < 0) {
nfnetlink_set_err(ctx->net, ctx->portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES,
err);
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3845
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3845/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
|
status_t Parcel::writeBlob(size_t len, WritableBlob* outBlob)
{
status_t status;
if (!mAllowFds || len <= IN_PLACE_BLOB_LIMIT) {
ALOGV("writeBlob: write in place");
status = writeInt32(0);
if (status) return status;
void* ptr = writeInplace(len);
if (!ptr) return NO_MEMORY;
outBlob->init(false /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
ALOGV("writeBlob: write to ashmem");
int fd = ashmem_create_region("Parcel Blob", len);
if (fd < 0) return NO_MEMORY;
int result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
void* ptr = ::mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
status = -errno;
} else {
result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
status = writeInt32(1);
if (!status) {
status = writeFileDescriptor(fd, true /*takeOwnership*/);
if (!status) {
outBlob->init(true /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
::munmap(ptr, len);
}
::close(fd);
return status;
}
|
status_t Parcel::writeBlob(size_t len, WritableBlob* outBlob)
{
status_t status;
if (!mAllowFds || len <= IN_PLACE_BLOB_LIMIT) {
ALOGV("writeBlob: write in place");
status = writeInt32(0);
if (status) return status;
void* ptr = writeInplace(len);
if (!ptr) return NO_MEMORY;
outBlob->init(false /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
ALOGV("writeBlob: write to ashmem");
int fd = ashmem_create_region("Parcel Blob", len);
if (fd < 0) return NO_MEMORY;
int result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
void* ptr = ::mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
status = -errno;
} else {
result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
status = writeInt32(1);
if (!status) {
status = writeFileDescriptor(fd, true /*takeOwnership*/);
if (!status) {
outBlob->init(true /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
::munmap(ptr, len);
}
::close(fd);
return status;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
gpc_Gprq(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
if (in->r == in->g && in->g == in->b)
out->r = out->g = out->b = ilineara_g22(in->g, in->a);
else
out->r = out->g = out->b = u16d(in->a * 257 *
YfromRGB(g22_to_d[in->r], g22_to_d[in->g], g22_to_d[in->b]));
out->a = 65535;
}
|
gpc_Gprq(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
if (in->r == in->g && in->g == in->b)
out->r = out->g = out->b = ilineara_g22(in->g, in->a);
else
out->r = out->g = out->b = u16d(in->a * 257 *
YfromRGB(g22_to_d[in->r], g22_to_d[in->g], g22_to_d[in->b]));
out->a = 65535;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Box *stvi_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_StereoVideoBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STVI);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
GF_Box *stvi_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_StereoVideoBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STVI);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
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