CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
void CameraSource::ProxyListener::dataCallbackTimestamp(
nsecs_t timestamp, int32_t msgType, const sp<IMemory>& dataPtr) {
mSource->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp / 1000, msgType, dataPtr);
}
|
void CameraSource::ProxyListener::dataCallbackTimestamp(
nsecs_t timestamp, int32_t msgType, const sp<IMemory>& dataPtr) {
mSource->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp / 1000, msgType, dataPtr);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4127/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int linear_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
iterate_devices_callout_fn fn, void *data)
{
struct linear_c *lc = ti->private;
return fn(ti, lc->dev, lc->start, ti->len, data);
}
|
static int linear_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
iterate_devices_callout_fn fn, void *data)
{
struct linear_c *lc = ti->private;
return fn(ti, lc->dev, lc->start, ti->len, data);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10269/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/1044b43637fa7f70fb19b93593777b78bd20da86
|
1044b43637fa7f70fb19b93593777b78bd20da86
|
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
|
LogLuvEncode24(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvEncode24";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
tmsize_t i;
tmsize_t npixels;
tmsize_t occ;
uint8* op;
uint32* tp;
assert(s == 0);
assert(sp != NULL);
npixels = cc / sp->pixel_size;
if (sp->user_datafmt == SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW)
tp = (uint32*) bp;
else {
tp = (uint32*) sp->tbuf;
if(sp->tbuflen < npixels) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Translation buffer too short");
return (0);
}
(*sp->tfunc)(sp, bp, npixels);
}
/* write out encoded pixels */
op = tif->tif_rawcp;
occ = tif->tif_rawdatasize - tif->tif_rawcc;
for (i = npixels; i--; ) {
if (occ < 3) {
tif->tif_rawcp = op;
tif->tif_rawcc = tif->tif_rawdatasize - occ;
if (!TIFFFlushData1(tif))
return (-1);
op = tif->tif_rawcp;
occ = tif->tif_rawdatasize - tif->tif_rawcc;
}
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp >> 16);
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp >> 8 & 0xff);
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp++ & 0xff);
occ -= 3;
}
tif->tif_rawcp = op;
tif->tif_rawcc = tif->tif_rawdatasize - occ;
return (1);
}
|
LogLuvEncode24(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvEncode24";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
tmsize_t i;
tmsize_t npixels;
tmsize_t occ;
uint8* op;
uint32* tp;
assert(s == 0);
assert(sp != NULL);
npixels = cc / sp->pixel_size;
if (sp->user_datafmt == SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW)
tp = (uint32*) bp;
else {
tp = (uint32*) sp->tbuf;
if(sp->tbuflen < npixels) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Translation buffer too short");
return (0);
}
(*sp->tfunc)(sp, bp, npixels);
}
/* write out encoded pixels */
op = tif->tif_rawcp;
occ = tif->tif_rawdatasize - tif->tif_rawcc;
for (i = npixels; i--; ) {
if (occ < 3) {
tif->tif_rawcp = op;
tif->tif_rawcc = tif->tif_rawdatasize - occ;
if (!TIFFFlushData1(tif))
return (-1);
op = tif->tif_rawcp;
occ = tif->tif_rawdatasize - tif->tif_rawcc;
}
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp >> 16);
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp >> 8 & 0xff);
*op++ = (uint8)(*tp++ & 0xff);
occ -= 3;
}
tif->tif_rawcp = op;
tif->tif_rawcc = tif->tif_rawdatasize - occ;
return (1);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
String FrameLoader::outgoingOrigin() const
{
return m_frame->document()->securityOrigin()->toString();
}
|
String FrameLoader::outgoingOrigin() const
{
return m_frame->document()->securityOrigin()->toString();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9510
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9510/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/6e4b8e505173f803a5fc05abc09f64eef89dc308
|
6e4b8e505173f803a5fc05abc09f64eef89dc308
|
Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
|
void smp_send_init(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_INIT, p_cb);
}
|
void smp_send_init(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_INIT, p_cb);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8935
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8935/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
Update header handling to RFC 7230
|
SAPI_API double sapi_get_request_time(TSRMLS_D)
{
if(SG(global_request_time)) return SG(global_request_time);
if (sapi_module.get_request_time && SG(server_context)) {
SG(global_request_time) = sapi_module.get_request_time(TSRMLS_C);
} else {
struct timeval tp = {0};
if (!gettimeofday(&tp, NULL)) {
SG(global_request_time) = (double)(tp.tv_sec + tp.tv_usec / 1000000.00);
} else {
SG(global_request_time) = (double)time(0);
}
}
return SG(global_request_time);
}
|
SAPI_API double sapi_get_request_time(TSRMLS_D)
{
if(SG(global_request_time)) return SG(global_request_time);
if (sapi_module.get_request_time && SG(server_context)) {
SG(global_request_time) = sapi_module.get_request_time(TSRMLS_C);
} else {
struct timeval tp = {0};
if (!gettimeofday(&tp, NULL)) {
SG(global_request_time) = (double)(tp.tv_sec + tp.tv_usec / 1000000.00);
} else {
SG(global_request_time) = (double)time(0);
}
}
return SG(global_request_time);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getProgramParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
WebGLProgram* program = V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0]) ? V8WebGLProgram::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])) : 0;
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[1]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getProgramParameter(program, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getProgramParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
WebGLProgram* program = V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0]) ? V8WebGLProgram::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])) : 0;
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[1]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getProgramParameter(program, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
void MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest(const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
DVLOG(1) << "SetUpRequest label " << label << " doesn't exist!!";
return; // This can happen if the request has been canceled.
}
request->SetAudioType(AdjustAudioStreamTypeBasedOnCommandLineSwitches(
request->controls.audio.stream_type));
request->SetVideoType(request->controls.video.stream_type);
const bool is_display_capture =
request->video_type() == MEDIA_DISPLAY_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_display_capture && !SetUpDisplayCaptureRequest(request)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_SCREEN_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
const bool is_tab_capture =
request->audio_type() == MEDIA_GUM_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
request->video_type() == MEDIA_GUM_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_tab_capture) {
if (!SetUpTabCaptureRequest(request, label)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_TAB_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
}
return;
}
const bool is_screen_capture =
request->video_type() == MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_screen_capture && !SetUpScreenCaptureRequest(request)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_SCREEN_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!is_tab_capture && !is_screen_capture && !is_display_capture) {
if (IsDeviceMediaType(request->audio_type()) ||
IsDeviceMediaType(request->video_type())) {
StartEnumeration(request, label);
return;
}
if (!SetUpDeviceCaptureRequest(request, MediaDeviceEnumeration())) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_NO_HARDWARE);
return;
}
}
ReadOutputParamsAndPostRequestToUI(label, request, MediaDeviceEnumeration());
}
|
void MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest(const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
DVLOG(1) << "SetUpRequest label " << label << " doesn't exist!!";
return; // This can happen if the request has been canceled.
}
request->SetAudioType(AdjustAudioStreamTypeBasedOnCommandLineSwitches(
request->controls.audio.stream_type));
request->SetVideoType(request->controls.video.stream_type);
const bool is_display_capture =
request->video_type() == MEDIA_DISPLAY_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_display_capture && !SetUpDisplayCaptureRequest(request)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_SCREEN_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
const bool is_tab_capture =
request->audio_type() == MEDIA_GUM_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
request->video_type() == MEDIA_GUM_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_tab_capture) {
if (!SetUpTabCaptureRequest(request, label)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_TAB_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
}
return;
}
const bool is_screen_capture =
request->video_type() == MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
if (is_screen_capture && !SetUpScreenCaptureRequest(request)) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_SCREEN_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!is_tab_capture && !is_screen_capture && !is_display_capture) {
if (IsDeviceMediaType(request->audio_type()) ||
IsDeviceMediaType(request->video_type())) {
StartEnumeration(request, label);
return;
}
if (!SetUpDeviceCaptureRequest(request, MediaDeviceEnumeration())) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_NO_HARDWARE);
return;
}
}
ReadOutputParamsAndPostRequestToUI(label, request, MediaDeviceEnumeration());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6401
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6401/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/akheron/jansson/commit/8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
void *json_object_iter_next(json_t *json, void *iter)
{
json_object_t *object;
if(!json_is_object(json) || iter == NULL)
return NULL;
object = json_to_object(json);
return hashtable_iter_next(&object->hashtable, iter);
}
|
void *json_object_iter_next(json_t *json, void *iter)
{
json_object_t *object;
if(!json_is_object(json) || iter == NULL)
return NULL;
object = json_to_object(json);
return hashtable_iter_next(&object->hashtable, iter);
}
|
C
|
jansson
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14763/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c91815b596245fd7da349ecc43c8def670d2269e
|
c91815b596245fd7da349ecc43c8def670d2269e
|
usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void dwc3_disconnect_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
if (dwc->gadget_driver && dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect) {
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect(&dwc->gadget);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
}
}
|
static void dwc3_disconnect_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
if (dwc->gadget_driver && dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect) {
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect(&dwc->gadget);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3760/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Bluetooth/+/122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
|
static bool initNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
sJniAdapterServiceObj = env->NewGlobalRef(obj);
sJniCallbacksObj = env->NewGlobalRef(env->GetObjectField(obj, sJniCallbacksField));
if (sBluetoothInterface) {
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->init(&sBluetoothCallbacks);
if (ret != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error while setting the callbacks: %d\n", ret);
sBluetoothInterface = NULL;
return JNI_FALSE;
}
ret = sBluetoothInterface->set_os_callouts(&sBluetoothOsCallouts);
if (ret != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error while setting Bluetooth callouts: %d\n", ret);
sBluetoothInterface->cleanup();
sBluetoothInterface = NULL;
return JNI_FALSE;
}
if ( (sBluetoothSocketInterface = (btsock_interface_t *)
sBluetoothInterface->get_profile_interface(BT_PROFILE_SOCKETS_ID)) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Error getting socket interface");
}
return JNI_TRUE;
}
return JNI_FALSE;
}
|
static bool initNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
sJniAdapterServiceObj = env->NewGlobalRef(obj);
sJniCallbacksObj = env->NewGlobalRef(env->GetObjectField(obj, sJniCallbacksField));
if (sBluetoothInterface) {
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->init(&sBluetoothCallbacks);
if (ret != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error while setting the callbacks: %d\n", ret);
sBluetoothInterface = NULL;
return JNI_FALSE;
}
ret = sBluetoothInterface->set_os_callouts(&sBluetoothOsCallouts);
if (ret != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error while setting Bluetooth callouts: %d\n", ret);
sBluetoothInterface->cleanup();
sBluetoothInterface = NULL;
return JNI_FALSE;
}
if ( (sBluetoothSocketInterface = (btsock_interface_t *)
sBluetoothInterface->get_profile_interface(BT_PROFILE_SOCKETS_ID)) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Error getting socket interface");
}
return JNI_TRUE;
}
return JNI_FALSE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0829
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0829/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d123966ec156cd2f92fdada36be39694641b479e
|
d123966ec156cd2f92fdada36be39694641b479e
|
File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FileAPIMessageFilter::DidGetMetadata(
int request_id,
base::PlatformFileError result,
const base::PlatformFileInfo& info,
const FilePath& platform_path) {
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidReadMetadata(request_id, info, platform_path));
else
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, result));
UnregisterOperation(request_id);
}
|
void FileAPIMessageFilter::DidGetMetadata(
int request_id,
base::PlatformFileError result,
const base::PlatformFileInfo& info,
const FilePath& platform_path) {
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidReadMetadata(request_id, info, platform_path));
else
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, result));
UnregisterOperation(request_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
{
events->exception.injected =
vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
!kvm_exception_is_soft(vcpu->arch.exception.nr);
events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code;
events->exception.pad = 0;
events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
events->interrupt.injected =
vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft;
events->interrupt.nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
events->interrupt.soft = 0;
events->interrupt.shadow =
kvm_x86_ops->get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu,
KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS | KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI);
events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending;
events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
events->nmi.pad = 0;
events->sipi_vector = vcpu->arch.sipi_vector;
events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW);
memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved));
}
|
static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
{
events->exception.injected =
vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
!kvm_exception_is_soft(vcpu->arch.exception.nr);
events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code;
events->exception.pad = 0;
events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
events->interrupt.injected =
vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft;
events->interrupt.nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
events->interrupt.soft = 0;
events->interrupt.shadow =
kvm_x86_ops->get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu,
KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS | KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI);
events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending;
events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
events->nmi.pad = 0;
events->sipi_vector = vcpu->arch.sipi_vector;
events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW);
memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType ParseImageResourceBlocks(Image *image,
const unsigned char *blocks,size_t length,
MagickBooleanType *has_merged_image)
{
const unsigned char
*p;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,blocks);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
for (p=blocks; (p >= blocks) && (p < (blocks+length-16)); )
{
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
switch (id)
{
case 0x03ed:
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned short
resolution;
/*
Resolution info.
*/
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->x_resolution=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",
image->x_resolution);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:XResolution",value);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->y_resolution=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",
image->y_resolution);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:YResolution",value);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
break;
}
case 0x0421:
{
if (*(p+4) == 0)
*has_merged_image=MagickFalse;
p+=count;
break;
}
default:
{
p+=count;
break;
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType ParseImageResourceBlocks(Image *image,
const unsigned char *blocks,size_t length,
MagickBooleanType *has_merged_image)
{
const unsigned char
*p;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,blocks);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
for (p=blocks; (p >= blocks) && (p < (blocks+length-16)); )
{
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
switch (id)
{
case 0x03ed:
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned short
resolution;
/*
Resolution info.
*/
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->x_resolution=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",
image->x_resolution);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:XResolution",value);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->y_resolution=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",
image->y_resolution);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:YResolution",value);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
break;
}
case 0x0421:
{
if (*(p+4) == 0)
*has_merged_image=MagickFalse;
p+=count;
break;
}
default:
{
p+=count;
break;
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5202
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
Ensure that OpenVR only adds placeholder buttons when needed.
The current implementation of the OpenVRGamepadHelper always adds the
optional grip and secondary axes buttons; however, if those buttons are
missing and no additional buttons need to be supported, they should not
be included. A prime example of this is the vive controller, which has
a trigger, a grip, and a touchpad, but no secondary axis button. This
is essentially the controller that the new TestGamepadOptionalData test
builds.
Bug: 964026
Change-Id: I1de93b5bd7bd0d9e75013cf33b8f333e5d70270f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1627914
Reviewed-by: Bill Orr <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Cooper <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#662843}
|
device::XrButtonId GetAxisId(unsigned int offset) {
return static_cast<device::XrButtonId>(device::XrButtonId::kAxisPrimary +
offset);
}
|
device::XrButtonId GetAxisId(unsigned int offset) {
return static_cast<device::XrButtonId>(device::XrButtonId::kAxisPrimary +
offset);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a6b3167fa0e825aebb5a7cd8b437b6d41584a196
|
a6b3167fa0e825aebb5a7cd8b437b6d41584a196
| null |
static bool is_request_lun_aligned(int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors,
IscsiLun *iscsilun)
{
if ((sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) % iscsilun->block_size ||
(nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) % iscsilun->block_size) {
error_report("iSCSI misaligned request: "
"iscsilun->block_size %u, sector_num %" PRIi64
", nb_sectors %d",
iscsilun->block_size, sector_num, nb_sectors);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
static bool is_request_lun_aligned(int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors,
IscsiLun *iscsilun)
{
if ((sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) % iscsilun->block_size ||
(nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) % iscsilun->block_size) {
error_report("iSCSI misaligned request: "
"iscsilun->block_size %u, sector_num %" PRIi64
", nb_sectors %d",
iscsilun->block_size, sector_num, nb_sectors);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::setDefaultStatus(const String& string) {
default_status_ = string;
}
|
void LocalDOMWindow::setDefaultStatus(const String& string) {
default_status_ = string;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1152
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1152/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/d9cd01ede97f4145af9781d448c62a3318952719
|
d9cd01ede97f4145af9781d448c62a3318952719
|
Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
|
static void handle_binary_protocol_error(conn *c) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_EINVAL, 0);
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Protocol error (opcode %02x), close connection %d\n",
c->binary_header.request.opcode, c->sfd);
}
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
}
|
static void handle_binary_protocol_error(conn *c) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_EINVAL, 0);
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Protocol error (opcode %02x), close connection %d\n",
c->binary_header.request.opcode, c->sfd);
}
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
}
|
C
|
memcached
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2Implementation::GetSamplerParameterivHelper(GLuint /* sampler */,
GLenum /* pname */,
GLint* /* params */) {
return false;
}
|
bool GLES2Implementation::GetSamplerParameterivHelper(GLuint /* sampler */,
GLenum /* pname */,
GLint* /* params */) {
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
static struct page *alloc_buddy_huge_page(struct hstate *h,
gfp_t gfp_mask, int nid, nodemask_t *nmask)
{
int order = huge_page_order(h);
struct page *page;
gfp_mask |= __GFP_COMP|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_NOWARN;
if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
nid = numa_mem_id();
page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, nid, nmask);
if (page)
__count_vm_event(HTLB_BUDDY_PGALLOC);
else
__count_vm_event(HTLB_BUDDY_PGALLOC_FAIL);
return page;
}
|
static struct page *alloc_buddy_huge_page(struct hstate *h,
gfp_t gfp_mask, int nid, nodemask_t *nmask)
{
int order = huge_page_order(h);
struct page *page;
gfp_mask |= __GFP_COMP|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_NOWARN;
if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
nid = numa_mem_id();
page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, nid, nmask);
if (page)
__count_vm_event(HTLB_BUDDY_PGALLOC);
else
__count_vm_event(HTLB_BUDDY_PGALLOC_FAIL);
return page;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
Avoid excessive nesting / recursion in browser URL handling.
BUG=31517
TEST=ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/525038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35585 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
~SecurityState() {
scheme_policy_.clear();
}
|
~SecurityState() {
scheme_policy_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7730
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7730/
|
CWE-125
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=6cbd34025e5fd3ba47b29b602096e456507ce83b
|
6cbd34025e5fd3ba47b29b602096e456507ce83b
| null |
bool PSIR_FileWriter::IsLegacyChanged()
{
if ( ! this->changed ) return false;
if ( this->legacyDeleted ) return true;
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irPos = this->imgRsrcs.begin();
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irEnd = this->imgRsrcs.end();
for ( ; irPos != irEnd; ++irPos ) {
const InternalRsrcInfo & rsrcInfo = irPos->second;
if ( rsrcInfo.changed && (rsrcInfo.id != kPSIR_XMP) ) return true;
}
return false; // Can get here if the XMP is the only thing changed.
} // PSIR_FileWriter::IsLegacyChanged
|
bool PSIR_FileWriter::IsLegacyChanged()
{
if ( ! this->changed ) return false;
if ( this->legacyDeleted ) return true;
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irPos = this->imgRsrcs.begin();
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irEnd = this->imgRsrcs.end();
for ( ; irPos != irEnd; ++irPos ) {
const InternalRsrcInfo & rsrcInfo = irPos->second;
if ( rsrcInfo.changed && (rsrcInfo.id != kPSIR_XMP) ) return true;
}
return false; // Can get here if the XMP is the only thing changed.
} // PSIR_FileWriter::IsLegacyChanged
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int inet6_addr_modify(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, u32 ifa_flags,
u32 prefered_lft, u32 valid_lft)
{
u32 flags;
clock_t expires;
unsigned long timeout;
bool was_managetempaddr;
bool had_prefixroute;
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (!valid_lft || (prefered_lft > valid_lft))
return -EINVAL;
if (ifa_flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR &&
(ifp->flags & IFA_F_TEMPORARY || ifp->prefix_len != 64))
return -EINVAL;
timeout = addrconf_timeout_fixup(valid_lft, HZ);
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(timeout)) {
expires = jiffies_to_clock_t(timeout * HZ);
valid_lft = timeout;
flags = RTF_EXPIRES;
} else {
expires = 0;
flags = 0;
ifa_flags |= IFA_F_PERMANENT;
}
timeout = addrconf_timeout_fixup(prefered_lft, HZ);
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(timeout)) {
if (timeout == 0)
ifa_flags |= IFA_F_DEPRECATED;
prefered_lft = timeout;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
was_managetempaddr = ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR;
had_prefixroute = ifp->flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT &&
!(ifp->flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE);
ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_DEPRECATED | IFA_F_PERMANENT | IFA_F_NODAD |
IFA_F_HOMEADDRESS | IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR |
IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE);
ifp->flags |= ifa_flags;
ifp->tstamp = jiffies;
ifp->valid_lft = valid_lft;
ifp->prefered_lft = prefered_lft;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (!(ifp->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
if (!(ifa_flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE)) {
addrconf_prefix_route(&ifp->addr, ifp->prefix_len, ifp->idev->dev,
expires, flags);
} else if (had_prefixroute) {
enum cleanup_prefix_rt_t action;
unsigned long rt_expires;
write_lock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
action = check_cleanup_prefix_route(ifp, &rt_expires);
write_unlock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
if (action != CLEANUP_PREFIX_RT_NOP) {
cleanup_prefix_route(ifp, rt_expires,
action == CLEANUP_PREFIX_RT_DEL);
}
}
if (was_managetempaddr || ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR) {
if (was_managetempaddr && !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR))
valid_lft = prefered_lft = 0;
manage_tempaddrs(ifp->idev, ifp, valid_lft, prefered_lft,
!was_managetempaddr, jiffies);
}
addrconf_verify_rtnl();
return 0;
}
|
static int inet6_addr_modify(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, u32 ifa_flags,
u32 prefered_lft, u32 valid_lft)
{
u32 flags;
clock_t expires;
unsigned long timeout;
bool was_managetempaddr;
bool had_prefixroute;
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (!valid_lft || (prefered_lft > valid_lft))
return -EINVAL;
if (ifa_flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR &&
(ifp->flags & IFA_F_TEMPORARY || ifp->prefix_len != 64))
return -EINVAL;
timeout = addrconf_timeout_fixup(valid_lft, HZ);
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(timeout)) {
expires = jiffies_to_clock_t(timeout * HZ);
valid_lft = timeout;
flags = RTF_EXPIRES;
} else {
expires = 0;
flags = 0;
ifa_flags |= IFA_F_PERMANENT;
}
timeout = addrconf_timeout_fixup(prefered_lft, HZ);
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(timeout)) {
if (timeout == 0)
ifa_flags |= IFA_F_DEPRECATED;
prefered_lft = timeout;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
was_managetempaddr = ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR;
had_prefixroute = ifp->flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT &&
!(ifp->flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE);
ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_DEPRECATED | IFA_F_PERMANENT | IFA_F_NODAD |
IFA_F_HOMEADDRESS | IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR |
IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE);
ifp->flags |= ifa_flags;
ifp->tstamp = jiffies;
ifp->valid_lft = valid_lft;
ifp->prefered_lft = prefered_lft;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (!(ifp->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
if (!(ifa_flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE)) {
addrconf_prefix_route(&ifp->addr, ifp->prefix_len, ifp->idev->dev,
expires, flags);
} else if (had_prefixroute) {
enum cleanup_prefix_rt_t action;
unsigned long rt_expires;
write_lock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
action = check_cleanup_prefix_route(ifp, &rt_expires);
write_unlock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
if (action != CLEANUP_PREFIX_RT_NOP) {
cleanup_prefix_route(ifp, rt_expires,
action == CLEANUP_PREFIX_RT_DEL);
}
}
if (was_managetempaddr || ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR) {
if (was_managetempaddr && !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR))
valid_lft = prefered_lft = 0;
manage_tempaddrs(ifp->idev, ifp, valid_lft, prefered_lft,
!was_managetempaddr, jiffies);
}
addrconf_verify_rtnl();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/640b04121d7cd2cac90e2f7c82b97fce05f074a5
|
640b04121d7cd2cac90e2f7c82b97fce05f074a5
|
IOMX: do not clear buffer if it's allocated by component
The component might depends on their buffers to be initialized
in certain ways to work. Don't clear unless we're allocating it.
bug: 31586647
Change-Id: Ia0a125797e414998ef0cd8ce03672f5b1e0bbf7a
(cherry picked from commit ea76573aa276f51950007217a97903c4fe64f685)
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
bool copy = mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex,
(portIndex == kPortIndexInput) && copy /* copyToOmx */,
(portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) && copy /* copyFromOmx */,
NULL /* data */);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
bool copy = mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex,
(portIndex == kPortIndexInput) && copy /* copyToOmx */,
(portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) && copy /* copyFromOmx */,
NULL /* data */);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
memset(header->pBuffer, 0, header->nAllocLen);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static int dbpageColumn(
sqlite3_vtab_cursor *pCursor,
sqlite3_context *ctx,
int i
){
DbpageCursor *pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)pCursor;
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
switch( i ){
case 0: { /* pgno */
sqlite3_result_int(ctx, pCsr->pgno);
break;
}
case 1: { /* data */
DbPage *pDbPage = 0;
rc = sqlite3PagerGet(pCsr->pPager, pCsr->pgno, (DbPage**)&pDbPage, 0);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3_result_blob(ctx, sqlite3PagerGetData(pDbPage), pCsr->szPage,
SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
}
sqlite3PagerUnref(pDbPage);
break;
}
default: { /* schema */
sqlite3 *db = sqlite3_context_db_handle(ctx);
sqlite3_result_text(ctx, db->aDb[pCsr->iDb].zDbSName, -1, SQLITE_STATIC);
break;
}
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
|
static int dbpageColumn(
sqlite3_vtab_cursor *pCursor,
sqlite3_context *ctx,
int i
){
DbpageCursor *pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)pCursor;
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
switch( i ){
case 0: { /* pgno */
sqlite3_result_int(ctx, pCsr->pgno);
break;
}
case 1: { /* data */
DbPage *pDbPage = 0;
rc = sqlite3PagerGet(pCsr->pPager, pCsr->pgno, (DbPage**)&pDbPage, 0);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3_result_blob(ctx, sqlite3PagerGetData(pDbPage), pCsr->szPage,
SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
}
sqlite3PagerUnref(pDbPage);
break;
}
default: { /* schema */
sqlite3 *db = sqlite3_context_db_handle(ctx);
sqlite3_result_text(ctx, db->aDb[pCsr->iDb].zDbSName, -1, SQLITE_STATIC);
break;
}
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
AXObject::AXRange AXLayoutObject::textControlSelection() const {
if (!getLayoutObject())
return AXRange();
LayoutObject* layout = nullptr;
if (getLayoutObject()->isTextControl()) {
layout = getLayoutObject();
} else {
Element* focusedElement = getDocument()->focusedElement();
if (focusedElement && focusedElement->layoutObject() &&
focusedElement->layoutObject()->isTextControl())
layout = focusedElement->layoutObject();
}
if (!layout)
return AXRange();
AXObject* axObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(layout);
if (!axObject || !axObject->isAXLayoutObject())
return AXRange();
VisibleSelection selection =
layout->frame()->selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
TextControlElement* textControl =
toLayoutTextControl(layout)->textControlElement();
ASSERT(textControl);
int start = textControl->selectionStart();
int end = textControl->selectionEnd();
return AXRange(axObject, start, selection.visibleStart().affinity(), axObject,
end, selection.visibleEnd().affinity());
}
|
AXObject::AXRange AXLayoutObject::textControlSelection() const {
if (!getLayoutObject())
return AXRange();
LayoutObject* layout = nullptr;
if (getLayoutObject()->isTextControl()) {
layout = getLayoutObject();
} else {
Element* focusedElement = getDocument()->focusedElement();
if (focusedElement && focusedElement->layoutObject() &&
focusedElement->layoutObject()->isTextControl())
layout = focusedElement->layoutObject();
}
if (!layout)
return AXRange();
AXObject* axObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(layout);
if (!axObject || !axObject->isAXLayoutObject())
return AXRange();
VisibleSelection selection =
layout->frame()->selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
TextControlElement* textControl =
toLayoutTextControl(layout)->textControlElement();
ASSERT(textControl);
int start = textControl->selectionStart();
int end = textControl->selectionEnd();
return AXRange(axObject, start, selection.visibleStart().affinity(), axObject,
end, selection.visibleEnd().affinity());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tun_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
free_netdev(tun_sk(sk)->tun->dev);
}
|
static void tun_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
free_netdev(tun_sk(sk)->tun->dev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderFlexibleBox::flipForWrapReverse(const Vector<LineContext>& lineContexts, LayoutUnit crossAxisStartEdge)
{
LayoutUnit contentExtent = crossAxisContentExtent();
RenderBox* child = m_orderIterator.first();
for (size_t lineNumber = 0; lineNumber < lineContexts.size(); ++lineNumber) {
for (size_t childNumber = 0; childNumber < lineContexts[lineNumber].numberOfChildren; ++childNumber, child = m_orderIterator.next()) {
ASSERT(child);
LayoutUnit lineCrossAxisExtent = lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisExtent;
LayoutUnit originalOffset = lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisOffset - crossAxisStartEdge;
LayoutUnit newOffset = contentExtent - originalOffset - lineCrossAxisExtent;
adjustAlignmentForChild(child, newOffset - originalOffset);
}
}
}
|
void RenderFlexibleBox::flipForWrapReverse(const Vector<LineContext>& lineContexts, LayoutUnit crossAxisStartEdge)
{
LayoutUnit contentExtent = crossAxisContentExtent();
RenderBox* child = m_orderIterator.first();
for (size_t lineNumber = 0; lineNumber < lineContexts.size(); ++lineNumber) {
for (size_t childNumber = 0; childNumber < lineContexts[lineNumber].numberOfChildren; ++childNumber, child = m_orderIterator.next()) {
ASSERT(child);
LayoutUnit lineCrossAxisExtent = lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisExtent;
LayoutUnit originalOffset = lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisOffset - crossAxisStartEdge;
LayoutUnit newOffset = contentExtent - originalOffset - lineCrossAxisExtent;
adjustAlignmentForChild(child, newOffset - originalOffset);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
int snd_seq_set_queue_tempo(int client, struct snd_seq_queue_tempo *tempo)
{
if (!snd_seq_queue_check_access(tempo->queue, client))
return -EPERM;
return snd_seq_queue_timer_set_tempo(tempo->queue, client, tempo);
}
|
int snd_seq_set_queue_tempo(int client, struct snd_seq_queue_tempo *tempo)
{
if (!snd_seq_queue_check_access(tempo->queue, client))
return -EPERM;
return snd_seq_queue_timer_set_tempo(tempo->queue, client, tempo);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void LauncherView::OnBoundsAnimatorProgressed(views::BoundsAnimator* animator) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
PreferredSizeChanged();
}
|
void LauncherView::OnBoundsAnimatorProgressed(views::BoundsAnimator* animator) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1344/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxcfs/commit/8ee2a503e102b1a43ec4d83113dc275ab20a869a
|
8ee2a503e102b1a43ec4d83113dc275ab20a869a
|
Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
|
static int send_creds(int sock, struct ucred *cred, char v, bool pingfirst)
{
struct msghdr msg = { 0 };
struct iovec iov;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*cred))];
char buf[1];
buf[0] = 'p';
if (pingfirst) {
if (msgrecv(sock, buf, 1) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error getting reply from server over socketpair\n",
__func__);
return SEND_CREDS_FAIL;
}
}
msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), cred, sizeof(*cred));
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
buf[0] = v;
iov.iov_base = buf;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(buf);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed at sendmsg: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
if (errno == 3)
return SEND_CREDS_NOTSK;
return SEND_CREDS_FAIL;
}
return SEND_CREDS_OK;
}
|
static int send_creds(int sock, struct ucred *cred, char v, bool pingfirst)
{
struct msghdr msg = { 0 };
struct iovec iov;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*cred))];
char buf[1];
buf[0] = 'p';
if (pingfirst) {
if (msgrecv(sock, buf, 1) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error getting reply from server over socketpair\n",
__func__);
return SEND_CREDS_FAIL;
}
}
msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), cred, sizeof(*cred));
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
buf[0] = v;
iov.iov_base = buf;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(buf);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed at sendmsg: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
if (errno == 3)
return SEND_CREDS_NOTSK;
return SEND_CREDS_FAIL;
}
return SEND_CREDS_OK;
}
|
C
|
lxcfs
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int hextoint(char *src, unsigned int len)
{
char hex[16];
char *end;
int res;
if(len >= sizeof(hex))
return -1;
strncpy(hex, src, len+1);
hex[len] = '\0';
res = strtol(hex, &end, 0x10);
if(end != (char*)&hex[len])
return -1;
return res;
}
|
static int hextoint(char *src, unsigned int len)
{
char hex[16];
char *end;
int res;
if(len >= sizeof(hex))
return -1;
strncpy(hex, src, len+1);
hex[len] = '\0';
res = strtol(hex, &end, 0x10);
if(end != (char*)&hex[len])
return -1;
return res;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
const char* DialogTypeToString(ChromeClient::DialogType dialog_type) {
switch (dialog_type) {
case ChromeClient::kAlertDialog:
return "alert";
case ChromeClient::kConfirmDialog:
return "confirm";
case ChromeClient::kPromptDialog:
return "prompt";
case ChromeClient::kPrintDialog:
return "print";
case ChromeClient::kHTMLDialog:
NOTREACHED();
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
|
const char* DialogTypeToString(ChromeClient::DialogType dialog_type) {
switch (dialog_type) {
case ChromeClient::kAlertDialog:
return "alert";
case ChromeClient::kConfirmDialog:
return "confirm";
case ChromeClient::kPromptDialog:
return "prompt";
case ChromeClient::kPrintDialog:
return "print";
case ChromeClient::kHTMLDialog:
NOTREACHED();
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7826/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9
|
086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9
|
tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/[email protected]
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr)
{
if (!syscalls_metadata || nr >= NR_syscalls || nr < 0)
return NULL;
return syscalls_metadata[nr];
}
|
static struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr)
{
if (!syscalls_metadata || nr >= NR_syscalls || nr < 0)
return NULL;
return syscalls_metadata[nr];
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5548/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/05a974efa4bdf6e2a150e3f27dc6fcf0a9ad5655
|
05a974efa4bdf6e2a150e3f27dc6fcf0a9ad5655
|
ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
|
atusb_set_frame_retries(struct ieee802154_hw *hw, s8 retries)
{
struct atusb *atusb = hw->priv;
struct device *dev = &atusb->usb_dev->dev;
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 3) {
dev_info(dev, "Automatic frame retransmission is only available from "
"firmware version 0.3. Please update if you want this feature.");
return -EINVAL;
}
return atusb_write_subreg(atusb, SR_MAX_FRAME_RETRIES, retries);
}
|
atusb_set_frame_retries(struct ieee802154_hw *hw, s8 retries)
{
struct atusb *atusb = hw->priv;
struct device *dev = &atusb->usb_dev->dev;
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 3) {
dev_info(dev, "Automatic frame retransmission is only available from "
"firmware version 0.3. Please update if you want this feature.");
return -EINVAL;
}
return atusb_write_subreg(atusb, SR_MAX_FRAME_RETRIES, retries);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14223
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14223/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/afc9c683ed9db01edb357bc8c19edad4282b3a97
|
afc9c683ed9db01edb357bc8c19edad4282b3a97
|
avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int asf_read_stream_properties(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
ASFStream *asf_st;
ff_asf_guid g;
enum AVMediaType type;
int type_specific_size, sizeX;
unsigned int tag1;
int64_t pos1, pos2, start_time;
int test_for_ext_stream_audio, is_dvr_ms_audio = 0;
if (s->nb_streams == ASF_MAX_STREAMS) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "too many streams\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
pos1 = avio_tell(pb);
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 32, 1, 1000); /* 32 bit pts in ms */
start_time = asf->hdr.preroll;
if (!(asf->hdr.flags & 0x01)) { // if we aren't streaming...
int64_t fsize = avio_size(pb);
if (fsize <= 0 || (int64_t)asf->hdr.file_size <= 0 ||
20*FFABS(fsize - (int64_t)asf->hdr.file_size) < FFMIN(fsize, asf->hdr.file_size))
st->duration = asf->hdr.play_time /
(10000000 / 1000) - start_time;
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
test_for_ext_stream_audio = 0;
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_audio_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_video_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_jfif_media)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_command_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_embed_stream_header)) {
test_for_ext_stream_audio = 1;
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
} else {
return -1;
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_skip(pb, 8); /* total_size */
type_specific_size = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
st->id = avio_rl16(pb) & 0x7f; /* stream id */
asf->asfid2avid[st->id] = s->nb_streams - 1;
asf_st = &asf->streams[st->id];
avio_rl32(pb);
if (test_for_ext_stream_audio) {
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_audio_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
is_dvr_ms_audio = 1;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl32(pb);
}
}
st->codecpar->codec_type = type;
if (type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) {
int ret = ff_get_wav_header(s, pb, st->codecpar, type_specific_size, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (is_dvr_ms_audio) {
st->request_probe = 1;
st->codecpar->codec_tag = 0;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_NONE;
else
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
/* We have to init the frame size at some point .... */
pos2 = avio_tell(pb);
if (size >= (pos2 + 8 - pos1 + 24)) {
asf_st->ds_span = avio_r8(pb);
asf_st->ds_packet_size = avio_rl16(pb);
asf_st->ds_chunk_size = avio_rl16(pb);
avio_rl16(pb); // ds_data_size
avio_r8(pb); // ds_silence_data
}
if (asf_st->ds_span > 1) {
if (!asf_st->ds_chunk_size ||
(asf_st->ds_packet_size / asf_st->ds_chunk_size <= 1) ||
asf_st->ds_packet_size % asf_st->ds_chunk_size)
asf_st->ds_span = 0; // disable descrambling
}
} else if (type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO &&
size - (avio_tell(pb) - pos1 + 24) >= 51) {
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_rl16(pb); /* size */
sizeX = avio_rl32(pb); /* size */
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
/* not available for asf */
avio_rl16(pb); /* panes */
st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample = avio_rl16(pb); /* depth */
tag1 = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 20);
if (sizeX > 40) {
st->codecpar->extradata_size = ffio_limit(pb, sizeX - 40);
st->codecpar->extradata = av_mallocz(st->codecpar->extradata_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!st->codecpar->extradata)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avio_read(pb, st->codecpar->extradata, st->codecpar->extradata_size);
}
/* Extract palette from extradata if bpp <= 8 */
/* This code assumes that extradata contains only palette */
/* This is true for all paletted codecs implemented in libavcodec */
if (st->codecpar->extradata_size && (st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample <= 8)) {
#if HAVE_BIGENDIAN
int i;
for (i = 0; i < FFMIN(st->codecpar->extradata_size, AVPALETTE_SIZE) / 4; i++)
asf_st->palette[i] = av_bswap32(((uint32_t *)st->codecpar->extradata)[i]);
#else
memcpy(asf_st->palette, st->codecpar->extradata,
FFMIN(st->codecpar->extradata_size, AVPALETTE_SIZE));
#endif
asf_st->palette_changed = 1;
}
st->codecpar->codec_tag = tag1;
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_codec_bmp_tags, tag1);
if (tag1 == MKTAG('D', 'V', 'R', ' ')) {
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
/* issue658 contains wrong w/h and MS even puts a fake seq header
* with wrong w/h in extradata while a correct one is in the stream.
* maximum lameness */
st->codecpar->width =
st->codecpar->height = 0;
av_freep(&st->codecpar->extradata);
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 0;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_ONCE;
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_ONCE;
}
pos2 = avio_tell(pb);
avio_skip(pb, size - (pos2 - pos1 + 24));
return 0;
}
|
static int asf_read_stream_properties(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
ASFStream *asf_st;
ff_asf_guid g;
enum AVMediaType type;
int type_specific_size, sizeX;
unsigned int tag1;
int64_t pos1, pos2, start_time;
int test_for_ext_stream_audio, is_dvr_ms_audio = 0;
if (s->nb_streams == ASF_MAX_STREAMS) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "too many streams\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
pos1 = avio_tell(pb);
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 32, 1, 1000); /* 32 bit pts in ms */
start_time = asf->hdr.preroll;
if (!(asf->hdr.flags & 0x01)) { // if we aren't streaming...
int64_t fsize = avio_size(pb);
if (fsize <= 0 || (int64_t)asf->hdr.file_size <= 0 ||
20*FFABS(fsize - (int64_t)asf->hdr.file_size) < FFMIN(fsize, asf->hdr.file_size))
st->duration = asf->hdr.play_time /
(10000000 / 1000) - start_time;
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
test_for_ext_stream_audio = 0;
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_audio_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_video_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_jfif_media)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_command_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_embed_stream_header)) {
test_for_ext_stream_audio = 1;
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
} else {
return -1;
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_skip(pb, 8); /* total_size */
type_specific_size = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
st->id = avio_rl16(pb) & 0x7f; /* stream id */
asf->asfid2avid[st->id] = s->nb_streams - 1;
asf_st = &asf->streams[st->id];
avio_rl32(pb);
if (test_for_ext_stream_audio) {
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_audio_stream)) {
type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
is_dvr_ms_audio = 1;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl32(pb);
}
}
st->codecpar->codec_type = type;
if (type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) {
int ret = ff_get_wav_header(s, pb, st->codecpar, type_specific_size, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (is_dvr_ms_audio) {
st->request_probe = 1;
st->codecpar->codec_tag = 0;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_NONE;
else
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
/* We have to init the frame size at some point .... */
pos2 = avio_tell(pb);
if (size >= (pos2 + 8 - pos1 + 24)) {
asf_st->ds_span = avio_r8(pb);
asf_st->ds_packet_size = avio_rl16(pb);
asf_st->ds_chunk_size = avio_rl16(pb);
avio_rl16(pb); // ds_data_size
avio_r8(pb); // ds_silence_data
}
if (asf_st->ds_span > 1) {
if (!asf_st->ds_chunk_size ||
(asf_st->ds_packet_size / asf_st->ds_chunk_size <= 1) ||
asf_st->ds_packet_size % asf_st->ds_chunk_size)
asf_st->ds_span = 0; // disable descrambling
}
} else if (type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO &&
size - (avio_tell(pb) - pos1 + 24) >= 51) {
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_rl16(pb); /* size */
sizeX = avio_rl32(pb); /* size */
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
/* not available for asf */
avio_rl16(pb); /* panes */
st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample = avio_rl16(pb); /* depth */
tag1 = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 20);
if (sizeX > 40) {
st->codecpar->extradata_size = ffio_limit(pb, sizeX - 40);
st->codecpar->extradata = av_mallocz(st->codecpar->extradata_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!st->codecpar->extradata)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avio_read(pb, st->codecpar->extradata, st->codecpar->extradata_size);
}
/* Extract palette from extradata if bpp <= 8 */
/* This code assumes that extradata contains only palette */
/* This is true for all paletted codecs implemented in libavcodec */
if (st->codecpar->extradata_size && (st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample <= 8)) {
#if HAVE_BIGENDIAN
int i;
for (i = 0; i < FFMIN(st->codecpar->extradata_size, AVPALETTE_SIZE) / 4; i++)
asf_st->palette[i] = av_bswap32(((uint32_t *)st->codecpar->extradata)[i]);
#else
memcpy(asf_st->palette, st->codecpar->extradata,
FFMIN(st->codecpar->extradata_size, AVPALETTE_SIZE));
#endif
asf_st->palette_changed = 1;
}
st->codecpar->codec_tag = tag1;
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_codec_bmp_tags, tag1);
if (tag1 == MKTAG('D', 'V', 'R', ' ')) {
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
/* issue658 contains wrong w/h and MS even puts a fake seq header
* with wrong w/h in extradata while a correct one is in the stream.
* maximum lameness */
st->codecpar->width =
st->codecpar->height = 0;
av_freep(&st->codecpar->extradata);
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 0;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_ONCE;
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4)
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_ONCE;
}
pos2 = avio_tell(pb);
avio_skip(pb, size - (pos2 - pos1 + 24));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5107/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
c25b198675380f713a56649c857b4367601d4a3d
|
[Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
void LockScreenMediaControlsView::SeekTo(double seek_progress) {
DCHECK(position_.has_value());
media_controller_remote_->SeekTo(seek_progress * position_->duration());
}
|
void LockScreenMediaControlsView::SeekTo(double seek_progress) {
DCHECK(position_.has_value());
media_controller_remote_->SeekTo(seek_progress * position_->duration());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
static Range* findRangeOfStringAlgorithm(
Document& document,
const String& target,
const EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>& referenceRange,
FindOptions options) {
if (target.isEmpty())
return nullptr;
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> documentRange =
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>::rangeOfContents(document);
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> searchRange(documentRange);
bool forward = !(options & Backwards);
bool startInReferenceRange = false;
if (referenceRange.isNotNull()) {
startInReferenceRange = options & StartInSelection;
if (forward && startInReferenceRange)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
referenceRange.startPosition(), documentRange.endPosition());
else if (forward)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
referenceRange.endPosition(), documentRange.endPosition());
else if (startInReferenceRange)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
documentRange.startPosition(), referenceRange.endPosition());
else
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
documentRange.startPosition(), referenceRange.startPosition());
}
Range* resultRange = findStringBetweenPositions(target, searchRange, options);
if (resultRange && startInReferenceRange &&
normalizeRange(EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(resultRange)) ==
referenceRange) {
if (forward)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
fromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(resultRange->endPosition()),
searchRange.endPosition());
else
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
searchRange.startPosition(),
fromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(resultRange->startPosition()));
resultRange = findStringBetweenPositions(target, searchRange, options);
}
if (!resultRange && options & WrapAround)
return findStringBetweenPositions(target, documentRange, options);
return resultRange;
}
|
static Range* findRangeOfStringAlgorithm(
Document& document,
const String& target,
const EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>& referenceRange,
FindOptions options) {
if (target.isEmpty())
return nullptr;
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> documentRange =
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>::rangeOfContents(document);
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> searchRange(documentRange);
bool forward = !(options & Backwards);
bool startInReferenceRange = false;
if (referenceRange.isNotNull()) {
startInReferenceRange = options & StartInSelection;
if (forward && startInReferenceRange)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
referenceRange.startPosition(), documentRange.endPosition());
else if (forward)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
referenceRange.endPosition(), documentRange.endPosition());
else if (startInReferenceRange)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
documentRange.startPosition(), referenceRange.endPosition());
else
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
documentRange.startPosition(), referenceRange.startPosition());
}
Range* resultRange = findStringBetweenPositions(target, searchRange, options);
if (resultRange && startInReferenceRange &&
normalizeRange(EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(resultRange)) ==
referenceRange) {
if (forward)
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
fromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(resultRange->endPosition()),
searchRange.endPosition());
else
searchRange = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
searchRange.startPosition(),
fromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(resultRange->startPosition()));
resultRange = findStringBetweenPositions(target, searchRange, options);
}
if (!resultRange && options & WrapAround)
return findStringBetweenPositions(target, documentRange, options);
return resultRange;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
Desist libxml from continuing the parse after a SAX callback has stopped the
parse.
Attempt 2 -- now with less compile fail on Mac / Clang.
BUG=95465
TBR=cdn
TEST=covered by existing tests under ASAN
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7892003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100953 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlCtxtReadFd(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int fd,
const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserInputBufferPtr input;
xmlParserInputPtr stream;
if (fd < 0)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
input = xmlParserInputBufferCreateFd(fd, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (input == NULL)
return (NULL);
input->closecallback = NULL;
stream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, input, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (stream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(input);
return (NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, stream);
return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 1));
}
|
xmlCtxtReadFd(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int fd,
const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserInputBufferPtr input;
xmlParserInputPtr stream;
if (fd < 0)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
input = xmlParserInputBufferCreateFd(fd, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (input == NULL)
return (NULL);
input->closecallback = NULL;
stream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, input, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (stream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(input);
return (NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, stream);
return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 1));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9217/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/a924f43f30f9c4acaf70618dd2a055f8b0f166be
|
a924f43f30f9c4acaf70618dd2a055f8b0f166be
|
resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
|
DnsPacket *dns_packet_ref(DnsPacket *p) {
if (!p)
return NULL;
assert(!p->on_stack);
assert(p->n_ref > 0);
p->n_ref++;
return p;
}
|
DnsPacket *dns_packet_ref(DnsPacket *p) {
if (!p)
return NULL;
assert(!p->on_stack);
assert(p->n_ref > 0);
p->n_ref++;
return p;
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int piv_find_discovery(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r = 0;
u8 rbuf[256];
size_t rbuflen = sizeof(rbuf);
u8 * arbuf = rbuf;
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/*
* During piv_match or piv_card_reader_lock_obtained,
* we use the discovery object to test if card present, and
* if PIV AID is active. So we can not use the cache
*/
/* If not valid, read, cache and test */
if (!(priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags & PIV_OBJ_CACHE_VALID)) {
r = piv_process_discovery(card);
} else {
/* if already in cache,force read */
r = piv_get_data(card, PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY, &arbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r >= 0)
/* make sure it is PIV AID */
r = piv_parse_discovery(card, rbuf, rbuflen, 1);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
|
static int piv_find_discovery(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r = 0;
u8 rbuf[256];
size_t rbuflen = sizeof(rbuf);
u8 * arbuf = rbuf;
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/*
* During piv_match or piv_card_reader_lock_obtained,
* we use the discovery object to test if card present, and
* if PIV AID is active. So we can not use the cache
*/
/* If not valid, read, cache and test */
if (!(priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags & PIV_OBJ_CACHE_VALID)) {
r = piv_process_discovery(card);
} else {
/* if already in cache,force read */
r = piv_get_data(card, PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY, &arbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r >= 0)
/* make sure it is PIV AID */
r = piv_parse_discovery(card, rbuf, rbuflen, 1);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void shadowRootAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::shadowRootAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void shadowRootAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::shadowRootAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9665/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
|
b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
| null |
Conic_To( RAS_ARGS Long cx,
Long cy,
Long x,
Long y )
{
Long y1, y2, y3, x3, ymin, ymax;
TStates state_bez;
ras.arc = ras.arcs;
ras.arc[2].x = ras.lastX;
ras.arc[2].y = ras.lastY;
ras.arc[1].x = cx;
ras.arc[1].y = cy;
ras.arc[0].x = x;
ras.arc[0].y = y;
do
{
y1 = ras.arc[2].y;
y2 = ras.arc[1].y;
y3 = ras.arc[0].y;
x3 = ras.arc[0].x;
/* first, categorize the Bezier arc */
if ( y1 <= y3 )
{
ymin = y1;
ymax = y3;
}
else
{
ymin = y3;
ymax = y1;
}
if ( y2 < ymin || y2 > ymax )
{
/* this arc has no given direction, split it! */
Split_Conic( ras.arc );
ras.arc += 2;
}
else if ( y1 == y3 )
{
/* this arc is flat, ignore it and pop it from the Bezier stack */
ras.arc -= 2;
}
else
{
/* the arc is y-monotonous, either ascending or descending */
/* detect a change of direction */
state_bez = y1 < y3 ? Ascending_State : Descending_State;
if ( ras.state != state_bez )
{
Bool o = state_bez == Ascending_State ? IS_BOTTOM_OVERSHOOT( y1 )
: IS_TOP_OVERSHOOT( y1 );
/* finalize current profile if any */
if ( ras.state != Unknown_State &&
End_Profile( RAS_VARS o ) )
goto Fail;
/* create a new profile */
if ( New_Profile( RAS_VARS state_bez, o ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* now call the appropriate routine */
if ( state_bez == Ascending_State )
{
if ( Bezier_Up( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
else
if ( Bezier_Down( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
} while ( ras.arc >= ras.arcs );
ras.lastX = x3;
ras.lastY = y3;
return SUCCESS;
Fail:
return FAILURE;
}
|
Conic_To( RAS_ARGS Long cx,
Long cy,
Long x,
Long y )
{
Long y1, y2, y3, x3, ymin, ymax;
TStates state_bez;
ras.arc = ras.arcs;
ras.arc[2].x = ras.lastX;
ras.arc[2].y = ras.lastY;
ras.arc[1].x = cx;
ras.arc[1].y = cy;
ras.arc[0].x = x;
ras.arc[0].y = y;
do
{
y1 = ras.arc[2].y;
y2 = ras.arc[1].y;
y3 = ras.arc[0].y;
x3 = ras.arc[0].x;
/* first, categorize the Bezier arc */
if ( y1 <= y3 )
{
ymin = y1;
ymax = y3;
}
else
{
ymin = y3;
ymax = y1;
}
if ( y2 < ymin || y2 > ymax )
{
/* this arc has no given direction, split it! */
Split_Conic( ras.arc );
ras.arc += 2;
}
else if ( y1 == y3 )
{
/* this arc is flat, ignore it and pop it from the Bezier stack */
ras.arc -= 2;
}
else
{
/* the arc is y-monotonous, either ascending or descending */
/* detect a change of direction */
state_bez = y1 < y3 ? Ascending_State : Descending_State;
if ( ras.state != state_bez )
{
Bool o = state_bez == Ascending_State ? IS_BOTTOM_OVERSHOOT( y1 )
: IS_TOP_OVERSHOOT( y1 );
/* finalize current profile if any */
if ( ras.state != Unknown_State &&
End_Profile( RAS_VARS o ) )
goto Fail;
/* create a new profile */
if ( New_Profile( RAS_VARS state_bez, o ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* now call the appropriate routine */
if ( state_bez == Ascending_State )
{
if ( Bezier_Up( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
else
if ( Bezier_Down( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
} while ( ras.arc >= ras.arcs );
ras.lastX = x3;
ras.lastY = y3;
return SUCCESS;
Fail:
return FAILURE;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8374/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
static int wait_snapshoting_atomic_t(atomic_t *a)
{
schedule();
return 0;
}
|
static int wait_snapshoting_atomic_t(atomic_t *a)
{
schedule();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool WebPluginImpl::acceptsInputEvents() {
return accepts_input_events_;
}
|
bool WebPluginImpl::acceptsInputEvents() {
return accepts_input_events_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void copy_rtnl_link_stats64(void *v, const struct rtnl_link_stats64 *b)
{
memcpy(v, b, sizeof(*b));
}
|
static void copy_rtnl_link_stats64(void *v, const struct rtnl_link_stats64 *b)
{
memcpy(v, b, sizeof(*b));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13136/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*images,
*next,
*pyramid_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
resolution;
size_t
columns,
rows;
/*
Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
(void) SetImageProperty(clone_image,"tiff:subfiletype","none",exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image);
columns=next->columns;
rows=next->rows;
resolution=next->resolution;
while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64))
{
columns/=2;
rows/=2;
resolution.x/=2;
resolution.y/=2;
pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,exception);
if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
DestroyBlob(pyramid_image);
pyramid_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(next->blob);
pyramid_image->resolution=resolution;
(void) SetImageProperty(pyramid_image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image);
}
}
status=MagickFalse;
if (images != (Image *) NULL)
{
/*
Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=GetFirstImageInList(images);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue;
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(images->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,images,exception);
images=DestroyImageList(images);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
}
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*images,
*next,
*pyramid_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
resolution;
size_t
columns,
rows;
/*
Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
(void) SetImageProperty(clone_image,"tiff:subfiletype","none",exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image);
columns=next->columns;
rows=next->rows;
resolution=next->resolution;
while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64))
{
columns/=2;
rows/=2;
resolution.x/=2;
resolution.y/=2;
pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,exception);
if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
DestroyBlob(pyramid_image);
pyramid_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(next->blob);
pyramid_image->resolution=resolution;
(void) SetImageProperty(pyramid_image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image);
}
}
status=MagickFalse;
if (images != (Image *) NULL)
{
/*
Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=GetFirstImageInList(images);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue;
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(images->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,images,exception);
images=DestroyImageList(images);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
}
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8087/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
0ddcff49b672239dda94d70d0fcf50317a9f4b51
|
mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
|
static int hwsim_cloned_frame_received_nl(struct sk_buff *skb_2,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data2;
struct ieee80211_rx_status rx_status;
const u8 *dst;
int frame_data_len;
void *frame_data;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
if (!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_RECEIVER] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RX_RATE] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL])
goto out;
dst = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_RECEIVER]);
frame_data_len = nla_len(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
frame_data = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
/* Allocate new skb here */
skb = alloc_skb(frame_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
if (frame_data_len > IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN)
goto err;
/* Copy the data */
skb_put_data(skb, frame_data, frame_data_len);
data2 = get_hwsim_data_ref_from_addr(dst);
if (!data2)
goto out;
if (hwsim_net_get_netgroup(genl_info_net(info)) != data2->netgroup)
goto out;
if (info->snd_portid != data2->wmediumd)
goto out;
/* check if radio is configured properly */
if (data2->idle || !data2->started)
goto out;
/* A frame is received from user space */
memset(&rx_status, 0, sizeof(rx_status));
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FREQ]) {
/* throw away off-channel packets, but allow both the temporary
* ("hw" scan/remain-on-channel) and regular channel, since the
* internal datapath also allows this
*/
mutex_lock(&data2->mutex);
rx_status.freq = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FREQ]);
if (rx_status.freq != data2->channel->center_freq &&
(!data2->tmp_chan ||
rx_status.freq != data2->tmp_chan->center_freq)) {
mutex_unlock(&data2->mutex);
goto out;
}
mutex_unlock(&data2->mutex);
} else {
rx_status.freq = data2->channel->center_freq;
}
rx_status.band = data2->channel->band;
rx_status.rate_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RX_RATE]);
rx_status.signal = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL]);
memcpy(IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), &rx_status, sizeof(rx_status));
data2->rx_pkts++;
data2->rx_bytes += skb->len;
ieee80211_rx_irqsafe(data2->hw, skb);
return 0;
err:
pr_debug("mac80211_hwsim: error occurred in %s\n", __func__);
out:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int hwsim_cloned_frame_received_nl(struct sk_buff *skb_2,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data2;
struct ieee80211_rx_status rx_status;
const u8 *dst;
int frame_data_len;
void *frame_data;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
if (!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_RECEIVER] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RX_RATE] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL])
goto out;
dst = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_RECEIVER]);
frame_data_len = nla_len(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
frame_data = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
/* Allocate new skb here */
skb = alloc_skb(frame_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
if (frame_data_len > IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN)
goto err;
/* Copy the data */
skb_put_data(skb, frame_data, frame_data_len);
data2 = get_hwsim_data_ref_from_addr(dst);
if (!data2)
goto out;
if (hwsim_net_get_netgroup(genl_info_net(info)) != data2->netgroup)
goto out;
if (info->snd_portid != data2->wmediumd)
goto out;
/* check if radio is configured properly */
if (data2->idle || !data2->started)
goto out;
/* A frame is received from user space */
memset(&rx_status, 0, sizeof(rx_status));
if (info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FREQ]) {
/* throw away off-channel packets, but allow both the temporary
* ("hw" scan/remain-on-channel) and regular channel, since the
* internal datapath also allows this
*/
mutex_lock(&data2->mutex);
rx_status.freq = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FREQ]);
if (rx_status.freq != data2->channel->center_freq &&
(!data2->tmp_chan ||
rx_status.freq != data2->tmp_chan->center_freq)) {
mutex_unlock(&data2->mutex);
goto out;
}
mutex_unlock(&data2->mutex);
} else {
rx_status.freq = data2->channel->center_freq;
}
rx_status.band = data2->channel->band;
rx_status.rate_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RX_RATE]);
rx_status.signal = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL]);
memcpy(IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), &rx_status, sizeof(rx_status));
data2->rx_pkts++;
data2->rx_bytes += skb->len;
ieee80211_rx_irqsafe(data2->hw, skb);
return 0;
err:
pr_debug("mac80211_hwsim: error occurred in %s\n", __func__);
out:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual ~MockIpcDelegate() {}
|
virtual ~MockIpcDelegate() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
[email protected]
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
WmWindow* PaletteTray::GetWindow() {
return shelf()->GetWindow();
}
|
WmWindow* PaletteTray::GetWindow() {
return shelf()->GetWindow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/net/wifi/+/a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
|
static jobject android_net_wifi_get_driver_version(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
int buffer_length = 256;
char *buffer = (char *)malloc(buffer_length);
if (!buffer) return NULL;
memset(buffer, 0, buffer_length);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_get_driver_version = %p", handle);
if (handle == 0) {
return NULL;
}
wifi_error result = hal_fn.wifi_get_driver_version(handle, buffer, buffer_length);
if (result == WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGD("buffer is %p, length is %d", buffer, buffer_length);
JNIObject<jstring> driver_version = helper.newStringUTF(buffer);
free(buffer);
return driver_version.detach();
} else {
ALOGD("Fail to get driver version");
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
}
|
static jobject android_net_wifi_get_driver_version(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
int buffer_length = 256;
char *buffer = (char *)malloc(buffer_length);
if (!buffer) return NULL;
memset(buffer, 0, buffer_length);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_get_driver_version = %p", handle);
if (handle == 0) {
return NULL;
}
wifi_error result = hal_fn.wifi_get_driver_version(handle, buffer, buffer_length);
if (result == WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGD("buffer is %p, length is %d", buffer, buffer_length);
JNIObject<jstring> driver_version = helper.newStringUTF(buffer);
free(buffer);
return driver_version.detach();
} else {
ALOGD("Fail to get driver version");
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/77b498aa18e610ed8ac3863ae048573d4f943b16
|
77b498aa18e610ed8ac3863ae048573d4f943b16
|
Add CHECKs for file descriptors used in select() by InotifyReaderTask
Since these are used in an fd_set, there's the possibility that invalid file descriptors cause stack overflow/corruption.
BUG=chromium:105162
TEST=No functional changes, compiles and passes tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8681006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@111369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool InotifyReader::RemoveWatch(Watch watch,
FilePathWatcherImpl* watcher) {
if (!valid_)
return false;
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
watchers_[watch].erase(watcher);
if (watchers_[watch].empty()) {
watchers_.erase(watch);
return (inotify_rm_watch(inotify_fd_, watch) == 0);
}
return true;
}
|
bool InotifyReader::RemoveWatch(Watch watch,
FilePathWatcherImpl* watcher) {
if (!valid_)
return false;
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
watchers_[watch].erase(watcher);
if (watchers_[watch].empty()) {
watchers_.erase(watch);
return (inotify_rm_watch(inotify_fd_, watch) == 0);
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
bool ShouldUseCustomizedDefaultWallpaper() {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
return !(pref_service->FindPreference(
prefs::kCustomizationDefaultWallpaperURL)->IsDefaultValue());
}
|
bool ShouldUseCustomizedDefaultWallpaper() {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
return !(pref_service->FindPreference(
prefs::kCustomizationDefaultWallpaperURL)->IsDefaultValue());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5847
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5847/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/GStreamer/gst-plugins-ugly/commit/d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
|
gst_asf_demux_push_obj (GstASFDemux * demux, guint32 obj_id)
{
const gchar *nick;
nick = gst_asf_get_guid_nick (asf_object_guids, obj_id);
if (g_str_has_prefix (nick, "ASF_OBJ_"))
nick += strlen ("ASF_OBJ_");
if (demux->objpath == NULL) {
demux->objpath = g_strdup (nick);
} else {
gchar *newpath;
newpath = g_strdup_printf ("%s/%s", demux->objpath, nick);
g_free (demux->objpath);
demux->objpath = newpath;
}
return (const gchar *) demux->objpath;
}
|
gst_asf_demux_push_obj (GstASFDemux * demux, guint32 obj_id)
{
const gchar *nick;
nick = gst_asf_get_guid_nick (asf_object_guids, obj_id);
if (g_str_has_prefix (nick, "ASF_OBJ_"))
nick += strlen ("ASF_OBJ_");
if (demux->objpath == NULL) {
demux->objpath = g_strdup (nick);
} else {
gchar *newpath;
newpath = g_strdup_printf ("%s/%s", demux->objpath, nick);
g_free (demux->objpath);
demux->objpath = newpath;
}
return (const gchar *) demux->objpath;
}
|
C
|
gst-plugins-ugly
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8382
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8382/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834
|
c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834
| null |
PHPAPI pcre* pcre_get_compiled_regex(char *regex, pcre_extra **extra, int *preg_options TSRMLS_DC)
{
pcre_cache_entry * pce = pcre_get_compiled_regex_cache(regex, strlen(regex) TSRMLS_CC);
if (extra) {
*extra = pce ? pce->extra : NULL;
}
if (preg_options) {
*preg_options = pce ? pce->preg_options : 0;
}
return pce ? pce->re : NULL;
}
|
PHPAPI pcre* pcre_get_compiled_regex(char *regex, pcre_extra **extra, int *preg_options TSRMLS_DC)
{
pcre_cache_entry * pce = pcre_get_compiled_regex_cache(regex, strlen(regex) TSRMLS_CC);
if (extra) {
*extra = pce ? pce->extra : NULL;
}
if (preg_options) {
*preg_options = pce ? pce->preg_options : 0;
}
return pce ? pce->re : NULL;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2877
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2877/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d31f450c723ba46b53c1762e51188557447d85fd
|
d31f450c723ba46b53c1762e51188557447d85fd
|
[WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool LayerTreeHost::supportsAcceleratedCompositing()
{
return true;
}
|
bool LayerTreeHost::supportsAcceleratedCompositing()
{
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6546
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6546/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a
|
3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a
|
atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr,
int *sockaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr;
struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
*sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc);
addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr;
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return 0;
}
|
static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr,
int *sockaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr;
struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
*sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc);
addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr;
addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1738
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1738/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void format_interrupt(void)
{
switch (interpret_errors()) {
case 1:
cont->error();
case 2:
break;
case 0:
cont->done(1);
}
cont->redo();
}
|
static void format_interrupt(void)
{
switch (interpret_errors()) {
case 1:
cont->error();
case 2:
break;
case 0:
cont->done(1);
}
cont->redo();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0826/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
|
void CameraService::BasicClient::opChanged(int32_t op, const String16& packageName) {
String8 name(packageName);
String8 myName(mClientPackageName);
if (op != AppOpsManager::OP_CAMERA) {
ALOGW("Unexpected app ops notification received: %d", op);
return;
}
int32_t res;
res = mAppOpsManager.checkOp(AppOpsManager::OP_CAMERA,
mClientUid, mClientPackageName);
ALOGV("checkOp returns: %d, %s ", res,
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_ALLOWED ? "ALLOWED" :
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_IGNORED ? "IGNORED" :
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_ERRORED ? "ERRORED" :
"UNKNOWN");
if (res != AppOpsManager::MODE_ALLOWED) {
ALOGI("Camera %d: Access for \"%s\" revoked", mCameraId,
myName.string());
mClientPid = getCallingPid();
notifyError();
disconnect();
}
}
|
void CameraService::BasicClient::opChanged(int32_t op, const String16& packageName) {
String8 name(packageName);
String8 myName(mClientPackageName);
if (op != AppOpsManager::OP_CAMERA) {
ALOGW("Unexpected app ops notification received: %d", op);
return;
}
int32_t res;
res = mAppOpsManager.checkOp(AppOpsManager::OP_CAMERA,
mClientUid, mClientPackageName);
ALOGV("checkOp returns: %d, %s ", res,
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_ALLOWED ? "ALLOWED" :
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_IGNORED ? "IGNORED" :
res == AppOpsManager::MODE_ERRORED ? "ERRORED" :
"UNKNOWN");
if (res != AppOpsManager::MODE_ALLOWED) {
ALOGI("Camera %d: Access for \"%s\" revoked", mCameraId,
myName.string());
mClientPid = getCallingPid();
notifyError();
disconnect();
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3538/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320
|
4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320
|
* Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
|
parse_apple(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line)
{
struct magic *m = &me->mp[0];
return parse_extra(ms, me, line, offsetof(struct magic, apple),
sizeof(m->apple), "APPLE", 0);
}
|
parse_apple(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line)
{
struct magic *m = &me->mp[0];
return parse_extra(ms, me, line, offsetof(struct magic, apple),
sizeof(m->apple), "APPLE", 0);
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
void CL_StartDemoLoop( void ) {
Cbuf_AddText ("d1\n");
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
}
|
void CL_StartDemoLoop( void ) {
Cbuf_AddText ("d1\n");
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4486
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4486/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
|
5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
|
net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int rtnl_phys_port_name_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
int err;
err = dev_get_phys_port_name(dev, name, sizeof(name));
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_PHYS_PORT_NAME, strlen(name), name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
|
static int rtnl_phys_port_name_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
int err;
err = dev_get_phys_port_name(dev, name, sizeof(name));
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_PHYS_PORT_NAME, strlen(name), name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2140/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109
|
604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109
|
xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
|
static struct pending_req *alloc_req(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
struct pending_req *req = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&blkif->pending_free)) {
req = list_entry(blkif->pending_free.next, struct pending_req,
free_list);
list_del(&req->free_list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
return req;
}
|
static struct pending_req *alloc_req(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
struct pending_req *req = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&blkif->pending_free)) {
req = list_entry(blkif->pending_free.next, struct pending_req,
free_list);
list_del(&req->free_list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
return req;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16068/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/66e24a8793615bd9d5c238b1745b093090e1f72d
|
66e24a8793615bd9d5c238b1745b093090e1f72d
|
[mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
|
MojoResult DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::AddWatcherRef(
const scoped_refptr<WatcherDispatcher>& watcher,
uintptr_t context) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (is_closed_ || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return watchers_.Add(watcher, context, GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
}
|
MojoResult DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::AddWatcherRef(
const scoped_refptr<WatcherDispatcher>& watcher,
uintptr_t context) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (is_closed_ || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return watchers_.Add(watcher, context, GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5129
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5129/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/783c28d59c4c748ef9b787d4717882c90c5b227b
|
783c28d59c4c748ef9b787d4717882c90c5b227b
|
Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
|
void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
WrapRefPtr(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
WrapRefPtr(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
|
void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RenderViewHost* RenderViewHost::FromID(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!process)
return NULL;
RenderWidgetHost* widget = process->GetRenderWidgetHostByID(render_view_id);
if (!widget || !widget->IsRenderView())
return NULL;
return static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget));
}
|
RenderViewHost* RenderViewHost::FromID(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!process)
return NULL;
RenderWidgetHost* widget = process->GetRenderWidgetHostByID(render_view_id);
if (!widget || !widget->IsRenderView())
return NULL;
return static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10210
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10210/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/3119b232c9c453c98d8fa8b6ae4e37ba18117cd4
|
3119b232c9c453c98d8fa8b6ae4e37ba18117cd4
|
re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
|
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
yr_initialize();
test_boolean_operators();
test_comparison_operators();
test_arithmetic_operators();
test_bitwise_operators();
test_syntax();
test_anonymous_strings();
test_strings();
test_wildcard_strings();
test_hex_strings();
test_count();
test_at();
test_in();
test_offset();
test_length();
test_of();
test_for();
test_re();
test_filesize();
test_comments();
test_modules();
test_integer_functions();
test_entrypoint();
test_global_rules();
#if defined(HASH_MODULE)
test_hash_module();
#endif
test_file_descriptor();
yr_finalize();
return 0;
}
|
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
yr_initialize();
test_boolean_operators();
test_comparison_operators();
test_arithmetic_operators();
test_bitwise_operators();
test_syntax();
test_anonymous_strings();
test_strings();
test_wildcard_strings();
test_hex_strings();
test_count();
test_at();
test_in();
test_offset();
test_length();
test_of();
test_for();
test_re();
test_filesize();
test_comments();
test_modules();
test_integer_functions();
test_entrypoint();
test_global_rules();
#if defined(HASH_MODULE)
test_hash_module();
#endif
test_file_descriptor();
yr_finalize();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8897/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9
|
x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static inline void idt_init_desc(gate_desc *gate, const struct idt_data *d)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) d->addr;
gate->offset_low = (u16) addr;
gate->segment = (u16) d->segment;
gate->bits = d->bits;
gate->offset_middle = (u16) (addr >> 16);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
gate->offset_high = (u32) (addr >> 32);
gate->reserved = 0;
#endif
}
|
static inline void idt_init_desc(gate_desc *gate, const struct idt_data *d)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) d->addr;
gate->offset_low = (u16) addr;
gate->segment = (u16) d->segment;
gate->bits = d->bits;
gate->offset_middle = (u16) (addr >> 16);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
gate->offset_high = (u32) (addr >> 32);
gate->reserved = 0;
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1547/
|
CWE-311
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=21c856b75d81eff61aa63b4f036bb64a85bf6d46
|
21c856b75d81eff61aa63b4f036bb64a85bf6d46
| null |
void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group)
return;
if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_finish(group);
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
BN_clear_free(&group->order);
BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor);
if (group->seed) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(group->seed, group->seed_len);
OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof(*group));
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
|
void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group)
return;
if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_finish(group);
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
BN_clear_free(&group->order);
BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor);
if (group->seed) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(group->seed, group->seed_len);
OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof(*group));
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4623/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
|
static void ssl_mac_sha1( unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
unsigned char *ctr, int type )
{
unsigned char header[11];
unsigned char padding[40];
sha1_context sha1;
memcpy( header, ctr, 8 );
header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type;
header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
header[10] = (unsigned char)( len );
memset( padding, 0x36, 40 );
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, secret, 20 );
sha1_update( &sha1, padding, 40 );
sha1_update( &sha1, header, 11 );
sha1_update( &sha1, buf, len );
sha1_finish( &sha1, buf + len );
memset( padding, 0x5C, 40 );
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, secret, 20 );
sha1_update( &sha1, padding, 40 );
sha1_update( &sha1, buf + len, 20 );
sha1_finish( &sha1, buf + len );
}
|
static void ssl_mac_sha1( unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
unsigned char *ctr, int type )
{
unsigned char header[11];
unsigned char padding[40];
sha1_context sha1;
memcpy( header, ctr, 8 );
header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type;
header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
header[10] = (unsigned char)( len );
memset( padding, 0x36, 40 );
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, secret, 20 );
sha1_update( &sha1, padding, 40 );
sha1_update( &sha1, header, 11 );
sha1_update( &sha1, buf, len );
sha1_finish( &sha1, buf + len );
memset( padding, 0x5C, 40 );
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, secret, 20 );
sha1_update( &sha1, padding, 40 );
sha1_update( &sha1, buf + len, 20 );
sha1_finish( &sha1, buf + len );
}
|
C
|
polarssl
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static void StopAltErrorPageFetcher(WebDataSource* data_source) {
if (data_source) {
NavigationState* state = NavigationState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (state)
state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(NULL);
}
}
|
static void StopAltErrorPageFetcher(WebDataSource* data_source) {
if (data_source) {
NavigationState* state = NavigationState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (state)
state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(NULL);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4565/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664
|
8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664
|
net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline u32 max_delay(const struct illinois *ca)
{
return ca->max_rtt - ca->base_rtt;
}
|
static inline u32 max_delay(const struct illinois *ca)
{
return ca->max_rtt - ca->base_rtt;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9919
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9919/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79dc7e3f1cd323be4c81aa1a94faa1b3ed987fb2
|
79dc7e3f1cd323be4c81aa1a94faa1b3ed987fb2
|
net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct ctl_table * __net_init ipv6_icmp_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = kmemdup(ipv6_icmp_table_template,
sizeof(ipv6_icmp_table_template),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (table)
table[0].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time;
return table;
}
|
struct ctl_table * __net_init ipv6_icmp_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = kmemdup(ipv6_icmp_table_template,
sizeof(ipv6_icmp_table_template),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (table)
table[0].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time;
return table;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7097/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
|
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
|
int orangefs_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error = 0;
ClearModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
error = posix_acl_create(dir, &mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
if (default_acl) {
error = orangefs_set_acl(inode, default_acl, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
if (!error)
error = orangefs_set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
/* If mode of the inode was changed, then do a forcible ->setattr */
if (mode != inode->i_mode) {
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
orangefs_flush_inode(inode);
}
return error;
}
|
int orangefs_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error = 0;
ClearModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
error = posix_acl_create(dir, &mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
if (default_acl) {
error = orangefs_set_acl(inode, default_acl, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
if (!error)
error = orangefs_set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
/* If mode of the inode was changed, then do a forcible ->setattr */
if (mode != inode->i_mode) {
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
orangefs_flush_inode(inode);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11596
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11596/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89
|
fix jsvGetString regression
|
void jsvArrayPushAll(JsVar *target, JsVar *source, bool checkDuplicates) {
assert(jsvIsArray(target));
assert(jsvIsArray(source));
JsvObjectIterator it;
jsvObjectIteratorNew(&it, source);
while (jsvObjectIteratorHasValue(&it)) {
JsVar *v = jsvObjectIteratorGetValue(&it);
bool add = true;
if (checkDuplicates) {
JsVar *idx = jsvGetIndexOf(target, v, false);
if (idx) {
add = false;
jsvUnLock(idx);
}
}
if (add) jsvArrayPush(target, v);
jsvUnLock(v);
jsvObjectIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvObjectIteratorFree(&it);
}
|
void jsvArrayPushAll(JsVar *target, JsVar *source, bool checkDuplicates) {
assert(jsvIsArray(target));
assert(jsvIsArray(source));
JsvObjectIterator it;
jsvObjectIteratorNew(&it, source);
while (jsvObjectIteratorHasValue(&it)) {
JsVar *v = jsvObjectIteratorGetValue(&it);
bool add = true;
if (checkDuplicates) {
JsVar *idx = jsvGetIndexOf(target, v, false);
if (idx) {
add = false;
jsvUnLock(idx);
}
}
if (add) jsvArrayPush(target, v);
jsvUnLock(v);
jsvObjectIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvObjectIteratorFree(&it);
}
|
C
|
Espruino
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
void AutofillDialogViews::OverlayView::OnNativeThemeChanged(
const ui::NativeTheme* theme) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(
theme->GetSystemColor(ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_DialogBackground)));
}
|
void AutofillDialogViews::OverlayView::OnNativeThemeChanged(
const ui::NativeTheme* theme) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(
theme->GetSystemColor(ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_DialogBackground)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1679
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1679/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
|
base::Value* reference_value() const { return reference_value_.get(); }
|
base::Value* reference_value() const { return reference_value_.get(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6271/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/BelledonneCommunications/bzrtp/commit/bbb1e6e2f467ee4bd7b9a8c800e4f07343d7d99b
|
bbb1e6e2f467ee4bd7b9a8c800e4f07343d7d99b
|
Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
|
uint8_t *messageTypeInttoString(uint32_t messageType) {
switch(messageType) {
case MSGTYPE_HELLO :
return (uint8_t *)"Hello ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_HELLOACK :
return (uint8_t *)"HelloACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_COMMIT :
return (uint8_t *)"Commit ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_DHPART1 :
return (uint8_t *)"DHPart1 ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_DHPART2 :
return (uint8_t *)"DHPart2 ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1 :
return (uint8_t *)"Confirm1";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2 :
return (uint8_t *)"Confirm2";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK :
return (uint8_t *)"Conf2ACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_ERROR :
return (uint8_t *)"Error ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_ERRORACK :
return (uint8_t *)"ErrorACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_GOCLEAR :
return (uint8_t *)"GoClear ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CLEARACK :
return (uint8_t *)"ClearACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_SASRELAY :
return (uint8_t *)"SASrelay";
break;
case MSGTYPE_RELAYACK :
return (uint8_t *)"RelayACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_PING :
return (uint8_t *)"Ping ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_PINGACK :
return (uint8_t *)"PingACK ";
break;
}
return NULL;
}
|
uint8_t *messageTypeInttoString(uint32_t messageType) {
switch(messageType) {
case MSGTYPE_HELLO :
return (uint8_t *)"Hello ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_HELLOACK :
return (uint8_t *)"HelloACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_COMMIT :
return (uint8_t *)"Commit ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_DHPART1 :
return (uint8_t *)"DHPart1 ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_DHPART2 :
return (uint8_t *)"DHPart2 ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1 :
return (uint8_t *)"Confirm1";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2 :
return (uint8_t *)"Confirm2";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK :
return (uint8_t *)"Conf2ACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_ERROR :
return (uint8_t *)"Error ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_ERRORACK :
return (uint8_t *)"ErrorACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_GOCLEAR :
return (uint8_t *)"GoClear ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_CLEARACK :
return (uint8_t *)"ClearACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_SASRELAY :
return (uint8_t *)"SASrelay";
break;
case MSGTYPE_RELAYACK :
return (uint8_t *)"RelayACK";
break;
case MSGTYPE_PING :
return (uint8_t *)"Ping ";
break;
case MSGTYPE_PINGACK :
return (uint8_t *)"PingACK ";
break;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
bzrtp
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8963/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
/*
* There's a time window between 'ctx->is_active' check
* in perf_event_enable function and this place having:
* - IRQs on
* - ctx->lock unlocked
*
* where the task could be killed and 'ctx' deactivated
* by perf_event_exit_task.
*/
if (!ctx->is_active)
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event) {
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
}
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
|
static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
/*
* There's a time window between 'ctx->is_active' check
* in perf_event_enable function and this place having:
* - IRQs on
* - ctx->lock unlocked
*
* where the task could be killed and 'ctx' deactivated
* by perf_event_exit_task.
*/
if (!ctx->is_active)
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event) {
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
}
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void d_drop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
__d_drop(dentry);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
|
void d_drop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
__d_drop(dentry);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11811
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11811/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
|
401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
|
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned char intf_mem_inl(const struct si_sm_io *io,
unsigned int offset)
{
return (readl((io->addr)+(offset * io->regspacing)) >> io->regshift)
& 0xff;
}
|
static unsigned char intf_mem_inl(const struct si_sm_io *io,
unsigned int offset)
{
return (readl((io->addr)+(offset * io->regspacing)) >> io->regshift)
& 0xff;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
bool SharedMemoryHandleProvider::InitForSize(size_t size) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK_EQ(map_ref_count_, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(!shared_memory_);
shared_memory_.emplace();
if (shared_memory_->CreateAnonymous(size)) {
mapped_size_ = size;
read_only_flag_ = false;
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool SharedMemoryHandleProvider::InitForSize(size_t size) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK_EQ(map_ref_count_, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(!shared_memory_);
shared_memory_.emplace();
if (shared_memory_->CreateAnonymous(size)) {
mapped_size_ = size;
read_only_flag_ = false;
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9644/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560
|
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int crypto_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = &pctx->abreq;
struct scatterlist *dst;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
u8 *authtag = pctx->auth_tag;
u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
u8 *iv = req->iv;
int err;
if (cryptlen < authsize)
return -EINVAL;
cryptlen -= authsize;
err = crypto_ccm_check_iv(iv);
if (err)
return err;
pctx->flags = aead_request_flags(req);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(authtag, req->src, cryptlen, authsize, 0);
memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
sg_init_table(pctx->src, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->src, authtag, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->src, 2, req->src);
dst = pctx->src;
if (req->src != req->dst) {
sg_init_table(pctx->dst, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->dst, authtag, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->dst, 2, req->dst);
dst = pctx->dst;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->ctr);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, pctx->flags,
crypto_ccm_decrypt_done, req);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
err = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(abreq);
if (err)
return err;
err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, req->dst, cryptlen);
if (err)
return err;
/* verify */
if (crypto_memneq(authtag, odata, authsize))
return -EBADMSG;
return err;
}
|
static int crypto_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = &pctx->abreq;
struct scatterlist *dst;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
u8 *authtag = pctx->auth_tag;
u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
u8 *iv = req->iv;
int err;
if (cryptlen < authsize)
return -EINVAL;
cryptlen -= authsize;
err = crypto_ccm_check_iv(iv);
if (err)
return err;
pctx->flags = aead_request_flags(req);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(authtag, req->src, cryptlen, authsize, 0);
memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
sg_init_table(pctx->src, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->src, authtag, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->src, 2, req->src);
dst = pctx->src;
if (req->src != req->dst) {
sg_init_table(pctx->dst, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->dst, authtag, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->dst, 2, req->dst);
dst = pctx->dst;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->ctr);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, pctx->flags,
crypto_ccm_decrypt_done, req);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
err = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(abreq);
if (err)
return err;
err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, req->dst, cryptlen);
if (err)
return err;
/* verify */
if (crypto_memneq(authtag, odata, authsize))
return -EBADMSG;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6942/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
|
29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
| null |
Ins_FDEF( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_ULong n;
TT_DefRecord* rec;
TT_DefRecord* limit;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
/* arguments to opcodes are skipped by `SKIP_Code' */
FT_Byte opcode_pattern[9][12] = {
/* #0 inline delta function 1 */
{
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x53, /* GTEQ */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x51, /* LTEQ */
0x5A, /* AND */
0x58, /* IF */
0x38, /* SHPIX */
0x1B, /* ELSE */
0x21, /* POP */
0x21, /* POP */
0x59 /* EIF */
},
/* #1 inline delta function 2 */
{
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x54, /* EQ */
0x58, /* IF */
0x38, /* SHPIX */
0x1B, /* ELSE */
0x21, /* POP */
0x21, /* POP */
0x59 /* EIF */
},
/* #2 diagonal stroke function */
{
0x20, /* DUP */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 1 */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x46, /* GC_cur */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 64 */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x42 /* WS */
},
/* #3 VacuFormRound function */
{
0x45, /* RCVT */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x46, /* GC_cur */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0 /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 38 */
},
/* #4 TTFautohint bytecode (old) */
{
0x20, /* DUP */
0x64, /* ABS */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 32 */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x66, /* FLOOR */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0xB0 /* PUSHB_1 */
},
/* #5 spacing function 1 */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 24 */
0x43, /* RS */
0x58 /* IF */
},
/* #6 spacing function 2 */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0x18, /* RTG */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 24 */
0x43, /* RS */
0x58 /* IF */
},
/* #7 TypeMan Talk DiagEndCtrl function */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 3 */
0x25, /* CINDEX */
},
/* #8 TypeMan Talk Align */
{
0x06, /* SPVTL */
0x7D, /* RDTG */
},
};
FT_UShort opcode_patterns = 9;
FT_UShort opcode_pointer[9] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
FT_UShort opcode_size[9] = { 12, 8, 8, 6, 7, 4, 5, 4, 2 };
FT_UShort i;
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
/* FDEF is only allowed in `prep' or `fpgm' */
if ( exc->curRange == tt_coderange_glyph )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( DEF_In_Glyf_Bytecode );
return;
}
/* some font programs are broken enough to redefine functions! */
/* We will then parse the current table. */
rec = exc->FDefs;
limit = rec + exc->numFDefs;
n = (FT_ULong)args[0];
for ( ; rec < limit; rec++ )
{
if ( rec->opc == n )
break;
}
if ( rec == limit )
{
/* check that there is enough room for new functions */
if ( exc->numFDefs >= exc->maxFDefs )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Too_Many_Function_Defs );
return;
}
exc->numFDefs++;
}
/* Although FDEF takes unsigned 32-bit integer, */
/* func # must be within unsigned 16-bit integer */
if ( n > 0xFFFFU )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Too_Many_Function_Defs );
return;
}
rec->range = exc->curRange;
rec->opc = (FT_UInt16)n;
rec->start = exc->IP + 1;
rec->active = TRUE;
rec->inline_delta = FALSE;
rec->sph_fdef_flags = 0x0000;
if ( n > exc->maxFunc )
exc->maxFunc = (FT_UInt16)n;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
/* We don't know for sure these are typeman functions, */
/* however they are only active when RS 22 is called */
if ( n >= 64 && n <= 66 )
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_STROKES;
#endif
/* Now skip the whole function definition. */
/* We don't allow nested IDEFS & FDEFs. */
while ( SkipCode( exc ) == SUCCESS )
{
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY )
{
for ( i = 0; i < opcode_patterns; i++ )
{
if ( opcode_pointer[i] < opcode_size[i] &&
exc->opcode == opcode_pattern[i][opcode_pointer[i]] )
{
opcode_pointer[i] += 1;
if ( opcode_pointer[i] == opcode_size[i] )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "sph: Function %d, opcode ptrn: %d, %s %s\n",
i, n,
exc->face->root.family_name,
exc->face->root.style_name ));
switch ( i )
{
case 0:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1;
break;
case 1:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2;
break;
case 2:
switch ( n )
{
/* needs to be implemented still */
case 58:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_DIAGONAL_STROKE;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_DIAGONAL_STROKE;
}
break;
case 3:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_VACUFORM_ROUND_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_VACUFORM_ROUND_1;
}
break;
case 4:
/* probably not necessary to detect anymore */
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TTFAUTOHINT_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TTFAUTOHINT_1;
break;
case 5:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 7:
case 8:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_1;
}
break;
case 6:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 7:
case 8:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_2;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_2;
}
break;
case 7:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
break;
case 8:
#if 0
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
#endif
break;
}
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
}
else
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
/* Set sph_compatibility_mode only when deltas are detected */
exc->face->sph_compatibility_mode =
( ( exc->face->sph_found_func_flags & SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1 ) |
( exc->face->sph_found_func_flags & SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2 ) );
}
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
switch ( exc->opcode )
{
case 0x89: /* IDEF */
case 0x2C: /* FDEF */
exc->error = FT_THROW( Nested_DEFS );
return;
case 0x2D: /* ENDF */
rec->end = exc->IP;
return;
}
}
}
|
Ins_FDEF( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_ULong n;
TT_DefRecord* rec;
TT_DefRecord* limit;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
/* arguments to opcodes are skipped by `SKIP_Code' */
FT_Byte opcode_pattern[9][12] = {
/* #0 inline delta function 1 */
{
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x53, /* GTEQ */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x51, /* LTEQ */
0x5A, /* AND */
0x58, /* IF */
0x38, /* SHPIX */
0x1B, /* ELSE */
0x21, /* POP */
0x21, /* POP */
0x59 /* EIF */
},
/* #1 inline delta function 2 */
{
0x4B, /* PPEM */
0x54, /* EQ */
0x58, /* IF */
0x38, /* SHPIX */
0x1B, /* ELSE */
0x21, /* POP */
0x21, /* POP */
0x59 /* EIF */
},
/* #2 diagonal stroke function */
{
0x20, /* DUP */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 1 */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x46, /* GC_cur */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 64 */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x42 /* WS */
},
/* #3 VacuFormRound function */
{
0x45, /* RCVT */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0x46, /* GC_cur */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0 /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 38 */
},
/* #4 TTFautohint bytecode (old) */
{
0x20, /* DUP */
0x64, /* ABS */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 32 */
0x60, /* ADD */
0x66, /* FLOOR */
0x23, /* SWAP */
0xB0 /* PUSHB_1 */
},
/* #5 spacing function 1 */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 24 */
0x43, /* RS */
0x58 /* IF */
},
/* #6 spacing function 2 */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0x18, /* RTG */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 24 */
0x43, /* RS */
0x58 /* IF */
},
/* #7 TypeMan Talk DiagEndCtrl function */
{
0x01, /* SVTCA_x */
0x20, /* DUP */
0xB0, /* PUSHB_1 */
/* 3 */
0x25, /* CINDEX */
},
/* #8 TypeMan Talk Align */
{
0x06, /* SPVTL */
0x7D, /* RDTG */
},
};
FT_UShort opcode_patterns = 9;
FT_UShort opcode_pointer[9] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
FT_UShort opcode_size[9] = { 12, 8, 8, 6, 7, 4, 5, 4, 2 };
FT_UShort i;
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
/* FDEF is only allowed in `prep' or `fpgm' */
if ( exc->curRange == tt_coderange_glyph )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( DEF_In_Glyf_Bytecode );
return;
}
/* some font programs are broken enough to redefine functions! */
/* We will then parse the current table. */
rec = exc->FDefs;
limit = rec + exc->numFDefs;
n = (FT_ULong)args[0];
for ( ; rec < limit; rec++ )
{
if ( rec->opc == n )
break;
}
if ( rec == limit )
{
/* check that there is enough room for new functions */
if ( exc->numFDefs >= exc->maxFDefs )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Too_Many_Function_Defs );
return;
}
exc->numFDefs++;
}
/* Although FDEF takes unsigned 32-bit integer, */
/* func # must be within unsigned 16-bit integer */
if ( n > 0xFFFFU )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Too_Many_Function_Defs );
return;
}
rec->range = exc->curRange;
rec->opc = (FT_UInt16)n;
rec->start = exc->IP + 1;
rec->active = TRUE;
rec->inline_delta = FALSE;
rec->sph_fdef_flags = 0x0000;
if ( n > exc->maxFunc )
exc->maxFunc = (FT_UInt16)n;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
/* We don't know for sure these are typeman functions, */
/* however they are only active when RS 22 is called */
if ( n >= 64 && n <= 66 )
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_STROKES;
#endif
/* Now skip the whole function definition. */
/* We don't allow nested IDEFS & FDEFs. */
while ( SkipCode( exc ) == SUCCESS )
{
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY )
{
for ( i = 0; i < opcode_patterns; i++ )
{
if ( opcode_pointer[i] < opcode_size[i] &&
exc->opcode == opcode_pattern[i][opcode_pointer[i]] )
{
opcode_pointer[i] += 1;
if ( opcode_pointer[i] == opcode_size[i] )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "sph: Function %d, opcode ptrn: %d, %s %s\n",
i, n,
exc->face->root.family_name,
exc->face->root.style_name ));
switch ( i )
{
case 0:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1;
break;
case 1:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2;
break;
case 2:
switch ( n )
{
/* needs to be implemented still */
case 58:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_DIAGONAL_STROKE;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_DIAGONAL_STROKE;
}
break;
case 3:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_VACUFORM_ROUND_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_VACUFORM_ROUND_1;
}
break;
case 4:
/* probably not necessary to detect anymore */
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TTFAUTOHINT_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TTFAUTOHINT_1;
break;
case 5:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 7:
case 8:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_1;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_1;
}
break;
case 6:
switch ( n )
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 7:
case 8:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_2;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_SPACING_2;
}
break;
case 7:
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
break;
case 8:
#if 0
rec->sph_fdef_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
exc->face->sph_found_func_flags |= SPH_FDEF_TYPEMAN_DIAGENDCTRL;
#endif
break;
}
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
}
else
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
/* Set sph_compatibility_mode only when deltas are detected */
exc->face->sph_compatibility_mode =
( ( exc->face->sph_found_func_flags & SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_1 ) |
( exc->face->sph_found_func_flags & SPH_FDEF_INLINE_DELTA_2 ) );
}
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
switch ( exc->opcode )
{
case 0x89: /* IDEF */
case 0x2C: /* FDEF */
exc->error = FT_THROW( Nested_DEFS );
return;
case 0x2D: /* ENDF */
rec->end = exc->IP;
return;
}
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8929/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/053e67e3ec81cc9268ce30eaf0d6663d8639ed1e
|
053e67e3ec81cc9268ce30eaf0d6663d8639ed1e
|
Fix issue #658
|
int yr_execute_code(
YR_RULES* rules,
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
int timeout,
time_t start_time)
{
int64_t mem[MEM_SIZE];
int32_t sp = 0;
uint8_t* ip = rules->code_start;
YR_VALUE args[MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS];
YR_VALUE *stack;
YR_VALUE r1;
YR_VALUE r2;
YR_VALUE r3;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
YR_RULE* current_rule = NULL;
#endif
YR_RULE* rule;
YR_MATCH* match;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
YR_OBJECT** obj_ptr;
YR_ARENA* obj_arena;
char* identifier;
char* args_fmt;
int i;
int found;
int count;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int stop = FALSE;
int cycle = 0;
int tidx = context->tidx;
int stack_size;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
clock_t start = clock();
#endif
yr_get_configuration(YR_CONFIG_STACK_SIZE, (void*) &stack_size);
stack = (YR_VALUE*) yr_malloc(stack_size * sizeof(YR_VALUE));
if (stack == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
FAIL_ON_ERROR_WITH_CLEANUP(
yr_arena_create(1024, 0, &obj_arena),
yr_free(stack));
while(!stop)
{
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_NOP:
break;
case OP_HALT:
assert(sp == 0); // When HALT is reached the stack should be empty.
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_PUSH:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP:
pop(r1);
break;
case OP_CLEAR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i] = 0;
break;
case OP_ADD_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (!is_undef(r2))
mem[r1.i] += r2.i;
break;
case OP_INCR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i]++;
break;
case OP_PUSH_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
mem[r1.i] = r2.i;
break;
case OP_SWAPUNDEF:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
{
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
}
else
{
push(r2);
}
break;
case OP_JNUNDEF:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1), ip);
break;
case OP_JLE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
push(r1);
push(r2);
ip = jmp_if(r1.i <= r2.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JTRUE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1) && r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JFALSE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(is_undef(r1) || !r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1) || is_undef(r2))
r1.i = 0;
else
r1.i = r1.i && r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
push(r2);
}
else if (is_undef(r2))
{
push(r1);
}
else
{
r1.i = r1.i || r2.i;
push(r1);
}
break;
case OP_NOT:
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.i= !r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_MOD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i % r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >> r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i << r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_NOT:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = ~r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i & r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i | r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_XOR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i ^ r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_PUSH_RULE:
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = rule->t_flags[tidx] & RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INIT_RULE:
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
current_rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
#endif
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case OP_MATCH_RULE:
pop(r1);
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
if (!is_undef(r1) && r1.i)
rule->t_flags[tidx] |= RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH;
else if (RULE_IS_GLOBAL(rule))
rule->ns->t_flags[tidx] |= NAMESPACE_TFLAGS_UNSATISFIED_GLOBAL;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
start = clock();
#endif
assert(sp == 0);
break;
case OP_OBJ_LOAD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.o = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
context->objects_table,
identifier,
NULL);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_FIELD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.o = yr_object_lookup_field(r1.o, identifier);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_VALUE:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
switch(r1.o->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
r1.i = ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
if (isnan(((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.d = ((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
if (((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.p = ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INDEX_ARRAY:
pop(r1); // index
pop(r2); // array
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
r1.o = yr_object_array_get_item(r2.o, 0, (int) r1.i);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_LOOKUP_DICT:
pop(r1); // key
pop(r2); // dictionary
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY);
r1.o = yr_object_dict_get_item(
r2.o, 0, r1.ss->c_string);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CALL:
args_fmt = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
i = (int) strlen(args_fmt);
count = 0;
while (i > 0)
{
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1)) // count the number of undefined args
count++;
args[i - 1] = r1;
i--;
}
pop(r2);
ensure_defined(r2);
if (count > 0)
{
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
}
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) r2.o;
result = ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
{
if (function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt == NULL)
break;
if (strcmp(function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt, args_fmt) == 0)
{
result = function->prototypes[i].code(args, context, function);
break;
}
}
// if i == MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS at this point no matching
// prototype was found, but this shouldn't happen.
assert(i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS);
// make a copy of the returned object and push the copy into the stack
// function->return_obj can't be pushed because it can change in
// subsequent calls to the same function.
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
result = yr_object_copy(function->return_obj, &r1.o);
// a pointer to the copied object is stored in a arena in order to
// free the object before exiting yr_execute_code
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
result = yr_arena_write_data(obj_arena, &r1.o, sizeof(r1.o), NULL);
stop = (result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FOUND:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FOUND_AT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
r1.i = 0;
push(r1);
break;
}
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL)
{
if (r1.i == match->base + match->offset)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
break;
}
if (r1.i < match->base + match->offset)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_FOUND_IN:
pop(r3);
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
match = r3.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL && !r3.i)
{
if (match->base + match->offset >= r1.i &&
match->base + match->offset <= r2.i)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
}
if (match->base + match->offset > r2.i)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_COUNT:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].count;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OFFSET:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->base + match->offset;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_LENGTH:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->match_length;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_OF:
found = 0;
count = 0;
pop(r1);
while (!is_undef(r1))
{
if (r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL)
found++;
count++;
pop(r1);
}
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
r1.i = found >= count ? 1 : 0;
else
r1.i = found >= r2.i ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FILESIZE:
r1.i = context->file_size;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_ENTRYPOINT:
r1.i = context->entry_point;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CONTAINS:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
r1.i = memmem(r1.ss->c_string, r1.ss->length,
r2.ss->c_string, r2.ss->length) != NULL;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_IMPORT:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
result = yr_modules_load((char*) r1.p, context);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_MATCHES:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r1.ss->length == 0)
{
r1.i = FALSE;
push(r1);
break;
}
result = yr_re_exec(
(uint8_t*) r2.re->code,
(uint8_t*) r1.ss->c_string,
r1.ss->length,
0,
r2.re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL,
&found);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
r1.i = found >= 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_TO_DBL:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r2 = stack[sp - r1.i];
if (is_undef(r2))
stack[sp - r1.i].i = UNDEFINED;
else
stack[sp - r1.i].d = (double) r2.i;
break;
case OP_STR_TO_BOOL:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.ss->length > 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i == r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i != r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i < r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i > r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i <= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i + r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i - r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i * r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i / r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = -r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d < r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d > r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d <= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d >= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d == r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d != r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d + r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d - r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d * r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d / r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = -r1.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_STR_EQ:
case OP_STR_NEQ:
case OP_STR_LT:
case OP_STR_LE:
case OP_STR_GT:
case OP_STR_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_STR_EQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) == 0);
break;
case OP_STR_NEQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) != 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) < 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) <= 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) > 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) >= 0);
break;
}
push(r1);
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
if (timeout > 0) // timeout == 0 means no timeout
{
if (++cycle == 10)
{
if (difftime(time(NULL), start_time) > timeout)
{
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
assert(current_rule != NULL);
current_rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
#endif
result = ERROR_SCAN_TIMEOUT;
stop = TRUE;
}
cycle = 0;
}
}
ip++;
}
obj_ptr = (YR_OBJECT**) yr_arena_base_address(obj_arena);
while (obj_ptr != NULL)
{
yr_object_destroy(*obj_ptr);
obj_ptr = (YR_OBJECT**) yr_arena_next_address(
obj_arena, obj_ptr, sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
}
yr_arena_destroy(obj_arena);
yr_modules_unload_all(context);
yr_free(stack);
return result;
}
|
int yr_execute_code(
YR_RULES* rules,
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
int timeout,
time_t start_time)
{
int64_t mem[MEM_SIZE];
int32_t sp = 0;
uint8_t* ip = rules->code_start;
YR_VALUE args[MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS];
YR_VALUE *stack;
YR_VALUE r1;
YR_VALUE r2;
YR_VALUE r3;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
YR_RULE* current_rule = NULL;
#endif
YR_RULE* rule;
YR_MATCH* match;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
char* identifier;
char* args_fmt;
int i;
int found;
int count;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int stop = FALSE;
int cycle = 0;
int tidx = context->tidx;
int stack_size;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
clock_t start = clock();
#endif
yr_get_configuration(YR_CONFIG_STACK_SIZE, (void*) &stack_size);
stack = (YR_VALUE*) yr_malloc(stack_size * sizeof(YR_VALUE));
if (stack == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
while(!stop)
{
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_NOP:
break;
case OP_HALT:
assert(sp == 0); // When HALT is reached the stack should be empty.
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_PUSH:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP:
pop(r1);
break;
case OP_CLEAR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i] = 0;
break;
case OP_ADD_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (!is_undef(r2))
mem[r1.i] += r2.i;
break;
case OP_INCR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i]++;
break;
case OP_PUSH_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
mem[r1.i] = r2.i;
break;
case OP_SWAPUNDEF:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
{
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
}
else
{
push(r2);
}
break;
case OP_JNUNDEF:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1), ip);
break;
case OP_JLE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
push(r1);
push(r2);
ip = jmp_if(r1.i <= r2.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JTRUE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1) && r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JFALSE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(is_undef(r1) || !r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1) || is_undef(r2))
r1.i = 0;
else
r1.i = r1.i && r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
push(r2);
}
else if (is_undef(r2))
{
push(r1);
}
else
{
r1.i = r1.i || r2.i;
push(r1);
}
break;
case OP_NOT:
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.i= !r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_MOD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i % r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >> r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i << r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_NOT:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = ~r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i & r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i | r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_XOR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i ^ r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_PUSH_RULE:
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = rule->t_flags[tidx] & RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INIT_RULE:
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
current_rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
#endif
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case OP_MATCH_RULE:
pop(r1);
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
if (!is_undef(r1) && r1.i)
rule->t_flags[tidx] |= RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH;
else if (RULE_IS_GLOBAL(rule))
rule->ns->t_flags[tidx] |= NAMESPACE_TFLAGS_UNSATISFIED_GLOBAL;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
start = clock();
#endif
break;
case OP_OBJ_LOAD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.o = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
context->objects_table,
identifier,
NULL);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_FIELD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.o = yr_object_lookup_field(r1.o, identifier);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_VALUE:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
switch(r1.o->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
r1.i = ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
if (isnan(((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.d = ((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
if (((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.p = ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INDEX_ARRAY:
pop(r1); // index
pop(r2); // array
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
r1.o = yr_object_array_get_item(r2.o, 0, (int) r1.i);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_LOOKUP_DICT:
pop(r1); // key
pop(r2); // dictionary
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY);
r1.o = yr_object_dict_get_item(
r2.o, 0, r1.ss->c_string);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CALL:
args_fmt = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
i = (int) strlen(args_fmt);
count = 0;
while (i > 0)
{
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1)) // count the number of undefined args
count++;
args[i - 1] = r1;
i--;
}
pop(r2);
ensure_defined(r2);
if (count > 0)
{
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
}
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) r2.o;
result = ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
{
if (function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt == NULL)
break;
if (strcmp(function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt, args_fmt) == 0)
{
result = function->prototypes[i].code(args, context, function);
break;
}
}
assert(i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS);
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
r1.o = function->return_obj;
push(r1);
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case OP_FOUND:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FOUND_AT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
r1.i = 0;
push(r1);
break;
}
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL)
{
if (r1.i == match->base + match->offset)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
break;
}
if (r1.i < match->base + match->offset)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_FOUND_IN:
pop(r3);
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
match = r3.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL && !r3.i)
{
if (match->base + match->offset >= r1.i &&
match->base + match->offset <= r2.i)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
}
if (match->base + match->offset > r2.i)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_COUNT:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].count;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OFFSET:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->base + match->offset;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_LENGTH:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->match_length;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_OF:
found = 0;
count = 0;
pop(r1);
while (!is_undef(r1))
{
if (r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL)
found++;
count++;
pop(r1);
}
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
r1.i = found >= count ? 1 : 0;
else
r1.i = found >= r2.i ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FILESIZE:
r1.i = context->file_size;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_ENTRYPOINT:
r1.i = context->entry_point;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CONTAINS:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
r1.i = memmem(r1.ss->c_string, r1.ss->length,
r2.ss->c_string, r2.ss->length) != NULL;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_IMPORT:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
result = yr_modules_load((char*) r1.p, context);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_MATCHES:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r1.ss->length == 0)
{
r1.i = FALSE;
push(r1);
break;
}
result = yr_re_exec(
(uint8_t*) r2.re->code,
(uint8_t*) r1.ss->c_string,
r1.ss->length,
0,
r2.re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL,
&found);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
r1.i = found >= 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_TO_DBL:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r2 = stack[sp - r1.i];
if (is_undef(r2))
stack[sp - r1.i].i = UNDEFINED;
else
stack[sp - r1.i].d = (double) r2.i;
break;
case OP_STR_TO_BOOL:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.ss->length > 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i == r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i != r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i < r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i > r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i <= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i + r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i - r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i * r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i / r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = -r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d < r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d > r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d <= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d >= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d == r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d != r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d + r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d - r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d * r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d / r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = -r1.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_STR_EQ:
case OP_STR_NEQ:
case OP_STR_LT:
case OP_STR_LE:
case OP_STR_GT:
case OP_STR_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_STR_EQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) == 0);
break;
case OP_STR_NEQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) != 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) < 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) <= 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) > 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) >= 0);
break;
}
push(r1);
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
if (timeout > 0) // timeout == 0 means no timeout
{
if (++cycle == 10)
{
if (difftime(time(NULL), start_time) > timeout)
{
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
assert(current_rule != NULL);
current_rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
#endif
result = ERROR_SCAN_TIMEOUT;
stop = TRUE;
}
cycle = 0;
}
}
ip++;
}
yr_modules_unload_all(context);
yr_free(stack);
return result;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
ktime_t remaining =
hrtimer_get_remaining(&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer);
u64 value;
if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) <= 0)
return 0;
value = ktime_to_ns(remaining) * vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
do_div(value, 1000000);
return value >> VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
}
|
static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
ktime_t remaining =
hrtimer_get_remaining(&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer);
u64 value;
if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) <= 0)
return 0;
value = ktime_to_ns(remaining) * vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
do_div(value, 1000000);
return value >> VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3698
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3698/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/jpirko/libndp/commit/a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f
|
a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f
|
libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
|
static void ndp_msg_addrto_adjust_all_nodes(struct in6_addr *addr)
{
struct in6_addr any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
if (memcmp(addr, &any, sizeof(any)))
return;
addr->s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xFF020000);
addr->s6_addr32[1] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[3] = htonl(0x1);
}
|
static void ndp_msg_addrto_adjust_all_nodes(struct in6_addr *addr)
{
struct in6_addr any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
if (memcmp(addr, &any, sizeof(any)))
return;
addr->s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xFF020000);
addr->s6_addr32[1] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[3] = htonl(0x1);
}
|
C
|
libndp
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
BaseShadow::jobWantsGracefulRemoval()
{
bool job_wants_graceful_removal = false;
ClassAd *thejobAd = getJobAd();
if( thejobAd ) {
thejobAd->LookupBool( ATTR_WANT_GRACEFUL_REMOVAL, job_wants_graceful_removal );
}
return job_wants_graceful_removal;
}
|
BaseShadow::jobWantsGracefulRemoval()
{
bool job_wants_graceful_removal = false;
ClassAd *thejobAd = getJobAd();
if( thejobAd ) {
thejobAd->LookupBool( ATTR_WANT_GRACEFUL_REMOVAL, job_wants_graceful_removal );
}
return job_wants_graceful_removal;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6712
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6712/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
int iwl_send_lq_cmd(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct iwl_link_quality_cmd *lq, u8 flags, bool init)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags_spin;
struct iwl_host_cmd cmd = {
.id = REPLY_TX_LINK_QUALITY_CMD,
.len = { sizeof(struct iwl_link_quality_cmd), },
.flags = flags,
.data = { lq, },
};
if (WARN_ON(lq->sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
if (!(priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
return -EINVAL;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
iwl_dump_lq_cmd(priv, lq);
if (WARN_ON(init && (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_lq_table_valid(priv, ctx, lq))
ret = iwl_trans_send_cmd(trans(priv), &cmd);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)
return ret;
if (init) {
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "init LQ command complete, "
"clearing sta addition status for sta %d\n",
lq->sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used &= ~IWL_STA_UCODE_INPROGRESS;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
}
return ret;
}
|
int iwl_send_lq_cmd(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct iwl_link_quality_cmd *lq, u8 flags, bool init)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags_spin;
struct iwl_host_cmd cmd = {
.id = REPLY_TX_LINK_QUALITY_CMD,
.len = { sizeof(struct iwl_link_quality_cmd), },
.flags = flags,
.data = { lq, },
};
if (WARN_ON(lq->sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
if (!(priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
return -EINVAL;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
iwl_dump_lq_cmd(priv, lq);
if (WARN_ON(init && (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_lq_table_valid(priv, ctx, lq))
ret = iwl_trans_send_cmd(trans(priv), &cmd);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)
return ret;
if (init) {
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "init LQ command complete, "
"clearing sta addition status for sta %d\n",
lq->sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used &= ~IWL_STA_UCODE_INPROGRESS;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5546
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5546/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f
|
c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f
|
mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void slab_destroy_debugcheck(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct page *page)
{
}
|
static void slab_destroy_debugcheck(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct page *page)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15857
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15857/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/xkbcommon/libxkbcommon/commit/c1e5ac16e77a21f87bdf3bc4dea61b037a17dddb
|
c1e5ac16e77a21f87bdf3bc4dea61b037a17dddb
|
xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]>
|
FreeStmt(ParseCommon *stmt)
{
ParseCommon *next;
while (stmt)
{
next = stmt->next;
switch (stmt->type) {
case STMT_INCLUDE:
FreeInclude((IncludeStmt *) stmt);
/* stmt is already free'd here. */
stmt = NULL;
break;
case STMT_EXPR:
FreeExpr((ExprDef *) stmt);
break;
case STMT_VAR:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VarDef *) stmt)->name);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VarDef *) stmt)->value);
break;
case STMT_TYPE:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((KeyTypeDef *) stmt)->body);
break;
case STMT_INTERP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((InterpDef *) stmt)->match);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((InterpDef *) stmt)->def);
break;
case STMT_VMOD:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VModDef *) stmt)->value);
break;
case STMT_SYMBOLS:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((SymbolsDef *) stmt)->symbols);
break;
case STMT_MODMAP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((ModMapDef *) stmt)->keys);
break;
case STMT_GROUP_COMPAT:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((GroupCompatDef *) stmt)->def);
break;
case STMT_LED_MAP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((LedMapDef *) stmt)->body);
break;
case STMT_LED_NAME:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((LedNameDef *) stmt)->name);
break;
default:
break;
}
free(stmt);
stmt = next;
}
}
|
FreeStmt(ParseCommon *stmt)
{
ParseCommon *next;
while (stmt)
{
next = stmt->next;
switch (stmt->type) {
case STMT_INCLUDE:
FreeInclude((IncludeStmt *) stmt);
/* stmt is already free'd here. */
stmt = NULL;
break;
case STMT_EXPR:
FreeExpr((ExprDef *) stmt);
break;
case STMT_VAR:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VarDef *) stmt)->name);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VarDef *) stmt)->value);
break;
case STMT_TYPE:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((KeyTypeDef *) stmt)->body);
break;
case STMT_INTERP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((InterpDef *) stmt)->match);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((InterpDef *) stmt)->def);
break;
case STMT_VMOD:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((VModDef *) stmt)->value);
break;
case STMT_SYMBOLS:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((SymbolsDef *) stmt)->symbols);
break;
case STMT_MODMAP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((ModMapDef *) stmt)->keys);
break;
case STMT_GROUP_COMPAT:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((GroupCompatDef *) stmt)->def);
break;
case STMT_LED_MAP:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((LedMapDef *) stmt)->body);
break;
case STMT_LED_NAME:
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) ((LedNameDef *) stmt)->name);
break;
default:
break;
}
free(stmt);
stmt = next;
}
}
|
C
|
libxkbcommon
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6376/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u16 dest)
{
return dest == 0xff || kvm_apic_id(apic) == dest;
}
|
int kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u16 dest)
{
return dest == 0xff || kvm_apic_id(apic) == dest;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3153
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3153/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8
|
e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8
|
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct futex_hash_bucket *hash_futex(union futex_key *key)
{
u32 hash = jhash2((u32*)&key->both.word,
(sizeof(key->both.word)+sizeof(key->both.ptr))/4,
key->both.offset);
return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
}
|
static struct futex_hash_bucket *hash_futex(union futex_key *key)
{
u32 hash = jhash2((u32*)&key->both.word,
(sizeof(key->both.word)+sizeof(key->both.ptr))/4,
key->both.offset);
return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
update_info_presentation (Device *device)
{
gboolean hide;
gboolean nopolicy;
hide = FALSE;
if (g_udev_device_has_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_HIDE"))
hide = g_udev_device_get_property_as_boolean (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_HIDE");
device_set_device_presentation_hide (device, hide);
nopolicy = FALSE;
if (g_udev_device_has_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NOPOLICY"))
nopolicy = g_udev_device_get_property_as_boolean (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NOPOLICY");
device_set_device_presentation_nopolicy (device, nopolicy);
device_set_device_presentation_name (device, g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NAME"));
device_set_device_presentation_icon_name (device, g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d,
"UDISKS_PRESENTATION_ICON_NAME"));
return TRUE;
}
|
update_info_presentation (Device *device)
{
gboolean hide;
gboolean nopolicy;
hide = FALSE;
if (g_udev_device_has_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_HIDE"))
hide = g_udev_device_get_property_as_boolean (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_HIDE");
device_set_device_presentation_hide (device, hide);
nopolicy = FALSE;
if (g_udev_device_has_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NOPOLICY"))
nopolicy = g_udev_device_get_property_as_boolean (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NOPOLICY");
device_set_device_presentation_nopolicy (device, nopolicy);
device_set_device_presentation_name (device, g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_PRESENTATION_NAME"));
device_set_device_presentation_icon_name (device, g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d,
"UDISKS_PRESENTATION_ICON_NAME"));
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661}
|
bool ProcessSingletonNotificationCallback(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
const base::FilePath& current_directory) {
if (!g_browser_process || g_browser_process->IsShuttingDown()) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
browser_watcher::ExitFunnel::RecordSingleEvent(
chrome::kBrowserExitCodesRegistryPath,
L"ProcessSingletonIsShuttingDown");
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
return false;
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kOriginalProcessStartTime)) {
std::string start_time_string =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOriginalProcessStartTime);
int64 remote_start_time;
if (base::StringToInt64(start_time_string, &remote_start_time)) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed =
base::Time::Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(remote_start_time);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kFastStart)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Startup.WarmStartTimeFromRemoteProcessStartFast", elapsed);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Startup.WarmStartTimeFromRemoteProcessStart", elapsed);
}
}
}
g_browser_process->platform_part()->PlatformSpecificCommandLineProcessing(
command_line);
base::FilePath user_data_dir =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->user_data_dir();
base::FilePath startup_profile_dir =
GetStartupProfilePath(user_data_dir, command_line);
StartupBrowserCreator::ProcessCommandLineAlreadyRunning(
command_line, current_directory, startup_profile_dir);
return true;
}
|
bool ProcessSingletonNotificationCallback(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
const base::FilePath& current_directory) {
if (!g_browser_process || g_browser_process->IsShuttingDown()) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
browser_watcher::ExitFunnel::RecordSingleEvent(
chrome::kBrowserExitCodesRegistryPath,
L"ProcessSingletonIsShuttingDown");
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
return false;
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kOriginalProcessStartTime)) {
std::string start_time_string =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOriginalProcessStartTime);
int64 remote_start_time;
if (base::StringToInt64(start_time_string, &remote_start_time)) {
base::TimeDelta elapsed =
base::Time::Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(remote_start_time);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kFastStart)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Startup.WarmStartTimeFromRemoteProcessStartFast", elapsed);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Startup.WarmStartTimeFromRemoteProcessStart", elapsed);
}
}
}
g_browser_process->platform_part()->PlatformSpecificCommandLineProcessing(
command_line);
base::FilePath user_data_dir =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->user_data_dir();
base::FilePath startup_profile_dir =
GetStartupProfilePath(user_data_dir, command_line);
StartupBrowserCreator::ProcessCommandLineAlreadyRunning(
command_line, current_directory, startup_profile_dir);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
HTMLKeygenElement::HTMLKeygenElement(Document& document, HTMLFormElement* form)
: HTMLFormControlElementWithState(keygenTag, document, form)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
ensureUserAgentShadowRoot();
}
|
HTMLKeygenElement::HTMLKeygenElement(Document& document, HTMLFormElement* form)
: HTMLFormControlElementWithState(keygenTag, document, form)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
ensureUserAgentShadowRoot();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void __vmx_load_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (!vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed) {
kvm_load_ldt(vmx->host_state.ldt_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
load_gs_index(vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#else
loadsegment(gs, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#endif
}
if (vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed)
loadsegment(fs, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (unlikely(vmx->host_state.ds_sel | vmx->host_state.es_sel)) {
loadsegment(ds, vmx->host_state.ds_sel);
loadsegment(es, vmx->host_state.es_sel);
}
#endif
reload_tss();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs);
/*
* If the FPU is not active (through the host task or
* the guest vcpu), then restore the cr0.TS bit.
*/
if (!user_has_fpu() && !vmx->vcpu.guest_fpu_loaded)
stts();
load_gdt(this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt));
}
|
static void __vmx_load_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (!vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed) {
kvm_load_ldt(vmx->host_state.ldt_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
load_gs_index(vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#else
loadsegment(gs, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#endif
}
if (vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed)
loadsegment(fs, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (unlikely(vmx->host_state.ds_sel | vmx->host_state.es_sel)) {
loadsegment(ds, vmx->host_state.ds_sel);
loadsegment(es, vmx->host_state.es_sel);
}
#endif
reload_tss();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs);
/*
* If the FPU is not active (through the host task or
* the guest vcpu), then restore the cr0.TS bit.
*/
if (!user_has_fpu() && !vmx->vcpu.guest_fpu_loaded)
stts();
load_gdt(this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXObject::computeAncestorExposesActiveDescendant() const {
const AXObject* parent = parentObjectUnignored();
if (!parent)
return false;
if (parent->supportsActiveDescendant() &&
!parent->getAttribute(aria_activedescendantAttr).isEmpty()) {
return true;
}
return parent->ancestorExposesActiveDescendant();
}
|
bool AXObject::computeAncestorExposesActiveDescendant() const {
const AXObject* parent = parentObjectUnignored();
if (!parent)
return false;
if (parent->supportsActiveDescendant() &&
!parent->getAttribute(aria_activedescendantAttr).isEmpty()) {
return true;
}
return parent->ancestorExposesActiveDescendant();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::getStatusBarIsVisible(bool& statusBarIsVisible)
{
statusBarIsVisible = m_uiClient.statusBarIsVisible(this);
}
|
void WebPageProxy::getStatusBarIsVisible(bool& statusBarIsVisible)
{
statusBarIsVisible = m_uiClient.statusBarIsVisible(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16229/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66
|
211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
|
void dccp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *data2,
u_int len)
{
const struct dccp_hdr *dh;
const struct ip *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
const u_char *cp;
u_short sport, dport;
u_int hlen;
u_int fixed_hdrlen;
uint8_t dccph_type;
dh = (const struct dccp_hdr *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)data2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)data2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
/* make sure we have enough data to look at the X bit */
cp = (const u_char *)(dh + 1);
if (cp > ndo->ndo_snapend) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Invalid packet|dccp]"));
return;
}
if (len < sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - (u_int)sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)));
return;
}
/* get the length of the generic header */
fixed_hdrlen = dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh);
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*dh, fixed_hdrlen);
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_dport);
hlen = dh->dccph_doff * 4;
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src), sport,
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst), dport));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src), sport,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst), dport));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DCCP"));
if (ndo->ndo_qflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", len - hlen));
if (hlen > len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad hdr length %u - too long, > %u]",
hlen, len));
}
return;
}
/* other variables in generic header */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (CCVal %d, CsCov %d, ", DCCPH_CCVAL(dh), DCCPH_CSCOV(dh)));
}
/* checksum calculation */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t sum = 0, dccp_sum;
dccp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_checksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "cksum 0x%04x ", dccp_sum));
if (IP_V(ip) == 4)
sum = dccp_cksum(ndo, ip, dh, len);
else if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
sum = dccp6_cksum(ndo, ip6, dh, len);
if (sum != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect -> 0x%04x)",in_cksum_shouldbe(dccp_sum, sum)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
dccph_type = DCCPH_TYPE(dh);
switch (dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_REQUEST: {
const struct dccp_hdr_request *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_request *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 4;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_req_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_RESPONSE: {
const struct dccp_hdr_response *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_response *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_resp_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_ACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSEREQ:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSE:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_RESET: {
const struct dccp_hdr_reset *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_reset *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (code=%s) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
dccp_reset_code(dhr->dccph_reset_code)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_SYNC:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_SYNCACK:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "unknown-type-%u", dccph_type)));
break;
}
if ((DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_DATA) &&
(DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_REQUEST))
dccp_print_ack_no(ndo, bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "seq %" PRIu64, dccp_seqno(bp)));
/* process options */
if (hlen > fixed_hdrlen){
u_int optlen;
cp = bp + fixed_hdrlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <"));
hlen -= fixed_hdrlen;
while(1){
optlen = dccp_print_option(ndo, cp, hlen);
if (!optlen)
break;
if (hlen <= optlen)
break;
hlen -= optlen;
cp += optlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
|
void dccp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *data2,
u_int len)
{
const struct dccp_hdr *dh;
const struct ip *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
const u_char *cp;
u_short sport, dport;
u_int hlen;
u_int fixed_hdrlen;
uint8_t dccph_type;
dh = (const struct dccp_hdr *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)data2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)data2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
/* make sure we have enough data to look at the X bit */
cp = (const u_char *)(dh + 1);
if (cp > ndo->ndo_snapend) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Invalid packet|dccp]"));
return;
}
if (len < sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - (u_int)sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)));
return;
}
/* get the length of the generic header */
fixed_hdrlen = dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh);
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*dh, fixed_hdrlen);
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_dport);
hlen = dh->dccph_doff * 4;
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src), sport,
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst), dport));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src), sport,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst), dport));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DCCP"));
if (ndo->ndo_qflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", len - hlen));
if (hlen > len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad hdr length %u - too long, > %u]",
hlen, len));
}
return;
}
/* other variables in generic header */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (CCVal %d, CsCov %d, ", DCCPH_CCVAL(dh), DCCPH_CSCOV(dh)));
}
/* checksum calculation */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t sum = 0, dccp_sum;
dccp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_checksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "cksum 0x%04x ", dccp_sum));
if (IP_V(ip) == 4)
sum = dccp_cksum(ndo, ip, dh, len);
else if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
sum = dccp6_cksum(ndo, ip6, dh, len);
if (sum != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect -> 0x%04x)",in_cksum_shouldbe(dccp_sum, sum)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
dccph_type = DCCPH_TYPE(dh);
switch (dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_REQUEST: {
const struct dccp_hdr_request *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_request *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 4;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_req_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_RESPONSE: {
const struct dccp_hdr_response *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_response *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_resp_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_ACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSEREQ:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSE:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_RESET: {
const struct dccp_hdr_reset *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_reset *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (code=%s) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
dccp_reset_code(dhr->dccph_reset_code)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_SYNC:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_SYNCACK:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "unknown-type-%u", dccph_type)));
break;
}
if ((DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_DATA) &&
(DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_REQUEST))
dccp_print_ack_no(ndo, bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "seq %" PRIu64, dccp_seqno(bp)));
/* process options */
if (hlen > fixed_hdrlen){
u_int optlen;
cp = bp + fixed_hdrlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <"));
hlen -= fixed_hdrlen;
while(1){
optlen = dccp_print_option(ndo, cp, hlen);
if (!optlen)
break;
if (hlen <= optlen)
break;
hlen -= optlen;
cp += optlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
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