CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2019-10131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10131/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/cb1214c124e1bd61f7dd551b94a794864861592e
|
cb1214c124e1bd61f7dd551b94a794864861592e
|
...
|
static int jpeg_extract(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
unsigned int marker;
unsigned int done = 0;
if (jpeg_skip_1(ifile) != 0xff)
return 0;
if (jpeg_skip_1(ifile) != M_SOI)
return 0;
while (done == MagickFalse)
{
marker = jpeg_skip_till_marker(ifile, M_APP13);
if (marker == M_APP13)
{
marker = jpeg_nextmarker(ifile, ofile);
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
static int jpeg_extract(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
unsigned int marker;
unsigned int done = 0;
if (jpeg_skip_1(ifile) != 0xff)
return 0;
if (jpeg_skip_1(ifile) != M_SOI)
return 0;
while (done == MagickFalse)
{
marker = jpeg_skip_till_marker(ifile, M_APP13);
if (marker == M_APP13)
{
marker = jpeg_nextmarker(ifile, ofile);
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InjectedBundlePage::enterFullScreenForElement(WKBundlePageRef pageRef, WKBundleNodeHandleRef elementRef)
{
if (InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldDumpFullScreenCallbacks())
InjectedBundle::shared().outputText("enterFullScreenForElement()\n");
if (!InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->hasCustomFullScreenBehavior()) {
WKBundlePageWillEnterFullScreen(pageRef);
WKBundlePageDidEnterFullScreen(pageRef);
}
}
|
void InjectedBundlePage::enterFullScreenForElement(WKBundlePageRef pageRef, WKBundleNodeHandleRef elementRef)
{
if (InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldDumpFullScreenCallbacks())
InjectedBundle::shared().outputText("enterFullScreenForElement()\n");
if (!InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->hasCustomFullScreenBehavior()) {
WKBundlePageWillEnterFullScreen(pageRef);
WKBundlePageDidEnterFullScreen(pageRef);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::SynchronizeVisualProperties(
bool scroll_focused_node_into_view) {
if (visual_properties_ack_pending_ || !process_->IsInitializedAndNotDead() ||
!view_ || !view_->HasSize() || !renderer_initialized_ || !delegate_) {
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<VisualProperties> visual_properties(new VisualProperties);
bool needs_ack = false;
if (!GetVisualProperties(visual_properties.get(), &needs_ack))
return false;
visual_properties->scroll_focused_node_into_view =
scroll_focused_node_into_view;
ScreenInfo screen_info = visual_properties->screen_info;
bool width_changed =
!old_visual_properties_ || old_visual_properties_->new_size.width() !=
visual_properties->new_size.width();
bool sent_visual_properties = false;
if (Send(new ViewMsg_SynchronizeVisualProperties(routing_id_,
*visual_properties))) {
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = needs_ack;
old_visual_properties_.swap(visual_properties);
sent_visual_properties = true;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetWasResized(this, screen_info, width_changed);
return sent_visual_properties;
}
|
bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::SynchronizeVisualProperties(
bool scroll_focused_node_into_view) {
if (visual_properties_ack_pending_ || !process_->IsInitializedAndNotDead() ||
!view_ || !view_->HasSize() || !renderer_initialized_ || !delegate_) {
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<VisualProperties> visual_properties(new VisualProperties);
bool needs_ack = false;
if (!GetVisualProperties(visual_properties.get(), &needs_ack))
return false;
visual_properties->scroll_focused_node_into_view =
scroll_focused_node_into_view;
ScreenInfo screen_info = visual_properties->screen_info;
bool width_changed =
!old_visual_properties_ || old_visual_properties_->new_size.width() !=
visual_properties->new_size.width();
bool sent_visual_properties = false;
if (Send(new ViewMsg_SynchronizeVisualProperties(routing_id_,
*visual_properties))) {
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = needs_ack;
old_visual_properties_.swap(visual_properties);
sent_visual_properties = true;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetWasResized(this, screen_info, width_changed);
return sent_visual_properties;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58c433b2426f8d23ad27f1976635506ee3643034
|
58c433b2426f8d23ad27f1976635506ee3643034
|
Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TestConnectionHelper(base::TaskRunner* runner,
QuicClock* clock,
MockUDPClientSocket* socket)
: QuicConnectionHelper(runner, clock, socket) {
}
|
TestConnectionHelper(base::TaskRunner* runner,
QuicClock* clock,
MockUDPClientSocket* socket)
: QuicConnectionHelper(runner, clock, socket) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FlagsState::RemoveFlagsSwitches(
std::map<std::string, CommandLine::StringType>* switch_list) {
for (std::map<std::string, std::string>::const_iterator
it = flags_switches_.begin(); it != flags_switches_.end(); ++it) {
switch_list->erase(it->first);
}
}
|
void FlagsState::RemoveFlagsSwitches(
std::map<std::string, CommandLine::StringType>* switch_list) {
for (std::map<std::string, std::string>::const_iterator
it = flags_switches_.begin(); it != flags_switches_.end(); ++it) {
switch_list->erase(it->first);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
ModuleExport void UnregisterMONOImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("MONO");
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterMONOImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("MONO");
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18190
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18190/
|
CWE-290
|
https://github.com/apple/cups/commit/afa80cb2b457bf8d64f775bed307588610476c41
|
afa80cb2b457bf8d64f775bed307588610476c41
|
Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
|
is_cgi(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
const char *filename, /* I - Real filename */
struct stat *filestats, /* I - File information */
mime_type_t *type) /* I - MIME type */
{
const char *options; /* Options on URL */
/*
* Get the options, if any...
*/
if ((options = strchr(con->uri, '?')) != NULL)
{
options ++;
cupsdSetStringf(&(con->query_string), "QUERY_STRING=%s", options);
}
/*
* Check for known types...
*/
if (!type || _cups_strcasecmp(type->super, "application"))
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 0.", filename, filestats, type ? type->super : "unknown", type ? type->type : "unknown");
return (0);
}
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-cgi") &&
(filestats->st_mode & 0111))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-cgi" is a CGI script.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, filename);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", options);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#ifdef HAVE_JAVA
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-java"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-java" is a Java servlet.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_JAVA);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_JAVA */
#ifdef HAVE_PERL
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-perl"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-perl" is a Perl page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PERL);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PERL */
#ifdef HAVE_PHP
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-php"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-php" is a PHP page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PHP);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PHP */
#ifdef HAVE_PYTHON
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-python"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-python" is a Python page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PYTHON);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PYTHON */
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 0.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (0);
}
|
is_cgi(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
const char *filename, /* I - Real filename */
struct stat *filestats, /* I - File information */
mime_type_t *type) /* I - MIME type */
{
const char *options; /* Options on URL */
/*
* Get the options, if any...
*/
if ((options = strchr(con->uri, '?')) != NULL)
{
options ++;
cupsdSetStringf(&(con->query_string), "QUERY_STRING=%s", options);
}
/*
* Check for known types...
*/
if (!type || _cups_strcasecmp(type->super, "application"))
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 0.", filename, filestats, type ? type->super : "unknown", type ? type->type : "unknown");
return (0);
}
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-cgi") &&
(filestats->st_mode & 0111))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-cgi" is a CGI script.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, filename);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", options);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#ifdef HAVE_JAVA
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-java"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-java" is a Java servlet.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_JAVA);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_JAVA */
#ifdef HAVE_PERL
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-perl"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-perl" is a Perl page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PERL);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PERL */
#ifdef HAVE_PHP
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-php"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-php" is a PHP page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PHP);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PHP */
#ifdef HAVE_PYTHON
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(type->type, "x-httpd-python"))
{
/*
* "application/x-httpd-python" is a Python page.
*/
cupsdSetString(&con->command, CUPS_PYTHON);
if (options)
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s %s", filename, options);
else
cupsdSetStringf(&con->options, " %s", filename);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 1.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_PYTHON */
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "is_cgi: filename=\"%s\", filestats=%p, type=%s/%s, returning 0.", filename, filestats, type->super, type->type);
return (0);
}
|
C
|
cups
| 0 |
CVE-2010-0011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-0011/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl/commit/1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
|
scroll_cmd(WebKitWebView* page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page; (void) result;
gchar *direction = g_array_index(argv, gchar*, 0);
gchar *argv1 = g_array_index(argv, gchar*, 1);
if (g_strcmp0(direction, "horizontal") == 0)
{
if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "begin") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value(uzbl.gui.bar_h, gtk_adjustment_get_lower(uzbl.gui.bar_h));
else if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "end") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value (uzbl.gui.bar_h, gtk_adjustment_get_upper(uzbl.gui.bar_h) -
gtk_adjustment_get_page_size(uzbl.gui.bar_h));
else
scroll(uzbl.gui.bar_h, argv1);
}
else if (g_strcmp0(direction, "vertical") == 0)
{
if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "begin") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value(uzbl.gui.bar_v, gtk_adjustment_get_lower(uzbl.gui.bar_v));
else if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "end") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value (uzbl.gui.bar_v, gtk_adjustment_get_upper(uzbl.gui.bar_v) -
gtk_adjustment_get_page_size(uzbl.gui.bar_v));
else
scroll(uzbl.gui.bar_v, argv1);
}
else
if(uzbl.state.verbose)
puts("Unrecognized scroll format");
}
|
scroll_cmd(WebKitWebView* page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page; (void) result;
gchar *direction = g_array_index(argv, gchar*, 0);
gchar *argv1 = g_array_index(argv, gchar*, 1);
if (g_strcmp0(direction, "horizontal") == 0)
{
if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "begin") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value(uzbl.gui.bar_h, gtk_adjustment_get_lower(uzbl.gui.bar_h));
else if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "end") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value (uzbl.gui.bar_h, gtk_adjustment_get_upper(uzbl.gui.bar_h) -
gtk_adjustment_get_page_size(uzbl.gui.bar_h));
else
scroll(uzbl.gui.bar_h, argv1);
}
else if (g_strcmp0(direction, "vertical") == 0)
{
if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "begin") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value(uzbl.gui.bar_v, gtk_adjustment_get_lower(uzbl.gui.bar_v));
else if (g_strcmp0(argv1, "end") == 0)
gtk_adjustment_set_value (uzbl.gui.bar_v, gtk_adjustment_get_upper(uzbl.gui.bar_v) -
gtk_adjustment_get_page_size(uzbl.gui.bar_v));
else
scroll(uzbl.gui.bar_v, argv1);
}
else
if(uzbl.state.verbose)
puts("Unrecognized scroll format");
}
|
C
|
uzbl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
Replaces the % character with \x when generating Windows shortcuts via
File->"Create application shortcuts." The \x is converted back to % in
handling the --app switch.
BUG=23693
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/515028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35377 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ScopableCPRequest::~ScopableCPRequest() {
pdata = NULL;
data = NULL;
free(const_cast<char*>(url));
free(const_cast<char*>(method));
}
|
ScopableCPRequest::~ScopableCPRequest() {
pdata = NULL;
data = NULL;
free(const_cast<char*>(url));
free(const_cast<char*>(method));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2880/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b
|
Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
CloudPolicyController::~CloudPolicyController() {
data_store_->RemoveObserver(this);
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
}
|
CloudPolicyController::~CloudPolicyController() {
data_store_->RemoveObserver(this);
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6321/
|
CWE-22
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=7340f67b9860ea0531c1450e5aa261c50f67165d
|
7340f67b9860ea0531c1450e5aa261c50f67165d
| null |
check_time (char const *file_name, struct timespec t)
{
if (t.tv_sec < 0)
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: implausibly old time stamp %s"),
file_name, tartime (t, true)));
else if (timespec_cmp (volume_start_time, t) < 0)
{
struct timespec now;
gettime (&now);
if (timespec_cmp (now, t) < 0)
{
char buf[TIMESPEC_STRSIZE_BOUND];
struct timespec diff;
diff.tv_sec = t.tv_sec - now.tv_sec;
diff.tv_nsec = t.tv_nsec - now.tv_nsec;
if (diff.tv_nsec < 0)
{
diff.tv_nsec += BILLION;
diff.tv_sec--;
}
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: time stamp %s is %s s in the future"),
file_name, tartime (t, true), code_timespec (diff, buf)));
}
}
}
|
check_time (char const *file_name, struct timespec t)
{
if (t.tv_sec < 0)
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: implausibly old time stamp %s"),
file_name, tartime (t, true)));
else if (timespec_cmp (volume_start_time, t) < 0)
{
struct timespec now;
gettime (&now);
if (timespec_cmp (now, t) < 0)
{
char buf[TIMESPEC_STRSIZE_BOUND];
struct timespec diff;
diff.tv_sec = t.tv_sec - now.tv_sec;
diff.tv_nsec = t.tv_nsec - now.tv_nsec;
if (diff.tv_nsec < 0)
{
diff.tv_nsec += BILLION;
diff.tv_sec--;
}
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: time stamp %s is %s s in the future"),
file_name, tartime (t, true), code_timespec (diff, buf)));
}
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2878
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2878/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void BitStack::push(bool bit)
{
unsigned index = m_size / bitsInWord;
unsigned shift = m_size & bitInWordMask;
if (!shift && index == m_words.size()) {
m_words.grow(index + 1);
m_words[index] = 0;
}
unsigned& word = m_words[index];
unsigned mask = 1U << shift;
if (bit)
word |= mask;
else
word &= ~mask;
++m_size;
}
|
void BitStack::push(bool bit)
{
unsigned index = m_size / bitsInWord;
unsigned shift = m_size & bitInWordMask;
if (!shift && index == m_words.size()) {
m_words.grow(index + 1);
m_words[index] = 0;
}
unsigned& word = m_words[index];
unsigned mask = 1U << shift;
if (bit)
word |= mask;
else
word &= ~mask;
++m_size;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
hstore_le(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int res = DatumGetInt32(DirectFunctionCall2(hstore_cmp,
PG_GETARG_DATUM(0),
PG_GETARG_DATUM(1)));
PG_RETURN_BOOL(res <= 0);
}
|
hstore_le(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int res = DatumGetInt32(DirectFunctionCall2(hstore_cmp,
PG_GETARG_DATUM(0),
PG_GETARG_DATUM(1)));
PG_RETURN_BOOL(res <= 0);
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfs4_release_reclaim(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < CLIENT_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
while (!list_empty(&nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[i])) {
crp = list_entry(nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[i].next,
struct nfs4_client_reclaim, cr_strhash);
nfs4_remove_reclaim_record(crp, nn);
}
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl_size);
}
|
nfs4_release_reclaim(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < CLIENT_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
while (!list_empty(&nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[i])) {
crp = list_entry(nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[i].next,
struct nfs4_client_reclaim, cr_strhash);
nfs4_remove_reclaim_record(crp, nn);
}
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl_size);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7480
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7480/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4
|
61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4
|
Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
|
void spl_object_storage_addall(spl_SplObjectStorage *intern, zval *this, spl_SplObjectStorage *other) { /* {{{ */
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&other->storage, element) {
spl_object_storage_attach(intern, this, &element->obj, &element->inf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
intern->index = 0;
} /* }}} */
|
void spl_object_storage_addall(spl_SplObjectStorage *intern, zval *this, spl_SplObjectStorage *other) { /* {{{ */
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&other->storage, element) {
spl_object_storage_attach(intern, this, &element->obj, &element->inf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
intern->index = 0;
} /* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3175
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3175/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4843d98517bd37e5940cd04627c6cfd2ac774d11
|
4843d98517bd37e5940cd04627c6cfd2ac774d11
|
Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
|
void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnFirstTextPaint(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
if (WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(timing.first_text_paint,
info)) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kHistogramFirstTextPaintImmediate,
timing.first_text_paint.value());
} else {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kBackgroundHistogramFirstTextPaintImmediate,
timing.first_text_paint.value());
}
}
|
void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnFirstTextPaint(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
if (WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(timing.first_text_paint,
info)) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kHistogramFirstTextPaintImmediate,
timing.first_text_paint.value());
} else {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kBackgroundHistogramFirstTextPaintImmediate,
timing.first_text_paint.value());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int ipxitf_rcv(struct ipx_interface *intrfc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
int rc = 0;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
/* See if we should update our network number */
if (!intrfc->if_netnum) /* net number of intrfc not known yet */
ipxitf_discover_netnum(intrfc, skb);
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->last_hop.index = -1;
if (ipx->ipx_type == IPX_TYPE_PPROP) {
rc = ipxitf_pprop(intrfc, skb);
if (rc)
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* local processing follows */
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
/* it doesn't make sense to route a pprop packet, there's no meaning
* in the ipx_dest_net for such packets */
if (ipx->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_PPROP &&
intrfc->if_netnum != IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net) {
/* We only route point-to-point packets. */
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) {
skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb)
rc = ipxrtr_route_skb(skb);
goto out_intrfc;
}
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* see if we should keep it */
if (!memcmp(ipx_broadcast_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN) ||
!memcmp(intrfc->if_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN)) {
rc = ipxitf_demux_socket(intrfc, skb, 0);
goto out_intrfc;
}
/* we couldn't pawn it off so unload it */
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_intrfc:
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
return rc;
}
|
static int ipxitf_rcv(struct ipx_interface *intrfc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
int rc = 0;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
/* See if we should update our network number */
if (!intrfc->if_netnum) /* net number of intrfc not known yet */
ipxitf_discover_netnum(intrfc, skb);
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->last_hop.index = -1;
if (ipx->ipx_type == IPX_TYPE_PPROP) {
rc = ipxitf_pprop(intrfc, skb);
if (rc)
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* local processing follows */
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
/* it doesn't make sense to route a pprop packet, there's no meaning
* in the ipx_dest_net for such packets */
if (ipx->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_PPROP &&
intrfc->if_netnum != IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net) {
/* We only route point-to-point packets. */
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) {
skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb)
rc = ipxrtr_route_skb(skb);
goto out_intrfc;
}
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* see if we should keep it */
if (!memcmp(ipx_broadcast_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN) ||
!memcmp(intrfc->if_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN)) {
rc = ipxitf_demux_socket(intrfc, skb, 0);
goto out_intrfc;
}
/* we couldn't pawn it off so unload it */
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_intrfc:
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5131/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d0c31f0342cefc46a3b3d80359a9779d044d4c0d
|
d0c31f0342cefc46a3b3d80359a9779d044d4c0d
|
Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void AsyncFileSystemChromium::directoryExists(const KURL& path, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
m_webFileSystem->directoryExists(path, new WebKit::WebFileSystemCallbacksImpl(callbacks));
}
|
void AsyncFileSystemChromium::directoryExists(const KURL& path, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
m_webFileSystem->directoryExists(path, new WebKit::WebFileSystemCallbacksImpl(callbacks));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
Implement NPN_RemoveProperty
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43315
Reviewed by Sam Weinig.
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Plugins/NPJSObject.cpp:
(WebKit::NPJSObject::removeProperty):
Try to remove the property.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::npClass):
Add NP_RemoveProperty.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::NP_RemoveProperty):
Call NPJSObject::removeProperty.
* WebProcess/Plugins/Netscape/NetscapeBrowserFuncs.cpp:
(WebKit::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Call the NPClass::removeProperty function.
WebKitTools:
* DumpRenderTree/DumpRenderTree.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.cpp:
(PluginTest::NPN_GetStringIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_GetIntIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Add NPN_ helpers.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.h:
Support more NPClass functions.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/Tests/NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp: Added.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPRuntimeRemoveProperty):
Test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::hasMethod):
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::invoke):
Add a testRemoveProperty method.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPP_GetValue):
Return the test object.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/win/TestNetscapePlugin.vcproj:
* DumpRenderTree/qt/TestNetscapePlugin/TestNetscapePlugin.pro:
* GNUmakefile.am:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
LayoutTests:
Add a test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property-expected.txt: Added.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static NPError NPN_PostURL(NPP npp, const char* url, const char* target, uint32_t len, const char* buf, NPBool file)
{
HTTPHeaderMap headerFields;
Vector<char> postData;
bool parseHeaders = file;
NPError error = parsePostBuffer(file, buf, len, parseHeaders, headerFields, postData);
if (error != NPERR_NO_ERROR)
return error;
RefPtr<NetscapePlugin> plugin = NetscapePlugin::fromNPP(npp);
plugin->loadURL("POST", makeURLString(url), target, headerFields, postData, false, 0);
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
static NPError NPN_PostURL(NPP npp, const char* url, const char* target, uint32_t len, const char* buf, NPBool file)
{
HTTPHeaderMap headerFields;
Vector<char> postData;
bool parseHeaders = file;
NPError error = parsePostBuffer(file, buf, len, parseHeaders, headerFields, postData);
if (error != NPERR_NO_ERROR)
return error;
RefPtr<NetscapePlugin> plugin = NetscapePlugin::fromNPP(npp);
plugin->loadURL("POST", makeURLString(url), target, headerFields, postData, false, 0);
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "originTrialEnabledLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setOriginTrialEnabledLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
static void OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "originTrialEnabledLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setOriginTrialEnabledLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7418
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7418/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c4cca4c20e75359c9a13a1f9a36cb7b4e9601d29?w=1
|
c4cca4c20e75359c9a13a1f9a36cb7b4e9601d29?w=1
|
Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
|
PHP_FUNCTION(wddx_add_vars)
{
int num_args, i;
zval ***args = NULL;
zval *packet_id;
wddx_packet *packet = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r+", &packet_id, &args, &num_args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE_NO_RETURN(packet, wddx_packet *, &packet_id, -1, "WDDX packet ID", le_wddx)) {
efree(args);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!packet) {
efree(args);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<num_args; i++) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(args[i]) != IS_ARRAY && Z_TYPE_PP(args[i]) != IS_OBJECT) {
convert_to_string_ex(args[i]);
}
php_wddx_add_var(packet, (*args[i]));
}
efree(args);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(wddx_add_vars)
{
int num_args, i;
zval ***args = NULL;
zval *packet_id;
wddx_packet *packet = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r+", &packet_id, &args, &num_args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE_NO_RETURN(packet, wddx_packet *, &packet_id, -1, "WDDX packet ID", le_wddx)) {
efree(args);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!packet) {
efree(args);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<num_args; i++) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(args[i]) != IS_ARRAY && Z_TYPE_PP(args[i]) != IS_OBJECT) {
convert_to_string_ex(args[i]);
}
php_wddx_add_var(packet, (*args[i]));
}
efree(args);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0884/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
[4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorController::didBeginFrame(int frameId)
{
if (InspectorTimelineAgent* timelineAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorTimelineAgent())
timelineAgent->didBeginFrame(frameId);
if (InspectorCanvasAgent* canvasAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorCanvasAgent())
canvasAgent->didBeginFrame();
}
|
void InspectorController::didBeginFrame(int frameId)
{
if (InspectorTimelineAgent* timelineAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorTimelineAgent())
timelineAgent->didBeginFrame(frameId);
if (InspectorCanvasAgent* canvasAgent = m_instrumentingAgents->inspectorCanvasAgent())
canvasAgent->didBeginFrame();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3179/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d800220da9f744779f1989e2092c88770adcd20a
|
d800220da9f744779f1989e2092c88770adcd20a
|
Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
|
ReadableByteStreamReader* ReadableByteStream::getBytesReader(ExecutionContext* executionContext, ExceptionState& es)
{
ReadableStreamReader* reader = getReader(executionContext, es);
if (es.hadException())
return nullptr;
return new ReadableByteStreamReader(reader);
}
|
ReadableByteStreamReader* ReadableByteStream::getBytesReader(ExecutionContext* executionContext, ExceptionState& es)
{
ReadableStreamReader* reader = getReader(executionContext, es);
if (es.hadException())
return nullptr;
return new ReadableByteStreamReader(reader);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14041/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/e5285319229a5d77bf316bb0d3a6cbd3cb8666d9
|
e5285319229a5d77bf316bb0d3a6cbd3cb8666d9
|
pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
|
static char *skip_int(char *start, int *out_n)
{
char *s;
char c;
*out_n = 0;
s = skip_white(start);
if (s == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
start = s;
while (*s) {
if (!isdigit(*s)) {
break;
}
++s;
}
c = *s;
*s = 0;
*out_n = atoi(start);
*s = c;
return s;
}
|
static char *skip_int(char *start, int *out_n)
{
char *s;
char c;
*out_n = 0;
s = skip_white(start);
if (s == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
start = s;
while (*s) {
if (!isdigit(*s)) {
break;
}
++s;
}
c = *s;
*s = 0;
*out_n = atoi(start);
*s = c;
return s;
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14469/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c
|
396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
ikev1_hash_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
return NULL;
}
|
ikev1_hash_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7277
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7277/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int skb_checksum_setup(struct sk_buff *skb, bool recalculate)
{
int err;
switch (skb->protocol) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv4(skb, recalculate);
break;
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv6(skb, recalculate);
break;
default:
err = -EPROTO;
break;
}
return err;
}
|
int skb_checksum_setup(struct sk_buff *skb, bool recalculate)
{
int err;
switch (skb->protocol) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv4(skb, recalculate);
break;
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv6(skb, recalculate);
break;
default:
err = -EPROTO;
break;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5400
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5400/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848
|
aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848
|
media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int airspy_s_frequency(struct file *file, void *priv,
const struct v4l2_frequency *f)
{
struct airspy *s = video_drvdata(file);
int ret;
u8 buf[4];
if (f->tuner == 0) {
s->f_adc = clamp_t(unsigned int, f->frequency,
bands[0].rangelow,
bands[0].rangehigh);
dev_dbg(s->dev, "ADC frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_adc);
ret = 0;
} else if (f->tuner == 1) {
s->f_rf = clamp_t(unsigned int, f->frequency,
bands_rf[0].rangelow,
bands_rf[0].rangehigh);
dev_dbg(s->dev, "RF frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_rf);
buf[0] = (s->f_rf >> 0) & 0xff;
buf[1] = (s->f_rf >> 8) & 0xff;
buf[2] = (s->f_rf >> 16) & 0xff;
buf[3] = (s->f_rf >> 24) & 0xff;
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_SET_FREQ, 0, 0, buf, 4);
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
|
static int airspy_s_frequency(struct file *file, void *priv,
const struct v4l2_frequency *f)
{
struct airspy *s = video_drvdata(file);
int ret;
u8 buf[4];
if (f->tuner == 0) {
s->f_adc = clamp_t(unsigned int, f->frequency,
bands[0].rangelow,
bands[0].rangehigh);
dev_dbg(s->dev, "ADC frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_adc);
ret = 0;
} else if (f->tuner == 1) {
s->f_rf = clamp_t(unsigned int, f->frequency,
bands_rf[0].rangelow,
bands_rf[0].rangehigh);
dev_dbg(s->dev, "RF frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_rf);
buf[0] = (s->f_rf >> 0) & 0xff;
buf[1] = (s->f_rf >> 8) & 0xff;
buf[2] = (s->f_rf >> 16) & 0xff;
buf[3] = (s->f_rf >> 24) & 0xff;
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_SET_FREQ, 0, 0, buf, 4);
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2384
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2384/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/44afb3a04391a74309d16180d1e4f8386fdfa745
|
44afb3a04391a74309d16180d1e4f8386fdfa745
|
drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
|
i915_gem_execbuffer_wait_for_flips(struct intel_ring_buffer *ring, u32 flips)
{
u32 plane, flip_mask;
int ret;
/* Check for any pending flips. As we only maintain a flip queue depth
* of 1, we can simply insert a WAIT for the next display flip prior
* to executing the batch and avoid stalling the CPU.
*/
for (plane = 0; flips >> plane; plane++) {
if (((flips >> plane) & 1) == 0)
continue;
if (plane)
flip_mask = MI_WAIT_FOR_PLANE_B_FLIP;
else
flip_mask = MI_WAIT_FOR_PLANE_A_FLIP;
ret = intel_ring_begin(ring, 2);
if (ret)
return ret;
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_WAIT_FOR_EVENT | flip_mask);
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_NOOP);
intel_ring_advance(ring);
}
return 0;
}
|
i915_gem_execbuffer_wait_for_flips(struct intel_ring_buffer *ring, u32 flips)
{
u32 plane, flip_mask;
int ret;
/* Check for any pending flips. As we only maintain a flip queue depth
* of 1, we can simply insert a WAIT for the next display flip prior
* to executing the batch and avoid stalling the CPU.
*/
for (plane = 0; flips >> plane; plane++) {
if (((flips >> plane) & 1) == 0)
continue;
if (plane)
flip_mask = MI_WAIT_FOR_PLANE_B_FLIP;
else
flip_mask = MI_WAIT_FOR_PLANE_A_FLIP;
ret = intel_ring_begin(ring, 2);
if (ret)
return ret;
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_WAIT_FOR_EVENT | flip_mask);
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_NOOP);
intel_ring_advance(ring);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
bool ValidityMessages::HasSureError(ServerFieldType field) const {
return IsSureError(GetMessageOrDefault(field));
}
|
bool ValidityMessages::HasSureError(ServerFieldType field) const {
return IsSureError(GetMessageOrDefault(field));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
if (hdev) {
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
mgmt_index_added(hdev);
clear_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags);
hci_dev_close(hdev->id);
}
atomic_dec(&hdev->promisc);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
sock_orphan(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
|
static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
if (hdev) {
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
mgmt_index_added(hdev);
clear_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags);
hci_dev_close(hdev->id);
}
atomic_dec(&hdev->promisc);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
sock_orphan(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10017/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/492022c7297ede682161d9c0ec2de15526424e76
|
492022c7297ede682161d9c0ec2de15526424e76
|
[Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
CHANNELINDEX CSoundFile::CheckNNA(CHANNELINDEX nChn, uint32 instr, int note, bool forceCut)
{
CHANNELINDEX nnaChn = CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
ModChannel &srcChn = m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
const ModInstrument *pIns = nullptr;
if(!ModCommand::IsNote(static_cast<ModCommand::NOTE>(note)))
{
return nnaChn;
}
if((!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT | MOD_TYPE_MT2)) || !m_nInstruments || forceCut) && !srcChn.HasMIDIOutput())
{
if(!srcChn.nLength || srcChn.dwFlags[CHN_MUTE] || !(srcChn.rightVol | srcChn.leftVol))
{
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
}
nnaChn = GetNNAChannel(nChn);
if(!nnaChn) return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nnaChn];
chn = srcChn;
chn.dwFlags.reset(CHN_VIBRATO | CHN_TREMOLO | CHN_MUTE | CHN_PORTAMENTO);
chn.nPanbrelloOffset = 0;
chn.nMasterChn = nChn + 1;
chn.nCommand = CMD_NONE;
chn.rowCommand.Clear();
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
srcChn.nLength = 0;
srcChn.position.Set(0);
srcChn.nROfs = srcChn.nLOfs = 0;
srcChn.rightVol = srcChn.leftVol = 0;
return nnaChn;
}
if(instr > GetNumInstruments()) instr = 0;
const ModSample *pSample = srcChn.pModSample;
pIns = instr > 0 ? Instruments[instr] : srcChn.pModInstrument;
if(pIns != nullptr)
{
uint32 n = pIns->Keyboard[note - NOTE_MIN];
note = pIns->NoteMap[note - NOTE_MIN];
if ((n) && (n < MAX_SAMPLES))
{
pSample = &Samples[n];
} else if(m_playBehaviour[kITEmptyNoteMapSlot] && !pIns->HasValidMIDIChannel())
{
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
}
}
if (srcChn.dwFlags[CHN_MUTE])
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
for(CHANNELINDEX i = nChn; i < MAX_CHANNELS; i++)
if(i >= m_nChannels || i == nChn)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[i];
bool applyDNAtoPlug = false;
if((chn.nMasterChn == nChn + 1 || i == nChn) && chn.pModInstrument != nullptr)
{
bool bOk = false;
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDCT)
{
case DCT_NOTE:
if(note && chn.nNote == note && pIns == chn.pModInstrument) bOk = true;
if(pIns && pIns->nMixPlug) applyDNAtoPlug = true;
break;
case DCT_SAMPLE:
if(pSample != nullptr && pSample == chn.pModSample) bOk = true;
break;
case DCT_INSTRUMENT:
if(pIns == chn.pModInstrument) bOk = true;
if(pIns && pIns->nMixPlug) applyDNAtoPlug = true;
break;
case DCT_PLUGIN:
if(pIns && (pIns->nMixPlug) && (pIns->nMixPlug == chn.pModInstrument->nMixPlug))
{
applyDNAtoPlug = true;
bOk = true;
}
break;
}
if (bOk)
{
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
if (applyDNAtoPlug && chn.nNote != NOTE_NONE)
{
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDNA)
{
case DNA_NOTECUT:
case DNA_NOTEOFF:
case DNA_NOTEFADE:
SendMIDINote(i, chn.GetPluginNote(m_playBehaviour[kITRealNoteMapping]) + NOTE_MAX_SPECIAL, 0);
chn.nArpeggioLastNote = NOTE_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDNA)
{
case DNA_NOTECUT:
KeyOff(&chn);
chn.nVolume = 0;
break;
case DNA_NOTEOFF:
KeyOff(&chn);
break;
case DNA_NOTEFADE:
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
}
if(!chn.nVolume)
{
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
}
}
}
bool applyNNAtoPlug = false;
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
IMixPlugin *pPlugin = nullptr;
if(srcChn.HasMIDIOutput() && ModCommand::IsNote(srcChn.nNote)) // instro sends to a midi chan
{
PLUGINDEX nPlugin = GetBestPlugin(nChn, PrioritiseInstrument, RespectMutes);
if(nPlugin > 0 && nPlugin <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS)
{
pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[nPlugin-1].pMixPlugin;
if(pPlugin)
{
applyNNAtoPlug = pPlugin->IsNotePlaying(srcChn.GetPluginNote(m_playBehaviour[kITRealNoteMapping]), GetBestMidiChannel(nChn), nChn);
}
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
if((srcChn.nRealVolume > 0 && srcChn.nLength > 0) || applyNNAtoPlug)
{
nnaChn = GetNNAChannel(nChn);
if(nnaChn != 0)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nnaChn];
chn = srcChn;
chn.dwFlags.reset(CHN_VIBRATO | CHN_TREMOLO | CHN_PORTAMENTO);
chn.nPanbrelloOffset = 0;
chn.nMasterChn = nChn < GetNumChannels() ? nChn + 1 : 0;
chn.nCommand = CMD_NONE;
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
if(applyNNAtoPlug && pPlugin)
{
switch(srcChn.nNNA)
{
case NNA_NOTEOFF:
case NNA_NOTECUT:
case NNA_NOTEFADE:
SendMIDINote(nChn, NOTE_KEYOFF, 0);
srcChn.nArpeggioLastNote = NOTE_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
switch(srcChn.nNNA)
{
case NNA_NOTEOFF:
KeyOff(&chn);
break;
case NNA_NOTECUT:
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
case NNA_NOTEFADE:
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
}
if(!chn.nVolume)
{
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
srcChn.nLength = 0;
srcChn.position.Set(0);
srcChn.nROfs = srcChn.nLOfs = 0;
}
}
return nnaChn;
}
|
CHANNELINDEX CSoundFile::CheckNNA(CHANNELINDEX nChn, uint32 instr, int note, bool forceCut)
{
CHANNELINDEX nnaChn = CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
ModChannel &srcChn = m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
const ModInstrument *pIns = nullptr;
if(!ModCommand::IsNote(static_cast<ModCommand::NOTE>(note)))
{
return nnaChn;
}
if((!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT | MOD_TYPE_MT2)) || !m_nInstruments || forceCut) && !srcChn.HasMIDIOutput())
{
if(!srcChn.nLength || srcChn.dwFlags[CHN_MUTE] || !(srcChn.rightVol | srcChn.leftVol))
{
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
}
nnaChn = GetNNAChannel(nChn);
if(!nnaChn) return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nnaChn];
chn = srcChn;
chn.dwFlags.reset(CHN_VIBRATO | CHN_TREMOLO | CHN_MUTE | CHN_PORTAMENTO);
chn.nPanbrelloOffset = 0;
chn.nMasterChn = nChn + 1;
chn.nCommand = CMD_NONE;
chn.rowCommand.Clear();
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
srcChn.nLength = 0;
srcChn.position.Set(0);
srcChn.nROfs = srcChn.nLOfs = 0;
srcChn.rightVol = srcChn.leftVol = 0;
return nnaChn;
}
if(instr > GetNumInstruments()) instr = 0;
const ModSample *pSample = srcChn.pModSample;
pIns = instr > 0 ? Instruments[instr] : srcChn.pModInstrument;
if(pIns != nullptr)
{
uint32 n = pIns->Keyboard[note - NOTE_MIN];
note = pIns->NoteMap[note - NOTE_MIN];
if ((n) && (n < MAX_SAMPLES))
{
pSample = &Samples[n];
} else if(m_playBehaviour[kITEmptyNoteMapSlot] && !pIns->HasValidMIDIChannel())
{
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
}
}
if (srcChn.dwFlags[CHN_MUTE])
return CHANNELINDEX_INVALID;
for(CHANNELINDEX i = nChn; i < MAX_CHANNELS; i++)
if(i >= m_nChannels || i == nChn)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[i];
bool applyDNAtoPlug = false;
if((chn.nMasterChn == nChn + 1 || i == nChn) && chn.pModInstrument != nullptr)
{
bool bOk = false;
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDCT)
{
case DCT_NOTE:
if(note && chn.nNote == note && pIns == chn.pModInstrument) bOk = true;
if(pIns && pIns->nMixPlug) applyDNAtoPlug = true;
break;
case DCT_SAMPLE:
if(pSample != nullptr && pSample == chn.pModSample) bOk = true;
break;
case DCT_INSTRUMENT:
if(pIns == chn.pModInstrument) bOk = true;
if(pIns && pIns->nMixPlug) applyDNAtoPlug = true;
break;
case DCT_PLUGIN:
if(pIns && (pIns->nMixPlug) && (pIns->nMixPlug == chn.pModInstrument->nMixPlug))
{
applyDNAtoPlug = true;
bOk = true;
}
break;
}
if (bOk)
{
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
if (applyDNAtoPlug && chn.nNote != NOTE_NONE)
{
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDNA)
{
case DNA_NOTECUT:
case DNA_NOTEOFF:
case DNA_NOTEFADE:
SendMIDINote(i, chn.GetPluginNote(m_playBehaviour[kITRealNoteMapping]) + NOTE_MAX_SPECIAL, 0);
chn.nArpeggioLastNote = NOTE_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
switch(chn.pModInstrument->nDNA)
{
case DNA_NOTECUT:
KeyOff(&chn);
chn.nVolume = 0;
break;
case DNA_NOTEOFF:
KeyOff(&chn);
break;
case DNA_NOTEFADE:
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
}
if(!chn.nVolume)
{
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
}
}
}
bool applyNNAtoPlug = false;
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
IMixPlugin *pPlugin = nullptr;
if(srcChn.HasMIDIOutput() && ModCommand::IsNote(srcChn.nNote)) // instro sends to a midi chan
{
PLUGINDEX nPlugin = GetBestPlugin(nChn, PrioritiseInstrument, RespectMutes);
if(nPlugin > 0 && nPlugin <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS)
{
pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[nPlugin-1].pMixPlugin;
if(pPlugin)
{
applyNNAtoPlug = pPlugin->IsNotePlaying(srcChn.GetPluginNote(m_playBehaviour[kITRealNoteMapping]), GetBestMidiChannel(nChn), nChn);
}
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
if((srcChn.nRealVolume > 0 && srcChn.nLength > 0) || applyNNAtoPlug)
{
nnaChn = GetNNAChannel(nChn);
if(nnaChn != 0)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nnaChn];
chn = srcChn;
chn.dwFlags.reset(CHN_VIBRATO | CHN_TREMOLO | CHN_PORTAMENTO);
chn.nPanbrelloOffset = 0;
chn.nMasterChn = nChn < GetNumChannels() ? nChn + 1 : 0;
chn.nCommand = CMD_NONE;
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
if(applyNNAtoPlug && pPlugin)
{
switch(srcChn.nNNA)
{
case NNA_NOTEOFF:
case NNA_NOTECUT:
case NNA_NOTEFADE:
SendMIDINote(nChn, NOTE_KEYOFF, 0);
srcChn.nArpeggioLastNote = NOTE_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
switch(srcChn.nNNA)
{
case NNA_NOTEOFF:
KeyOff(&chn);
break;
case NNA_NOTECUT:
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
case NNA_NOTEFADE:
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
break;
}
if(!chn.nVolume)
{
chn.nFadeOutVol = 0;
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE | CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
srcChn.nLength = 0;
srcChn.position.Set(0);
srcChn.nROfs = srcChn.nLOfs = 0;
}
}
return nnaChn;
}
|
C
|
openmpt
| 0 |
CVE-2008-1950
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-1950/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b
|
bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b
| null |
_gnutls_recv_finished (gnutls_session_t session)
{
uint8_t data[36], *vrfy;
int data_size;
int ret;
int vrfysize;
ret =
_gnutls_recv_handshake (session, &vrfy, &vrfysize,
GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, MANDATORY_PACKET);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERR ("recv finished int", ret);
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version (session) == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{
data_size = 36;
}
else
{
data_size = 12;
}
if (vrfysize != data_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return GNUTLS_E_ERROR_IN_FINISHED_PACKET;
}
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version (session) == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{
ret =
_gnutls_ssl3_finished (session,
(session->security_parameters.
entity + 1) % 2, data);
}
else
{ /* TLS 1.0 */
ret =
_gnutls_finished (session,
(session->security_parameters.entity +
1) % 2, data);
}
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return ret;
}
if (memcmp (vrfy, data, data_size) != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
ret = GNUTLS_E_ERROR_IN_FINISHED_PACKET;
}
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return ret;
}
|
_gnutls_recv_finished (gnutls_session_t session)
{
uint8_t data[36], *vrfy;
int data_size;
int ret;
int vrfysize;
ret =
_gnutls_recv_handshake (session, &vrfy, &vrfysize,
GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, MANDATORY_PACKET);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERR ("recv finished int", ret);
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version (session) == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{
data_size = 36;
}
else
{
data_size = 12;
}
if (vrfysize != data_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return GNUTLS_E_ERROR_IN_FINISHED_PACKET;
}
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version (session) == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{
ret =
_gnutls_ssl3_finished (session,
(session->security_parameters.
entity + 1) % 2, data);
}
else
{ /* TLS 1.0 */
ret =
_gnutls_finished (session,
(session->security_parameters.entity +
1) % 2, data);
}
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return ret;
}
if (memcmp (vrfy, data, data_size) != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
ret = GNUTLS_E_ERROR_IN_FINISHED_PACKET;
}
gnutls_free (vrfy);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void sw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
WARN_ON(event->parent);
static_key_slow_dec(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
swevent_hlist_put();
}
|
static void sw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
WARN_ON(event->parent);
static_key_slow_dec(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
swevent_hlist_put();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0036
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0036/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/bagder/curl/commit/75ca568fa1c19de4c5358fed246686de8467c238
|
75ca568fa1c19de4c5358fed246686de8467c238
|
URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
|
static CURLcode imap_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
bool premature)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct FTP *imap = data->state.proto.imap;
CURLcode result=CURLE_OK;
(void)premature;
if(!imap)
/* When the easy handle is removed from the multi while libcurl is still
* trying to resolve the host name, it seems that the imap struct is not
* yet initialized, but the removal action calls Curl_done() which calls
* this function. So we simply return success if no imap pointer is set.
*/
return CURLE_OK;
if(status) {
conn->bits.close = TRUE; /* marked for closure */
result = status; /* use the already set error code */
}
/* clear these for next connection */
imap->transfer = FTPTRANSFER_BODY;
return result;
}
|
static CURLcode imap_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
bool premature)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct FTP *imap = data->state.proto.imap;
CURLcode result=CURLE_OK;
(void)premature;
if(!imap)
/* When the easy handle is removed from the multi while libcurl is still
* trying to resolve the host name, it seems that the imap struct is not
* yet initialized, but the removal action calls Curl_done() which calls
* this function. So we simply return success if no imap pointer is set.
*/
return CURLE_OK;
if(status) {
conn->bits.close = TRUE; /* marked for closure */
result = status; /* use the already set error code */
}
/* clear these for next connection */
imap->transfer = FTPTRANSFER_BODY;
return result;
}
|
C
|
curl
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
void SetWallpaper(const gfx::ImageSkia& image, wallpaper::WallpaperInfo info) {
if (ash_util::IsRunningInMash()) {
service_manager::Connector* connector =
content::ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector();
if (!connector)
return;
ash::mojom::WallpaperControllerPtr wallpaper_controller;
connector->BindInterface(ash::mojom::kServiceName, &wallpaper_controller);
wallpaper_controller->SetWallpaper(*image.bitmap(), info);
} else if (ash::Shell::HasInstance()) {
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller()->SetWallpaperImage(image, info);
}
}
|
void SetWallpaper(const gfx::ImageSkia& image, wallpaper::WallpaperInfo info) {
if (ash_util::IsRunningInMash()) {
service_manager::Connector* connector =
content::ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector();
if (!connector)
return;
ash::mojom::WallpaperControllerPtr wallpaper_controller;
connector->BindInterface(ash::mojom::kServiceName, &wallpaper_controller);
wallpaper_controller->SetWallpaper(*image.bitmap(), info);
} else if (ash::Shell::HasInstance()) {
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller()->SetWallpaperImage(image, info);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
IPC::Message* ExecuteBrowserCommandObserver::ReleaseReply() {
return reply_message_.release();
}
|
IPC::Message* ExecuteBrowserCommandObserver::ReleaseReply() {
return reply_message_.release();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7566
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7566/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cb3232138e37129e88240a98a1d2aba2187ff57c
|
cb3232138e37129e88240a98a1d2aba2187ff57c
|
USB: serial: visor: fix crash on detecting device without write_urbs
The visor driver crashes in clie_5_attach() when a specially crafted USB
device without bulk-out endpoint is detected. This fix adds a check that
the device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Fixes: cfb8da8f69b8 ("USB: visor: fix initialisation of UX50/TH55 devices")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
|
static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_bulk_out < 2) {
dev_err(&serial->interface->dev, "missing bulk out endpoints\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
|
static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_ports < 2)
return -1;
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThreadImpl::OnSetZoomLevelForCurrentURL(const std::string& host,
double zoom_level) {
RenderViewZoomer zoomer(host, zoom_level);
content::RenderView::ForEach(&zoomer);
}
|
void RenderThreadImpl::OnSetZoomLevelForCurrentURL(const std::string& host,
double zoom_level) {
RenderViewZoomer zoomer(host, zoom_level);
content::RenderView::ForEach(&zoomer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15419
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15419/
|
CWE-601
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fa17c9878dbeebf991b25ac0deb2b4635d85f1b6
|
fa17c9878dbeebf991b25ac0deb2b4635d85f1b6
|
Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
|
ReferrerPolicy HTMLIFrameElement::ReferrerPolicyAttribute() {
return referrer_policy_;
}
|
ReferrerPolicy HTMLIFrameElement::ReferrerPolicyAttribute() {
return referrer_policy_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cc9b17ad29ecaa20bfe426a8d4dbfb94b13ff1cc
|
cc9b17ad29ecaa20bfe426a8d4dbfb94b13ff1cc
|
net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void sock_def_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
rcu_read_lock();
wq = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_wq);
if (wq_has_sleeper(wq))
wake_up_interruptible_all(&wq->wait);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
|
static void sock_def_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
rcu_read_lock();
wq = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_wq);
if (wq_has_sleeper(wq))
wake_up_interruptible_all(&wq->wait);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/820957a3386e960334be3b93b48636e749d38ea3
|
820957a3386e960334be3b93b48636e749d38ea3
|
Make WebContentsDelegate::OpenColorChooser return NULL on failure
Changing WebContentsDelegate::OpenColorChooser to return NULL on failure so we don't put the same ColorChooser into two scoped_ptrs(WebContentsImpl::color_chooser_)
BUG=331790
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/128053002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244710 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::GetWebUI() const {
return GetRenderManager()->web_ui() ? GetRenderManager()->web_ui()
: GetRenderManager()->pending_web_ui();
}
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::GetWebUI() const {
return GetRenderManager()->web_ui() ? GetRenderManager()->web_ui()
: GetRenderManager()->pending_web_ui();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
RenderStyle* Element::computedStyle(PseudoId pseudoElementSpecifier)
{
if (PseudoElement* element = pseudoElement(pseudoElementSpecifier))
return element->computedStyle();
if (RenderStyle* usedStyle = renderStyle()) {
if (pseudoElementSpecifier) {
RenderStyle* cachedPseudoStyle = usedStyle->getCachedPseudoStyle(pseudoElementSpecifier);
return cachedPseudoStyle ? cachedPseudoStyle : usedStyle;
} else
return usedStyle;
}
if (!attached())
return 0;
ElementRareData* data = ensureElementRareData();
if (!data->computedStyle())
data->setComputedStyle(document()->styleForElementIgnoringPendingStylesheets(this));
return pseudoElementSpecifier ? data->computedStyle()->getCachedPseudoStyle(pseudoElementSpecifier) : data->computedStyle();
}
|
RenderStyle* Element::computedStyle(PseudoId pseudoElementSpecifier)
{
if (PseudoElement* element = pseudoElement(pseudoElementSpecifier))
return element->computedStyle();
if (RenderStyle* usedStyle = renderStyle()) {
if (pseudoElementSpecifier) {
RenderStyle* cachedPseudoStyle = usedStyle->getCachedPseudoStyle(pseudoElementSpecifier);
return cachedPseudoStyle ? cachedPseudoStyle : usedStyle;
} else
return usedStyle;
}
if (!attached())
return 0;
ElementRareData* data = ensureElementRareData();
if (!data->computedStyle())
data->setComputedStyle(document()->styleForElementIgnoringPendingStylesheets(this));
return pseudoElementSpecifier ? data->computedStyle()->getCachedPseudoStyle(pseudoElementSpecifier) : data->computedStyle();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4471
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4471/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/kyz/libmspack/commit/18b6a2cc0b87536015bedd4f7763e6b02d5aa4f3
|
18b6a2cc0b87536015bedd4f7763e6b02d5aa4f3
|
Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header
|
static void lzxd_reset_state(struct lzxd_stream *lzx) {
int i;
lzx->R0 = 1;
lzx->R1 = 1;
lzx->R2 = 1;
lzx->header_read = 0;
lzx->block_remaining = 0;
lzx->block_type = LZX_BLOCKTYPE_INVALID;
/* initialise tables to 0 (because deltas will be applied to them) */
for (i = 0; i < LZX_MAINTREE_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->MAINTREE_len[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < LZX_LENGTH_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->LENGTH_len[i] = 0;
}
|
static void lzxd_reset_state(struct lzxd_stream *lzx) {
int i;
lzx->R0 = 1;
lzx->R1 = 1;
lzx->R2 = 1;
lzx->header_read = 0;
lzx->block_remaining = 0;
lzx->block_type = LZX_BLOCKTYPE_INVALID;
/* initialise tables to 0 (because deltas will be applied to them) */
for (i = 0; i < LZX_MAINTREE_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->MAINTREE_len[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < LZX_LENGTH_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->LENGTH_len[i] = 0;
}
|
C
|
libmspack
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5829
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5829/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/93a2001bdfd5376c3dc2158653034c20392d15c5
|
93a2001bdfd5376c3dc2158653034c20392d15c5
|
HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static noinline int hiddev_ioctl_string(struct hiddev *hiddev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *user_arg)
{
struct hid_device *hid = hiddev->hid;
struct usb_device *dev = hid_to_usb_dev(hid);
int idx, len;
char *buf;
if (get_user(idx, (int __user *)user_arg))
return -EFAULT;
if ((buf = kmalloc(HID_STRING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if ((len = usb_string(dev, idx, buf, HID_STRING_SIZE-1)) < 0) {
kfree(buf);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_to_user(user_arg+sizeof(int), buf, len+1)) {
kfree(buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(buf);
return len;
}
|
static noinline int hiddev_ioctl_string(struct hiddev *hiddev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *user_arg)
{
struct hid_device *hid = hiddev->hid;
struct usb_device *dev = hid_to_usb_dev(hid);
int idx, len;
char *buf;
if (get_user(idx, (int __user *)user_arg))
return -EFAULT;
if ((buf = kmalloc(HID_STRING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if ((len = usb_string(dev, idx, buf, HID_STRING_SIZE-1)) < 0) {
kfree(buf);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_to_user(user_arg+sizeof(int), buf, len+1)) {
kfree(buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(buf);
return len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
inline ElementRareData* Element::ensureElementRareData()
{
return static_cast<ElementRareData*>(ensureRareData());
}
|
inline ElementRareData* Element::ensureElementRareData()
{
return static_cast<ElementRareData*>(ensureRareData());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2527/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2-demos.git/commit/?id=b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
|
b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
| null |
usage( char* execname )
{
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "ftstring: string viewer -- part of the FreeType project\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "-------------------------------------------------------\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [options below] ppem fontname[.ttf|.ttc] ...\n",
execname );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -e enc specify encoding tag (default: unic)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -m message message to display\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
|
usage( char* execname )
{
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "ftstring: string viewer -- part of the FreeType project\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "-------------------------------------------------------\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [options below] ppem fontname[.ttf|.ttc] ...\n",
execname );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -e enc specify encoding tag (default: unic)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -m message message to display\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
ConnectionTracker* preconnecting_server_connection_tracker() const {
return preconnecting_server_connection_tracker_.get();
}
|
ConnectionTracker* preconnecting_server_connection_tracker() const {
return preconnecting_server_connection_tracker_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
CC: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
gen_svm_check_intercept(DisasContext *s, target_ulong pc_start, uint64_t type)
{
gen_svm_check_intercept_param(s, pc_start, type, 0);
}
|
gen_svm_check_intercept(DisasContext *s, target_ulong pc_start, uint64_t type)
{
gen_svm_check_intercept_param(s, pc_start, type, 0);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8952
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8952/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/be0726d33cb8f411945884664924bed3cb8c70ee
|
be0726d33cb8f411945884664924bed3cb8c70ee
|
ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext2_inode_info *ei = (struct ext2_inode_info *) foo;
rwlock_init(&ei->i_meta_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
#endif
mutex_init(&ei->truncate_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
init_rwsem(&ei->dax_sem);
#endif
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
|
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext2_inode_info *ei = (struct ext2_inode_info *) foo;
rwlock_init(&ei->i_meta_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
#endif
mutex_init(&ei->truncate_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
init_rwsem(&ei->dax_sem);
#endif
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2141/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void signal_delivered(int sig, siginfo_t *info, struct k_sigaction *ka,
struct pt_regs *regs, int stepping)
{
sigset_t blocked;
/* A signal was successfully delivered, and the
saved sigmask was stored on the signal frame,
and will be restored by sigreturn. So we can
simply clear the restore sigmask flag. */
clear_restore_sigmask();
sigorsets(&blocked, ¤t->blocked, &ka->sa.sa_mask);
if (!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_NODEFER))
sigaddset(&blocked, sig);
set_current_blocked(&blocked);
tracehook_signal_handler(sig, info, ka, regs, stepping);
}
|
void signal_delivered(int sig, siginfo_t *info, struct k_sigaction *ka,
struct pt_regs *regs, int stepping)
{
sigset_t blocked;
/* A signal was successfully delivered, and the
saved sigmask was stored on the signal frame,
and will be restored by sigreturn. So we can
simply clear the restore sigmask flag. */
clear_restore_sigmask();
sigorsets(&blocked, ¤t->blocked, &ka->sa.sa_mask);
if (!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_NODEFER))
sigaddset(&blocked, sig);
set_current_blocked(&blocked);
tracehook_signal_handler(sig, info, ka, regs, stepping);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/acae973ac6297404fe3c9b389b69bf3c7e62cd19
|
acae973ac6297404fe3c9b389b69bf3c7e62cd19
|
2009-07-24 Jian Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
[V8] More V8 bindings changes to use ErrorEvent.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27630
* bindings/v8/DOMObjectsInclude.h:
* bindings/v8/DerivedSourcesAllInOne.cpp:
* bindings/v8/V8DOMWrapper.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DOMWrapper::convertEventToV8Object):
* bindings/v8/V8Index.cpp:
* bindings/v8/V8Index.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@46360 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(v8::Handle<v8::Object> object, int type, void* cptr)
{
ASSERT(object->InternalFieldCount() >= 2);
object->SetPointerInInternalField(V8Custom::kDOMWrapperObjectIndex, cptr);
object->SetInternalField(V8Custom::kDOMWrapperTypeIndex, v8::Integer::New(type));
}
|
void V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(v8::Handle<v8::Object> object, int type, void* cptr)
{
ASSERT(object->InternalFieldCount() >= 2);
object->SetPointerInInternalField(V8Custom::kDOMWrapperObjectIndex, cptr);
object->SetInternalField(V8Custom::kDOMWrapperTypeIndex, v8::Integer::New(type));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/51dfe5e3b332bcea02fb4d4c7493ae841106dd9b
|
51dfe5e3b332bcea02fb4d4c7493ae841106dd9b
|
Add ALSA support to volume keys
If PulseAudio is running, everything should behave as before, otherwise use ALSA API for adjusting volume. The previous PulseAudioMixer was split into AudioMixerBase and audioMixerPusle, then AudioMixerAlsa was added.
BUG=chromium-os:10470
TEST=Volume keys should work even if pulseaudio disabled
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/5859003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@71115 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AudioHandler::AdjustVolumeByPercent(double adjust_by_percent) {
if (!VerifyMixerConnection())
return;
DVLOG(1) << "Adjusting Volume by " << adjust_by_percent << " percent";
double volume = mixer_->GetVolumeDb();
double pct = VolumeDbToPercent(volume);
if (pct < 0)
pct = 0;
pct = pct + adjust_by_percent;
if (pct > 100.0)
pct = 100.0;
double new_volume;
if (pct <= 0.1)
new_volume = AudioMixer::kSilenceDb;
else
new_volume = PercentToVolumeDb(pct);
if (new_volume != volume)
mixer_->SetVolumeDb(new_volume);
}
|
void AudioHandler::AdjustVolumeByPercent(double adjust_by_percent) {
if (!VerifyMixerConnection())
return;
DVLOG(1) << "Adjusting Volume by " << adjust_by_percent << " percent";
double volume = mixer_->GetVolumeDb();
double pct = VolumeDbToPercent(volume);
if (pct < 0)
pct = 0;
pct = pct + adjust_by_percent;
if (pct > 100.0)
pct = 100.0;
double new_volume;
if (pct <= 0.1)
new_volume = kSilenceDb;
else
new_volume = PercentToVolumeDb(pct);
if (new_volume != volume)
mixer_->SetVolumeDb(new_volume);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectUnsignedShortAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectUnsignedShortAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4588/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
static int ip_vs_genl_dump_daemons(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
if ((ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) && !cb->args[0]) {
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_daemon(skb, IP_VS_STATE_MASTER,
ip_vs_master_mcast_ifn,
ip_vs_master_syncid, cb) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
cb->args[0] = 1;
}
if ((ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) && !cb->args[1]) {
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_daemon(skb, IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP,
ip_vs_backup_mcast_ifn,
ip_vs_backup_syncid, cb) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
cb->args[1] = 1;
}
nla_put_failure:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
return skb->len;
}
|
static int ip_vs_genl_dump_daemons(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
if ((ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) && !cb->args[0]) {
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_daemon(skb, IP_VS_STATE_MASTER,
ip_vs_master_mcast_ifn,
ip_vs_master_syncid, cb) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
cb->args[0] = 1;
}
if ((ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) && !cb->args[1]) {
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_daemon(skb, IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP,
ip_vs_backup_mcast_ifn,
ip_vs_backup_syncid, cb) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
cb->args[1] = 1;
}
nla_put_failure:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
return skb->len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int paging64_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
return paging64_init_context_common(vcpu, context, PT64_ROOT_LEVEL);
}
|
static int paging64_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
return paging64_init_context_common(vcpu, context, PT64_ROOT_LEVEL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_process_tx_desc(E1000ECore *core,
struct e1000e_tx *tx,
struct e1000_tx_desc *dp,
int queue_index)
{
uint32_t txd_lower = le32_to_cpu(dp->lower.data);
uint32_t dtype = txd_lower & (E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT | E1000_TXD_DTYP_D);
unsigned int split_size = txd_lower & 0xffff;
uint64_t addr;
struct e1000_context_desc *xp = (struct e1000_context_desc *)dp;
bool eop = txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_EOP;
if (dtype == E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT) { /* context descriptor */
e1000x_read_tx_ctx_descr(xp, &tx->props);
e1000e_process_snap_option(core, le32_to_cpu(xp->cmd_and_length));
return;
} else if (dtype == (E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT | E1000_TXD_DTYP_D)) {
/* data descriptor */
tx->props.sum_needed = le32_to_cpu(dp->upper.data) >> 8;
tx->props.cptse = (txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_TSE) ? 1 : 0;
e1000e_process_ts_option(core, dp);
} else {
/* legacy descriptor */
e1000e_process_ts_option(core, dp);
tx->props.cptse = 0;
}
addr = le64_to_cpu(dp->buffer_addr);
if (!tx->skip_cp) {
if (!net_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(tx->tx_pkt, addr, split_size)) {
tx->skip_cp = true;
}
}
if (eop) {
if (!tx->skip_cp && net_tx_pkt_parse(tx->tx_pkt)) {
if (e1000x_vlan_enabled(core->mac) &&
e1000x_is_vlan_txd(txd_lower)) {
net_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header_ex(tx->tx_pkt,
le16_to_cpu(dp->upper.fields.special), core->vet);
}
if (e1000e_tx_pkt_send(core, tx, queue_index)) {
e1000e_on_tx_done_update_stats(core, tx->tx_pkt);
}
}
tx->skip_cp = false;
net_tx_pkt_reset(tx->tx_pkt);
tx->props.sum_needed = 0;
tx->props.cptse = 0;
}
}
|
e1000e_process_tx_desc(E1000ECore *core,
struct e1000e_tx *tx,
struct e1000_tx_desc *dp,
int queue_index)
{
uint32_t txd_lower = le32_to_cpu(dp->lower.data);
uint32_t dtype = txd_lower & (E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT | E1000_TXD_DTYP_D);
unsigned int split_size = txd_lower & 0xffff;
uint64_t addr;
struct e1000_context_desc *xp = (struct e1000_context_desc *)dp;
bool eop = txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_EOP;
if (dtype == E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT) { /* context descriptor */
e1000x_read_tx_ctx_descr(xp, &tx->props);
e1000e_process_snap_option(core, le32_to_cpu(xp->cmd_and_length));
return;
} else if (dtype == (E1000_TXD_CMD_DEXT | E1000_TXD_DTYP_D)) {
/* data descriptor */
tx->props.sum_needed = le32_to_cpu(dp->upper.data) >> 8;
tx->props.cptse = (txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_TSE) ? 1 : 0;
e1000e_process_ts_option(core, dp);
} else {
/* legacy descriptor */
e1000e_process_ts_option(core, dp);
tx->props.cptse = 0;
}
addr = le64_to_cpu(dp->buffer_addr);
if (!tx->skip_cp) {
if (!net_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(tx->tx_pkt, addr, split_size)) {
tx->skip_cp = true;
}
}
if (eop) {
if (!tx->skip_cp && net_tx_pkt_parse(tx->tx_pkt)) {
if (e1000x_vlan_enabled(core->mac) &&
e1000x_is_vlan_txd(txd_lower)) {
net_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header_ex(tx->tx_pkt,
le16_to_cpu(dp->upper.fields.special), core->vet);
}
if (e1000e_tx_pkt_send(core, tx, queue_index)) {
e1000e_on_tx_done_update_stats(core, tx->tx_pkt);
}
}
tx->skip_cp = false;
net_tx_pkt_reset(tx->tx_pkt);
tx->props.sum_needed = 0;
tx->props.cptse = 0;
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr2AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr2._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr2());
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr2AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr2._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr2());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRenderProcessGone(int status, int exit_code) {
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
render_view_host_->render_view_termination_status_ =
static_cast<base::TerminationStatus>(status);
}
frame_tree_node_->ResetForNewProcess();
SetRenderFrameCreated(false);
InvalidateMojoConnection();
document_scoped_interface_provider_binding_.Close();
SetLastCommittedUrl(GURL());
for (auto& iter : ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_)
std::move(iter.second).Run(ui::AXTreeUpdate());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (base::IDMap<std::unique_ptr<ExtractSmartClipDataCallback>>::iterator
iter(&smart_clip_callbacks_);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
std::move(*iter.GetCurrentValue()).Run(base::string16(), base::string16());
}
smart_clip_callbacks_.Clear();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.clear();
javascript_callbacks_.clear();
visual_state_callbacks_.clear();
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset();
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ = 0;
if (!is_active()) {
OnSwappedOut();
} else {
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->CancelPendingIfNecessary(this);
}
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRenderProcessGone(int status, int exit_code) {
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
render_view_host_->render_view_termination_status_ =
static_cast<base::TerminationStatus>(status);
}
frame_tree_node_->ResetForNewProcess();
SetRenderFrameCreated(false);
InvalidateMojoConnection();
document_scoped_interface_provider_binding_.Close();
SetLastCommittedUrl(GURL());
for (auto& iter : ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_)
std::move(iter.second).Run(ui::AXTreeUpdate());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (base::IDMap<std::unique_ptr<ExtractSmartClipDataCallback>>::iterator
iter(&smart_clip_callbacks_);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
std::move(*iter.GetCurrentValue()).Run(base::string16(), base::string16());
}
smart_clip_callbacks_.Clear();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.clear();
javascript_callbacks_.clear();
visual_state_callbacks_.clear();
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset();
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ = 0;
if (!is_active()) {
OnSwappedOut();
} else {
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->CancelPendingIfNecessary(this);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_METHOD(CURLFile, __wakeup)
{
zval *_this = getThis();
zend_unset_property(curl_CURLFile_class, _this, "name", sizeof("name")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_update_property_string(curl_CURLFile_class, _this, "name", sizeof("name")-1, "" TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception(NULL, "Unserialization of CURLFile instances is not allowed", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
ZEND_METHOD(CURLFile, __wakeup)
{
zend_update_property_string(curl_CURLFile_class, getThis(), "name", sizeof("name")-1, "" TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception(NULL, "Unserialization of CURLFile instances is not allowed", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
C
|
php
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3826/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6
|
9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6
|
Check effect command reply size in AudioFlinger
Bug: 29251553
Change-Id: I1bcc1281f1f0542bb645f6358ce31631f2a8ffbf
|
size_t AudioFlinger::EffectChain::removeEffect_l(const sp<EffectModule>& effect)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
size_t size = mEffects.size();
uint32_t type = effect->desc().flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (effect == mEffects[i]) {
if (mEffects[i]->state() == EffectModule::ACTIVE ||
mEffects[i]->state() == EffectModule::STOPPING) {
mEffects[i]->stop();
}
if (type == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY) {
delete[] effect->inBuffer();
} else {
if (i == size - 1 && i != 0) {
mEffects[i - 1]->setOutBuffer(mOutBuffer);
mEffects[i - 1]->configure();
}
}
mEffects.removeAt(i);
ALOGV("removeEffect_l() effect %p, removed from chain %p at rank %d", effect.get(),
this, i);
break;
}
}
return mEffects.size();
}
|
size_t AudioFlinger::EffectChain::removeEffect_l(const sp<EffectModule>& effect)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
size_t size = mEffects.size();
uint32_t type = effect->desc().flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (effect == mEffects[i]) {
if (mEffects[i]->state() == EffectModule::ACTIVE ||
mEffects[i]->state() == EffectModule::STOPPING) {
mEffects[i]->stop();
}
if (type == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY) {
delete[] effect->inBuffer();
} else {
if (i == size - 1 && i != 0) {
mEffects[i - 1]->setOutBuffer(mOutBuffer);
mEffects[i - 1]->configure();
}
}
mEffects.removeAt(i);
ALOGV("removeEffect_l() effect %p, removed from chain %p at rank %d", effect.get(),
this, i);
break;
}
}
return mEffects.size();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct ipx_interface *ipxitf_auto_create(struct net_device *dev,
__be16 dlink_type)
{
struct ipx_interface *intrfc = NULL;
struct datalink_proto *datalink;
if (!dev)
goto out;
/* Check addresses are suitable */
if (dev->addr_len > IPX_NODE_LEN)
goto out;
switch (ntohs(dlink_type)) {
case ETH_P_IPX: datalink = pEII_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_802_2: datalink = p8022_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_SNAP: datalink = pSNAP_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_802_3: datalink = p8023_datalink; break;
default: goto out;
}
intrfc = ipxitf_alloc(dev, 0, dlink_type, datalink, 0,
dev->hard_header_len + datalink->header_length);
if (intrfc) {
memset(intrfc->if_node, 0, IPX_NODE_LEN);
memcpy((char *)&(intrfc->if_node[IPX_NODE_LEN-dev->addr_len]),
dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
spin_lock_init(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
atomic_set(&intrfc->refcnt, 1);
ipxitf_insert(intrfc);
dev_hold(dev);
}
out:
return intrfc;
}
|
static struct ipx_interface *ipxitf_auto_create(struct net_device *dev,
__be16 dlink_type)
{
struct ipx_interface *intrfc = NULL;
struct datalink_proto *datalink;
if (!dev)
goto out;
/* Check addresses are suitable */
if (dev->addr_len > IPX_NODE_LEN)
goto out;
switch (ntohs(dlink_type)) {
case ETH_P_IPX: datalink = pEII_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_802_2: datalink = p8022_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_SNAP: datalink = pSNAP_datalink; break;
case ETH_P_802_3: datalink = p8023_datalink; break;
default: goto out;
}
intrfc = ipxitf_alloc(dev, 0, dlink_type, datalink, 0,
dev->hard_header_len + datalink->header_length);
if (intrfc) {
memset(intrfc->if_node, 0, IPX_NODE_LEN);
memcpy((char *)&(intrfc->if_node[IPX_NODE_LEN-dev->addr_len]),
dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
spin_lock_init(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
atomic_set(&intrfc->refcnt, 1);
ipxitf_insert(intrfc);
dev_hold(dev);
}
out:
return intrfc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static struct dentry *__lookup_hash(struct qstr *name,
struct dentry *base, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
int err;
inode = base->d_inode;
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_op && base->d_op->d_hash) {
err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(err);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
dentry = __d_lookup(base, name);
/* lockess __d_lookup may fail due to concurrent d_move()
* in some unrelated directory, so try with d_lookup
*/
if (!dentry)
dentry = d_lookup(base, name);
if (dentry && dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)
dentry = do_revalidate(dentry, nd);
if (!dentry) {
struct dentry *new;
/* Don't create child dentry for a dead directory. */
dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
goto out;
new = d_alloc(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!new)
goto out;
dentry = inode->i_op->lookup(inode, new, nd);
if (!dentry)
dentry = new;
else
dput(new);
}
out:
return dentry;
}
|
static struct dentry *__lookup_hash(struct qstr *name,
struct dentry *base, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
int err;
inode = base->d_inode;
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_op && base->d_op->d_hash) {
err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(err);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
dentry = __d_lookup(base, name);
/* lockess __d_lookup may fail due to concurrent d_move()
* in some unrelated directory, so try with d_lookup
*/
if (!dentry)
dentry = d_lookup(base, name);
if (dentry && dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)
dentry = do_revalidate(dentry, nd);
if (!dentry) {
struct dentry *new;
/* Don't create child dentry for a dead directory. */
dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
goto out;
new = d_alloc(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!new)
goto out;
dentry = inode->i_op->lookup(inode, new, nd);
if (!dentry)
dentry = new;
else
dput(new);
}
out:
return dentry;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static void uipc_flush_locked(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id)
{
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
return;
switch(ch_id)
{
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL);
break;
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO);
break;
}
}
|
static void uipc_flush_locked(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id)
{
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
return;
switch(ch_id)
{
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL);
break;
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static void *saved_cmdlines_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
void *v;
loff_t l = 0;
preempt_disable();
arch_spin_lock(&trace_cmdline_lock);
v = &savedcmd->map_cmdline_to_pid[0];
while (l <= *pos) {
v = saved_cmdlines_next(m, v, &l);
if (!v)
return NULL;
}
return v;
}
|
static void *saved_cmdlines_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
void *v;
loff_t l = 0;
preempt_disable();
arch_spin_lock(&trace_cmdline_lock);
v = &savedcmd->map_cmdline_to_pid[0];
while (l <= *pos) {
v = saved_cmdlines_next(m, v, &l);
if (!v)
return NULL;
}
return v;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12877
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12877/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/04178de2247e353fc095846784b9a10fefdbf890
|
04178de2247e353fc095846784b9a10fefdbf890
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/662
|
static Image *decompress_block(Image *orig, unsigned int *Size, ImageInfo *clone_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image2;
void *cache_block, *decompress_block;
z_stream zip_info;
FILE *mat_file;
size_t magick_size;
size_t extent;
int file;
int status;
int zip_status;
ssize_t TotalSize = 0;
if(clone_info==NULL) return NULL;
if(clone_info->file) /* Close file opened from previous transaction. */
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
cache_block = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)(*Size < 16384) ? *Size: 16384,sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(cache_block==NULL) return NULL;
decompress_block = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)(4096),sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(decompress_block==NULL)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
return NULL;
}
mat_file=0;
file = AcquireUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
mat_file = fdopen(file,"w");
if(!mat_file)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Cannot create file stream for decompressed image");
return NULL;
}
zip_info.zalloc=AcquireZIPMemory;
zip_info.zfree=RelinquishZIPMemory;
zip_info.opaque = (voidpf) NULL;
zip_status = inflateInit(&zip_info);
if (zip_status != Z_OK)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",clone_info->filename);
(void) fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
/* zip_info.next_out = 8*4;*/
zip_info.avail_in = 0;
zip_info.total_out = 0;
while(*Size>0 && !EOFBlob(orig))
{
magick_size = ReadBlob(orig, (*Size < 16384) ? *Size : 16384, (unsigned char *) cache_block);
zip_info.next_in = (Bytef *) cache_block;
zip_info.avail_in = (uInt) magick_size;
while(zip_info.avail_in>0)
{
zip_info.avail_out = 4096;
zip_info.next_out = (Bytef *) decompress_block;
zip_status = inflate(&zip_info,Z_NO_FLUSH);
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
extent=fwrite(decompress_block, 4096-zip_info.avail_out, 1, mat_file);
(void) extent;
TotalSize += 4096-zip_info.avail_out;
if(zip_status == Z_STREAM_END) goto DblBreak;
}
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
*Size -= magick_size;
}
DblBreak:
inflateEnd(&zip_info);
(void)fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
*Size = TotalSize;
if((clone_info->file=fopen(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL) goto UnlinkFile;
if( (image2 = AcquireImage(clone_info,exception))==NULL ) goto EraseFile;
status = OpenBlob(clone_info,image2,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
EraseFile:
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
UnlinkFile:
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
return image2;
}
|
static Image *decompress_block(Image *orig, unsigned int *Size, ImageInfo *clone_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image2;
void *cache_block, *decompress_block;
z_stream zip_info;
FILE *mat_file;
size_t magick_size;
size_t extent;
int file;
int status;
int zip_status;
ssize_t TotalSize = 0;
if(clone_info==NULL) return NULL;
if(clone_info->file) /* Close file opened from previous transaction. */
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
cache_block = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)(*Size < 16384) ? *Size: 16384,sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(cache_block==NULL) return NULL;
decompress_block = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)(4096),sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(decompress_block==NULL)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
return NULL;
}
mat_file=0;
file = AcquireUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
mat_file = fdopen(file,"w");
if(!mat_file)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Cannot create file stream for decompressed image");
return NULL;
}
zip_info.zalloc=AcquireZIPMemory;
zip_info.zfree=RelinquishZIPMemory;
zip_info.opaque = (voidpf) NULL;
zip_status = inflateInit(&zip_info);
if (zip_status != Z_OK)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",clone_info->filename);
(void) fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
/* zip_info.next_out = 8*4;*/
zip_info.avail_in = 0;
zip_info.total_out = 0;
while(*Size>0 && !EOFBlob(orig))
{
magick_size = ReadBlob(orig, (*Size < 16384) ? *Size : 16384, (unsigned char *) cache_block);
zip_info.next_in = (Bytef *) cache_block;
zip_info.avail_in = (uInt) magick_size;
while(zip_info.avail_in>0)
{
zip_info.avail_out = 4096;
zip_info.next_out = (Bytef *) decompress_block;
zip_status = inflate(&zip_info,Z_NO_FLUSH);
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
extent=fwrite(decompress_block, 4096-zip_info.avail_out, 1, mat_file);
(void) extent;
TotalSize += 4096-zip_info.avail_out;
if(zip_status == Z_STREAM_END) goto DblBreak;
}
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
*Size -= magick_size;
}
DblBreak:
inflateEnd(&zip_info);
(void)fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_block);
RelinquishMagickMemory(decompress_block);
*Size = TotalSize;
if((clone_info->file=fopen(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL) goto UnlinkFile;
if( (image2 = AcquireImage(clone_info,exception))==NULL ) goto EraseFile;
status = OpenBlob(clone_info,image2,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
EraseFile:
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
UnlinkFile:
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
return image2;
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
int apply_filter_to_req_line(struct session *s, struct channel *req, struct hdr_exp *exp)
{
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end;
int done;
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
int delta;
if (unlikely(txn->flags & (TX_CLDENY | TX_CLTARPIT)))
return 1;
else if (unlikely(txn->flags & TX_CLALLOW) &&
(exp->action == ACT_ALLOW ||
exp->action == ACT_DENY ||
exp->action == ACT_TARPIT))
return 0;
else if (exp->action == ACT_REMOVE)
return 0;
done = 0;
cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
/* Now we have the request line between cur_ptr and cur_end */
if (regex_exec_match2(exp->preg, cur_ptr, cur_end-cur_ptr, MAX_MATCH, pmatch)) {
switch (exp->action) {
case ACT_SETBE:
/* It is not possible to jump a second time.
* FIXME: should we return an HTTP/500 here so that
* the admin knows there's a problem ?
*/
if (s->be != s->fe)
break;
/* Swithing Proxy */
session_set_backend(s, (struct proxy *)exp->replace);
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_ALLOW:
txn->flags |= TX_CLALLOW;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_DENY:
txn->flags |= TX_CLDENY;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_TARPIT:
txn->flags |= TX_CLTARPIT;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_REPLACE:
trash.len = exp_replace(trash.str, trash.size, cur_ptr, exp->replace, pmatch);
if (trash.len < 0)
return -1;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, cur_ptr, cur_end, trash.str, trash.len);
/* FIXME: if the user adds a newline in the replacement, the
* index will not be recalculated for now, and the new line
* will not be counted as a new header.
*/
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
cur_end = (char *)http_parse_reqline(&txn->req,
HTTP_MSG_RQMETH,
cur_ptr, cur_end + 1,
NULL, NULL);
if (unlikely(!cur_end))
return -1;
/* we have a full request and we know that we have either a CR
* or an LF at <ptr>.
*/
txn->meth = find_http_meth(cur_ptr, txn->req.sl.rq.m_l);
hdr_idx_set_start(&txn->hdr_idx, txn->req.sl.rq.l, *cur_end == '\r');
/* there is no point trying this regex on headers */
return 1;
}
}
return done;
}
|
int apply_filter_to_req_line(struct session *s, struct channel *req, struct hdr_exp *exp)
{
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end;
int done;
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
int delta;
if (unlikely(txn->flags & (TX_CLDENY | TX_CLTARPIT)))
return 1;
else if (unlikely(txn->flags & TX_CLALLOW) &&
(exp->action == ACT_ALLOW ||
exp->action == ACT_DENY ||
exp->action == ACT_TARPIT))
return 0;
else if (exp->action == ACT_REMOVE)
return 0;
done = 0;
cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
/* Now we have the request line between cur_ptr and cur_end */
if (regex_exec_match2(exp->preg, cur_ptr, cur_end-cur_ptr, MAX_MATCH, pmatch)) {
switch (exp->action) {
case ACT_SETBE:
/* It is not possible to jump a second time.
* FIXME: should we return an HTTP/500 here so that
* the admin knows there's a problem ?
*/
if (s->be != s->fe)
break;
/* Swithing Proxy */
session_set_backend(s, (struct proxy *)exp->replace);
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_ALLOW:
txn->flags |= TX_CLALLOW;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_DENY:
txn->flags |= TX_CLDENY;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_TARPIT:
txn->flags |= TX_CLTARPIT;
done = 1;
break;
case ACT_REPLACE:
trash.len = exp_replace(trash.str, trash.size, cur_ptr, exp->replace, pmatch);
if (trash.len < 0)
return -1;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, cur_ptr, cur_end, trash.str, trash.len);
/* FIXME: if the user adds a newline in the replacement, the
* index will not be recalculated for now, and the new line
* will not be counted as a new header.
*/
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
cur_end = (char *)http_parse_reqline(&txn->req,
HTTP_MSG_RQMETH,
cur_ptr, cur_end + 1,
NULL, NULL);
if (unlikely(!cur_end))
return -1;
/* we have a full request and we know that we have either a CR
* or an LF at <ptr>.
*/
txn->meth = find_http_meth(cur_ptr, txn->req.sl.rq.m_l);
hdr_idx_set_start(&txn->hdr_idx, txn->req.sl.rq.l, *cur_end == '\r');
/* there is no point trying this regex on headers */
return 1;
}
}
return done;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0494/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
|
1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
| null |
digest_authentication_encode (const char *au, const char *user,
const char *passwd, const char *method,
const char *path, uerr_t *auth_err)
{
static char *realm, *opaque, *nonce, *qop, *algorithm;
static struct {
const char *name;
char **variable;
} options[] = {
{ "realm", &realm },
{ "opaque", &opaque },
{ "nonce", &nonce },
{ "qop", &qop },
{ "algorithm", &algorithm }
};
char cnonce[16] = "";
char *res = NULL;
int res_len;
size_t res_size;
param_token name, value;
realm = opaque = nonce = algorithm = qop = NULL;
au += 6; /* skip over `Digest' */
while (extract_param (&au, &name, &value, ',', NULL))
{
size_t i;
size_t namelen = name.e - name.b;
for (i = 0; i < countof (options); i++)
if (namelen == strlen (options[i].name)
&& 0 == strncmp (name.b, options[i].name,
namelen))
{
*options[i].variable = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
break;
}
}
if (qop && strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported quality of protection '%s'.\n"), qop);
xfree (qop); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
else if (algorithm && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5") && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5-sess"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported algorithm '%s'.\n"), algorithm);
xfree (algorithm); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
if (!realm || !nonce || !user || !passwd || !path || !method)
{
*auth_err = ATTRMISSING;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Calculate the digest value. */
{
struct md5_ctx ctx;
unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
char a1buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1], a2buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
char response_digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
/* A1BUF = H(user ":" realm ":" password) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)user, strlen (user), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)realm, strlen (realm), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)passwd, strlen (passwd), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
if (algorithm && !strcmp (algorithm, "MD5-sess"))
{
/* A1BUF = H( H(user ":" realm ":" password) ":" nonce ":" cnonce ) */
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
/* md5_process_bytes (hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, &ctx); */
md5_process_bytes (a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
}
/* A2BUF = H(method ":" path) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)method, strlen (method), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)path, strlen (path), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a2buf, hash);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
/* RFC 2617 Digest Access Authentication */
/* generate random hex string */
if (!*cnonce)
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" noncecount ":" clientnonce ":" qop ": " A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)"00000001", 8, &ctx); /* TODO: keep track of server nonce values */
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)qop, strlen (qop), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
else
{
/* RFC 2069 Digest Access Authentication */
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
dump_hash (response_digest, hash);
res_size = strlen (user)
+ strlen (realm)
+ strlen (nonce)
+ strlen (path)
+ 2 * MD5_DIGEST_SIZE /*strlen (response_digest)*/
+ (opaque ? strlen (opaque) : 0)
+ (algorithm ? strlen (algorithm) : 0)
+ (qop ? 128: 0)
+ strlen (cnonce)
+ 128;
res = xmalloc (res_size);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\""\
", qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest, cnonce);
}
else
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest);
}
if (opaque)
{
res_len += snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", opaque=\"%s\"", opaque);
}
if (algorithm)
{
snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", algorithm=\"%s\"", algorithm);
}
}
cleanup:
xfree (realm);
xfree (opaque);
xfree (nonce);
xfree (qop);
xfree (algorithm);
return res;
}
|
digest_authentication_encode (const char *au, const char *user,
const char *passwd, const char *method,
const char *path, uerr_t *auth_err)
{
static char *realm, *opaque, *nonce, *qop, *algorithm;
static struct {
const char *name;
char **variable;
} options[] = {
{ "realm", &realm },
{ "opaque", &opaque },
{ "nonce", &nonce },
{ "qop", &qop },
{ "algorithm", &algorithm }
};
char cnonce[16] = "";
char *res = NULL;
int res_len;
size_t res_size;
param_token name, value;
realm = opaque = nonce = algorithm = qop = NULL;
au += 6; /* skip over `Digest' */
while (extract_param (&au, &name, &value, ',', NULL))
{
size_t i;
size_t namelen = name.e - name.b;
for (i = 0; i < countof (options); i++)
if (namelen == strlen (options[i].name)
&& 0 == strncmp (name.b, options[i].name,
namelen))
{
*options[i].variable = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
break;
}
}
if (qop && strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported quality of protection '%s'.\n"), qop);
xfree (qop); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
else if (algorithm && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5") && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5-sess"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported algorithm '%s'.\n"), algorithm);
xfree (algorithm); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
if (!realm || !nonce || !user || !passwd || !path || !method)
{
*auth_err = ATTRMISSING;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Calculate the digest value. */
{
struct md5_ctx ctx;
unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
char a1buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1], a2buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
char response_digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
/* A1BUF = H(user ":" realm ":" password) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)user, strlen (user), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)realm, strlen (realm), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)passwd, strlen (passwd), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
if (algorithm && !strcmp (algorithm, "MD5-sess"))
{
/* A1BUF = H( H(user ":" realm ":" password) ":" nonce ":" cnonce ) */
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
/* md5_process_bytes (hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, &ctx); */
md5_process_bytes (a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
}
/* A2BUF = H(method ":" path) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)method, strlen (method), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)path, strlen (path), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a2buf, hash);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
/* RFC 2617 Digest Access Authentication */
/* generate random hex string */
if (!*cnonce)
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" noncecount ":" clientnonce ":" qop ": " A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)"00000001", 8, &ctx); /* TODO: keep track of server nonce values */
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)qop, strlen (qop), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
else
{
/* RFC 2069 Digest Access Authentication */
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
dump_hash (response_digest, hash);
res_size = strlen (user)
+ strlen (realm)
+ strlen (nonce)
+ strlen (path)
+ 2 * MD5_DIGEST_SIZE /*strlen (response_digest)*/
+ (opaque ? strlen (opaque) : 0)
+ (algorithm ? strlen (algorithm) : 0)
+ (qop ? 128: 0)
+ strlen (cnonce)
+ 128;
res = xmalloc (res_size);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\""\
", qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest, cnonce);
}
else
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest);
}
if (opaque)
{
res_len += snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", opaque=\"%s\"", opaque);
}
if (algorithm)
{
snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", algorithm=\"%s\"", algorithm);
}
}
cleanup:
xfree (realm);
xfree (opaque);
xfree (nonce);
xfree (qop);
xfree (algorithm);
return res;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6780
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6780/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
void WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::SetSelectedTab(
WebsiteSettingsUI::TabId tab_id) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
|
void WebsiteSettingsPopupAndroid::SetSelectedTab(
WebsiteSettingsUI::TabId tab_id) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearFramebufferForWorkaround(GLbitfield mask) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearWorkaround",
error_state_.get());
clear_framebuffer_blit_->ClearFramebuffer(
this, gfx::Size(viewport_max_width_, viewport_max_height_), mask,
state_.color_clear_red, state_.color_clear_green, state_.color_clear_blue,
state_.color_clear_alpha, state_.depth_clear, state_.stencil_clear);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearFramebufferForWorkaround(GLbitfield mask) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearWorkaround",
error_state_.get());
clear_framebuffer_blit_->ClearFramebuffer(
this, gfx::Size(viewport_max_width_, viewport_max_height_), mask,
state_.color_clear_red, state_.color_clear_green, state_.color_clear_blue,
state_.color_clear_alpha, state_.depth_clear, state_.stencil_clear);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2519
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2519/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=b2ea64bcc6c385a8e8318f9c759450a07df58b6d
|
b2ea64bcc6c385a8e8318f9c759450a07df58b6d
| null |
ft_lookup_glyph_renderer( FT_GlyphSlot slot )
{
FT_Face face = slot->face;
FT_Library library = FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face );
FT_Renderer result = library->cur_renderer;
if ( !result || result->glyph_format != slot->format )
result = FT_Lookup_Renderer( library, slot->format, 0 );
return result;
}
|
ft_lookup_glyph_renderer( FT_GlyphSlot slot )
{
FT_Face face = slot->face;
FT_Library library = FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face );
FT_Renderer result = library->cur_renderer;
if ( !result || result->glyph_format != slot->format )
result = FT_Lookup_Renderer( library, slot->format, 0 );
return result;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5067/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/83588d6ed473f923a46484958d440da0b8a51b1b
|
83588d6ed473f923a46484958d440da0b8a51b1b
|
media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
|
bool ImageProcessorClient::CreateImageProcessor(
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& input_config,
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& output_config,
size_t num_buffers) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(test_main_thread_checker_);
base::WaitableEvent done(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::AUTOMATIC,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
image_processor_client_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ImageProcessorClient::CreateImageProcessorTask,
base::Unretained(this), std::cref(input_config),
std::cref(output_config), num_buffers, &done));
done.Wait();
if (!image_processor_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create ImageProcessor";
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool ImageProcessorClient::CreateImageProcessor(
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& input_config,
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& output_config,
size_t num_buffers) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(test_main_thread_checker_);
base::WaitableEvent done(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::AUTOMATIC,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
image_processor_client_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ImageProcessorClient::CreateImageProcessorTask,
base::Unretained(this), std::cref(input_config),
std::cref(output_config), num_buffers, &done));
done.Wait();
if (!image_processor_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create ImageProcessor";
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15857
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15857/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/xkbcommon/libxkbcommon/commit/c1e5ac16e77a21f87bdf3bc4dea61b037a17dddb
|
c1e5ac16e77a21f87bdf3bc4dea61b037a17dddb
|
xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]>
|
ExprCreateArrayRef(xkb_atom_t element, xkb_atom_t field, ExprDef *entry)
{
EXPR_CREATE(ExprArrayRef, expr, EXPR_ARRAY_REF, EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
expr->array_ref.element = element;
expr->array_ref.field = field;
expr->array_ref.entry = entry;
return expr;
}
|
ExprCreateArrayRef(xkb_atom_t element, xkb_atom_t field, ExprDef *entry)
{
EXPR_CREATE(ExprArrayRef, expr, EXPR_ARRAY_REF, EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
expr->array_ref.element = element;
expr->array_ref.field = field;
expr->array_ref.entry = entry;
return expr;
}
|
C
|
libxkbcommon
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents(WebContents* contents) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents");
DevToolsWindow* new_devtools_window = contents ?
DevToolsWindow::GetDockedInstanceForInspectedTab(contents) : NULL;
if (devtools_window_ == new_devtools_window && (!new_devtools_window ||
new_devtools_window->dock_side() == devtools_dock_side_))
return;
if (devtools_window_ != new_devtools_window) {
if (devtools_window_) {
devtools_container_->DetachTab(
devtools_window_->tab_contents()->web_contents());
}
devtools_container_->SetTab(
new_devtools_window ? new_devtools_window->tab_contents() : NULL);
if (new_devtools_window) {
new_devtools_window->tab_contents()->web_contents()->WasShown();
}
}
if (devtools_window_) {
GtkAllocation contents_rect;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(contents_vsplit_, &contents_rect);
if (devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT) {
devtools_window_->SetWidth(
contents_rect.width -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_hsplit_)));
} else {
devtools_window_->SetHeight(
contents_rect.height -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_vsplit_)));
}
}
bool should_hide = devtools_window_ && (!new_devtools_window ||
devtools_dock_side_ != new_devtools_window->dock_side());
bool should_show = new_devtools_window && (!devtools_window_ || should_hide);
if (should_hide)
HideDevToolsContainer();
devtools_window_ = new_devtools_window;
if (should_show) {
devtools_dock_side_ = new_devtools_window->dock_side();
ShowDevToolsContainer();
} else if (new_devtools_window) {
UpdateDevToolsSplitPosition();
}
}
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents(WebContents* contents) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents");
DevToolsWindow* new_devtools_window = contents ?
DevToolsWindow::GetDockedInstanceForInspectedTab(contents) : NULL;
if (devtools_window_ == new_devtools_window && (!new_devtools_window ||
new_devtools_window->dock_side() == devtools_dock_side_))
return;
if (devtools_window_ != new_devtools_window) {
if (devtools_window_)
devtools_container_->DetachTab(devtools_window_->tab_contents());
devtools_container_->SetTab(
new_devtools_window ? new_devtools_window->tab_contents() : NULL);
if (new_devtools_window) {
new_devtools_window->tab_contents()->web_contents()->WasShown();
}
}
if (devtools_window_) {
GtkAllocation contents_rect;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(contents_vsplit_, &contents_rect);
if (devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT) {
devtools_window_->SetWidth(
contents_rect.width -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_hsplit_)));
} else {
devtools_window_->SetHeight(
contents_rect.height -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_vsplit_)));
}
}
bool should_hide = devtools_window_ && (!new_devtools_window ||
devtools_dock_side_ != new_devtools_window->dock_side());
bool should_show = new_devtools_window && (!devtools_window_ || should_hide);
if (should_hide)
HideDevToolsContainer();
devtools_window_ = new_devtools_window;
if (should_show) {
devtools_dock_side_ = new_devtools_window->dock_side();
ShowDevToolsContainer();
} else if (new_devtools_window) {
UpdateDevToolsSplitPosition();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6080/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b44e68087804e6543a99c87076ab7648d11d9b07
|
b44e68087804e6543a99c87076ab7648d11d9b07
|
memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
|
MATCHER(IsBackgroundDump, "") {
return arg.level_of_detail == MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND;
}
|
MATCHER(IsBackgroundDump, "") {
return arg.level_of_detail == MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-9923
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-9923/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120
|
cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120
| null |
decode_num (uintmax_t *num, char const *arg, uintmax_t maxval)
{
uintmax_t u;
char *arg_lim;
if (!ISDIGIT (*arg))
return false;
errno = 0;
u = strtoumax (arg, &arg_lim, 10);
if (! (u <= maxval && errno != ERANGE) || *arg_lim)
return false;
*num = u;
return true;
}
|
decode_num (uintmax_t *num, char const *arg, uintmax_t maxval)
{
uintmax_t u;
char *arg_lim;
if (!ISDIGIT (*arg))
return false;
errno = 0;
u = strtoumax (arg, &arg_lim, 10);
if (! (u <= maxval && errno != ERANGE) || *arg_lim)
return false;
*num = u;
return true;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18955
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18955/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d2f007dbe7e4c9583eea6eb04d60001e85c6f1bd
|
d2f007dbe7e4c9583eea6eb04d60001e85c6f1bd
|
userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
|
void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
schedule_work(&ns->work);
}
|
void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
schedule_work(&ns->work);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10046
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10046/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/989f9f88ea6db09b99d25586e912c921c0da8d3f
|
989f9f88ea6db09b99d25586e912c921c0da8d3f
|
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
|
static PrimitiveInfo *TraceStrokePolygon(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
typedef struct _LineSegment
{
double
p,
q;
} LineSegment;
double
delta_theta,
dot_product,
mid,
miterlimit;
LineSegment
dx,
dy,
inverse_slope,
slope,
theta;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
PointInfo
box_p[5],
box_q[5],
center,
offset,
*path_p,
*path_q;
PrimitiveInfo
*polygon_primitive,
*stroke_polygon;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments,
max_strokes,
number_vertices;
ssize_t
j,
n,
p,
q;
/*
Allocate paths.
*/
number_vertices=primitive_info->coordinates;
max_strokes=2*number_vertices+6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_vertices+2UL,sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL) ||
(polygon_primitive == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL))
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(polygon_primitive,primitive_info,(size_t)
number_vertices*sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
closed_path=
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.x-primitive_info[0].point.x) < DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.y-primitive_info[0].point.y) < DrawEpsilon) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin) ||
((draw_info->linejoin == MiterJoin) && (closed_path != MagickFalse)))
{
polygon_primitive[number_vertices]=primitive_info[1];
number_vertices++;
}
polygon_primitive[number_vertices].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
/*
Compute the slope for the first line segment, p.
*/
dx.p=0.0;
dy.p=0.0;
for (n=1; n < (ssize_t) number_vertices; n++)
{
dx.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-polygon_primitive[0].point.x;
dy.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-polygon_primitive[0].point.y;
if ((fabs(dx.p) >= DrawEpsilon) || (fabs(dy.p) >= DrawEpsilon))
break;
}
if (n == (ssize_t) number_vertices)
n=(ssize_t) number_vertices-1L;
slope.p=0.0;
inverse_slope.p=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.p >= 0.0)
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.p >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.p=dy.p/dx.p;
inverse_slope.p=(-1.0/slope.p);
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
miterlimit=(double) (draw_info->miterlimit*draw_info->miterlimit*mid*mid);
if ((draw_info->linecap == SquareCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
TraceSquareLinecap(polygon_primitive,number_vertices,mid);
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.p*inverse_slope.p+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.p);
if ((dy.p*offset.x-dx.p*offset.y) > 0.0)
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
}
else
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
}
/*
Create strokes for the line join attribute: bevel, miter, round.
*/
p=0;
q=0;
path_q[p++]=box_q[0];
path_p[q++]=box_p[0];
for (i=(ssize_t) n+1; i < (ssize_t) number_vertices; i++)
{
/*
Compute the slope for this line segment, q.
*/
dx.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-polygon_primitive[n].point.x;
dy.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-polygon_primitive[n].point.y;
dot_product=dx.q*dx.q+dy.q*dy.q;
if (dot_product < 0.25)
continue;
slope.q=0.0;
inverse_slope.q=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.q >= 0.0)
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.q >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.q=dy.q/dx.q;
inverse_slope.q=(-1.0/slope.q);
}
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.q*inverse_slope.q+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.q);
dot_product=dy.q*offset.x-dx.q*offset.y;
if (dot_product > 0.0)
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
}
else
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
}
if (fabs((double) (slope.p-slope.q)) < DrawEpsilon)
{
box_p[4]=box_p[1];
box_q[4]=box_q[1];
}
else
{
box_p[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_p[0].x-box_p[0].y-slope.q*box_p[3].x+
box_p[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_p[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_p[4].x-box_p[0].x)+box_p[0].y);
box_q[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_q[0].x-box_q[0].y-slope.q*box_q[3].x+
box_q[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_q[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_q[4].x-box_q[0].x)+box_q[0].y);
}
if (q >= (ssize_t) (max_strokes-6*BezierQuantum-360))
{
if (~max_strokes < (6*BezierQuantum+360))
{
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
}
else
{
max_strokes+=6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_p,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_q,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
}
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL))
{
if (path_p != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
if (path_q != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
}
}
dot_product=dx.q*dy.p-dx.p*dy.q;
if (dot_product <= 0.0)
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_q[1].y-center.y,box_q[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_q[2].y-center.y,box_q[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.q < theta.p)
theta.q+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.q-theta.p)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_q[q].x=box_q[1].x;
path_q[q].y=box_q[1].y;
q++;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_q[q].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_q[q].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
q++;
}
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_p[1].y-center.y,box_p[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_p[2].y-center.y,box_p[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.p < theta.q)
theta.p+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.p-theta.q)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_p[p].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_p[p].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p++;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
slope.p=slope.q;
inverse_slope.p=inverse_slope.q;
box_p[0]=box_p[2];
box_p[1]=box_p[3];
box_q[0]=box_q[2];
box_q[1]=box_q[3];
dx.p=dx.q;
dy.p=dy.q;
n=i;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
/*
Trace stroked polygon.
*/
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(p+q+2UL*closed_path+2UL),sizeof(*stroke_polygon));
if (stroke_polygon != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) p; i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_p[i];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (p+q+closed_path); i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_q[p+q+closed_path-(i+1)];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[p+closed_path].point;
i++;
}
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
stroke_polygon[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
stroke_polygon[0].coordinates=(size_t) (p+q+2*closed_path+1);
}
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return(stroke_polygon);
}
|
static PrimitiveInfo *TraceStrokePolygon(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
typedef struct _LineSegment
{
double
p,
q;
} LineSegment;
double
delta_theta,
dot_product,
mid,
miterlimit;
LineSegment
dx,
dy,
inverse_slope,
slope,
theta;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
PointInfo
box_p[5],
box_q[5],
center,
offset,
*path_p,
*path_q;
PrimitiveInfo
*polygon_primitive,
*stroke_polygon;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments,
max_strokes,
number_vertices;
ssize_t
j,
n,
p,
q;
/*
Allocate paths.
*/
number_vertices=primitive_info->coordinates;
max_strokes=2*number_vertices+6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_vertices+2UL,sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL) ||
(polygon_primitive == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL))
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(polygon_primitive,primitive_info,(size_t)
number_vertices*sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
closed_path=
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.x-primitive_info[0].point.x) < DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.y-primitive_info[0].point.y) < DrawEpsilon) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin) ||
((draw_info->linejoin == MiterJoin) && (closed_path != MagickFalse)))
{
polygon_primitive[number_vertices]=primitive_info[1];
number_vertices++;
}
polygon_primitive[number_vertices].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
/*
Compute the slope for the first line segment, p.
*/
dx.p=0.0;
dy.p=0.0;
for (n=1; n < (ssize_t) number_vertices; n++)
{
dx.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-polygon_primitive[0].point.x;
dy.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-polygon_primitive[0].point.y;
if ((fabs(dx.p) >= DrawEpsilon) || (fabs(dy.p) >= DrawEpsilon))
break;
}
if (n == (ssize_t) number_vertices)
n=(ssize_t) number_vertices-1L;
slope.p=0.0;
inverse_slope.p=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.p >= 0.0)
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.p >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.p=dy.p/dx.p;
inverse_slope.p=(-1.0/slope.p);
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
miterlimit=(double) (draw_info->miterlimit*draw_info->miterlimit*mid*mid);
if ((draw_info->linecap == SquareCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
TraceSquareLinecap(polygon_primitive,number_vertices,mid);
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.p*inverse_slope.p+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.p);
if ((dy.p*offset.x-dx.p*offset.y) > 0.0)
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
}
else
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
}
/*
Create strokes for the line join attribute: bevel, miter, round.
*/
p=0;
q=0;
path_q[p++]=box_q[0];
path_p[q++]=box_p[0];
for (i=(ssize_t) n+1; i < (ssize_t) number_vertices; i++)
{
/*
Compute the slope for this line segment, q.
*/
dx.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-polygon_primitive[n].point.x;
dy.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-polygon_primitive[n].point.y;
dot_product=dx.q*dx.q+dy.q*dy.q;
if (dot_product < 0.25)
continue;
slope.q=0.0;
inverse_slope.q=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.q >= 0.0)
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.q >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.q=dy.q/dx.q;
inverse_slope.q=(-1.0/slope.q);
}
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.q*inverse_slope.q+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.q);
dot_product=dy.q*offset.x-dx.q*offset.y;
if (dot_product > 0.0)
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
}
else
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
}
if (fabs((double) (slope.p-slope.q)) < DrawEpsilon)
{
box_p[4]=box_p[1];
box_q[4]=box_q[1];
}
else
{
box_p[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_p[0].x-box_p[0].y-slope.q*box_p[3].x+
box_p[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_p[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_p[4].x-box_p[0].x)+box_p[0].y);
box_q[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_q[0].x-box_q[0].y-slope.q*box_q[3].x+
box_q[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_q[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_q[4].x-box_q[0].x)+box_q[0].y);
}
if (q >= (ssize_t) (max_strokes-6*BezierQuantum-360))
{
if (~max_strokes < (6*BezierQuantum+360))
{
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
}
else
{
max_strokes+=6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_p,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_q,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
}
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL))
{
if (path_p != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
if (path_q != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
}
}
dot_product=dx.q*dy.p-dx.p*dy.q;
if (dot_product <= 0.0)
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_q[1].y-center.y,box_q[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_q[2].y-center.y,box_q[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.q < theta.p)
theta.q+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.q-theta.p)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_q[q].x=box_q[1].x;
path_q[q].y=box_q[1].y;
q++;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_q[q].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_q[q].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
q++;
}
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_p[1].y-center.y,box_p[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_p[2].y-center.y,box_p[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.p < theta.q)
theta.p+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.p-theta.q)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_p[p].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_p[p].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p++;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
slope.p=slope.q;
inverse_slope.p=inverse_slope.q;
box_p[0]=box_p[2];
box_p[1]=box_p[3];
box_q[0]=box_q[2];
box_q[1]=box_q[3];
dx.p=dx.q;
dy.p=dy.q;
n=i;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
/*
Trace stroked polygon.
*/
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(p+q+2UL*closed_path+2UL),sizeof(*stroke_polygon));
if (stroke_polygon != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) p; i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_p[i];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (p+q+closed_path); i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_q[p+q+closed_path-(i+1)];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[p+closed_path].point;
i++;
}
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
stroke_polygon[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
stroke_polygon[0].coordinates=(size_t) (p+q+2*closed_path+1);
}
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return(stroke_polygon);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1789/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
|
a9b8ab4657dec65b8b86c225d12c533ad7e984e2
| null |
Splash::Splash(SplashBitmap *bitmapA, GBool vectorAntialiasA,
SplashScreenParams *screenParams) {
int i;
bitmap = bitmapA;
vectorAntialias = vectorAntialiasA;
inShading = gFalse;
state = new SplashState(bitmap->width, bitmap->height, vectorAntialias,
screenParams);
if (vectorAntialias) {
aaBuf = new SplashBitmap(splashAASize * bitmap->width, splashAASize,
1, splashModeMono1, gFalse);
for (i = 0; i <= splashAASize * splashAASize; ++i) {
aaGamma[i] = (Guchar)splashRound(
splashPow((SplashCoord)i /
(SplashCoord)(splashAASize * splashAASize),
splashAAGamma) * 255);
}
} else {
aaBuf = NULL;
}
minLineWidth = 0;
clearModRegion();
debugMode = gFalse;
}
|
Splash::Splash(SplashBitmap *bitmapA, GBool vectorAntialiasA,
SplashScreenParams *screenParams) {
int i;
bitmap = bitmapA;
vectorAntialias = vectorAntialiasA;
inShading = gFalse;
state = new SplashState(bitmap->width, bitmap->height, vectorAntialias,
screenParams);
if (vectorAntialias) {
aaBuf = new SplashBitmap(splashAASize * bitmap->width, splashAASize,
1, splashModeMono1, gFalse);
for (i = 0; i <= splashAASize * splashAASize; ++i) {
aaGamma[i] = (Guchar)splashRound(
splashPow((SplashCoord)i /
(SplashCoord)(splashAASize * splashAASize),
splashAAGamma) * 255);
}
} else {
aaBuf = NULL;
}
minLineWidth = 0;
clearModRegion();
debugMode = gFalse;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static char packet_put_head_l(l2cap_socket *sock, const void *data, uint32_t len)
{
struct packet *p = packet_alloc((const uint8_t*)data, len);
/*
* We do not check size limits here since this is used to undo "getting" a
* packet that the user read incompletely. That is to say the packet was
* already in the queue. We do check thos elimits in packet_put_tail_l() since
* that function is used to put new data into the queue.
*/
if (!p)
return FALSE;
p->prev = NULL;
p->next = sock->first_packet;
sock->first_packet = p;
if (p->next)
p->next->prev = p;
else
sock->last_packet = p;
sock->bytes_buffered += len;
return TRUE;
}
|
static char packet_put_head_l(l2cap_socket *sock, const void *data, uint32_t len)
{
struct packet *p = packet_alloc((const uint8_t*)data, len);
/*
* We do not check size limits here since this is used to undo "getting" a
* packet that the user read incompletely. That is to say the packet was
* already in the queue. We do check thos elimits in packet_put_tail_l() since
* that function is used to put new data into the queue.
*/
if (!p)
return FALSE;
p->prev = NULL;
p->next = sock->first_packet;
sock->first_packet = p;
if (p->next)
p->next->prev = p;
else
sock->last_packet = p;
sock->bytes_buffered += len;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::SetAdapter(const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path) {
DCHECK(!IsPresent());
object_path_ = object_path;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": using adapter.";
SetDefaultAdapterName();
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
PresentChanged(true);
if (properties->powered.value())
PoweredChanged(true);
if (properties->discoverable.value())
DiscoverableChanged(true);
if (properties->discovering.value())
DiscoveringChanged(true);
std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath> device_paths =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetDevicesForAdapter(object_path_);
for (std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath>::iterator iter = device_paths.begin();
iter != device_paths.end(); ++iter) {
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS* device_chromeos =
new BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(this, *iter);
devices_[device_chromeos->GetAddress()] = device_chromeos;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
DeviceAdded(this, device_chromeos));
}
}
|
void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::SetAdapter(const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path) {
DCHECK(!IsPresent());
object_path_ = object_path;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": using adapter.";
SetDefaultAdapterName();
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
PresentChanged(true);
if (properties->powered.value())
PoweredChanged(true);
if (properties->discoverable.value())
DiscoverableChanged(true);
if (properties->discovering.value())
DiscoveringChanged(true);
std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath> device_paths =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetDevicesForAdapter(object_path_);
for (std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath>::iterator iter = device_paths.begin();
iter != device_paths.end(); ++iter) {
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS* device_chromeos =
new BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(this, *iter);
devices_[device_chromeos->GetAddress()] = device_chromeos;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
DeviceAdded(this, device_chromeos));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
{
int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
if (cpu != -1)
smp_call_function_single(cpu,
__loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
}
|
static void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
{
int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
if (cpu != -1)
smp_call_function_single(cpu,
__loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
static void openssl_init(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4;
link->tiTicketing.bn = BN_new();
if (!link->tiTicketing.bn) {
spice_error("OpenSSL BIGNUMS alloc failed");
}
BN_set_word(link->tiTicketing.bn, f4);
}
|
static void openssl_init(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4;
link->tiTicketing.bn = BN_new();
if (!link->tiTicketing.bn) {
spice_error("OpenSSL BIGNUMS alloc failed");
}
BN_set_word(link->tiTicketing.bn, f4);
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15386/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidStartLoading(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
bool to_different_document) {
LoadingStateChanged(frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame() && to_different_document,
false, nullptr);
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->UserIsNavigatingAway();
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidStartLoading(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
bool to_different_document) {
LoadingStateChanged(frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame() && to_different_document,
false, nullptr);
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->UserIsNavigatingAway();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6304
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6304/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137
|
2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137
| null |
int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
unsigned short hbtype;
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Read type and payload length first */
if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
int r;
/*
* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3 + payload + padding);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
unsigned int seq;
/*
* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
* random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
*/
n2s(pl, seq);
if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
unsigned short hbtype;
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Read type and payload length first */
if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
int r;
/*
* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3 + payload + padding);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
unsigned int seq;
/*
* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
* random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
*/
n2s(pl, seq);
if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void VerifyDirectoryService(GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
ASSERT_TRUE(directory_service->root());
GDataDirectory* dir1 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir1");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir1);
GDataDirectory* dir2 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir2");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir2);
GDataDirectory* dir3 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir3);
GDataFile* file4 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/file4");
ASSERT_TRUE(file4);
EXPECT_EQ(file4->parent(), dir1);
GDataFile* file5 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/file5");
ASSERT_TRUE(file5);
EXPECT_EQ(file5->parent(), dir1);
GDataFile* file6 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file6");
ASSERT_TRUE(file6);
EXPECT_EQ(file6->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file7 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file7");
ASSERT_TRUE(file7);
EXPECT_EQ(file7->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file8 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file8");
ASSERT_TRUE(file8);
EXPECT_EQ(file8->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file9 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3/file9");
ASSERT_TRUE(file9);
EXPECT_EQ(file9->parent(), dir3);
GDataFile* file10 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3/file10");
ASSERT_TRUE(file10);
EXPECT_EQ(file10->parent(), dir3);
EXPECT_EQ(dir1, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir1"));
EXPECT_EQ(dir2, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir2"));
EXPECT_EQ(dir3, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir3"));
EXPECT_EQ(file4, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file4"));
EXPECT_EQ(file5, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file5"));
EXPECT_EQ(file6, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file6"));
EXPECT_EQ(file7, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file7"));
EXPECT_EQ(file8, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file8"));
EXPECT_EQ(file9, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file9"));
EXPECT_EQ(file10, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file10"));
}
|
void VerifyDirectoryService(GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
ASSERT_TRUE(directory_service->root());
GDataDirectory* dir1 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir1");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir1);
GDataDirectory* dir2 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir2");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir2);
GDataDirectory* dir3 = FindDirectory(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3");
ASSERT_TRUE(dir3);
GDataFile* file4 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/file4");
ASSERT_TRUE(file4);
EXPECT_EQ(file4->parent(), dir1);
GDataFile* file5 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/file5");
ASSERT_TRUE(file5);
EXPECT_EQ(file5->parent(), dir1);
GDataFile* file6 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file6");
ASSERT_TRUE(file6);
EXPECT_EQ(file6->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file7 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file7");
ASSERT_TRUE(file7);
EXPECT_EQ(file7->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file8 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir2/file8");
ASSERT_TRUE(file8);
EXPECT_EQ(file8->parent(), dir2);
GDataFile* file9 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3/file9");
ASSERT_TRUE(file9);
EXPECT_EQ(file9->parent(), dir3);
GDataFile* file10 = FindFile(directory_service, "drive/dir1/dir3/file10");
ASSERT_TRUE(file10);
EXPECT_EQ(file10->parent(), dir3);
EXPECT_EQ(dir1, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir1"));
EXPECT_EQ(dir2, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir2"));
EXPECT_EQ(dir3, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"dir_resource_id:dir3"));
EXPECT_EQ(file4, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file4"));
EXPECT_EQ(file5, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file5"));
EXPECT_EQ(file6, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file6"));
EXPECT_EQ(file7, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file7"));
EXPECT_EQ(file8, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file8"));
EXPECT_EQ(file9, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file9"));
EXPECT_EQ(file10, directory_service->GetEntryByResourceId(
"file_resource_id:file10"));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2803
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2803/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/48f2ec5c24570c9b96bb2798a9ffe956117c5066
|
48f2ec5c24570c9b96bb2798a9ffe956117c5066
|
Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TreeModelNode* TreeView::GetNodeForTreeItem(HTREEITEM tree_item) {
NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetailsByTreeItem(tree_item);
return details ? details->node : NULL;
}
|
TreeModelNode* TreeView::GetNodeForTreeItem(HTREEITEM tree_item) {
NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetailsByTreeItem(tree_item);
return details ? details->node : NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9330/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
|
26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
| null |
static inline int ohci_read_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_iso_td *td)
{
return get_dwords(ohci, addr, (uint32_t *)td, 4) ||
get_words(ohci, addr + 16, td->offset, 8);
}
|
static inline int ohci_read_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_iso_td *td)
{
return get_dwords(ohci, addr, (uint32_t *)td, 4) ||
get_words(ohci, addr + 16, td->offset, 8);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform2uiv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform2uiv",
Program::kUniform2ui,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniform2uivFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform2uiv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform2uiv",
Program::kUniform2ui,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniform2uivFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7586/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
psf_sanitize_string (char * cptr, int len)
{
do
{
len -- ;
cptr [len] = psf_isprint (cptr [len]) ? cptr [len] : '.' ;
}
while (len > 0) ;
} /* psf_sanitize_string */
|
psf_sanitize_string (char * cptr, int len)
{
do
{
len -- ;
cptr [len] = psf_isprint (cptr [len]) ? cptr [len] : '.' ;
}
while (len > 0) ;
} /* psf_sanitize_string */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
ServiceWorkerContextCore::ServiceWorkerContextCore(
const base::FilePath& user_data_directory,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> database_task_runner,
storage::QuotaManagerProxy* quota_manager_proxy,
storage::SpecialStoragePolicy* special_storage_policy,
URLLoaderFactoryGetter* url_loader_factory_getter,
base::ObserverListThreadSafe<ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver>*
observer_list,
ServiceWorkerContextWrapper* wrapper)
: wrapper_(wrapper),
providers_(std::make_unique<ProviderByIdMap>()),
provider_by_uuid_(std::make_unique<ProviderByClientUUIDMap>()),
loader_factory_getter_(url_loader_factory_getter),
force_update_on_page_load_(false),
was_service_worker_registered_(false),
observer_list_(observer_list),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(observer_list_);
storage_ = ServiceWorkerStorage::Create(
user_data_directory, AsWeakPtr(), std::move(database_task_runner),
quota_manager_proxy, special_storage_policy);
job_coordinator_ = std::make_unique<ServiceWorkerJobCoordinator>(AsWeakPtr());
}
|
ServiceWorkerContextCore::ServiceWorkerContextCore(
const base::FilePath& user_data_directory,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> database_task_runner,
storage::QuotaManagerProxy* quota_manager_proxy,
storage::SpecialStoragePolicy* special_storage_policy,
URLLoaderFactoryGetter* url_loader_factory_getter,
base::ObserverListThreadSafe<ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver>*
observer_list,
ServiceWorkerContextWrapper* wrapper)
: wrapper_(wrapper),
providers_(std::make_unique<ProviderByIdMap>()),
provider_by_uuid_(std::make_unique<ProviderByClientUUIDMap>()),
loader_factory_getter_(url_loader_factory_getter),
force_update_on_page_load_(false),
was_service_worker_registered_(false),
observer_list_(observer_list),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(observer_list_);
storage_ = ServiceWorkerStorage::Create(
user_data_directory, AsWeakPtr(), std::move(database_task_runner),
quota_manager_proxy, special_storage_policy);
job_coordinator_ = std::make_unique<ServiceWorkerJobCoordinator>(AsWeakPtr());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataCache::DestroyOnUIThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
ui_weak_ptr_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::Destroy,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
void GDataCache::DestroyOnUIThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
ui_weak_ptr_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::Destroy,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::changeLocation(const KURL& url, const String& referrer, bool lockHistory, bool lockBackForwardList, bool userGesture, bool refresh)
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
ResourceRequest request(url, referrer, refresh ? ReloadIgnoringCacheData : UseProtocolCachePolicy);
if (m_frame->script()->executeIfJavaScriptURL(request.url(), userGesture))
return;
urlSelected(request, "_self", 0, lockHistory, lockBackForwardList, userGesture, SendReferrer);
}
|
void FrameLoader::changeLocation(const KURL& url, const String& referrer, bool lockHistory, bool lockBackForwardList, bool userGesture, bool refresh)
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
ResourceRequest request(url, referrer, refresh ? ReloadIgnoringCacheData : UseProtocolCachePolicy);
if (m_frame->script()->executeIfJavaScriptURL(request.url(), userGesture))
return;
urlSelected(request, "_self", 0, lockHistory, lockBackForwardList, userGesture, SendReferrer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static int cma_join_ib_multicast(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
struct cma_multicast *mc)
{
struct ib_sa_mcmember_rec rec;
struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr = &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr;
ib_sa_comp_mask comp_mask;
int ret;
ib_addr_get_mgid(dev_addr, &rec.mgid);
ret = ib_sa_get_mcmember_rec(id_priv->id.device, id_priv->id.port_num,
&rec.mgid, &rec);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = cma_set_qkey(id_priv, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
cma_set_mgid(id_priv, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr, &rec.mgid);
rec.qkey = cpu_to_be32(id_priv->qkey);
rdma_addr_get_sgid(dev_addr, &rec.port_gid);
rec.pkey = cpu_to_be16(ib_addr_get_pkey(dev_addr));
rec.join_state = 1;
comp_mask = IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MGID | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_PORT_GID |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_PKEY | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_JOIN_STATE |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_QKEY | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_SL |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_FLOW_LABEL |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_TRAFFIC_CLASS;
if (id_priv->id.ps == RDMA_PS_IPOIB)
comp_mask |= IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_RATE |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_RATE_SELECTOR |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MTU_SELECTOR |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MTU |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_HOP_LIMIT;
mc->multicast.ib = ib_sa_join_multicast(&sa_client, id_priv->id.device,
id_priv->id.port_num, &rec,
comp_mask, GFP_KERNEL,
cma_ib_mc_handler, mc);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(mc->multicast.ib);
}
|
static int cma_join_ib_multicast(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
struct cma_multicast *mc)
{
struct ib_sa_mcmember_rec rec;
struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr = &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr;
ib_sa_comp_mask comp_mask;
int ret;
ib_addr_get_mgid(dev_addr, &rec.mgid);
ret = ib_sa_get_mcmember_rec(id_priv->id.device, id_priv->id.port_num,
&rec.mgid, &rec);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = cma_set_qkey(id_priv, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
cma_set_mgid(id_priv, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr, &rec.mgid);
rec.qkey = cpu_to_be32(id_priv->qkey);
rdma_addr_get_sgid(dev_addr, &rec.port_gid);
rec.pkey = cpu_to_be16(ib_addr_get_pkey(dev_addr));
rec.join_state = 1;
comp_mask = IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MGID | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_PORT_GID |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_PKEY | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_JOIN_STATE |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_QKEY | IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_SL |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_FLOW_LABEL |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_TRAFFIC_CLASS;
if (id_priv->id.ps == RDMA_PS_IPOIB)
comp_mask |= IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_RATE |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_RATE_SELECTOR |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MTU_SELECTOR |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_MTU |
IB_SA_MCMEMBER_REC_HOP_LIMIT;
mc->multicast.ib = ib_sa_join_multicast(&sa_client, id_priv->id.device,
id_priv->id.port_num, &rec,
comp_mask, GFP_KERNEL,
cma_ib_mc_handler, mc);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(mc->multicast.ib);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7998/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/commit/20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
|
vips_foreign_load_generate( VipsRegion *or,
void *seq, void *a, void *b, gboolean *stop )
{
VipsRegion *ir = (VipsRegion *) seq;
VipsRect *r = &or->valid;
/* Ask for input we need.
*/
if( vips_region_prepare( ir, r ) )
return( -1 );
/* Attach output region to that.
*/
if( vips_region_region( or, ir, r, r->left, r->top ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
|
vips_foreign_load_generate( VipsRegion *or,
void *seq, void *a, void *b, gboolean *stop )
{
VipsRegion *ir = (VipsRegion *) seq;
VipsRect *r = &or->valid;
/* Ask for input we need.
*/
if( vips_region_prepare( ir, r ) )
return( -1 );
/* Attach output region to that.
*/
if( vips_region_region( or, ir, r, r->left, r->top ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
|
C
|
libvips
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DesktopSessionWin::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return false;
}
|
bool DesktopSessionWin::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::GetGpuChannel() {
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
return NULL;
if (gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return NULL;
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
|
GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::GetGpuChannel() {
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
return NULL;
if (gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return NULL;
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void __usb_queue_reset_device(struct work_struct *ws)
{
int rc;
struct usb_interface *iface =
container_of(ws, struct usb_interface, reset_ws);
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(iface);
rc = usb_lock_device_for_reset(udev, iface);
if (rc >= 0) {
usb_reset_device(udev);
usb_unlock_device(udev);
}
usb_put_intf(iface); /* Undo _get_ in usb_queue_reset_device() */
}
|
static void __usb_queue_reset_device(struct work_struct *ws)
{
int rc;
struct usb_interface *iface =
container_of(ws, struct usb_interface, reset_ws);
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(iface);
rc = usb_lock_device_for_reset(udev, iface);
if (rc >= 0) {
usb_reset_device(udev);
usb_unlock_device(udev);
}
usb_put_intf(iface); /* Undo _get_ in usb_queue_reset_device() */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1666984c8625b3db19a9abc298931d35ab7bc64b
|
1666984c8625b3db19a9abc298931d35ab7bc64b
|
usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int usbnet_suspend (struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message)
{
struct usbnet *dev = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
if (!dev->suspend_count++) {
spin_lock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
/* don't autosuspend while transmitting */
if (dev->txq.qlen && PMSG_IS_AUTO(message)) {
dev->suspend_count--;
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
return -EBUSY;
} else {
set_bit(EVENT_DEV_ASLEEP, &dev->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
}
/*
* accelerate emptying of the rx and queues, to avoid
* having everything error out.
*/
netif_device_detach (dev->net);
usbnet_terminate_urbs(dev);
__usbnet_status_stop_force(dev);
/*
* reattach so runtime management can use and
* wake the device
*/
netif_device_attach (dev->net);
}
return 0;
}
|
int usbnet_suspend (struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message)
{
struct usbnet *dev = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
if (!dev->suspend_count++) {
spin_lock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
/* don't autosuspend while transmitting */
if (dev->txq.qlen && PMSG_IS_AUTO(message)) {
dev->suspend_count--;
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
return -EBUSY;
} else {
set_bit(EVENT_DEV_ASLEEP, &dev->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->txq.lock);
}
/*
* accelerate emptying of the rx and queues, to avoid
* having everything error out.
*/
netif_device_detach (dev->net);
usbnet_terminate_urbs(dev);
__usbnet_status_stop_force(dev);
/*
* reattach so runtime management can use and
* wake the device
*/
netif_device_attach (dev->net);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserActionButton::IsPopup() {
return browser_action_->has_popup();
}
|
bool BrowserActionButton::IsPopup() {
return browser_action_->has_popup();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11412/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ccxvii/mujs/commit/1e5479084bc9852854feb1ba9bf68b52cd127e02
|
1e5479084bc9852854feb1ba9bf68b52cd127e02
|
Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
|
static void cvarinit(JF, js_Ast *list)
{
while (list) {
js_Ast *var = list->a;
if (var->b) {
cexp(J, F, var->b);
emitline(J, F, var);
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, var->a);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
list = list->b;
}
}
|
static void cvarinit(JF, js_Ast *list)
{
while (list) {
js_Ast *var = list->a;
if (var->b) {
cexp(J, F, var->b);
emitline(J, F, var);
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, var->a);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
list = list->b;
}
}
|
C
|
mujs
| 0 |
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