CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-0912
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0912/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faceb51d5058e1159835a4b0cd65081bb0a9de1e
|
faceb51d5058e1159835a4b0cd65081bb0a9de1e
|
Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setGamepadEnabled(enable);
}
|
void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setGamepadEnabled(enable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void urlStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::urlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void urlStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::urlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10507
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10507/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/da940424816e11d624362ce080bc026adffa26e8
|
da940424816e11d624362ce080bc026adffa26e8
|
Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
|
static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* pDst, OPJ_INT32 dstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
pDst[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT[pSrc[x]];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pDst += dstStride;
}
}
|
static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* pDst, OPJ_INT32 dstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
pDst[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT[pSrc[x]];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pDst += dstStride;
}
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4119
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4119/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
|
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY QuerySecurityPackageInfoA(SEC_CHAR* pszPackageName, PSecPkgInfoA* ppPackageInfo)
{
int index;
size_t size;
UINT32 cPackages;
SecPkgInfoA* pPackageInfo;
cPackages = sizeof(SecPkgInfoA_LIST) / sizeof(*(SecPkgInfoA_LIST));
for (index = 0; index < (int) cPackages; index++)
{
if (strcmp(pszPackageName, SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Name) == 0)
{
size = sizeof(SecPkgInfoA);
pPackageInfo = (SecPkgInfoA*) sspi_ContextBufferAlloc(QuerySecurityPackageInfoIndex, size);
pPackageInfo->fCapabilities = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->fCapabilities;
pPackageInfo->wVersion = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->wVersion;
pPackageInfo->wRPCID = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->wRPCID;
pPackageInfo->cbMaxToken = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->cbMaxToken;
pPackageInfo->Name = _strdup(SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Name);
pPackageInfo->Comment = _strdup(SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Comment);
*(ppPackageInfo) = pPackageInfo;
return SEC_E_OK;
}
}
*(ppPackageInfo) = NULL;
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
}
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY QuerySecurityPackageInfoA(SEC_CHAR* pszPackageName, PSecPkgInfoA* ppPackageInfo)
{
int index;
size_t size;
UINT32 cPackages;
SecPkgInfoA* pPackageInfo;
cPackages = sizeof(SecPkgInfoA_LIST) / sizeof(*(SecPkgInfoA_LIST));
for (index = 0; index < (int) cPackages; index++)
{
if (strcmp(pszPackageName, SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Name) == 0)
{
size = sizeof(SecPkgInfoA);
pPackageInfo = (SecPkgInfoA*) sspi_ContextBufferAlloc(QuerySecurityPackageInfoIndex, size);
pPackageInfo->fCapabilities = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->fCapabilities;
pPackageInfo->wVersion = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->wVersion;
pPackageInfo->wRPCID = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->wRPCID;
pPackageInfo->cbMaxToken = SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->cbMaxToken;
pPackageInfo->Name = _strdup(SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Name);
pPackageInfo->Comment = _strdup(SecPkgInfoA_LIST[index]->Comment);
*(ppPackageInfo) = pPackageInfo;
return SEC_E_OK;
}
}
*(ppPackageInfo) = NULL;
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
const int error_action = 1; /* no error, no defines in png.h */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_rgb_to_gray(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set, data.green_to_set);
# else
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set,
data.green_to_set);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_cHRM_SUPPORTED
if (that->pm->current_encoding != 0)
{
/* We have an encoding so a cHRM chunk may have been set; if so then
* check that the libpng APIs give the correct (X,Y,Z) values within
* some margin of error for the round trip through the chromaticity
* form.
*/
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ
# define API_form "FP"
# define API_type double
# define API_cvt(x) (x)
# else
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ_fixed
# define API_form "fixed"
# define API_type png_fixed_point
# define API_cvt(x) ((double)(x)/PNG_FP_1)
# endif
API_type rX, gX, bX;
API_type rY, gY, bY;
API_type rZ, gZ, bZ;
if ((API_function(pp, pi, &rX, &rY, &rZ, &gX, &gY, &gZ, &bX, &bY, &bZ)
& PNG_INFO_cHRM) != 0)
{
double maxe;
const char *el;
color_encoding e, o;
/* Expect libpng to return a normalized result, but the original
* color space encoding may not be normalized.
*/
modifier_current_encoding(that->pm, &o);
normalize_color_encoding(&o);
/* Sanity check the pngvalid code - the coefficients should match
* the normalized Y values of the encoding unless they were
* overridden.
*/
if (data.red_to_set == -1 && data.green_to_set == -1 &&
(fabs(o.red.Y - data.red_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.green.Y - data.green_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.blue.Y - data.blue_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON))
png_error(pp, "internal pngvalid cHRM coefficient error");
/* Generate a colour space encoding. */
e.gamma = o.gamma; /* not used */
e.red.X = API_cvt(rX);
e.red.Y = API_cvt(rY);
e.red.Z = API_cvt(rZ);
e.green.X = API_cvt(gX);
e.green.Y = API_cvt(gY);
e.green.Z = API_cvt(gZ);
e.blue.X = API_cvt(bX);
e.blue.Y = API_cvt(bY);
e.blue.Z = API_cvt(bZ);
/* This should match the original one from the png_modifier, within
* the range permitted by the libpng fixed point representation.
*/
maxe = 0;
el = "-"; /* Set to element name with error */
# define CHECK(col,x)\
{\
double err = fabs(o.col.x - e.col.x);\
if (err > maxe)\
{\
maxe = err;\
el = #col "(" #x ")";\
}\
}
CHECK(red,X)
CHECK(red,Y)
CHECK(red,Z)
CHECK(green,X)
CHECK(green,Y)
CHECK(green,Z)
CHECK(blue,X)
CHECK(blue,Y)
CHECK(blue,Z)
/* Here in both fixed and floating cases to check the values read
* from the cHRm chunk. PNG uses fixed point in the cHRM chunk, so
* we can't expect better than +/-.5E-5 on the result, allow 1E-5.
*/
if (maxe >= 1E-5)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[256];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, API_form);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " cHRM ");
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, el);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " error: ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, maxe, 7);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " ");
/* Print the color space without the gamma value: */
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &o, 0);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " -> ");
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &e, 0);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* READ_cHRM */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
|
image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
PNG_CONST int error_action = 1; /* no error, no defines in png.h */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_rgb_to_gray(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set, data.green_to_set);
# else
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set,
data.green_to_set);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_cHRM_SUPPORTED
if (that->pm->current_encoding != 0)
{
/* We have an encoding so a cHRM chunk may have been set; if so then
* check that the libpng APIs give the correct (X,Y,Z) values within
* some margin of error for the round trip through the chromaticity
* form.
*/
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ
# define API_form "FP"
# define API_type double
# define API_cvt(x) (x)
# else
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ_fixed
# define API_form "fixed"
# define API_type png_fixed_point
# define API_cvt(x) ((double)(x)/PNG_FP_1)
# endif
API_type rX, gX, bX;
API_type rY, gY, bY;
API_type rZ, gZ, bZ;
if ((API_function(pp, pi, &rX, &rY, &rZ, &gX, &gY, &gZ, &bX, &bY, &bZ)
& PNG_INFO_cHRM) != 0)
{
double maxe;
PNG_CONST char *el;
color_encoding e, o;
/* Expect libpng to return a normalized result, but the original
* color space encoding may not be normalized.
*/
modifier_current_encoding(that->pm, &o);
normalize_color_encoding(&o);
/* Sanity check the pngvalid code - the coefficients should match
* the normalized Y values of the encoding unless they were
* overridden.
*/
if (data.red_to_set == -1 && data.green_to_set == -1 &&
(fabs(o.red.Y - data.red_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.green.Y - data.green_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.blue.Y - data.blue_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON))
png_error(pp, "internal pngvalid cHRM coefficient error");
/* Generate a colour space encoding. */
e.gamma = o.gamma; /* not used */
e.red.X = API_cvt(rX);
e.red.Y = API_cvt(rY);
e.red.Z = API_cvt(rZ);
e.green.X = API_cvt(gX);
e.green.Y = API_cvt(gY);
e.green.Z = API_cvt(gZ);
e.blue.X = API_cvt(bX);
e.blue.Y = API_cvt(bY);
e.blue.Z = API_cvt(bZ);
/* This should match the original one from the png_modifier, within
* the range permitted by the libpng fixed point representation.
*/
maxe = 0;
el = "-"; /* Set to element name with error */
# define CHECK(col,x)\
{\
double err = fabs(o.col.x - e.col.x);\
if (err > maxe)\
{\
maxe = err;\
el = #col "(" #x ")";\
}\
}
CHECK(red,X)
CHECK(red,Y)
CHECK(red,Z)
CHECK(green,X)
CHECK(green,Y)
CHECK(green,Z)
CHECK(blue,X)
CHECK(blue,Y)
CHECK(blue,Z)
/* Here in both fixed and floating cases to check the values read
* from the cHRm chunk. PNG uses fixed point in the cHRM chunk, so
* we can't expect better than +/-.5E-5 on the result, allow 1E-5.
*/
if (maxe >= 1E-5)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[256];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, API_form);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " cHRM ");
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, el);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " error: ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, maxe, 7);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " ");
/* Print the color space without the gamma value: */
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &o, 0);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " -> ");
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &e, 0);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* READ_cHRM */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const FeatureInfo::Workarounds& workarounds() const {
return feature_info_->workarounds();
}
|
const FeatureInfo::Workarounds& workarounds() const {
return feature_info_->workarounds();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16066/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bf635c28effa427a270f4fc45df84ed344f411c
|
2bf635c28effa427a270f4fc45df84ed344f411c
|
Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
|
void SVGStyleElement::FinishParsingChildren() {
StyleElement::ProcessingResult result =
StyleElement::FinishParsingChildren(*this);
SVGElement::FinishParsingChildren();
if (result == StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
|
void SVGStyleElement::FinishParsingChildren() {
StyleElement::ProcessingResult result =
StyleElement::FinishParsingChildren(*this);
SVGElement::FinishParsingChildren();
if (result == StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000050
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000050/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/nothings/stb/commit/244d83bc3d859293f55812d48b3db168e581f6ab
|
244d83bc3d859293f55812d48b3db168e581f6ab
|
fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
|
static int get8_packet_raw(vorb *f)
{
if (!f->bytes_in_seg) { // CLANG!
if (f->last_seg) return EOP;
else if (!next_segment(f)) return EOP;
}
assert(f->bytes_in_seg > 0);
--f->bytes_in_seg;
++f->packet_bytes;
return get8(f);
}
|
static int get8_packet_raw(vorb *f)
{
if (!f->bytes_in_seg) { // CLANG!
if (f->last_seg) return EOP;
else if (!next_segment(f)) return EOP;
}
assert(f->bytes_in_seg > 0);
--f->bytes_in_seg;
++f->packet_bytes;
return get8(f);
}
|
C
|
stb
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3760
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3760/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Bluetooth/+/122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
122feb9a0b04290f55183ff2f0384c6c53756bd8
|
Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
|
static void interopDatabaseClearNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s()", __FUNCTION__);
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return;
sBluetoothInterface->interop_database_clear();
}
|
static void interopDatabaseClearNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s()", __FUNCTION__);
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return;
sBluetoothInterface->interop_database_clear();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6254
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6254/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/collectd/collectd/commit/b589096f907052b3a4da2b9ccc9b0e2e888dfc18
|
b589096f907052b3a4da2b9ccc9b0e2e888dfc18
|
network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
|
static void free_sockent_client (struct sockent_client *sec) /* {{{ */
{
if (sec->fd >= 0)
{
close (sec->fd);
sec->fd = -1;
}
sfree (sec->addr);
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
sfree (sec->username);
sfree (sec->password);
if (sec->cypher != NULL)
gcry_cipher_close (sec->cypher);
#endif
} /* }}} void free_sockent_client */
|
static void free_sockent_client (struct sockent_client *sec) /* {{{ */
{
if (sec->fd >= 0)
{
close (sec->fd);
sec->fd = -1;
}
sfree (sec->addr);
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
sfree (sec->username);
sfree (sec->password);
if (sec->cypher != NULL)
gcry_cipher_close (sec->cypher);
#endif
} /* }}} void free_sockent_client */
|
C
|
collectd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
void avcodec_align_dimensions(AVCodecContext *s, int *width, int *height)
{
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(s->pix_fmt);
int chroma_shift = desc->log2_chroma_w;
int linesize_align[AV_NUM_DATA_POINTERS];
int align;
avcodec_align_dimensions2(s, width, height, linesize_align);
align = FFMAX(linesize_align[0], linesize_align[3]);
linesize_align[1] <<= chroma_shift;
linesize_align[2] <<= chroma_shift;
align = FFMAX3(align, linesize_align[1], linesize_align[2]);
*width = FFALIGN(*width, align);
}
|
void avcodec_align_dimensions(AVCodecContext *s, int *width, int *height)
{
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(s->pix_fmt);
int chroma_shift = desc->log2_chroma_w;
int linesize_align[AV_NUM_DATA_POINTERS];
int align;
avcodec_align_dimensions2(s, width, height, linesize_align);
align = FFMAX(linesize_align[0], linesize_align[3]);
linesize_align[1] <<= chroma_shift;
linesize_align[2] <<= chroma_shift;
align = FFMAX3(align, linesize_align[1], linesize_align[2]);
*width = FFALIGN(*width, align);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RootWindow::Init() {
compositor()->SetScaleAndSize(GetDeviceScaleFactorFromMonitor(this),
host_->GetBounds().size());
Window::Init(ui::LAYER_NOT_DRAWN);
last_mouse_location_ =
ui::ConvertPointToDIP(layer(), host_->QueryMouseLocation());
compositor()->SetRootLayer(layer());
SetBounds(
ui::ConvertRectToDIP(layer(), gfx::Rect(host_->GetBounds().size())));
Show();
host_->SetRootWindow(this);
}
|
void RootWindow::Init() {
compositor()->SetScaleAndSize(GetDeviceScaleFactorFromMonitor(this),
host_->GetBounds().size());
Window::Init(ui::LAYER_NOT_DRAWN);
last_mouse_location_ =
ui::ConvertPointToDIP(layer(), host_->QueryMouseLocation());
compositor()->SetRootLayer(layer());
SetBounds(
ui::ConvertRectToDIP(layer(), gfx::Rect(host_->GetBounds().size())));
Show();
host_->SetRootWindow(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::OpenLanguageOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenLanguageOptionsDialog"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kLanguageOptionsSubPage);
}
|
void Browser::OpenLanguageOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenLanguageOptionsDialog"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kLanguageOptionsSubPage);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
init_tilde()
{
if( tilde ) {
free( tilde );
tilde = NULL;
}
# if defined UNIX
struct passwd *pw;
if( (pw=getpwnam( myDistro->Get() )) ) {
tilde = strdup( pw->pw_dir );
}
# else
HKEY handle;
char regKey[1024];
snprintf( regKey, 1024, "Software\\%s", myDistro->GetCap() );
if ( RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regKey,
0, KEY_READ, &handle) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
char the_path[MAX_PATH];
DWORD valType;
DWORD valSize = MAX_PATH - 2;
the_path[0] = '\0';
if ( RegQueryValueEx(handle, "TILDE", 0,
&valType, (unsigned char *)the_path, &valSize) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
if ( valType == REG_SZ && the_path[0] ) {
tilde = strdup(the_path);
}
}
RegCloseKey(handle);
}
# endif
}
|
init_tilde()
{
if( tilde ) {
free( tilde );
tilde = NULL;
}
# if defined UNIX
struct passwd *pw;
if( (pw=getpwnam( myDistro->Get() )) ) {
tilde = strdup( pw->pw_dir );
}
# else
HKEY handle;
char regKey[1024];
snprintf( regKey, 1024, "Software\\%s", myDistro->GetCap() );
if ( RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regKey,
0, KEY_READ, &handle) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
char the_path[MAX_PATH];
DWORD valType;
DWORD valSize = MAX_PATH - 2;
the_path[0] = '\0';
if ( RegQueryValueEx(handle, "TILDE", 0,
&valType, (unsigned char *)the_path, &valSize) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
if ( valType == REG_SZ && the_path[0] ) {
tilde = strdup(the_path);
}
}
RegCloseKey(handle);
}
# endif
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16072/
|
CWE-346
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/153f8457c7867d5c9b627c11b52f5de0671d2fff
|
153f8457c7867d5c9b627c11b52f5de0671d2fff
|
Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
|
void WebMediaPlayerImpl::CreateWatchTimeReporter() {
if (!HasVideo() && !HasAudio())
return;
watch_time_reporter_.reset(new WatchTimeReporter(
mojom::PlaybackProperties::New(pipeline_metadata_.has_audio,
pipeline_metadata_.has_video, false, false,
!!chunk_demuxer_, is_encrypted_,
embedded_media_experience_enabled_),
pipeline_metadata_.natural_size,
base::BindRepeating(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::GetCurrentTimeInternal,
base::Unretained(this)),
media_metrics_provider_.get(),
frame_->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalMedia)));
watch_time_reporter_->OnVolumeChange(volume_);
if (delegate_->IsFrameHidden())
watch_time_reporter_->OnHidden();
else
watch_time_reporter_->OnShown();
if (client_->HasNativeControls())
watch_time_reporter_->OnNativeControlsEnabled();
else
watch_time_reporter_->OnNativeControlsDisabled();
switch (client_->DisplayType()) {
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kInline:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeInline();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kFullscreen:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeFullscreen();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kPictureInPicture:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypePictureInPicture();
break;
}
UpdateSecondaryProperties();
}
|
void WebMediaPlayerImpl::CreateWatchTimeReporter() {
if (!HasVideo() && !HasAudio())
return;
watch_time_reporter_.reset(new WatchTimeReporter(
mojom::PlaybackProperties::New(pipeline_metadata_.has_audio,
pipeline_metadata_.has_video, false, false,
!!chunk_demuxer_, is_encrypted_,
embedded_media_experience_enabled_),
pipeline_metadata_.natural_size,
base::BindRepeating(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::GetCurrentTimeInternal,
base::Unretained(this)),
media_metrics_provider_.get(),
frame_->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalMedia)));
watch_time_reporter_->OnVolumeChange(volume_);
if (delegate_->IsFrameHidden())
watch_time_reporter_->OnHidden();
else
watch_time_reporter_->OnShown();
if (client_->HasNativeControls())
watch_time_reporter_->OnNativeControlsEnabled();
else
watch_time_reporter_->OnNativeControlsDisabled();
switch (client_->DisplayType()) {
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kInline:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeInline();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kFullscreen:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeFullscreen();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kPictureInPicture:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypePictureInPicture();
break;
}
UpdateSecondaryProperties();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
ResourceTimingInfo* ResourceFetcher::GetNavigationTimingInfo() {
return navigation_timing_info_.get();
}
|
ResourceTimingInfo* ResourceFetcher::GetNavigationTimingInfo() {
return navigation_timing_info_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
fz_default_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs)
{
if (default_cs)
return default_cs->cmyk;
else
return fz_device_cmyk(ctx);
}
|
fz_default_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs)
{
if (default_cs)
return default_cs->cmyk;
else
return fz_device_cmyk(ctx);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12183
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12183/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=55caa8b08c84af2b50fbc936cf334a5a93dd7db5
|
55caa8b08c84af2b50fbc936cf334a5a93dd7db5
| null |
ProcXFixesCreateRegionFromGC(ClientPtr client)
{
RegionPtr pRegion, pClip;
GCPtr pGC;
int rc;
REQUEST(xXFixesCreateRegionFromGCReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesCreateRegionFromGCReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->region, client);
rc = dixLookupGC(&pGC, stuff->gc, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (pGC->clientClip) {
pClip = (RegionPtr) pGC->clientClip;
pRegion = XFixesRegionCopy(pClip);
if (!pRegion)
return BadAlloc;
} else {
return BadMatch;
}
if (!AddResource(stuff->region, RegionResType, (void *) pRegion))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
|
ProcXFixesCreateRegionFromGC(ClientPtr client)
{
RegionPtr pRegion, pClip;
GCPtr pGC;
int rc;
REQUEST(xXFixesCreateRegionFromGCReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesCreateRegionFromGCReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->region, client);
rc = dixLookupGC(&pGC, stuff->gc, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (pGC->clientClip) {
pClip = (RegionPtr) pGC->clientClip;
pRegion = XFixesRegionCopy(pClip);
if (!pRegion)
return BadAlloc;
} else {
return BadMatch;
}
if (!AddResource(stuff->region, RegionResType, (void *) pRegion))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4470/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void ip_copy_addrs(struct iphdr *iph, const struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(typeof(*fl4), daddr) !=
offsetof(typeof(*fl4), saddr) + sizeof(fl4->saddr));
memcpy(&iph->saddr, &fl4->saddr,
sizeof(fl4->saddr) + sizeof(fl4->daddr));
}
|
static void ip_copy_addrs(struct iphdr *iph, const struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(typeof(*fl4), daddr) !=
offsetof(typeof(*fl4), saddr) + sizeof(fl4->saddr));
memcpy(&iph->saddr, &fl4->saddr,
sizeof(fl4->saddr) + sizeof(fl4->daddr));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4979
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4979/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/2d0e4eff04ea963128a41faaef21f987272e05a2
|
2d0e4eff04ea963128a41faaef21f987272e05a2
|
modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is aborted
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *session)
{
server_rec *s;
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
IDCONST unsigned char *id;
unsigned int idlen;
/*
* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
*/
if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
}
sc = mySrvConfig(s);
/*
* Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
id = (unsigned char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen);
#else
id = session->session_id;
idlen = session->session_id_length;
#endif
/* TODO: Do we need a temp pool here, or are we always shutting down? */
ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen, sc->mc->pPool);
ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
"OK", "dead", 0);
return;
}
|
void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *session)
{
server_rec *s;
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
IDCONST unsigned char *id;
unsigned int idlen;
/*
* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
*/
if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
}
sc = mySrvConfig(s);
/*
* Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
id = (unsigned char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen);
#else
id = session->session_id;
idlen = session->session_id_length;
#endif
/* TODO: Do we need a temp pool here, or are we always shutting down? */
ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen, sc->mc->pPool);
ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
"OK", "dead", 0);
return;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6787/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
int perf_event_release_kernel(struct perf_event *event)
{
put_event(event);
return 0;
}
|
int perf_event_release_kernel(struct perf_event *event)
{
put_event(event);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4350/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void sctp_v6_del_protocol(void)
{
inet6_del_protocol(&sctpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_SCTP);
unregister_inet6addr_notifier(&sctp_inet6addr_notifier);
}
|
void sctp_v6_del_protocol(void)
{
inet6_del_protocol(&sctpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_SCTP);
unregister_inet6addr_notifier(&sctp_inet6addr_notifier);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
auth_get_default_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY);
}
|
auth_get_default_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_raise_legacy_irq(E1000ECore *core)
{
trace_e1000e_irq_legacy_notify(true);
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, IAC);
pci_set_irq(core->owner, 1);
}
|
e1000e_raise_legacy_irq(E1000ECore *core)
{
trace_e1000e_irq_legacy_notify(true);
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, IAC);
pci_set_irq(core->owner, 1);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
MockContentSettingsClient::~MockContentSettingsClient() {}
|
MockContentSettingsClient::~MockContentSettingsClient() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
}
|
void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2802
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2802/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool SendGetCookiesJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const std::string& url,
ListValue** cookies,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "GetCookies");
dict.SetString("url", url);
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
if (!SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg))
return false;
Value* cookies_unscoped_value;
if (!reply_dict.Remove("cookies", &cookies_unscoped_value))
return false;
scoped_ptr<Value> cookies_value(cookies_unscoped_value);
if (!cookies_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_LIST))
return false;
*cookies = static_cast<ListValue*>(cookies_value.release());
return true;
}
|
bool SendGetCookiesJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const std::string& url,
ListValue** cookies,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "GetCookies");
dict.SetString("url", url);
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
if (!SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg))
return false;
Value* cookies_unscoped_value;
if (!reply_dict.Remove("cookies", &cookies_unscoped_value))
return false;
scoped_ptr<Value> cookies_value(cookies_unscoped_value);
if (!cookies_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_LIST))
return false;
*cookies = static_cast<ListValue*>(cookies_value.release());
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2909/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/819cbb120eaec7e014e5abd029260db1ca8c5735
|
819cbb120eaec7e014e5abd029260db1ca8c5735
|
staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
const unsigned minor = iminor(inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_device *dev =
dev_file_info ? dev_file_info->device : NULL;
if (dev == NULL) {
DPRINTK("invalid minor number\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
/* This is slightly hacky, but we want module autoloading
* to work for root.
* case: user opens device, attached -> ok
* case: user opens device, unattached, in_request_module=0 -> autoload
* case: user opens device, unattached, in_request_module=1 -> fail
* case: root opens device, attached -> ok
* case: root opens device, unattached, in_request_module=1 -> ok
* (typically called from modprobe)
* case: root opens device, unattached, in_request_module=0 -> autoload
*
* The last could be changed to "-> ok", which would deny root
* autoloading.
*/
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
if (dev->attached)
goto ok;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module) {
DPRINTK("in request module\n");
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module)
goto ok;
dev->in_request_module = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
request_module("char-major-%i-%i", COMEDI_MAJOR, dev->minor);
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
#endif
dev->in_request_module = 0;
if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_NET_ADMIN\n");
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
ok:
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
if (dev->attached) {
if (!try_module_get(dev->driver->module)) {
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENOSYS;
}
}
if (dev->attached && dev->use_count == 0 && dev->open) {
int rc = dev->open(dev);
if (rc < 0) {
module_put(dev->driver->module);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return rc;
}
}
dev->use_count++;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return 0;
}
|
static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
const unsigned minor = iminor(inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_device *dev =
dev_file_info ? dev_file_info->device : NULL;
if (dev == NULL) {
DPRINTK("invalid minor number\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
/* This is slightly hacky, but we want module autoloading
* to work for root.
* case: user opens device, attached -> ok
* case: user opens device, unattached, in_request_module=0 -> autoload
* case: user opens device, unattached, in_request_module=1 -> fail
* case: root opens device, attached -> ok
* case: root opens device, unattached, in_request_module=1 -> ok
* (typically called from modprobe)
* case: root opens device, unattached, in_request_module=0 -> autoload
*
* The last could be changed to "-> ok", which would deny root
* autoloading.
*/
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
if (dev->attached)
goto ok;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module) {
DPRINTK("in request module\n");
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module)
goto ok;
dev->in_request_module = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
request_module("char-major-%i-%i", COMEDI_MAJOR, dev->minor);
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
#endif
dev->in_request_module = 0;
if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_NET_ADMIN\n");
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
ok:
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
if (dev->attached) {
if (!try_module_get(dev->driver->module)) {
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return -ENOSYS;
}
}
if (dev->attached && dev->use_count == 0 && dev->open) {
int rc = dev->open(dev);
if (rc < 0) {
module_put(dev->driver->module);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return rc;
}
}
dev->use_count++;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
XineramaSetWindowPntrs(DeviceIntPtr pDev, WindowPtr pWin)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
if (pWin == screenInfo.screens[0]->root) {
int i;
FOR_NSCREENS(i)
pSprite->windows[i] = screenInfo.screens[i]->root;
}
else {
PanoramiXRes *win;
int rc, i;
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &win, pWin->drawable.id,
XRT_WINDOW, serverClient, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return FALSE;
FOR_NSCREENS(i) {
rc = dixLookupWindow(pSprite->windows + i, win->info[i].id,
serverClient, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success) /* window is being unmapped */
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
|
XineramaSetWindowPntrs(DeviceIntPtr pDev, WindowPtr pWin)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
if (pWin == screenInfo.screens[0]->root) {
int i;
FOR_NSCREENS(i)
pSprite->windows[i] = screenInfo.screens[i]->root;
}
else {
PanoramiXRes *win;
int rc, i;
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &win, pWin->drawable.id,
XRT_WINDOW, serverClient, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return FALSE;
FOR_NSCREENS(i) {
rc = dixLookupWindow(pSprite->windows + i, win->info[i].id,
serverClient, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success) /* window is being unmapped */
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8924/
|
CWE-191
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e
|
654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e
|
USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
|
static int check_fw_sanity(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
u16 length_total;
u8 checksum = 0;
int pos;
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
if (fw->size < sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr)) {
dev_err(dev, "incomplete fw header\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
length_total = le16_to_cpu(fw_hdr->length) +
sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr);
if (fw->size != length_total) {
dev_err(dev, "bad fw size (expected: %u, got: %zu)\n",
length_total, fw->size);
return -EINVAL;
}
for (pos = sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr); pos < fw->size; ++pos)
checksum += fw->data[pos];
if (checksum != fw_hdr->checksum) {
dev_err(dev, "bad fw checksum (expected: 0x%x, got: 0x%x)\n",
fw_hdr->checksum, checksum);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int check_fw_sanity(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
u16 length_total;
u8 checksum = 0;
int pos;
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
if (fw->size < sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr)) {
dev_err(dev, "incomplete fw header\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
length_total = le16_to_cpu(fw_hdr->length) +
sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr);
if (fw->size != length_total) {
dev_err(dev, "bad fw size (expected: %u, got: %zu)\n",
length_total, fw->size);
return -EINVAL;
}
for (pos = sizeof(struct edgeport_fw_hdr); pos < fw->size; ++pos)
checksum += fw->data[pos];
if (checksum != fw_hdr->checksum) {
dev_err(dev, "bad fw checksum (expected: 0x%x, got: 0x%x)\n",
fw_hdr->checksum, checksum);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
void WallpaperManager::SetCustomizedDefaultWallpaperAfterCheck(
const GURL& wallpaper_url,
const base::FilePath& downloaded_file,
std::unique_ptr<CustomizedWallpaperRescaledFiles> rescaled_files) {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
std::string current_url =
pref_service->GetString(prefs::kCustomizationDefaultWallpaperURL);
if (current_url != wallpaper_url.spec() || !rescaled_files->AllSizesExist()) {
DCHECK(rescaled_files->downloaded_exists());
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, downloaded_file, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnCustomizedDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), wallpaper_url,
base::Passed(std::move(rescaled_files))));
} else {
SetDefaultWallpaperPath(rescaled_files->path_rescaled_small(),
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia>(),
rescaled_files->path_rescaled_large(),
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia>());
}
}
|
void WallpaperManager::SetCustomizedDefaultWallpaperAfterCheck(
const GURL& wallpaper_url,
const base::FilePath& downloaded_file,
std::unique_ptr<CustomizedWallpaperRescaledFiles> rescaled_files) {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
std::string current_url =
pref_service->GetString(prefs::kCustomizationDefaultWallpaperURL);
if (current_url != wallpaper_url.spec() || !rescaled_files->AllSizesExist()) {
DCHECK(rescaled_files->downloaded_exists());
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, downloaded_file, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnCustomizedDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), wallpaper_url,
base::Passed(std::move(rescaled_files))));
} else {
SetDefaultWallpaperPath(rescaled_files->path_rescaled_small(),
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia>(),
rescaled_files->path_rescaled_large(),
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia>());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19200/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/uriparser/uriparser/commit/f58c25069cf4a986fe17a80c5b38687e31feb539
|
f58c25069cf4a986fe17a80c5b38687e31feb539
|
ResetUri: Protect against NULL
|
const URI_TYPE(TextRange) * b) {
int diff;
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) {
return ((a == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a->first == NULL) || (b->first == NULL)) {
return ((a->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
diff = ((int)(a->afterLast - a->first) - (int)(b->afterLast - b->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
diff = URI_STRNCMP(a->first, b->first, (a->afterLast - a->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
return diff;
}
|
const URI_TYPE(TextRange) * b) {
int diff;
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) {
return ((a == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a->first == NULL) || (b->first == NULL)) {
return ((a->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
diff = ((int)(a->afterLast - a->first) - (int)(b->afterLast - b->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
diff = URI_STRNCMP(a->first, b->first, (a->afterLast - a->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
return diff;
}
|
C
|
uriparser
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18344/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c71d8045ce0592cf3f4290744ab57b23c1d1b4c6
|
c71d8045ce0592cf3f4290744ab57b23c1d1b4c6
|
[DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
|
void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::DidFinishNavigation(
NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
NavigationHandleImpl* handle =
static_cast<NavigationHandleImpl*>(navigation_handle);
if (handle->frame_tree_node() != frame_tree_node_)
return;
navigation_handles_.erase(handle);
NotifyNavigated();
scoped_refptr<RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost> protect(this);
UpdateFrameHost(frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host());
if (navigation_handles_.empty()) {
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->ResumeSendingMessagesToAgent();
}
if (handle->HasCommitted()) {
for (auto* target : protocol::TargetHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
target->DidCommitNavigation();
}
}
|
void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::DidFinishNavigation(
NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
NavigationHandleImpl* handle =
static_cast<NavigationHandleImpl*>(navigation_handle);
if (handle->frame_tree_node() != frame_tree_node_)
return;
navigation_handles_.erase(handle);
NotifyNavigated();
scoped_refptr<RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost> protect(this);
UpdateFrameHost(frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host());
if (navigation_handles_.empty()) {
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->ResumeSendingMessagesToAgent();
}
if (handle->HasCommitted()) {
for (auto* target : protocol::TargetHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
target->DidCommitNavigation();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5547/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6d104af38b570d37aa32a5803b04c354f8ed513d
|
6d104af38b570d37aa32a5803b04c354f8ed513d
|
HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char *data;
data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
out:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2018-14363
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14363/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING] = "";
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
/* These sscanf limits must match the sizes of the group and desc arrays */
if (sscanf(line, "%1023s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %8191[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
{
mutt_debug(4, "Cannot parse server line: %s\n", line);
return 0;
}
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
|
int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING] = "";
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
/* These sscanf limits must match the sizes of the group and desc arrays */
if (sscanf(line, "%1023s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %8191[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
{
mutt_debug(4, "Cannot parse server line: %s\n", line);
return 0;
}
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17456
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17456/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/a124133e1e6ab5c7a9fef6d0e6bcb084e3455b46
|
a124133e1e6ab5c7a9fef6d0e6bcb084e3455b46
|
fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static int verify_headers(const void *data, unsigned long size,
struct object *obj, struct fsck_options *options)
{
const char *buffer = (const char *)data;
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
switch (buffer[i]) {
case '\0':
return report(options, obj,
FSCK_MSG_NUL_IN_HEADER,
"unterminated header: NUL at offset %ld", i);
case '\n':
if (i + 1 < size && buffer[i + 1] == '\n')
return 0;
}
}
/*
* We did not find double-LF that separates the header
* and the body. Not having a body is not a crime but
* we do want to see the terminating LF for the last header
* line.
*/
if (size && buffer[size - 1] == '\n')
return 0;
return report(options, obj,
FSCK_MSG_UNTERMINATED_HEADER, "unterminated header");
}
|
static int verify_headers(const void *data, unsigned long size,
struct object *obj, struct fsck_options *options)
{
const char *buffer = (const char *)data;
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
switch (buffer[i]) {
case '\0':
return report(options, obj,
FSCK_MSG_NUL_IN_HEADER,
"unterminated header: NUL at offset %ld", i);
case '\n':
if (i + 1 < size && buffer[i + 1] == '\n')
return 0;
}
}
/*
* We did not find double-LF that separates the header
* and the body. Not having a body is not a crime but
* we do want to see the terminating LF for the last header
* line.
*/
if (size && buffer[size - 1] == '\n')
return 0;
return report(options, obj,
FSCK_MSG_UNTERMINATED_HEADER, "unterminated header");
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
bool Document::isInInvisibleSubframe() const
{
if (!localOwner())
return false; // this is a local root element
DCHECK(frame());
return !frame()->ownerLayoutObject();
}
|
bool Document::isInInvisibleSubframe() const
{
if (!localOwner())
return false; // this is a local root element
DCHECK(frame());
return !frame()->ownerLayoutObject();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16081
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16081/
|
CWE-862
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7c3bb2970fd0890df611b1d8b345b60b1978c2d7
|
7c3bb2970fd0890df611b1d8b345b60b1978c2d7
|
Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
[email protected], [email protected]
[email protected]
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
|
PlatformFontSkia::PlatformFontSkia() {
CHECK(InitDefaultFont()) << "Could not find the default font";
InitFromPlatformFont(g_default_font.Get().get());
}
|
PlatformFontSkia::PlatformFontSkia() {
CHECK(InitDefaultFont()) << "Could not find the default font";
InitFromPlatformFont(g_default_font.Get().get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4352/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
|
7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
| null |
generate_from_message (DBusString *data,
DBusValidity *expected_validity,
DBusMessage *message)
{
dbus_message_set_serial (message, 1);
dbus_message_lock (message);
*expected_validity = DBUS_VALID;
/* move for efficiency, since we'll nuke the message anyway */
if (!_dbus_string_move (&message->header.data, 0,
data, 0))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!_dbus_string_copy (&message->body, 0,
data, _dbus_string_get_length (data)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
}
|
generate_from_message (DBusString *data,
DBusValidity *expected_validity,
DBusMessage *message)
{
dbus_message_set_serial (message, 1);
dbus_message_lock (message);
*expected_validity = DBUS_VALID;
/* move for efficiency, since we'll nuke the message anyway */
if (!_dbus_string_move (&message->header.data, 0,
data, 0))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!_dbus_string_copy (&message->body, 0,
data, _dbus_string_get_length (data)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Document& SelectionEditor::GetDocument() const {
DCHECK(LifecycleContext());
return *LifecycleContext();
}
|
Document& SelectionEditor::GetDocument() const {
DCHECK(LifecycleContext());
return *LifecycleContext();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static int load_bitmap_entries_v1(struct bitmap_index *index)
{
uint32_t i;
struct stored_bitmap *recent_bitmaps[MAX_XOR_OFFSET] = { NULL };
for (i = 0; i < index->entry_count; ++i) {
int xor_offset, flags;
struct ewah_bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
struct stored_bitmap *xor_bitmap = NULL;
uint32_t commit_idx_pos;
const unsigned char *sha1;
commit_idx_pos = read_be32(index->map, &index->map_pos);
xor_offset = read_u8(index->map, &index->map_pos);
flags = read_u8(index->map, &index->map_pos);
sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(index->pack, commit_idx_pos);
bitmap = read_bitmap_1(index);
if (!bitmap)
return -1;
if (xor_offset > MAX_XOR_OFFSET || xor_offset > i)
return error("Corrupted bitmap pack index");
if (xor_offset > 0) {
xor_bitmap = recent_bitmaps[(i - xor_offset) % MAX_XOR_OFFSET];
if (xor_bitmap == NULL)
return error("Invalid XOR offset in bitmap pack index");
}
recent_bitmaps[i % MAX_XOR_OFFSET] = store_bitmap(
index, bitmap, sha1, xor_bitmap, flags);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int load_bitmap_entries_v1(struct bitmap_index *index)
{
uint32_t i;
struct stored_bitmap *recent_bitmaps[MAX_XOR_OFFSET] = { NULL };
for (i = 0; i < index->entry_count; ++i) {
int xor_offset, flags;
struct ewah_bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
struct stored_bitmap *xor_bitmap = NULL;
uint32_t commit_idx_pos;
const unsigned char *sha1;
commit_idx_pos = read_be32(index->map, &index->map_pos);
xor_offset = read_u8(index->map, &index->map_pos);
flags = read_u8(index->map, &index->map_pos);
sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(index->pack, commit_idx_pos);
bitmap = read_bitmap_1(index);
if (!bitmap)
return -1;
if (xor_offset > MAX_XOR_OFFSET || xor_offset > i)
return error("Corrupted bitmap pack index");
if (xor_offset > 0) {
xor_bitmap = recent_bitmaps[(i - xor_offset) % MAX_XOR_OFFSET];
if (xor_bitmap == NULL)
return error("Invalid XOR offset in bitmap pack index");
}
recent_bitmaps[i % MAX_XOR_OFFSET] = store_bitmap(
index, bitmap, sha1, xor_bitmap, flags);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18187/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/83c9f495ffe70c7dd280b41fdfd4881485a3bc28
|
83c9f495ffe70c7dd280b41fdfd4881485a3bc28
|
Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
|
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
|
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
explicit ShelfBackgroundAnimatorTestApi(ShelfBackgroundAnimator* animator)
: animator_(animator) {}
|
explicit ShelfBackgroundAnimatorTestApi(ShelfBackgroundAnimator* animator)
: animator_(animator) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2006-3635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2006-3635/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4dcc29e1574d88f4465ba865ed82800032f76418
|
4dcc29e1574d88f4465ba865ed82800032f76418
|
[IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
|
ia64_patch_imm64 (u64 insn_addr, u64 val)
{
/* The assembler may generate offset pointing to either slot 1
or slot 2 for a long (2-slot) instruction, occupying slots 1
and 2. */
insn_addr &= -16UL;
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 2,
0x01fffefe000UL, ( ((val & 0x8000000000000000UL) >> 27) /* bit 63 -> 36 */
| ((val & 0x0000000000200000UL) << 0) /* bit 21 -> 21 */
| ((val & 0x00000000001f0000UL) << 6) /* bit 16 -> 22 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000ff80UL) << 20) /* bit 7 -> 27 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000007fUL) << 13) /* bit 0 -> 13 */));
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 1, 0x1ffffffffffUL, val >> 22);
}
|
ia64_patch_imm64 (u64 insn_addr, u64 val)
{
/* The assembler may generate offset pointing to either slot 1
or slot 2 for a long (2-slot) instruction, occupying slots 1
and 2. */
insn_addr &= -16UL;
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 2,
0x01fffefe000UL, ( ((val & 0x8000000000000000UL) >> 27) /* bit 63 -> 36 */
| ((val & 0x0000000000200000UL) << 0) /* bit 21 -> 21 */
| ((val & 0x00000000001f0000UL) << 6) /* bit 16 -> 22 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000ff80UL) << 20) /* bit 7 -> 27 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000007fUL) << 13) /* bit 0 -> 13 */));
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 1, 0x1ffffffffffUL, val >> 22);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static TimeDelta GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(const ModelType& model_type,
SyncManager::SyncInternal* core) {
NudgeDelayStrategy delay_type = GetNudgeDelayStrategy(model_type);
return GetNudgeDelayTimeDeltaFromType(delay_type,
model_type,
core);
}
|
static TimeDelta GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(const ModelType& model_type,
SyncManager::SyncInternal* core) {
NudgeDelayStrategy delay_type = GetNudgeDelayStrategy(model_type);
return GetNudgeDelayTimeDeltaFromType(delay_type,
model_type,
core);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
Shutdown Timebomb - In canary, get a callstack if it takes longer than
10 minutes. In Dev, get callstack if it takes longer than 20 minutes.
In Beta (50 minutes) and Stable (100 minutes) it is same as before.
BUG=519321
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1409333005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355586}
|
bool ThreadWatcher::IsVeryUnresponsive() {
DCHECK(WatchDogThread::CurrentlyOnWatchDogThread());
return unresponsive_count_ >= unresponsive_threshold_;
}
|
bool ThreadWatcher::IsVeryUnresponsive() {
DCHECK(WatchDogThread::CurrentlyOnWatchDogThread());
return unresponsive_count_ >= unresponsive_threshold_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
ProcRenderQueryDithers(ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
|
ProcRenderQueryDithers(ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2482/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
[SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_apply_peer_addr_params(struct sctp_paddrparams *params,
struct sctp_transport *trans,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_sock *sp,
int hb_change,
int pmtud_change,
int sackdelay_change)
{
int error;
if (params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_DEMAND && trans) {
error = sctp_primitive_REQUESTHEARTBEAT (trans->asoc, trans);
if (error)
return error;
}
if (params->spp_hbinterval) {
if (trans) {
trans->hbinterval = msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->hbinterval = msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else {
sp->hbinterval = params->spp_hbinterval;
}
}
if (hb_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_pathmtu) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
sctp_frag_point(sp, params->spp_pathmtu);
} else {
sp->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
}
}
if (pmtud_change) {
if (trans) {
int update = (trans->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_DISABLE) &&
(params->spp_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE);
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
if (update) {
sctp_transport_pmtu(trans);
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
}
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_sackdelay) {
if (trans) {
trans->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else {
sp->sackdelay = params->spp_sackdelay;
}
}
if (sackdelay_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_pathmaxrxt) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else {
sp->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_apply_peer_addr_params(struct sctp_paddrparams *params,
struct sctp_transport *trans,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_sock *sp,
int hb_change,
int pmtud_change,
int sackdelay_change)
{
int error;
if (params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_DEMAND && trans) {
error = sctp_primitive_REQUESTHEARTBEAT (trans->asoc, trans);
if (error)
return error;
}
if (params->spp_hbinterval) {
if (trans) {
trans->hbinterval = msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->hbinterval = msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else {
sp->hbinterval = params->spp_hbinterval;
}
}
if (hb_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_pathmtu) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
sctp_frag_point(sp, params->spp_pathmtu);
} else {
sp->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
}
}
if (pmtud_change) {
if (trans) {
int update = (trans->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_DISABLE) &&
(params->spp_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE);
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
if (update) {
sctp_transport_pmtu(trans);
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
}
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_sackdelay) {
if (trans) {
trans->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else {
sp->sackdelay = params->spp_sackdelay;
}
}
if (sackdelay_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
}
}
if (params->spp_pathmaxrxt) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else {
sp->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9120/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7
|
9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7
|
staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void ion_free(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
static void ion_free_nolock(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
bool valid_handle;
BUG_ON(client != handle->client);
valid_handle = ion_handle_validate(client, handle);
if (!valid_handle) {
WARN(1, "%s: invalid handle passed to free.\n", __func__);
return;
}
ion_handle_put_nolock(handle);
}
void ion_free(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
BUG_ON(client != handle->client);
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
ion_free_nolock(client, handle);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
}
|
void ion_free(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
bool valid_handle;
BUG_ON(client != handle->client);
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
valid_handle = ion_handle_validate(client, handle);
if (!valid_handle) {
WARN(1, "%s: invalid handle passed to free.\n", __func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return;
}
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
ion_handle_put(handle);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-10966
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10966/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
|
GSList *nicklist_get_same_unique(SERVER_REC *server, void *id)
{
NICKLIST_GET_SAME_UNIQUE_REC rec;
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(id != NULL, NULL);
rec.id = id;
rec.list = NULL;
for (tmp = server->channels; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
rec.channel = tmp->data;
g_hash_table_foreach(rec.channel->nicks,
(GHFunc) get_nicks_same_hash_unique,
&rec);
}
return rec.list;
}
|
GSList *nicklist_get_same_unique(SERVER_REC *server, void *id)
{
NICKLIST_GET_SAME_UNIQUE_REC rec;
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(id != NULL, NULL);
rec.id = id;
rec.list = NULL;
for (tmp = server->channels; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
rec.channel = tmp->data;
g_hash_table_foreach(rec.channel->nicks,
(GHFunc) get_nicks_same_hash_unique,
&rec);
}
return rec.list;
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
void handle_rc_passthrough_cmd ( tBTA_AV_REMOTE_CMD *p_remote_cmd)
{
const char *status;
int pressed, i;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: p_remote_cmd->rc_id=%d", __FUNCTION__, p_remote_cmd->rc_id);
/* If AVRC is open and peer sends PLAY but there is no AVDT, then we queue-up this PLAY */
if (p_remote_cmd)
{
/* queue AVRC PLAY if GAVDTP Open notification to app is pending (2 second timer) */
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PLAY) && (!btif_av_is_connected()))
{
if (p_remote_cmd->key_state == AVRC_STATE_PRESS)
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: AVDT not open, queuing the PLAY command", __FUNCTION__);
btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play = TRUE;
}
return;
}
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PAUSE) && (btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play))
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Clear the pending PLAY on PAUSE received", __FUNCTION__);
btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play = FALSE;
return;
}
}
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_STOP) && (!btif_av_stream_started_ready()))
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Stream suspended, ignore STOP cmd",__FUNCTION__);
return;
}
if (p_remote_cmd->key_state == AVRC_STATE_RELEASE) {
status = "released";
pressed = 0;
} else {
status = "pressed";
pressed = 1;
}
/* If this is Play/Pause command (press or release) before processing, check the following
* a voice call has ended recently
* the remote device is not of type headset
* If the above conditions meet, drop the Play/Pause command
* This fix is to interop with certain carkits which sends an automatic PLAY or PAUSE
* commands right after call ends
*/
if((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PLAY || p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PAUSE)&&
(btif_hf_call_terminated_recently() == TRUE) &&
(check_cod( (const bt_bdaddr_t*)&(btif_rc_cb.rc_addr), COD_AV_HEADSETS) != TRUE))
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s:Dropping the play/Pause command received right after call end cmd:%d",
__FUNCTION__,p_remote_cmd->rc_id);
return;
}
if (p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_FAST_FOR || p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_REWIND) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_callbacks, passthrough_cmd_cb, p_remote_cmd->rc_id, pressed);
return;
}
for (i = 0; key_map[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (p_remote_cmd->rc_id == key_map[i].avrcp) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %s %s", __FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name, status);
/* MusicPlayer uses a long_press_timeout of 1 second for PLAYPAUSE button
* and maps that to autoshuffle. So if for some reason release for PLAY/PAUSE
* comes 1 second after the press, the MediaPlayer UI goes into a bad state.
* The reason for the delay could be sniff mode exit or some AVDTP procedure etc.
* The fix is to generate a release right after the press and drown the 'actual'
* release.
*/
if ((key_map[i].release_quirk == 1) && (pressed == 0))
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: AVRC %s Release Faked earlier, drowned now",
__FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name);
return;
}
send_key(uinput_fd, key_map[i].mapped_id, pressed);
if ((key_map[i].release_quirk == 1) && (pressed == 1))
{
GKI_delay(30); // 30ms
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: AVRC %s Release quirk enabled, send release now",
__FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name);
send_key(uinput_fd, key_map[i].mapped_id, 0);
}
break;
}
}
if (key_map[i].name == NULL)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s AVRCP: unknown button 0x%02X %s", __FUNCTION__,
p_remote_cmd->rc_id, status);
}
|
void handle_rc_passthrough_cmd ( tBTA_AV_REMOTE_CMD *p_remote_cmd)
{
const char *status;
int pressed, i;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: p_remote_cmd->rc_id=%d", __FUNCTION__, p_remote_cmd->rc_id);
/* If AVRC is open and peer sends PLAY but there is no AVDT, then we queue-up this PLAY */
if (p_remote_cmd)
{
/* queue AVRC PLAY if GAVDTP Open notification to app is pending (2 second timer) */
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PLAY) && (!btif_av_is_connected()))
{
if (p_remote_cmd->key_state == AVRC_STATE_PRESS)
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: AVDT not open, queuing the PLAY command", __FUNCTION__);
btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play = TRUE;
}
return;
}
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PAUSE) && (btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play))
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Clear the pending PLAY on PAUSE received", __FUNCTION__);
btif_rc_cb.rc_pending_play = FALSE;
return;
}
}
if ((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_STOP) && (!btif_av_stream_started_ready()))
{
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Stream suspended, ignore STOP cmd",__FUNCTION__);
return;
}
if (p_remote_cmd->key_state == AVRC_STATE_RELEASE) {
status = "released";
pressed = 0;
} else {
status = "pressed";
pressed = 1;
}
/* If this is Play/Pause command (press or release) before processing, check the following
* a voice call has ended recently
* the remote device is not of type headset
* If the above conditions meet, drop the Play/Pause command
* This fix is to interop with certain carkits which sends an automatic PLAY or PAUSE
* commands right after call ends
*/
if((p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PLAY || p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PAUSE)&&
(btif_hf_call_terminated_recently() == TRUE) &&
(check_cod( (const bt_bdaddr_t*)&(btif_rc_cb.rc_addr), COD_AV_HEADSETS) != TRUE))
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s:Dropping the play/Pause command received right after call end cmd:%d",
__FUNCTION__,p_remote_cmd->rc_id);
return;
}
if (p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_FAST_FOR || p_remote_cmd->rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_REWIND) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_callbacks, passthrough_cmd_cb, p_remote_cmd->rc_id, pressed);
return;
}
for (i = 0; key_map[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (p_remote_cmd->rc_id == key_map[i].avrcp) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %s %s", __FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name, status);
/* MusicPlayer uses a long_press_timeout of 1 second for PLAYPAUSE button
* and maps that to autoshuffle. So if for some reason release for PLAY/PAUSE
* comes 1 second after the press, the MediaPlayer UI goes into a bad state.
* The reason for the delay could be sniff mode exit or some AVDTP procedure etc.
* The fix is to generate a release right after the press and drown the 'actual'
* release.
*/
if ((key_map[i].release_quirk == 1) && (pressed == 0))
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: AVRC %s Release Faked earlier, drowned now",
__FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name);
return;
}
send_key(uinput_fd, key_map[i].mapped_id, pressed);
if ((key_map[i].release_quirk == 1) && (pressed == 1))
{
GKI_delay(30); // 30ms
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: AVRC %s Release quirk enabled, send release now",
__FUNCTION__, key_map[i].name);
send_key(uinput_fd, key_map[i].mapped_id, 0);
}
break;
}
}
if (key_map[i].name == NULL)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s AVRCP: unknown button 0x%02X %s", __FUNCTION__,
p_remote_cmd->rc_id, status);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __net_init int l2tp_eth_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct l2tp_eth_net *pn = net_generic(net, l2tp_eth_net_id);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pn->l2tp_eth_dev_list);
spin_lock_init(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
return 0;
}
|
static __net_init int l2tp_eth_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct l2tp_eth_net *pn = net_generic(net, l2tp_eth_net_id);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pn->l2tp_eth_dev_list);
spin_lock_init(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9756
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9756/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c
|
KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static int em_pushf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_VM;
return em_push(ctxt);
}
|
static int em_pushf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_VM;
return em_push(ctxt);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
Layer* LayerTreeHost::LayerById(int id) const {
auto iter = layer_id_map_.find(id);
return iter != layer_id_map_.end() ? iter->second : nullptr;
}
|
Layer* LayerTreeHost::LayerById(int id) const {
auto iter = layer_id_map_.find(id);
return iter != layer_id_map_.end() ? iter->second : nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dfd28b1909358445e838fb0fdf3995c77a420aa8
|
dfd28b1909358445e838fb0fdf3995c77a420aa8
|
Refactor ScrollableShelf on |space_for_icons_|
|space_for_icons_| indicates the available space in scrollable shelf
to accommodate shelf icons. Now it is an integer type. Replace it with
gfx::Rect.
Bug: 997807
Change-Id: I4f9ba3206bd69dfdaf50894de46239e676db6454
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1801326
Commit-Queue: Andrew Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Manu Cornet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696446}
|
gfx::Size ScrollableShelfView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
return shelf_container_view_->GetPreferredSize();
}
|
gfx::Size ScrollableShelfView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
return shelf_container_view_->GetPreferredSize();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
static int select_item(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path_in, sc_file_t ** file_out, int requiredType)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
mscfs_file_t *file_data = NULL;
int pathlen = path_in->len;
int r = 0;
int objectIndex;
u8* oid;
mscfs_check_cache(fs);
r = mscfs_loadFileInfo(fs, path_in->value, path_in->len, &file_data, &objectIndex);
if(r < 0) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,r);
/* Check if its the right type */
if(requiredType >= 0 && requiredType != file_data->ef) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
oid = file_data->objectId.id;
/* Is it a file or directory */
if(file_data->ef) {
fs->currentPath[0] = oid[0];
fs->currentPath[1] = oid[1];
fs->currentFile[0] = oid[2];
fs->currentFile[1] = oid[3];
} else {
fs->currentPath[0] = oid[pathlen - 2];
fs->currentPath[1] = oid[pathlen - 1];
fs->currentFile[0] = 0;
fs->currentFile[1] = 0;
}
fs->currentFileIndex = objectIndex;
if(file_out) {
sc_file_t *file;
file = sc_file_new();
file->path = *path_in;
file->size = file_data->size;
file->id = (oid[2] << 8) | oid[3];
if(!file_data->ef) {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
} else {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
}
/* Setup ACLS */
if(file_data->ef) {
muscle_load_file_acls(file, file_data);
} else {
muscle_load_dir_acls(file, file_data);
/* Setup directory acls... */
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
*file_out = file;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int select_item(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path_in, sc_file_t ** file_out, int requiredType)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
mscfs_file_t *file_data = NULL;
int pathlen = path_in->len;
int r = 0;
int objectIndex;
u8* oid;
mscfs_check_cache(fs);
r = mscfs_loadFileInfo(fs, path_in->value, path_in->len, &file_data, &objectIndex);
if(r < 0) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,r);
/* Check if its the right type */
if(requiredType >= 0 && requiredType != file_data->ef) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
oid = file_data->objectId.id;
/* Is it a file or directory */
if(file_data->ef) {
fs->currentPath[0] = oid[0];
fs->currentPath[1] = oid[1];
fs->currentFile[0] = oid[2];
fs->currentFile[1] = oid[3];
} else {
fs->currentPath[0] = oid[pathlen - 2];
fs->currentPath[1] = oid[pathlen - 1];
fs->currentFile[0] = 0;
fs->currentFile[1] = 0;
}
fs->currentFileIndex = objectIndex;
if(file_out) {
sc_file_t *file;
file = sc_file_new();
file->path = *path_in;
file->size = file_data->size;
file->id = (oid[2] << 8) | oid[3];
if(!file_data->ef) {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
} else {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
}
/* Setup ACLS */
if(file_data->ef) {
muscle_load_file_acls(file, file_data);
} else {
muscle_load_dir_acls(file, file_data);
/* Setup directory acls... */
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
*file_out = file;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2839/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void SetArgs(const ListValue* args) {}
|
virtual void SetArgs(const ListValue* args) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2672
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2672/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static void ath_tx_processq(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_txq *txq)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct ath_common *common = ath9k_hw_common(ah);
struct ath_buf *bf, *lastbf, *bf_held = NULL;
struct list_head bf_head;
struct ath_desc *ds;
struct ath_tx_status ts;
int status;
ath_dbg(common, QUEUE, "tx queue %d (%x), link %p\n",
txq->axq_qnum, ath9k_hw_gettxbuf(sc->sc_ah, txq->axq_qnum),
txq->axq_link);
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
for (;;) {
if (test_bit(SC_OP_HW_RESET, &sc->sc_flags))
break;
if (list_empty(&txq->axq_q)) {
txq->axq_link = NULL;
ath_txq_schedule(sc, txq);
break;
}
bf = list_first_entry(&txq->axq_q, struct ath_buf, list);
/*
* There is a race condition that a BH gets scheduled
* after sw writes TxE and before hw re-load the last
* descriptor to get the newly chained one.
* Software must keep the last DONE descriptor as a
* holding descriptor - software does so by marking
* it with the STALE flag.
*/
bf_held = NULL;
if (bf->bf_state.stale) {
bf_held = bf;
if (list_is_last(&bf_held->list, &txq->axq_q))
break;
bf = list_entry(bf_held->list.next, struct ath_buf,
list);
}
lastbf = bf->bf_lastbf;
ds = lastbf->bf_desc;
memset(&ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
status = ath9k_hw_txprocdesc(ah, ds, &ts);
if (status == -EINPROGRESS)
break;
TX_STAT_INC(txq->axq_qnum, txprocdesc);
/*
* Remove ath_buf's of the same transmit unit from txq,
* however leave the last descriptor back as the holding
* descriptor for hw.
*/
lastbf->bf_state.stale = true;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bf_head);
if (!list_is_singular(&lastbf->list))
list_cut_position(&bf_head,
&txq->axq_q, lastbf->list.prev);
if (bf_held) {
list_del(&bf_held->list);
ath_tx_return_buffer(sc, bf_held);
}
ath_tx_process_buffer(sc, txq, &ts, bf, &bf_head);
}
ath_txq_unlock_complete(sc, txq);
}
|
static void ath_tx_processq(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_txq *txq)
{
struct ath_hw *ah = sc->sc_ah;
struct ath_common *common = ath9k_hw_common(ah);
struct ath_buf *bf, *lastbf, *bf_held = NULL;
struct list_head bf_head;
struct ath_desc *ds;
struct ath_tx_status ts;
int status;
ath_dbg(common, QUEUE, "tx queue %d (%x), link %p\n",
txq->axq_qnum, ath9k_hw_gettxbuf(sc->sc_ah, txq->axq_qnum),
txq->axq_link);
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
for (;;) {
if (test_bit(SC_OP_HW_RESET, &sc->sc_flags))
break;
if (list_empty(&txq->axq_q)) {
txq->axq_link = NULL;
ath_txq_schedule(sc, txq);
break;
}
bf = list_first_entry(&txq->axq_q, struct ath_buf, list);
/*
* There is a race condition that a BH gets scheduled
* after sw writes TxE and before hw re-load the last
* descriptor to get the newly chained one.
* Software must keep the last DONE descriptor as a
* holding descriptor - software does so by marking
* it with the STALE flag.
*/
bf_held = NULL;
if (bf->bf_state.stale) {
bf_held = bf;
if (list_is_last(&bf_held->list, &txq->axq_q))
break;
bf = list_entry(bf_held->list.next, struct ath_buf,
list);
}
lastbf = bf->bf_lastbf;
ds = lastbf->bf_desc;
memset(&ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
status = ath9k_hw_txprocdesc(ah, ds, &ts);
if (status == -EINPROGRESS)
break;
TX_STAT_INC(txq->axq_qnum, txprocdesc);
/*
* Remove ath_buf's of the same transmit unit from txq,
* however leave the last descriptor back as the holding
* descriptor for hw.
*/
lastbf->bf_state.stale = true;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bf_head);
if (!list_is_singular(&lastbf->list))
list_cut_position(&bf_head,
&txq->axq_q, lastbf->list.prev);
if (bf_held) {
list_del(&bf_held->list);
ath_tx_return_buffer(sc, bf_held);
}
ath_tx_process_buffer(sc, txq, &ts, bf, &bf_head);
}
ath_txq_unlock_complete(sc, txq);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
void mark_parents_uninteresting(struct commit *commit)
{
struct commit_list *parents = NULL, *l;
for (l = commit->parents; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
while (parents) {
struct commit *commit = parents->item;
l = parents;
parents = parents->next;
free(l);
while (commit) {
/*
* A missing commit is ok iff its parent is marked
* uninteresting.
*
* We just mark such a thing parsed, so that when
* it is popped next time around, we won't be trying
* to parse it and get an error.
*/
if (!has_sha1_file(commit->object.sha1))
commit->object.parsed = 1;
if (commit->object.flags & UNINTERESTING)
break;
commit->object.flags |= UNINTERESTING;
/*
* Normally we haven't parsed the parent
* yet, so we won't have a parent of a parent
* here. However, it may turn out that we've
* reached this commit some other way (where it
* wasn't uninteresting), in which case we need
* to mark its parents recursively too..
*/
if (!commit->parents)
break;
for (l = commit->parents->next; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
commit = commit->parents->item;
}
}
}
|
void mark_parents_uninteresting(struct commit *commit)
{
struct commit_list *parents = NULL, *l;
for (l = commit->parents; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
while (parents) {
struct commit *commit = parents->item;
l = parents;
parents = parents->next;
free(l);
while (commit) {
/*
* A missing commit is ok iff its parent is marked
* uninteresting.
*
* We just mark such a thing parsed, so that when
* it is popped next time around, we won't be trying
* to parse it and get an error.
*/
if (!has_sha1_file(commit->object.sha1))
commit->object.parsed = 1;
if (commit->object.flags & UNINTERESTING)
break;
commit->object.flags |= UNINTERESTING;
/*
* Normally we haven't parsed the parent
* yet, so we won't have a parent of a parent
* here. However, it may turn out that we've
* reached this commit some other way (where it
* wasn't uninteresting), in which case we need
* to mark its parents recursively too..
*/
if (!commit->parents)
break;
for (l = commit->parents->next; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
commit = commit->parents->item;
}
}
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1632
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1632/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3f38b2253b19f9f9595f79fb92bfb5077e7b1959
|
3f38b2253b19f9f9595f79fb92bfb5077e7b1959
|
Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
FileMetricsProvider* provider() {
if (!provider_)
provider_.reset(new FileMetricsProvider(prefs()));
return provider_.get();
}
|
FileMetricsProvider* provider() {
if (!provider_)
provider_.reset(new FileMetricsProvider(prefs()));
return provider_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2859
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2859/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
454434f6100cb6a529652a25b5fc181caa7c7f32
|
Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PendingExtensionManager* ExtensionService::pending_extension_manager() {
return &pending_extension_manager_;
}
|
PendingExtensionManager* ExtensionService::pending_extension_manager() {
return &pending_extension_manager_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6490/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
|
1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
| null |
static void virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq(VirtQueue *vq)
{
if (vq->vring.desc && vq->handle_aio_output) {
VirtIODevice *vdev = vq->vdev;
trace_virtio_queue_notify(vdev, vq - vdev->vq, vq);
vq->handle_aio_output(vdev, vq);
}
}
|
static void virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq(VirtQueue *vq)
{
if (vq->vring.desc && vq->handle_aio_output) {
VirtIODevice *vdev = vq->vdev;
trace_virtio_queue_notify(vdev, vq - vdev->vq, vq);
vq->handle_aio_output(vdev, vq);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3963/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a38f71865b63025dce4de1f8cca71979c48d14d
|
0a38f71865b63025dce4de1f8cca71979c48d14d
|
Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
DictionaryValue params;
params.SetString("pairing", "bluetoothRemotePasskey");
params.SetInteger("passkey", passkey);
params.SetInteger("entered", entered);
SendDeviceNotification(device, ¶ms);
}
|
void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int dev_alloc_name_ns(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev,
const char *name)
{
char buf[IFNAMSIZ];
int ret;
ret = __dev_alloc_name(net, name, buf);
if (ret >= 0)
strlcpy(dev->name, buf, IFNAMSIZ);
return ret;
}
|
static int dev_alloc_name_ns(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev,
const char *name)
{
char buf[IFNAMSIZ];
int ret;
ret = __dev_alloc_name(net, name, buf);
if (ret >= 0)
strlcpy(dev->name, buf, IFNAMSIZ);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
int64_t max_buffer_forward() { return loader()->max_buffer_forward_; }
|
int64_t max_buffer_forward() { return loader()->max_buffer_forward_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
|
qboolean Com_FieldStringToPlayerName( char *name, int length, const char *rawname )
{
char hex[5];
int i;
int ch;
if( name == NULL || rawname == NULL )
return qfalse;
if( length <= 0 )
return qtrue;
for( i = 0; *rawname && i + 1 <= length; rawname++, i++ ) {
if( *rawname == '\\' ) {
Q_strncpyz( hex, rawname + 1, sizeof(hex) );
ch = Com_HexStrToInt( hex );
if( ch > -1 ) {
name[i] = ch;
rawname += 4; //hex string length, 0xXX
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
}
name[i] = '\0';
return qtrue;
}
|
qboolean Com_FieldStringToPlayerName( char *name, int length, const char *rawname )
{
char hex[5];
int i;
int ch;
if( name == NULL || rawname == NULL )
return qfalse;
if( length <= 0 )
return qtrue;
for( i = 0; *rawname && i + 1 <= length; rawname++, i++ ) {
if( *rawname == '\\' ) {
Q_strncpyz( hex, rawname + 1, sizeof(hex) );
ch = Com_HexStrToInt( hex );
if( ch > -1 ) {
name[i] = ch;
rawname += 4; //hex string length, 0xXX
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
}
name[i] = '\0';
return qtrue;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2017/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
enum gro_result dev_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct packet_type *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &ptype_base[ntohs(type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK];
int same_flow;
int mac_len;
enum gro_result ret;
if (!(skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO))
goto normal;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) || skb_has_frags(skb))
goto normal;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || ptype->dev || !ptype->gro_receive)
continue;
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
mac_len = skb->network_header - skb->mac_header;
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free = 0;
pp = ptype->gro_receive(&napi->gro_list, skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (&ptype->list == head)
goto normal;
same_flow = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow;
ret = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free ? GRO_MERGED_FREE : GRO_MERGED;
if (pp) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = *pp;
*pp = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
napi->gro_count--;
}
if (same_flow)
goto ok;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush || napi->gro_count >= MAX_GRO_SKBS)
goto normal;
napi->gro_count++;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = skb_gro_len(skb);
skb->next = napi->gro_list;
napi->gro_list = skb;
ret = GRO_HELD;
pull:
if (skb_headlen(skb) < skb_gro_offset(skb)) {
int grow = skb_gro_offset(skb) - skb_headlen(skb);
BUG_ON(skb->end - skb->tail < grow);
memcpy(skb_tail_pointer(skb), NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0, grow);
skb->tail += grow;
skb->data_len -= grow;
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].page_offset += grow;
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].size -= grow;
if (unlikely(!skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].size)) {
put_page(skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].page);
memmove(skb_shinfo(skb)->frags,
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags + 1,
--skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags);
}
}
ok:
return ret;
normal:
ret = GRO_NORMAL;
goto pull;
}
|
enum gro_result dev_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct packet_type *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &ptype_base[ntohs(type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK];
int same_flow;
int mac_len;
enum gro_result ret;
if (!(skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO))
goto normal;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) || skb_has_frags(skb))
goto normal;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || ptype->dev || !ptype->gro_receive)
continue;
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
mac_len = skb->network_header - skb->mac_header;
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free = 0;
pp = ptype->gro_receive(&napi->gro_list, skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (&ptype->list == head)
goto normal;
same_flow = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow;
ret = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free ? GRO_MERGED_FREE : GRO_MERGED;
if (pp) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = *pp;
*pp = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
napi->gro_count--;
}
if (same_flow)
goto ok;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush || napi->gro_count >= MAX_GRO_SKBS)
goto normal;
napi->gro_count++;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = skb_gro_len(skb);
skb->next = napi->gro_list;
napi->gro_list = skb;
ret = GRO_HELD;
pull:
if (skb_headlen(skb) < skb_gro_offset(skb)) {
int grow = skb_gro_offset(skb) - skb_headlen(skb);
BUG_ON(skb->end - skb->tail < grow);
memcpy(skb_tail_pointer(skb), NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0, grow);
skb->tail += grow;
skb->data_len -= grow;
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].page_offset += grow;
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].size -= grow;
if (unlikely(!skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].size)) {
put_page(skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0].page);
memmove(skb_shinfo(skb)->frags,
skb_shinfo(skb)->frags + 1,
--skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags);
}
}
ok:
return ret;
normal:
ret = GRO_NORMAL;
goto pull;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
|
08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
| null |
get_array_element_start(void *state, bool isnull)
{
GetState *_state = (GetState *) state;
bool get_next = false;
int lex_level = _state->lex->lex_level;
/* Update array element counter */
if (lex_level <= _state->npath)
_state->array_cur_index[lex_level - 1]++;
if (lex_level <= _state->npath &&
_state->pathok[lex_level - 1] &&
_state->path_indexes != NULL &&
_state->array_cur_index[lex_level - 1] == _state->path_indexes[lex_level - 1])
{
if (lex_level < _state->npath)
{
/* if not at end of path just mark path ok */
_state->pathok[lex_level] = true;
}
else
{
/* end of path, so we want this value */
get_next = true;
}
}
/* same logic as for objects */
if (get_next)
{
_state->tresult = NULL;
_state->result_start = NULL;
if (_state->normalize_results &&
_state->lex->token_type == JSON_TOKEN_STRING)
{
_state->next_scalar = true;
}
else
{
_state->result_start = _state->lex->token_start;
}
}
}
|
get_array_element_start(void *state, bool isnull)
{
GetState *_state = (GetState *) state;
bool get_next = false;
int lex_level = _state->lex->lex_level;
/* Update array element counter */
if (lex_level <= _state->npath)
_state->array_cur_index[lex_level - 1]++;
if (lex_level <= _state->npath &&
_state->pathok[lex_level - 1] &&
_state->path_indexes != NULL &&
_state->array_cur_index[lex_level - 1] == _state->path_indexes[lex_level - 1])
{
if (lex_level < _state->npath)
{
/* if not at end of path just mark path ok */
_state->pathok[lex_level] = true;
}
else
{
/* end of path, so we want this value */
get_next = true;
}
}
/* same logic as for objects */
if (get_next)
{
_state->tresult = NULL;
_state->result_start = NULL;
if (_state->normalize_results &&
_state->lex->token_type == JSON_TOKEN_STRING)
{
_state->next_scalar = true;
}
else
{
_state->result_start = _state->lex->token_start;
}
}
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams::ContextualSearchParams(
int version,
size_t start,
size_t end,
const std::string& selection,
const std::string& content,
const std::string& base_page_url,
const std::string& encoding,
int contextual_cards_version)
: version(version),
start(start),
end(end),
selection(selection),
content(content),
base_page_url(base_page_url),
encoding(encoding),
|
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams::ContextualSearchParams(
int version,
size_t start,
size_t end,
const std::string& selection,
const std::string& content,
const std::string& base_page_url,
const std::string& encoding,
int now_on_tap_version)
: version(version),
start(start),
end(end),
selection(selection),
content(content),
base_page_url(base_page_url),
encoding(encoding),
now_on_tap_version(now_on_tap_version) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static char *get_field(char *src, int nfields)
{
char *p = src;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nfields; i++) {
while (*p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t')
p++;
if (!*p)
break;
p++;
}
return p;
}
|
static char *get_field(char *src, int nfields)
{
char *p = src;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nfields; i++) {
while (*p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t')
p++;
if (!*p)
break;
p++;
}
return p;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3110
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3110/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/23a52bd208885df236cde3ad2cd162b094c0bbe4
|
23a52bd208885df236cde3ad2cd162b094c0bbe4
|
Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebPlugin* ChromeContentRendererClient::CreatePlugin(
content::RenderView* render_view,
WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginParams& original_params,
const ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status& status,
const webkit::WebPluginInfo& plugin,
const std::string& actual_mime_type) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::Value status_value = status.value;
GURL url(original_params.url);
std::string orig_mime_type = original_params.mimeType.utf8();
PluginPlaceholder* placeholder = NULL;
if (status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound) {
MissingPluginReporter::GetInstance()->ReportPluginMissing(
orig_mime_type, url);
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateMissingPlugin(
render_view, frame, original_params);
} else {
scoped_ptr<webkit::npapi::PluginGroup> group(
webkit::npapi::PluginList::Singleton()->GetPluginGroup(plugin));
string16 name = group->GetGroupName();
WebPluginParams params(original_params);
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugin.mime_types.size(); ++i) {
if (plugin.mime_types[i].mime_type == actual_mime_type) {
AppendParams(plugin.mime_types[i].additional_param_names,
plugin.mime_types[i].additional_param_values,
¶ms.attributeNames,
¶ms.attributeValues);
break;
}
}
if (params.mimeType.isNull() && (actual_mime_type.size() > 0)) {
params.mimeType = WebString::fromUTF8(actual_mime_type.c_str());
}
ContentSettingsObserver* observer =
ContentSettingsObserver::Get(render_view);
bool is_nacl_plugin =
plugin.name ==
ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::ChromeContentClient::kNaClPluginName);
ContentSettingsType content_type =
is_nacl_plugin ? CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT :
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS;
if ((status_value ==
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kUnauthorized ||
status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay ||
status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kBlocked) &&
observer->plugins_temporarily_allowed()) {
status_value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed;
}
switch (status_value) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound: {
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed: {
if (prerender::PrerenderHelper::IsPrerendering(render_view)) {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD);
placeholder->set_blocked_for_prerendering(true);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
break;
}
const char* kNaClMimeType = "application/x-nacl";
bool is_nacl_mime_type = actual_mime_type == kNaClMimeType;
bool is_nacl_unrestricted;
if (is_nacl_plugin) {
is_nacl_unrestricted = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableNaCl);
} else {
is_nacl_unrestricted = true;
}
if (is_nacl_plugin || is_nacl_mime_type) {
GURL manifest_url = is_nacl_mime_type ?
url : GetNaClContentHandlerURL(actual_mime_type, plugin);
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(manifest_url));
bool is_extension_from_webstore =
extension && extension->from_webstore();
bool is_extension_unrestricted = extension &&
(extension->location() == Extension::COMPONENT ||
extension->location() == Extension::LOAD);
GURL top_url = frame->top()->document().url();
if (!IsNaClAllowed(manifest_url,
top_url,
is_nacl_unrestricted,
is_extension_unrestricted,
is_extension_from_webstore,
¶ms)) {
frame->addMessageToConsole(
WebConsoleMessage(
WebConsoleMessage::LevelError,
"Only unpacked extensions and apps installed from the "
"Chrome Web Store can load NaCl modules without enabling "
"Native Client in about:flags."));
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_BLOCKED);
break;
}
}
return render_view->CreatePlugin(frame, plugin, params);
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kDisabled: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_DISABLED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_DISABLED);
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kOutdatedBlocked: {
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGIN_INSTALLATION)
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_OUTDATED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
render_view->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_BlockedOutdatedPlugin(
render_view->GetRoutingID(), placeholder->CreateRoutingId(),
group->identifier()));
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kOutdatedDisallowed: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_OUTDATED);
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kUnauthorized: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_NOT_AUTHORIZED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
render_view->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_BlockedUnauthorizedPlugin(
render_view->GetRoutingID(), group->GetGroupName()));
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
RenderThread::Get()->RecordUserMetrics("Plugin_ClickToPlay");
observer->DidBlockContentType(content_type, group->identifier());
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kBlocked: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_BLOCKED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
RenderThread::Get()->RecordUserMetrics("Plugin_Blocked");
observer->DidBlockContentType(content_type, group->identifier());
break;
}
}
}
placeholder->SetStatus(status);
return placeholder->plugin();
}
|
WebPlugin* ChromeContentRendererClient::CreatePlugin(
content::RenderView* render_view,
WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginParams& original_params,
const ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status& status,
const webkit::WebPluginInfo& plugin,
const std::string& actual_mime_type) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::Value status_value = status.value;
GURL url(original_params.url);
std::string orig_mime_type = original_params.mimeType.utf8();
PluginPlaceholder* placeholder = NULL;
if (status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound) {
MissingPluginReporter::GetInstance()->ReportPluginMissing(
orig_mime_type, url);
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateMissingPlugin(
render_view, frame, original_params);
} else {
scoped_ptr<webkit::npapi::PluginGroup> group(
webkit::npapi::PluginList::Singleton()->GetPluginGroup(plugin));
string16 name = group->GetGroupName();
WebPluginParams params(original_params);
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugin.mime_types.size(); ++i) {
if (plugin.mime_types[i].mime_type == actual_mime_type) {
AppendParams(plugin.mime_types[i].additional_param_names,
plugin.mime_types[i].additional_param_values,
¶ms.attributeNames,
¶ms.attributeValues);
break;
}
}
if (params.mimeType.isNull() && (actual_mime_type.size() > 0)) {
params.mimeType = WebString::fromUTF8(actual_mime_type.c_str());
}
ContentSettingsObserver* observer =
ContentSettingsObserver::Get(render_view);
bool is_nacl_plugin =
plugin.name ==
ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::ChromeContentClient::kNaClPluginName);
ContentSettingsType content_type =
is_nacl_plugin ? CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT :
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS;
if ((status_value ==
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kUnauthorized ||
status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay ||
status_value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kBlocked) &&
observer->plugins_temporarily_allowed()) {
status_value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed;
}
switch (status_value) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound: {
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed: {
if (prerender::PrerenderHelper::IsPrerendering(render_view)) {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD);
placeholder->set_blocked_for_prerendering(true);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
break;
}
const char* kNaClMimeType = "application/x-nacl";
bool is_nacl_mime_type = actual_mime_type == kNaClMimeType;
bool is_nacl_unrestricted;
if (is_nacl_plugin) {
is_nacl_unrestricted = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableNaCl);
} else {
is_nacl_unrestricted = true;
}
if (is_nacl_plugin || is_nacl_mime_type) {
GURL manifest_url = is_nacl_mime_type ?
url : GetNaClContentHandlerURL(actual_mime_type, plugin);
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(manifest_url));
bool is_extension_from_webstore =
extension && extension->from_webstore();
bool is_extension_unrestricted = extension &&
(extension->location() == Extension::COMPONENT ||
extension->location() == Extension::LOAD);
GURL top_url = frame->top()->document().url();
if (!IsNaClAllowed(manifest_url,
top_url,
is_nacl_unrestricted,
is_extension_unrestricted,
is_extension_from_webstore,
¶ms)) {
frame->addMessageToConsole(
WebConsoleMessage(
WebConsoleMessage::LevelError,
"Only unpacked extensions and apps installed from the "
"Chrome Web Store can load NaCl modules without enabling "
"Native Client in about:flags."));
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_BLOCKED);
break;
}
}
return render_view->CreatePlugin(frame, plugin, params);
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kDisabled: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_DISABLED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_DISABLED);
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kOutdatedBlocked: {
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGIN_INSTALLATION)
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_OUTDATED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
render_view->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_BlockedOutdatedPlugin(
render_view->GetRoutingID(), placeholder->CreateRoutingId(),
group->identifier()));
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kOutdatedDisallowed: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_OUTDATED);
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kUnauthorized: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_NOT_AUTHORIZED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
render_view->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_BlockedUnauthorizedPlugin(
render_view->GetRoutingID(), group->GetGroupName()));
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
RenderThread::Get()->RecordUserMetrics("Plugin_ClickToPlay");
observer->DidBlockContentType(content_type, group->identifier());
break;
}
case ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kBlocked: {
placeholder = PluginPlaceholder::CreateBlockedPlugin(
render_view, frame, params, plugin, name,
IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML, IDS_PLUGIN_BLOCKED);
placeholder->set_allow_loading(true);
RenderThread::Get()->RecordUserMetrics("Plugin_Blocked");
observer->DidBlockContentType(content_type, group->identifier());
break;
}
}
}
placeholder->SetStatus(status);
return placeholder->plugin();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::allowWebGL(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
bool default_value) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (!default_value)
return false;
bool blocked = true;
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_Are3DAPIsBlocked(
render_view_->GetRoutingID(),
GURL(frame->top()->securityOrigin().toString()),
THREE_D_API_TYPE_WEBGL,
&blocked));
return !blocked;
}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::allowWebGL(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
bool default_value) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (!default_value)
return false;
bool blocked = true;
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_Are3DAPIsBlocked(
render_view_->GetRoutingID(),
GURL(frame->top()->securityOrigin().toString()),
THREE_D_API_TYPE_WEBGL,
&blocked));
return !blocked;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14734
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14734/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8
|
infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_replace(&multicast_idr, mc, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-6622
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6622/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AppLauncherHandler::ExtensionUninstallCanceled() {
CleanupAfterUninstall();
}
|
void AppLauncherHandler::ExtensionUninstallCanceled() {
CleanupAfterUninstall();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1428
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1428/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=weechat.git;a=commit;h=c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
|
c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
| null |
hook_search_type (const char *type)
{
int i;
if (!type)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < HOOK_NUM_TYPES; i++)
{
if (strcmp (hook_type_string[i], type) == 0)
return i;
}
/* type not found */
return -1;
}
|
hook_search_type (const char *type)
{
int i;
if (!type)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < HOOK_NUM_TYPES; i++)
{
if (strcmp (hook_type_string[i], type) == 0)
return i;
}
/* type not found */
return -1;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7815
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7815/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
|
e6908bfe8e07f2b452e78e677da1b45b1c0f6829
| null |
double vnc_update_freq(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int i, j;
double total = 0;
int num = 0;
x = (x / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
y = (y / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
for (j = y; j <= y + h; j += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
for (i = x; i <= x + w; i += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
total += vnc_stat_rect(vs->vd, i, j)->freq;
num++;
}
}
if (num) {
return total / num;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
|
double vnc_update_freq(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int i, j;
double total = 0;
int num = 0;
x = (x / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
y = (y / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
for (j = y; j <= y + h; j += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
for (i = x; i <= x + w; i += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
total += vnc_stat_rect(vs->vd, i, j)->freq;
num++;
}
}
if (num) {
return total / num;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -u, --umask=MASK umask for file creation (in numeric form)\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
|
usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -u, --umask=MASK umask for file creation (in numeric form)\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5164
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5164/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93bc623489bdcfc7e9127614fcfb3258edf3f0f9
|
93bc623489bdcfc7e9127614fcfb3258edf3f0f9
|
[DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
void V8Debugger::v8DebugEventCallback(const v8::Debug::EventDetails& eventDetails)
{
V8Debugger* thisPtr = toV8Debugger(eventDetails.GetCallbackData());
thisPtr->handleV8DebugEvent(eventDetails);
}
|
void V8Debugger::v8DebugEventCallback(const v8::Debug::EventDetails& eventDetails)
{
V8Debugger* thisPtr = toV8Debugger(eventDetails.GetCallbackData());
thisPtr->handleV8DebugEvent(eventDetails);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7822/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int pipe_to_user(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
int n = copy_page_to_iter(buf->page, buf->offset, sd->len, sd->u.data);
return n == sd->len ? n : -EFAULT;
}
|
static int pipe_to_user(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
int n = copy_page_to_iter(buf->page, buf->offset, sd->len, sd->u.data);
return n == sd->len ? n : -EFAULT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1999015
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1999015/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/5aba5b89d0b1d73164d3b81764828bb8b20ff32a
|
5aba5b89d0b1d73164d3b81764828bb8b20ff32a
|
avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static inline int mpeg4_decode_dc(MpegEncContext *s, int n, int *dir_ptr)
{
int level, code;
if (n < 4)
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_lum.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
else
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_chrom.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (code < 0 || code > 9 /* && s->nbit < 9 */) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dc vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (code == 0) {
level = 0;
} else {
if (IS_3IV1) {
if (code == 1)
level = 2 * get_bits1(&s->gb) - 1;
else {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
level = get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) + (1 << (code - 1));
else
level = -get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) - (1 << (code - 1));
}
} else {
level = get_xbits(&s->gb, code);
}
if (code > 8) {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) == 0) { /* marker */
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & (AV_EF_BITSTREAM|AV_EF_COMPLIANT)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dc marker bit missing\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
}
return ff_mpeg4_pred_dc(s, n, level, dir_ptr, 0);
}
|
static inline int mpeg4_decode_dc(MpegEncContext *s, int n, int *dir_ptr)
{
int level, code;
if (n < 4)
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_lum.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
else
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_chrom.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (code < 0 || code > 9 /* && s->nbit < 9 */) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dc vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (code == 0) {
level = 0;
} else {
if (IS_3IV1) {
if (code == 1)
level = 2 * get_bits1(&s->gb) - 1;
else {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
level = get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) + (1 << (code - 1));
else
level = -get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) - (1 << (code - 1));
}
} else {
level = get_xbits(&s->gb, code);
}
if (code > 8) {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) == 0) { /* marker */
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & (AV_EF_BITSTREAM|AV_EF_COMPLIANT)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dc marker bit missing\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
}
return ff_mpeg4_pred_dc(s, n, level, dir_ptr, 0);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
WallpaperManagerBase::TestApi::TestApi(WallpaperManagerBase* wallpaper_manager)
: wallpaper_manager_(wallpaper_manager) {
}
|
WallpaperManagerBase::TestApi::TestApi(WallpaperManagerBase* wallpaper_manager)
: wallpaper_manager_(wallpaper_manager) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
_exsltDateDayInWeek(long yday, long yr)
{
long ret;
if (yr < 0) {
ret = ((yr + (((yr+1)/4)-((yr+1)/100)+((yr+1)/400)) + yday) % 7);
if (ret < 0)
ret += 7;
} else
ret = (((yr-1) + (((yr-1)/4)-((yr-1)/100)+((yr-1)/400)) + yday) % 7);
return ret;
}
|
_exsltDateDayInWeek(long yday, long yr)
{
long ret;
if (yr < 0) {
ret = ((yr + (((yr+1)/4)-((yr+1)/100)+((yr+1)/400)) + yday) % 7);
if (ret < 0)
ret += 7;
} else
ret = (((yr-1) + (((yr-1)/4)-((yr-1)/100)+((yr-1)/400)) + yday) % 7);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThread::OnNetworkStateChanged(bool online) {
EnsureWebKitInitialized();
WebNetworkStateNotifier::setOnLine(online);
}
|
void RenderThread::OnNetworkStateChanged(bool online) {
EnsureWebKitInitialized();
WebNetworkStateNotifier::setOnLine(online);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4819
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4819/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/render/render.c?id=5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
|
5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
| null |
ProcRenderTriFan (ClientPtr client)
{
int rc, npoints;
PicturePtr pSrc, pDst;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
REQUEST(xRenderTrianglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTrianglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
if (pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->maskFormat)
{
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&pFormat, stuff->maskFormat,
PictFormatType, client, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
else
pFormat = 0;
npoints = ((client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderTriStripReq));
if (npoints & 4)
return BadLength;
npoints >>= 3;
if (npoints >= 3)
CompositeTriFan (stuff->op, pSrc, pDst, pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc,
npoints, (xPointFixed *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
|
ProcRenderTriFan (ClientPtr client)
{
int rc, npoints;
PicturePtr pSrc, pDst;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
REQUEST(xRenderTrianglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTrianglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
if (pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->maskFormat)
{
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&pFormat, stuff->maskFormat,
PictFormatType, client, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
else
pFormat = 0;
npoints = ((client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderTriStripReq));
if (npoints & 4)
return BadLength;
npoints >>= 3;
if (npoints >= 3)
CompositeTriFan (stuff->op, pSrc, pDst, pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc,
npoints, (xPointFixed *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1465
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1465/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0
|
df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0
|
ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void rt_cache_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
}
|
static void rt_cache_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9262
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9262/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/634ce8e8a5accc0fa05dd2c20d42b4749d4b2735
|
634ce8e8a5accc0fa05dd2c20d42b4749d4b2735
|
Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
|
static long mem_seek(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, long offset, int origin)
{
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
size_t newpos;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_seek(%p, %ld, %d)\n", obj, offset, origin));
switch (origin) {
case SEEK_SET:
newpos = offset;
break;
case SEEK_END:
newpos = m->len_ - offset;
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
newpos = m->pos_ + offset;
break;
default:
abort();
break;
}
if (newpos < 0) {
return -1;
}
m->pos_ = newpos;
return m->pos_;
}
|
static long mem_seek(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, long offset, int origin)
{
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
long newpos;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_seek(%p, %ld, %d)\n", obj, offset, origin));
switch (origin) {
case SEEK_SET:
newpos = offset;
break;
case SEEK_END:
newpos = m->len_ - offset;
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
newpos = m->pos_ + offset;
break;
default:
abort();
break;
}
if (newpos < 0) {
return -1;
}
m->pos_ = newpos;
return m->pos_;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMTextures(
const char* function_name,
GLenum dest_target,
TextureRef* source_texture_ref,
TextureRef* dest_texture_ref) {
if (!source_texture_ref || !dest_texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "unknown texture id");
return false;
}
Texture* source_texture = source_texture_ref->texture();
Texture* dest_texture = dest_texture_ref->texture();
if (source_texture == dest_texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"source and destination textures are the same");
return false;
}
if (dest_texture->target() !=
GLES2Util::GLFaceTargetToTextureTarget(dest_target)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"target should be aligned with dest target");
return false;
}
switch (dest_texture->target()) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
break;
default:
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"invalid dest texture target binding");
return false;
}
switch (source_texture->target()) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
case GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES:
break;
default:
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"invalid source texture target binding");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCopyTextureCHROMIUMTextures(
const char* function_name,
GLenum dest_target,
TextureRef* source_texture_ref,
TextureRef* dest_texture_ref) {
if (!source_texture_ref || !dest_texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "unknown texture id");
return false;
}
Texture* source_texture = source_texture_ref->texture();
Texture* dest_texture = dest_texture_ref->texture();
if (source_texture == dest_texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"source and destination textures are the same");
return false;
}
if (dest_texture->target() !=
GLES2Util::GLFaceTargetToTextureTarget(dest_target)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"target should be aligned with dest target");
return false;
}
switch (dest_texture->target()) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
break;
default:
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"invalid dest texture target binding");
return false;
}
switch (source_texture->target()) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
case GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES:
break;
default:
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"invalid source texture target binding");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserRenderProcessHost::ResetVisitedLinks() {
visited_link_updater_->AddReset();
if (visible_widgets_ == 0)
return;
visited_link_updater_->Update(this);
}
|
void BrowserRenderProcessHost::ResetVisitedLinks() {
visited_link_updater_->AddReset();
if (visible_widgets_ == 0)
return;
visited_link_updater_->Update(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8786
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8786/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/445a5a42c500ceb80f8fa7f2c11f3682538033f3
|
445a5a42c500ceb80f8fa7f2c11f3682538033f3
|
Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
static BOOL update_send_cache_glyph_v2(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_GLYPH_V2_ORDER* cache_glyph_v2)
{
wStream* s;
UINT16 flags;
size_t bm, em, inf;
int headerLength;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
flags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
inf = update_approximate_cache_glyph_v2_order(cache_glyph_v2, &flags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_glyph_v2_order(s, cache_glyph_v2, &flags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD | ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, flags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_GLYPH); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
|
static BOOL update_send_cache_glyph_v2(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_GLYPH_V2_ORDER* cache_glyph_v2)
{
wStream* s;
UINT16 flags;
size_t bm, em, inf;
int headerLength;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
flags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
inf = update_approximate_cache_glyph_v2_order(cache_glyph_v2, &flags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_glyph_v2_order(s, cache_glyph_v2, &flags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD | ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, flags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_GLYPH); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8746/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da
|
NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static void nfs4_reclaim_complete_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_reclaim_complete_data *calldata = data;
struct nfs_client *clp = calldata->clp;
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res = &calldata->res.seq_res;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs41_sequence_done(task, res))
return;
trace_nfs4_reclaim_complete(clp, task->tk_status);
if (nfs41_reclaim_complete_handle_errors(task, clp) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
|
static void nfs4_reclaim_complete_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_reclaim_complete_data *calldata = data;
struct nfs_client *clp = calldata->clp;
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res = &calldata->res.seq_res;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs41_sequence_done(task, res))
return;
trace_nfs4_reclaim_complete(clp, task->tk_status);
if (nfs41_reclaim_complete_handle_errors(task, clp) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1a9c0e454b08c96ca73788a1b4dccb405ce027
|
ce1a9c0e454b08c96ca73788a1b4dccb405ce027
|
Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
|
KURL ImageLoader::imageSourceToKURL(AtomicString imageSourceURL) const {
KURL url;
Document& document = m_element->document();
if (!document.isActive())
return url;
if (!imageSourceURL.isNull()) {
String strippedImageSourceURL =
stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(imageSourceURL);
if (!strippedImageSourceURL.isEmpty())
url = document.completeURL(strippedImageSourceURL);
}
return url;
}
|
KURL ImageLoader::imageSourceToKURL(AtomicString imageSourceURL) const {
KURL url;
Document& document = m_element->document();
if (!document.isActive())
return url;
if (!imageSourceURL.isNull()) {
String strippedImageSourceURL =
stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(imageSourceURL);
if (!strippedImageSourceURL.isEmpty())
url = document.completeURL(strippedImageSourceURL);
}
return url;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13303
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13303/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/00e8181bd97c834fe60751b0c511d4bb97875f78
|
00e8181bd97c834fe60751b0c511d4bb97875f78
|
avcodec/ac3_parser: Check init_get_bits8() for failure
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_6.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int av_ac3_parse_header(const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
uint8_t *bitstream_id, uint16_t *frame_size)
{
GetBitContext gb;
AC3HeaderInfo hdr;
int err;
init_get_bits8(&gb, buf, size);
err = ff_ac3_parse_header(&gb, &hdr);
if (err < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
*bitstream_id = hdr.bitstream_id;
*frame_size = hdr.frame_size;
return 0;
}
|
int av_ac3_parse_header(const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
uint8_t *bitstream_id, uint16_t *frame_size)
{
GetBitContext gb;
AC3HeaderInfo hdr;
int err;
init_get_bits8(&gb, buf, size);
err = ff_ac3_parse_header(&gb, &hdr);
if (err < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
*bitstream_id = hdr.bitstream_id;
*frame_size = hdr.frame_size;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1446
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1446/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e3fbf870481eb53b2d3a322d1fc395ad8b367ed
|
8e3fbf870481eb53b2d3a322d1fc395ad8b367ed
|
hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void *yam_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
return (*pos < NR_PORTS) ? yam_devs[*pos] : NULL;
}
|
static void *yam_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
return (*pos < NR_PORTS) ? yam_devs[*pos] : NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7412/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/28f80baf3c53e267c9ce46a2a0fadbb981585132?w=1
|
28f80baf3c53e267c9ce46a2a0fadbb981585132?w=1
|
Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
|
MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_protocol, get_sha256_pk_request_response_packet)(MYSQLND_PROTOCOL * const protocol, zend_bool persistent TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct st_mysqlnd_packet_sha256_pk_request_response * packet = mnd_pecalloc(1, packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_RESPONSE_PACKET].struct_size, persistent);
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_protocol::get_sha256_pk_request_response_packet");
if (packet) {
packet->header.m = &packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_RESPONSE_PACKET];
packet->header.persistent = persistent;
}
DBG_RETURN(packet);
}
|
MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_protocol, get_sha256_pk_request_response_packet)(MYSQLND_PROTOCOL * const protocol, zend_bool persistent TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct st_mysqlnd_packet_sha256_pk_request_response * packet = mnd_pecalloc(1, packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_RESPONSE_PACKET].struct_size, persistent);
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_protocol::get_sha256_pk_request_response_packet");
if (packet) {
packet->header.m = &packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_RESPONSE_PACKET];
packet->header.persistent = persistent;
}
DBG_RETURN(packet);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool isPositionedContainer(RenderLayer* layer)
{
RenderObject* o = layer->renderer();
return o->isRenderView() || o->isOutOfFlowPositioned() || o->isRelPositioned() || layer->hasTransform();
}
|
static bool isPositionedContainer(RenderLayer* layer)
{
RenderObject* o = layer->renderer();
return o->isRenderView() || o->isOutOfFlowPositioned() || o->isRelPositioned() || layer->hasTransform();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::RecomputeAndUpdateWebKitPreferences() {
std::unique_ptr<RenderWidgetHostIterator> widgets(
RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetAllRenderWidgetHosts());
while (RenderWidgetHost* widget = widgets->GetNextHost()) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(widget);
if (!rvh)
continue;
if (rvh->GetProcess()->GetID() != GetID())
continue;
rvh->OnWebkitPreferencesChanged();
}
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::RecomputeAndUpdateWebKitPreferences() {
std::unique_ptr<RenderWidgetHostIterator> widgets(
RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetAllRenderWidgetHosts());
while (RenderWidgetHost* widget = widgets->GetNextHost()) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(widget);
if (!rvh)
continue;
if (rvh->GetProcess()->GetID() != GetID())
continue;
rvh->OnWebkitPreferencesChanged();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0037
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0037/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/dajobe/raptor/commit/a676f235309a59d4aa78eeffd2574ae5d341fcb0
|
a676f235309a59d4aa78eeffd2574ae5d341fcb0
|
CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
|
raptor_libxml_resolveEntity(void* user_data,
const xmlChar *publicId, const xmlChar *systemId)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = sax2->xc;
const unsigned char *uri_string = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr entity_input;
int load_entity = 0;
if(ctxt->input)
uri_string = RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const unsigned char *, ctxt->input->filename);
if(!uri_string)
uri_string = RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const unsigned char *, ctxt->directory);
load_entity = RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(sax2, RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES);
if(load_entity)
load_entity = raptor_sax2_check_load_uri_string(sax2, uri_string);
if(load_entity) {
entity_input = xmlLoadExternalEntity(RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const char*, uri_string),
RAPTOR_GOOD_CAST(const char*, publicId),
ctxt);
} else {
RAPTOR_DEBUG4("Not loading entity URI %s by policy for publicId '%s' systemId '%s'\n", uri_string, publicId, systemId);
}
return entity_input;
}
|
raptor_libxml_resolveEntity(void* user_data,
const xmlChar *publicId, const xmlChar *systemId) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_resolveEntity(sax2->xc, publicId, systemId);
}
|
C
|
raptor
| 1 |
CVE-2017-13008
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13008/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/5edf405d7ed9fc92f4f43e8a3d44baa4c6387562
|
5edf405d7ed9fc92f4f43e8a3d44baa4c6387562
|
CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
|
ctrl_body_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
uint16_t fc, const u_char *p)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(ctrl_str, "Unknown Ctrl Subtype", FC_SUBTYPE(fc))));
switch (FC_SUBTYPE(fc)) {
case CTRL_CONTROL_WRAPPER:
/* XXX - requires special handling */
break;
case CTRL_BAR:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_BAR_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s TA:%s CTL(%x) SEQ(%u) ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ra),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ta),
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ctl)),
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->seq))));
break;
case CTRL_BA:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_BA_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_ba_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_PS_POLL:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_PS_POLL_HDRLEN))
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AID(%x)",
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_ps_poll_hdr_t *)p)->aid))));
break;
case CTRL_RTS:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_RTS_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_rts_hdr_t *)p)->ta)));
break;
case CTRL_CTS:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_CTS_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_cts_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_ACK:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_ACK_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_ack_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_CF_END:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_END_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_end_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_END_ACK:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_END_ACK_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_end_ack_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
}
return 1;
}
|
ctrl_body_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
uint16_t fc, const u_char *p)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(ctrl_str, "Unknown Ctrl Subtype", FC_SUBTYPE(fc))));
switch (FC_SUBTYPE(fc)) {
case CTRL_CONTROL_WRAPPER:
/* XXX - requires special handling */
break;
case CTRL_BAR:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_BAR_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s TA:%s CTL(%x) SEQ(%u) ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ra),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ta),
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->ctl)),
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_bar_hdr_t *)p)->seq))));
break;
case CTRL_BA:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_BA_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_ba_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_PS_POLL:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_PS_POLL_HDRLEN))
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AID(%x)",
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&(((const struct ctrl_ps_poll_hdr_t *)p)->aid))));
break;
case CTRL_RTS:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_RTS_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_rts_hdr_t *)p)->ta)));
break;
case CTRL_CTS:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_CTS_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_cts_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_ACK:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_ACK_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_ack_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_CF_END:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_END_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_end_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
case CTRL_END_ACK:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, CTRL_END_ACK_HDRLEN))
return 0;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ((const struct ctrl_end_ack_hdr_t *)p)->ra)));
break;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5479
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5479/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.libav.org/?p=libav.git;a=commitdiff;h=0a49a62f998747cfa564d98d36a459fe70d3299b
|
0a49a62f998747cfa564d98d36a459fe70d3299b
| null |
static int h263_decode_block(MpegEncContext * s, int16_t * block,
int n, int coded)
{
int code, level, i, j, last, run;
RLTable *rl = &ff_h263_rl_inter;
const uint8_t *scan_table;
GetBitContext gb= s->gb;
scan_table = s->intra_scantable.permutated;
if (s->h263_aic && s->mb_intra) {
rl = &ff_rl_intra_aic;
i = 0;
if (s->ac_pred) {
if (s->h263_aic_dir)
scan_table = s->intra_v_scantable.permutated; /* left */
else
scan_table = s->intra_h_scantable.permutated; /* top */
}
} else if (s->mb_intra) {
/* DC coef */
if (CONFIG_RV10_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RV10) {
if (s->rv10_version == 3 && s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
int component, diff;
component = (n <= 3 ? 0 : n - 4 + 1);
level = s->last_dc[component];
if (s->rv10_first_dc_coded[component]) {
diff = ff_rv_decode_dc(s, n);
if (diff == 0xffff)
return -1;
level += diff;
level = level & 0xff; /* handle wrap round */
s->last_dc[component] = level;
} else {
s->rv10_first_dc_coded[component] = 1;
}
} else {
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if (level == 255)
level = 128;
}
}else{
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if((level&0x7F) == 0){
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dc %d at %d %d\n", level, s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_BITSTREAM)
return -1;
}
if (level == 255)
level = 128;
}
block[0] = level;
i = 1;
} else {
i = 0;
}
if (!coded) {
if (s->mb_intra && s->h263_aic)
goto not_coded;
s->block_last_index[n] = i - 1;
return 0;
}
retry:
for(;;) {
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, rl->vlc.table, TEX_VLC_BITS, 2);
if (code < 0){
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal ac vlc code at %dx%d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return -1;
}
if (code == rl->n) {
/* escape */
if (CONFIG_FLV_DECODER && s->h263_flv > 1) {
ff_flv2_decode_ac_esc(&s->gb, &level, &run, &last);
} else {
last = get_bits1(&s->gb);
run = get_bits(&s->gb, 6);
level = (int8_t)get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if(level == -128){
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RV10) {
/* XXX: should patch encoder too */
level = get_sbits(&s->gb, 12);
}else{
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 5);
level |= get_sbits(&s->gb, 6)<<5;
}
}
}
} else {
run = rl->table_run[code];
level = rl->table_level[code];
last = code >= rl->last;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
level = -level;
}
i += run;
if (i >= 64){
if(s->alt_inter_vlc && rl == &ff_h263_rl_inter && !s->mb_intra){
rl = &ff_rl_intra_aic;
i = 0;
s->gb= gb;
s->bdsp.clear_block(block);
goto retry;
}
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "run overflow at %dx%d i:%d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y, s->mb_intra);
return -1;
}
j = scan_table[i];
block[j] = level;
if (last)
break;
i++;
}
not_coded:
if (s->mb_intra && s->h263_aic) {
ff_h263_pred_acdc(s, block, n);
i = 63;
}
s->block_last_index[n] = i;
return 0;
}
|
static int h263_decode_block(MpegEncContext * s, int16_t * block,
int n, int coded)
{
int code, level, i, j, last, run;
RLTable *rl = &ff_h263_rl_inter;
const uint8_t *scan_table;
GetBitContext gb= s->gb;
scan_table = s->intra_scantable.permutated;
if (s->h263_aic && s->mb_intra) {
rl = &ff_rl_intra_aic;
i = 0;
if (s->ac_pred) {
if (s->h263_aic_dir)
scan_table = s->intra_v_scantable.permutated; /* left */
else
scan_table = s->intra_h_scantable.permutated; /* top */
}
} else if (s->mb_intra) {
/* DC coef */
if (CONFIG_RV10_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RV10) {
if (s->rv10_version == 3 && s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
int component, diff;
component = (n <= 3 ? 0 : n - 4 + 1);
level = s->last_dc[component];
if (s->rv10_first_dc_coded[component]) {
diff = ff_rv_decode_dc(s, n);
if (diff == 0xffff)
return -1;
level += diff;
level = level & 0xff; /* handle wrap round */
s->last_dc[component] = level;
} else {
s->rv10_first_dc_coded[component] = 1;
}
} else {
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if (level == 255)
level = 128;
}
}else{
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if((level&0x7F) == 0){
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dc %d at %d %d\n", level, s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_BITSTREAM)
return -1;
}
if (level == 255)
level = 128;
}
block[0] = level;
i = 1;
} else {
i = 0;
}
if (!coded) {
if (s->mb_intra && s->h263_aic)
goto not_coded;
s->block_last_index[n] = i - 1;
return 0;
}
retry:
for(;;) {
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, rl->vlc.table, TEX_VLC_BITS, 2);
if (code < 0){
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal ac vlc code at %dx%d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return -1;
}
if (code == rl->n) {
/* escape */
if (CONFIG_FLV_DECODER && s->h263_flv > 1) {
ff_flv2_decode_ac_esc(&s->gb, &level, &run, &last);
} else {
last = get_bits1(&s->gb);
run = get_bits(&s->gb, 6);
level = (int8_t)get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
if(level == -128){
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RV10) {
/* XXX: should patch encoder too */
level = get_sbits(&s->gb, 12);
}else{
level = get_bits(&s->gb, 5);
level |= get_sbits(&s->gb, 6)<<5;
}
}
}
} else {
run = rl->table_run[code];
level = rl->table_level[code];
last = code >= rl->last;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
level = -level;
}
i += run;
if (i >= 64){
if(s->alt_inter_vlc && rl == &ff_h263_rl_inter && !s->mb_intra){
rl = &ff_rl_intra_aic;
i = 0;
s->gb= gb;
s->bdsp.clear_block(block);
goto retry;
}
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "run overflow at %dx%d i:%d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y, s->mb_intra);
return -1;
}
j = scan_table[i];
block[j] = level;
if (last)
break;
i++;
}
not_coded:
if (s->mb_intra && s->h263_aic) {
ff_h263_pred_acdc(s, block, n);
i = 63;
}
s->block_last_index[n] = i;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
libav
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0815
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0815/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/5403587a74aee2fb57076528c3927851531c8afb
|
5403587a74aee2fb57076528c3927851531c8afb
|
Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
|
status_t MPEG4Source::parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationSizes(off64_t offset, off64_t size) {
ALOGV("parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationSizes");
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (version != 0) {
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
offset++;
uint32_t flags;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt24(offset, &flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 3;
if (flags & 1) {
uint32_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentAuxInfoType = tmp;
offset += 4;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentAuxInfoTypeParameter = tmp;
offset += 4;
}
uint8_t defsize;
if (mDataSource->readAt(offset, &defsize, 1) != 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize = defsize;
offset++;
uint32_t smplcnt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &smplcnt)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoCount = smplcnt;
offset += 4;
if (mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize != 0) {
ALOGV("@@@@ using default sample info size of %d", mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize);
return OK;
}
if (smplcnt > mCurrentSampleInfoAllocSize) {
mCurrentSampleInfoSizes = (uint8_t*) realloc(mCurrentSampleInfoSizes, smplcnt);
mCurrentSampleInfoAllocSize = smplcnt;
}
mDataSource->readAt(offset, mCurrentSampleInfoSizes, smplcnt);
return OK;
}
|
status_t MPEG4Source::parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationSizes(off64_t offset, off64_t size) {
ALOGV("parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationSizes");
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (version != 0) {
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
offset++;
uint32_t flags;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt24(offset, &flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 3;
if (flags & 1) {
uint32_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentAuxInfoType = tmp;
offset += 4;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentAuxInfoTypeParameter = tmp;
offset += 4;
}
uint8_t defsize;
if (mDataSource->readAt(offset, &defsize, 1) != 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize = defsize;
offset++;
uint32_t smplcnt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &smplcnt)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoCount = smplcnt;
offset += 4;
if (mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize != 0) {
ALOGV("@@@@ using default sample info size of %d", mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize);
return OK;
}
if (smplcnt > mCurrentSampleInfoAllocSize) {
mCurrentSampleInfoSizes = (uint8_t*) realloc(mCurrentSampleInfoSizes, smplcnt);
mCurrentSampleInfoAllocSize = smplcnt;
}
mDataSource->readAt(offset, mCurrentSampleInfoSizes, smplcnt);
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.