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sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article elee sf apr menudo menudo uh edu elee sf menudo menudo uh edu karl barrus writes would you trust a black box from the nsa versus an open system from elsewhere absolutely if i were assured by someone i trusted that the black box was more secure i have nothing to conceal from the government but i would like to be sure that any russian japanese french or other competitors for my services can t read my traffic i d like to be sure that competitive bid information was safe from commercial competitors and foreign governments which would aid them i believe the nsa has identical motivations with respect to my activities the president and many other senior government officials have made it very clear that they share these motivations thus i d trust them on the coincidence of interests argument as well as on a basic trust in their professionalism and a high confidence in their skills david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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bit keyseach machine in article apr lokkur dexter mi us scs lokkur dexter mi us steve simmons writes normally i d be the last to argue with steve but shouldn t that read years for all solutions i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it hmmmm i think with really large keyspaces like this you need to alter the strategy discussed for des attempt decryption of several blocks and check the disctribution of the contents i don t think it s at all feasible to keep encryptions of a known plaintext block on any amount of tape or cd rom and certainly not such encrypted blocks anyone know a cheap way of converting every atom in the solar system into a one bit storage device actually a keysearch of this kind shouldn t be much worse than the simpler kind in terms of speed it s just that you have to do it over for every encrypted message dumb question has anyone ever done any serious research on how many legitimate ascii encoded byte blocks there are that could be part of an english sentence for attacking des in ecb mode it seems like a dictionary of this kind might be pretty valuable john kelsey
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re fighting the clipper initiative in article r nov p e access digex net steve b access digex com steve brinich writes american manufacturers peddling cripple chips with a secret untested algorithm whose keys are held by people with a history of untrustworthy behavoir or er excuse me but since the escrow agencies aren t yet chosen how can you say they have a history of untrustworthy behavoir sic i m sure each of us can think of agencies without such a history price waterhouse has kept the secret of the academy awards for many years even in the face of an aggressive press the federal reserve open market committee has successfully kept decisions from leaking for the statutory period until publication even the department of agriculture has successfully kept crop forecasts from leaking prematurely frankly i d trust the above not the d of a of course since they might be subject to political pressure far sooner than the aclu eff or cpsr which though not exactly government apologists have no particular track record for internal security that i know of david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re bit keyseach machine in article bb c mizzou missouri edu c mizzou missouri edu john kelsey writes in article apr lokkur dexter mi us scs lokkur dexter mi us steve simmons writes normally i d be the last to argue with steve but shouldn t that read years for all solutions i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it hmmmm i think with really large keyspaces like this you need to alter the strategy discussed for des attempt decryption of several blocks and check the disctribution of the contents i don t think it s at all feasible to keep encryptions of a known plaintext block on any amount of tape or cd rom and certainly not such encrypted blocks anyone know a cheap way of converting every atom in the solar system into a one bit storage device i don t claim to be a crypto analyist there isn t a whole lot of good literature on the subject and the best people don t seem to publish their work but i rather doubt the approach such folks use is brute force sorry to have implied that in my previous post the history of these things is folks find clever ways of limiting the search and bang from there i guess my real problem with skipjack is i can not believe nsa would make publicly available a system they couldn t break if they wanted it just isn t in their charter remember des came from ibm not nsa and when first published was given a useful life of years i think we are well past that point now remember based on the size of the nsa budget they spend a lot more on the technology of decryption than most computer companies spend on r d i have to imagine their stuff is real interesting a friend who once worked for them he is dead now said he always enjoyed monitoring sac s strategic air command crypto traffic and i rather suspect that stuff is a bit more complex than skipjack or was it the military got the stuff from the nsa just like we get skipjack from them btw folks nsa wasn t being given the keys and the walker spy case shows for some of the systems the kgb didn t need them either information farming at for addr phone finger a a the ohio state university jebright magnus acs ohio state edu jim ebright e mail jre osu edu support privacy support encryption
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security in article r f rh news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes one thing that clipper offers is interoperability at a higher degree of security than we currently have in non proprietary voice encryption systems this means it will be cheaper than anyone s proprietary scheme and easier to deploy i may be an anarchist nutcase but i wouldn t have frothed overmuch had the government proposed a secure encryption standard in fact if the nsa had come up with a privacy chip rather than a wiretap chip i would have been happy they could have done this set up an ansi committee picked a secure cryptosystem defined a protocol and interface and said hey start building them instead we have a deliberately brain dead version of a cryptosystem that has not even been peer reviewed yes the nsa owns some smart people but if they pulled a feal well at t is going to be left with a lot of dud phones on its hands perry said someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography can you tell me where exactly we have given up that right heh heh the government already gave it up for us remember in the announcement they described this scheme as balancing the two extremes of having no privacy and claiming that citizens had a constitutional right to encryption so much for clinton s support of the right of privacy pgp key by finger or e mail void when prohibited eli ebrandt jarthur claremont edu
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sci.crypt
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re clipper chip long follow up in article apr cc curtin edu au zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system i apologize for being so dense but this sentence reads as if it was lifted from a luis bunuel screenplay am i missing something why on earth would drug smugglers even use the device then obviously they ll be using something like triple encryption des instead as long as alternatives to clipper remain legal clipper accomplishes absolutely nothing zero as far as law enforcement is concerned the whole scheme is an absolute total incredible waste of government time and money as long as other encryption schemes that are any good remain legal in order for clipper to work as intended all strong cryptosystems have to be outlawed jan bielawski computervision san diego jpb calmasd prime com
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re cryptology in the world in article apr news weeg uiowa edu holthaus news weeg uiowa edu james r holthaus writes what is the status of cruptology for private citizens throughout the world or more clearly is there a listing of countries and their policies on citizens encrypting electronic data i m curious how the europeans handle this for instance good question i also wanted to find out and i did a while ago in our former communist times such activity i e sending crypto emails would be prevented sooner ot later law or no law but now there is no law against it so we are free to use it we now have an ec conformant law for protection and registration of personal files you must remember that the situation in small countries is vastly different from the big ones borut b lavrencic d sc x c si a mail p ac o ijs s lavrencic j stefan institute internet borut b lavrencic ijs si university of ljubljana phone si ljubljana slovenia pgp public key available on request dolgo smois kalis ovraz nikei njihk ocnoo dkril ivseb ipika
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crypto final call crypto conference announcement final call for papers the thirteenth annual crypto conference sponsored by the international association for cryptologic research iacr in cooperation with the ieee computer society technical committee on security and privacy the computer science department of the university of california santa barbara and bell northern research a subsidiary of northern telecom will be held on the campus of the university of california santa barbara on august original research papers and technical expository talks are solicited on all practical and theoretical aspects of cryptology it is anticipated that some talks may also be presented by special invitation of the program committee instructions for authors authors are requested to send copies of a detailed abstract not a full paper by april to the program chair at the address given below a limit of pages of pt type not counting the bibliography or the title page is placed on all submissions submissions must arrive on time or be postmarked no later than april and sent by airmail in order to receive consideration by the program committee it is required that submissions start with a succinct statement of the problem addressed the solution proposed and its significance to cryptology appropriate for a non specialist reader technical development directed to the specialist should follow as needed abstracts that have been submitted to other conferences that have proceedings are not eligible for submission submissions must be anonymous this means that names and affiliations of authors should only appear on the title page of the submission it should be possible to remove this page and send the papers to program committee members a latex style file that produces output in this format is available by email from the program chair authors will be informed of acceptance or rejection in a letter mailed on or before june a compilation of all accepted abstracts will be available at the conference in the form of pre proceedings authors of accepted abstracts will be allowed to submit revised versions for the pre proceedings a revised abstract should contain only minor changes and corrections to the originally submitted abstract all revised abstracts must be received by the program chair by july the page limit will be strictly enforced for the pre proceedings complete conference proceedings are expected to be published in springer verlag s lecture notes in computer science series at a later date pending negotiation the program committee consists of d stinson chair nebraska m bellare ibm t j watson e biham technion israel e brickell sandia national labs j feigenbaum at t bell labs r impagliazzo ucsd a odlyzko at t bell labs t okamoto ntt japan b pfitzmann hildesheim germany r rueppel r switzerland s vanstone waterloo canada send submissions to the program chair douglas r stinson crypto computer science and engineering department ferguson hall university of nebraska lincoln ne usa telephone fax internet stinson bibd unl edu for other information contact the general chair paul c van oorschot crypto bell northern research mail stop carling ave nepean ontario k h e canada telephone fax internet crypto bnr ca crypto general information august the program crypto is the thirteenth in a series of workshops on cryptology held at santa barbara and is sponsored by the international association for cryptologic research in cooperation with the ieee computer society technical committee on security and privacy the computer science department of the university of california santa barbara and bell northern research a subsidiary of northern telecom the program for the workshop will cover all aspects of cryptology extended abstracts of the papers presented at the conference will be distributed to all attendees at the conference and formal proceedings will be published at a later date in addition to the regular program of papers selected or invited by the program committee there will be a rump session on tuesday evening for informal presentations facilities will also be provided for attendees to demonstrate hardware software and other items of cryptographic interest if you wish to demonstrate such items you are urged to contact the general chair so that your needs will be attended to the social program will include hosted cocktail parties on sunday and monday in addition there will be a beach barbecue on wednesday evening the price of the barbecue is included in the room and board charge and extra tickets may be purchased about the conference facilities the workshop will be held on the campus of the university of california santa barbara the campus is located adjacent to the santa barbara airport and the pacific ocean accommodations are available in the university dormitories at relatively low cost for conference participants children under the age of are not allowed to stay in the dormitories so those bringing small children will need to make separate arrangements in one of several nearby hotels more information on hotels is enclosed parking on campus is available at no cost to the participants however participants must indicate on the registration form if they desire a parking permit travel information the campus is located approximately miles from the santa barbara airport which is served by several airlines including american america west delta united and us air free shuttle bus service will be provided between the santa barbara airport and the campus on sunday and thursday afternoons all major rental car agencies are also represented in santa barbara and amtrak has rail connections to san francisco from the north and los angeles from the south santa barbara is approximately miles north of los angeles airport and miles south of san francisco registration participation is invited by interested parties but attendance at the workshop is limited and pre registration is strongly advised late registrations subject to a late registration fee may be accepted if space is available but there are no guarantees to register fill out the attached registration form and return to the address on the form along with payment in full before july campus accommodations will be available on a first come first serve basis for attendees who register by july the conference fees include participation in the program and all social functions as well as membership to the iacr and a subscription to the journal of cryptology the room and board charges include dormitory lodging and meals from dinner on sunday to lunch on thursday technical sessions will run from monday morning to thursday at noon a very limited number of stipends are available to those unable to obtain funding applications for stipends should be sent to the general chair before june crypto crypto registration form registration deadline july last name first name sex m f affiliation mailing address phone fax electronic mail payment of the conference fee entitles you to membership in the international association for cryptologic research for one year at no extra charge including a subscription to the journal of cryptology published by springer verlag at no extra charge do you wish to be an iacr member yes no the conference fee also includes the conference proceedings when they become available containing final versions of conference papers the book of extended abstracts distributed at the conference will contain only shortened preliminary versions of these papers maximum pages conference fee regular us attended eurocrypt norway full time student deduct if you do not wish proceedings total conference fee us room and board nights smoking non smoking single room per person double room per person roommate s name extra barbecue tickets each one is included in room and board late fee for registration after july registration not guaranteed after july total funds enclosed u s dollars us payment must be by check payable in u s funds by money order in u s funds or by u s bank draft payable to crypto payment should be mailed to the general chair paul c van oorschot crypto bell northern research mail stop carling ave nepean ontario k h e canada crypto hotel information for those who choose not to stay in the dormitories the following is a partial list of hotels in the area those who choose to stay off campus are responsible for making their own reservations and early reservations are advised since august is a popular season in santa barbara note that goleta is closer to ucsb than santa barbara but that a car will probably be required to travel between any hotel and the campus all prices are subject to change prices should be confirmed by calling the individual hotels directly however mention crypto when you are making your reservation and in several of the hotels listed you will be eligible for the university rate which can be significantly less than the normal rates we are not able to block rooms in these hotels so please make reservations as early as possible the quality of the hotels range from rather expensive beach front resorts to basic inexpensive accommodations for further information try contacting the santa barbara convention and visitors center south coast inn calle real goleta ca regular rates single double call for university rates contact murrill forrester at or toll free at cathedral oaks lodge calle real santa barbara single rates not available double rates start at including breakfast no university rates call tom patton at or toll free at motel calle real goleta ca single double no university rate available call the sandman inn state st santa barbara ca regular rates single or double for king size university rate call jean ingerle at or toll free at miramar hotel beachfront miles south of santa barbara on u s at san ysidro turnoff regular rates no university rates call pepper tree inn state st santa barbara ca regular rates for two people university rates for two people call christopher oliphant at or toll free at encina lodge bath street santa barbara ca regular rates for two people no university rates call carol wolford at or toll free at quality suites hollister ave santa barbara ca close to campus regular rates single double university rates double must mention you are attending a ucsb program call michael ensign at upham hotel bed and breakfast de la vina road santa barbara ca university rate mention you are from crypto call sheila donegan at stevew helios unl edu fender smoke on the water fire in the sky smoke on the water stevew hoss unl edu bars guitar solo deep purple the best
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sci.crypt
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re clipper considered harmful in article optilink com brad optilink com brad yearwood writes if clipper comes to cellular phones along with legal proscriptions against using other cipher systems on these phones a new and potentially dangerous class of crime is created aside from possession of terrorist tools unapproved encryption devices or programs criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed once a suitable collection of devices is stolen criminals can communicate with impunity assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from key escrow until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means because life is cheap criminals are currently willing to kill people to steal very large and conspicuous property luxury cars it is reasonable to assume that they will be willing to kill people to steal small and inconspicuous property a cipher cellular phone just as we have seen in the past with blue box technology and in the present with modified cellular phones we can expect to see among high stakes criminals a lucrative market for stolen cipher phones which can be used for a few days the high stakes criminals will pay the life is cheap types substantial amounts for stolen instruments because a person is typically discovered as missing or dead in a few days a stolen instrument will be usable for only a few days there will be a continuing demand for fresh phones fresh bodies and since clinton is also going full bore to deny unconnected citizens the means to defend themselves we will protect you is good enough for you by perverting or trashing the second amendment the targeted individuals will be guaranteed easy prey what is a few bodies compared to the greater good of the fed being able to defeat a citizen s security with impunity you don t think there doesn t exist a means by which the nsa can do their usual eavesdropping scanning for keywords with or without a court order or any keys do you if so i got some great florida real estate you might be interested in perhaps the idea of escrowed keys is meant to divert the discussion to how they will be safeguarded and away from the basic fact that the government is systematically taking away our right to privacy to be secure for the means of self defense and just about every other right spelled out in the bill of rights nawwww they are the government trust us in other words clipper and similar systems have the potential to turn a current inconvenience to law enforcement into a direct vicious and persistent threat to the general public what is more important to the government law enforcement people control or the safety of the general public the gun control issue should answer that one look at how good that works in making cities safer the places that are the worst in that regard are also the places with the best gun control government is not about public good it is about control never forget that our founding fathers sure were concerned about it remainder deleted pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re list of large integer arithmetic packages mrr scss cl msu edu mark riordan writes not very comprehensive list deleted there is a very comprehensive list in sci math symbolic which detailed descriptions of many packages especially you mark should update your list here it is available systems this is the list of currently developed and distributed software for symbolic math applications no informations is supplied on systems no longer being supported like saint formac alpak altran mathlab sin sac camal scratchpad mumath sheep trigman analitik smp or ccalc for more detailed info on any of the systems below look into the directory pub symbolic math in the anonymous ftp of math berkeley edu no particular recommendation is made for any of these if you want prices contact the company programs are listed by aprox the reverse order of the number of machines they run on in each class general purpose systems first if you have any information to add to this list we know we are missing mupad felix please send it to ca math berkeley edu paulo ney de souza department of mathematics university of california berkeley ca desouza math berkeley edu general purpose maple type commercial machines most impressive list of machines i seen for a program workstations dec hp ibm mips sun sgi apollo pc s mac amiga atari at t b gould convex ncr pyramid sequent unisys and cray s contact maple daisy waterloo edu waterloo maple software columbia street west waterloo ontario canada n l l phone version release comments general purpose source available for most routines graphics support in a demo of the program for pc dos can be obtained from anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos modern algebra maplev zip mathematica type commercial machines cray ymp down to mac s and pc s contact info wri com phone math wolfram research inc trade center drive champaign il version comments general purpose notebook interface on next mac nice graphics macsyma type commercial machines sun sun sparc vax unix and vms apollo hp dec risc pc dos symbolics computers and no sx s pc s contact macsyma service macsyma com phone macsyma macsyma inc academy st arlington ma version depends on machine is the latest for sun hp and dec risc for pc s comments general purpose many diverse capabilities one of the oldest around includes propietary improvements from symbolics and macsyma inc descendant of mit s macsyma doe macsyma type distribution fee only machines gigamos symbolics and ti explorer lisp machines the nil version runs on vaxes using the vms system the public domain franz lisp version runs on unix machines including suns and vaxes using unix contact estsc energy science technology software center p o box oak ridge tn phone comments help with doe macsyma general and help with issues such as obtaining support new versions etc lph paradigm com leon harten from paradigm assoc paradigm associates inc putnam avenue suite cambridge ma maxima type licence for a fee get licence from estc before download machines unix workstations sun mips hp pc s and pc dos beta contact wfs rascal utexas edu bill schelter version comments general purpose mit macsyma family common lisp implementation by william f schelter based on kyoto common lisp modified version of doe macsyma available to estsc doe sites get the licence from estsc phone and then dowload the software from dos math utexas edu pub beta max zip or unix rascal ics utexas edu pub maxima tar z currently their charge for machine license is to universities site licenses are also available aljabr type commercial machines mac s with meg of ram contact aljabr fpr com phone fort pond research fort pond road acton ma us version comments mit macsyma family descendant uses franz lisp paramacs type commercial machines vax vms sun sun sgi and mac s on the works contact lph paradigm com version comments vaxima type distribution fee only machines vax unix contact estsc see doe macsyma above version comments general purpose mit macsyma family descendant includes source and binaries with assembler for macsyma and franz lisp opus reduce type commercial machines all unix workstations a variety of mainframes ms dos mbyte and atari st contact reduce netlib rand org version comments general purpose form type public domain verison version commercial machines msdos atarist mac sun sun sparc apollo next vax vms vax ultrix decstation and others contact t nikhef nl jos vermaseren binary versions of version are available by anonymous ftp from nikhef nikhef nl version and comments general purpose designed for big problems batch like interface axiom type commercial machines ibm rs s and other ibm plataforms contact ryan nag com phone fax nag numerical algorithms group inc opus place suite downers grove il version comments general purpose simath type anonymous ftp machines suns apollo dn and siemens workstations contact simath math uni sb de version comments general purpose derive type commercial machines runs on pc s and hp s contact soft warehouse inc harding ave suite honolulu hawaii version comments said to be very robust gets problems that other larger programs fail on low cost theorist type commercial machines mac s contact prescien well sf ca us phone fax prescience corp howard st san francisco ca version comments general purpose graphics if you like the mac interface you ll love this fixed precision digits runs on smaller mac s than mma mas type anonymous ftp machines atari st tdi and spc modula compilers ibm pc at m sds and topspeed modula compilers and commodore amiga m amiga compiler contact h kredel computer algebra group university of passau germany version comments mas is an experimental computer algebra system combining imperative programming facilities with algebraic specification capabilities for design and study of algebraic algorithms mas is available via anonymous ftp from alice fmi uni passau de mockmma type anonymous ftp from peoplesparc berkeley edu machines anywhere running common lisp contact fateman cs berkeley edu version comments it does matematica or i mispelled that weyl type anonymous ftp from ftp cs cornell edu pub weyl contact rz cs cornell edu version comments intended to be incorporated in larger more specialized systems flac type machines ibm pc s dos contact victor l kistlerov institute for control sciences profsoyuznaya moscow ussr version comments functional language group theory cayley type cost recovery machines sun sun ibm aix and vm machines apollo dec vax vms mac running a ux or higher and convex contact cayley maths su oz au phone fax computational algebra group university of sydney nsw australia version comments designed for fast computation with algebraic and combinatorial structures such as groups rings fields modules and graphs although it began as a group theory system it has recently evolved into a general abstract algebra system gap type anonymous ftp free but not pd basically gnu copyleft machines all unix workstations atari st ibm pc and mac contact gap samson math rwth aachen de ftp site samson math rwth aachen de math ucla edu version to be released dec comments group theory calculations algebra number theory pari type anonymous ftp machines most workstations mac and next contact pari mizar greco prog fr anonymous ftp to math ucla edu in the directory pub pari version comments number theoretical computations source available key routines are in assembler ascii and xwindows graphics pc dos version available from anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos modern algebra pari macaulay type anonymous ftp machines complete source available binary mac versions available contact anonymous ftp to zariski harvard edu version comments focused on algebra type computations polynomial rings over finite fields things like that kant type machines contact kant group prof dr m e pohst dr johannes graf v schmettow mathematisches institut heinrich heine universit at universit atsstr d d usseldorf pohst dd rud bitnet or schmetto dd rud bitnet version comments kant computational algebraic number theory is subroutine package for algorithms from geometry of numbers and algebraic number theory there are two versions of kant kant v is written in ansi fortran while kant v is built on the cayley platform and written in ansi c lie type commercial machines unix workstations sun dec sgi ibm next pc s atari and mac s contact lie can nl phone fax can expertise centre kruislaan sj amsterdam the netherlands version comments lie group computations ubasic type anonymous ftp ubas zip machines mac and ibm pc s contact malm argo acs oakland edu phone donald e g malm department of mathematical sciences oakland university rochester mi version comments basic like environment for number theory in the collection of programs written for it one can find malm collection of ubasic number theory programs malm zip by donald e g malm and copyrighted by him including baillie wagstaff lucas pseudoprime test algorithm for chinese remaindering elliptic curve method to factorize n fermat s method of factoring general periodic continued fraction to quadratic routine evaluates carmichael s function d h lehmer s method of solving x q mod p ubmpqs prime factorization program for numbers over digits ubmpqs zip that can be found in the wurst archives wuarchive wustl edu numbers type free but not public domain registration required machines pc dos contact ivo dntsch phone rechenzentrum fax universitt osnabrck bitnet duentsch dosuni postfach w osnabrck germany version c comments numbers is a calculator for number theory it performs various routines in elementary number theory some of which are also usable in algebra or combinatorics available in the anonymous ftp in ftp rz uni osnabrueck de in the directory pub msdos math cocoa type machines mac s contact cocoa igecuniv bitnet version comments computations in commutative algebra galois type commercial machines ibm pc dos contact cifeg inc kalkgruberweg a linz austria version comments algebra and number theory microcomputer written by r lidl r w matthews and r wells from the u tasmania in turbo pascal v ganith type anonymous ftp machines any system with vanilla common lisp x and has at least a rudimentary lisp c interface contact chanderjit bajaj andrew royappa department of computer science purdue university west lafayette in bajaj and royappa cs purdue edu version comments ganith is an algebraic geometry toolkit for computing and visualising solutions to systems of algebraic equations it is written in common lisp and c and runs under version of the x window system ganith is available from the anonymous ftp at cs purdue edu in the file pub avr ganith src tar z tensor analysis schoonship type machines contact mentioned in comp phys comm version comments i have heard this program mentioned supposely it s designed for large problems i e thousands of terms in series expansions developed at cern for cdc stensor type machines vax sun apollos orion atari amiga contact lh vand physto se lars hornfeldt physics department university of stockholm vanadisv s stockholm sweden version comments system for tensor calculus and noncommutative algebra lisp calculators jacal type gnu copyleft machines needs a lisp either common or scheme contact available by anon ftp to altdorf ai mit edu version comments an ibm pc version on floppy for is available from aubrey jaffer pleasant st wakefield ma usa gnu calc type gnu copyleft machines where emacs runs contact free software foundation version comments it runs inside gnu emacs and is written entirely in emacs lisp it does the usual things arbitrary precision integer real and complex arithmetic all written in lisp scientific functions symbolic algebra and calculus matrices graphics etc and can display expressions with square root signs and integrals by drawing them on the screen with ascii characters it comes with well written page online manual you can ftp it from any gnu site differential equations delia type informal distribution machines ibm pc s dos contact a v bocharov program systems institute ussr academy of science pereslavl p o box ussr tlx boat version comments differetial equation computations pc shareware symbmath type shareware student and advanced versions machines ibm pc contact chen deakin oz au version comments runs on plain k dos machines the shareware version is available in the file sm a zip on the wurst archives more capable versions are available by mail order from the author cla type anonymous ftp machines pc dos contact version comments a linear or matrix algebra package which computes rank determinant rwo reduced echelon form jordan canonical form characteristic equation eigenvalues etc of a matrix file cla zip on the wurst archives xpl type anonymous ftp machines pc dos contact david meredith department of mathematics san francisco state university san francisco ca meredith sfsuvax sfsu edu version comments formerly called ccalc well integrated graphics and some numerical matrix manipulation routines intended for calculus students prentice hall sells this with a book isbn x or by calling but it is also available without the manual but with a comprehensive help system by anonymous ftp from wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos calculus cc zip amp type commercial evaluation copy available by anonymous ftp machines pc dos contact mark garber compuserve com ph cerebral software po box chamblee ga version comments the algebraic manipulation program amp is written in modula and is a symbolic calculation tool amp functions in an interpreter mode and program mode it has tensor manipulation using index notation the evaluation copy is available in the anonymous ftp at ftp rz uni osnabrueck de pub msdos math amp zip mercury type shareware machines pc dos contact version comments limited in symbolic capabilities but is extremely adept at numerically solving equations and produces publication quality graphical output this used to be borland s eureka but when borland abandoned it its original author started selling it as shareware under the name mercury available from anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos calculus mrcry zip pfsa type public domain machines pc dos contact version comments available from the anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos modern algebra vol zip lie type public domain machines pc dos contact head rivett mst csiro au a k head csiro division of materials science and technology melbourne australia or locked bag clayton vic australia phone telex aa fax version comments lie is a program written in the mumath language not a package for lie analysis of differential equations available from anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos adv diff equations lie calculus type shareware machines pc dos with ega contact byoung keum dept of mathematics university of il urbana il version comments program for calculus and differential equations it has symbolic diff integration simple functions graphs very unstable program no reason to use it except for price suggested registration fee is available from anonymous ftp at wuarchive wustl edu edu math msdos calculus calc arc marc conrad universitaet des saarlandes luxemburg marc math uni sb de france germany these opinions are not necessarily these x you are here of the simath group and maybe even not mine
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes in the uk it s impossible to get approval to attach any crypto device to the phone network anything that plugs in to our bt phone sockets must be approved for some reason crypto devices just never are whats the difference between a v bis modem and a v bis modem i m not being entirely silly here what i m pointing out is that the modems that they have already approved for data transmission will work just fine to transmit scrambled vocoded voice absolutely i just meant that no secure dedicated crypto device has ever been given approval guerrilla underground devices should be well possible with today s high speed modems not that i can think of many v bis modems that are approved either mind you just the overpriced couriers can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run digital speech down k i think it is i ve heard it s not lets say bit samples would raw data at the corresponding sampling rate be usable if not how fancy does the compression need to be g
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip i think i should also point out that the mystical des engines are known plaintext engines unless you add a ton of really smart hardware assume the ton of smart hardware it doesn t really have to be that smart g
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re the secret source of that announcement even more interesting the smtp server at csrc ncsl nist gov no longer recognizes the expn and vrfy commands telnet csrc ncsl nist gov smtp trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first org sendmail nist ready at tue apr edt expn clipper command unrecognized seems like sombody didn t like your snooping around marc or mine or the dozen or so other people who probably had the same idea so does this rush to shut it down imply that some of the names on that list are heavy duty spooks g
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption actually many of us have noted this we have noted that the program started at least years ago that the contracts with vlsi technology and microtoxin were let at least months ago that production of the chips is well underway and so forth nobody i know has claimed clinton intitiated the program but he chose to go ahead with it perhaps the nsa realised that no one would even contemplate falling for the dual escrow bluff while under the bush administration and had to wait for a democrat govt to con into promoting this because people might just believe they were honest didn t work did it g
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qmugcinnpu gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes the key question is whether non clipper encryption will be made illegal it seems pretty obvious that it will be made illegal if very loud noise is not made about this immediately to congress and the house it looks like the worst nightmares raised by dorothy denning s proposals are coming true if the government continues on this course i imagine that we will see strong cryptography made illegal encryption programs for disk files and email as well as software to allow for encrypted voice communications will be distributed only through the underground people will have to learn how to hide the fact that they are protecting their privacy i don t know what s worse the waste of money or the fact that in spite of all clinton s rhetoric to the contrary this is a feeble attempt by a large group of bored intelligence bureaucrats to justify their currently useless jobs clinton said he was going to trim the fat from the government this doesn t look very dietetic to me as i said before in this group drug dealing and terrorism both tend to be international crimes which are not going to cease if the us starts to regulate encryption the drug dealers and terrorists will simply go to other countries to communicate their plans and will still carry them out here and or wherever else this is not the solution to the problem they try to invent a new problem by saying we need encryption i guess it s a good thing bill gates isn t a star general or we would all need our own copies of ms dos too right und vee haff vays uff findink out iff you are usink doctor dos it s shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here our health care and education systems are in the toilet and they come up with this pearl if this goddamned government doesn t get a clue real quick and start trying to repair the infrastructure of the country rather than inventing someone to blame germany and japan are going to eat the us alive and we will deserve it it s not like there s any shortage of real problems to solve guys a clipper chip is really going to help the homeless a clipper chip is really going to help educate the children in the ghettos of our cities just think of the generation gap that can be developed when they rehire dod engineer dad to work on clipper chips that will be used to decrypt slightly rebellious adolescent hacker son s naughty gif files i can see the shitcom already if that wasn t a forged post or a sick joke i m popping that dead kennedys tape into the car stereo and tearing ass to canada clinton on white horse is near it s the suede denim secret police they have come for your uncool niece don t worry it s only a phone shit i knew i should have gotten some of those consent to monitoring stickers they keep on autovon phones when i had the chance i should have known i d need them in civilian life redsonja olias linet org rs self possession is of the law alien we control the laws of nature how come when it s human it s an joel and you still dress that way abortion but when it s a chicken mst k gamera vs guiron it s an omelet george carlin
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re fighting the clipper initiative er excuse me but since the escrow agencies aren t yet chosen how can you say they have a history of untrustworthy behavoir sic i refer to the federal law enforcement apparatus which is ultimately in charge of this generally
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr escom com al donaldson writes unrelated question isn t the term clipper as neat as it is already taken by intergraph yes clipper is a trademark of intergraph its the risc chip used in some of thier workstations i wonder what intergraph is going to do to this infringement on thier name sake jeff hyche there can be only one presto random uunet uu net x
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re an open letter to mr clinton in article vkcsbl mbeckman mbeckman com mbeckman mbeckman com writes as an economist i m sure you can see the flaws in this logic if the naive market is flooded with proprietary but weak encryption then truly strong encryption will be unable to compete this is true for the mass market but not for those who need strong crypto and are willing to pay the price after all one can buy strong crypto today if one is willing to spend enough thus the concern is not economic the issue most worth worrying about is that after the system takes hold the government will outlaw other systems and something voluntary will become the only system available that is a political not an economic issue as a separate matter you may be making an implied advocacy for cheap secure crypto for everyone it s true that the clipper chip would probably prevent that except via clipper but cheap secure crypto for everyone is a political discussion not an economic one and the whole point of clipper is to resolve that political policy tension between securing legitimate communications and tapping the crooks david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes instead we have a deliberately brain dead version of a cryptosystem that has not even been peer reviewed yes the nsa owns some smart people but if they pulled a feal well at t is going to be left with a lot of dud phones on its hands agreed remember i don t even think of clipper as encryption in any real sense if i did i d probably be a lot more annoyed about it heh heh the government already gave it up for us remember in the announcement they described this scheme as balancing the two extremes of having no privacy and claiming that citizens had a constitutional right to encryption that s not for clinton or anyone under him to say though only the federal and supreme courts can say anything about the constitutionality anything the administration or any governmental agency says is opinion at best amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys let s assume a brute force engine like that hypothesized for des microsecond per trial million chips that s trials per second or about years for trials well maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond and build a machine with million chips sure only years for each solution but there is a much more pernicious problem with the scheme as proposed building a brute force machine to test possible keys if you have the other half from one escrow agent is easy one chip one test per microsecond gives you one break every two weeks and that break gives you all messages involving that phone the xor scheme so that the files from one escrow agent gives you nothing is an improvement but notice that xoring with truely random bit strings allows for an arbitrary number of escrow agents using for xor sk for the escrowed key and a and b for two random bit strings hand sk a b sk a and sk b to three escrow agents it is possible to come with an encoding scheme to match any escrow pattern for example of such that fewer cooperating escrow agents gives the cracking agency no benefit robert i eachus with standard disclaimer use standard disclaimer function message text in clever ideas return better ideas is
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article apr shearson com pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes i wrote the chip and algorithm are classified if you reverse engineer it and tell people you are likely to go to jail well i m not a lawyer but from what i can tell this is completely and utterly untrue the u s does not have an official secrets act we do have laws that will punish you for revealing what classified information you learned in your capacity as a government official contractor etc and we have laws that prohibit stealing such information however if they sell you the chip i can t see that they can make reverse engineering it and revealing the details illegal in most cases information you come by properly is yours to use as you wish but there are certainly exceptions if you write a paper which includes sufficiently detailed information on how to build a nuclear weapon it is classified as i understand the law nuclear weapons design is automatically classified even if you do the work yourself i believe you are then not allowed to read your own paper a less serious example if you tell drivers about a speed trap they are about to run into you can be fined even though you might argue that you broke no law when you discovered the location of the policeman the charge is interfering with a police officer which is quite similar what you would be doing by reverse engineering the clipper chip don t tell me that you think this violates the constitution find some court cases which have struck down such laws many people would not be comforted by the fact that the government violated their rights when it imprisoned them john carr jfc athena mit edu
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re freely distributable public key cryptography c code where d wigglesworth smhanaes gpu utcc utoronto ca wrote do you know of any freely distributable c or c code for public key cryptography such as rsa i ve tried various archie searches to no avail have you heard of pgp i assume from your post that you have not pgp is a freeware rsa encryption program which includes digital signatures and comprehensive key management facilities most sites also keep the source code a growing number of people are using this excellent software to encrypt to a very high standard their email and data get it before clinton outlaws it two of the many sites are rsa com pub pgp soda berkeley edu pub cypherpunks pgp hope this helps jon jon saville who alive can say thou art no ee jks brunel ac uk poet may st not tell thy dreams keats pgp public key available upon request or by finger
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re clipper chip and crypto key escrow excerpts from the clipper announcement with some questions the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system in these two sections the phrases or other legal order and normally a court order imply there is some other way or ways of doing a legal wiretap what is are these how do they affect the way people who trust the system of court orders to protect them feel about this escrow system the second section shows the sequence of events the law enforcer armed with his warrant attaches his headphones to the line with his croc clips remember these are the folk who couldn t cope with digital telephony and hears a load of modem like tones we are talking analogue telephony here what next what modulation scheme do these clipper boxes use is it possible to record the tones for use after the keys are obtained i thought it was quite difficult to record a modem session at some intermediate point on the line maybe they have taken a crash course in data comms and have a unit that demodulates the tones and stores the digital stream for decryption later this would still suffer from the same problems as trying to record the tones as the demodulator would not be at one end of the line if calls can t be recorded for decryption later it would be quite easy to foil the system by buying lots of clipper units these are supposed to be cheap mass market items and using them in turn how tolerant is the modulation scheme to errors these things are proposed for use by us corporations to secure their foreign offices where phone line quality may well be poor it seems hard enough to me to get digitised speech of any quality into something a modem can handle without having to add lots of error correction to keep the decryption in sync q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad this raises an intersting question in the uk here it is illegal to connect anything to a public telecomms network without it being approved by a body called babt it has been stated either here or in the uk telecom group that they will not approve equipment that does encryption i don t know if this is true or not but this would make a good test case perhaps friendly countries and the uk may still qualify will get to fish in the escrowed key pool as well peter ilieve peter memex co uk
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re the secret source of that announcement in article r hgqinndaa uwm edu rick miller rick ee uwm edu writes jbotz mtholyoke edu jurgen botz writes marc mit edu marc horowitz n nzu writes seems like sombody didn t like your snooping around marc or the more likely explanation is that marc is spoofing i sincerely doubt that denning and crew are keen enough to react that quickly and i doubt they d want to cripple their smtp server t boot marc is not spoofing try it yourself at least the commands work exactly as he described i e they do not work josh no pattern content or thing is the being who looks out from each pair of eyes and only that is important e t gendlin
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alternate legal wiretaps tuinstra signal ece clarkson edu soe writes it would be a strong incentive as vesselin points out for more police agencies to go rogue and try to get keys through more efficient but less constitutional means notice what the release said q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place the clear implication is that there are legal authorizations other than a court order just how leaky are these and who knows what s in those pages that authorized the nsa there i was a cryptologic tech in the us navy ctrsn nothing big all spooks in the navy are required to know the gist of ussid the navy way of naming a particular presidential executive order it outlines what spooks can and can t do with respect to the privacy of us nationals the following information is of course unclassified the whole issue hangs about what you mean by wiretap if the signal can be detected by non intrusive means like radio listening then it may be recorded and it may be analyzed analyzed means that it may be either deciphered and or radio location may be used to locate the transmitter the catch is this any and all record of the signal and its derivatives may only be kept for a maximum of days after which they are destroyed unless permission is obtained from the us attorney general to keep them didn t you ever wonder how coast guard cutters find those drug runners in all those tens of thousands of square miles of sea even in the dark rick miller rick ee uwm edu ricxjo discus mil wi us ricxjo muelisto send a postcard get one back enposxtigu bildkarton kaj vi ricevos alion rick miller woods muskego wis usa
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re organized lobbying for cryptography tarl neustaedter tarl coyoacan sw stratus com wrote it means that the eff s public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant to the encryption issue per se there may well be people who care about the encryption issue who don t care to associate themselves with the network erotica issue or may even disagree with the eff s position perhaps these encryption only types would defend the digitized porn if it was posted encrypted these issues are not as seperable as you maintain
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re once tapped your code is no good any more random presto uucp jeff w hyche writes yes clipper is a trademark of intergraph its the risc chip used in some of thier workstations i wonder what intergraph is going to do to this infringement on thier name sake probably keep quiet and take it lest they get their kneecaps busted good news ten weeks from friday will be a good day
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re why the clipper algorithm is secret in article apr fsl noaa gov bear kestrel fsl noaa gov bear giles writes in article c pstr lu panix com dfl panix com danny o bedlam writes the algorithm is classified because a military contract or similar government equivalent to military has been let for this proprietary design that the feds say that nsa developed is there a patent is that patent publicly available my betting is that that too is classified unless there has been a major change in the law there s no such beast as a classified patent patents exist to encourage communications and develop the state of the art while there aren t classified patents there are patent secrecy orders suppose you invent a voice scrambler for cb radio and apply for a patent the patent office decides the nsa might be interested gives them a copy of your application and you get a nice note back saying your patent application has now been classified for national security reasons and you re no longer allowed to make and sell it i m picking this example because it happened in the late s it was probably some analog scrambler and would have probably violated fcc rules anyway but it did get classified or suppose you publish a paper on your really spiffy algorithm and then file a patent application since it s been published they can t gain anything by classifying it though you can t get patents in most countries other than the us where patent laws are different obviously a system of classified patents would be highly bogus you can t sell that widget because there s a classified patent on it you re not allowed to see the patent or know who owns the design so just give us all your money and work in progress and maybe we won t throw you in jail for espionage some countries might have that kind of system but we don t have that here quite yet pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article c sy z td demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys we don t yet know if all bits count that doesn t worry me at all they re not going to cheat at something they can get caught at and key size is one of the things that can be verified externally feed lots of random key input pairs into the chip then try flipping random key bits and see what happens to the output we already know what should happen about half the output bits should vary on average from a bit key change or input change if they were out to build a weak cryptosystem it might be the case that some of the bits are much less powerful than others in the sense that they only enter into the encryption very late in the game by contrast des was designed to use each key bit as early as possible the output change rate appears as early as round again though i don t think nsa is going to cheat that crudely they re likely to get caught remember that they ve promised to let a committee of outside experts see the cryptosystem design if you assume something des like a biased subkey generation schedule will stick out like a sore thumb the committee can and should run lots of tests and retain the output this can be verified later against the chip and yes the civilian community has at least some secure storage facilities that i don t think even nsa can get into without it being noticed until fort meade gets its transporter working again oops i don t think i was supposed to talk about that the committee members can even retain secure copies of the code in two halves which you have to xor together to recover the program seriously there are i think problems with this whole scheme but the people who invented it aren t stupid and they ve been in the crypto game and the smoke and mirrors game far longer than most of us they re not going to lie in ways that can be detected easily since their credibility is the only thing they can use to sell this system if they ve lied about the civilian committee no one will believe them about the absence of other back doors if they ve lied about the key size no one will believe that they haven t copied the programming disk with the u keys if they ve lied about obvious aspects of the strength of the cryptosystem no one will believe the escrow agencies aren t in cahoots with them that isn t to say that they aren t lying about all those other things anyway and i m certainly not claiming that nsa can t build a cryptosystem with a back door that the committee can t find look how long it took for folks to believe that the s boxes weren t sabotaged it s entirely possible that the committee will release an ambiguous report for just such reasons but that s a subtle point i e one you can t explain to a senator anyway its looking like the keys and escrow arrangements are smoke and mirrors to cover the way the nsa can regenerate the key from the transmitted serial number i don t like the unit key generation process any better than you do however s and s are supposed to be under control of the same escrow agents if they can t be trusted to keep the seed values secure they can t be trusted to keep the half keys secure i still don t know if or when s and s change i thought i had seen something about them being constant but i just reread denning s technical information post and it doesn t say anything one way or the other steve bellovin
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de vesselin bontchev writes if there are many as er people in the usa who reason like the above then it should not be surprising that the current plot has been allowed to happen the willingness of the majority of the people to give up their freedom in exchange for a sense of safety is hardly limited to the usa and is an endemic problem in any human society of any appreciable size the structure of the us government does try to combat this tendency to some extent but fighting entropy is always a losing battle most people would rather have comfort than freedom the paradox is that you can t really have the former in the long term unless you have the latter one of the reasons that i probably come across to some people as a weird cross between a libertarian and an establishment tool is that i end up taking an utterly pragmatic view of government i don t get up in arms when the government fails to protect the interests of the people because in my lifetime it never has therefore i have no expectation that it will as a result i protect my own interests rather than expecting the government to be fair i will use strong cryptography when i think it is needed whether or not it is legal at the time same thing with anything else the government would rather not see in private hands that s their problem what s important to me is using the right tool for the job if it s legal so much the better if it is not but does not violate my very strong sense of personal ethics i will use it anyway as long i think it is worth it expecting the government to actually protect the interests of its citizens except by accident is utter folly even jefferson one of the major architects of the american system of government figured that in a couple hundred years it would become so corrupt and self serving that it would be time dismantle it and try again by revolution if necessary i agree and while i don t go around trying to spark one i ll certainly participate if it happens when i m around there is a reason i am such a strong supporter of individual rights while being so cynical about politics i ve already written off politics and yes this may get me in trouble some day if so so be it i drive faster than mph too amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re the secret source of that announcement andrew molitor amolitor nmsu edu wrote monitor my phonecalls monitor usenet provide only cryptosystems they can easily crack etc etc this is not to say that they don t they might but you don t know that they do and you have no evidence that they do for almost all values of you it follows therefore that for most values of you your claims about the nsa border on paranoia andrew now i wouldn t be the one to claim that you are injecting some disinformation into the net andrew but paranoia refers to unwarranted or excessive suspicions or fear not those that have reasonable roots let s start with looking at the professionals the nsa itself its birth was by secret executive order by harry s truman in until even not even one word of this executive order chartering the nsa was sealed paranoia right on the outside of the nsa complex is a ten foot cyclone fence with multiple rows of barbed wire with high voltage complete with signs prohibiting even making sketches under penalty of the internal security act the area is completely scanned by closed circuit television more paranoia these are professionals maybe they know something we don t eh do you think it would have helped admiral yamamoto if the japanese had been a little more paranoid of their purple cipher or maybe the germans should have been a little more paranoid about their engima with respect to turing and the british how about the cracking of the zimmerman telegram would a little more paranoia have helped the germans here maybe the nsa should have been a little more paranoid about emma woikin or joseph sidney petersen jr or maybe you want to talk about macmillan publishers cooperation with the cia and nsa to suppress yardley s japanese diplomatic secrets or even kahn s the codebreakers paranoia right the most popular cipher systems in captured soviet spies was the one time pad even with the necessity of keeping incriminating evidence about is known to be the only proven unbreakable system soviet paranoia right and what do you think the nsa does with its wullenwebers and huge rhombics pointed embassy row and their sites near satellite uplink and downlink sites duh when i worked in a classified mitre communications lab at one time even with a secret clearance i had to be escorted to the toilet and the entire site was built into a mosler type vault with very thick bomb proof door mitre paranoia i could cite probably a hundred more facts which all support as best hypothesis the notion that the nsa is grabbing as much as it can as fast as it can one would be a fool to ignore the pattern of facts and conclude that they were random and we know the government is violent even against children as recent events prove judge william sessions is a disgrace but a solemn warning to those who ignore the web of evidence that our government institutions have in their contempt for our civil rights and of course we have to err somewhat on the excessive side of caution because that does much less harm than erring on the reckless side as member of the crew of the uss liberty might aver i might suggest andrew that you read kahn s codebreakers and bamford s puzzle palace and come back with some more facts to support your sheepish acquiescence to authority grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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re clipper considered harmful shirriff sprite berkeley edu ken shirriff writes it seems likely to me that that a large subset of encrypted communications would be archived to tape so they could be read if sometime in the future probable cause arises and a warrant is obtained i can even imagine this being found legal and constitutional since nothing is actually listened to until a valid warrant is issued and the keys are obtained imagine archiving all pay phone conversations so if someone turns out to be a drug dealer you can listen to all their past drug deals and archive calls to from suspected mafia members potential terrorists radicals etc imagine the convenience for the police of being able to get a warrant now and listening to all the calls the world trade center bombers made in the past year imagine if this were available during the elections instead of clumsily searching through the clinton passport file they could have just done a voice grep as someone stated earlier on his telephone conversations for the last years i m not a lawyer and i don t even play one on tv but intuitively there s something wrong with having one s words archived for possible future use against you this possibility frightens me more than any of the talk about the clipper chip right to cryptography etc since archiving would be such a powerful tool and so easy to do why wouldn t it happen i m afraid it just might nhy nina h yuan it s a miracle that curiosity harvard college survives formal education yuan husc harvard edu albert einstein
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re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me in article qsvfcinnq v dns nmsu edu amolitor moink nmsu edu andrew molitor writes a lot of this article has been deleted for space look this is clearly the first step toward outlawing our own screw thread specifications if this madness isn t fought tooth and nail every step of the way it ll be a crime to use screw threads other than those our fearless leaders so graciously define for us the clipper standard is the first step toward outlawing other strong encryption standards if the government didn t intend to outlaw other forms of encryption than clipper is just a big waste of time and money why you ask because anyone who is transferring data that any government agency could use against him her would be a total fool to use the clipper system so why add the backdoor key if all lawbreakers will use alternate encryption methods because they assume they can just do away with everything else i for one am planning on boycotting any equipment that contains clipper technology
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and some people thought that i am exaggerating when claiming that the cripple chip is just a first step in a totalitarian plot against the civil liberties in the usa it seems that i ve even been an optimist the things are happening even faster than i expected that s another of the dirty tricks they used to apply on us under the communist regime do something secret then tell the people about is after the fact when nothing can be done any more and of course explaining them how much better the situation is now in my previous messages i wrote that the americans should wake up and fight against the new proposal now it seems to me that it is already too late it has already happened the civil liberties have been violated no stollen from the american people while the most part of this people has been sleeping happily too sad as one of the happily sleeping people i would just like to ask this aren t people just slightly overreacting to this or are we all of a sudden going to draw parallels to nazi germany and communist russia the point of the matter is that yes this is a serious problem but it is not the end of the world guess what we re doing something now you can t do in a communist country or nazi germany we re complaining about it or rather you re complaining about it and nobody is shooting at us or rather if they re shooting at me they have real bad aim guess what people you live in one of the few countries in the world where a person can complain without getting shot at people are always complaining that somebody did this wrong or somebody did that wrong or whatever sit down and figure out two things what have they done right how much worse can it get and you ll find that you and i are pretty damn lucky so let s talk about it get some action going decide what s going on but let s not overreact regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany jerry han crc doc div of behavioural research jhan debra dgbt doc ca these are my opinions and my opinions only a proud and frozen member of the mighty warriors band memories of those i ve left behind still ringing in my ears genesis
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re organized lobbying for cryptography generally an organization has influence in proportion to the narrowness of its objectives the number of members the strength of belief of its members this is why the pro and anti abortion groups are so strong narrow objectives lots of interested members who are real passionate for this reason mixing with the nra is probably a bad idea it diffuses the interests of both groups it may well diminish the passion index of the combined organization it is not clear it would greatly enlarge the nra so i believe a new organization which may cooperate with nra where the two organization s interest coincide is the optimum strategy lew lew glendenning rlglende netcom com perspective is worth iq points niels bohr or somebody like that
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run digital speech down k i think it is i ve heard it s not lets say bit samples would raw data at the corresponding sampling rate be usable if not how fancy does the compression need to be a good vocoder like ours will give you bits per second locked at full rate it s a variable rate voice activity vocoder if you want less quality cut that to bps half rate at full rate variable you could put two full duplex conversations on a v bis modem this requires a dsp or asics though an rs has a cpu that could probably do it in real time because it has the add and multiply instruction and a few other dsp things if you want to do speech in real time you need about samples a second for not very good voice with your bit samples isdn is bit samples a second which is kbps you could do a fast compression on that to get it down to kbps which is just about v bis the quality at this point is very bleah but it should work now add in the time for your encryption method you re going to need sampling hardware which is no problem on a new mac an amiga or a pc with a soundblaster card just because they re so popular and cheap you could also build a simple adc the problem with the soundblaster is that it doesn t seem to be full duplex you can t sample and play backq at the same time making a two way conversation a bit tough the special hardware or a more capable sound card may be required the only thing that worries me is that compression the soundblaster can do it automatically in hardware but other than that i don t have a good feel for how processor intensive it is so i can t estimate how fast a pc you d need not all men who drink are poets some of us drink because we are not poets
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re fighting the clipper initiative in article strnlghtc toc kiu netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes the federal reserve open market committee has successfully kept decisions from leaking for the statutory period until publication how are you sure of that weren t there some recent studies that found corelations between not yet announced decisions and market changes aren t there continuing early rumors of their deliberations even the department of agriculture has successfully kept crop forecasts from leaking prematurely sheesh remember the big scandal a year or two or ago about exactly such leaks vernon schryver vjs sgi com
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine in article tom apr amber ssd csd harris com tom ssd csd harris com tom horsley writes this isn t intended to be a flame or anything i am just really curious how to manufacture these things while still maintaining the key escrow security without simply saying trust the manufacturer they won t look without getting into the really thorny questions about reverse engineering and all of that let me just point out that there already exist gate arrays and suchlike that have what s known as a security fuse which can be programmed after you ve verified all other programming this makes it impossible to read out the programming of the device again ignoring the reverse engineering questions speaking from experience here i had to completely reinvent one of my designs some six or seven years ago when the disk file was zapped the backups were all bad and the devices were unreadable because of the security fuses made me appreciate the value of printouts so on this point at least there s not so much worry but whether or not we can get the chips made reliably and securely is really secondary to the question of whether use of the chip is itself likely to be secure methinks robert bickford a hacker is any person who derives joy from rab well sf ca us discovering ways to circumvent limitations rab i recognize that a class of criminals and juvenile delinquents has taken to calling themselves hackers but i consider them irrelevant to the true meaning of the word just as the mafia calls themselves businessmen but nobody pays that fact any attention rab
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i don t have ftp live in canada how do i get rsa ras my ataris i don t have ftp and i live in canada this means that it would be illeagle for a u s citizen to send the program to me their gigerment wishes to restrict its dispersil but someone in europe must have ported a coppy of rsa to the atarist by now how do i get a coppy of the rsa from a non ftp news feed allan brockman ab ersys edmonton ab ca
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re the clipper chip a technical summary in article apr guvax acc georgetown edu denning guvax acc georgetown edu writes prof denning s description of skipjack mostly omitted chip structure the clipper chip contains a classified bit block encryption algorithm called skipjack the algorithm uses bit keys compared with for the des and has rounds of scrambling compared with for the des it supports all des modes of operation throughput is mbits a second f an bit family key that is common to all chips n a bit serial number u an bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip the key k and message stream m i e digitized voice are then fed into the clipper chip to produce two values e m k the encrypted message stream and e e k u n f a law enforcement block three questions it looks like each bits of input gives you bits of output e m k bits e k u e bits bits e e k u n f e bits bits do you really need to transmit all bits each time or do you only transmit the bits of wiretap block at the beginning all would be really obnoxious for bandwidth limited applications like cellular phones or even regular phones over how do the des modes interact with the two part output do the various feedback modes only apply to the message block or also to the wiretap block or if the wiretap block is only transmitted at the beginning does it get incorporated into everything through feedback modes but not during ecb mode does the clipper chip check the wiretap block itself does the block have to be present at all since the receiving chip doesn t know the transmitter s u it presumably can t check the validity of e k u so it s limited to checking the form of the wiretap block and maybe checking the serial number for reasonableness unless there s some sort of back door structure that lets it recognize a valid e k u in that case can you replace the wiretap block with a different wiretap block presumably an old valid one to avoid attracting attention the chip won t do it so you postprocess the output regular people can do one with their own serial number and a dummy key paranoid people can use someone else s serial number on the other hand if i could think of that solution so easily presumably the nsa could too have they done something to block it like use message encryption that s really e m k u n thanks pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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re once tapped your code is no good any more david sternlight writes i d trust something from the nsa long before i d trust something from some swiss or anbody japanese what this is an incredible statement the nsa tried to suppress public key crypto and rsa and yet they claim to encourage use of strong crypto for us citizens would you trust a black box from the nsa versus an open system from elsewhere karl l barrus elee sf menudo uh edu preferred address barrus tree egr uh edu nextmail karl l barrus elee sf menudo uh edu preferred address barrus tree egr uh edu nextmail
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it i think you d have to do some massive data compression just to fit a bit of key information on each primary particle of the known universe but hey it s fun to imagine mjr
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freely distributable public key cryptography c code where do you know of any freely distributable c or c code for public key cryptography such as rsa i ve tried various archie searches to no avail thanks dan
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article c so hxv demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good why not make its algrithm public so many people can exchange ideas and examine it rather than a few isolated respected experts respected by whom for what perhaps a one more time if they released the algorithm it would be possible for someone to come up with an implementation which was identical but lacking an escrowed key note that the press announcement mentioned that the algorithm was being kept secret for security of the key escrow system in this case security means an escrowed key for every clipper chip assuming you believed all that is said about the effective of the algorithm and the escrow system which would you buy a chip from firm a with the escrowed key b second source chip from reputable firm b with no key in government escrow there would obviously be powerful economic incentives for a second source non escrowed vendor
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re once tapped your code is no good any more andersom spot colorado edu marc anderson writes methods this year s crime bill will have teeth not bare gums clinton said in particular his administration will place strict controls on data formats and protocols and require the registration of so called cryptographic keys in the hope of denying drug dealers the ability to communicate in secret clinton said the approach could be used for crackdowns on other forms of underground economic activity such as the deficit causing tax evaders who live in luxury at the expense of our grandchildren and some people thought that i am exaggerating when claiming that the cripple chip is just a first step in a totalitarian plot against the civil liberties in the usa it seems that i ve even been an optimist the things are happening even faster than i expected that s another of the dirty tricks they used to apply on us under the communist regime do something secret then tell the people about is after the fact when nothing can be done any more and of course explaining them how much better the situation is now in my previous messages i wrote that the americans should wake up and fight against the new proposal now it seems to me that it is already too late it has already happened the civil liberties have been violated no stollen from the american people while the most part of this people has been sleeping happily too sad regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes some of the more notorious self styled dissidents here for example have already got their heads so high above the tall grass that they d have little chance of getting a clearance if there are many as er people in the usa who reason like the above then it should not be surprising that the current plot has been allowed to happen regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re the secret source of that announcement i guess the cryptowranglers read this group too but of course i knew that because it is so easy to do there is not a single doubt in my mind that every byte that passes every significant gateway or bone is captured for the colligation of data about maybe your name is here maybe we should start a newsgroup for the distribution of encrypted posts intended of members of affinity groups with a shared private key for example at the coming up cypherpunks meeting a private key corresponding to that particular meeting could be passed out by a moderator minutes followup comments to other participants and so on could be posted to the alt encrypted group for the use of the people who attended communiques intended by the group for non attendees could of course just be signed using the private key but otherwises not encrypted starting a alt encrypted newsgroup rather than just maintaining mailing lists is better for several reasons first it would be easier to archive for people who might join a group late and who might like to easily read earlier posts second traffic analysis to know exactly to whom an affinity message is directed would be foiled three a newsgroup is much more public and would serve to publicize available privacy measures on the internet and it would be fun to accumulate a secret keyring full of such keys it beats giving out t shirts as a door prize we could send a copy of alt encrypted directly to judge william sessions or admiral studeman to save them the time of having it collected for them grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article strnlghtc t o k p netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes actually the govrnment is telling you that if you want to use their product the manufacturer actually better yet some trusted pair of escrow agencies has to have the key most of us already are in this situation our car makers have keys to our cars or can get them quickly from the vin number and i have no doubt that if presented with a court order they d surrender copies to the government chances are that many locksmiths have the code numbers for house locks they ve installed and in an emergency can cut keys thus they d also provide such keys to the government pursuant to a court order of course nothing prevents you from buying a new lock with cash and installing it yourself even modifying the core to match some arbitrary key is not difficult to do at home i once knew someone who had fixed his locks in this way his house office and cars all took the same key which he took good care of the state has no difficulty gaining access to your safe deposit box if they have a court order bad analogy very bad yours that is have you ever had a safety deposit box they work on a two key system the bank clerk has one and you have the other they are different keys the bank does not keep a copy of your key if you lose it they have to drill out the lock and replace the door this is a time consuming and expensive process which they will be happy to charge to your account this process is exactly analogous to having a private key which is not in a escrow system and the state having to crack your cipher to get the data please do not use false analogies peter trei ptrei mitre org
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re organized lobbying for cryptography in article apr husc harvard edu kubo zariski harvard edu tal kubo writes having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations i would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction gathering the support of the nra by emphasizing the rkba side of the issue as well as the first amendment side tal kubo math harvard edu hmmm this gave me an interesting idea how about this argument second amendment gives us the right to keep and bear arms strong cryptography is arms according to the u s government that s why it s so hard to export therefore we have a constituitional right to strong cryptography q e d however it s likely to be as hard or harder to exercise this right as it is getting to exercise the other rights that the government is slowly restricting maybe the nra would be the best existing organization although i think a new one might be better but perhaps would take too long to start up i would certainly join from the electronic desk of bob langford health sciences computing fax virginia commonwealth university e mail langford gems vcu edu or langford vcuvax for bitnet
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys we don t yet know if all bits count that doesn t worry me at all they re not going to cheat at something they can get caught at and key size is one of the things that can be verified externally feed lots of random key input pairs into the chip then see what happens to the output if the device is designed to use the key that s registered with the feds i don t see how you can feed it a different key if the user can change the key to any of the possibilities the main reason for regarding this proposal as unacceptable disappears
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip i don t like the unit key generation process any better than you do however s and s are supposed to be under control of the same escrow agents if they can t be trusted to keep the seed values secure they can t be trusted to keep the half keys secure i hope there is something i don t understand about this system but can someone tell me how these chips are going to be manufactured while maintaining each half key under total control of the separate escrow agencies don t both halfs of the key have to come together in some form at the time the chip is constructed or is it built like a fusable prom with the chip being sent to the st escrow agency to program its key then the nd agency to program its key but who invents the safeguards that prevent the nd agency from reading the information already programmed by the st this isn t intended to be a flame or anything i am just really curious how to manufacture these things while still maintaining the key escrow security without simply saying trust the manufacturer they won t look domain tahorsley csd harris com usmail tom horsley uucp uunet hcx tahorsley kingbird circle delray beach fl censorship is the only form of obscenity wait i forgot government tobacco subsidies
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr rick dgbt doc ca jhan debra dgbt doc ca jerry han writes as one of the happily sleeping people i would just like to ask this aren t people just slightly overreacting to this or are we all of a sudden going to draw parallels to nazi germany and communist russia the point of the matter is that yes this is a serious problem but it is not the end of the world guess what we re doing something now you can t do in a communist country or nazi germany we re complaining about it or rather you re complaining about it and nobody is shooting at us or rather if they re shooting at me they have real bad aim guess what people you live in one of the few countries in the world where a person can complain without getting shot at people are always complaining that somebody did this wrong or somebody did that wrong or whatever sit down and figure out two things what have they done right how much worse can it get and you ll find that you and i are pretty damn lucky so let s talk about it get some action going decide what s going on but let s not overreact us having the liberties to talk about this doesn t make the problem go away it doesn t make it right rather the opposite if we do not do anything about it you can bet it s going to get worse angel foghorn leghorn coe northeastern edu btw these are my opinions and not that of any other entity my god its full of stars dave i don t know about you but we ve got company epidemic
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re organized lobbying for cryptography in article r jgbinn i eli cs yale edu jgfoot minerva cis yale edu writes tarl neustaedter tarl coyoacan sw stratus com wrote it means that the eff s public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant to the encryption issue per se there may well be people who care about the encryption issue who don t care to associate themselves with the network erotica issue or may even disagree with the eff s position perhaps these encryption only types would defend the digitized porn if it was posted encrypted these issues are not as seperable as you maintain now why would anyone post anything encrypted encryption is only of use between persons who know how to decrypt the data and why should i care what other people look at what does concern me is the continued erosion of my constitutional rights amendments i ii iv and v to note a few shaun p hughes facts are stupid things sphughes sfsuvax sfsu edu ronald reagan republican national finger for pgp public key convention
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re organized lobbying for cryptography shaun p hughes sphughes sfsuvax sfsu edu wrote in article r jgbinn i eli cs yale edu jgfoot minerva cis yale edu writes deletion perhaps these encryption only types would defend the digitized porn if it was posted encrypted these issues are not as seperable as you maintain now why would anyone post anything encrypted encryption is only of use between persons who know how to decrypt the data and why should i care what other people look at i was responding to another person tarl neustaedter who held that the eff wasn t the best organization to fight for crytography rights since the eff also supports the right to distribute pornography over the internet something some crypto people might object to in other words he s implying that there are people who will protect any speech just as long as it is encrypted
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re once tapped your code is no good any more agreed this is like the bay of pigs fiasco planned by the eisenhower administration but given the final green light by kennedy to be sure hen it all went down kennedy was at least man enough to take full responsibility which is not what i expect from slick willie clinton
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr rick dgbt doc ca jhan debra dgbt doc ca jerry han writes in article bontchev fbihh as one of the happily sleeping people i would just like to ask this aren t people just slightly overreacting to this or are we all of a sudden going to draw parallels to nazi germany and communist russia yes reasonable parallels though i don t think russia ever claimed to be communist the point of the matter is that yes this is a serious problem but it is not the end of the world guess what we re doing something now you can t do in a communist country or nazi germany we re complaining about i must protest your in a communist country how do you know there haven t been any and are unlikely to ever be any in some socialist dictatorships you can t whilst in some socialist democracies such as france or australia you can of course some people may disagree about france australia being socialist it or rather you re complaining about it and nobody is shooting at us yet or rather if they re shooting at me they have real bad aim guess what people you live in one of the few countries in the world where a person can complain without getting shot at in some circumstances i was at a public meeting last night in the usa where a protester who was very nice and calm and just said before the speaker started to beware of his opinions was forced out of the meeting by two armed policemen there are a lot of things that one cannot do in the usa you may not notice them but as an australian visitor i notice them people are always complaining that somebody did this wrong or somebody did that wrong or whatever sit down and figure out two things what have they done right how much worse can it get and you ll find that you and i are pretty damn lucky yes we are lucky at the moment i hope that is still true in a few years time because it didn t just happen it required concious effort so let s talk about it get some action going decide what s going on but let s not overreact of course don t over react but don t under react andrew disclaimer all my opinions are my own and do not represent the society for the conservation of momentum or any other group i hope i don t lose my student visa as a result of these opinions andrew conway arc leland stanford edu phone usa
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes remember that they ve promised to let a committee of outside experts see the cryptosystem design i hope there are some silicon jocks on the committee who can follow the algorithm through to hardware while i doubt the nsa would pull any monkey business on this point they have to expect that the chip will be reverse engineered sooner or later it s an obvious opportunity to introduce additional holes steve bellovin pgp key by finger or e mail eli ebrandt jarthur claremont edu
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re organized lobbying for cryptography langford gems vcu edu writes in article apr husc harvard edu kubo zariski harvard edu tal kubo writes having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations i would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction gathering the support of the nra by emphasizing the rkba side of the issue as well as the first amendment side hmmm this gave me an interesting idea how about this argument second amendment gives us the right to keep and bear arms strong cryptography is arms according to the u s government that s why it s so hard to export therefore we have a constituitional right to strong cryptography q e d maybe the nra would be the best existing organization i think a new organization would be a much better idea as the nra carries as much undesireable baggage for me as the eff and cpsr do for others are any hot shot reputable organizers reading this message if an effective group comes into existence it can count on me signing up george mitchell george tessi com
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i have seen the lobby and it is us in article apr gems vcu edu langford gems vcu edu writes however it s likely to be as hard or harder to exercise this right as it is getting to exercise the other rights that the government is slowly restricting maybe the nra would be the best existing organization although i think a new one might be better but perhaps would take too long to start up i would certainly join the nra is successful because among a number of things on the drop of a hat they can get a congresspersons office flooded with postcards faxes and phone calls certainly with our way cool internet powers of organization we can act in the same way if such action is appropriate as long as we are kept informed of events anyone on this bboard can make a call to action hopefully we re a strong enough community to act on those calls i realize this is a little optomistic and i m glad eff is working in the loop on these issues but don t underestimate the potential of the net for political action adam i speak for myself
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes in article c sy z td demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys we don t yet know if all bits count that doesn t worry me at all they re not going to cheat at something they can get caught at and key size is one of the things that can be verified externally feed lots of random key input pairs into the chip then try flipping random key bits and see what happens to the output we already know what should happen about half the output bits should vary on average from a bit key change or input change if they were out to build a weak cryptosystem it might be the case that some of the bits are much less powerful than others in the sense that they only enter into the encryption very late in the game by contrast des was designed to use each key bit as early as possible the output change rate appears as early as round again though i don t think nsa is going to cheat that crudely they re likely to get caught consider a cryptosytem that starts out by xoring bits and and not using either of these bits except through this xor this system makes early use of every bit but an exhaustive key search would now only have keys to search your test by varying single key bits wouldn t turn up anything interesting remember that they ve promised to let a committee of outside experts see the cryptosystem design if you assume something des like a biased subkey generation schedule will stick out like a sore thumb the algorithm i suggest above would stick out like a sore thumb but i m sure i could design a system with a more subtle key redundancy which was well hidden but would still make an exhaustive key search take far less than encryptions i don t believe your claim that the real keysize can be verified externally andy latto andyl harlequin com
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security in article aa pizzabox demon co uk gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run digital speech down k i think it is i ve heard it s not lets say bit samples would raw data at the corresponding sampling rate be usable if not how fancy does the compression need to be as far as i know isdn call it swissnet here and it s being plugged in it s bit hz gives you one channel of kbit sec i guess you should not go below a sampling rate of hz if you want to have same quality as on an analog line anybody knows compression algorithms factors for voice greetings germano caronni instruments register only through things they re designed to register space still contains infinite unknowns pgp key id germano caronni caronni nessie cs id ethz ch fd ccf f da ea c dd f
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryp gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes whatever happens though the effect of this new chip will be to make private crypto stand out like a sore thumb only if this chip catches on which means alternatives have to be developed which will only happen if clipper is discredited tony lezard is tony mantis co uk pgp public key available from key or tony mantis co uk uknet ac uk servers such as pgp public keys demon co uk or even arl phx cam ac uk c f bbea c b cf c a fa
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption bena dec cs monash edu au ben aveling writes don t forget you are in the country that wouldn t let the russians buy apple ii s because of security concerns that s nothing they wouldn t let the british buy inmos transputer systems because of security concerns and we designed the damn things mathew
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new encryption as promised i spoke today with the company mentioned in a washington times article about the clipper chip announcement the name of the company is secure communicatiions technology information will be given at the end of this message on how to contact them basically they are disturbed about the announcement for many reasons that we are more specifically however mr bryen of secure communications brought to light many points that might interest most of the readers his belief is that at t was made known of the clipper well before the rest of the industry this is for several reasons several of which are a company of at t s size could never be able to make a decision to use the new chip on the same day it was announced months ago they proposed using their own chip for at t s secure telephone devices at t basically blew them off as being not interested at all this stuck them as strange until now also i spoke with art melnick their cryptographer he expressed several concerns over the new clipper chip the obvious backdoor will be able to let many people decrypt the code once the key is released to authorities the security of the crypto system is lost forever these keys can end up in the hands of any agency of the government the fact that the escrowed keys never change means that the algorithm is vulnerable over time to an attacker the classified algorithm may hide another backdoor but he feels that it is probably to keep people from forging fake serial numbers or changing the keys themselves additionally he feels that the nsa has probably spent enough time and money in working on a way to keep this chip from being reversed engineered that he feels that reverse engineering it will be very difficult to do he feels that they have developed a suitable technique to protect the chip from this attack also he feels that the chip is hardware encoded with the algorithm and not microcoded onto the chip additonally i spoke with mr melnick about their algorithm he couldn t tell me much about their new agorithm because it hasn t been patented yet however he told me a little the algorithm will be released for public review after patents have been granted for it this is so the crypto community can see that it is secure the algorithm is called nea for new encryption algorithm the details were sketchy because now it is held as a trade secret until the patent was issued but i was told that it will incorporate the following it will have fast encryption of data exact specs not given but mr melnick stated much faster than what an rs can put out it is a symmetric cipher just like idea and des it will use bit data blocks for encryption like des and idea the key length was not given to me but mr melnick states that it is adujustable and is more than adequate for security the algorithm is written in c and assembler in software form and can be ported to many platforms unlike the the clipper chip which is hardware only and cannot be made into software this i consider a definite plus for the nea for widespread use the algorithm will accomodate public key distribution techniques such as rsa or diffie hellman this will also be supported in the hardware chip right now the projected cost of the nea chip will be about dollars for each clipper will run each chip that is if it is produced enough which probably won t happen they currently sell a program called c com that uses the algorithm and a special streaming protocol that does not divide the encrypted data into blocks this could prevent plaintext attacks if you know what the block header is this program operates at all supported rs speeds and uses the software implementation of the algorithm most importantly it does not have a backdoor right now the company is afraid that the new clipper chip will put them out of business this is a very real possibility so they really need help in stopping the clipper chip from becoming a standard if you want to contact them they can be reached at secure communications technology georgia ave suite silver spring md i talked to mr bryen who represents the company he can answer any questions you have any factual errors occurring in this write up are my own and i apologize for them ahead of time psionic wam umd edu fight the wiretap chip ask me how c craig h rowland amiga pgp key available those who would give up liberty for by request security deserve neither a
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run digital speech down k i think it is i ve heard it s not lets say bit samples would raw data at the corresponding sampling rate be usable if not how fancy does the compression need to be note i am not a cable freak so i might have completely misunderstood what you said also my math is frequently noted for being wrong so you ll better check the calculations yourself i assume that k means k bits so if we assume one start and one stopbit and no protocol overhead the effective number of bytes per second is k let s also assume that you do not want to transmit your speech in stereo so that you can send samples sec this corresponds to a nyquist frequency of hz which should be too low especially if you think about the bit low quality sound furthermore your d a converter will probably not present you with a signal that has been cut off at hz but will instead alias in all the higher frequencies although you can definitely build a filter to overcome that problem on the other hand speech should be easily compressible for example you could form power spectra or you could simply band pass filter and then linearize the fourier transforms it won t be cd quality sound but it ll be discernible the power spectrum method is very good in that respect i have once programmed such a software compressor and compression rates of with relative errors due to linearization of less than were common although i must say that these were musical sounds not speech have fun stephan neuhaus informatik uni kl de sig closed for inventory please leave your pickaxe outside pgp public key available on request note the expiration date
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr chpc org rboudrie chpc org rob boudrie writes in article c so hxv demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good why not make its algrithm public so many people can exchange ideas and examine it rather than a few isolated respected experts respected by whom for what perhaps a one more time if they released the algorithm it would be possible for someone to come up with an implementation which was identical but lacking an escrowed key note that the press announcement mentioned that the algorithm was being kept secret for security of the key escrow system in this case security means an escrowed key for every clipper chip assuming you believed all that is said about the effective of the algorithm and the escrow system which would you buy a chip from firm a with the escrowed key b second source chip from reputable firm b with no key in government escrow there would obviously be powerful economic incentives for a second source non escrowed vendor but what about second sources for pin compatible non clipper algorithm chips that also have escrowed keys if a reputable firm produces a chip with escrowed key that is a pop in replacement for the clipper chip in my phone and uses an algorithm that is widely known and evaluated and trusted then what s the problem the clipper is going to be reverse engineered anyway by any organization with sufficient resources can you say billions of cocaine dollars so those drug dealers they re so worried about will be slipping through the cracks we law abiding non incredibly wealthy citizens naturally will not have this recourse but claiming that the algorithm can t be released to prevent people from using non key escrowed chips is plain deceitful analysis of the chip output will provide information on the necessary headers and whatnot so the bad guys could build chips using a different algorithm and still not escrow their keys or they could just buy bunches of cheap phones at k mart every week and play swap the clipper chip with their cellular phone every day michael t palmer a man is crazy who writes a secret in any m t palmer larc nasa gov other way than one which will conceal it ripem key on server from the vulgar roger bacon
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re how to detect use of an illegal cipher as for my impressions of the whole scheme it seems that instead of trying to ban strong crypto they are trying to co opt it their contention that they need to keep the algorythm secret to protect the security of the key registration suggests possible inherent weakness to the algorythm more likely is that they dont want anyone constructing black market devices which dont have the keys registered anyone else notice that in their q a session they preventing black market chips w non escrowed keys is exactly what they mean by protecting the security of the key escrow system there are two parts to the security of such a system a preventing decruption by unauthorized personel b assuring that the gummit can always decrypt clipper traffic when it authorizes itself to do so of course the ministry of propoganda will do a lot of tallking about a and very little about b rob boudrie rboudrie chpc org ps anyone care to guess what encryption scheme the gov t is using on its newly formed database of anarch cryptists who oppose this entire lunacy
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in r l inn gq senator bedfellow mit edu jfc athena mit edu john f carr writes in most cases information you come by properly is yours to use as you wish but there are certainly exceptions if you write a paper which includes sufficiently detailed information on how to build a nuclear weapon it is classified as i understand the law nuclear weapons design is automatically classified even if you do the work yourself i believe you are then not allowed to read your own paper this has now been thrown out by the courts the progressive case a less serious example if you tell drivers about a speed trap they are about to run into you can be fined even though you might argue that you broke no law when you discovered the location of the policeman the charge is interfering with a police officer which is quite similar what you would be doing by reverse engineering the clipper chip this is outright illegal it does violate the first amendment if you would give a case in which your speed trap example has been upheld by the courts arthur l rubin a rubin dsg dse beckman com work beckman instruments brea mcimail com compuserve com arthur pnet cts com personal my opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in strnlghtc uij t netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article elee sf apr menudo menudo uh edu elee sf menudo menudo uh edu karl barrus writes would you trust a black box from the nsa versus an open system from elsewhere absolutely if i were assured by someone i trusted that the black box was more secure i have nothing to conceal from the government but i would like to be sure that any russian japanese french or other competitors for my services can t read my traffic i d like to be sure that competitive bid information was safe from commercial competitors and foreign governments which would aid them i believe the nsa has identical motivations with respect to my activities the president and many other senior government officials have made it very clear that they share these motivations thus i d trust them on the coincidence of interests argument as well as on a basic trust in their professionalism and a high confidence in their skills david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted nothing but errors and omissions here arthur l rubin a rubin dsg dse beckman com work beckman instruments brea mcimail com compuserve com arthur pnet cts com personal my opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr clarinet com sci crypt alt security comp org eff talk comp security misc comp org acm comp org ieee brad clarinet com brad templeton writes let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and the other is the eff and i m not entirely joking about those two names the problem with let s assume reasoning is that taken to the extreme and you re close you arrive at let s assume this is perfectly ok the assumptions you make are big ones if the system is really secure then why does the government have to keep the algorithm secret there are plenty of encryption algorithms that don t depend upon nondisclosure to be secure so why in the world use one that does there are reasons of course but i certainly can t think of any honest ones next you assume we can trust the escrow houses but the last time i checked every single branch of government has experienced unauthorized disclosure corruption and even fabrication of supposedly secure data the govt is saying yeah but now we re serious so you can trust us bullcrypt and finally although you didn t state it explicitly you implicitly assume that the warrant mechanism in this country is safe and reasonable the case in ventura county of a man shot and killed by officers serving a deliberately fraudulant warrant tells me that the govt has a long ways to go on this score remember that all this is to catch the drug dealers right as others have pointed out the current proposal will if deployed render truly secure encryption much more expensive and inconvenient than uncle sam s brand who will be able to afford and be sufficiently motivated to purchase this expensive inconvenient higher protection somebody with lots of extra cash the following is more true than ever when strong encryption is outlawed only outlaws will have strong encryption mel beckman internet mbeckman mbeckman com beckman software engineering compuserve ventura ca voice fax you can observe a lot just by watching yogi bera
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re an open letter to mr clinton in article strnlghtc m cv hx netcom com sci crypt strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary that is you get high quality secure nsa classified technology if you agree to escrow your key otherwise you are on your own david as an economist i m sure you can see the flaws in this logic if the naive market is flooded with proprietary but weak encryption then truly strong encryption will be unable to compete suppose the govt had a secret tv broadcast standard and then sold tvs below cost private industry has a better standard but it s not as widespread due to the govt early flooding of the market with cheap proprietary sets even though the industry s technology is better the programming is being broadcast to the govt s unduplicatable standard who could compete the other flaw of course is that making something voluntary today ensures that it will be voluntary in the future i went to renew my ca drivers license last week and was required not only to give my ssn but to produce an ssn card to veryify the number note that a federal law once said that no state or local govt could ever require the use of ssns for drivers license registration specifically i do not trust the govt that says trust me on this even though we could have an arrangement that doesn t require your trust something is big time fishy if you look more carefully you ll see it mel mel beckman internet mbeckman mbeckman com beckman software engineering compuserve ventura ca voice fax you can observe a lot just by watching yogi bera
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re once tapped your code is no good any more it might be nice to cut out the ad hominem attacks on prof denning mr sternlight etc if you have something objective to say about their views go ahead and say it subject to point personal attacks reflect more on the attacker more than on the attackee throw light not heat restrict the discussion to appropriate newsgroups i submit that comp org acm and comp org ieee are not appropriate for this discussion you have now made subscribers to these newsgroups aware of the issue if they want to know more or participate in the discussion they can easily join sci crypt comp security misc alt security or comp org eff talk russ schnapp email netcom metaflow rschnapp or rschnapp metaflow com or rschnapp bix com metaflow technologies voice x fax la jolla california unless otw specified i m speaking only for myself
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article apr clarinet com sci crypt brad clarinet com brad templeton writes interestingly enough in designing the escrow we may want to use some rather unusual technology such as sealed boxes of paper or destructive read memory rather than typical computer databases which is fun for a database of hundreds of millions of keys to me a larger problem is that once disclosed your keys could be used to decrypt any previously recorded conversations i gather that from this proposal a warrant would be required to get the keys but not to collect conversations consider the scenario where an agency collects preemptively all encrypted conversations for certain people likely to be targets and not necessarily legitimate targets then arranges for some unrelated incident that can trigger a warrant your honor we know that the suspect has received calls from noted crime figure bugsy butthead said calls arranged by the agency and we must therefore have this warrant to determine whether this suspect in a sensitive govt post is corrupt i suppose that it is conceivable that there are session keys involved somewhere but that doesn t seem likely if there are why wouldn t the technical overview mention them when it goes to such details as the number of bits held by each escrow authority this scheme is full of holes and stinks to high heaven mel mel beckman internet mbeckman mbeckman com beckman software engineering compuserve ventura ca voice fax you can observe a lot just by watching yogi bera
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article r ausinni senator bedfellow mit edu jfc athena mit edu john f carr writes the chip and algorithm are classified if you reverse engineer it and tell people you are likely to go to jail i don t find this a credible argument for two reasons one you have supplied below unless i care about entering the usa at any time in the future eg the taiwanese backyard cloners who btw have been known to decap custom silicon and reproduce it on daughterboards when pirating high profit arcade machines and the like who wouldn t care less i am not going to care much about us confidentiality am i only people like the real me who does care about travelling to various countries for business reasons will sit up and follow laws like this but i would contend that we re not the main threat i also have grave doubts whether an algorythm widely distributed in silicon could possibly be called classified it s like handing out military secrets to the whole world in envelopes marked don t open me i can imagine several credible defences which could be employed if it came to a trial one would be the stupidity of the government s actions perhaps some foreign governments or corporations could help us out by cracking the system outside the usa the us government could probably stop importation of clone hardware but a software implementation should be practical amusing thought could they have employed an algorythm which is infeasable for a fast software implementation but which is easy in custom hardware in des the extensive use of permutation tables trivial in hardware you just swap bus lines but relatively slow in software have had a big effect on the speed difference between hardware and software implementations of that cipher indeed i suspect that lucifer s designers were well aware that it would be and approved certain algorythms usually parallel search algorythms can be very slow in software yet can fly in custom hardware i have no proof of their employment in clipper it is pure conjecture however as a software implementation of this cipher is something that its designers would have been trying to avoid at all costs then the inclusion of such techniques seems credible hmmm i also wonder what intergraph thinks about the use of the name clipper for this device ian farquhar phone office of computing services fax macquarie university nsw also australia email ifarqhar laurel ocs mq edu au
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article almaden ibm com ameline vnet ibm com ian ameline writes i also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread any back doors or weaknesses would further discredit the scheme and help grow the market demand for a secure alternative i must admit that this point has been running through my mind for most of the discussion one the dice are out there it won t be long before someone decaps it and after a bit of work has full details of the clipper algorythm this isn t trivial to do but then again it is not impossibly difficult either any half way decent vlsi design student should be able to take a photograph of a technology s he is familiar with and given a description of the input output control and supply lines figure out the function of various subsystems on the die indeed this is not an uncommon exercise performed during training because it makes you think about design decisions made by other designers i could speculate that these chips are going to be manufactured using tamperproof carriers unlikely such techniques are very expensive and this thing is supposed to be relatively cheap to produce or that there will be some legal or legislative framework to prevent publication of the algorythm unlikely please correct me if i am wrong but aren t these supposed to be sold internationally i suppose that the most likely reason the algorythm is remaining secret for the moment is that some idiot bureaucrat untrammeled by the realities of the situation decided that well we should keep it a secret because it is supposed to be secret isn t it just some random thoughts ian farquhar phone office of computing services fax macquarie university nsw also australia email ifarqhar laurel ocs mq edu au
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re once tapped your code is no good any more jhan debra dgbt doc ca jerry han writes the point of the matter is that yes this is a serious problem but it is not the end of the world guess what we re doing something now you can t do in a communist country or nazi germany or john edgar hoover s usa we re complaining about it or rather you re complaining about it and nobody is shooting at us yet guess what people you live in one of the few countries in the world where a person can complain without getting shot at yet people are always complaining that somebody did this wrong or somebody did that wrong or whatever sit down and figure out two things what have they done right how much worse can it get and you ll find that you and i are pretty damn lucky so far so let s talk about it get some action going decide what s going on but let s not overreact what harm is there in overreacting this may be the largest single threat to civil liberties yet in my lifetime the us has done some pretty heinous things in the past and we haven t yet recovered from all of them there certainly seems to be a historical trend towards less liberty with occasional perturbations time to break out the quotes from american political radicals lyle transarc grant street the gulf tower pittsburgh there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by the gradual and silent encroachment of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpation james madison
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re the secret source of that announcement in article gradyc uamw bng netcom com grady netcom com ef writes i guess the cryptowranglers read this group too but of course i knew that because it is so easy to do there is not a single doubt in my mind that every byte that passes every significant gateway or bone is captured for the colligation of data about maybe your name is here i really like these claims where did they come from we hear practically daily that the nsa monitors oh everything they can crack anything they d never release a cryptosystem they couldn t crack where do people get these fascinating facts the puzzle palace if you can get it for a buck nd hand it must be true eh i m pretty sure the nsa is supposed to among many other things provide high quality cryptosystems to a variety of places i don t recall reading anywhere reliable that they re supposed to monitor my phonecalls monitor usenet provide only cryptosystems they can easily crack etc etc this is not to say that they don t they might but you don t know that they do and you have no evidence that they do for almost all values of you it follows therefore that for most values of you your claims about the nsa border on paranoia andrew
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clipper chip facts a request having read the various clipper announcements on the net over the last few days and a lot of uninformed speculation about the chip its uses government plots etc i have the following questions what does the clipper chip actually implement just the skipjack cryptographic algorithm or does it also implement a chip to chip communications protocol if it does implement a communications protocol can it be used as just a crypt chip also where can the chip specifications and spec sheets be obtained who may purchase them and under what conditions are there restrictions as to how the chip may be used in a system the security of the algorithm and the encrypted communications does not appear to require that the family key be a secret why is it a secret what happens when the family key becomes well known if it s a secret to make traffic analysis more difficult does the law enforcement message contain any random information how much and how random is it can the chip be programmed to reveal the unit key the chip serial number any of the programming parameters raymond s brand rbrand usasoc soc mil
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes andersom spot colorado edu marc anderson writes methods this year s crime bill will have teeth not bare gums clinton said in particular his administration will place strict controls on data formats and protocols and require the registration of so called cryptographic keys in the hope of denying drug dealers the ability to communicate in secret clinton said the approach could be used for crackdowns on other forms of underground economic activity such as the deficit causing tax evaders who live in luxury at the expense of our grandchildren and some people thought that i am exaggerating when claiming that the cripple chip is just a first step in a totalitarian plot against the civil liberties in the usa it seems that i ve even been an optimist the things are happening even faster than i expected that s another of the dirty tricks they used to apply on us under the communist regime do something secret then tell the people about is after the fact when nothing can be done any more and of course explaining them how much better the situation is now in my previous messages i wrote that the americans should wake up and fight against the new proposal now it seems to me that it is already too late it has already happened the civil liberties have been violated no stollen from the american people while the most part of this people has been sleeping happily too sad i m definitely going to write my congressman and nobody s ever going to make me respect a law that violates my freedom of speech and if the feds try to enforce this law on me i will protect my freedoms with force if it ever comes to that hopefully it won t doug holland doug holland anyone who tries to take away my freedom holland cs colostate edu of speech will have to pry it from my pgp key available by e mail cold dead lips
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security in article r c an news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes agreed remember i don t even think of clipper as encryption in any real sense if i did i d probably be a lot more annoyed about it i agree with this assessment furthermore its promotion as providing greater protection than bare voice is quite true as far as it goes however the only way for it to fulfill its stated goal of letting le wiretap terrorists and drug dealers is to restrict stronger techniques wiretap targets presently use strong encryption weak encryption or the vast majority no encryption the latter two classes can be tapped with weak encryption in every phone the no encryption class is merged into the weak encryption class will the introduction of clipper cause targets presently enjoying strong privacy to give up on it that is to rely for privacy on a system expressly designed to deny it to people like them i doubt it the mere introduction of this scheme will give the government nothing the stated goal of preventing the degradation of wiretapping capabilities can be fulfilled by restriction of domestic cryptography and only by this restriction clipper appears to be no more than a sop given to the public to mute any complaints we would find this a grossly inadequate tradeoff but i fear the public at large will not care i hate to even mention gun control but most people seem to think that an assault weapon as the nyt uses the word is some sort of automatic weapon caliber maybe who wants to have such a thing legal well people know even less about cryptology i suspect that strong cryptography could easily be labeled too much secrecy for law abiding citizens to need that s not for clinton or anyone under him to say though only the federal and supreme courts can say anything about the constitutionality anything the administration or any governmental agency says is opinion at best what they say is opinion but what they do is what matters and will continue unless overturned and the courts are reluctant to annul law or regulation going to some length to decide cases on other grounds furthermore congress can get away with quite a bit they could levy a burdensome tax this would place enforcement in the hands of the batf who as we ve seen you really don t want on your case they could invoke the commerce clause this seems most likely this clause will get you anywhere these days the th was required because the supreme court ruled a prohibitory statute unconstitutional in congress prohibited many drugs with a textual nod to the commerce clause the controlled substances act of still stands i think the government could get away with it amanda walker pgp key by finger or e mail eli ebrandt jarthur claremont edu
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method amanda intercon com amanda walker writes i don t get up in arms when the government fails to protect the interests of the people because in my lifetime it never has therefore i have no expectation that it will just to make sure everyone is clear on this it never has refers to protects not fails to protect i e in my lifetime i have never seen the u s government consistently protect the interest of u s citizens except by accident amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re once tapped your code is no good any more res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes wouldn t a a second monitor of similar type scrolling gibberish and adjacent to the one being used provide reasonable resistance to tempest attacks it would be in a different location so a directional antenna could probably lock in on just the one monitor failing that a phased array could likely seperate the signals admittedly this is expensive but so is all the rest of this stuff anyway perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr lokkur dexter mi us scs lokkur dexter mi us steve simmons writes smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys let s assume a brute force engine like that hypothesized for des microsecond per trial million chips that s trials per second or about years for trials well maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond and build a machine with million chips sure only years for each solution normally i d be the last to argue with steve but shouldn t that read years for all solutions i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it at the company i worked for previously i received a file that was des encryped and the person that had sent it went on vaction rather than wait two weeks i set up a straight frontal attack with one key at a time it only took two days to crack the file no i don t have any faith in des a g a g russell dept a s oltp section of pals group vm id sc at ausvm email arussell austin ibm com phone tieline these are my views on anyone else they would look silly free the berkeley
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet in article apr charon gsfc nasa gov paul charon gsfc nasa gov paul olson writes in article qnav r l transfer stratus com cme ellisun sw stratus com carl ellison writes in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes further the attorney general good post describing what is in store for us deleted it s also interesting to note that two months ago rush limbaugh said that clinton would have the plumbers out in force shortly clinton and his henchmen firmly believe in strong ubiquitous government control anytime a leader believes in that the leader will use every means possible to retain that control and take more we have to take our government back otherwise we will end up living in the equivalent of a high tech third world dictatorship we have to take responsibility for ourselves our personal welfare and our actions i totally agree but how do you propose we take government back they obviously don t listen to the people or want the people to know who is responsibile for what a person telnetted the site of the clipper chip release to see what the entity clipper was and got a few lists but when another person tried a bit later the commands were disabled does not sound like an administration that wants to have any accountability or information they don t control given to the people the secret development and implimentation of the clipper chip decision further backs that up you can bet unaurhorized encryption methods and software will be considered terrorist tools and also subject to civil forfeiture along with the systems that are running it you watch see if i am wrong the government is not going to be very cooperative about the people taking it back and they have all the resources unlimited access to the media for propeganda and almost all the guns soon to be all the guns if clinton s agenda succeeds those that do not play ball waco might be a good example of what to expect the warrant just released stated the reason for the raid was the bds spent a very large sum for weapons over an undetermined amount of time i don t recall spending a lot of money on guns etc being illegal yet that is clinton might go down in history as the worst thing to ever happen to the us of a now to be known as the peoples socalist democratic republic of america psdra big brother is listening hail big brother and sister only ten years late pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security in article r f rh news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker wrote one thing that clipper offers is interoperability at a higher degree of security than we currently have in non proprietary voice encryption systems this means it will be cheaper than anyone s proprietary scheme and easier to probably cheaper than you think i ll bet some of my and yours tax dollars become a subsidy for these chips if these chips don t sell well what s to stop the us government from giving them away in the interest of national security deploy this is of course either a bug or a feature depending on how you look at it amanda walker intercon systems corporation steven p holton network administrator rtp fast northern telecom inc replies to cmsph nt com on bounce sholton aol com compuserve com opinions expressed here are my own
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method quoting strnlght netcom com david sternlight in article strnlghtc t nh is netcom com in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes so don t just think of replacements for clipper also think of front ends this only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non escrowed encryption schemes otherwise why not just use the front end without clipper because that will make private encryption stick out like a sore thumb and the government will start to take a sharp interest in everything you do o paul crowley pdc dcs ed ac uk trust me i know what i m doing x fold a fish for jesus
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sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr coop com felixg coop com felix gallo writes pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good please note that bill clinton probably has little if anything to do with the design implementation or reasoning behind this chip or behind any moves being made using this chip as a pawn uh i notice he has not either asked for or allowed public input and he damn sure has not stopped it remember when you elect a president of the united states it s not the case that all the republicans etc in the nsa and fbi and cia immediately pack their bags and get replaced by a team of fresh young democrats most of the government say is appointed or hired rather than elected since this clipper device has been in production for over six months it probably has little or no foundation in the currently elected democratic executive body again if it was something clinton didn t like how come he did not stop it or get public input before implimenting the decision he sure has asserted his authority on other things he did not agree with from the bush administrationk i notice he is the president therefore he is responsible for the actions of the execuitive branch i have not the slightest bit of doubt you would be holding bush or reagan to that standard had they been in office when this thing was cast into stone btw those who suggest that this is just an attack on clinton believe this i would be going ballistic reagardless who seriously proposed this thing it is just another step in a gradual erosion of our rights under the constitution or bill of rights the last couple of decades have been a non stop series of end runs around the protections of the constitution it has to stop now is as good a time as any if it isn t too late allready could be however the sky hasn t fallen yet chicken little thanks for the name calling that really makes your position higly credible lenin had a term for folks with your outlook do you really have that much faith in the trustworthiness and honesty of the government that is primarily concerned with people control i suspect you will be in for an unpleasant surprise i would just as soon see this nipped in the bud while if it still can be done instead of waiting for yet more abridgements of our bill of rights thank you pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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6,887 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr cs ucla edu geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes fishing expeditions without the target s knowlege don t give up the right to be safe from that that should be non negotiable and clinton and co know it which is probably why they quietly developed this thing figuring if they get it this far they can ram it on through it always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever administration is current for things they couldn t possibly have initiated this chip had to take years to develop yet already we re claiming that the clinton administration sneaked it in on us bullshit the bush administration and the career gestapo were responsible for this horror and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli that doesn t excuse clinton and gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it but let s lay the body at the proper door to start with you are so correct clinton did not initiate it he just cast it in granite by implimenting not stopping the decision i also stated in another post i don t give a damn what administration does it i still find it totally unacceptable and whoever impliments it or rams it down our throats ought to be run out of office also bush was not trying to deprive us of our second amendment rights clinton is busting his butt in that regard that reveals a total difference in philosophy clinton appears to support the idea of total people control eavesdropping whenever they feel like it no real security for the common person and no ability to defend oneself against illegal attack from whatever source trust us we will protect and control you if we don t find it inconvenient clinton has also shown his utter contempt for public disclosure and accountability as well he had plenty of time to change the policy he didn t he expanded on it i bet had bush been in office you would be in there howling louder than i pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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6,888 |
sci.crypt
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re organized lobbying for cryptography quoting jgfoot minerva cis yale edu in article r jgbinn i eli cs yale edu perhaps these encryption only types would defend the digitized porn if it was posted encrypted these issues are not as seperable as you maintain in fact since effective encryption makes censorship impossible they are almost the same issue and they certainly fall into the brief of the eff o paul crowley pdc dcs ed ac uk trust me i know what i m doing x fold a fish for jesus
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6,889 |
sci.crypt
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revised technical summary of clipper chip here is a revised version of my summary which corrects some errors and provides some additional information and explanation the clipper chip a technical summary dorothy denning revised april introduction on april the president announced a new initiative that will bring together the federal government and industry in a voluntary program to provide secure communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement at the heart of the plan is a new tamper proof encryption chip called the clipper chip together with a split key approach to escrowing keys two escrow agencies are used and the key parts from both are needed to reconstruct a key chip contents the clipper chip contains a classified single key bit block encryption algorithm called skipjack the algorithm uses bit keys compared with for the des and has rounds of scrambling compared with for the des it supports all des modes of operation the algorithm takes clock ticks and in electronic codebook ecb mode runs at mbits per second each chip includes the following components the skipjack encryption algorithm f an bit family key that is common to all chips n a bit serial number this length is subject to change u an bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip the chips are programmed by mykotronx inc which calls them the myk the silicon is supplied by vlsi technology inc they are implemented in micron technology and will initially sell for about each in quantities of or more the price should drop as the technology is shrunk to micron encrypting with the chip to see how the chip is used imagine that it is embedded in the at t telephone security device as it will be suppose i call someone and we both have such a device after pushing a button to start a secure conversation my security device will negotiate an bit session key k with the device at the other end this key negotiation takes place without the clipper chip in general any method of key exchange can be used such as the diffie hellman public key distribution method once the session key k is established the clipper chip is used to encrypt the conversation or message stream m digitized voice the telephone security device feeds k and m into the chip to produce two values e m k the encrypted message stream and e e k u n f a law enforcement field which are transmitted over the telephone line the law enforcement field thus contains the session key k encrypted under the unit key u concatenated with the serial number n all encrypted under the family key f the law enforcement field is decrypted by law enforcement after an authorized wiretap has been installed the ciphertext e m k is decrypted by the receiver s device using the session key d e m k k m chip programming and escrow all clipper chips are programmed inside a scif secure compartmented information facility which is essentially a vault the scif contains a laptop computer and equipment to program the chips about chips are programmed during a single session the scif is located at mykotronx at the beginning of a session a trusted agent from each of the two key escrow agencies enters the vault agent enters a secret random bit value s into the laptop and agent enters a secret random bit value s these random values serve as seeds to generate unit keys for a sequence of serial numbers thus the unit keys are a function of secret random bits where each agent knows only to generate the unit key for a serial number n the bit value n is first padded with a fixed bit block to produce a bit block n s and s are then used as keys to triple encrypt n producing a bit block r r e d e n s s s similarly n is padded with two other bit blocks to produce n and n and two additional bit blocks r and r are computed r e d e n s s s r e d e n s s s r r and r are then concatenated together giving bits the first bits are assigned to u and the second bits to u the rest are discarded the unit key u is the xor of u and u u and u are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow agencies as a sequence of values for u u and u are generated they are written onto three separate floppy disks the first disk contains a file for each serial number that contains the corresponding key part u the second disk is similar but contains the u values the third disk contains the unit keys u agent takes the first disk and agent takes the second disk thus each agent walks away knowing an bit seed and the bit key parts however the agent does not know the other bits used to generate the keys or the other bit key parts the third disk is used to program the chips after the chips are programmed all information is discarded from the vault and the agents leave the laptop may be destroyed for additional assurance that no information is left behind the protocol may be changed slightly so that four people are in the room instead of two the first two would provide the seeds s and s and the second two the escrow agents would take the disks back to the escrow agencies the escrow agencies have as yet to be determined but they will not be the nsa cia fbi or any other law enforcement agency one or both may be independent from the government law enforcement use when law enforcement has been authorized to tap an encrypted line they will first take the warrant to the service provider in order to get access to the communications line let us assume that the tap is in place and that they have determined that the line is encrypted with the clipper chip the law enforcement field is first decrypted with the family key f giving e k u n documentation certifying that a tap has been authorized for the party associated with serial number n is then sent e g via secure fax to each of the key escrow agents who return e g also via secure fax u and u u and u are xored together to produce the unit key u and e k u is decrypted to get the session key k finally the message stream is decrypted all this will be accomplished through a special black box decoder capstone the next generation a successor to the clipper chip called capstone by the government and myk by mykotronx has already been developed it will include the skipjack algorithm the digital signature standard dss the secure hash algorithm sha a method of key exchange a fast exponentiator and a randomizer a prototoype will be available for testing on april and the chips are expected to be ready for delivery in june or july acknowledgment and distribution notice this article is based on information provided by nsa nist fbi and mykotronx permission to distribute this document is granted
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6,890 |
sci.crypt
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re i have seen the lobby and it is us in article apr eff org a charles gross acg eff org writes certainly with our way cool internet powers of organization we can act in the same way if such action is appropriate as long as we are kept informed of events anyone on this bboard can make a call to action hopefully we re a strong enough community to act on those calls i realize this is a little optomistic and i m glad eff is working in the loop on these issues but don t underestimate the potential of the net for political action adam i speak for myself i second the motion all in favor btw a few days ago charles fee cxf psuvm psu edu posted the names addresses and phone numbers voice and fax of almost all the rd congress s members this info along witha great number of cabinet men etc i captured it as did many others i am sure we should single out a few of the people on the list and bombard them with lobbying against the clipper chip et al nate o o i hate quotations this message brought you by tell me what you know nate sammons and the number ralph waldo emerson ns longs lance colostate edu o o
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6,891 |
sci.crypt
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re why the algorithm is secret exactly but i ll add another observation if the chip does become a standard the algorithm won t remain secret leaving the government with the only remaining option to make use of un escrowed keys illegal which won t begin to bother the terrorists and child abusers the government is so fond of referring to note that the federalist papers stress one reason for the right of citizens to bear arms to defend themselves against the army our army imho the primary purpose of private crypto is defend ourselves against the government the odd terrorist i m not worried about the goverment damages my quality of life every day rob robert ullmann ariel world std com x quand maigret poussa la porte du tabac fontaine vers une heure et demie le patron du bar qui venait de se lever descendait lentement un escalier en colima on qui s amor ait dans l arri re salle arriv derri re le comptoir il repousa le gar on d un geste n gligent de la main saisit une bouteille de vin blanc un verre m langea au vin de l eau min rale et la t te renvers e en arri re se gargarisa simenon text is iso utf universal character set
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6,892 |
sci.crypt
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re estimating wiretap costs benefits in article apr kronos arc nasa gov hanson kronos arc nasa gov robin hanson writes a rough estimate suggests that wiretaps are worth about five million dollars per year to u s law enforcement agencies in u s wiretaps led to arrests while total police expenditures of billion led to million arrests ref us statistical abstracts i m working on estimating this wiretap benefit more accurately but you seem to be assuming that all arrests are of equal value and that the use of wiretaps is spread uniformly among them given this comparatively tiny number of wiretaps and the associated difficulty and cost involved judges technicians etc i expect that law enforcement reserves the use of wiretaps for the most valuable cases since the value of an arrest can vary over an enormous range eg jaywalking mass murder i think your million estimate may be too low by a couple of orders of magnitude
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6,893 |
sci.crypt
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re the secret source of that announcement in article r hgqinndaa uwm edu rick miller rick ee uwm edu writes jbotz mtholyoke edu jurgen botz writes seems like sombody didn t like your snooping around marc or the more likely explanation is that marc is spoofing while i didn t try the expansion personally i know of at least two other people who did and got the same results your allegation is incorrect at best pgp key by finger or e mail eli ebrandt jarthur claremont edu
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6,894 |
sci.crypt
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dos compression api partial answer for those of you looking for information on ms dos s file system compression api today i called microsoft s dos hotline at they told me that the dos resource kit had the specifications for the compression interface the resource kit costs plus tax and shipping i ordered a copy and will post further when i get it and know more about it i am posting now because the order turnaround is working days if anyone knows for sure where s there s a good source of info on this api please speak up i am slightly skeptical about the resource kit s likelihood of having detailed programming info mark r mrr ripem msu edu posted also to sci crypt since the api could presumably also be used for file system encryption
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6,895 |
sci.crypt
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip don t get fooled by exponents possible keys is not in the same league with particles in the universe remember avagadro s number there are about that many elementary particles not molecules in one mole pretty small universe or if you can put gigabytes on one tape you would need about trillion tapes allowing several bytes per entry still more than all of the existing magnetic media on the planet but wait a few years i m including existing audio and video cassettes in the total ten trillion is about per person worldwide gives new meaning to the suspicions of hiden messages robert i eachus with standard disclaimer use standard disclaimer function message text in clever ideas return better ideas is
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6,896 |
sci.crypt
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re the escrow database in article apr shearson com pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes each of the two escrow databases fits conveniently on a single very valuable exabyte tape this can only get easier with time but who cares i can already hold all the clipper keys in the country in my pocket on two mm tapes excellent point and there s a related point i d like to make they ll have to back up these databases themselves won t they how many tape copies will there be and how secure will the tapes be if they store them off site it wouldn t be too hard to hijack them in transit if they re all kept on site one good bomb attack by some group intent on freeing us from the threat of government snooping will take care of the problem once and for all i can see it now hi we re from the government and we um misplaced our copy of your key could you mail us a copy
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6,897 |
sci.crypt
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption could somebody provide an overview of the proposed systems using the chip ought to see if att has a spec sheet skipjack sounds like a normal digital encryption algorithm so the data path will have to be voice digitize compress encrypt compression will be necessary to fit the data on the wire unless they want to wait for isdn that we should be so lucky feeding pre encrypted data into the compressor will cause it to chuckle at you you d have to tap into the guts of the phone and hack either the compressed data stream or selected parts of the output stream before it hits the modem unless you want to pay for two fast modems on top of the encryption and just plug the box in between your phone and the wall carl pgp key by finger or e mail eli ebrandt jarthur claremont edu
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6,898 |
sci.crypt
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re the secret source of that announcement in r om c m slab mtholyoke edu jbotz mtholyoke edu jurgen botz writes even more interesting the smtp server at csrc ncsl nist gov no longer recognizes the expn and vrfy commands telnet csrc ncsl nist gov smtp trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first org sendmail nist ready at tue apr edt expn clipper command unrecognized seems like sombody didn t like your snooping around marc then it is a good thing we already have this the csspub mailing list csspab mail gw ncsl nist gov and address on the clipper mailing list seems to contain basically the members of the nist security board in addition to the names already posted their true names are as follows burrows ecf james burrows a director of nist s national computer systems laboratory mcnulty ecf f lynn mcnulty an associate director for computer security at the national institute of standards and technology s computer systems laboratory gangemi dockmaster ncsc mil gaetano gangemi is director of the secure systems program at wang laboratories inc he wrote computer security basics by deborah russell and g t gangemi sr o reilly and associates slambert cgin cto citicorp com sandra lambert is vice president of information security at citibank n a lipner mitre org lipner is mitre corp s director of information systems gallagher dockmaster ncsc mil patrick gallagher director of the national security agency s national computer security center and a security board member walker tis com stephen walker a computer security expert and president of trusted information systems inc in glenwood md willis rand org willis h ware a the rand corp executive who chairs the security board whitehurst vnet ibm com william whitehurst is a security board member and director of ibm corp s data security programs harry shapiro habs panix com list administrator of the extropy institute mailing list private communication for the extropian community since harry shapiro habs panix com list administrator of the extropy institute mailing list private communication for the extropian community since
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6,899 |
sci.crypt
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow after reading the debate over the clipper i have a few things to add first most of the people i know who activly use encryption privately do not care about most of the issues that surround this debate and any questions about what is or is not ok to use in the us all they care about is wether or not what they are using is secure or not that after all is the bottom line second if i look at all the people i know who use any form of encryption at all and this group spans people from the morons who still insist that the des is a good and secure standard to people looking at trying to improve upon existing strategies i can not think of anyone of them who would approve blindly of a strategy that leaves their methods open to abuse the clipper does this because people make mistakes by nature and the us government is made up of people who are just as vulnerable to mistakes as everyone else third since most of the people i know are at least marginaly familiar with the vulnerabilities present in current software encryption stratigies i can t see how most of them are going to blindly trust that someone will not figure out a good way to compromise the clipper chip that despite any strengths or weaknesses that may exist in it so i can not see a high degree of confidence developing in the chip fourth when it comes to criminal abuse sure there are many stupid people out there and yes some will be open to being caught via the built in back door of the clipper chip however anyone who is going to do any serious investigation of how best to secure their data is going to run into that problem pretty damned fast and i would assume start looking around for other easily obtainible methods of encryption if nothing else were avalible none of this would be an issue however the truth is that most private encryption users that i ve ever run into simply do not give a damn about the legal status of rsa or pgp or anything else if it works they use it this is not going to change either i do not think for a moment that anyone with serious criminal intent will be slowed down by the advent of the clipper chip it is all to easy to convert encrypted data into unintellgible garbage as it is if anything the clipper chip just adds another tool to the user the bottom line here is that people will use what works and unavoidibly i m sure most criminals would rather face an encryption related charge than one which could potentialy lead to death penalty charges in the case of criminals who murder as part of their conspiricy the other thing that has struck me since the advent and wide useage of public encryption has begun is that quite simply the cat is out of the bag or if you have an interest in snooping pandora s box has been opened and this is not going to change i ve seen a blindness to this that i ve found utterly stunning and the clipper chip along with the way it has been presented only confirms this to me to a larger degree sincerly tim scanlon tfs gravity gmu edu
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