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sci.crypt
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re clipper chip technical details in article apr silverton berkeley edu djb silverton berkeley edu d j bernstein writes short summary of what bellovin says hellman says the nsa says there is a global key g plus one key u c for each chip c the user can choose a new session key k p for each phone call p he makes chip c knows three keys g its own u c and the user s k p the government as a whole knows g and every u c apparently a message m is encrypted as e g e u c k p c e k p m that s it the system as described here can t possibly work what happens when someone plugs the above ciphertext into a receiving chip to get m the receiving chip needs k p to get k p the receiving chip needs u c the only information it can work with is c if u c can be computed from c then the system is cryptographically useless and the key escrow is bullshit otherwise how is a message decrypted via k p of course nothing was said about where k p comes from it s the session key though and it s chosen however you usually choose session keys exponential key exchange shared secret rsa etc but however you choose it the chip will apparently emit the escrow header when you do
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corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate staff executive in two fortune companies i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the nsa for business if they told me it was more secure than des and in particular resistant to attempts by japanese french and other competitive companies and governments to break i d be happy to do so even with escrowed keys provided i was happy about the bona fides of the escrow agencies the federal reserve would certainly satisfy me as would something set up by one of the big accounting firms i don t doubt that this will be the attitude of many corporate leaders it s understandable most corporate execs don t know much about cryptology and it s easy to get taken in by someone peddling snake oil and the proposed scheme is a major improvement in telephone security to what exists now the problem is that with any security scheme of this kind you have to concern yourself with the weakest link in the chain i suspect that nsa has put a fairly strong encryption algorithm in this wiretap chip of theirs probably at least as strong as say des in ofb mode unfortunately the existence of the key registry system seems to make possible all kinds of possible attacks at a small fraction of the expense of trying to build say a des keysearch machine as originally described it sounded like any police court combination could acquire the key for a given chip i hope that s not the case since it would imply a glaring hole how much does it cost to find one crooked jodge and one crooked cop especially for a foreign intelligence agency or organized crime boss however even if more intelligent schemes are used to allow access to the unencrypted phone conversations there will be weak nesses they may be very expensive and very difficult but who would trust his her confidential information to an encryption scheme that for say could by cracked one time in a hundred des for all the complaints about a bit key would probably cost several million dollars to build a keysearch machine for how many million dollars would the confidential phone messages of the gm headquarters be worth to nissan chrysler or audi how about home phones of major execs and important engineers and designers gee mr jones i understand you ve had some financial problems lately maybe i can help i d trust something from the nsa long before i d trust something from some swiss or anybody japanese indeed if nsa really designed the algorithm to be secure it s very likely as secure as idea or key des however the system as a whole isn t resistant to practical cryptanalysis in the puzzle palace bamford describes how several nsa employees were turned by foreign presumably kgb agents despite security measures that i doubt any big accounting firm could match and nsa confidential data was not subject to being requested by thousands of police organizations and courts across the land john kelsey c mizzou missouri edu
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re why the clipper algorithm is secret in apr iecc cambridge ma us johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes quoting someone else here the cryptographic protocol though is another matter i see no valid reasons for keeping it secret and as i hope i ve shown above there are a lot of ways to do things that aren t quite as bad it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build physically identical clone versions of the chip that would interoperate with official clipper chips but the cloner wouldn t provide the keys to the escrow houses hmmn yeah the algorithm is classified because a military contract or similar government equivalent to military has been let for this proprietary design that the feds say that nsa developed is there a patent is that patent publicly available my betting is that that too is classified if the algorithm were made public or reverse engineered it would compromise not only the goal of justice of being able to read every chip users cypto data but would reduce profits for the selected chip maker wouldn t that just be too bad danny o bedlam dfl panix com cmcl panix dfl danny lieberman po box church st station new yawk new yawk usa
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the wiretap chip clones and secure key exchange u uicvm uic edu writes the cryptographic algorythm must be kept secret or private individuals could make clipperclones with which they could transmit messages which the feds would not have ready access to not necessarily i ve been thinking about this and if this chip scheme is to provide any real security there must be some sort of key exchange either using a public key encryption scheme or using a key exchange scheme like diffie hellman if there s an out of band transmission of a shared session key then what protects that band from eavesdropping if the phone company or some other online central authority generates a session key and sends it to both users then what s the point of going to the trouble of having some complicated key depositories just ask the phone company for a copy of the session key for each call now it s probably not practical for each user to keep an online copy of every public key used by anyone anywhere right so probably there will be some way of getting these keys verified this might be a digitally signed by the chip manufacturer copy of the public key in this unit stored by this unit it might also be an online directory with access to everyone s public keys this would introduce another weakness to the security of the scheme of course presumably if you don t use your designated key you can t get a verified connection to other standard chips it might be useful to have a modified chip which would allow you to use either the original public private key pair or some other key pair and verification scheme unfortunately this would not allow you to call most people and establish secure communications john kelsey i hope somebody starts doing this soon after the first ones are released
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re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article c nmb cof news claremont edu ebrandt jarthur claremont edu eli brandt writes get their copy of your key any criminal who s going to use encryption will do it under cover of clipper the only way to avoid this will be to try to prohibit strong encryption this isn t true today s criminals regularly use all sorts of unsafe methods from cordless phones to cellular phones to plain old copper wire analog phones that you can put alligator clips on to plan and execute their crimes it is amazing how stupid they are which is why the fbi was so keen on the digital telphony law and its successor the clipper chip they re hoping here that most crooks will remain stupid feel safe using clipper chip phones and get caught brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article apr magnus acs ohio state edu jebright magnus acs ohio state edu james r ebright writes in article brad clarinet com brad templeton writes the greatest danger of the escrow database if it were kept on disk would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out you of course then it s hard to backup however i think the consequences of no backup the data is not there when a warrant comes are worse than the consequences of a secret backup if the data isn t there when the warrant comes you effectively have secure crypto if secret backups are kept then you effectively have no crypto thus this poster is essentialy arguing no crypto is better than secure crypto no the poster me has his brain in the wrong gear as you can infer from the first sentence i meant the consequences of no backup are better than the consequences of an easy to copy database brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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competing standard perhaps one way of getting away from this cripple chip that the u s government seems to be pushing would be to come up with a good alternative for example how about a scheme using rsa and some hybrid of des cfb and another strong stream cipher maybe idea cfb this could be substantially the same as the cripple chip except that instead of key registration the police could demand that you give up your secret key to them with a court issued warrant then they could read the last few months of wiretapped messages you ve sent and assuming you ve committed no crimes you could generate a new key pair and go about your business i find that i d be willing to pay rsa for the right to use such a system especially given the alternative if you were unwilling to give up your secret key then you d probably stay in jail has anyone got a real legal precedent for this this would allow court issued warrants to be used to gather information on suspected criminals but it couldn t be done in secrecy and there would be enormously less likelihood of corruption or theft of escrowed keys maybe someone from the law enforcement or intelligent community will correct me but this doesn t seem like such a big loss in terms of law enforcement capabilities any comments john kelsey
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re clipper chip technical details in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes nothing was said about where k p comes from oh hellman said each user will get to choose his or her own key that s the key which i called k p the session key according to hellman if alice and bob are communicating with the clipper chip then alice chooses her own key and bob chooses his own key this is incompatible with the suggestion that when alice and bob are talking they use a common k p chosen by classical or public key approaches the protocol key management description published so far is either incomplete or incorrect it leaves me with no idea of how the system would actually work i hope the cpsr foia request succeeds so that we get full details dan
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re fighting the clipper initiative prz sage cgd ucar edu philip zimmermann writes philip i think your ideas are well taken and constructive thanks for articulating them in this forum work the press talk with your local newspaper s science and technology reporter write to your favorite trade rags better yet write some articles yourself for your favorite magazines or newspapers explain why the clipper chip initiative is a bad idea remember to tailor it to your audience the general public may be slow to grasp why it s a bad idea since it seems so technical and arcane and innocent sounding try not to come across as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist even if you are one as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical any suggestions perhaps somebody could post a list of these mobilize opposition in industry companies that will presumably develop products that will incorporate the clipper chip should be lobbied against it from within and from without if you work for a telecommunications equipment vendor first enlist the aid of your coworkers and fellow engineers against this initiative and then present your company s management with a united front of engineering talent against this initiative write persuasive memos to your management with your name and your colleagues names on it hold meetings on it one way to do this might be to suggest that these companies should be implementing their own schemes not being limited to the govt s scheme i find that most of my reasons for opposition to the clipper scheme are algoritm insecurity and mistrust of the govt nsa these are hard to sell in letters to the editor and to nontechnical people any hints or advice maybe a small faq type thing why should i hate clipper would be a good idea james holthaus james holthaus uiowa edu government is an association of men who do violence to the rest of us leo tolstoy pgp public key available on request or from key server
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re why the clipper algorithm is secret johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes the cryptographic protocol though is another matter i see no valid reasons for keeping it secret and as i hope i ve shown above there it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build physically identical clone versions i recall seeing a post some time ago saying that if the details of an encryption scheme couldn t be revealed then the encryption scheme is worthless i believe the statement was in response to somebody saying that they had some new snazzy scheme but the algorithm was a secret does this algorithm depend on the fact that the scheme is secret or is it for the stated reasons above mike
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re fighting the clipper initiative as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical the idea that foisting the cripple chip standard on us manufacturers would result in saying sayonara to yet another high tech market isn t technical isn t in the least difficult to understand and plays on a concern lots of people are worried about already
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryp brad clarinet com brad templeton writes let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and the other is the eff and i m not entirely joking about those two names hi i m new to internet so this is a bit of a test message so even a token reply would be very appreciated anyways reading this i d figure this would be as excellent a method of corrupting the aclu and the eff as could be wished for who gaurds the guardians etc
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re automatic online encryption of data from andersom spot colorado edu marc anderson also how about a box that you plug your phone into which would allow encrypted voice communications with someone who has a similar box digitizing input speech transmitting and decrypting on the other end i don t know how a public key system could work in this regard but it might heh heh i posted this just before reading all the clinton chip messages i guess they beat me to it anyway i think it would be a great idea to develop such a product perhaps in the underground as it would otherwise probably become illegal pretty quickly here it s really very feasible and shouldn t be too expensive all that s needed is a box with a phone jack on one side a dsp in the middle to do codec functions of speech compressed bytestream and an rs on the other side you d plug your phone into it plug the rs into your computer and have a good old fashioned normal modem on your other rs port the cpu in the middle would do the encryption with a version of pgp modified to work on a byte stream with v bis or better modems to carry the bytestream it should work quality would only be marginally lower than a normal telephone at the very highest price you could use one of those voice mail compatible modems to do the digitisation that puts an upper bound of about on the cost of such a box in practice you really ought to be able to get the price well below i could do it now in software on my cheap nasty home risc box acorn archimedes with the digitising microphone i bought for pounds if i knew how to write good speech compression software which i don t the reason it won t work of course is that hardly anyone will have one the only consumer equipment to have encryption will use the wiretap chip economics i m afraid however we can get about kcps throughput on the internet even with the bottleneck of a v bis modem when we get isdn for all ha ha ha and the new nren it might then be trivial to run compressed speech over a tcp ip connection on the internet perhaps we should start thinking now of a standard to keep voice on the internet compatible for everyone and side step the clipper stuff and use internet for all our phone calls in future joking g
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re clipper chip technical details the protocol key management description published so far is either incomplete or incorrect it leaves me with no idea of how the system would actually work i hope the cpsr foia request succeeds so that we get full details wouldn t it be easier just to ask denning cs georgetown edu g
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re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip indeed if nsa really designed the algorithm to be secure it s very likely as secure as idea or key des however the system as a whole isn t resistant to practical cryptanalysis in the puzzle palace bamford describes how several nsa employees were turned by foreign presumably kgb agents despite security measures that i doubt any big accounting firm could match and nsa confidential data was not subject to being requested by thousands of police organizations and courts across the land ah yes don t anyone mention ronald william pelton heh heh heh how embarrassing g nsa kgb
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clipper proposal key length danny weitzner djw eff org writes april initial eff analysis of clinton privacy and security proposal details of the proposal escrow the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key the manufacturer of the communications device would be required to register all keys with the two independent escrow agents a key is tied to the device however not the person using it so if we subvert one of the two escrow agents we only have a bit space to search through doesn t sound that big is digital telephony subject to a known plaintext attack in which case half the key seems to be all that is needed and the two agent escrow arrangement is pointless of course the unknown algorithm might turn gaps in speech into pseudo random sequences or there might be some magic involved or mike bell promis com
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles robert l ward
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off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article bb c mizzou missouri edu c mizzou missouri edu john kelsey writes strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes stuff deleted existence of the key registry system seems to make possible all kinds of possible attacks at a small fraction of the expense of trying to build say a des keysearch machine as originally described it sounded like any police court combination could acquire the key for a given chip i hope that s not the case since it would imply a glaring hole how much does it cost to find one crooked jodge and one crooked cop especially for a foreign intelligence agency or organized crime boss however even if more intelligent schemes are used to allow access to the unencrypted phone conversations there will be weak nesses they may be very expensive and very difficult but who would trust his her confidential information to an encryption scheme that for say could by cracked one time in a hundred des for all the complaints about a bit key would probably cost several million dollars to build a keysearch machine for i can buy a des keysearch machine off the shelf now for approx k but it is not sold by that name go buy a circuit emulation machine eg quickturn containing a bunch of fpgas say to s and program each to be a des search engine lets say chips running at mhz g tests sec time is e sec max weeks weeks average can t wait that long buy a bigger machine david lewis
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re once tapped your code is no good any amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes not to pick on mr may in particular of course but isn t this kind of the domino theory when one little country falls its neighbor will surely follow and before you know it we re all mining salt in siberia for not turning in our captain crunch secret decoder rings there was an interesting column on the editorial page of the dallas morning news on saturday by walter williams who i believe is a professor at georgetown i wonder if he knows of dorothy you re not in kansas anymore denning the article was titled government slowly eroding our liberties and in it he tells a story attributed to the late leonard read who explained that if you wanted to take liberty away from americans you had to know how to cook a frog mr read said you can t cook a frog by boiling a pot of water and then throwing the frog in his reflexes are so quick that as soon as his feet touch the water he will leap away you must put the frog in a pot of cold water and heat it up bit by bit by the time the frog realizes he s being cooked it is too late it is the same with americans if anyone tried to take our freedoms all at once we would naturally rebel and suppress the tyrant but as with successful frog cooking our liberties can be taken a little bit at a time the last line of the article says it s not too late for us but the water is getting pretty warm i d have toagree that it s warm and the clipper is keeping the temperature on an upward course note followups redirected to alt privacy clipper jim jdailey asic sc ti com ti pays absolutely no attention to me or my opinions therefore the foregoing information cannot possibly represent ti s viewpoint
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr clarinet com brad clarinet com brad templeton writes let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and the other is the eff and i m not entirely joking about those two names in that case the prince of wales has nothing to worry about on this system i must respectfully disagree with this assertion brad the government is notoriously sloppy with physical communications and information security they can t keep their computers safe and they re trying read dea is not adequately protecting national security information gao imtec for an excellent example of what i m talking about private sector organizations tend to be even more lax in their security measures i believe that the escrow organizations will be penetrated by foreign intelligence services within months if not weeks of their selection private organizations that lack the resources of a full fleged intelligence service will take longer perhaps on the order of one to two years nonetheless the penetrations will take place without question philip r moyer ecn software staff engineering computer network voice prm ecn purdue edu fax
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re an open letter to mr clinton strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary as usually you are not reading the proposal does say that it is a voluntary program this doesn t make it more desirable though that is you get high quality secure nsa classified technology if you agree to escrow your key otherwise you are on your own secure how do you know because nsa is trying to make you believe it trust us yeah right otherwise you are on your own how do you know that tomorrow they will not outlaw encrypring devices that don t use their technology because they are promising you gee they are not doing even that read the proposal again regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re once tapped your code is no good any more strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it is incompetent like almost anything you have posted here so you ll be flamed sorry it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate staff executive in two fortune companies your years of background in two fortune companies i ve lived years under a totalitarian regime and boy i can recognize a totalitarian plot when i see one i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the nsa for business if they told me it was more secure than des and in particular resistant to i am sure that you would be happy to use anything they tell you is secure we re talking about the intelligent people here or the criminal ones if you don t like the previous sentence or those who don t want their privacy to be guaranteed to be invadable by the government any current and future government mind you i d be happy to do so even with escrowed keys provided i was happy about the bona fides of the escrow agencies the federal reserve would certainly satisfy me as would something set up by one of the big accounting firms even if you ignore the nonsense of the above statement for a moment and even if you are happy with such system and the current escrow agencies now what guarantees that you ll be happy with them tomorrow when the government changes or when the current government throws away the sheep skin all the sheep who are reasoning like you will get caught by surprise but it will be too late because then cryptography that is not guaranteed to be breakable by the government will already have been outlawed after all you ve already got privacy that is said to be breakable only by the law enforcement agencies so if you are law abiding you have no reasons to use a stronger one right so if you are using a stronger one you have something to hide from the law enforcement agencies right something unlawful right therefore strong crypto is a clear idndication that you are doing something unlawful i d trust the nsa or the president if they stated there were no trap considering the level of competence in cryptology that you have demonstrated in your messages you would trust just anything and no this is not an ad hominem attack it s an attack against the contents of your messages grin doors i d be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure and how do you know that these experts are not corrupted and how do you know that they will not make a mistake and how do you know that the version of the algorithm they will be let to examine is the same as the one that will be really used regarding the mistake even the few information they have let out has revealed a serious security hole in the protocol the bit key is split in two bit ones thus the whole system is easily breakable if you have only one of the keys i d trust something from the nsa long before i d trust something from some swiss or anybody japanese the swiss or the japanese are motivated by simple greed nsa is motivated by their wish to control the people that s why the drug dealers have their accounts in swiss banks instead of in american ones for some reason they do trust the swiss banks more guess they ll trust the swiss encryption more too i see idea becoming suddenly popular this may seem surprising to some here but i suggest most corporations would feel the same way most many some pick one corporations have an attitude that the nsa is part of our government and we support our government as one very famous ceo put it to me one day it s not surprising at all but not because of the reason you give it s because it is obvious that the us government has put a lot of money behind this program and it will support it thus most corporations will try to get their piece from the pie by supporting it too the same good old greed strong encryption is not widely available now not because of some plot but because the companies don t see much money in it it will be available even less if the companies can see any penalties associated with it just some perspective from another point of view yeah just as i predicted you are here again to support the new system regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me nathaniel sammons ns lance colostate edu wrote on mon apr gmt if the gov establishes a cryptography standard that has to be used by everyone and everyone s personal key is divided into two segments and stored at two separate albeit easy to find places and that key is only bits to begin with we are screwed pardon the allusion to the affore mentioned article the gov i believe as do many others probably already have the cracking chips for this clipper chip made hell they probably based the encoder on the chip that cracks it that way it s easier to break the code but since it is a classified algorythm no one knows that they can crack it so easily agreed no agency such as the nsa or whoever would approve the public release of a crypto system if they didn t already have the technical means or the know how to decrypt everything at their whim surely the whole point of all this madness is to make joe public think that his her communications will be kept safe while james bond at the nsa can if need be have full decrypted access to someone s communications that ll be quite a heist if they can pull it off i thought that the us government were going to release the algorithm to a panel of carefully chosen experts who would then study it deeply and report their findings exactly who will these people be academics or government sponsored researchers tiny toons i for one and quite scared of this kind of thing and plan to support organizations and even disorganizations who are fighting against this clipper chip in any way that i can i can only hope that the same sort of thing doesn t start filtering over into the ears of the uk government and if the european parliament gets wind of it well we can kiss goodbye to any form of democracy in europe at all i do not want the government to be able to have access even with a search warrant to my keys and i don t want those keys to be only bits long to begin with hallelujah rick m tait bell northern research europe tel fax network management systems pgp public key available on request new southgate london uk email ricktait bnr co uk rt cix compulink co uk ricktait bnr ca
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes though some may argue about the nose of the camel it s worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony if it is only used for that purpose and does not extend to electronic mail or file as usual david sternlight is demonstrating his inability to read the proposal clearly states the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links it speaks about telecommunications in general read it again david maybe you ll understand it the next time nah probably not encryption then it is an improvement over the current mass produced standard civilian technology which with a few exceptions is limited to easy to break inverters that s exactly what the government wants all sheep minded people to think let s look at the current situation it allows to almost anybody to eavesdrop almost everybody unless secure and i mean secure encryption is used what will happen when if ha optimists the new proposal gets accepted almost nobody except some will be able to eavesdrop everybody else but the ability of these some to eavesdrop will be guaranteed the proposal emphasizes on the former almost nobody which is clearly an improvement and forgets to mention the drawbacks of the latter guaranteed yes my statement assumes that the next step will be to make the strong crypto unlawful you think that it will not happen good luck note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap it s not just continued ability it s guaranteed ability before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for e mail and files let s focus on this yeah that s exactly what your government wants you to think let s take small steps one at a time concentrate on the current one don t think about the future trust us one question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is limited to telephony or if the government intends to expand it it s not asked because the proposal clearly says that this is the intention they unlike you read what they write though i share many of the concerns expressed by some i find the proposal less threatening than many others since right now most americans have no secure telephony and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a goat can eavesdrop this would also plug up the security hole in cellular and cordless phones yes it will it will stop the jerk who is eavesdropping now it will allow only to the government to eavesdrop if the scheme is secure of course which is yet to be proven but how do you know that the jerk you are fearing now will not get a government job tomorrow the new proposal guarantees him the ability to eavesdrop then hell that will even motivate him to get that job if he indeed is that mentally pervert reading between the lines i infer that the system is highly secure without access to the keys great the greatest cryptographer of all times david sternlight tm has succeeded to evaluate the new system in the absense of any details whatsoever and has concluded that it is highly secure i guess that comes from the background of working some years for the two major crypto evaluating companies right gee now the government can save all that money and trouble to ask a secret council of crypto experts to secretly analyse the new secret method for david sternlight has already done all the job for them this would meet the needs of u s businesses confronted by rich and powerful adversaries including french and japanese security services and rich japanese companies it allows the nsa to make available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs trust us we re from the government and we re here to help you most legitimate u s corporations trust the nsa and would be delighted to have a high security system certified by them even at the price of depositing keys in escrow i see no difficulty in creating a reliable those who are prepared to trade their liberties for the promises of future safety do not deserve either this or something like that i don t have the exact quote but the meaning is the same has been said by one of your great men maybe you should study their works more carefully if you have the brains to understand them of course from my point of view this is a fair starting point there are concerns that need to be addressed including the reliability of the escrows but in the main question is to guarantee to availability of really secure cryptography to the masses gee if the proposal was saying we guarantee that every american will still have the full right to use any kind of encryption s he would like and regard this proposal as just a default voluntary implementation there would have been much less opposition for some reason they didn t even try to promise you that i wonder why was orwell off only by years return we get access to high security crypto no in return you get crypto that is guaranteed to be crippled many have suggested that des and other systems may be breakable by the nsa and hence others similarly skilled and endowed while the above is just rumors and while even if it is true it is not done easily the new scheme can is guaranteed to be easily breakable by anybody who has the two keys it might be also breakable by somebody who does not have them but knows the right trick or who has only one of them nsa also told you that des is secure why don t you simply trust them huh there is at least a good possibility which should be checked that the proposed system is not so breakable it doesn t have to it is guaranteed to be easily breakable just get the keys it might be even easier but until there is some evidence this is just a wild speculation be nor does it have to have trapdoors if the government can get the keys the trapdoors are there in government s hands the keys pursuant to a legitimate court order thus they can protect legitimate communications against economic adversaries while still being able to eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order legitimate and who decides what communications are legitimate oh i guess it s the government right the guys who already have the keys it s kinda if i have the keys from your car and i am asked to decide who has the right to use it legitimately in discussing this let s try to avoid the nastiness personal attacks and noise of some previous threads impossible since you are demonstrating the same level of incompetence and ignorance as in the provious threads this is a substantive and technical issue and personal remarks have no place in such a discussion unfortunately i have yet to see you posting a technically competent message regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes nothing i m doing would be of the slightest interest to president nixon a typical example of seep minded thinking we all know that david sternlight is a jerk but i m afraid that in this case of the population will think like him realize it guys nsa dorothy denning and the us government have already won the battle unless unless you succeed to wake up the people but nah that s too unlikely the events are happening too fast cryptography is a too sophisticated issue and almost nobody cares anyway a few thousand of net readers won t make the difference if millions are caught asleep too sad regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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more technical details here are some corrections and additions to hellman s note courtesy of dorothy denning again this is reposted with permission two requests first note the roles of s and s it appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key and the nature of the generation process for k and k is such that neither can be produced alone thus the scheme cannot be implemented such that one repository generates the first half key and another generates the second that is ominous second these postings are not revealed scripture nor are they carefully crafted spook postings don t attempt to draw out hidden meanings as opposed to say the official announcements of clipper leave denning out of this given hellman s record of opposition to des which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read i don t think you can impugn his integrity oh yeah the folks who invented clipper aren t stupid if you think something doesn t make sense it s almost certainly because you don t understand their goals steve bellovin date sun apr edt from denning cs georgetown edu dorothy denning subject re clipper chip to a long list of folks i was also briefed by the nsa and fbi so let me add a few comments to marty s message the clipper chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in the algorithm operates on bit blocks like des and the chip supports all des modes of operation the algorithm uses rounds of scrambling compared with in des in addition to the system key each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired call this key plain old k when a message is to be sent it will first be k is the session key shared by the sender and receiver any method e g public key can be used to establish the session key in the at t telephone security devices which will have the new chip the key is negotiated using a public key protocol encrypted under k then k will be encrypted under the unit key uk and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key sk producing e e m k e k uk serial number sk my understanding is that e m k is not encrypted under sk called the family key and that the decrypt key corresponding to sk is held by law enforcement does anyone have first hand knowledge on this i will also check it out but this is am sunday so i did not want to wait the unit key will be generated as the xor of two bit random numbers k and k uk k k which will be kept by the two escrow the unit key also called the chip key is generated from the serial number n as follows let n n and n be bit blocks derived from n and let s and s be two bit seeds used as keys compute the bit block r e d e n s s s note that this is like using the des in triple encryption mode with two keys similarly compute blocks r and r starting with n and n i m unlear about whether the keys s and s change the fact that they re called seeds suggests they might then r r and r are concatenated together giving bits the first bits form k and the next bits form k the remaining bits are discarded authorities who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the attorney general but it was stressed to me that they will not be nsa or law enforcement agencies that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased marty is right on this and the fbi has asked me for suggestions please pass them to me along with your reasons in addition to marty s criteria i would add that the agencies must have an established record of being able to safeguard highly sensitive information some suggestions i ve received so far include sri rand mitre the national labs sandia lanl los alamos treasury gao when a court order obtains k and k and thence k the law enforcement agency will use sk to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link aside it is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links with or without a court order since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow my understanding is that there will be only one decode box and that it will be operated by the fbi the service provider will isolate the communications stream and pass it to the fbi where it will pass through the decode box which will have been keyed with k for the wiretap authorizations when levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over blank signed forms every time levi did not comply and changed the system but the lesson is clear no single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps no single person does at least for fbi taps after completing a mound of paperwork an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain that includes fbi legal counsel before the request is even taken to the attorney general for final approval dorothy denning
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re wh proposal from police point of view strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the effects of the clipper chip on state and local police actually reading between the lines it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one respect since it will at least prevent cowboy cops and cowboy state and local agancies from reading your traffic if they tap it illegally instead of reading between the lines try to think a little bit ok if that s way too difficult to you here are some hints indeed the new proposal imposes some additional burocratic burden on the local police if they badly want to tape the magic cookie recipie that your mom is telling you on the phone so guess what they will do propose that the new technology is removed or implement some facilitations of course you won t want to wait until they get the approval from two different agencies to decrypt the conversation between two child molesters because meanwhile those two child molesters might be conspiring about molesting your child right so there should be some way for them to get access to those keys quickly right like they could have a copy of the database and worry about a warrant later regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re powerful similarity too i ve been asked to supply more specific directions for automated fetching of the source and documentation for agrep the powerful similarity pattern matching tool it is at cs arizona edu in directory agrep readme agrep agrep tar z agrep agrep ps z agrep agrep ps z the ps suffixed files are the optional postscript docs a reasonably good research report with benchmarks is included note for macintosh mpw users after a few hours of drudgery i ported the tool to mpw running under system if you would like me to e mail a binhexed copy of the tool suitable for dropping in to your mpw tools folder please write other than the more purely cryptographic uses for the tool i ve been having lots of fun picking up the lost references to things i m interested in for example starting a search like agrep i burning chrome cyberpunkspool immediately finds references like burning crome that i have always missed before see how many times john gilmore s name is mentioned in the cud archives and how often misspelled how about your name as usual i will e mail the uuencoded tar z upon request if you cannot do anonymous ftp grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption misinterpretation though it should be a crime in itself is what united states lawyers use to make their bread and butter in manchester ct a few years ago a small company wanted to run a game system galled lasergames similar in many aspects to photon tm three lawyers and about a hundred citizens found an ancient law in manchester s books which clearly from context was designed to prohibit travelling carnivals by enumerating the features of a carnival which they felt at the time made the prohibition obvious among these things was shooting galleries which is what the lawyers for the opposition to lasergames wanted to harp upon the judge took the two words from this law completely out of context and ruled that lasergames could not operate in manchester keep in mind that most travelling carnivals use projectile weapons in their shooting galleries and not light beams clearly from context lasergames got shafted but if the two words are applied their denial of operating permission was justified if i had the text of the law i d post it but i m afraid i don t remember it all well enough to even try that little bit with the two words stuck well though john dormer jad expert cc purdue edu
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report on privacy protecting off line cash available i recently published a new privacy protecting off line electronic cash system as a technical report at cwi being a phd student at david chaum s cryptography group our group has a long history in research in the field of privacy protecting cash systems the report is called cs r ps z contains pages and can be retrieved from ftp cwi nl from the directory pub cwireports aa the postscript file is suitable for dpi laserprinters abstract from coverpage we present a new off line electronic cash system based on a problem called the representation problem of which little use has been made in literature thus far our system is the first to be based entirely on discrete logarithms using the representation problem as a basic concept some techniques are introduced that enable us to construct protocols for withdrawal and payment that do not use the cut and choose methodology of earlier systems as a consequence our cash system is much more efficient in both computation and communication complexity than any such system proposed previously another important aspect of our system concerns its provability contrary to previously proposed systems its correctness can be mathematically proven to a very great extent specifically if we make one plausible assumption concerning a single hash function the ability to break the system seems to imply that one can break the diffie hellman problem our system offers a number of extensions that are hard to achieve in previously known systems in our opinion the most interesting of these is that the entire cash system including all the extensions can be incorporated in a setting based on wallets with observers which has the important advantage that double spending can be prevented in the first place rather than detecting the identity of a double spender after the fact in particular it can be incorporated even under the most stringent requirements conceivable about the privacy of the user which seems to be impossible to do with previously proposed systems another benefit of our system is that framing attempts by a bank have negligible probability of success independent of computing power by a simple mechanism from within the system which is something that previous solutions lack entirely furthermore the basic cash system can be extended to checks multi show cash and divisibility while retaining its computational efficiency cryptographers are challenged to try to break this system i made a particular effort to keep the report as self contained as possible nevertheless if you have any questions please e mail to me and i will try to reply as good as i can any comments are also welcome stefan brands cwi kruislaan sj amsterdam the netherlands tel e mail brands cwi nl
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re the source of that announcement in marc apr oliver mit edu marc mit edu marc horowitz n nzu writes i received mail from mitch kapor saying that he did not ask to be on the list and does not know why he was added i m sure the same applies to others on the list so i guess my initial theory was right that the clipper list was just someone s idea of a bad joke i guess i should be happy it wasn t a conspiracy i have also been in contact with mitch about this i believe him when he says he didn t ask to be on the clipper list he also forwarded the traffic he had recieved through that list to me which will be placed at some ftp site however the first alias on the clipper list was csspab which was another mailing list it basically contained the addresses for staffers and board members of the nist security board several of these people had their accounts within the dockmaster domain these are the people we might wish to foia harry harry shapiro habs panix com list administrator of the extropy institute mailing list private communication for the extropian community since
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re once tapped your code is no good any more uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes i wish i could agree with you ask yourself this why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was known to be at least partially compromised a to use for sensitive but not strategically important traffic b if the system was cheap for example i don t own a cordless phone with clipper i would if the local men in blue really want to listen to me talk to my friends or order pizza i m no worse off than i am now and i don t have to worry about local kids or nosy neighbors that is to say clipper raises the bar on insecure channels it doesn t make them secure by any means but a wall even if the fbi can get a master key by court order is still better than a keep off the grass sign the answer seems obvious to me they wouldn t there is other hardware out there not compromised des as an example triple des as a better one so where can i buy a des encrypted cellular phone how much does it cost personally cylink stuff is out of my budget for personal use how can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making the clipper system the only crypto available in the u s the second and fourth amendments do come to mind amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context yes btw the appropriate amendments were posted here some time ago if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individual to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles it s ok it s ok just a month ago i expressed my belief that the right to have a means to shoot your neighbor is not that much necessary to ensure a people s right to be free and got flamed by lots of american gun supporters so i thought that never mind the new cripple chip is a purely american problem so deal with the mess yourselves i just wanted to share with you a bit of my experience of living years under a totalitarian regime i m bulgarian because i thought that it might be useful to you oh well regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re why the clipper algorithm is secret in article apr iecc cambridge ma us johnl iecc cambridge ma us john r levine writes it just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret if it were published one could then build physically identical clone versions of the chip that would interoperate with official clipper chips but the cloner wouldn t provide the keys to the escrow houses hmmn not necessarily they could release the details of the algorithm without releasing the system key called sk by hellman that would make most people happy and with some sort of verification procedure before key exchange the official chips would only work with other official chips in other words secrecy of sk makes physically identical clone versions impossible secrecy of the algorithm shouldn t be necessary of course revealing the algorithm opens them up to attacks on sk since all units share this key compromising it may be a big deal personally i wouldn t feel too comfortable knowing that one secret bit number held in many places was all that guaranteed my security of course compromise of sk doesn t necessarily mean that the system is compromised but it s impossible to tell whether or not that s true with a secret algorithm incidentally what s to keep a secret algorithm from using the secret sk as the main key with uk being only marginally important then a court order for uk may not even be necessary to do a wiretap steve tate srt cs duke edu the reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem dept of computer science above all other sciences is that its laws are duke university absolutely certain and indisputable while those of all durham nc other sciences are to some extent debatable einstein
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help me please i am a phd student can i get the sci crypt group posted directly to me also i would like some feed back on the encryption schemes that my research in finite fields can be applied to any takers reply to gamv udcf gla ac uk thanks yours gavin
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes i m a political dissident i m scared shitless of the feds listening in on my calls my opinions are the sort that would get me disappeared in a slightly less free society and who knows what sort of society we will be in in five or ten years i have friends who have had their phones tapped none of this is theoretical to me i understand believe it or not and there are any number of kinds of conversation and communication i engage in that i wouldn t even consider using this scheme for on the other hand i don t see clipper as providing a secure channel it just prevents casual eavesdropping this is part of why i am not worried about it per se trying to look at clipper as a serious security tool is simply ludicrous it s a voice scrambler nothing more there is still plenty of market for real crypto as for its better than the status quo well first of all you can get a cryptophone from companies like cylink today and they work well they cost an arm and a leg though clipper is obviously aimed at the mass market it certainly won t put cylink out of business in addition a number of groups are now working on building software to turn any pc into a privacy enhanced phone right now and they are all working in overdrive mode this is old news i can do this now there are no crypto restrictions yet you can use anything you want right now the point is to maintain that right there are restrictions example we re a networking software vendor with a large overseas share of our market we cannot currently ship pem or even simple des in our products without case by case approval from the department of state itar presents a material trade barrier to us firms trying to compete in international information systems markets sure you can use whatever freebie software you want to talk over bbs s in the usa i on the other hand want strong crypto pkcs for example to be the default for electronic mail worldwide i want priests to be able to hear confession over email i want lawyers to be able to talk to clients in confidence over email or doctors talk with patients i want to be able to order products from my favorite japanese mail order catalog over the net i want to be able to sign contracts transact business and so on electronically this is so far infeasible as a result of the current restrictions on crytographic systems especially beyond the borders of the usa clipper is irrelevant and if it distracts the authorities into feeling safe all the better its only danger is if it emboldens them into trying to put more restrictions into place on the theory that it is good enough for anyone who has nothing to hide that argument is of course utter bs just as much as no one needs an assault rifle amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles false as federal courts have affirmed on many occasions this is getting out of sci crypt territory though amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re fifth amendment and passwords i am postive someone will correct me if i am wrong but doesn t the fifth also cover not being forced to do actions that are self incriminating from mike godwin mnemonic eff org posted with permission carl sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests i am sure that mike is correct on this point i am also pretty sure that administering truth serum would be ruled a violation of your right not to incriminate yourself but what is the salient difference both drawing blood and injecting truth serum incapacitate you for a while but do no permanent damage is it simply that we have come to view one as acceptable while the other is viewed as a fundamental violation of one s rights if this is the case how do we expand the protections of the th amendment to incorporate new technologies without the results being a hodgepodge of different judges personal opinions rob stampfli rob colnet cmhnet org the neat thing about standards ham radio kd wk n jyv oh there are so many to choose from
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes yes those evil guys in the fbi can probably with some effort abuse the system i got news for you if the evil guys in the fbi decide they want to persecute you they re gonna and you re gonna hate it fact is the fbi doesn t want to listen to your phone calls and if they do and if you re using triple des they ll just get a parabolic microphone and point it at your head just because they can do it anyway somehow does not mean it is smart to make the job easier for them on the first day after christmas my truelove served to me leftover turkey on the second day after christmas my truelove served to me turkey casserole that she made from leftover turkey days deleted flaming turkey wings pizza hut commercial and m tlu a gic bait ken arromdee arromdee jyusenkyou cs jhu edu
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suggestions for escrow agencies was re more technical details below is my response to dr denning s letter to steven bellovin comments are invited paul in alt privacy clipper steve bellovin posted your message to him which included a brief passage concerning selection of agencies as escrow agencies i am glad to see that the proposal as written states that the escrow agencies won t be law enforcement agencies i would argue however that one of the escrow agencies shouldn t be federal at all as a private citizen i would feel much more secure in my person and papers knowing that an organization committed to individual civil liberties the aclu and the nra come to mind was safeguarding half of my key both the aclu and the nra are resistent to government pressure by the simple expedient fact that they are not supported funded or overtly controlled by the government of those federal and federally funded candidate agencies that you mentioned i have the following comments sri rand mitre and national labs i agree that they have great experience safeguarding sensitive information i am not convinced that they would adequately safeguard this information since in any case requiring disclosure there s likely to be sigificant pressure for disclosure possibly wrongful disclosure gao perhaps i would like to see more concrete evidence of their fidelity and ability treasury surely you re joking perhaps you d ask batf to safeguard keys maybe the federal reserve would be a better choice ever since last fall s trial balloon was posted in sci crypt your name has been synonymous with those who place a great deal of trust in the ability of government agencies and agents to act within the law i agree with you in part those agencies and agents almost always act properly however there have been enough cases where sworn agents of the federal government have acted wrongly to make me feel that having two federal agencies as key repositories is unacceptable respectfully paul robichaux not speaking for nti bcss or nasa paul robichaux kd jzg help stop the big brother chip nti mission software development div ripem key on request
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption you re drifting off topic in any case if you check on any of the topics devoted to gun rights issues you will find ample evidence that the misinformation is your assertion that the term the people in the second amendment has mysteriously taken on a meaning diametrically opposite the meaning of the exact same term in the first and fourth amendments
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re more technical details in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes here are some corrections and additions to hellman s note courtesy of dorothy denning again this is reposted with permission two requests first note the roles of s and s it appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key and the nature of the generation process for k and k is such that neither can be produced alone thus the scheme cannot be implemented such that one repository generates the first half key and another generates the second that is ominous second these postings are not revealed scripture nor are they carefully crafted spook postings don t attempt to draw out hidden meanings as opposed to say the official announcements of clipper leave denning out of this given hellman s record of opposition to des which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read i don t think you can impugn his integrity oh yeah the folks who invented clipper aren t stupid if you think something doesn t make sense it s almost certainly because you don t understand their goals this is an addition posted with permission to some tech details of cliper they enligthen the use of s and s for keygeneration date mon apr edt from denning cs cosc georgetown edu dorothy denning subject re clipper chip i just had another conversation with nsa to clarify some of the features of clipper please feel free to distribute this and my other messages on clipper the name of the encryption algorithm is skipjack martin hellman had written and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key sk producing e e m k e k uk serial number sk to which i responded my understanding is that e m k is not encrypted under sk called the family key and that the decrypt key corresponding to sk is held by law enforcement does anyone have first hand knowledge on this i was correct in that e m k is not encrypted under sk however skipjack being a single key system there is of course not a separate decrypt key for the family key sk the unit key also called the chip key is generated from the serial number n as follows let n n and n be bit blocks derived from n and let s and s be two bit seeds used as keys compute the bit block r e d e n s s s note that this is like using the des in triple encryption mode with two keys similarly compute blocks r and r starting with n and n i m unlear about whether the keys s and s change the fact that they re called seeds suggests they might then r r and r are concatenated together giving bits the first bits form k and the next bits form k the remaining bits are discarded the seeds s and s do not change the whole process is performed on a laptop computer and s and s are supplied by two independent people so that no one person knows both the same s and s are used during an entire programming session to generate keys for a stream of serial numbers everything is discarded at the end the computer could be thrown out if desired the serial number is bits and the values n n and n are formed by padding the serial number with fixed bit blocks separate padding for each value the resulting keys k and k are output onto separate floppy disks paired up with their serial number each pair is stored in a separate file the floppy disks are taken away by two separate people on behalf of the two escrow agencies dorothy denning denning cs georgetown edu i am sure more technical detail will be known when time goes by please remark that in posting this i do not automatically agree with it s contents and implications so don t swamp my mailbox i just think this is an valuable addition to the less than technical discussion that is rising here and no i don t mind if you call s and s backdoor as i could imagine the key generation process working without these seeds and the dependency of k k from the serial number friendly greetings germano caronni instruments register only through things they re designed to register space still contains infinite unknowns pgp key id germano caronni caronni nessie cs id ethz ch fd ccf f da ea c dd f
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re once tapped your code is no good any more amanda walker amanda intercon com wrote uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes deletions how can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making the clipper system the only crypto available in the u s the second and fourth amendments do come to mind i think i heard someplace misc legal comp org eff talk that the courts have pretty much eliminated the fourth amendment already allen well sf ca us words got me the wound ethridge bnr ca and will get me well my opinions are my own if you believe it jim morrison
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i take it you mean president nixon not private citizen nixon sure nothing i m doing would be of the slightest interest to president nixon are you sure you aren t being watched let me remind you that watergate was only the tip of the iceberg nixon extensively used the nsa to watch people because he didn t like them according to decrypting the puzzle palace presumably the nsa is restricted from conducting american surveillance by both the foreign intelligence surveillance act of fisa and a series of presidential directives beginning with one issued by president ford following richard nixon s bold misuse of the nsa in which he explicitly directed the nsa to conduct widespread domestic surveillance of political dissidents and drug users of course just because there are laws saying the gov t is not supposed to conduct illegal surveillance doesn t mean those laws can t be broken when they are in the way doug holland
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re what is going on in article gthomas sfu ca gthomas fraser sfu ca guy thomas writes zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes in article apr cc curtin edu au zrepachol cc curtin edu au paul repacholi writes if you can t be bothered reading get the video manufacturing consent in reply to mail queries i don t know if a video is available yet i asked about a month ao and was told rsn yes it is from the national film board of canada ah not in the usa thats a relief thought reality must be slipping for a second st noam was on the radio tonight he has just published a new book years published by south end i guess could some bostonian confirm please i would love to hear what he thinks of the clipper scam paul ps the first posting i saw i thought was a joke in very bad taste my appologies to the person who broke the news
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i take it you mean president nixon not private citizen nixon sure nothing i m doing would be of the slightest interest to president nixon david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted ergo if your life is sufficiently boring you have no need for privacy this is not meant to be personal just the logical conclusion of your statement tim cuffel finger for pgp the cia has admitted that the assassination of saddam hussien was one of their goals they failed of course seems as though that motorcade through downtown dallas trick only works once
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr colnet cmhnet org res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests i am sure that mike is correct on this point i am also pretty sure that administering truth serum would be ruled a violation of your right not to incriminate yourself but what is the salient difference you can find the salient difference in any number of th amendment related supreme court opinions the court limits th amendment protections to what they call testimonial evidence as opposed to physical evidence the whole question would hinge on whether a crypto key would be considered testimonial evidence i suppose arguments could be made either way though obviously i would hope it would be considered testimonial phil
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re more technical details in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni actually dorothy denning writes the seeds s and s do not change let me see if i have this straight if a person knows s and s and the serial number of the unit it s easy to reconstruct uk of course if they know sk the family key they can easily get the serial number of any unit that has made a transmission so with s and s being used for a while batch of the unit keys the number of used s s pairs will probably be fairly low of course you have to believe that the nsa fbi name your favorite government agency will know sk so all it needs is the s s pairs and presto nasty details like court orders for wire taps are no longer necessary now i m not one of the people who distrusts the government at every turn but taking someone s word for it that the s s pairs are not kept around is pushing what i m willing to believe just a little bit too far steve tate srt cs duke edu the reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem dept of computer science above all other sciences is that its laws are duke university absolutely certain and indisputable while those of all durham nc other sciences are to some extent debatable einstein
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re key registering bodies if we do not trust the nsa to be a registrar of clipper chip key halves i would not trust mitre either mitre does lots of work for nsa at least in the trusted product evaluation program evaluation of commercial off the shelf software for its efficacy in safeguarding classified information and i assume in other less open programs there are at least two other ffrdcs federally funded research and development corporations that work for nsa aerospace corporation and the institute for defense analysis now if nsa were to be untrustworthy a position that i am neutral about for purposes of this posting it would be in a position to exert economic pressure upon mitre to release key halves on demand it could just say if you don t cooperate with us we ll place all our evaluation contracts with aerospace and ida i am not saying that people at nsa mitre aerospace or ida are dishonest folk but since they are people and people occasionally go bad the system works better if organizations that you are depending upon to be independent really are and of course i speak for myself not my employer lynn grant
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re wh proposal from police point of view in article strnlghtc puor netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes there has been extensive discussion in the eff forum for example about inadmissible taps being used to develop information that could then lead to admissible evidence this might put a stop to such things which must from time to time be simple fishing expeditions far more likely these things will continue to be done no matter what assurances we are given key escrow is likely going to prove to be a joke perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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re more technical details hmm followup on my own posting well who cares first let me try to work out the facts that we get to know about the clipper chip from what hellman and denning were able to tell us the chip itself is not confined to digital telephony but performs general encryption in a symmetric manner the chip supports cfb ofb ecb and whatever the fourth mode of operation for des is the algorithm consists of rounds of whatever and takes bit keys input data seems to be bit yes so if two people want secure communication whatever that means when clipper is involved they have first to agree on one secret key or is it one key per direction they can exchange this key via dh schemes or however somehow the two feed their so won secret key into the clipper chip which is now ready to work the clipper chip carries an unique serial number bit s and key bits these key bits seem to have been gained by encrypting the serial number with seed bits the seed bits seem not to be stored in the chip at beginning of communication and perhaps at certain invtervals whithin before sending the fist real bit output of the first encryption the clipper chip put s out packets i guess which represent the serial number and the session key this might look like x e k chipkeyk k serial number where x is a transformation of these packets involving a family key this family sp key is equal for all chips x might be a simple xor after that the digital phone call can be done as usual every packet being encrypted and decrypted by clipper denning describes how k and k shall be generated using a seed of bit s now leaving alone politics which does not concern me as much as you not being an american citicien tm there are some weak points in this scheme which might be exploited by several parties as far as i know about the generation of k k s and s look like the obvious backdoor they could be used to generate the chip keys by knowing the serial number and also the family key of the chip i really can t imagine why these seeds would be needed otherwise as true random sources for the generation of the k k can be bought for not to much money then the escrows each of them will get bit of a bit key security could as little as existant be maximized by giving them bits each which have to be xored together to give the k k now let s simply assume the escrows are trustworthy and can t be fooled by criminals or law enforchemnt agencies and there will be no quarrel between escrows and l e a which would hinder the l e a in doing their duties and so on and so on once the keys are surrendered the corresponding chip is compromised forever not very clever imho how about sending in the encrypted session keys for each phone call that the police or whoever want s to listen to escrows could then simply decode this session key and send it back to police and would naturally not do this after the warrant has expired this would be a better technical solution but i guess politics will not work that way apparently as miss dennings stated the only one performing actually decodes of intercepted messages shall be the fbi great so local guys can not inter cept understand your traffic anymore does this mean that the fbi monopolizes the right to do legal wiretaps how is law over there i have no idea who is allowed to tap and who not this certainly means that watched communi cations will be routed automatically from the service providing company to the fbi if the communicaiton is a watched one and this means as far as i understand it that the family key has to be known by each switching company and those providing cellular phone servies etcetc so the family key will not be very secret and thus serial numbers of calls will be readable by anybody who cares i like traffic analysis what do you guess what happens if you use the chip in ecb mode and the first few packets of the chip are somehow lost or garbled so the session key would not be actually broadcasted over the line hmmm shouldn t be so difficult to do that and now a last point for the other side after all i have read and heard about clipper not the programming language for dbase is it it seems to have many advantages which shold not be overseen now an afterthought to your rights please note that i have no idea what i am talking about from grady netcom com ef amendment congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances if this text is actually in your bill of rights who can overrule this but freedom of speech is not secrecy of speech maybe you need to extend your amendment to cover information and communication too i am not very sure in what position your government actually is legally when it tries to ban cryptography and arms amendment say you may have them but not under what conditions hmm tricky situation actually it will make not much sense to discuss that topic in sci crypt discussion of technical details and vulnerabilites of the system are highly suggested and appreciated friendly greetings germano caronni disclaimer everything in here is derived from things i heard and read from other persons so everything could be wrong all opinions and thoughts in here are mine and subject to change without further notification no warranty neither implicit not explicit etc etc etc ad nauseam p s please don t ask me about political opinions as i might not bother to re ply for further information read the last line of p metzgers signature instruments register only through things they re designed to register space still contains infinite unknowns pgp key id germano caronni caronni nessie cs id ethz ch fd ccf f da ea c dd f
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet in article qnav r l transfer stratus com cme ellisun sw stratus com carl ellison writes in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes further the attorney general shall utilize funds from the department of justice asset forfeiture super surplus fund to effect this purchase talk about adding insult to injury i for one believe that the use of civil forfeiture should be abolished by a decent administration not continued instead it looks like that ill gotten gain will be used to help pay for wiretap equipment i wholeheartedly agree knowing that we have let our law enforcement agencies seize our property against the fifth amendment of our constitution tells me that we are absolving ourselves of our responsibility for self governance we have to take our government back from the self serving politicians who create laws and rules only to better their positions within the government we have allowed them to take too much power from the people of this nation that situation has to be changed allowing the law enforcement agencies to use the seized property to pay off drug informants who lie and continue to deal in drugs is tantamount to making a pact with the devil himself it s a vicious cycle the law enforcement agencies are motivated to seize property to fund their own activities and having no easy way for the citizen to regain the property intact once taken gives even more incentive for the agencies to take property it s also interesting to note that two months ago rush limbaugh said that clinton would have the plumbers out in force shortly clinton and his henchmen firmly believe in strong ubiquitous government control anytime a leader believes in that the leader will use every means possible to retain that control and take more we have to take our government back otherwise we will end up living in the equivalent of a high tech third world dictatorship we have to take responsibility for ourselves our personal welfare and our actions paul j olson vax systems manager resident amiga addict c voice decnet charon paul internet paul charon gsfc nasa gov xx disclaimer statements in my messages are wholely my own amiga ignorance is a renewable resource p j o rourke
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re clipper chip long follow up in article rand org jim rand org jim gillogly writes this document is in the anonymous ftp directory at nist looks to me like the other shoe has dropped jim gillogly trewesday astron s r thanks for posting this and making it available this post will be long i will comment on most of it and am reluctantly leaving all of the original in place to provide context please note that an alt group has been set up for the clipper stuff note this file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc ncsl nist gov in directory pub nistnews and via the nist computer security bbs at the white house office of the press secretary for immediate release april statement by the press secretary the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary hum at t vlsi and mykotronx are industry wonder what happened to ibm this should be right up their street and a mandateed scheme is voluntary mr orwell would love this program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement telephone encryption and scrambleing are years behind digital ones like rsa idea or even des the above while literaly true is a clasic straw man claim in the context of non real time circuits such as e mail and the like the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links i would modestly propose that a mandated use of isdn would do more for commun ications than this lot for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption normmaly des technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals note the use of the word business in the above the whole tenor of this release seems to be establishing a ground rule that only business use is legitimate for debate if you want the nothings you drop in your wife s ear to remain secret and private that is not even on the agenda for debate note that there is no role for you to contain private info in this the only reference is to information already in the hands of others the unauthorized release bit is also drawing a long bow most of these cases are by people who have legitimate access abusing it and revealing or often selling the info these people are of course in this proposal the people who will have the keys the criminals also use lawers courts the cia white house officials and pens to go about their business when will they be outlawed as well yeah several of them would be a better idea than clipper them again the protections of law and the courts have been seriously erroded over the last decade ofr so a state of the art microcircuit called the clipper chip has been developed by government engineers the chip represents a nsa new approach to encryption technology yeah this bit is very true it can be used in new relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today note the repeated mixing of telephone scrabeling and encryption a demo of the above claim on an ordanary pots would be a good nights entertainment i suspect note also the many not all as the general tone implies this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals the case record seems to indicate that what is needed is a brutal tightening of the current abuses i have not heard yet of a case that was impeaded by the use of secure encryption by the men in black the other side abuse by law enforcers is well documented even by govt agencies and the phone vs other coms is blurred yet again a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans lets run that line twice not very carefully what it says the stated purpose of the key eschrow is to make the use of clipper compulsory note the word ensure as to protect or law abiding i will leave to you so to the person who asked if it included the outlawing of other encryptions the answer in this press release is yes each device containing the chip will have two unique keys numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap just as they only can wiretap now with a warrent the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans just makes sure that the illegal ones are preserved to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings where do you find many experts any ex kgb people looking for a contract and as a later posting asks what of the stu iiis they already have it will be very interesting to see if the military and us embasies start to use it after all it is secure isn t it the govt will answer that point by its own actions the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches like the key escrow system the president has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes again personal use seems to be a unaskable question the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens ah so warrents are not always needed it seems the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the national information infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of american industry in the global marketplace and the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products the itars seem to slightly impeed this the president has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries the congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice note that all this wonderfull stuff will be in secret only the proper people will be able to express an opinion hence only the desired result will emerge since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law encryption and codes have been around for millenia they are generaly in equilibrium with the technology of the time the systematic study of cyphers has resulted in a swing in favor of the encrypter at the moment i have no doubt that the factoring problem will fall in time probably fofr practical purposes by the middle of the next century further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet the provisions of the president s directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available for additional details call mat heyman national institute of standards and technology questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks it is a little hard to critisise a non proposal q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today note we drop back to phone mode again if this is a true answer it can be rephrased as it sucks big time anyone who can drive the crypt work bench will use it for light amusement before breakfast while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system this link between the security of the key eschrow and the actual algorithm is a real winner given that i have secret bit numbers could someone please explain how the details of an encryption algorithm will reveal them we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities just make sure you read the cvs real carfully ok q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the commerce department and other key agencies were involved in this decision this approach has been endorsed by the president the vice president and appropriate cabinet officials quick with out looking back what name is missing from that list q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative the people who agree with us and who think there is a buck in it for them q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them the reverse engineering provisions of the mask work act could be relevent here q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future q how do i buy one of these encryption devices a we expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the clipper chip into their devices you don t not unless you are one of the right people q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow they missed the word secret here he needs a grammar lesson too mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology which the administration is developing i would say less secure less conveniant more expensive pgp is free less available and more prone to being comprimised proofs to the contarary will be welcome note proof the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product they don t seem to be saying anything that makes much sense and this proposal does prohibit it except in a very limited way and this is the one explicit reference to personal rights it is a denial and yes i don t think that the mexicans brazilians and canucks are included in clinton et als magnanamous gesture there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques the false tension is false the balance is between two repugnant points the right to privacy is hand waved to non existance by putting it behind the false assessment it is assumed that the removal of the right to take what ever steps you deem suitable to protect your privacy is non negotiable hence is defined in the govenment language to be non existant if you don t agree you must be a criminal as only criminals don t agree with out laws also note the non question if what is here was not possible q what does this decision indicate about how the clinton administration s policy toward encryption will differ from that of the bush administration a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism it indicates we know that bush dropped the ball in squashing that nasty insert suitable retoric and will stamp out this disorderly unruley outbreak of freedom and ultra national sentiment q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the same is true for other encryption devices one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad we plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products this one is a real giggle in australia or france they will have to reveal the keys and the algorithm don t think it s at the top of my list of things i must have so the restrictions will protect me from saleks trying to sell me a bill of crock any for any others using it they must be nuts good luck folks paul
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re more technical details the system or family key would appear to be cryptographically useless since every chip must know it and be able to remove its effects from the bitstream i daresay that it will be widely known almost immediately after this system is deployed and since it s been pointed out that there is not a separate decrypt key the same key is used for both encryption and decryption there goes any benefit to the use of a system wide key in skipjack robert bickford a hacker is any person who derives joy from rab well sf ca us discovering ways to circumvent limitations rab i recognize that a class of criminals and juvenile delinquents has taken to calling themselves hackers but i consider them irrelevant to the true meaning of the word just as the mafia calls themselves businessmen but nobody pays that fact any attention rab
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re once tapped your code is no good any more for example i don t own a cordless phone with clipper i would if the local men in blue really want to listen to me talk to my friends or order pizza i m no worse off than i am now and i don t have to worry about local kids or nosy neighbors i do tend to agree sigh so where can i buy a des encrypted cellular phone how much does it cost of course if we didn t have government monopolies on cellular phone service there probably would be some available how can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making the clipper system the only crypto available in the u s the second and fourth amendments do come to mind the second amendment is especially apt given the itar definitions of crypto equipment as munitions and the gun control people s increasing ability to define things as assault weapons and make them illegal triple des is obviously used for assault phones while cripple will be legal and triple cripple may fall into the gray area of illegally upgrading to an assault phone pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr afterlife ncsc mil rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles read the constitution yourself the second amendment says the right to bear arms shall not be infringed so a well regulated militia may be more easily formed i have an interpretation of the second that shows there are no qualifications to the right to keep and bear arms if you want i can e mail it to you by the way gun talk belongs in talk politics guns doug holland
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in strnlghtc nrhw qb netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article bu edu uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes i wish i could agree with you ask yourself this why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was known to be at least partially compromised key escrows in this instance why would any private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that had not been properly evaluated i e algorythm not publically released the answer seems obvious to me they wouldn t there is other hardware out there not compromised des as an example triple des as a better one what follows is my opinion it is not asserted to be the truth so no flames please it comes out of a background of years as a senior corporate staff executive in two fortune companies no wonder american businesses are going down the tubes i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the nsa for business if they told me it was more secure than des and in particular resistant to attempts by japanese french and other competitive companies and governments to break it s nist not nsa nsa is not supposed to have anything to do with this they didn t say that they said is was better than some commercial grade encryptions i for one wouldn t trust them if they did unless they release the algorithm for investigation i d be happy to do so even with escrowed keys provided i was happy about the bona fides of the escrow agencies the federal reserve would certainly satisfy me as would something set up by one of the big accounting firms maybe the aclu and eff it would have to be a non profit so the big would be out i d trust the nsa or the president if they stated there were no trap doors i d be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure i wouldn t trust the nsa i think i would trust the president on this but i m not certain he would be told i d trust something from the nsa long before i d trust something from some swiss or anybody japanese that s your problem this may seem surprising to some here but i suggest most corporations would feel the same way most many some pick one corporations have an attitude that the nsa is part of our government and we support our government as one very famous ceo put it to me one day i want to emphasize the i am not speaking for beckman instruments at this point however we are an international company and i would like to think that our customers come first ahead of our government s whims arthur l rubin a rubin dsg dse beckman com work beckman instruments brea mcimail com compuserve com arthur pnet cts com personal my opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes fishing expeditions without the target s knowlege don t give up the right to be safe from that that should be non negotiable and clinton and co know it which is probably why they quietly developed this thing figuring if they get it this far they can ram it on through it always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever administration is current for things they couldn t possibly have initiated this chip had to take years to develop yet already we re claiming that the clinton administration sneaked it in on us bullshit the bush administration and the career gestapo were responsible for this horror and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli that doesn t excuse clinton and gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it but let s lay the body at the proper door to start with geoff kuenning geoff maui cs ucla edu geoff itcorp com
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screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens this is a world wide issue please put distribution world on the distrubution line thank you ygoland wright seas ucla edu the jester writes however assuming that i can still encrypt things as i please who cares about the clipper chip you don t care that people are being lied to fooled into believing the chip gives privacy when it fact it allows wiretaps you don t give a shit about anybody s privacy except your own and not even your own are you so smart that you know when you re talking to somebody who has a wiretap chip on their phone instead of a privacy chip with private keys attitude that everyone else should have instead of worrying about a clipper chip simply connect your handset to your computer and feed the voice single through process encrypt and transmit over the phone the guy on the other hand then does the same in reverse simply everyone should have this attitude the only people who can have this attitude are the most hard core computer hackers who never make phone calls away from their computer who apparently never call anybody except another computer hacker or perhaps another spook u s classified agents refuse to use their own system only oblivious civilian dupes get that dubious privilege only spooks and hard core hackers need privacy huh we do need an alternative to nsa bugged telephones but we re talking inexpensive telephones here including hand sized cellulars that need strong crypto real privacy make shift computer hacker rigs that require living by your computer to talk privately over the phone are just a dumb stunt that doesn t do anything for anybody s privacy in the real world what we need is a true privacy chip for example a real time voice encryption rsa put it into a silicon compiler and spit out asic put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international business diplomats and private communications if the u s bans it we make it somewhere else and import it the japanese german dutch taiwanese korean etc electronics companies don t want the nsa spying on them u s workers lose more jobs to government fascist stupidity jhart agora rain com
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re once tapped your code is no good any more geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes bullshit the bush administration and the career gestapo were responsible for this horror and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli that doesn t excuse clinton and gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it but let s lay the body at the proper door to start with the final stages of denial i can hardly imagine what the result would have been if the clinton administration had actually supported this plan instead of merely acquiescing with repugnance as they ve so obviously doing i don t believe the chip originated with the clinton administration either but the clinton administration has embraced it and brought it to fruition both of the major parties have what they consider excellent reasons for limiting your freedoms and violating your privacy and even seem to feel that they re doing you a favor if this is really surprising to anyone it means they ve been willfully ignoring quite a bit of previous evidence there s only one political party not calling anarchists a party that considers your freedom and privacy goals worthy in and of themselves if you re voting for the big two you re supporting a reduction of those rights given their goals and their histories regardless of whether you personally support that reduction to paint clinton and gore as unwitting tools is really stretching things when you have to kill a man it costs nothing to be polite churchill
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re once tapped your code is no good any more geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes it always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever administration is current for things they couldn t possibly have initiated this chip had to take years to develop yet already we re claiming that the clinton administration sneaked it in on us no kidding the most recent post i saw in alt privacy clipper and i hope anyone interested in this topic ends up there states that clipper has been in development for over four years i am however more than a little po d that clinton put his name on this monstrosity or even allowed it to get out the door for that matter he s already heard from me and i hope you ll all take the time to voice your extreme displeasure as well tim russell omaha ne trussell unomaha edu
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr qualcomm com karn unix ka q ampr org phil karn writes in article apr colnet cmhnet org res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests i am sure that mike is correct on this point i am also pretty sure that administering truth serum would be ruled a violation of your right not to incriminate yourself but what is the salient difference you can find the salient difference in any number of th amendment related supreme court opinions the court limits th amendment protections to what they call testimonial evidence as opposed to physical evidence i have a question that is a slight variation on the previously mentioned examples that perhaps people could give me some pointers on it has been a couple of years since my con law class in college so i hope i am not missing something obvious here basic scenario i set up a bbs that uses public key encryption and encryption of files on disk the general setup is designed so that when users connect they send a private key encrypted using the system public key and the user s public private keypair is used to wrap the one time session keys used for encrypting the files on disk the result of this is that even if i reveal the system private key it is impossible for anyone to gain access to the files stored on the machine what is possible is for someone to use the revealed system private key to entice users into revealing thier personal private keys during the authentication sequence questions does the fact that the system private key does not provide any information useful for a search give me any protection as far as being coerced to reveal the key i doubt it myself it seems providing the system private key does not mean that i am assisting in entrapment the users would send thier key anyway and are not being enticed into doing something they would not otherwise do but is there any other hook that can be used would the user private key enticement require wiretap approval any answers or general musings on the subject would be appreciated jim jim mccoy ut unix sysadmin tiger team mccoy ccwf cc utexas edu include disclaimer h j mccoy nwu edu pgp key available via finger or upon request
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption gee i guess they should also have such a repository for house keys car keys safety deposit keys rdl
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re what the clipper nay sayers sound like to me in article qsvfcinnq v dns nmsu edu amolitor moink nmsu edu andrew molitor writes the following is available in some ftp archive somewhere i insert my comments liberally throughout this demonic memo of big brotherdom white house announcement on screw thread standards this is to announce that the american national standards institute or whatever it is has been given the authority to define standard dimensions for screw threads look this is clearly the first step toward outlawing our own screw thread specifications if this madness isn t fought tooth and nail every step of the way it ll be a crime to use screw threads other than those our fearless leaders so graciously define for us sarcastic text deleted no value judgement implied screw you bill clinton you and your totalitarianist thugs amolitor nmsu edu finger for pgst personal screw thread pitch or screw threads see the screw thread servers must be freed at first i was going to complain that your analogy was completely irrelevant but then i remembered something remember that move to get the u s to the metric system all those years ago as far as i know we were supposed to be there by now the government sold it as better for the people easier to be in tune with the rest of the world they had decided it was for our own good then when the plan was released it soon became apparant that the government were a bunch o thickies think about it change all the railroad track widths signs screws abolish the old regime at the cost of millions of dollars your point is well taken you think there is nothing to worry about you could care less who designs your cryptography any more than who designs your screws or the system of measurement you use sit back that s right just relax we ll take care of all your needs mr molitor uni acs bu edu public keys by finger and or request public key archives pgp public keys pgp iastate edu sovereignty is the sign of a brutal past fight clinton s wiretap chip df f b de b c c crypto is not a crime ask me how
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some questions regarding big brother clipper in previous postings by hellman bellovin etal it was reported the big brother clipper chip will encrypt plaintext in bit blocks as is done with des the users key k which can be derived from rsa diffy hellman etc is used to encrypt plaintext m and is then used to form a three part message this three part message consists of e m k k encrypted with some other key and the chip serial number this three part message is then encrypted by still another key my question is what is a message for example say we are dealing with an encrypted digitized voice application the speech waveform is sampled and digitized and then some number of samples are grouped into a bit block this block is then encrypted and transmitted over a non secure communications link where is the three part message is something appended to each bit block is a header sent at the beginning of the session if the header is sent at the beginning of the session how do they insure the equipment manufacturer using the chip does just that can just anyone manufacture products using the chip is a facility clearance required to manufacture any ideas
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc pucl kp netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes let me ask you this would you trust richard nixon with your crypto keys i wouldn t i take it you mean president nixon not private citizen nixon sure nothing i m doing would be of the slightest interest to president nixon i am sure you didn t miss the implication that we could have another richard nixon type president in the future perhaps not too distant future acutally with that in mind then i take it you also would not object to the gov coming up with a decision not proposal just like clinton cripple is a decision not a proposal sprung on us to start placing video cameras with sound in every room of your house which could be activated without your knowlege they would be well concealed so you wouldn t know the location to prevent you from covering the lens opening after all nothing you re doing would be of the slightest interest to a government official right so you surely should not object to such a proposal not the best anology but the principle is pretty close the ability to eavesdrop on your activity with little or no effort without your knowlege protected by entirely by government safeguards you can still draw your curtains so you can still have your privacy from everyone else except big brother after all we need this for protection from drug dealers and terrorists and other criminals like enemies of the state and you don t really have a right to unbreakable privacy anyway sort of as the press release of the clinton cripple decision puts it i find it curious they use the word unbreakable when the term really should be difficult to break without proper authorization which the government most certainly has at their disposal right they wouldn t want to be able to break it illegally would they nawww not for the people clinton can you while my mind is on it give us one good reason that the algorithm should be a secret algorithm unless this encryption scheme either is a joke or contains features like a master key or other back door for unauthorized eavesdropping if it was really even moderately secure and the government really meant to require the proper court order and the keys that are in the escrow accounts to be able to decipher the traffic what is the need to keep the algorithm secret seems i hear rather often that if an encryption scheme requires the algorithm to remain a secret to be effective it is not a worthwhile scheme is this just idle talk or is the administration bullshitting everyone with great skepticism and many doubts on our administrations intentions and wait we haven t been told the next gem the administration has in mind for e mail and datafile security the press release does say that this is part of a comprehensive thing on data security for us unprivileged citizens perhaps subjects would be the better term citizens somehow does not seem appropriate that implies a free people subjects better fits a population who serve at the pleasure of their rulers one thing for certain the government no longer regards the citizens as their bosses anymore but the other way around pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re key registering bodies in article dockmaster ncsc mil grant dockmaster ncsc mil lynn r grant writes if we do not trust the nsa to be a registrar of clipper chip key halves i would not trust mitre either i wouldn t trust mitre for another reason remember the cuckoo s egg how great was their security eh nsa well with the list of known turncoats does it make you wonder how many more unknown still are there regards uri uri watson ibm com scifi angmar uri disclaimer
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow begin pgp signed message in article pmetzger apr snark shearson com pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes in article qnupd jpm news intercon com amanda intercon com amanda walker writes from amanda intercon com amanda walker jhesse netcom com john hesse writes oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds hey it s better than the status quo i am far less worried about the feds tapping my phone than high school scanner surfers who get their kicks out of eavesdropping on cellular and cordless phone calls i m a political dissident i m scared shitless of the feds listening in on my calls my opinions are the sort that would get me disappeared in a slightly less free society and who knows what sort of society we will be in in five or ten years i have friends who have had their phones tapped none of this is theoretical to me as for its better than the status quo well first of all you can get a cryptophone from companies like cylink today and they work well in addition a number of groups are now working on building software to turn any pc into a privacy enhanced phone right now and they are all working in overdrive mode and yes i d rather just see all crypto restrictions lifted but this is at least an incrememental improvement for certain applications there are no crypto restrictions yet you can use anything you want right now the point is to maintain that right the point you all seem to have missed was covered when the uk cellphone scrambling system was discussed incidentally my mp has responded to my questions on that issue and it appears that the uk and other approved countries will get the secure a encryption and dodgy countries will get a x existing mobile equipment will drop to clear mode when used with a x systems but newer equipment will use a a x clear depending on the capabilities of the base station the cops feds do not need to be able to get hold of your private key to listen in to cellular conversations encryption is not end to end but cellphone to base station it has to be this way so that cellular users and fixed installations can talk to each other for cellular to cellular calls the transmission is decrypted at the base station passed to another base station and re encrypted the cops feds can listen to the unscrambled call provided they get a warrant to tap into the cellular provider s equipment the only reason for wanting a crackable system is so they can listen without having to obtain a warrant but maybe the clipper system is secure and they really do need a warrant to get the key out of escrow before they can listen in using a scanner see above they don t have to go down this route anyway i have my doubts but even if true once they have the key they will never again need a warrant to tap into that particular phone whenever they want well judge it appears he wasn t a drug dealer after all so naturally we ll stop listening in you have every reason to be scared shitless take a look at the records of mccarthy hoover j edgar not the cleaner though they both excelled at sucking and nixon paul
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screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only i suspect that this clipper thing could backfire on the gov in a big hurry i expect that products using these chips will socket them rather than soldering them since once the keys are handed over by the escrow agencies the chip is so much garbage and will need to be replaced i expect that someone will come along with a pin compatible chip that uses secure encryption possibly even disguised so that it s not possible to tell it from the clipper chip until you try to use the backdoor keys if i were to manufacture such a chip as part of my marketing strategy i would try to subvert one or both escrow agencies either through bribes or industrial espionage and then publicize the fact doing my best not to be connected with such activities which would likely not be legal publicly discrediting the escrow agencies would go quite far towards creating a market for a secure alternative i also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread any back doors or weaknesses would further discredit the scheme and help grow the market demand for a secure alternative i believe that the company that provides such an alternative will make few friends in the le community but lots of money i also believe that the government will do it s best to make such plug replacements illegal i expect that they will see the same success in limiting the availability of such alternatives as they have seen in limiting the availability of certain illicit drugs ie little to none regards ian ameline of course the ramblings above have nothing to do with my employer nor do i necessarily advocate doing any of the things described here i just believe that the events above are likely to take place
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article qv m i geraldo cc utexas edu mccoy ccwf cc utexas edu jim mccoy writes i set up a bbs that uses public key encryption and encryption of files on disk the general setup is designed so that when users connect they send a private key encrypted using the system public key and the user s public private keypair is used to wrap the one time session keys used for encrypting the files on disk the result of this is that even if i reveal the system private key it is impossible for anyone to gain access to the files stored on the machine what is possible is for someone to use the revealed system private key to entice users into revealing thier personal private keys during the authentication sequence any answers or general musings on the subject would be appreciated just a question as a provider of a public bbs service aren t you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the bbs if police comes with sufficent authorisation i guessed this would be a basic condition for such systems i did run a bbs some time ago but that was in switzerland friendly greetings germano caronni instruments register only through things they re designed to register space still contains infinite unknowns pgp key id germano caronni caronni nessie cs id ethz ch fd ccf f da ea c dd f
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re more technical details another objection occurred to me there was a comment about how supposedly there would only be one decode box operated by the fbi this is flat ridiculous and i don t believe it for a millisecond even if they in fact only build one or two or some other small number of these that won t stop others from building one make it work like two clipper chip phones one listening to each side of the recorded conversation i ll have to have another look at the specs posted so far but offhand i didn t see anything that would preclude this sort of thing robert bickford rab well sf ca us treasurer and newsletter editor lib party of marin county ca don t blame me i voted libertarian member ca state central committee
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cripple chip how about this the telco has your clipper key the telco has your intended partner s key if he is using one whenever you call the message gets decrypted and reencrypted wihtout y key exchange i know it s a stupid system but for the feds it d be great the point of this isn t to take over the crypto market btw clinton doen not want people to have any sort of crypto at all just like busch but he needs some support for the technology initiative garbage he s pushing industrial policy stuff and a computer hip designed by the gov t is just the thing who s going to thing about the literal billions of dollars it took for a government agency to design watkins earth eecs uic edu
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re once tapped your code is no good any more johnson trwacs fp trw com steve johnson writes tim may whose sig block may get him busted in the new regime a remark i heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly frightening significance the comment was made that in other parts of the world the democrats note the big d would be known as socialists and in other parts of the world european socialists would be known as fascist capitalist pigs get your head out of your labels and think carefully for once according to the eff announcement on this thing the nsa has been developing this turkey for four years the manufacturing contract was let months ago anyone out there who believes that the fact that clinton s name was on this white house announcement means that bush or any other republican is a staunch supporter of personal privacy is a fool if this topic disturbs you can the political finger pointing and talk about what you can do about it if you ve just got to point fingers remember that this scheme was started when a secret policeman was president
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re wh proposal from police point of view in article pmetzger apr snark shearson com pmetzger lehman com writes in article strnlghtc puor netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes there has been extensive discussion in the eff forum for example about inadmissible taps being used to develop information that could then lead to admissible evidence this might put a stop to such things which must from time to time be simple fishing expeditions far more likely these things will continue to be done no matter what assurances we are given key escrow is likely going to prove to be a joke i feel like winston churchill in but the privacy clipper will to the extent key escrow is legitimate stop most of the abuse of wiretaps by local cops company cops angry husbands wives etc it is going to be hard for the keystone cops the proctor gamble cops etc to bypass even a product as flawed as the clipjob now i admit i am hard pressed to find anything else good to say about it except that if it actually takes off someone will certainly come up with a real crypto chip pin compatable that we can buy unless of course big brother makes it illegal to have real crypto cause good honest law abiding citizens will be happy to let the government listen to their every word me did i say that i am not a crook president richard m nixon information farming at for addr phone finger a a the ohio state university jebright magnus acs ohio state edu jim ebright e mail jre osu edu
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni writes just a question as a provider of a public bbs service aren t you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the bbs if police comes with sufficent authorisation i guessed this would be a basic condition for such systems i did run a bbs some time ago but that was in switzerland that sounds like an old dragnet episode joe and i went to the apartment of prime suspect nobody answered the door but his landlord gave us permission to search the apartment perhaps that worked in california in the s but as i understand the law landlords do not have authority to grant permission to search space rented by a third party provided the lease is not in default etc i m not even sure if they can provide the master key when shown a search warrant since the subject of the search is supposed to be notified at this point the question becomes did the user rent the disk space her encrypted file occupies if she did it should fall under the same body of case law that applies to apartments storage lockers etc as to whether any court would recognize this fact if she did not i e no compensation exchanged i don t know how it would be treated there doesn t seem to be a non cyberspace equivalent bear giles bear fsl noaa gov
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re why the clipper algorithm is secret in article c pstr lu panix com dfl panix com danny o bedlam writes the algorithm is classified because a military contract or similar government equivalent to military has been let for this proprietary design that the feds say that nsa developed is there a patent is that patent publicly available my betting is that that too is classified unless there has been a major change in the law there s no such beast as a classified patent patents exist to encourage communications and develop the state of the art the year lock is a nuisance but historically has been pretty trivial it s only in an industry which doubles performance every three years or months for some hardware that years is an eternity the same thing applies in civilian development you can t patent something and declare it a trade secret however you can and should mark all software including proprietary code unpublished copyright so that it ever does get exposed you still have some legal protection post berne this isn t required since everything is born copyrighted but it takes a while for people to learn the new rules bear giles bear fsl noaa gov
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clipper chip bush did it in article wcs apr rainier att com wcs anchor ho att com bill stewart writes this is the democrats version defend free speech reject republicans followed by speech control this must have been in the works for some time the bush administration must have been working on it for quite a while clinton simply took the credit or blame depending on how you look at it john gilbert johng ecs comm mot com
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the clipper chip a technical summary the following document summarizes the clipper chip how it is used how programming of the chip is coupled to key generation and the escrow process and how law enforcement decrypts communications since there has been some speculation on this news group about my own involvement in this project i d like to add that i was not in any way involved i found out about it when the fbi briefed me on thursday evening april since then i have spent considerable time talking with the nsa and fbi to learn more about this and i attended the nist briefing at the department of commerce on april the document below is the result of that effort dorothy denning the clipper chip a technical summary dorothy denning april introduction on april the president announced a new initiative that will bring together the federal government and industry in a voluntary program to provide secure communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement at the heart of the plan is a new tamper proof encryption chip called the clipper chip together with a split key approach to escrowing keys two escrow agencies are used and the key parts from both are needed to reconstruct a key chip structure the clipper chip contains a classified bit block encryption algorithm called skipjack the algorithm uses bit keys compared with for the des and has rounds of scrambling compared with for the des it supports all des modes of operation throughput is mbits a second each chip includes the following components the skipjack encryption algorithm f an bit family key that is common to all chips n a bit serial number u an bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip encrypting with the chip to see how the chip is used imagine that it is embedded in the at t telephone security device as it will be suppose i call someone and we both have such a device after pushing a button to start a secure conversation my security device will negotiate a session key k with the device at the other end in general any method of key exchange can be used the key k and message stream m i e digitized voice are then fed into the clipper chip to produce two values e m k the encrypted message stream and e e k u n f a law enforcement block the law enforcement block thus contains the session key k encrypted under the unit key u concatenated with the serial number n all encrypted under the family key f chip programming and escrow all clipper chips are programmed inside a scif secure computer information facility which is essentially a vault the scif contains a laptop computer and equipment to program the chips about chips are programmed during a single session the scif is located at mikotronx at the beginning of a session a trusted agent from each of the two key escrow agencies enters the vault agent enters an bit value s into the laptop and agent enters an bit value s these values serve as seeds to generate keys for a sequence of serial numbers to generate the unit key for a serial number n the bit value n is first padded with a fixed bit block to produce a bit block n s and s are then used as keys to triple encrypt n producing a bit block r r e d e n s s s similarly n is padded with two other bit blocks to produce n and n and two additional bit blocks r and r are computed r e d e n s s s r e d e n s s s r r and r are then concatenated together giving bits the first bits are assigned to u and the second bits to u the rest are discarded the unit key u is the xor of u and u u and u are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow agencies as a sequence of values for u u and u are generated they are written onto three separate floppy disks the first disk contains a file for each serial number that contains the corresponding key part u the second disk is similar but contains the u values the third disk contains the unit keys u agent takes the first disk and agent takes the second disk the third disk is used to program the chips after the chips are programmed all information is discarded from the vault and the agents leave the laptop may be destroyed for additional assurance that no information is left behind the protocol may be changed slightly so that four people are in the room instead of two the first two would provide the seeds s and s and the second two the escrow agents would take the disks back to the escrow agencies the escrow agencies have as yet to be determined but they will not be the nsa cia fbi or any other law enforcement agency one or both may be independent from the government law enforcement use when law enforcement has been authorized to tap an encrypted line they will first take the warrant to the service provider in order to get access to the communications line let us assume that the tap is in place and that they have determined that the line is encrypted with clipper they will first decrypt the law enforcement block with the family key f this gives them e k u n they will then take a warrant identifying the chip serial number n to each of the key escrow agents and get back u and u u and u are xored together to produce the unit key u and e k u is decrypted to get the session key k finally the message stream is decrypted all this will be accomplished through a special black box decoder operated by the fbi acknowledgment and distribution notice all information is based on information provided by nsa nist and the fbi permission to distribute this document is granted
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clipper and ranting libertarians i would think that you could reduce the defense of using non clipper based encryption technologies to defending freedom of expression ie free speech that you have to right to express whatever you want in whatever form your little heart desires so long as you do not impinge on the rights of others encrypted text sound video is just another form of expression of that particular text sound video just like digitized sound is another means of expression of sound streams of instead of continuous waveforms also it shouldn t be up to the government at all encryption standards can be decided upon by independent standards orgainizations apologies for the acronym one can note how well this has worked with iso and the metric system sae etc independent entities or consortia of people industries in that particular area are far more qualified to set standards than any one government agency consider for example what the ascii character set would have looked like if it was decided by the government i hope this helps folks to formulate their defenses i m still working on mine and hope to be faxing my congressmen soon d j hagberg hagberg ccit arizona edu finger for info and pgp public key
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would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption currently when you send an encrypted message an opponent can usually tell that you are using encryption which encryption method you are using because that information is usually in the clear with clipper most opponents will only know that you are sending clipper text they won t know that your clipper text is itself encoded only those few opponents who get your clipper keys will know that your message is double encrypted kind of like a safety deposit box containing a lock box so don t just think of replacements for clipper also think of front ends carl carl kadie i do not represent eff this is just me kadie eff org kadie cs uiuc edu
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qnpjuinn ci gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes brad clarinet com brad templeton writes their strategy is a business one rather than legal one they are pushing to get a standard in place a secret standard and if they get it as a standard then they will drive competitors out of the market it will be legal to sell better untapable encryption that doesn t have registered keys but it will be difficult and thus not a plan for most phone companies if brad s analysis is correct it may offer an explanation for why the encryption algorithm is being kept secret this will prevent competitors from coming out with clipper compatible phones which lack the government installed back door the strategy brad describes will only work as long as the only way to get compatible phones is to have ones with the government chips it would be nice from the point of view of personal privacy if brad turns out to be right as long as people still have the power to provide their own encryption in place of or in addition to the clipper privacy is still possible but the wording of several passages in the announcement makes me doubt whether this will turn out to be true even if what brad says turns out to be accurate you can bet that the administration will have made it very clear to the vendors that it would very much be in their best interests to institute a voluntary policy of refusing to sell anything but clinton cripple equipped equipment to anyone other than authorized government agencies and law enforcement or individuals and corporations who have been been determined by the administration to have a valid need on a case by case basis for an effective system note that this is very much like the language used in many gun control bills laws the administration is pushing for or otherwise supporting the logic and actual rationale as opposed to the excuses that get fed to the media is the same in both cases only the items or technology in question are different i think this is no accident it comes from the same philosophy that the government rules controls the people not the people controlling the government that the unconnected citizens are not sophisticated enough to know what is best for them so the government must tell the people what they need or do not need we know best and the idea that that a commoner can defend himself against government eavesdropping or unlawful attack is totally unacceptable to people with this outlook hal finney combine this all with pushing for national identity cards with smart chips to encode anything they please internal passport under the guise of streamlining the state people s health care system and with you can be certain more jewels yet to come and one sees an extremely ominous trend so what if will be ten years late it still is turning out to be an amazingly accurate prophecy unless a lot of people wake up and in a hurry one should always have every red warning light and bell and danger flag come up when the government seeks to set itself apart in regard to rights etc from the unconnected unprivileged citizen or should we now be saying subject instead why shouldn t the average person have a good secure system of data security not dependent on nebulous safeguards for maintaining that security why shouldn t the average person be able to defend himself from an agency gone rogue i am sure the feds could break into any data they really wanted to but it would take some work and using the same logic one should not be allowed to have a good safe unless a duplicate of the key s or combination are submitted for safekeeping by the government i don t really see a difference philosophically encrypted data sure won t evaporate not with such high tech tools as a tape recorder pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re more technical details encrypted under k then k will be encrypted under the unit key uk and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key sk producing e e m k e k uk serial number sk my understanding is that e m k is not encrypted under sk called the family key and that the decrypt key corresponding to sk is held by law enforcement does anyone have first hand knowledge on this i will also check it out but this is am sunday so i did not want to wait ok so there are in fact two distinct components transmitted by the chip the real message encrypted with the conventional key and the serial number and encrypted conventional key encrypted with the imho kind of bogus as the whole concept of one key that millions of people use which can t be changed doesn t seem reasonable family key suppose i analyze the output of this chip and i m able to determine which bits are the encrypted packet which contains the serial number and session key suppose i also design a simple algorithm based on this information which takes the data containing the encrypted session key and twiddles a bit or several before it s sent down the line mind you i m sure the nsa thought of this along with a dozen other attacks i can t imagine and the system is probably somehow designed so that manipulation of this information will cause a compliant receiving chip to somehow fail to decrypt successfully but how what if the two parties agree in advance on some kind of consistent bit twiddling scheme so the decryption chip sees the restored proper bitstream but an eavesdropper gets a e k uk packet that s wrong i suppose this could be easily defeated if the chip sends that information out many times in slightly different ways making it effectively impossible to be certain you know all the information being sent marc vanheyningen mvanheyn cs indiana edu mime ripem accepted if your theory predicts different outcomes depending on whether you use discrete mathematics or continuous mathematics then you ve got the wrong theory bruce maclennan
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re more technical details srt duke cs duke edu stephen r tate writes now i m not one of the people who distrusts the government at every turn but taking someone s word for it that the s s pairs are not kept around is pushing what i m willing to believe just a little bit too far even if they somehow address this issue it is unlikely to be the only back door in they might even have a few intentionally visible to distract from the ones that aren t visible perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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the escrow database here is a disturbing thought now we no longer live in the days of big filing cabinets we live in the electronic age i asked myself how big could the escrow database get how hard might it be to steal the whole thing particularly were i an nsa official operating with the tacit permission of the escrow houses we can pretend that such will not happen but thats naive well lets see ten bytes of each escrow half lets asume ten bytes of serial number in fact i believe the serial number is smaller but this is an order of magnitude calculation we assume as the population and that each person has a key i get five gigabytes for each of the two escrow databases fits conveniently on a single very valuable exabyte tape this can only get easier with time but who cares i can already hold all the clipper keys in the country in my pocket on two mm tapes admittely they will think of safeguards they won t put the whole database on one disk prehaps maybe they will throw stumbling blocks in the way this changes nothing they keys will be needed every day by hundreds if not thousands of law enforcement types so convenience will dictate that the system permit quick electronic retrieval at some point with or without collusion by the agencies those exabyte tapes are going to get cut dorothy denning and david sternlight will doubtless claim this can t happen but we know that can t is a prayer not a word that in this instance connotes realism with two exabyte tapes in your pocket you would hold the keys for every person s conversations in the country in your hands yeah you need the master key two but thats just ten bytes of information that have to be stored an awful lot of places come to think of it even if the nsa getting a copy of the database isn t a threat to you because unlike me you have no contraversial political views consider foreign intelligence services you know the ones that david sternlight wants to protect us from because of the evil industrial espionage that they do the french apparently do have a big spying operation in friendly countries to get industrial secrets so he isn t being completely irrational here although why our companies couldn t use cryptosystems without back doors is left unexplained by those that point out this threat presumably foreign intelligence services can get moles into the nsa and other agencies we have proof by example of this its happened many times presumably someday they will get their hands on some fraction of the keys you can t avoid that sort of thing don t pretend that no one unauthorized will ever get their hands on the escrow databases we crypto types are all taught something very important at the beginning of intro to cryptography security must depend on the easily changed key that you pick to run your system and not on a secret the escrow databases aren t the sorts of secrets that our teachers told us about but they are the sort of big secrets they would lump into this category imagine trying to replace million clipper chips i cannot believe that the nsa or whomever it is thats doing this doesn t realize all this already they are too smart there are too many of them who have made their bones in the real world i suspect that they know precisely what they are doing and that what they are doing is giving us the appearance of safety so that they can continue to surveil in spite of the growth of strong cryptography i suspect that they realize that they can t put things off forever but they can try to delay things as long as possible who knows maybe even some of the higher ups the inevitable bureaucratic types that rise in any organization really do believe that this scheme might give people some security even as their subordinates in fort meade wring their hands over the foolishness of it all perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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6,684 |
sci.crypt
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles the supreme court seems to disagree with you they have stated that the people is a term of art refering to an individual right and have explicitly mentioned the second amendment as an example i quote the people seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the constitution the preamble declares that the constitution is ordained and established by the people of the the u s the second amendment protects the right of the people to keep and bear arms supreme court of the u s u s v uerdugo uriquidez furthermore in the miller decision they only permitted prosecution for possession of a sawed off shotgun because the defense had not presented testimony and they therefore accepted the argument of the government that such weapons have no military value they held that the amendment protected the individual right to possess military weapons unfortunately no second amendment case has successfully gotten to the court in fifty years however that does not change the interpretation furthermore it appears that others disagree with you as well vis the conclusion is thus inescapable that the history concept and wording of the second amendment to the constitution of the united states as well as its interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half century after its ratifi cation indicates that what is protected is an individual right of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner report of the subcommittee on the constitution of the committee on the judiciary united states senate th congress second session february you might rightfully ask well then what does that first bit about militias mean well militia in historical context basically means the whole of the adult males of the country indeed the u s code still defines militia as all armed men over the age of the militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense and these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time supreme court of the united states u s v miller the reason for the phrase being there was to explain the rationale behind the amendment which was this by depending on the people to bear arms in defense of the country no centralization of military power could ever occur which would permit tyranny in short the government would remain perpetually in fear of the people rather than the other way around no free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms the strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms is as a last resort to protect themselves against tyranny in government thomas jefferson proposal virginia constitution june thomas jefferson papers c j boyd ed and what country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that this people preserve the spirit of resistance let them take arms the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants thomas jefferson letter to william s smith in jefferson on democracy s padover ed before a standing army can rule the people must be disarmed as they are in almost every kingdom of europe the supreme power in america cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword because the whole body of the people are armed and constitute a force superior to any bands of regular troops that can be on any pretense raised in the united states noah webster an examination into the leading principles of the federal constitution in pamphlets on the constitution of the united states p ford you may disagree with the second amendment and wish that it be repealed but please do not pretend that it isn t there and that it doesn t mean what it says you might argue that conditions have changed and that it should no longer be present but you can t imagine it away i could fill a book with detailed argumentation many have already however none of this has anything to do with cryptography lets get it out of here if you insist on discussing this please do it in talk politics guns where people will gladly discuss this matter with you perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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6,685 |
sci.crypt
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re fighting the clipper initiative steve b access digex com steve brinich writes as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical the idea that foisting the cripple chip standard on us manufacturers would result in saying sayonara to yet another high tech market isn t technical isn t in the least difficult to understand and plays on a concern lots of people are worried about already could you expand on this i have a feeling you re right but i don t quite understand you could be an ocarina salesman going metatron press austin texas from door to door laurie anderson human systems performance group
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6,686 |
sci.crypt
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re clipper chip bush did it johng ecs comm mot com john gilbert writes this must have been in the works for some time the bush administration must have been working on it for quite a while clinton simply took the credit or blame depending on how you look at it and the initiative for actual implementation clinton is not just an innocent bystander here they didn t just slap his name on it without consulting him what exactly is his extensive history of individual rights advocacy that people are assuming he really has nothing to do with this he just went back on his pledge to cut the espionage budget and is now asking for more money than even bush wanted i ve left my body to science and science is contesting the will
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6,687 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more dave ihnat ignatz chinet chi il us wrote in article qpg finn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes not to pick on mr may in particular of course but isn t this kind of the domino theory when one little country falls its neighbor will surely follow and before you know it we re all mining salt in siberia for not turning in our captain crunch secret decoder rings but for all the wrongness of our attempt to correct it vietnam et al the domino theory wasn t disproved at all ironically the domino theory in fact was a reasonable metaphor for the collapse of communism from the liberalizations in poland and hungary to the border crossings in the summer of to the fall of the wall later that year and then to the ultimate collapse of the ussr tim may timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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6,688 |
sci.crypt
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re source of random bits on a unix workstation in article qs cg cq msuinfo cl msu edu mrr scss cl msu edu mark riordan writes a few more sources are statistics on your filesystems easily and quickly obtained and the output from the rusage system call you can also exec a finger to one or more favorite heavily used systems though this can take several seconds cf the source code to ripem on ripem msu edu mark r other alternatives include output of vmstat iostat pstat and friends with various flags or even better crash e g on an rs aix you can get lots of relatively unpredicatble data out of crash the output from the following script usually gives about k of goo on a moderately busy system bin sh crash proc tty stack pcb callout vfs socket vnode inode mbuf file mst buffer le mark henderson markh wimsey bc ca ripem key available by key server finger e mail md ofpublickey f f f c cbeaf adafa
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6,689 |
sci.crypt
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet alan barrett barrett lucy ee und ac za wrote in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key escrow system in making this decision i intend to prevent the private sector from developing except with the government s approval other microcircuits or algorithms that are more effective in assuring privacy doesn t this just mean that the government might not approve something for use by other government agencies this does not sound to me to be any form of threat that joe user can t develop and use his own encryption algorithm you want it should sing too yeah we got dogs and valvoline ngorelic speclab cr usgs gov its a pretty damn good time life is pain anyone that tells you different is trying to sell you something
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6,690 |
sci.crypt
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do we need the clipper for cheap security amanda intercon com amanda walker writes the answer seems obvious to me they wouldn t there is other hardware out there not compromised des as an example triple des as a better one so where can i buy a des encrypted cellular phone how much does it cost personally cylink stuff is out of my budget for personal use if the clipper chip can do cheap crypto for the masses obviously one could do the same thing without building in back doors indeed even without special engineering you can construct a good system right now a standard codec chip a chip to do vocoding a des chip a v bis integrated modem module and a small processor to do glue work are all you need to have a secure phone you can dump one or more of the above if you have a fast processor with integration you could put all of them onto a single chip and in the future they can be yes cheap crypto is good but we don t need it from the government you can do everything the clipper chip can do without needing it to be compromised when the white house releases stuff saying this is good because it gives people privacy note that we didn t need them to give us privacy the capability is available using commercial hardware right now indeed were it not for the government doing everything possible to stop them qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to the cdma cellular phone system they are pioneering were it not for the nsa and company cheap encryption systems would be everywhere as it is they try every trick in the book to stop it had it not been for them i m sure cheap secure phones would be out right now they aren t the ones making cheap crypto available they are the ones keeping cheap crypto out of people s hands when they hand you a clipper chip what you are getting is a mess of pottage your prize for having traded in your birthright and what did we buy with our birthright did we get safety from foreigners no they can read conference papers as well as anyone else and are using strong cryptography did we get safety from professional terrorists i suspect that they can get cryptosystems themselves on the open market that work just fine most of them can t be idiots like the guys that bombed the trade center are we getting cheaper crypto for ourselves no because the market would have provided that on its own had they not deliberately sabotaged it someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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6,691 |
sci.crypt
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption true but will traditional encryptions schemes when further encrypted by clipper be more vulnerable to attacks such as partially known plaintext thomas
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6,692 |
sci.crypt
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article c qy m de agora rain com jhart agora rain com jim hart writes since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens this is a world wide issue please put distribution world on the distrubution line thank you no distribution keywords are case sensitive what you want is distribution world or no distribution line at all world in capital letters is wrong apb alan barrett dept of electronic eng univ of natal durban south africa rfc barrett ee und ac za
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6,693 |
sci.crypt
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re the escrow database perry e metzger pmetzger snark shearson com wrote here is a disturbing thought good stuff elided don t pretend that no one unauthorized will ever get their hands on the escrow databases secret the escrow databases aren t the sorts of secrets that our teachers told us about but they are the sort of big secrets they would lump into this category imagine trying to replace million clipper chips sounds to me like a great gimmick for a replacement market every so often issue a clipper alert announcing that some key backup tapes are missing that some drug lords got em whatever then the owners of these clipperphones have to trot down to their local key escrow agency and buy new chips and have them programmed microtoxin the clipper supplier will make a killing maybe this was the real idea anybody know if janet reno has stock in microtoxin vlsi technology or at t could be a good opportunity to undermine this with some disinformation float rumors that the key database has been stolen all the chips need replacing it angers people undermines confidence even more and kills sales after the waco massacre and the big brother wiretap chip any tactic is fair tim may timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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6,694 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in strnlghtc p zp zm netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes note that measures to protect yourself from tempest surveillance are still classified as far as i know i think this to be inaccurate one can buy tempest equipment commercially even macs sure you can buy a tempest approved mac if you have enough money i haven t had any reason to look at this type of pricing for about years but a tempest rating in would raise the price of a radio shack model iii to something around bill internet bill celestial com bill campbell celestial software uucp thebes camco bill east mercer way uunet camco bill mercer island wa speed costs money how fast do you want to go
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6,695 |
sci.crypt
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article almaden ibm com ameline vnet ibm com ian ameline writes i also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread the chip and algorithm are classified if you reverse engineer it and tell people you are likely to go to jail perhaps some foreign governments or corporations could help us out by cracking the system outside the usa the us government could probably stop importation of clone hardware but a software implementation should be practical john carr jfc athena mit edu
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6,696 |
sci.crypt
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security from pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger indeed were it not for the government doing everything possible to stop them qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to the cdma cellular phone system they are pioneering were it not for the nsa and company cheap encryption systems would be everywhere as it is they try every trick in the book to stop it had it not been for them i m sure cheap secure phones would be out right now in the uk it s impossible to get approval to attach any crypto device to the phone network anything that plugs in to our bt phone sockets must be approved for some reason crypto devices just never are i was wondering some time ago how big a market there was for good old fashion acoustic coupler technology to build a secure phone is it possible to mask out all the real voice well enough so that none of it strays into the mouthpiece perhaps a well sealed coupler attachment that was as well blocked as possible then a white noise generator on the outside to muffle any real speech g
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6,697 |
sci.crypt
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow the cops feds do not need to be able to get hold of your private key to listen in to cellular conversations encryption is not end to end but cellphone to base station it has to be this way so that cellular users and fixed installations can talk to each other for cellular to cellular calls the transmission is decrypted at the base station passed to another base station and re encrypted the cops feds can listen to the unscrambled call provided they get a warrant to tap into the cellular provider s equipment the only reason for wanting a crackable system is so they can listen without having to obtain a warrant but maybe the clipper system is secure and they really do need a warrant to get the key out of escrow before they can listen in using a scanner see above they don t have to go down this route anyway i have my doubts but even if true once they have the key they will never again need a warrant to tap into that particular phone whenever they want well judge it appears he wasn t a drug dealer after all so naturally we ll stop listening in that was true for the uk paul but i m fairly sure they re talking about building end to end encryption phones out of this chip it s not for cellular though it certainly could be used there in the way you suggest g
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6,698 |
sci.crypt
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screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only since the at t wiretap chip is scheduled to be distributed internationally allowing the u s government to spy on foreign governments companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens this is a world wide issue thus distribution world ygoland wright seas ucla edu the jester writes however assuming that i can still encrypt things as i please who cares about the clipper chip why do we hackers care about the clipper chip do we give a shit about anybody s privacy accept our own and perhaps not even our own are we so smart that we always know when we re talking to somebody who has a wiretap on their phone i find the call thru your computer ideas may reflect this attitude ideas that are of by and for hackers and don t help anybody in the real world aren t going to do anybody much good including ourselves where voice phones are concerned we do need an alternative to nsa bugged telephones but we re talking inexpensive telephones here including hand sized cellulars that need strong crypto real privacy make shift computer hacker rigs that require living by your computer to talk privately over the phone are just a dumb stunt that doesn t do anything for anybody s privacy in the real world what we need is a true privacy chip for example a real time voice encryption rsa silicon compile it and spit out asic put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international business diplomats and private communications if the u s bans it we make it somewhere else and import it the japanese german dutch taiwanese korean etc electronics companies don t want the nsa spying on them u s workers lose more jobs to government fascist stupidity jhart agora rain com
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6,699 |
sci.crypt
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screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only date apr gmt from jhart agora rain com jim hart simply everyone should have this attitude the only people who can have this attitude are the most hard core computer hackers who never make phone calls away from their computer in yeards everybody will be talkig into his or her pda anyway that should solve most of the problem
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