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sci.crypt
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re fighting the clipper initiative as a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist i at a loss for specific objections that don t sound frighteningly technical the idea that foisting the cripple chip standard on us manufacturers would result in saying sayonara to yet another high tech market isn t technical isn t in the least difficult to understand and plays on a concern lots of people are worried about already could you expand on this simple if you have a choice between american manufacturers peddling cripple chips with a secret untested algorithm whose keys are held by people with a history of untrustworthy behavoir or japanese to pick the obvious example manufacturers peddling encryption chips with an algorithm that has faced public scrutiny and keys under the control of the user which would you choose at most the american government can deny this choice to american citizens and probably not that if the glorious success of the war on drugs is any example it can t do much about the global market
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni writes just a question as a provider of a public bbs service aren t you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the bbs if police comes with sufficent authorisation i guessed this would be a basic condition for such systems i did run a bbs some time ago but that was in switzerland you are obliged to let the police search the equipment if they have a proper court order you are under no legal obligation to keep the data intelligble if you wish to run your bbs entirely with all data encrypted such that if the police show up they cannot read anything well thats their problem there are no legal restrictions on domestic use of cryptography in the united states yet perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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facinating facts bit serial number possibly fixed s and s denning guvax acc georgetown edu vidkun abraham lauritz quisling writes each chip includes the following components the skipjack encryption algorithm f an bit family key that is common to all chips n a bit serial number u an bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip hmmm a thirty bit serial number and we are told the unit key u is derived deterministically from this serial number that means that there are only one billion possible unit keys to generate the unit key for a serial number n the bit value n is first padded with a fixed bit block to produce a bit block n s and s are then used as keys to triple encrypt n producing a bit block r r e d e n s s s similarly n is padded with two other bit blocks to produce n and n and two additional bit blocks r and r are computed r e d e n s s s r e d e n s s s r r and r are then concatenated together giving bits the first bits are assigned to u and the second bits to u the rest are discarded the unit key u is the xor of u and u u and u are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow agencies hmmm we must assume that generating the unit key u from the serial number n rather than generating it from a randomly selected u and u is an intentional way of assuring a fail safe for the government u is completedly determined given s s and n if s and s do not change they constitute effective master keys along with f the theft of which or the possession of which by various authorities completely obviates the security of the system however more interestingly we know for a fact that if s and s are fixed no matter what the keyspace for u is no more than why not pick u and u at random why this interesting restriction of they key space if it not to provide an additional back door i find it disturbing that at the very best my security is dependant on approximately bytes worth of information that could be written on the back of a napkin even if s and s change periodically the rationale behind this restriction in the size of the keyspace seems strange if one is assuming that the goal is security and makes perfect sense if the goal is an illusion of security if s and s do not change even if they remain secret i wonder if they can somehow be back derived given enough unit key serial number pairs we are assured that this cannot happen but no one understands how skipjack works outside of government officials and soon foreign intelligence services that gain the information via espionage presumably we will eventually have the information as well reverse engineering gets more and more advanced every year but by the time we know it may be too late as a sequence of values for u u and u are generated they are written onto three separate floppy disks the first disk contains a file for each serial number that contains the corresponding key part u the second disk is similar but contains the u values the third disk contains the unit keys u agent takes the first disk and agent takes the second disk the third disk is used to program the chips after the chips are programmed all information is discarded from the vault and the agents leave the laptop may be destroyed for additional assurance that no information is left behind none of this makes me feel the least bit secure the silly notion of destroying the laptop appears to be yet another bizarre distraction we all know that you can t read data from dram that has been turned off for more than a few moments on the other hand what we don t know is why there is a need to generate the unit keys from s and s in the first place other than to weaken the system we don t know if the agents in question would resist a million in cash a piece for their information its probably worth hundreds of million so you can make the bribe arbitrarily hard to resist and to tell you the truth doing this in a vault rather than in joe random tempest shielded room with a laptop computer seems like melodrama designed to make high school dropouts from peoria impressed but it does very little for most of the rest of us the protocol may be changed slightly so that four people are in the room instead of two the first two would provide the seeds s and s and the second two the escrow agents would take the disks back to the escrow agencies what would this provide lets say the escrow agencies are the aclu and the nra and their agents personally take back the disks and are always honest who cares the nsa must be laughing out loud because they have the algorithm to regenerate u given n and likely don t need to steal they keys as they effectively already have them perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr jarvis csri toronto edu lewis eecg toronto edu david lewis writes in article bb c mizzou missouri edu c mizzou missouri edu john kelsey writes strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes stuff deleted but who would trust his her confidential information to an encryption scheme that for say could by cracked one time in a hundred des for all the complaints about a bit key would probably cost several million dollars to build a keysearch machine for i can buy a des keysearch machine off the shelf now for approx k but it is not sold by that name go buy a circuit emulation machine eg quickturn containing a bunch of fpgas say to s and program each to be a des search engine lets say chips running at mhz g tests sec time is e sec max weeks weeks average can t wait that long buy a bigger machine oh but can big brother afford such things in these times of tight budgets i don t know how many folks noticed it but dorothy trust me denning gave a real clue to the current state of the art at nsa on decrypto machines when she said the nsa told her they didn t even want to be the holder of any part of the key now why is that i doubt there is a trapdoor in skipjack but we will never know and i doubt the nsa would promote a mass market chip they couldn t compromise ergo nsa is now capable of compromising probably with brute force keysearch engines of the complexity of skipjack look at the specs why i bet they have thousands of little chips chugging away in their crypto busters maybe even tens of thousands complexity not much more than a how many such machines will fit into fort meade i think pgp should have bit idea keys information farming at for addr phone finger a a the ohio state university jebright magnus acs ohio state edu jim ebright e mail jre osu edu support privacy support encryption
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article a rubin dsg dse beckman com arthur rubin writes in strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes i d be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the nsa for business if they told me it was more secure than des and in particular resistant to attempts by japanese french and other competitive companies and governments to break it s nist not nsa nsa is not supposed to have anything to do with this with all the activity in sci crypt these past few days i am not supprised you missed it nist got skipjack from the nsa i d trust the nsa or the president if they stated there were no trap doors i d be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure i wouldn t trust the nsa i think i would trust the president on this but i m not certain he would be told i am not a crook president richard m nixon information farming at for addr phone finger a a the ohio state university jebright magnus acs ohio state edu jim ebright e mail jre osu edu support privacy support encryption
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption from brad clarinet com brad templeton let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and the other is the eff and i m not entirely joking about those two names i m really not entirely sure i trust eff any more to be honest anyway any organisation can be deeply infiltrated look at cnd in britain a dozen years ago one of their top members was an sis spy who stole their complete address list how hard would it be to get one person to sneak in and copy the escrow data to disk g
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption bred wrote and this means that the fbi will want to track the customer lists of better encryption phones because the only reason a person would want one is to evade the police they don t have to track customer lists they merely have to digitally listen to any phone line and eliminate any that don t have the clipper header signature no one has said how it will be modulated want a bet it s a non standard and hence easily recognisable baudrate devices to scan exchanges and detect modems etc already exist i ve seen them advertised in the trade press once you eliminate crippled crypto devices and ordinary data modems what s left is crypto worth looking more closely at i guess any substitute scheme will have to be v bis or v fast to disguise it though then they just start looking at the data too whatever happens though the effect of this new chip will be to make private crypto stand out like a sore thumb g
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes can you while my mind is on it give us one good reason that the algorithm should be a secret algorithm unless this encryption scheme either is a joke or contains features like a master key or other back door for unauthorized eavesdropping hmm here are a couple if the algorithm becomes known it will be easy to produce pin compatible non crippled chips that provide real encryption and privacy because their keys are only in their users hands since skipjack is a symmetric key cypher it needs some way to agree on a session key the released information says that any protocol may be used e g dh from a theoretical point of view this is probably true however from a practical point of view those chips must have some kind of key exchange protocol built in what if it is good old rsa this will mean that the producer will have to pay lots of bucks to pkp by keeping the details secret this can be avoided regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr bernina ethz ch caronni nessie cs id ethz ch germano caronni writes just a question as a provider of a public bbs service aren t you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the bbs if police comes with sufficent authorisation i guessed this would be a basic condition for such systems i did run a bbs some time ago but that was in switzerland the us doesn t yet have many laws covering bbss they re not common carriers they re not phone companies they re just private machines or services operated by businesses there s no obligation to keep records as perry metzger points out if the police come with a search warrant you have to let them see what the warrant demands if it exists and they generally can confiscate the equipment as evidence which is not constitutionally valid but we re only beginning to develop court cases supporting us a court may be able to compel you to tell them information you know such as the encryption password for the disk there aren t any definitive cases yet since it s a new situation and there probably aren t laws specifically covering it but the court can t force you to know the keys and there are no laws preventing you from allowing your users to have their own keys for their own files without giving them to you even in areas that do have established law there is uncertainty there was a guy in idaho a few years ago who had his business records subpoenaed as evidence for taxes or some other business restriction law so he gave the court the records which were in hebrew the us doesn t have laws forcing you to keep your records in english and these were the originals of the records he didn t speak hebrew and neither did anybody in the court organization don t think they were able to do much about it it might be illegal for your bbs to deny access to potential customers based on race religion national origin gender or sexual preference it probably hasn t been tested in court but it seems like a plausible extension of anti discrimination laws affecting other businesses pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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new reason for clipper alg m secrecy apologies for not posting to alt clipper or whatever but it seems it may not be in the newsfeed here there may be another reason good from nsa s point of view horrible from everyone else s why the algorithm chip design might be secret first note that the experts will only look at details and of just the algorithm in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings why not the chip design well here s the possiblity in addition to encryption the chip pre processes voice signals to make them easier to analyze transcribe electronically the chip once widespread might effectively be part of a massively parallel computer for voice grepping the us phone network or the criminal wrong thinking patrons thereof i wouldn t put it past the nsa think how much easier it would make life for them and if this is indeed the case think of the possible public outcry should it become widely known thus the secrecy it might be a good idea to have experts in dsp voice recognition and ai conversation understanding to be on that panel and insist they be given authenticatable design specs and implementation documentation dwight tuinstra best tuinstra sandman ece clarkson edu tolerable tuinstrd craft camp clarkson edu look out kid it s something that you did god knows when but you re doin it again
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sci.crypt
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facinating facts bit serial number possibly fixed s and s hmmm we must assume that generating the unit key u from the serial number n rather than generating it from a randomly selected u and u is an intentional way of assuring a fail safe for the government u is completedly determined given s s and n if s and s do not change they constitute effective master keys along with f the theft of which or the possession of which by various authorities completely obviates the security of the system however more interestingly we know for a fact that if s and s are fixed no matter what the keyspace for u is no more than why not pick u and u at random why this interesting restriction of they key space if it not to provide an additional back door i find it disturbing that at the very best my security is dependant on approximately bytes worth of information that could be written on the back of a napkin even if s and s change periodically the rationale behind this restriction in the size of the keyspace seems strange if one is assuming that the goal is security and makes perfect sense if the goal is an illusion of security if s and s do not change even if they remain secret i wonder if they can somehow be back derived given enough unit key serial number pairs we are assured that this cannot happen but no one understands how skipjack works outside of government officials and soon foreign intelligence services that gain the information via espionage presumably we will eventually have the information as well reverse engineering gets more and more advanced every year but by the time we know it may be too late perhaps the trusted escrow agencies can be the ones who come up with s and s and if these agencies are really trusted aclu nra is an interesting example we can hope that they ll use some physical process to come up with truly random numbers if the nsa comes up with the numbers that s a trap door you could drive a truck through none of this makes me feel the least bit secure me either it seems from the following that the cpsr is atleats starting to question this bogosity april washington dc computer professionals call for public debate on new government encryption initiative computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr today called for the public disclosure of technical data underlying the government s newly announced public encryption management initiative the new cryptography scheme was announced today by the white house and the national institute for standards and technology nist which will implement the technical specifications of the plan a nist spokesman acknowledged that the national security agency nsa the super secret military intelligence agency had actually developed the encryption technology around which the new initiative is built according to nist the technical specifications and the presidential directive establishing the plan are classified to open the initiative to public review and debate cpsr today filed a series of freedom of information act foia requests with key agencies including nsa nist the national security council and the fbi for information relating to the encryption plan the cpsr requests are in keeping with the spirit of the computer security act which congress passed in in order to open the development of non military computer security standards to public scrutiny and to limit nsa s role in the creation of such standards cpsr previously has questioned the role of nsa in developing the so called digital signature standard dss a communications authentication technology that nist proposed for government wide use in after cpsr sued nist in a foia lawsuit last year the civilian agency disclosed for the first time that nsa had in fact developed that security standard nsa is due to file papers in federal court next week justifying the classification of records concerning its creation of the dss david sobel cpsr legal counsel called the administration s apparent commitment to the privacy of electronic communications as reflected in today s official statement a step in the right direction but he questioned the propriety of nsa s role in the process and the apparent secrecy that has thus far shielded the development process from public scrutiny at a time when we are moving towards the development of a new information infrastructure it is vital that standards designed to protect personal privacy be established openly and with full public participation it is not appropriate for nsa an agency with a long tradition of secrecy and opposition to effective civilian cryptography to play a leading role in the development process cpsr is a national public interest alliance of computer industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of technology on society cpsr has chapters in the u s and maintains offices in palo alto california cambridge massachusetts and washington dc for additional information on cpsr call or e mail cpsr csli stanford edu regards ian ameline
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stray thought was re more technical details in apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes date sun apr edt from denning cs georgetown edu dorothy denning the clipper chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in the algorithm operates on bit blocks like des and the chip supports all des modes of operation the algorithm uses rounds of scrambling compared with in des so in a few years there could be millions of these chips in the usa all networked together sounds like a good science fiction story the government wants to crack foreign des or whatever messages so they con the public into individually buying all of the components and installing them soon the us could be covered by the largest parallel computer in the world built on top of our current phone net those who suppress freedom always rob quinn do so in the name of law rjq phys ksu edu and order john lindsay quinnbob ksuvm bitnet
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sci.crypt
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list of large integer arithmetic packages this is the file bignums txt from ripem msu edu last updated april in response to email requests i have assembled this list of large integer arithmetic packages of which i have heard most of these are c function libraries available in source form for your convenience i have placed copies of some of these on ripem msu edu they are available for anonymous ftp in the directory pub bignum however what i have may not be the most current version in all cases here they are in no particular order mp multiple precision package that comes with some unixes multiple precision package accessed via lmp flag on your compiler provides gcd exponentiation sqrt comes with sunos next mach bbn mach and probably a few others see man mp object code only of course pari henri cohen et al universite bordeaux i paris france multiple precision desk calculator and library routines contains optimized assembly code for motorola semi optimized code for sparc and apparently rather slow generic c version does both integers and reals does vectors and matrices as well as scalars contains a number of advanced functions some of which i ve never heard of weber s function has a factorization function primality test other related stuff plenty of tex documentation public domain but you can t distribute modified versions available via anonymous ftp from math ucla edu there seem to be mac and next specific versions there in addition to filename pari a tar z arithmetic in global fields arith kevin r coombes david r grant package of routines for arbitrary precision integers or polynomials over finite fields includes basic and a few others like gcd source code in c distributed under the terms of the gnu public license includes man pages and tex documentation filename arith tar z arbitrary precision math library lloyd zusman los gatos ca c package which supports basic provides for radix points i e non integers not as polished as the others here posted to comp sources misc in october filename apml tar z bignum j vuillemin inria france and others distributed by digital equipment paris research lab decprl a portable and efficient arbitrary precision integer package c code with generic c kernel plus assembly kernels for mc x intel i mips ns pyramid and of course vax this is probably one of the better known packages of this type implements mod plus logical operations or and xor both signed and unsigned arithmetic available available via email from librarian decprl dec com you will receive shell archives give your postal address and you will also receive printed documentation from france package includes tex documentation publicly available for non commercial use i removed this from my archive when i heard a rumor that prl doesn t like others to distribute it however bignum is distributed as part of ecpp see below lenstra s package arjen lenstra bellcore portable unsigned integer package written entirely in c includes exponentiation mod primality testing sqrt random number generator and a few others the package was uncommented and undocumented i have tried to add enough comments to get by this is the only of these packages that i have actually used it works well and is very portable i haven t done any benchmarks against the others but the code looks clever lenstra is an accomplished number theorist unlike the other packages here this one requires you to allocate storage statically only a problem if your numbers are really huge arjen has placed the code in the public domain filename lenstra tar z lenstra arjen lenstra bellcore an improved version of arjen s package above this one does signed arithmetic and dynamic allocation which can be turned off as an option has a few new routines too lenstra contains minor bugfixes to the previously available lenstra and lenstra filename lenstra c bmp brent s multiple precision r p brent vintage fortran code to do extended precision floating fixed point arithmetic includes most of the mathematical functions you d find in a fortran run time library this code is an acm algorithm number to obtain send a mail message to netlib ornl gov containing the line send mp f from bmp or better yet perhaps just start with help spx kannan alagappan joseph tardo dec this is a huge prototype public key authentication system based on rsa i mention it here because those who have heard of spx have probably correctly guessed that it contains a large integer package and i want to inform you that the large integer package it contains is indeed dec s bignum from france you can get a beta test copy of spx from crl dec com use it only for testing as it may expire on a certain date i don t know whether this has expired yet amp antti s multiple precision antti louko alo kampi hut fi multiple precision integer package in c includes pow mod x mod y random sqrt gcd available for non commercial use the package includes share secret a public key system based on the diffie hellman algorithm this is normally part of the well known des dist tar z but i have removed the des part to avoid having to deal with cryptographic export laws and have named the result filename amp tar z gennum per bothner u of wisconsin madison c routines and classes to do generic arithmetic both integer and rational formerly available on sevenlayer cs wis edu however it seems to have disappeared sorry miracl by someone in dublin ireland integer and fractional multiple precision package includes factorization primality testing encryption not public domain apparently it is available from the austin code works see ads in byte magazine or dr dobbs precision dave barrett barrettd tigger colorado edu multiple precision integer package in c with sqrt rand mod pow log simple vector support does dynamic allocation of memory free as long as you don t sell it or any program that uses it filename precision tar z ubasic prof yuji kida rikkyo university nishi ikebukuro tokyo japan kida rkmath rikkyo ac jp multiple precision version of the basic programming language for ms dos includes floating point said by keith briggs to be pretty fast object only i think ervin morekypr bitnet says this is the best package that i know of for fast arithmetic has a version optimized for machines includes routines to do mpqs the fastest currently known general factoring algorithm an additional file is at both sites to allow mpqs to use hard drives so that it can factor up to digits many number theoretical functions are included in ubasic it allows over digits of precision available via anonymous ftp from shape mps ohio state edu or simtel army mil or wuarchive wustl edu calc v unknown ms dos c like language that allows infinite precision nice intrinsic functions ervin morekypr bitnet reports problems when changing precision on the fly see simtel or wuarchive briggs arith keith briggs kbriggs mundoe maths mu oz au turbo pascal source for routines that do multiple precision sqrt gcd factoring rand for integers also includes and rand for rational numbers filename briggs arith pas institute fur experimentelle mathematik dr gerhard schneider fast c multiple precision subroutine library i don t know anything about it sl ely cl cam ac uk says to contact mat de hrz a bitnet for more info postal address institute fur experimentelle mathematik ellernstr d essen germany longint markus mueller mueller komsys tik ethz ch multi precision arithmetic written in modula with the most time critical parts written in assembler includes basic arithmetics as well as arithmetics modulo a number an additional module provides a collection of procedures for primality testing gcd multiplicative inverse and more the package is part of a privacy enhanced mail pem package which includes a pem mailer rsa key generator and certificate generation tools source is in modula c and assembler for sun longint has also been ported to ms dos under logitech modula and turbo assembler availability free for university use research and education otherwise a source license is required to obtain write or email to markus mueller bertastrasse ch dietikon switzerland email mueller komsys tik ethz ch bignum henrik johansson nexus comm se bignum package written in portable c will in the future conform to the common lisp functions that handles integers currently includes exponentiation exptmod comparison random numbers and gcd filename bignum gnu multiple precision gnu free software foundation multiple precision package i haven t looked at it yet this is current as of april but there may be a more recent version by the time you read this this package is very widely available on ftp sites filename gmp tar z elliptic curve primality proving francois morian france large package to prove the primality of any prime includes inria s bignum package obtained from ftp inria fr filename ecpp v tar z pgp pretty good privacy philip zimmermann prz sage cgd ucar edu intel based crypto package that includes bignum routines in c said to be quite fast for intel processors unix and mac versions also available the crypto package violates rsa patents but the bignum routines can be used without fear of legal repercussions bell s arbitrary precision calculator david i bell australia dbell pdact pd necisa oz au arbitrary precision calculator with good online help c like language many builtin functions support for integers rational numbers they work like floating point complex numbers matrices strings lists files objects includes gcd primality testing even trig functions recommended large package though obtained from comp sources unix filename calc tar z built in support in other languages various multiple precision arithmetic is available in a number of programming languages such as lisp and abc cf mcsun eu net perl by larry wall available from devvax jpl nasa gov includes source in perl for such a package but it s probably not suitable for serious use for some of these source code may be available this list is long enough so i m not going to pursue it aggressively thanks to ed vielmetti and several others who contributed to this list mark riordan mrr ripem msu edu
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption nobody seems to have noticed that the clipper chip must have been under development for considerably longer than the months that clinton has been president this is not something that choosing choosing bush over clinton would have changed in the slightest it has been in the works for some time
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re facinating facts bit serial number possibly fixed s and s from pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger denning guvax acc georgetown edu vidkun abraham lauritz quisling writes each chip includes the following components the skipjack encryption algorithm f an bit family key that is common to all chips n a bit serial number u an bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip hmmm a thirty bit serial number and we are told the unit key u is derived deterministically from this serial number that means that there are only one billion possible unit keys oh hell it s much worse than that you think they ll ever make more than a million of them serial numbers aren t handed out at random you know they start at and work up call it a bit space maybe g
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re clipper chip technical details in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes nothing was said about where k p comes from if you ve got a secure device you don t need public keys if the secret key which all chips share is sk you can just use kp e myname yourname date sk maybe that s why jim bidzos was reported as being cheesed off ross
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re once tapped your code is no good any more with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from i could independently invent about half a dozen right off the top of my head if i had studied advanced e m a little better i could probably come up with a very good system wouldn t a a second monitor of similar type scrolling gibberish and adjacent to the one being used provide reasonable resistance to tempest attacks rob stampfli rob colnet cmhnet org the neat thing about standards ham radio kd wk n jyv oh there are so many to choose from
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re the old key registration idea in article qn ic hp access digex net pcw access digex com peter wayner writes that leads me to conjecture that the system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks i seriously doubt that any practical implementation of this proposal would place the onus on the individual to register keys realistically the clipper chip will probably emit an id code which will serve as the identifier when requesting the key fragments the chip manufacturer would register this identifier code vs key combination when the chip is made and the uninitiated end user can therefore remain completely outside the loop the chip could be used in a cellular phone a modem or other device it really makes no difference when the authorities detect the use of this encryption standard during surveillance they would then capture the id and apply for the key in order to decrypt the data rob stampfli rob colnet cmhnet org the neat thing about standards ham radio kd wk n jyv oh there are so many to choose from
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re once tapped your code is no good any more pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good please note that bill clinton probably has little if anything to do with the design implementation or reasoning behind this chip or behind any moves being made using this chip as a pawn remember when you elect a president of the united states it s not the case that all the republicans etc in the nsa and fbi and cia immediately pack their bags and get replaced by a team of fresh young democrats most of the government say is appointed or hired rather than elected since this clipper device has been in production for over six months it probably has little or no foundation in the currently elected democratic executive body btw those who suggest that this is just an attack on clinton believe this i would be going ballistic reagardless who seriously proposed this thing it is just another step in a gradual erosion of our rights under the constitution or bill of rights the last couple of decades have been a non stop series of end runs around the protections of the constitution it has to stop now is as good a time as any if it isn t too late allready could be however the sky hasn t fallen yet chicken little pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it in article ygoland wright the jester writes proof windows is a virus it is very widespread it eats up your disk space it slows down your computer it takes control over your computer it performs disk access at random times it displays silly messages on your screen it randomly crashes the computer vesselin this sounds like a version unix solaris
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spoofing clipper serial number secrecy in clipper chip the serial number of the clipper chip is encrypted with the system key and transmitted as one part of a three part message presumably the protocol can be recovered if by nothing else differential analysis postulate if you will a chip or logic sitting between the clipper chip and its communications channel the purpose of this chip is twofold transmit channel the spoof chip xors the bit encrypted serial number with a secondary keying variable this renders the serial number unrecoverable with just the system key recieve channel the spoof chip xors the incoming encrypted serial number with a secondary keying variable assuming the serial number is necessary for local operation this has the net result of hiding the serial number this gets more interesting when the number of serial numbers issued becomes large making it difficult to distinguish between valid serial numbers and a spoofed serial number without knowing the system key you could lie about the serial number but risk detection of the lie if you had the system key and the encryption algorithm you could successfully lie with a lower probability of detection by emulating the format of your own serial number makes you wonder whats being hidden here seems like the secrecy is to prevent you from lying about who you are
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how large are commercial keys what are the typical sizes for keys for commercial secret key algorithms i know des is bits tripple des is bits and idea is bits is there anything made in the us that has bit keys anything anywhere that has larger keys i ve heard that rc can be scaled to arbitrarily large keys but is this actually implemented anywhere finally can anyone even concieve of a time place where bit keys aren t sufficient i certainly can t even at a trillion keys a second it would take about billion years to search just one billionth of that keys space thanks dane
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security pmetzger snark shearson com perry e metzger writes if the clipper chip can do cheap crypto for the masses obviously one could do the same thing without building in back doors i agree so why is cylink the only and expensive game in town note i think cylink is great and if my boss would double my salary i d buy a bunch of their stuff one thing that clipper offers is interoperability at a higher degree of security than we currently have in non proprietary voice encryption systems this means it will be cheaper than anyone s proprietary scheme and easier to deploy this is of course either a bug or a feature depending on how you look at it indeed even without special engineering you can construct a good system right now a standard codec chip a chip to do vocoding a des chip a v bis integrated modem module and a small processor to do glue work are all you need to have a secure phone great where can i buy it another note if clipper increases the incentive to bring stronger encryption to the mass market all the better it s far overpriced at the moment yes cheap crypto is good but we don t need it from the government i don t care where we need to get it from i care where we can get it from and whether it will interoperate with everyone else indeed were it not for the government doing everything possible to stop them qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to the cdma cellular phone system they are pioneering were it not for the nsa and company cheap encryption systems would be everywhere as it is they try every trick in the book to stop it had it not been for them i m sure cheap secure phones would be out right now you can build them right now as long as you don t want to export a restriction i firmly oppose the only thing stopping people from making cheap encryption is greed they want a lock on the market they aren t the ones making cheap crypto available they are the ones keeping cheap crypto out of people s hands when they hand you a clipper chip what you are getting is a mess of pottage your prize for having traded in your birthright oh come on only if you trust it farther than it deserves a clipper phone is not a substitute for a cylink phone or a stu iii it s a substitute for the voice scramblers advertised in the back of radio electronics are we getting cheaper crypto for ourselves no because the market would have provided that on its own had they not deliberately sabotaged it i disagree modulo itar it s not the government that has sabotaged the market someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography can you tell me where exactly we have given up that right amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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clipper considered harmful if clipper comes to cellular phones along with legal proscriptions against using other cipher systems on these phones a new and potentially dangerous class of crime is created criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed once a suitable collection of devices is stolen criminals can communicate with impunity assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from key escrow until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means because life is cheap criminals are currently willing to kill people to steal very large and conspicuous property luxury cars it is reasonable to assume that they will be willing to kill people to steal small and inconspicuous property a cipher cellular phone just as we have seen in the past with blue box technology and in the present with modified cellular phones we can expect to see among high stakes criminals a lucrative market for stolen cipher phones which can be used for a few days the high stakes criminals will pay the life is cheap types substantial amounts for stolen instruments because a person is typically discovered as missing or dead in a few days a stolen instrument will be usable for only a few days there will be a continuing demand for fresh phones fresh bodies in other words clipper and similar systems have the potential to turn a current inconvenience to law enforcement into a direct vicious and persistent threat to the general public on the other hand if a criminal were to apply some arbitrary cipher to a device in a mostly non ciphered network the communication will at least stand out as being unusual and perhaps worthy of other means of investigation finally because there is essentially no possibility of intercepting in realtime the scrutable content of communications between stolen instruments there will exist strong motivation to record and archive all communications in the network for ex post facto scrutiny once some criminal act is discovered and the instruments involved have been identified while recording and archiving may not be feasible for wireline networks it is probably feasible across the more limited bandwidth of radio networks the existence of these recordings could open up vast potential for abuse brad yearwood brad optilink com uunet pyramid optilink brad petaluma ca
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr colnet cmhnet org res colnet cmhnet org rob stampfli writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from i could independently invent about half a dozen right off the top of my head if i had studied advanced e m a little better i could probably come up with a very good system wouldn t a a second monitor of similar type scrolling gibberish and adjacent to the one being used provide reasonable resistance to tempest attacks actually old video games and pinball machines are supposed to work pretty good at blocking em eavesdropping too those things put out a lot of em noise back in the s i read about computer companies putting bunches of games in their buildings for just this purpose not to mention the dane
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re is there any security in the clipper in article zeev apr sepia ccc amdahl com zeev ccc amdahl com ze ev wurman writes it seems to me that all discussions about clipper security are almost irrelevant if i cannot choose the key but have to use a key chosen for me by the foundry the security of the whole universe of users is as good or as bad as the security of vlsi technologies inc or their handlers it is a trivial effort to run any ciphertext agains all the keys ever manufactured after all we are talking about to million keys that will ever be manufactured the key depositories can be as secure and incorruptible as they wish to be nobody cares anyway they key depositories are irrelevant in order for the applicable law enformcement agencies to be able to know what keys to request from escrow the system will have to squawk its serial number in clear text as part of the link establishment protocol whoever owns the program that assigns keys to each serial number won t need access to the key depository in other words the fbi may need a court ordered release of escrowed keys but the nsa has the keys before the chip is ever manufactured there is no need to go through the escrow or to try all keys while relations between law enforment agencies have sometimes been strained there is also a long history of trading favors this will re establish the nsa as a very important agency for everyone to get along with because they can give you untraceable encryption leaks without court orders the more i think about this affair the fouler it smells i d rather have a des with an engineered in backdoor lars poulsen smts software engineer internet e mail lars cmc com cmc network products rockwell int l telephone santa barbara ca telefax
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks jhart agora rain com jim hart writes you don t care that people are being lied to fooled into believing the chip gives privacy when it fact it allows wiretaps it does give privacy just not absolute privacy the announcement was very up front about this and about allowing wiretaps how is this fooling anyone are you so smart that you know when you re talking to somebody who has a wiretap chip on their phone instead of a privacy chip with private keys sure the two don t interoperate you couldn t talk to say a cylink phone from a clipper phone i would expect even multiprotocal phones to come with indicators saying which kind of link encryption is in use we do need an alternative to nsa bugged telephones but we re talking inexpensive telephones here including hand sized cellulars that need strong crypto real privacy so start a company and build them this is still mostly a capitalist economy what we need is a true privacy chip for example a real time voice encryption rsa put it into a silicon compiler and spit out asic put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international business diplomats and private communications i agree go for it amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption ted dunning ted nmsu edu wrote nobody seems to have noticed that the clipper chip must have been under development for considerably longer than the months that clinton has been president this is not something that choosing choosing bush over clinton would have changed in the slightest it has been in the works for some time actually many of us have noted this we have noted that the program started at least years ago that the contracts with vlsi technology and microtoxin were let at least months ago that production of the chips is well underway and so forth nobody i know has claimed clinton intitiated the program but he chose to go ahead with it tim may timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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clipper business as usual notwithstanding all the legitimate fuss about this proposal how much of a change is it att s last product in this area a was priced over as i suspect clipper phones will be b came to the customer with the key automatically preregistered with government authorities thus aside from attempting to further legitimize and solidify the fed s posture clipper seems to be more of the same rather than a new direction yes technology will eventually drive the cost down and thereby promote more widespread use but at present the man on the street is not going to purchase a crypto telephone especially when the guy on the other end probably doesn t have one anyway am i missing something the real question is what the gov will do in a year or two when air tight voice privacy on a phone line is as close as your nearest pc that has got to a problematic scenario for them even if the extent of usage never surpasses the underground stature of pgp ray berry kb ht ray ole cdac com rjberry eskimo com compuserve com
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from tempest surveillance are still classified as far as i know note that tempest is the name of the shielding standard tempest is not the name of the surveillance technique ken shirriff shirriff sprite berkeley edu disclaimer this is what i ve heard and it s in the sci crypt faq so it s probably true but i can t guarantee it i d like to know if i m wrong
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes whatever happens though the effect of this new chip will be to make private crypto stand out like a sore thumb it already does amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption but if you are making custom equipment in any case why not just roll your own clipper implementation and report the wrong keys to the escrow agency tells us who is going to be in the chip business if this thing goes through nsa and those with something to hide from nsa if anyone can verify that your phone is not using the key registered to that serial number either they have a court ordered wiretap but what are they going to do tell the judge that this individual really does have privacy all they know is that the keys are not enough but not why they have a court ordered wiretap on a phone in this series this part is really scary since the expectation is that all chips in a particular batch will uses seeds based on the same s and s and the serial number getting the keys for one of a batch may give access to all there is a backdoor which allows all messages to be deciphered without the keys i find this one especially threatening since the scheme seems very open to known plaintext attacks what i need to decipher is the data in the header if i talk to someone who has one of these phones presumably there will be an automatically negotiated key generated i m not trying to decipher the record of the conversation to know what was said i use it as a known plaintext to recover the backdoor represented by the header but i know what the header says for conversations i participate in even worse if the phones in a series have related keys i can buy a phone chip from the same production lot then i can recover its keys either elegantly by talking to myself or by brute force analysis of the actual chip then apply the key generation process with those seeds to find the target keys hmmm i don t think i want to ever come close to these phones even des is starting to look good two cans and a string will provide much better security robert i eachus with standard disclaimer use standard disclaimer function message text in clever ideas return better ideas is
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tempest vs lcd was re once tapped douglas craig holland holland cs colostate edu writes with e mail if they can t break your pgp encryption they ll just call up one of their tempest trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal note that measures to protect yourself from tempest surveillance are still classified as far as i know steiner jupiter cse utoledo edu jason think steiner writes are lcd displays vulnerable to tempest i can see high voltage type display devices being vulnerable crts plasma displays etc but jason beat me to this question what about em radiation from low voltage items like lcd displays perhaps the critical element is the driver circuitry the cabling what about a portable pc mac etc where all the noise is bunched into one tiny area
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr magnus acs ohio state edu jebright magnus acs ohio state edu james r ebright writes now why is that i doubt there is a trapdoor in skipjack but we will never know and i doubt the nsa would promote a mass market chip they couldn t compromise ergo nsa is now capable of compromising probably with brute force keysearch engines of the complexity of skipjack look at the specs why i bet they have thousands of little chips chugging away in their crypto busters maybe even tens of thousands complexity not much more than a how many such machines will fit into fort meade i think pgp should have bit idea keys thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys let s assume a brute force engine like that hypothesized for des microsecond per trial million chips that s trials per second or about years for trials well maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond and build a machine with million chips sure only years for each solution idea uses bit keys shall i bother doing the calculations for you hint multiply years by and you can t do idea at that speed key setup takes much too long i wouldn t be surprised if that were the case for skipjack too though there s no way of knowing just yet des used only xor because that s what was feasible with mid s technology modern chips can do a lot more nsa may or may not know how to crack skipjack and idea i doubt it for the former i have no idea for the latter though it does seem to be a strong cryptosystem but it ain t gonna be by exhaustive search
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article apr coop com felixg coop com felix gallo writes pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good please note that bill clinton probably has little if anything to do with the design implementation or reasoning behind this chip or behind can t we move the political bickering to a more appropriate group brad kepley internet kepley photon phys unca edu work days voice
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re clipper considered harmful brad optilink com brad yearwood writes criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications specificall the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed why doing it in such a rough manner it is much more professional to steal the chip from the phone and even to replace it with a pin compatible do nothing chip that does not encrypt at all chances are that the victim will not notice anything especially if it is done professionally once a suitable collection of devices is stolen criminals can communicate with impunity assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from key escrow until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means no because the feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations true they ll blame the wrong guys but nevertheless one cannot say something like the drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship terminus when the feds are listening even if they cannot identify who the speaker is no the criminals will just use some secure encryption the new proposal does not stop criminals it ensures that the government will be able to wiretap the average citizen and stops the casual snooper to me it also clearly looks as a step towards outlawing any other strong encryption devices regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re how large are commercial keys butzerd maumee eng ohio state edu dane c butzer writes finally can anyone even concieve of a time place where bit keys aren t sufficient it depends on the algorithm used bit secret keys for rsa are definitively not secure enough regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only jfc athena mit edu john f carr writes in article almaden ibm com ameline vnet ibm com ian ameline writes i also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread the chip and algorithm are classified if you reverse engineer it and tell people you are likely to go to jail well i m not a lawyer but from what i can tell this is completely and utterly untrue you see this country has this thing called a constitution if you legitimately aquire the device and you yourself are not a government employee or otherwise encumbered i don t think they can stop you from revealing anything about the device you can determine remember the pentagon papers precedent the first amendment applies here the u s does not have an official secrets act we do have laws that will punish you for revealing what classified information you learned in your capacity as a government official contractor etc and we have laws that prohibit stealing such information however if they sell you the chip i can t see that they can make reverse engineering it and revealing the details illegal perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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re how does it really work was re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption from marc vanheyningen mvanheyn cs indiana edu the majority of the discussion involving this clipper chip seems to pertain to the encryption of telephone conversations does anyone know if that means this chip is designed to work primarily with analog signals the language sort of suggests this but it s hard to say i d lay a few bucks that its just data in data out in parallel i suspect to make it a phone you d need a codec and speech compression there would be a loss of bandwidth on the speech signal which i suspect would scupper any of the suggestions i ve seen here about putting a different encryption front end on it there s no hint of any modulation scheme in the docs i m sure it s purely a digital chip the back end will come later but i m positive it won t be left to the manufacturers they all have to be the same modulation scheme to make it easy for the nsa to tap them the only other possibility is that this is intended only for isdn phones puts a whole new spin on effs obsession about isdn if true bwahahaha g
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article rwing uucp pat rwing uucp pat myrto writes if the clinton clipper is so very good why not make its algrithm public so many people can exchange ideas and examine it rather than a few isolated respected experts respected by whom for what perhaps a certain professor who likes key banks would be one of the selected experts this does seem to expand on some ideas the person was advocating if i recall how would anybody know that what the actually i am completely baffled by why dorothy denning has chosen to throw away her academic respectability like this it looks to me like a major career limiting move there can be very few people who know what she s been saying who take her seriously any more i wonder if she landed such a fat fee from cooperation with the nsa in the design and propoganda stages that she doesn t care any more g
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re clipper chip from dan mckinnon dan mckinnon canrem com i have lurked here a bit lately and though some of the math is unknown to me found it interesting i thought i would post an article i found in the saturday april toronto star clipper chip to protect privacy politics is of course dirty pool old man and here we have a classic example the nsa and the administration have been working on this for a long time and in parallel with the announcement to us techies we see they re hitting the press with propoganda it s my bet the big magazines byte scientific american et all will be ready to run with a pre written government slanted story on this in the next issue just keep us some pages spare boys we ll give you the copy in time for the presses we must get big names in the industry to write well argued pieces against this proposal can you call it that when it s a de facto announcement and get them into the big magazines before too much damage is done it would be well worth folks archiving all the discussions from here since the day of the announcement to keep all the arguments at our fingertips i think between us we could write quite a good piece now who among us carries enough clout to guarantee publication phil don parker mitch kapor g
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow gtoal news ibmpcug co uk graham toal writes try reading between the lines david there are strong hints in there that they re angling for nren next where i honestly didn t see any hint sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption hint this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens very big hint the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice very big hint see above since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use and the only conceivable meaning of applying this particular technology to a computer network is that they intend it to be used in exclusion to any other means of encryption i disagree if for no other reason than that there are already other standards in place besides even if they restrict encryption on the nren who cares most of the internet is commercial anyway the nren is only for geovernment and university research read the proposals it s a data superhighway for cray users not anything having to do with the internet oh i see your point i think you re wrong but if you sit back and wait to find out if i m right it ll be too late just listen very carefully for the first such and such will not be permitted on network xyz shoe to drop g
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re the secret source of that announcement in article marc apr oliver mit edu marc mit edu marc horowitz n nzu writes just who is that i asked myself or rather i asked the computer telnet csrc ncsl nist gov trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first org sendmail nist ready at sat apr edt expn clipper csspab mail gw ncsl nist gov first org closing connection connection closed well isn t that interesting dorothy denning mitch kapor even more interesting the smtp server at csrc ncsl nist gov no longer recognizes the expn and vrfy commands telnet csrc ncsl nist gov smtp trying connected to csrc ncsl nist gov escape character is first org sendmail nist ready at tue apr edt expn clipper command unrecognized seems like sombody didn t like your snooping around marc jurgen botz jbotz mtholyoke edu vending machines should respond to a finger south hadley ma usa request with a list of all items currently unix is dead long live unix available for purchase rfc
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption ted nmsu edu ted dunning writes nobody seems to have noticed that the clipper chip must have been under development for considerably longer than the months that clinton has been president this is not something that choosing choosing bush over clinton would have changed in the slightest it has been in the works for some time i ve got no doubts that this would probably have gone ahead if bush was still president what s puzzling to me are the people who are apparently amazed that clinton is going along with it other than that mrs lincoln how did you like the play
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another key registration body bites the dust imho one of the candidates that has been suggested for a key registration body is the aclu i think this is poor choice the aclu is essentially a group of auditors they audit how people s civil liberties are administered traditionally auditors do not like to get involved in the design or operational aspects of things and with good reason when i was a systems programmer it always infuriated me that the auditors would come in and tell us our implementation stunk from a security point of view but wouldn t tell us how to fix it i always figured they just liked to critcize without doing the work to help fix the problem then i took a stint as an auditor and i found out the real reason auditors don t like to recommend solutions because it puts them in a bad position if they have to criticize the implementation later the auditee can say well you told us this way would be ok it compromises the independence that is a necessary part of the auditor s job taking the case at hand suppose aclu becomes a key half registrar suppose that perhaps through some error on aclu s part a key half gets away that shouldn t and is used to deprive someone of her civil liberties the aclu gets wind of this and wants to take it to court but they end up being at the same time on the side of the defendant and of the plaintiff which is not an easy position to be in there are exceptions to the complete independence of auditors at one place where i worked when payroll checks were printed they were signed automatically by a signature drum on the bursting machine this drum was kept by the auditors who also kept the check stock and was brought down to data processing when it was time to do the checks i believe the difference between this situation and the key registration situation is that it is fairly obvious when it is time to do the payroll checks if they were done yesterday and someone wants to do them again today he better be able to produce yesterday s checks so that they can be destroyed determining which of the many requests for key halves are legit is a trickier process one much more prone to mistakes that could put the aclu in a protecting the client versus protecting the aclu conflict of interest as always my opinions are my own lynn grant grant dockmaster ncsc mil
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes responding to claims about skipjack cracking engines thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys let s assume a brute force engine like that hypothesized for des microsecond per trial million chips that s trials per second or about years for trials well maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond and build a machine with million chips sure only years for each solution i think i should also point out that the mystical des engines are known plaintext engines unless you add a ton of really smart hardware the plaintext is digitized voice and exists for a very short time probably in a couple inches of copper tops it s flatly not available your bug in my office can hear my voice and even digitize it but it s going to get a different bitstream it is horribly naive to suppose that regular folks can figure out how to crack skipjack or clipper based telephones i m certainly not devoting a great deal of thought to it andrew molitor
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estimating wiretap costs benefits i m attempting to write a serious policy paper examining whether the proposed wiretap or clipper chip is a cost effective tool for police investigation that is ignoring concerns about government intrusions into individual privacy is the value of easy wiretaps to investigators greater than the cost to the communications industry and their customers to support this wiretap technology a rough estimate suggests that wiretaps are worth about five million dollars per year to u s law enforcement agencies in u s wiretaps led to arrests while total police expenditures of billion led to million arrests ref us statistical abstracts i m working on estimating this wiretap benefit more accurately but i d like to ask hardware experts out there to help me with estimating the costs of the new proposed wiretap technology please send me quotable citeable estimates for how many chips which would need to be made per year to keep all phones with wiretap chips how much would it cost to make each chip how much did it cost to develop this technology in the first place how much more would supporting hardware people etc cost per chip what percentage cheaper would encryption chips and support have been if private enterprise could compete to meet customer encryption needs what percentage of phone traffic would be taken up by the proposed law enforcement blocks what is the total cost of handling all phone traffic per year put another way the question i m asking is what if each police agency that wanted a particular wiretap had to pay for it being charged their share of the full social cost of forcing communication to be wiretap compatible would they choose to buy such wiretaps or would they find it more cost effective to instead investigate crimes in other ways robin hanson hanson ptolemy arc nasa gov ms nasa ames research center moffett field ca male terrace fremont ca
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exportability of pkzip was re rc vesselin bontchev bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes markowitz dockmaster ncsc mil writes it is interesting to note in this regard that permission to export pkzip s encryption scheme has twice been denied by nsa draw you own conclusions uh i m afraid that your information is slightly out of date pkware has obtained a license to export their program to the whole world except a very limited list of countries draw your own conclusions about the strength of the algorithm sorry if i was less than clear i was referring to our own efforts to receive export permission from nsa for the pkzip encryption algorithm not to any effort on the part of phil katz or pkware i should point out that the original version of this algorithm was designed by roger schlafly and that we meaning roger and myself were twice denied an export license for it the second go round was just this past fall i had no knowledge of phil s attempts in this i do not even know for sure if he choose to implement the algorithm as it was designed by roger though i believe that was at least the case for versions prior to and then there s the question of key management and even if our applications were identical there is no reason to assume the nsa would treat them that way mjm michael j markowitz vp r d markowitz dockmaster ncsc mil information security corp fax lake cook rd suite d mci deerfield il cis
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article r otuinndb dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes the plaintext is digitized voice and exists for a very short time probably in a couple inches of copper tops it s flatly not available your bug in my office can hear my voice and even digitize it but it s going to get a different bitstream i am an idiot the plaintext that s relevant is the session key if you know that you probably don t need a roomful of chips do you if you were going to brute force something interesting that d be the message stream which is sort of approximately known by say a bug in my office then your roomful of chips could get the session key which i change every morning really it s just a whole lot easier for the illicit wiretappers to stick a bug in your phone andrew molitor
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re clipper considered harmful brad optilink com brad yearwood writes if clipper comes to cellular phones along with legal proscriptions against using other cipher systems on these phones a new and potentially dangerous class of crime is created criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed yow get some sleep brad you mean that people i e life is cheap terrorists drug dealing warlords who want to communicate in privacy will prefer to break into my house kill or kidnap me and steal my telephone rather than spending at k mart to buy a new phone purchasing a load of phones from the black market flea market super market talking gasp face to face walking down to any one of millions of pay phones using messengers going to excruciating effort to think of code phrases like i had a blowout on the freeway today look this system does nothing to threaten folks who know they re being wiretapped since it s trivial to find other avenues of communication they d have no reason to resort to extreme measures since a plethora of simple alternatives are easily available to them among all the legitimate reasons to damn the proposed system i don t think we need to worry about terrorist commie drug warlord assasin thugs murdering our families kicking the dog and leaving the toilet seat up just to steal a telephone the system is more like urine testing it catches some small number of very stupid people has no effect on the bad guys with at least three neurons working in unison who wish to subvert it and penalizes most heavily those who have no cause to be subject to it steve hollasch kubota pacific computer inc hollasch kpc com santa clara california
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes oh i see your point i think you re wrong but if you sit back and wait to find out if i m right it ll be too late just listen very carefully for the first such and such will not be permitted on network xyz shoe to drop i ve been a very intent nren spectator of the nren for years as a commercial ip software vendor it really is my professional opinion that the nren at this point is irrelevant to private sector networking if it had been deployed five years ago it would have been a major development now however it s just an upgrade to the nsfnet and an attempt to revive the lagging use of the national supercomputer centers you could cut out the nsfnet completely and the internet would continue chugging along without a hiccup aside from a few universities long haul networking and internet connectivity have long since ceased to be under federal sponsorship or regulation at least in the usa the success of the cix commercial internet exchange is a prime example of this while our dear vp has been promoting his data superhighway the private sector has been building it without the nsfnet s restrictions to illustrate a connection from the machine on my desk to the machine your article was posted from pizzabox demon co uk involves only commercial ip providers until it hits amsterdam no nsfnet no nren no appropriate use restrictions it s even mbps t until it hits the eunet gateway qed amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re facinating facts bit serial number possibly fixed s and s the only way to view this method of generating unit keys is as a back door what else can you call a key deterministically generated from the serial number to generate the unit key for a serial number n the bit value n is first padded with a fixed bit block to produce a bit block n s and s are then used as keys to triple encrypt n producing a bit block r r e d e n s s s similarly n is padded with two other bit blocks to produce n and n and two additional bit blocks r and r are computed r e d e n s s s r e d e n s s s r r and r are then concatenated together giving bits the first bits are assigned to u and the second bits to u the rest are discarded the unit key u is the xor of u and u u and u are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow agencies what happens is that the need for the escrow houses is completely eliminated or should i say the need to access the escrow houses to decrypt the data the houses will still serve a real purpose as far as generating the illusion of protection and small town cops won t be let in on the secret so they will still go through the motions of going to the escrow houses but the fact is the federal government can and will build a chip which generates the unit keys from the encrypted serial number nuff said
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only begin pgp signed message why do we hackers care about the clipper chip do we give a shit about anybody s privacy accept our own and perhaps not even our own are we so smart that we always know when we re talking to somebody who has a wiretap on their phone i find this a very disturbing view yes we do care about everyone s privacy even if they don t know it what happens if the gov t starts creating legislation such that the clipper and such technologies become the only legal encryption forms what happens when the clipper is the only type of encryption chips available to the masses sure you might have your own method of encryption but if you don t have anyone else to talk to what use is it you can t assume that everyone will be as open as you appear to be about encryption the point here is not the specific instance of the wiretap chip rather it is like having the government telling you that they want a copy of your house key safe deposit box keys etc and telling you that they wont use them unless its totally neccessary i sure wouldn t want that why should encryption be any different derek pgp key available upon request on the key server pgp public keys toxicwaste mit edu derek atkins mit electrical engineering and computer science secretary mit student information processing board sipb mit media laboratory speech research group warlord mit edu pp asel n nwh
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow quoting pla sktb demon co uk in article aohonj n sktb demon co uk you have every reason to be scared shitless take a look at the records of mccarthy hoover j edgar not the cleaner though they both excelled at sucking and nixon history does not record whether j edgar hoover was any good at sucking as for the cleaners i ll stick with my w electrolux and damn the carpet o paul crowley pdc dcs ed ac uk trust me i know what i m doing x fold a fish for jesus
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article c so hxv demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes actually i am completely baffled by why dorothy denning has chosen to throw away her academic respectability like this it looks to me like a major career limiting move there can be very few people who know what she s been saying who take her seriously any more actually i ve been following her remarks for some time with interest i m also a member of academia and her remarks have nothing but elevate her respectability in my eyes it remains to be seen whether you are the radical fringe or i it is generally an error to assume that your beliefs are held by the majority or even a sizable minority especially when you re seeing tens nay dozens of people on usenet agreeing with you andrew molitor
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr afterlife ncsc mil rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles hmmm this could become a flame war very quickly the text is well regulated militia when that amendment was written and approved regulated meand armed remember all of those westerns where bounty hunters were called regulators this is now an archaic usage of the word but the original intent of the amendment was about weapons not control my dan robinson
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip in article apr ulysses att com smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys we don t yet know if all bits count anyway its looking like the keys and escrow arrangements are smoke and mirrors to cover the way the nsa can regenerate the key from the transmitted serial number g
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re wh proposal from police point of view in article apr news clarkson edu tuinstra sunspot ece clarkson edu soe dwight tuinstra writes it might pay to start looking at what this proposal might mean to a police agency it just might be a bad idea for them too ok suppose the ny state police want to tap a suspect s phone they need a warrant just like the old days but unlike the old days they now need to a get two federal agencies to give them the two parts of the key now what happens if there s a tiff between the two escrow houses posession release of keys becomes a political bargaining chit while i think it is unrealistic to suppose that the federal agencies will fail to promptly comply with a court order there is still a good point here local law enforcement will be unable to perform a wiretap without bringing in federal agencies based on the possibly incomplete understanding of the system quoted from d denning only the fbi will be able to decrypt the system key encryption layer which seems to be needed even to identify what escrowed keys to request this moves a great deal of law enforcement power to the federal level the reason i like this point is that it may sway or even persuade people who don t generally line up with the civil liberties crowd a national police force is opposed by people from a broad range of political viewpoints olson umbc edu
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re once tapped your code is no good any more for that matter it shouldn t be that difficult to design a black box that gives off emr similar to a monitor with gibberish on the screen
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re once tapped your code is no good any more graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes actually i am completely baffled by why dorothy denning has chosen to throw away her academic respectability like this it looks to me like a major career limiting move there can be very few people who know what she s been saying who take her seriously any more i m not sure it is a major limiting move in the academic circles i ve seen arguing for increased government intervention and management is almost always a plus not the least because it usually means more high paying jobs for academics as advisors also consider that it looks like denning has some decent nsa government connections which is always a plus for an academic institute that wants more government funding and work tossed their way despicable yes career limiting well the publicity probably outweighs the drawbacks and there are a whole bunch of people who think the whole thing is just peachy keen if it s only going to be used against drug dealers child pornographers and terrorists well it must be good p truth is hard to find and harder to obscure
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re clipper considered harmful criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed why doing it in such a rough manner it is much more professional to steal the chip from the phone and even to replace it with a pin compatible do nothing chip that does not encrypt at all chances are that the victim will not notice anything especially if it is done professionally assuming that the bad guys can easily obtain substitute chips which don t cause any noticeable effect to either the user or the person at the other end of the line if there is any significant difficulty to obtaining such chips some of the criminals will decide to fall back on the murder kidnap method once a suitable collection of devices is stolen criminals can communicate with impunity assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from key escrow until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means no because the feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations true they ll blame the wrong guys but nevertheless one cannot say something like the drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship terminus when the feds are listening even if they cannot identify who the speaker is this assumes that the feds are tapping clipper phones belonging to ordinary citizens getting such a phone is the whole point of the crime under discussion to be sure i wouldn t put it past them but raising the possibility of such crime has the benefit of forcing the feds to either fess up about such intentions in advance or state that using clipper exposes the user to an additional criminal threat g no the criminals will just use some secure encryption the new proposal does not stop criminals it ensures that the government will be able to wiretap the average citizen and stops the casual snooper to me it also clearly looks as a step towards outlawing any other strong encryption devices agreed
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow pdc dcs ed ac uk paul crowley writes as for the cleaners i ll stick with my w electrolux and damn the carpet nah nothing sucks like a vax amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re once tapped your code is no good any more i wonder if she landed such a fat fee from cooperation with the nsa in the design and propoganda stages that she doesn t care any more which is to say is the nsa totally perfidious or does it at least have the redeeming virtue of taking care of its own g
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re estimating wiretap costs benefits in article apr kronos arc nasa gov hanson kronos arc nasa gov robin hanson writes i m attempting to write a serious policy paper examining whether the proposed wiretap or clipper chip is a cost effective tool for police investigation that is ignoring concerns about government intrusions into individual privacy is the value of easy wiretaps to investigators greater than the cost to the communications industry and their customers to support this wiretap technology a rough estimate suggests that wiretaps are worth about five million dollars per year to u s law enforcement agencies in u s wiretaps led to arrests while total police expenditures of billion led to million arrests ref us statistical abstracts i m working on estimating this wiretap benefit more accurately but i d like to ask hardware experts out there to help me with estimating the costs of the new proposed wiretap technology please send me quotable citeable estimates for how many chips which would need to be made per year to keep all phones with wiretap chips how much would it cost to make each chip how much did it cost to develop this technology in the first place how much more would supporting hardware people etc cost per chip what percentage cheaper would encryption chips and support have been if private enterprise could compete to meet customer encryption needs what percentage of phone traffic would be taken up by the proposed law enforcement blocks what is the total cost of handling all phone traffic per year put another way the question i m asking is what if each police agency that wanted a particular wiretap had to pay for it being charged their share of the full social cost of forcing communication to be wiretap compatible would they choose to buy such wiretaps or would they find it more cost effective to instead investigate crimes in other ways robin hanson hanson ptolemy arc nasa gov ms nasa ames research center moffett field ca male terrace fremont ca first what the fuck is nasa doing wasting my tax dollars doing policy papers on stuff far outside of their purvew mission second this isn t a problem of economics this is a problem of the incremental accumulation of police state powers by our government how exactly do you put a price on the loss of freedom of a society maybe use the dollars life lost calculations for the extra people killed by the gov the pain and suffering cases for those tortured the dollars life lost caused by the inevitable collapse of the economy and all the secondary effects of diseases diet etc plus the inevitable collapse of the economy as the gov controls it becomes corrupt etc do us a favor resign rather than right this paper for nasa go do useful work for the society lew lew glendenning rlglende netcom com perspective is worth iq points niels bohr or somebody like that
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pseudo random character generators large state here are four pseudo random character generators based on irreducible trinomials each contains separate trinomials one of which is selected on initialization there are distinct trinomials between the prcgs the prcgs are initialized with a bit seed and a bit trinomial selector i would like to get comments on these by anyone who is interested enough to look them over please email because our news is on the fritz note that this was posted via email peter k boucher boucher csl sri com clip clip
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re clipper considered harmful in article optilink com brad optilink com brad yearwood writes finally because there is essentially no possibility of intercepting in realtime the scrutable content of communications between stolen instruments there will exist strong motivation to record and archive all communications in the network for ex post facto scrutiny once some criminal act is discovered and the instruments involved have been identified it seems likely to me that that a large subset of encrypted communications would be archived to tape so they could be read if sometime in the future probable cause arises and a warrant is obtained i can even imagine this being found legal and constitutional since nothing is actually listened to until a valid warrant is issued and the keys are obtained imagine archiving all pay phone conversations so if someone turns out to be a drug dealer you can listen to all their past drug deals and archive calls to from suspected mafia members potential terrorists radicals etc imagine the convenience for the police of being able to get a warrant now and listening to all the calls the world trade center bombers made in the past year since archiving would be such a powerful tool and so easy to do why wouldn t it happen ken shirriff shirriff sprite berkeley edu
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a little political philosophy worth reading read this through once or twice then replace prince with government or president as appropriate and read it again from chapter xx of the prince by n macchiavelli as translated by daniel donno in order to keep their lands secure some princes have disarmed their subjects others have prompted division within the cities they have subjugated some have nurtured animosities against themselves others have sought to win the approval of those they initially distrusted some have erected fortresses others have destroyed them now although it is impossible to set down definite judgements on all of these measures without considering the particular circumstances of the states where they may be employed i shall nevertheless discuss them in such broad terms as the subject itself will allow to begin with there has never been a case of a new prince disarming his subjects indeed whenever he found them disarmed he proceeded to arm them for by arming your subjects you make their arms your own those among them who are suspicious become loyal while those who are already loyal remain so and from subjects they are transformed into partisans though you cannot arm them all nonetheless you increase your safety among those you leave unarmed by extending privileges to those you arm your different treatment of the two categories will make the latter feel obligated to you while the former will consider it proper thoat those who assume added duties and dangers should receive advantages when you disarm your subjects however you offend them by showing that either from cowardliness or from lack of faith you distrust them and either conclusion will induce them to hate you moreover since it is impossible for you to remain unarmed you would have to resort to mercenaries whose limitations have already been discussed even if such troops were good however they could never be good enough to defend you from powerful enemies and doubtful subjects therefore as i have said a new prince in a newly acquired state has always taken measures to arm his subjects and history is full of examples proving that this is so but when a prince takes posession of a new state which he annexes as an addition to his original domain then he must disarm all the subjects of the new state except those who helped him to acquire it and these as time and occasion permit he must seek to render soft and weak he must arrange matters in such a way that the arms of the entire state will be in the hands of soldiers who are native to his original domain and since the subject demands it i will not fail to remind any prince who has acquired a new state by the aid of its inhabitants that he soundly consider what induced them to assist him if the reason is not natural affection for him but rather dissatisfaction with the former government he will find it extremely difficult to keep them friendly for it will be impossible to please them if he will carefully think the matter through in the light of examples drawn from ancient and modern affairs he will understand why it is much easier to win the favor of those who were happy with their former government and hence were his enemies than to keep the favor of those who out of dissatisfaction with the former rule helped him to replace it
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re how large are commercial keys in article apr ee eng ohio state edu butzerd maumee eng ohio state edu dane c butzer writes finally can anyone even concieve of a time place where bit keys aren t sufficient i certainly can t even at a trillion keys a second it would take about billion years to search just one billionth of that keys space it depends on the attack adding a bit to the key doubles the amount of work to be done in a straight brute force attack where you try every single possible key until one works processing and storage requirements for this kind of attack on a bit key seem like they ought to make it effectively impossible however there may be other attacks whose difficulty is for example proportional to say sqrt n or some such also a long key does you little good if there is a way to incrementally guess a little of the key at a time thanks dane john
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article rdippold qualcom rdippold qualcomm com ron asbestos dippold writes geoff ficus cs ucla edu geoffrey kuenning writes bullshit the bush administration and the career gestapo were responsible for this horror and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli that doesn t excuse clinton and gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it but let s lay the body at the proper door to start with the final stages of denial i can hardly imagine what the result would have been if the clinton administration had actually supported this plan instead of merely acquiescing with repugnance as they ve so obviously doing i don t believe the chip originated with the clinton administration either but the clinton administration has embraced it and brought it to fruition the date i have for this is note clinton s statements about encryption in the rd paragraph i guess this statement doesen t contradict what you said though cut here washington upi the war on drugs is about to get a fresh start president clinton told delegates to the national federation of police commisioners convention in washington in the first speech on the drug issue since his innaugural clinton said that his planned escalation of the drug war would make everything so far seem so half hearted that for all practical purposes this war is only beginning now he repeatedly emphasized his view that regardless of what has been tried or who has tried it or how long they ve been trying it this is day one to me the audience at the convention whose theme is how do we spell fiscal relief f o r f e i t u r e interrupted clinton frequently with applause clinton s program presented in the speech follows the outline given in his campaign position papers a cabinet level drug czar and boot camps for first time youthful offenders he did however cover in more detail his plans for improved enforcement methods this year s crime bill will have teeth not bare gums clinton said in particular his administration will place strict controls on data formats and protocols and require the registration of so called cryptographic keys in the hope of denying drug dealers the ability to communicate in secret clinton said the approach could be used for crackdowns on other forms of underground economic activity such as the deficit causing tax evaders who live in luxury at the expense of our grandchildren clinton expressed optimism that the drug war can be won because even though not everyone voted for bill clinton last november everyone did vote for a candidate who shares my sense of urgency about fighting the drug menace the advocates of legalization the advocates of surrender may be very good at making noise clinton said but when the american people cast their ballots it only proved what i knew all along that the advocates of surrender are nothing more than a microscopic fringe
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re the escrow database in article tcmayc rs n lz netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes after the waco massacre and the big brother wiretap chip any tactic is fair this is pernicious nonsense david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes so don t just think of replacements for clipper also think of front ends this only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non escrowed encryption schemes otherwise why not just use the front end without clipper david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow begin pgp signed message in message aa pizzabox demon co uk you write the cops feds do not need to be able to get hold of your private key to listen in to cellular conversations encryption is not end to end but cellphone to base station that was true for the uk paul but i m fairly sure they re talking about building end to end encryption phones out of this chip it s not for cellular though it certainly could be used there in the way you suggest i d lost the white house s deathless prose when i posted that s what happens when you read news at home when you re rat arsed but i did have a bunch of follow ups going on about cellular cordless comms the original article has reappeared so the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement hmm telephone communications could indeed include end to end encryption on ordinary landlines the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links but the next paragraph says telecoms networks and wireless communications links ok it s far from clear exactly what cripple what an apposite anagram will be applied to but the reason joe public wants secure comms is to stop people listening in to his cellular or cordless phones and he wouldn t even be bothered about that were it not for wingnut and squidqy s misfortunes yes cripple might be for end to end encyption dropping to clear when the other end doesn t have cripple but then a cordless to ordinary conversation would be in clear leaving the cordless end just as vulnerable as at present nope i suspect that cripple will only be used on radio links ok it s possible telecommunications networks could mean ordinary phone lines but i m betting it means the microwave links used by the telcos my apologies if i m wrong particularly if the turgid press release makes it clear that i m wrong and i missed it but as far as i can see it was full of obfuscation and anyone expecting end to end encryption is in for a surprise imho btw graham i ve posted questions to alt security pgp and not seen any replies followups from outside europe how about you have i made it into everyone s kill file or is there some problem paul
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article apr afterlife ncsc mil rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individuals to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles read it again yourself then re apply the admonition you gave to the previous poster to yourself as well the first clause is not a condition it is a reason for explicitly supporting the right which exists militia or not that the people have a right to keep and bear arms this is not a right granted by the constitution it is a right presumed to exist by default the constitution mentioning a right is to prevent the government from removing that right by stating very clearly the government shall not infringe mess with block limit that right remember the constitution is a bunch of negative things things the government cannot do all rights etc not epxressly given to the government go to the states and the people the same people the other amendments in the bill of rights talk about since i am sure you will summarily reject my interpretation i am appending a linguistic analysis by one far more expert than myself and you i suspect i am sure you will find his qualifications adequate if that isn t enough i can send you the senate subcommitee to the judiciary on the constitution report on the same thing there are some things in there that big brother types like biden etc must have really had to swallow hard to admit i think you will find that people that seriously study the constitution and state what it means will say the same thing those who come up with new improved meanings are those who are trying to subvert the constitution for a given agenda like clinton and his clinton cripple gun control people control and control control and the whole nasty mess please tell us how this person is in error won t you and please back it up with some proof since i am backing my assertion up with independent proof and have a bunch more i can provide note followups set to talk politics guns begin included article the unabridged second amendment by j neil schulman if you wanted to know all about the big bang you d ring up carl sagan right and if you wanted to know about desert warfare the man to call would be norman schwarzkopf no question about it but who would you call if you wanted the top expert on american usage to tell you the meaning of the second amendment to the united states constitution that was the question i asked a c brocki editorial coordinator of the los angeles unified school district and formerly senior editor at houghton mifflin publishers who himself had been recommended to me as the foremost expert on english usage in the los angeles school system mr brocki told me to get in touch with roy copperud a retired professor journalism at the university of southern california and the author of american usage and style the consensus a little research lent support to brocki s opinion of professor copperud s expertise roy copperud was a newspaper writer on major dailies for over three decades before embarking on a a distinguished year career teaching journalism at usc since copperud has been writing a column dealing with the professional aspects of journalism for editor and publisher a weekly magazine focusing on the journalism field he s on the usage panel of the american heritage dictionary and merriam webster s usage dictionary frequently cites him as an expert copperud s fifth book on usage american usage and style the consensus has been in continuous print from van nostrand reinhold since and is the winner of the association of american publisher s humanities award that sounds like an expert to me after a brief telephone call to professor copperud in which i introduced myself but did not give him any indication of why i was interested i sent the following letter i am writing you to ask you for your professional opinion as an expert in english usage to analyze the text of the second amendment to the united states constitution and extract the intent from the text the text of the second amendment is a well regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free state the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed the debate over this amendment has been whether the first part of the sentence a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state is a restrictive clause or a subordinate clause with respect to the independent clause containing the subject of the sentence the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed i would request that your analysis of this sentence not take into consideration issues of political impact or public policy but be restricted entirely to a linguistic analysis of its meaning and intent further since your professional analysis will likely become part of litigation regarding the consequences of the second amendment i ask that whatever analysis you make be a professional opinion that you would be willing to stand behind with your reputation and even be willing to testify under oath to support if necessary my letter framed several questions about the test of the second amendment then concluded i realize that i am asking you to take on a major responsibility and task with this letter i am doing so because as a citizen i believe it is vitally important to extract the actual meaning of the second amendment while i ask that your analysis not be affected by the political importance of its results i ask that you do this because of that importance after several more letters and phone calls in which we discussed terms for his doing such an analysis but in which we never discussed either of our opinions regarding the second amendment gun control or any other political subject professor copperud sent me the follow analysis into which i have inserted my questions for the sake of clarity copperud the words a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state contrary to the interpretation cited in your letter of july constitutes a present participle rather than a clause it is used as an adjective modifying militia which is followed by the main clause of the sentence subject the right verb shall the to keep and bear arms is asserted as an essential for maintaining a militia in reply to your numbered questions schulman can the sentence be interpreted to grant the right to keep and bear arms solely to a well regulated militia copperud the sentence does not restrict the right to keep and bear arms nor does it state or imply possession of the right elsewhere or by others than the people it simply makes a positive statement with respect to a right of the people schulman is the right of the people to keep and bear arms granted by the words of the second amendment or does the second amendment assume a preexisting right of the people to keep and bear arms and merely state that such right shall not be infringed copperud the right is not granted by the amendment its existence is assumed the thrust of the sentence is that the right shall be preserved inviolate for the sake of ensuring a militia schulman is the right of the people to keep and bear arms conditioned upon whether or not a well regulated militia is in fact necessary to the security of a free state and if that condition is not existing is the statement the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed null and void copperud no such condition is expressed or implied the right to keep and bear arms is not said by the amendment to depend on the existence of a militia no condition is stated or implied as to the relation of the right to keep and bear arms and to the necessity of a well regulated militia as a requisite to the security of a free state the right to keep and bear arms is deemed unconditional by the entire sentence schulman does the clause a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state grant a right to the government to place conditions on the right of the people to keep and bear arms or is such right deemed unconditional by the meaning of the entire sentence copperud the right is assumed to exist and to be unconditional as previously stated it is invoked here specifically for the sake of the militia schulman which of the following does the phrase well regulated militia mean well equipped well organized well drilled well educated or subject to regulations of a superior authority copperud the phrase means subject to regulations of a superior authority this accords with the desire of the writers for civilian control over the military schulman if at all possible i would ask you to take account the changed meanings of words or usage since that sentence was written years ago but not take into account historical interpretations of the intents of the authors unless those issues can be clearly separated copperud to the best of my knowledge there has been no change in the meaning of words or in usage that would affect the meaning of the amendment if it were written today it might be put since a well regulated militia is necessary tot he security of a free state the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged schulman as a scientific control on this analysis i would also appreciate it if you could compare your analysis of the text of the second amendment to the following sentence a well schooled electorate being necessary to the security of a free state the right of the people to keep and read books shall not be infringed my questions for the usage analysis of this sentence would be is the grammatical structure and usage of this sentence and the way the words modify each other identical to the second amendment s sentence and could this sentence be interpreted to restrict the right of the people to keep and read books only to a well educated electorate for example registered voters with a high school diploma copperud your scientific control sentence precisely parallels the amendment in grammatical structure there is nothing in your sentence that either indicates or implies the possibility of a restricted interpretation professor copperud had only one additional comment which he placed in his cover letter with well known human curiosity i made some speculative efforts to decide how the material might be used but was unable to reach any conclusion so now we have been told by one of the top experts on american usage what many knew all along the constitution of the united states unconditionally protects the people s right to keep and bear arms forbidding all governments formed under the constitution from abridging that right as i write this the attempted coup against constitutional government in the soviet union has failed apparently because the will of the people in that part of the world to be free from capricious tyranny is stronger than the old guard s desire to maintain a monopoly on dictatorial power and here in the united states elected lawmakers judges and appointed officials who are pledged to defend the constitution of the united states ignore marginalize or prevaricate about the second amendment routinely american citizens are put in american prisons for carrying arms owning arms of forbidden sorts or failing to satisfy bureaucratic requirements regarding the owning and carrying of firearms all of which is an abridgement of the unconditional right of the people to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the constitution and even the american civil liberties union aclu staunch defender of the rest of the bill of rights stands by and does nothing it seems it is up to those who believe in the right to keep and bear arms to preserve that right no one else will no one else can will we beg our elected representatives not to take away our rights and continue regarding them as representing us if they do will we continue obeying judges who decide that the second amendment doesn t mean what it says it means but means whatever they say it means in their orwellian doublespeak or will be simply keep and bear the arms of our choice as the constitution of the united states promises us we can and pledge that we will defend that promise with our lives our fortuned and our sacred honor c by the new gun week and second amendment foundation informational reproduction of the entire article is hereby authorized provided the author the new gun week and second amendment foundation are credited all other rights reserved about the author j neil schulman is the award winning author of novels endorsed by anthony burgess and nobel economist milton friedman and writer of the cbs twilight zone episode in which a time traveling historian prevents the jfk assassination he s also the founder and president of softserv publishing the first publishing company to distribute paperless books via personal computers and modems most recently schulman has founded the committee to enforce the second amendment cesa through which he intends to see the individual s right to keep and bear arms recognized as a constitutional protection equal to those afforded in the first fourth fifth ninth and fourteenth amendments end included article can you still honestly say the second is a state run militia only right pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes rlward afterlife ncsc mil robert ward writes and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of have you read the applicable part of the constitution and interpreted it in context yes btw the appropriate amendments were posted here some time ago if not please do so before posting this misinterpretation again it refers to the right of the people to organize a militia not for individual to carry handguns grenades and assault rifles it s ok it s ok just a month ago i expressed my belief that the right to have a means to shoot your neighbor is not that much necessary to ensure a people s right to be free and got flamed by lots of american gun supporters so i thought that never mind the new cripple chip is a purely american problem so deal with the mess yourselves i just wanted to share with you a bit of my experience of living years under a totalitarian regime i m bulgarian because i thought that it might be useful to you oh well i think your experiences under the bulgarian regime are highly relevant we have too many people with their heads in the sand saying it cannot happen here as our constitutional rights are being trashed every day because the government justifies doing some end run around the protections by a crisis requiring drastic action it is most likely that in the future possession of secure encryption tools will be regarded as possession of terrorist and drug dealers tools and be some serious fedaral felony just like common tools are burgular tools if the police say so common computer programs even computers themselves are now hackers tools and will become terrorist tools bet on it the insights of someone who has lived throught this are very important if the us goes the way of the old soviet union and its client states as far as individual rights privacy and overall freedom are concerned the rest of the world remember new world order will not be far behind only a few years please keep posting anything you find that is deficient or that threatens ones rights in this thing for example a conversation between a suspect and a lawyer will no longer be private from big brother eavesdropping political dissent allready is very dangerous in this country all it takes is the government to decide that enough people will take one seriously then one becomes guilty of plotting to overthrow the government by illegal means the phrase illegal means is defined as whatever the government wants it to be defined as couple this with clinton s pressing for a smart national id card an internal passport with the added wrinkle that anything about you and your past can be put on it and you can only take the government s word as to what is really on it since they will be the only ones with the means to completely read and reprogram the thing isn t that nice while the feds can bust into one s safe without the keys the owner knows his safe has been broken into when they break into your secure phone conversations or other stored transmitted data in the near future you have no way of knowing so accountability as to the legalities has gone out the window just like a safe if they have a legal cause they can get the keys from the suspect just like they can get the keys to a safe or the combination from the suspect same with encryption record everything get the warrants then decode it with the keys obtained from the suspect this clinton cripple along with its natural extensions will make any priviliged communications between client and lawyer and any meaningful political dissent virtually impossible which is the general idea any propeganda about its being secure and the safeguards and all of that are just that propeganda to reassure people so they will by into this monstrosity don t be suckered big brother is listening regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re an open letter to mr clinton in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de writes strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary as usually you are not reading the proposal does say that it is a voluntary program this doesn t make it more desirable though that is you get high quality secure nsa classified technology if you agree to escrow your key otherwise you are on your own secure how do you know because nsa is trying to make you believe it trust us yeah right otherwise you are on your own how do you know that tomorrow they will not outlaw encrypring devices that don t use their technology because they are promising you gee they are not doing even that read the proposal again one minor nitpick it is not a proposal it is a decision from their point of view it is a done deal the chips are being manufactured it obviously has been budgeted the whole thing that is what is so upsetting this was all done in secret because they didn t want the people to know what was going on until it is too late otherwise i agree with you percent how come it always takes someone who has lived under the eastern bloc to remind us about how precious and fragile our liberties are please keep up the good work hopefully you will wake someone up regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany pat rwing uucp without prejudice ucc pat myrto seattle wa if all else fails try uunet pilchuck rwing pat wisdom only two things are infinite the universe and human stupidity and i am not sure about the former albert einstien
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article c rrtd gz agora rain com jhart agora rain com jim hart writes what we need is a true privacy chip for example a real time voice encryption rsa silicon compile it and spit out asic put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international business diplomats and private communications if the u s bans it we make it somewhere else and import it the japanese german dutch taiwanese korean etc electronics companies don t want the nsa spying on them u s workers lose more jobs to government fascist stupidity some countries have laws about importing crypto gear i believe the u s does without a license the above scheme won t work at least not legally in such countries including at least france and the u s david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method in article eachus apr spectre mitre org eachus spectre mitre org robert i eachus writes but if you are making custom equipment in any case why not just roll your own clipper implementation and report the wrong keys to the escrow agency tells us who is going to be in the chip business if this thing goes through nsa and those with something to hide from nsa this won t work if there is a checksum on the keys you don t know about neither will registering a clipper chip and then substituting a counterfeit one if the serial number contains a checksum chances are the government has thought of this and just anyone won t be permitted access to enough of the internals to make a fake clipper chip chances are that the government has classified some details of the internals at a very high level and manufacturers are required to observe security safeguards and clearances corresponding to that level while not perfect it would prevent joe hacker from rolling his own spoofing chip since not many counterfeiters can survive a background investigation some of the more notorious self styled dissidents here for example have already got their heads so high above the tall grass that they d have little chance of getting a clearance of course it s not impossible that someone do this but probably extremely difficult chances are there will also be very heavy criminal penalties for phony clipper chips on some national security classified info grounds or other thus making the game not worth the candle david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re screw the people crypto is for hard core hackers spooks only in article warlord apr deathtongue mit edu warlord mit edu derek atkins writes the point here is not the specific instance of the wiretap chip rather it is like having the government telling you that they want a copy of your house key safe deposit box keys etc and telling you that they wont use them unless its totally neccessary i sure wouldn t want that why should encryption be any different actually the govrnment is telling you that if you want to use their product the manufacturer actually better yet some trusted pair of escrow agencies has to have the key most of us already are in this situation our car makers have keys to our cars or can get them quickly from the vin number and i have no doubt that if presented with a court order they d surrender copies to the government chances are that many locksmiths have the code numbers for house locks they ve installed and in an emergency can cut keys thus they d also provide such keys to the government pursuant to a court order the state has no difficulty gaining access to your safe deposit box if they have a court order bad analogy this is not to argue for or against the proposal but rather better distinctions are required in thinking about it than house key safe deposit keys etc david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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organized lobbying for cryptography in article apr silverton berkeley edu djb silverton berkeley edu d j bernstein writes i want to see an organization which will combat such statements encryption does not threaten the public safety any more than ski masks do every american is entitled to use strong encryption which ensures his own privacy and is not crippled by a key escrow system i guess i m looking for a league for cryptographic freedom or a national cryptography association an excellent idea to what extent does the eff serve this purpose is a new organization necessary does it already exist while i don t know the full scope of the activities of the eff from what little i ve seen i think it would be better to lobby for strong cryptography through a distinct organization the eff has been associated with efforts to prevent the banning of sex and pictures newsgroups at various universities horror stories about the contents of those groups e g exploitative pictures of possibly underaged models have already surfaced in the press the white house bulletin already raised the specter of drug dealing and terrorism which is only one step removed from the old crypto wielding child molester argument an eff lobbying effort for cryptography would be too easily derailed by the connection to child pornography and the like similarly lpf is connected with stallman and his gnu project in light of say the gnu manifesto this means that in a public debate it stands to be labelled as communist anarchist hackers radical etc i don t know about cpsr but if it is an offshoot of physicians for social responsibility best known for helen caldicott and her hysterical antinuclear lobbying then it probably also carries unwelcome political baggage perhaps for practical reasons a lobbying organization for cryptography would best be formed under the umbrella of eff or some other existing group but its charter should then be distinct independent and limited to advocacy for the right to cryptography to reiterate dan bernstein s question does any suitable organization exist if not what are you going to do about it having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations i would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction gathering the support of the nra by emphasizing the rkba side of the issue as well as the first amendment side tal kubo math harvard edu
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re do we need the clipper for cheap security gtoal gtoal com graham toal writes in the uk it s impossible to get approval to attach any crypto device to the phone network anything that plugs in to our bt phone sockets must be approved for some reason crypto devices just never are whats the difference between a v bis modem and a v bis modem i m not being entirely silly here what i m pointing out is that the modems that they have already approved for data transmission will work just fine to transmit scrambled vocoded voice perry metzger pmetzger shearson com laissez faire laissez passer le monde va de lui meme
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re hard drive security for fbi targets in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes i m not a lawyer so correct me if i m wrong but doing that could be considered obstruction of justice which could land you in prison for quite a while the thing that s great about the secret key is it is idea encrypted so even if the fbi do get the key they re sol unless they know the magic word if they try to force you to give them your pass phrase just say oops i forgot since the burden of proof is still on the prosecution in this country if you keep your mouth shut how can they prove that you didn t forget your pass phrase ok doug is right it would be obstruction of justice blah blah blah but saying i forgot is a lie which is just as bad from a moral point of view if you think lawfulness is a good in and of itself which admittedly most people do not but there s an even better way out of this provided the government is prosecuting you criminally you can probably plead the fifth amendmeent and thus legally avoid revealing your key the government cannot demand information from a criminal defendant which may tend to incriminate that defendant though this has never been applied in the cryptography context at least as far as i can tell it seems an obvious application to me this may be a common suggestion in this group but if it s not i m new here i d love to hear what people have to say about it since i don t really read this group and since the subject matter is more legal than cryptoid maybe misc legal computing would be an appropriate place steve steve kramarsky university of chicago law school steve faerie chi il us or smk quads uchicago edu all i did was kiss a girl jake the night before his hanging
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article r r ninnebn dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes in article c so hxv demon co uk graham toal gtoal gtoal com writes actually i am completely baffled by why dorothy denning has chosen to throw away her academic respectability like this actually i ve been following her remarks for some time with interest i m also a member of academia and her remarks have nothing but elevate her respectability in my eyes it remains to be seen whether you are the radical fringe or i it is generally an error to assume that your beliefs are held by the majority or even a sizable minority especially when you re seeing tens nay dozens of people on usenet agreeing with you the people on usenet are clearly a special bunch we live the net which is the future of our culture usenetters have rapid electronic access to information society in general must depend on cnn i can only hope we can make this information accessable by the public before the radical fringe which is the majority destroys the fabric of this country freedom is never easily won thomas
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re keeping your mouth shut was hard drive security in article apr qualcomm com karn servo qualcomm com phil karn writes i say in theory because in another case a woman was held in contempt for refusing to reveal the location of her child even after taking the th in this case the woman was suspected of having murdered the kid so taking the th wasn t surprising sure so she was probably guilty but that s not good enough in our system you re not supposed to be able to force a suspect to confess to a crime no matter how strongly you think they re guilty you have to develop your evidence independently doing otherwise might catch a few more crooks but only at the cost of turning the clock back to the middle ages when confessions were routinely tortured out of suspects both guilty and innocent ok i should have read the thread before posting my own i would just add to phil s very infomative discussion the following caveat the fifth amendment applies only in crinial cases nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself thus if the father sued for custody of the children the case would be civil and the defendant mother would not have fifth amendment protection oddly enough her refusal to give information in a civil case can lead to criminal contempt charges thus landing her in jail the interesting part of all this is that in a murder trial the woman can plead the fifth as to the location of the child this is routine a computer crime prosecution thus would seem to be fertile ground for this kind of defense where a suit by a party injured by hackers would not if i am accused for example of sending encrypted kiddie porn over the nets the fifth should protect my key if i am accused of sending copyrighted material however it proabably will not copyright infringement not being a crime in the technical sense the really tricky question is say i do both naughty boy that i am can the government use the information gained in the civil trial ie my key to gain access to my files for use in the criminal prosecution the answer should certainly be no but lord only knows how this would work out steve steve kramarsky university of chicago law school steve faerie chi il us or smk quads uchicago edu all i did was kiss a girl jake the night before his hanging
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re don t fight clipper chip subvert or replace it marc thibault marc tanda isis org writes the jester writes proof windows is a virus it is very widespread it eats up your disk space it slows down your computer it takes control over your computer it performs disk access at random times it displays silly messages on your screen it randomly crashes the computer vesselin this sounds like a version unix solaris as someone who just lived through a switch from sunos x x to solaris i ll heartily agree with this obcrypt one of my main gripes with solaris is its braindead mailx which is almost enough like mail to get you hoping but crashes horribly when you try to do anything useful with it like use pgp capable sendmail replacements jason i stood up on my van i yelled excuse me sir ain t nothing wrong with this country that a few plastic explosives won t cure steve taylor i blew up the clinic real good steiner jupiter cse utoledo edu
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr sugra uucp ken sugra uucp kenneth ng writes in article apr linus mitre org ptrei bistromath mitre org peter trei writes judge i grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key itself you the keyphrase is i confess to deliberately evading copyright the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of copyrighted peanuts strips can we use murder instead of copyright violation just to keep things straight the th applies only to criminal cases which copyright infringements are not they are civil steve p s i m sorry to waste bandwidth on a quibble i just don t want anyone to get confused i think a bunch of kiddie porn gifs make a better test case than a bunch of peanuts strips and that is criminal both in posession and distribution steve kramarsky university of chicago law school steve faerie chi il us or smk quads uchicago edu all i did was kiss a girl jake the night before his hanging
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re organized lobbying for cryptography kubo zariski harvard edu tal kubo writes the eff has been associated with efforts to prevent the banning of sex and pictures newsgroups at various universities so what justices william brennan thurgood marshall john paul stevens and byron white are associated with a plurality supreme court decision that prevented the removal of anti american anti christian anti semitic and just plain filthy books from a public high school library board of education v pico does this mean that they could no longer defend free expression and privacy carl carl kadie i do not represent any organization this is just me kadie cs uiuc edu
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re estimating wiretap costs benefits rlglende netcom com robert lewis glendenning writes in article apr kronos arc nasa gov hanson kronos arc nasa gov robin hanson writes i m attempting to write a serious policy paper examining whether the proposed wiretap or clipper chip is a cost effective tool for police investigation that is ignoring concerns about government intrusions into individual privacy is the value of easy wiretaps to investigators greater than the cost to the communications industry and their customers to support this wiretap technology first what the fuck is nasa doing wasting my tax dollars doing policy papers on stuff far outside of their purvew mission do us a favor resign rather than right this paper for nasa go do useful work for the society whew take it easy on the guy maybe he s going to do this in his spare time maybe he s going to do this to see how much a wiretap really costs maybe he s going to do this so he can add to the opposition to clipper i don t know fully why he might do this but maybe we shouldn t start flaming at the drop of a hat james holthaus james holthaus uiowa edu government is an association of men who do violence to the rest of us leo tolstoy pgp public key available on request or from key server
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption mathew mathew mantis co uk writes bena dec cs monash edu au ben aveling writes don t forget you are in the country that wouldn t let the russians buy apple ii s because of security concerns that s nothing they wouldn t let the british buy inmos transputer systems because of security concerns and we designed the damn things funny we had plenty of them in bulgaria regardless of the embargo so much for export controls regards vesselin vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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cryptology in the world what is the status of cruptology for private citizens throughout the world or more clearly is there a listing of countries and their policies on citizens encrypting electronic data i m curious how the europeans handle this for instance james holthaus james holthaus uiowa edu government is an association of men who do violence to the rest of us leo tolstoy pgp public key available on request or from key server
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re organized lobbying for cryptography in article c tbpd lt cs uiuc edu kadie cs uiuc edu carl m kadie writes the eff has been associated with efforts to prevent the banning of sex and pictures newsgroups at various universities so what justices william brennan thurgood marshall john paul stevens and byron white are associated with it means that the eff s public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant to the encryption issue per se there may well be people who care about the encryption issue who don t care to associate themselves with the network erotica issue or may even disagree with the eff s position ending up with pallets of baggage to drag around is a frequent problem with permanent organizations eff is no exception tarl
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looking for ms dos crypto programs i am a new reader of sci crypt i would like to obtain a copy of a public domain program that can encrypt files preferably using des that runs under ms dos i would also like to obtain a program which will password protect floppy disks if this is possible thanks david maddison melbourne australia
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re list of large integer arithmetic packages mark riordan writes a list of large integer arithmetic packages elided i thought i would note that except lenstra s packages none of the large integer packages are in the public domain as an alternative a straightforward pd implementation of knuth s algorithms may be found as a part of uof arizona s icon distribution oz with diligence it is possible to make electric oz sis yorku ca anything run slowly tom duff ph x
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re off the shelf cheap des keyseach machine was re corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip smb research att com steven bellovin writes thousands tens of thousands do some arithmetic please skipjack has possible keys let s assume a brute force engine like that hypothesized for des microsecond per trial million chips that s trials per second or about years for trials well maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond and build a machine with million chips sure only years for each solution normally i d be the last to argue with steve but shouldn t that read years for all solutions i mean if we can imagine the machine that does trial nanosecond we can imagine the storage medium that could index and archive it shadwell hated all southerners and by inference was standing at the north pole good omens by neil gaiman and terry pratchett
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re clipper considered harmful shirriff sprite berkeley edu ken shirriff writes since archiving would be such a powerful tool and so easy to do why wouldn t it happen not enough magtape seriously do you have any idea how much traffic flows through the us phone system in a single day amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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clipper will corrupt cops was wh proposal from police point of view in article fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de vesselin bontchev writes strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the effects of the clipper chip on state and local police actually reading between the lines it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one respect since it will at least prevent cowboy cops and cowboy state and local agancies from reading your traffic if they tap it illegally instead of reading between the lines try to think a little bit ok if that s way too difficult to you here are some hints indeed the new proposal imposes some additional burocratic burden on the local police if they badly want to tape the magic cookie recipie that your mom is telling you on the phone so guess what they will do propose that the new technology is removed or implement some facilitations of course you won t want to wait until they get the approval from two different agencies to decrypt the conversation between two child molesters because meanwhile those two child molesters might be conspiring about molesting your child right so there should be some way for them to get access to those keys quickly right like they could have a copy of the database and worry about a warrant later i perhaps should have been clearer and more concise in my post but that s what i get from posting at am the central point i made is that local state police agencies attempting to play by the rules and get warrants legit escrowed keys etc may find themselves at the mercy of bureaucratic inertia and agency infighting at the federal level i disagree that this would assist civil liberties by hobbling the cowboy cops it would be a strong incentive as vesselin points out for more police agencies to go rogue and try to get keys through more efficient but less constitutional means notice what the release said q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place the clear implication is that there are legal authorizations other than a court order just how leaky are these and who knows what s in those pages that authorized the nsa there may well arise a black market of sorts within police agencies in which keys are traded furthermore the police will be in an excellent position to carry out this kind of thing without being caught they already have a communication infrastructure with secure portions there are a few laws that i know of that limit citizens rights to access police communications or use the information they get it may be very difficult to prove police misuse the fact that you have such evidence may itself be evidence that you have broken some other law throw in private detectives who have even fewer policy constitutional restrictions also consider mercenaries who ve retired from intelligence agencies william gibson must be loving it great story material don t think it ll happen well consider e g the michigan state police generally a very professional organization which for years kept red files on thousands of suspected commies knowing full well it was not consititutional the standards of evidence were just about zero people were in the file because they happened to park near a place where say a us china people s friendship rally was happening the police went around writing down license plate numbers if you happened to be visiting a friend who lived near the meeting place well the state police wound up filing you as a subversive they were eventually found out and a court ruled against carrying on any more such nonsense i believe thay may have had to destroy the tapes as well even with well meaning cops and i m sure there are many there will be strong pressure to bend the constitutional safeguards we don t need to assume corrupt or unbalanced officers it will all be in the interest of enforcing sensible laws saving lives and protecting property compromises will be made by well meaning officers facing what to them will be a moral dilemma clipper will make criminals out of cops do we want to do this to our police forces dwight tuinstra best tuinstra sandman ece clarkson edu tolerable tuinstrd craft camp clarkson edu homo sapiens planetary cancer news at six
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6,795 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in apr magnus acs ohio state edu jebright magnus acs ohio state edu james r ebright writes in article a rubin dsg dse beckman com arthur rubin writes i wouldn t trust the nsa i think i would trust the president on this but i m not certain he would be told i am not a crook president richard m nixon this president and i could easily be wrong arthur l rubin a rubin dsg dse beckman com work beckman instruments brea mcimail com compuserve com arthur pnet cts com personal my opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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6,796 |
sci.crypt
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method begin pgp signed message in article strnlghtc t nh is netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes in article apr eff org kadie eff org carl m kadie writes so don t just think of replacements for clipper also think of front ends this only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non escrowed encryption schemes otherwise why not just use the front end without clipper david david they the gov t have already said that they hope to do this in the long run derek pgp key available upon request on the key server pgp public keys toxicwaste mit edu derek atkins mit electrical engineering and computer science secretary mit student information processing board sipb mit media laboratory speech research group warlord mit edu pp asel n nwh
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6,797 |
sci.crypt
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re would clipper make a good cover for other encryption method strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes chances are the government has thought of this and just anyone won t be permitted access to enough of the internals to make a fake clipper chip once the chips are released in phones or whatever they are vulnerable to phsyical inspection and observation now i will grant that there will no doubt be safeguards against peeling the chip but the nsa has no monopoly on cleverness the chip and the algorithms it uses will not remain secret for very long any university with a vlsi lab has the required equipment as does any offshore semiconductor manufacturer amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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6,798 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article qsip innnj dns nmsu edu amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes al escom com al donaldson writes amolitor nmsu edu andrew molitor writes this appears to be generic calling upon the name of the anti christ just for the hell of it let s destroy this remark let us imagine that the executive branch actually could extract keys from the escrow houses without anyone knowing or telling now what dick has bits of data what the hell s he gonna do with it trot around to the telco and say we d like an unauthorised decrypting tap uh huh break in to watergate and install his own tap so his people still do have to break in neat huh record some noise then get the executive branch phone decryption box huh they ve got one goodness wait til the washington post gets hold of this and decrypt the noise more likely stare at the key and say oh hell it s not worth all this bloody hassle no he gives the keys to the fbi who may then give them to the local police on request who then simply put some alagator clips on your phone junction box and conduct an illegal tap they then decrypt when they recover the tape its just doing what the government does best breaking the law bill smythe
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6,799 |
sci.crypt
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re the secret source of that announcement grady netcom com suggests using a common but restricted distribution private key to allow public key system encrypted postings in theory that will work fine as long as the privae key remains secure in practice it would be a good idea to check to see if that would be a violation of some net rule practice custom etc i don t say it would be just that it would be a good idea to check this is not like rot where everybody can have the key trivially it would also be a good idea to check to see if such posts would be forwarded by the sites needed to make the chain work of course there d be no problem with a discussion group travelling over facilities entirely under the control of the members probably there would also be no problem with a mailing list approach it might even be fun for some david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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