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sci.crypt
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re hard drive security for fbi targets do a straight encryption of your keyrings and put the results with misleading names somewhere they won t be noticed eg in the windows directory nobody knows what half those files are do a straight encryption of a bat file that will decrypt the keyrings to ramdisk and will set pgppath to point at it set up another bat file to decrypt and execute the first again on ram disk have it take the name of the target file as an argument so that there is no link between this file and the non existent batch file referred to by the rest of the system comment it so it looks like a test script for fooling around with pgp set pgppath to the pgp directory leave the original keyrings that came with pgp in the directory with pgp a good indication that you are playing with but haven t made serious use of pgp add a set of keys with your name and a really simple passphrase never use it or use it as your widely published key for low security e mail when needed run the second bat file make sure all intermediate and plainfiles are generated on ramdisk when you hear the concussion grenade hit the power switch cheers marc marc thibault cis put another log marc tanda isis org nc freenet aa on the fire
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sci.crypt
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source to mactinosh pgp in c available source code to macintosh pgp now available via anonymous ftp ftp netcom com cd pub grady mget macpgp src sea hqx mget macpgp srcsignature convert to a compact pro self extracting archive with binhex if appropriate check the digital signature of the hqx file with your copy of pgp non macintosh users wishing to check the digital signature please note that cr denotes the end of line on a macintosh not lf or crlf for the purposes of the itar act this unclassified technical documentation is hereby released into the public domain however no representation is made as to copyright or other commercial rights that may exist in this package full source code symantec think c projects and full user documentation is included for both and versions of pretty good privacy a strong public key encryption and digital signature application using the rsa algorithm patented in the united states and the idea cipher patented in switzerland no executables are included executables are available via anonymous ftp from leif thep lu se sweden night nig ac jp japan van bc wimsey bc ca canada soda berkeley edu p r of berkeley src doc ic ac uk united kingdom ghost dsi unimi it italy plaza aarnet edu au australia nic funet fi finland other s public keys are available from anonymous server sites send message subject help for more information internet sites pgp public keys junkbox cc iastate edu michael graff explorer iastate edu ftp tbird cc iastate edu usr explorer public keys pgp pgp public keys toxicwaste mit edu derek atkins warlord mit edu ftp toxicwaste mit edu pub keys public keys pgp pgp public keys phil utmb edu john perry perry phil utmb edu ftp phil utmb edu pub pgp public keys pgp pgp public keys demon co uk mark turner mark demon co uk ftp ftp demon co uk pub pgp pubring pgp uucp site pgp public keys jpunix com john perry perry jpunix com the executable application built from these sources has not been licensed by rsa data security inc nor has the rsa public key algorithm or the idea block cipher algorithm been approved by the national security agency this unclassified technical documentation is made available for educational use only possession distribution or use of an executable binary built from this source may be a civil or criminal offense suggested improvements bugs or comments should be directly posted to alt security pgp or to the principal developers listed among the source documents general questions and comments about public key cryptography or the idea cipher may be posted to alt security pgp or to the sci crypt usenet groups grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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sci.crypt
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re fifth amendment and passwords ashall magnus acs ohio state edu andrew s hall writes i am postive someone will correct me if i am wrong but doesn t the fifth also cover not being forced to do actions that are self incriminating from mike godwin mnemonic eff org posted with permission carl sadly it does not suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and voice exemplars and to take blood and dna tests e g the police couldn t demand that you silently take them to where the body is buried or where the money is hidden no but they could compell you to produce the key to a safe where as it happens evidence that will convict you is stored the crypto key disclosure issue hasn t come up yet but current law suggests that it s a loser for the defendant he ll be compelled to turn over the key the test for compelled self incrimination is whether the material to be disclosed in itself tends to inculpate the discloser in the example i gave above the safe key itself has no testimonial value ergo it can be disclosed under compulsion e g subpoena duces tecum moreover the government can always immunize the disclosure of a crypto key compelling you to disclose the key at the price of not using the fact of your disclosure as evidence in the case against you of course they can use whatever they discover as a result of this disclosure against you mike carl kadie i do not represent any organization this is just me kadie cs uiuc edu
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sci.crypt
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re pgp pem and rfc s was cryptography patents charles kincy ckincy cs umr edu wrote all i have to say is yeah right if you re willing to pay them mucho big bucks and or use the routines they tell you to do doesn t sound very reasonable to me all i have to say is this is full of shit i have negotiated a license and the bucks are incredibly reasonable with an upfront charge on a sliding scale depending on your capitalization if you are a startup and can t afford it you can t afford to start up in the first place why do people insist on making unequivocal statements about that which they know nothing but i don t guess pkp and rsa are interested in big bucks maybe they have some other agenda secure communications only for government agents perhaps have you considered treatment for paranoia the government is the single biggest thorn in rsa s side some limitation let me guess don t use the code in any way pkp or rsa doesn t like such as providing secure communications for the average citizen that was exactly its purpose if you know anything about it there is nothing at all preventing the average citizen using it only selling it i hope my cynicism is misplaced here go ahead i m not afraid to be wrong every once in a while but i have an uneasy feeling that i am right it is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact with a tiny disclaimer at the end check your facts first and grow up why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography and immaturity i wonder bob cain normally rcain netcom com
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sci.crypt
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privacy anonymity on the internet faq of archive name net privacy part last modified version identity privacy and anonymity on the internet c l detweiler not for commercial use except by permission from author otherwise may be freely copied not to be altered please credit if quoted summary information on email and account privacy anonymous mailing and posting encryption and other privacy and rights issues associated with use of the internet and global networks in general search for for exact section search for underline for next section part this file identity what is identity on the internet why is identity un important on the internet how does my email address not identify me and my background how can i find out more about somebody from their email address why is identification un stable on the internet what is the future of identification on the internet privacy what is privacy on the internet why is privacy un important on the internet how in secure are internet networks how in secure is my account how in secure are my files and directories how in secure is x windows how in secure is my email how am i not liable for my email and postings how do i provide more less information to others on my identity who is my sysadmin what does s he know about me why is privacy un stable on the internet what is the future of privacy on the internet anonymity what is anonymity on the internet why is anonymity un important on the internet how can anonymity be protected on the internet what is anonymous mail what is anonymous posting why is anonymity un stable on the internet what is the future of anonymity on the internet part next file resources what unix programs are related to privacy how can i learn about or use cryptography what is the cypherpunks mailing list what are some privacy related newsgroups faqs what is internet privacy enhanced mail pem what are other request for comments rfcs related to privacy how can i run an anonymous remailer what are references on privacy in email what are some email usenet and internet use policies what is the mit crosslink anonymous message tv program miscellaneous what is digital cash what is a hacker or cracker what is a cypherpunk what is steganography and anonymous pools what is security through obscurity what are identity daemons what standards are needed to guard electronic privacy issues what is the electronic frontier foundation eff who are computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr what was operation sun devil and the steve jackson game case what is integrated services digital network isdn what is the national research and education network nren what is the fbi s proposed digital telephony act what other u s legislation is related to privacy on networks what are references on rights in cyberspace what is the computers and academic freedom caf archive footnotes what is the background behind the internet how is internet anarchy like the english language most wanted list change history part last file anonymizing what are some known anonymous remailing and posting sites what are the responsibilities associated with anonymity how do i kill anonymous postings what is the history behind anonymous posting servers what is the value of anonymity should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed what should system operators do with anonymous postings what is going on with anon penet fi maintained by j helsingius identity what is identity on the internet generally today people s identity on the internet is primarily determined by their email address in the sense that this is their most unchanging face in the electronic realm this is your login name qualified by the complete address domain information for example ld longs lance colostate edu people see this address when receiving mail or reading usenet posts from you and in other situations where programs record usage some obsolete forms of addresses such as bitnet still persist in email messages additional information on the path that a message takes is prepended to the message received by the recipient this information identifies the chain of hosts involved in the transmission and is a very accurate trace of its origination this type of identify and forward protocol is also used in the usenet protocol to a lesser extent forging these fields requires corrupted mailing software at sites involved in the forwarding and is very uncommon not so uncommon is forging the chain at the origination point so that all initial sites in the list are faked at the time the message is created tracing these messages can be difficult or impossible when the initial faked fields are names of real machines and represent real transfer routes why is identity un important on the internet the concept of identity is closely intertwined with communication privacy and security which in turn are all critical aspects of computer networks for example the convenience of communication afforded by email would be impossible without conventions for identification but there are many potential abuses of identity possible that can have very severe consequences with massive computer networks at the forefront of the issue which can potentially either exacerbate or solve these problems verifying that an identity is correct is called authentication and one classic example of the problems associated with it is h g well s war of the worlds radio broadcast that fooled segments of the population into thinking that an alien invasion was in progress hoaxes of this order are not uncommon on usenet and forged identities makes them more insidious people and their reputations can be assaulted by forgery however the fluidity of identity on the internet is for some one of its most attractive features identity is just as useful as it is harmful a professor might carefully explain a topic until he finds he is talking to an undergraduate a person of a particular occupation may be able to converse with others who might normally shun him some prejudices are erased but on the other hand many prejudices are useful a scientist might argue he can better evaluate the findings of a paper as a reviewer if he knows more about the authors likewise he may be more likely to reject it based on unfair or irrelevant criteria on the other side of the connection the author may find identities of reviewers useful in exerting pressure for acceptance identity is especially crucial in establishing and regulating credit not necessarily financial and ownership and usage many functions in society demand reliable and accurate techniques for identification heavy reliance will be placed on digital authentication as global economies become increasingly electronic many government functions and services are based on identification and law enforcement frequently hinges on it hence employees of many government organizations push toward stronger identification structures but when does identification invade privacy the growth of the internet is provoking social forces of massive proportions decisions made now on issues of identity will affect many future users especially as the network becomes increasingly global universal widespread and entrenched and the positive or adverse affects of these actions intended and inadvertent will literally be magnified exponentially how does my email address not identify me and my background your email address may contain information that influences people s perceptions of your background the address may identify you as from a department at a particular university an employee at a company or a government worker it may contain your last name initials or cryptic identification codes independent of both in the us some are based on parts of social security numbers others are in the form u where the number is incremented in the order that new users are added to the system standard internet addresses also can contain information on your broad geographical location or nationhood however none of this information is guaranteed to be correct or be there at all the fields in the domain qualification of the username are based on rather arbitrary organization such as mostly invisible network cabling distributions the only point to make is that early fields in the address are more specific such as specific computer names or local networks and the later ones the most general such as continental domains typically the first field is the name of the computer receiving mail gleaning information from the email address alone is sometimes an inspired art or an inconsistent and futile exercise for more information see the faqs on email addresses and known geographical distributions below however unix utilities exist to aid in the quest see the question on this common suffixes us united states uk united kingdom ca canada fi finland au australia edu university or college com commercial organization org other e g nonprofit organization gov government mil military site how can i find out more about somebody with a given email address one simple way is to send email to that address asking another way is to send mail to the postmaster at that address i e postmaster address although the postmaster s job is more to help find user id s of particular people given their real name and solve mail routing problems the sysadmin i e root address may also be able to supply information users with related email address may have information however all of these methods rely on the time and patience of others so use them minimally one of the most basic tools for determining identity over the internet is the unix utility finger the basic syntax is finger user here there everywhere this utility uses communication protocols to query the computer named in the address for information on the user named the response is generated completely by the receiving computer and may be in any format possible responses are as follows a message unknown host meaning some aspect of the address is incorrect two lines with no information and a message in real life in which case the receiving computer could not find any kind of a match on the username the finger utility may return this response in other situations a listing of information associated with multiple users some computers will search only for matching user ids others will attempt to find the username you specified as a substring of all actual full names of users kept in a local database at some sites finger can be used to get a list of all users on the system with a finger address in general this is often considered weak security however because attackers know valid user id s to crack passwords more information on the fields returned by finger is given below more information on finger and locating people s email addresses is given in the email faq such as the whois lookup utility just as you can use these means to find out about others they can use them to find out about you you can finger yourself to find out what is publicly reported by your unix system about you be careful when modifying finger data virtually anyone with internet access worldwide can query this information in one amazing case the new york times writer j markoff uncovered the identity of r morris author of the internet worm through the use of an anonymous tip and finger see the book cyberspace by k hafner and j markoff why is identification un stable on the internet generally identity is an amorphous and almost nonexistent concept on the internet for a variety of reasons one is the inherent fluidity of cyberspace where people emerge and submerge frequently and absences are not readily noted in the community most people remember faces and voices the primary means of casual identification in the real world the arbitary and cryptic sequences of letters and digits comprising most email addresses are not particularly noticeable or memorable and far from a unique identification of an individual who may use multiple accounts on multiple machines anywhere in the world currently internet users do not really have any great assurances that the messages in email and usenet are from who they appear to be a person s mailing address is far from an identification of an individual anyone with access to the account e g they know the password either legitimately or otherwise can send mail with that address in the from line email addresses for an individual tend to change frequently as they switch jobs or make moves inside their organizations as part of current mailing protocol standards forging the from line in mail messages is a fairly trivial operation for many hackers the status and path information prepended to messages by intermediate hosts is generally unforgeable in general while possible forgeries are fairly rare on most newsgroups and in email besides these pathological cases abve there are many basic problems with today s internet protocols affecting identification on the internet internet mail standards described in rfc are still evolving rapidly and not entirely orderly for example standards for mail address munging or parsing tend to vary slightly between sites and frequently mean the difference between finding addresses and bouncing mail domain names and computer names are frequently changed at sites and there are delays in the propagation of this data addresses cannot be resolved when certain critical computers crash such as the receiving computer or other computers involved in resolving names into addresses called nameservers a whole slew of problems is associated with nameservers if they are not updated they will not find name addresses and even the operation of what constitutes updating has different interpretations at different sites the current internet mailing and addressing protocols are slightly anachronistic in that they were created when the network was somewhat obscure and not widespread with only a fraction of the traffic it now sees today a large proportion of internet traffic is email comprising millions of messages what is the future of identification on the internet some new technologies and standards are introducing facial images and voice messages into mail and these will improve the sense of community that comes from the familiarity of identification however they are not currently widespread require large amounts of data transfer standardized software and make some compromises in privacy promising new cryptographic techniques may make digital signatures and digital authentication common see below also the trend in usenet standards is toward greater authentication of posted information on the other hand advances in ensuring anonymity such as remailers are forthcoming see below privacy what is privacy on the internet generally while privacy has multiple connotations in society and perhaps even more on the internet in cyberspace most take it to mean that you have exclusive use and access to your account and the data stored on and and directed to it such as email and you do not encounter arbitrary restrictions or searches in other words others may obtain data associated with your account but not without your permission these ideas are probably both fairly limiting and liberal in their scope in what most internet users consider their private domains some users don t expect or want any privacy some expect and demand it why is privacy un important on the internet this is a somewhat debatable and inflammatory topic arousing passionate opinions on the internet some take privacy for granted and are rudely surprised to find it tenuous or nonexistent most governments have rules that protect privacy such as the illegal search and seizure clause of the u s constitution adopted by others but have many that are antithetical to it such as laws prohibiting secret communications or allowing wiretapping these rules generally carry over to the internet with few specific rules governing it however the legal repercussions of the global internet are still largely unknown and untested i e no strong legal precedents and court cases the fact that internet traffic frequently passes past international boundaries and is not centrally managed significantly complicates and strongly discourages its regulation how in secure are internet networks theoretically people at any site in the chain of sites with access to hardware and network media that transmits data over the internet could potentially monitor or archive it however the sheer volume and general noise inherent to this data makes these scenarios highly improbable even by government agencies with supposedly vast funding and resources technologies exist to tap magnetic fields given off by electrical wires without detection less obscurely any machine with a network connection is a potential station for traffic detection but this scenario requires knowledge and access to very low level hardware the network card to pursue if even possible a company network general inc is one of many that manufactures and markets sophisticated network monitoring tools that can filter and read packets by arbitrary criteria for troubleshooting purposes but the cost of this type of device is prohibitive for casual use known instances of the above types of security breaches at a major scale such as at network hubs are very rare the greatest risks tend to emerge locally note that all these approaches are almost completely defused with the use of cryptography how in secure is my account by default not very there are a multitude of factors that may reinforce or compromise aspects of your privacy on the internet first your account must be secure from other users the universal system is to use a password but if it is weak i e easy to guess this security is significantly diminished somewhat surprisingly and frighteningly to some certain users of the system particularly the administrator generally have unlimited access regardless of passwords and may grant that access to others this means that they may read any file in your account without detection furthermore not universally known most unix systems keep fairly extensive accounting records of when and where you logged in what commands you execute and when they are executed in fact login information is usually public most features of this auditing or process accounting information are enabled by default after the initial installation and the system administrator may customize it to strengthen or weaken it to satisfy performance or privacy aims this information is frequently consulted for troubleshooting purposes and may otherwise be ignored this data tracks unsuccessful login attempts and other suspicious activities on the system a traditional part of the unix system that tracks user commands is easily circumvented by the user with the use of symbolic links described in man ln unix implementations vary widely particularly in tracking features and new sophisticated mechanisms are introduced by companies regularly typically system adminstrators augment the basic unix functionality with public domain programs and locally developed tools for monitoring and use them only to isolate suspicious activity as it arises e g remote accesses to the passwd file incorrect login attempts remote connection attempts etc generally you should expect little privacy on your account for various reasons potentially every keystroke you type could be intercepted by someone else system administrators make extensive backups that are completely invisible to users which may record the states of an account over many weeks erased files can under many operating systems be undeleted most automated services keep logs of use for troubleshooting or otherwise for example ftp sites usually log the commands and record the domain originations of users including anonymous ones some software exacerbates these problems see the section on x windows in security indepedent of malevolent administrators are fellow users a much more commonly harmful threat there are multiple ways to help ensure that your account will not be accessed by others and compromises can often be traced to failures in these guidelines choose a secure password change it periodically make sure to logout always do not leave a machine unattended for long make sure no one watches you when you type your password avoid password references in email be conservative in the use of the rhost file use utilities like xlock to protect a station but be considerate be wary of situations where you think you should supply your password there are only several basic situations where unix prompts you for a password when you are logging in to a system or changing your password situations can arise in which prompts for passwords are forged by other users especially in cases where you are talking to them such as internet relay chat also be aware that forged login screens are one method to illegitimately obtain passwords thanks to jim mattson mattson cs ucsd edu for contributions here how in secure are my files and directories the most important privacy considerations are related to file rights and many lapses can be traced to their misunderstood nature or haphazard maintenance be aware of the rights associated with your files and directories in unix if the x execute right on your parent directory is off for users groups and other these users cannot gain information on anything in your directories anything less may allow others to read change or even delete files in your home directory the rights on a directory supersede the rights associated with files in that directory for a directory x means that access to the files or subdirectories in the directory is possible if you know their names to list the contents of the directory however requires the r right by default most accounts are accessable only to the owner but the initial configuration varies between sites based on administrator preference the default file mode specifies the initial rights associated with newly created files and can be set in the shell with umask the details of rights implementations tend to vary between versions of unix consult man pages on chmod and ls examples traver lance ls ld drwx ld jan users ld here is a listing of the rights associated with a user s home directory denoted by the columns at the left identify what rights are available the first column identifies the entry as a directory and the next three columns mean that read write and execute rights respectively are permitted for that user for directories the x right means that contents file and subdirectory names within that directory can be listed the subsequent columns indicate that no other users have any rights to anything in the directory tree originating at that point they can t even see any lower files or subdirectories the hierarchy is completely invisible to them traver lance ls l msg rw r r ld jan msg traver lance chmod u rw g o msg traver lance ls l msg rw ld jan msg here the modes on the file msg were changed to take away rights from group and other note that ls l file requires both the r right to get the list of files and subdirectories and the x right to access the files and subdirectories in order to get their size etc for example suppose the directory foo has rights dr r r the following is possible ls foo these commands would fail independent of file rights ls l foo ls l foo file cat foo file cd foo if the directory foo has rights d x x x the following are possible if it is known beforehand that foo contains an r readable file named file ls l foo file cat foo file cd foo the following commands fail ls foo ls l foo thanks to uwe waldmann uwe mpi sb mpg de for contributions here how in secure is x windows x windows is the primary software developed by the mit athena project which is funded by u s government grants to develop applications to harness the power of networks in enhancing computational tasks particularly the human computer interface the software implements a client server interface to a computer via graphical windows in this case the client is the application requesting or utilizing graphical resources such as windows or a mouse and the server is the machine that provides them in many situations the client is an application program running on the same machine as the server the great utility of x windows comes from its complete dissociation of the client and server so that windows may be broadcast to a server at a remote location from the client unfortunately this dynamic power also introduces many deep intricate and complicated security considerations the primary security and privacy issue associated with x windows is that much more sensitive data may be sent over a network and over wider regions than in the case where the human is situated near the host computer currently there is no encryption of data such as screen updates and keystrokes in x windows due to either intentional design decisions or unintentional design flaws early versions of the x window system are extremely insecure anyone with an account on the server machine can disrupt that display or read it electronically based on access to the device unix by any regular user there are no protections from this type of access in these versions the problem arises because the security is completely based on machine addresses rather than users such that any user at a trusted machine is himself trusted quoting from x documentation man xsecurity any client on a host in the host access control list is allowed access to the x server this system can work reasonably well in an environment where everyone trusts everyone or when only a single person can log into a given machine this system does not work well when multiple people can log in to a single machine and mutual trust does not exist with the access control list the xhost command may prevent some naive attempts i e those other than the direct access unix evasion the syntax as typed on the host machine is xhost name where name is the domain name or internet address of an authorized client machine by default clients running nonlocal to the host are disabled public domain programs to disrupt a display momentarily such as flip or slowly mirror the screen image or cause pixels to melt down to the bottom have been circulating on the internet among hackers for several years and played as pranks on unsuspecting or inexperienced users much more serious security breaches are conceivable from similar mechanisms exploiting this inherent weaknesses the minimal easily bypassed trusted security mode of xhost has been jokingly referred to as x hanging open security terrible new versions of the x window system x r and higher by default make server access as secure as the file system using a xauthority file and magic cookies remote machines must have a code in the xauthority file in the home directory that matches the code allowed by the server many older programs and even new vendor supplied code does not support or is incompatible with magic cookies the basic magic cookie mechanism is vulnerable to monitoring techniques described earlier because no encryption of keys occurs in transmission x r also includes other sophisticated encryption mechanisms try man xsecurity to find out what is supported at your site even though improved security mechanisms have been available in x windows since local sites often update this software infrequently because installation is extremely complex thanks to marc vanheyningen mvanheyn whale cs indiana edu jim mattson mattson cs ucsd edu and bill marshall marshall cs iastate edu for contributions here how in secure is my email by default not very the characters that you are reading are almost certainly encoded in ascii the american standard code for information interchange that maps alphabetic and symbolic characters onto numeric codes and vice versa virtually every computer system uses this code and if not has ways of converting to and from it when you write a mail message by default it is being sent in ascii and since the standard is virtually universal there is no intrinsic privacy despite milleniums worth of accumulated cryptographic knowledge cryptographic technologies are only recently being established that afford high priority to privacy as a primary criteria in computer and network design some potential pitfalls in privacy are as follows the most serious threats are instances of immature or unscrupulous system operators reading private mail in the spool files at a local site i e at the source or destination of the message such as a university system administrators may also release files to law enforcement agencies but conventions and protocols for warrants involving computer searches have still not been strongly established and tested legally note that bounced messages go to postmasters at a given site in their entirety this means that if you address mail with an incorrect address it has a good chance of being seen by a human other than the recipient typically new user accounts are always set up such that the local mail directory is private but this is not guaranteed and can be overridden finally be aware that some mailing lists email addresses of everyone on a list are actually publicly accessable via mail routing software mechanisms this feature can be disabled most potential compromises in email privacy can be thoroughly avoided with the use of strong end to end cryptography which has its own set of caveats for example unscrupulous administrators may still be a threat if the encryption site is shared or nonlocal see the sections on email privacy and email policies how am i not liable for my email and postings as punishment or whatever your system administrator can revoke certain privileges such as emailing usenet posting or reading certain groups file transferring remote communications or generally any subset of capabilities available from your account this all is completely at the discretion of the local administrator and under the procedures followed at a particular site which in many cases are haphazard and crisis oriented currently there are virtually no widespread uniform guidelines or procedures for restricting use to any internet services and local administrators are free to make arbitrary decisions on access today punitive measures are regularly applied in various situations in the typical scenario complaint s reach a system adminstrator regarding abuses by a user usually but not necessarily preceded by complaints to the user in email regarding that person s objectionable email or postings abusive posters to usenet are usually first given admonitions from their system administrators as urged by others on the net the debate persists endlessly on many newsgroups whether this is also used as a questionable means of attacking or silencing harmless crackpots or censoring unpopular opinions system administrators at remote sites regularly cooperate to squelch severe cases of abuse in general however by tradition usenet readers are remarkably tolerant of diverse views and uses of the system but a colorful vocabularly of slang helps describe their alternatives when this patience is sapped the options wielded by the individual user are to simply advance to the next message referred to as hitting the n key or to plonk annoying posters according to the hacker s dictionary the sound a jerk makes at the end of a fall to the bottom of a kill file in cases where punitive actions are applied generally system administrators are least likely to restrict email usenet postings are much more commonly restricted either to individual users or entire groups such as a university campus restrictions are most commonly associated with the following abuses harassing or threatening notes email terrorism illegal uses e g piracy or propagation of copyrighted material ad hominem attacks i e insulting the reputation of the poster instead of citing the content of the message intentional or extreme vulgarity and offensiveness inappropriate postings esp binary files in regular groups mail bombing inundating mail boxes with numerous or massive files major problems originate from lack of distinctions in private and official email or postings most users have internet access via accounts at businesses or universities and their activities on the internet can be construed as representative of their parent organizations many people put disclaimers in their signatures in an attempt dissociate their identity and activities from parent organizations as a precaution a recent visible political case involves the privacy of electronic mail written by white house staff members of the bush administration following are some guidelines acquaint yourself with your company or university policy if possible avoid use of your company email address for private communication use a disclaimer keep a low profile avoid flamewars or simply don t post avoid posting information that could be construed to be proprietary or internal the following references are available from ftp eff com see also the section on internet use policies pub academic banned pub academic banned computer material that was banned challenged in academia in and including usenet hierarchies pub academic cases this is an on line collection of information about specific computers and academic freedom cases file readme is a detailed description of the items in the directory pub academic faq netnews liability notes on university liability for usenet how do i provide more less information to others on my identity the public information of your identity and account is mostly available though the unix utility finger described above you have control over most of this information with the utility chfn the specifics vary between sites on some systems use passwd f you can provide unlimited information in the plan file which is copied directly to the destination during the fingering a technique that works at some sites allows you to find out who is finger ing you and even to vary the plan file sent to them your signature is determined by the environment variable signature usenet signatures are conventionally stored in the signature file in your home directory providing less information on your online identity is more difficult and involved one approach is to ask your system adminstrator to change or delete information about you such as your full name you may be able to obtain access on a public account or one from someone unrelated to you personally you may be able to remotely login via modem or otherwise to computers that you are not physically near these are tactics for hiding or masking your online activities but nothing is foolproof consult man pages on the chmod command and the default file mode generally files on a shared system have good safeguards within the user pool but very little protection is possible from corrupt system administrators to mask your identity in email or on usenet you can use different accounts more untraceable are new anonymous posting and remailing services that are very recently being established see below who is my sysadmin what does s he know about me the requirements and screening for getting a system administration job and thereby access to all information on a system vary widely between sites and are sometimes frighteningly lax especially at universities many unix systems at universities are largely managed by undergraduates with a background in computing and often hacking in general commercial and industrial sites are more strict on qualifications and background and government sites are extremely strict the system adminstrator root user can monitor what commands you used and at what times s he may have a record backups of files on your account over a few weeks s he can monitor when you send email or post usenet messages and potentially read either s he may have access to records indicating what hosts you are using both locally and elsewhere administrators sometimes employ specialized programs to track strange or unusual activity which can potentially be misused why is privacy un stable on the internet for the numerous reasons listed above privacy should not be an expectation with current use of the internet furthermore large parts of the internet are funded by the u s nsf national science foundation which places certain restrictions on its use such as prohibiting commercial use some high level officials in this and other government agencies may be opposed to emerging techniques to guarantee privacy such as encryption and anonymous services historically the major threats to privacy on the internet have been local perhaps the most common example of this are the widespread occurrences of university administrators refusing to carry some portion of usenet newsgroups labelled as pornographic the alternative hierarchy in the usenet system which has virtually no restrictions on propagation and new group creation is frequently targeted although this material may appear anywhere from the global point of view traffic is generally completely unimpeded on the internet and only the most egregious offenders are pursued for example verbatim transcriptions of copyrighted material such as newspaper or magazine articles are posted to usenet with regularity without major consequences some email complaints may ensue more astonishing to some is that currently significant portions of usenet traffic and less so internet traffic is comprised of sexually explicit digitized images almost entirely originating from copyrighted material newsgroups such as alt sex regularly have the highest traffic what is the future of privacy on the internet some argue that the internet currently has an adequate or appropriate level of privacy others will argue that as a prototype for future global networks it has woefully inadequate safeguards the internet is growing to become a completely global international superhighway for data and this traffic will inevitably entail data such as voice messages postal mail and many other items of extremely personal nature computer items that many people consider completely private such as their local hard drives will literally be inches from global network connections also sensitive industrial and business information is exchanged over networks currently and this volume may conceivably merge with the internet most would agree that for these basic but sensitive uses of the internet no significant mechanisms are currently in place to ensure much privacy new standards are calling for uniform introduction of privacy enhanced mail pem which uses encryption technologies to ensure privacy so that privacy protection is automatic and may significantly improve safeguards the same technology that can be extremely destructive to privacy such as with surreptitious surveilance can be overwhelmingly effective in protecting it e g with encryption some government agencies are opposed to unlimited privacy in general and believe that it should lawfully be forfeited in cases of criminal conduct e g court authorized wiretapping however powerful new technologies to protect privacy on computers are becoming increasingly popular provoking some to say that the cat is out of the bag and the genie can t be put back in the bottle in less idiomatic terms they believe that the spread of strong cryptography is already underway will be socially and technically unstoppable to date no feasible system that guarantees both secure communication and government oversight has been proposed the two goals are largely incompatible proposals for registration of secret keys by d denning on sci crypt for example have been met with hot controversy at best and ridicule and derision at worst mainly because of concerns for the right to privacy and objections of inherent feasibility electronic privacy issues and particularly the proper roles of networks and the internet will foreseeably become highly visible and explosive over the next few years anonymity what is anonymity on the internet simply stated anonymity is the absence of identity the ultimate in privacy however there are several variations on this simple theme a person may wish to be consistently identified by a certain pseudonym or handle and establish a reputation under it in some area providing pseudo anonymity a person may wish to be completely untraceable for a single one way message a sort of hit and run or a person may wish to be openly anonymous but carry on a conversation with others with either known or anonymous identities via an anonymous return address a user may wish to appear as a regular user but actually be untraceable sometimes a user wishes to hide who he is sending mail to in addition to the message itself the anonymous item itself may be directed at individuals or groups a user may wish to access some service and hide all signs of the association all of these uses are feasible on the internet but are currently tricky to carry out in practice because of all the tracking mechanisms inherent to operating systems and network protocols officials of the nsf and other government agencies may be opposed to any of these uses because of the potential for abuse nevertheless the inherent facelessness of large networks will always guarantee a certain element of anonymity why is anonymity un important on the internet anonymity is another powerful tool that can be beneficial or problematic depending on its use arguably absence of identification is important as the presence of it it may be the case that many strong benefits from electronic anonymity will be discovered that were unforeseen and unpredicted because true anonymity has been historically very difficult to establish one can use anonymity to make personal statements to a colleague that would sabotage a relationship if stated openly such as employer employee scenarios one can use it to pass information and evade any threat of direct retribution for example whistleblowers reporting on government abuses economic social or political can bring issues to light without fear of stigma or retaliation sensitive personal potentially damaging information is often posted to some usenet groups a risky situation where anonymity allows conversations to be carried on completely independent of the identities of the participants some police departments run phone services that allow anonymous reporting of crimes such uses would be straightforward on the network unfortunately extortion and harassment become more insidious with assurances of anonymity how can anonymity be protected on the internet the chief means as alluded to above are masking identities in email and posting however anonymous accounts public accounts as accessable and anonymous as e g public telephones may be effective as well but this use is generally not officially supported and even discouraged by some system adminstrators and nsf guidelines the nonuniformity in the requirements of obtaining accounts at different sites and institutions makes anonymous accounts generally difficult to obtain to the public at large many communications protocols are inherently detrimental to anonymity virtually every protocol in existence currently contains information on both sender and receiver in every packet new communications protocols will likely develop that guarantee much higher degrees of secure anonymous communication what is anonymous mail one approach to anonymizing mail has been to set up an anonymous server that when activated by email to its address responds by allocating and supplying an anonymous id that is unique to the person requesting it based on his email address this will vary for the same person for different machine address email originations to send anonymous mail the user sends email directed to the server containing the final destination the server anonymizes the message by stripping of identification information and forwards the message which appears to originate from the anonymous server only from the corresponding anonymous user id this is the interactive use of anonymity or pseudonymity mentioned above another more fringe approach is to run a cypherpunk remailer from a regular user account no root system privileges are required these are currently being pioneered by eric hughes and hal finney hal alumni caltech edu the operator runs a process on a machine that anonymizes mail sent to him with certain characteristics that distinguish it from his regular incoming mail typically fields in the header one has been implemented as a perl script running on unix several of these are in existence currently but sites and software currently are highly unstable they may be in operation outside of system administrator knowledge the remailers don t generally support anonymous return addresses mail that is incorrectly addressed is received by the operator generally the user of the remailer has to disavow any responsibility for the messages forwarded through his system although actually may be held liable regardless these approaches have several serious disadvantages and weaknesses the anonymous server approach requires maintaining a mapping of anonymous id s to real addresses that must be maintained indefinitely one alternative is to allow deallocation of aliases at the request of the user but this has not been implemented yet although an unlikely scenario traffic to any of these sites could conceivably be monitored from the outside necessitating the use of cryptography for basic protection local administrators can shut them down either out of caprice or under pressure from local network or government agencies unscrupulous providers of the services can monitor the traffic that goes through them most remailers currently keep logs that may be inspected the cypherpunk approach tends to be highly unstable because these operators are basically network users who do not own the equipment and are accountable to their own system administrators who may be unaware of the use and unsympathetic to the philosophy of anonymity when the operation is discovered regarding it as illicit use in all cases a high degree of trust is placed in the anonymous server operator by the user currently the most direct route to anonymity involves using smtp protocols to submit a message directly to a server with arbitrary field information this practice not uncommon to hackers and the approach used by remailers is generally viewed with hostility by most system administrators information in the header routing data and logs of network port connection information may be retained that can be used to track the originating site in practice this is generally infeasible and rarely carried out some administrators on the network will contact local administrators to request a message be tracked and its writer admonished or punished more severely such as revoking the account all of this actually happening occasionally but infrequently see the sections known anonymous mail and posting sites and responsibilities associated with anonymity what is anonymous posting anonymous servers have been established as well for anonymous usenet posting with all the associated caveats above monitored traffic capricious or risky local circumstances logging make sure to test the system at least once by e g anonymous posting to misc test however some operators don t recommend this because many sites autorespond to test messages possibly causing the anonymous server to allocate anonymous ids for those machines see the responsibilties associated with anonymous posting before proceeding another direct route involves using nntp protocols to submit a message directly to a newserver with arbitrary field information this practice not uncommon to hackers is also generally viewed with hostility by most system administrators and similar consequences can ensue see the sections known anonymous mail and posting sites and responsibilities associated with anonymity why is anonymity un stable on the internet as noted many factors compromise the anonymity currently available to the general internet community and these services should be used with great caution to summarize the technology is in its infancy and current approaches are unrefined unreliable and not completely trustworthy no standards have been established and troubling situations of loss of anonymity and bugs in the software are prevalent here are some encountered and potential bugs one anonymous remailer reallocated already allocated anonymous return addresses others passed signature information embedded in messages unaltered address resolution problems resulting in anonymized mail bounced to a remailer are common forgeries to the anonymous server itself are a problem possibly allowing unauthorized users to potentially glean anon id email address mappings in the alias file this can be remedied with the use of passwords infinite mail loops are possible with chaining remailers source code is being distributed tested and refined for these systems but standards are progressing slowly and weakly the field is not likely to improve considerably without official endorsement and action by network agencies the whole idea is essentially still in its infancy and viewed with suspicion and distrust by many on the internet seen as illegitimate or favorable to criminality the major objection to anonymity over regular internet use is the perceived lack of accountability to system operators i e invulnerability to account restrictions resulting from outside complaints system adminstrators at some sites have threatened to filter anonymous news postings generated by the prominent servers from their redistribution flows this may only have the effect of encouraging server operators to create less characteristically detectable headers probably the least problematic approach and the most traditional to usenet is for individual users to deal with anonymous mail however they prefer e g ignoring it or filtering it with kill files what is the future of anonymity on the internet new anonymous protocols effectively serve to significantly increase safeguards of anonymity for example the same mechanism that routes email over multiple hosts thereby threatening its privacy can also be used to guarantee it in a scheme called chaining an anonymous message is passed through multiple anonymous servers before reaching a destination in this way generally multiple links of the chain have to be broken for security to be compromised re encryption at each link makes this scenario even more unlikely even more significantly the anonymous remailers could be spread over the internet globally so that local weaknesses such as corrupt governments or legal wiretapping within a nation would be more unlikely to sacrifice overall security by message tracing however remailers run by corrupt operators are possible the future of anonymous services on the internet is at this time highly uncertain and fraught with peril while specific groups seem to benefit significantly from anonymous posting capabilities many feel that unlimited newsgroup scope for anonymous posting is a disruptive and dangerous idea and detracts from discussions in serious groups the introduction of unlimited group anonymity may have fundamental repercussions on usenet conventions and distribution mechanisms such as moderated and alt groups have had in the past for example as part of new group creation the charter may specify whether anonymous posting is un welcome nevertheless the widespread introduction and use of anonymity may be inevitable based on traffic statistics anonymous services are in huge demand pervasive and readily available anonymity could carry significant and unforeseen social consequences however if its use is continued to be generally regarded as subversive it may be confined to the underground the ramifications of widespread introduction of anonymity to usenet are still largely unknown it is unclear whether it will provoke signficant amounts of new traffic or instead of expansion cause a shift where a greater portion of existing traffic is anonymized conceivably the services could play a role in influencing future mainstream social acceptance of usenet this is part of the privacy anonymity faq obtained via anonymous ftp to pit manager mit edu pub usenet news answers net privacy or newsgroups news answers sci answers alt answers every days written by l detweiler ld longs lance colostate edu all rights reserved
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privacy anonymity on the internet faq of archive name net privacy part last modified version identity privacy and anonymity on the internet c l detweiler not for commercial use except by permission from author otherwise may be freely copied not to be altered please credit if quoted summary email and account privacy anonymity file encryption academic computer policies relevant legislation and references eff and other privacy and rights issues associated with use of the internet and global networks in general search for for exact section search for underline for next section part this file resources what unix programs are related to privacy how can i learn about or use cryptography what is the cypherpunks mailing list what are some privacy related newsgroups faqs what is internet privacy enhanced mail pem what are other request for comments rfcs related to privacy how can i run an anonymous remailer what are references on privacy in email what are some email usenet and internet use policies what is the mit crosslink anonymous message tv program miscellaneous what is digital cash what is a hacker or cracker what is a cypherpunk what is steganography and anonymous pools what is security through obscurity what are identity daemons what standards are needed to guard electronic privacy issues what is the electronic frontier foundation eff who are computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr what was operation sun devil and the steve jackson game case what is integrated services digital network isdn what is the national research and education network nren what is the fbi s proposed digital telephony act what other u s legislation is related to privacy on networks what are references on rights in cyberspace what is the computers and academic freedom caf archive footnotes what is the background behind the internet how is internet anarchy like the english language most wanted list change history resources what unix programs are related to privacy for more information type man cmd or apropos keyword at the unix shell prompt passwd change password finger obtain information about a remote user chfn change information about yourself obtainable by remote users sometimes passwd f chmod change the rights associated with a file or directory umask shell change the default on creation file access rights ls list the rights associated with files and directories xhost allow or disable access control of particular users to an xwindow server last list the latest user logins on the system and their originations who list other users login idle times originations w list other users and what they are running xhost access control list for x window client use xauth control x window server authentication signature file in the home directory appended to usenet posts forward file used to forward email to other accounts xauthority file used for x window server authentication keys signature variable used for name in email and usenet postings the tcpdump packet tracing program is loosely based on smi s etherfind although none of the etherfind code remains it was originally written by van jacobson lawrence berkeley laboratory as part of an ongoing research project to investigate and improve tcp and internet gateway performance a current version is available via anonymous ftp from host ftp ee lbl gov currently at address file tcpdump tar z a compressed unix tar file this program is subject to the standard berkeley network software copyright how can i learn about or use cryptography a general introduction to mostly theoretical cryptographic issues especially those frequently discussed in sci crypt is available in faq form compiled by cme ellisun sw stratus com carl ellison gwyn brl mil doug gwyn smb ulysses att com steven bellovin nist u s national institute for standards and technology publishes an introductory paper on cryptography special publication public key cryptograhy by james nechvatal april available via anonymous ftp from csrc ncsl nist gov file pub nistpubs txt also via available anonymous ftp from wimsey bc ca as crypt txt z in the crypto directory covers technical mathematical aspects of encryption such as number theory more general information can be found in a faq by paul fahn of rsa labortories via anonymous ftp from rsa com in pub faq ps z see the readme file for information on the tex version also available as hardcopy for from rsa laboratories marine parkway redwood city ca send questions to faq editor rsa com phil zimmerman s pgp pretty good privacy public domain package for public key encryption is available at numerous sites and is in widespread use over the internet for general unix based file encryption including email consult the archie ftp database also see the newsgroup alt security pgp mailing list requests to info pgp request lucpul it luc edu from the ripem faq by marc vanheyningen mvanheyn whale cs indiana edu on news answers ripem is a program which performs privacy enhanced mail pem using the cryptographic techniques of rsa and des it allows your electronic mail to have the properties of authentication i e who sent it can be confirmed and privacy i e nobody can read it except the intended recipient ripem was written primarily by mark riordan mrr scss cl msu edu most of the code is in the public domain except for the rsa routines which are a library called rsaref licensed from rsa data security inc ripem is available via anonymous ftp to citizens and permanent residents in the u s from rsa com cd to rsaref and read the readme file for info ripem as well as some other crypt stuff has its home site on rpub cl msu edu which is open to non anonymous ftp for users in the u s and canada who are citizens or permanent residents to find out how to obtain access ftp there cd to pub crypt and read the file getting access note cryptography is generally not well integrated into email yet and some system proficiency is required by users to utilize it what is the cypherpunks mailing list eric hughes hughes toad com runs the cypherpunk mailing list dedicated to discussion about technological defenses for privacy in the digital domain send email to cypherpunks request toad com to be added or subtracted from the list from the charter the most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption to encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy but to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it what are some privacy related newsgroups faqs newsgroups alt comp acad freedom news alt comp acad freedom talk moderated and unmoderated issues related to academic freedom and privacy at universities documented examples of violated privacy in e g email documented examples of censorship as in e g limiting usenet groups local availability alt cyberpunks virtual reality science fiction by william gibson and bruce sterling cyberpunk in the mainstream alt hackers usenet network news transfer protocol nntp posting mechanisms simple mail transfer protocol smtp obligatory hack reports alt privacy general privacy issues involving taxpaying licensing social security numbers etc alt security comp security misc computer related security issues faq in news answers below alt security pgp alt security ripem dedicated to discussing public domain cryptographic software packages pgp or pretty good privacy software developed by phil zimmerman for public key encryption and ripem by mark riordan for public key and des encryption comp society privacy privacy issues associated with computer technologies examples caller identification social security numbers credit applications mailing lists etc moderated comp eff news comp eff talk moderated and unmoderated groups associated with the electronic frontier foundation started by mitch kapor for protecting civil and constitutional rights in the electronic realm news admin news admin policy concerns of news administrators nntp standards and mechanisms news lists usenet traffic distributions most frequent posters most voluminous groups most active sites etc sci crypt considers scientific and social issues of cryptography examples legitimate use of pgp public key patents des cryptographic security cypher breaking etc faqs faqs or frequently asked questions are available in the newsgroups answers or via anonymous ftp to pit manager mit edu also rtfm mit edu from the directory pub usenet news answers x where x is the archive name this faq is archived in the file net privacy others are network info part sources of information about the internet and how to connect to it through the nsf or commercial vendors alt security faq computer related security issues arising in alt security and comp security misc mostly unix related ssn privacy privacy issues associated with the use of the u s social security number ssn pdial public dialup internet accounts list college email part how to find email addresses for undergraduate and graduate students faculty and staff at various colleges and universities ripem faq information on ripem a program for public key mail encryption officially sanctioned by public key partners inc the company that owns patents on public key cryptography unix faq faq part frequently asked questions about unix including information on finger and terminal spying distributions known geographic university and network distributions what is internet privacy enhanced mail pem internet drafts on privacy enhanced mail pem describe a standard under revision for six years delineating the official protocols for email encryption the standard has only recently stabilized and implementations are being developed rfc privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part i message encryption and authentication procedures j linn mcimail com rfc privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part ii certificate based key management s kent kent bbn com rfc privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part iv key certification and related services b kaliski burt rsa com rfc privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part iii algorithms modes and identifiers d balenson belenson tis com send email to pem info tis com for more information see rfcs related to privacy for information on how to obtain rfcs what are other requests for comments rfcs related to privacy rfc smtp simple mail transfer protocol rfc nntp network news transfer protocol rfc standard for interchange of network news messages rfc glossary of networking terms rfc answers to experienced internet user questions rfc answers to new internet user questions rfc privacy issues in network information center databases rfc is fyi answers to commonly asked new internet user questions and includes basic terminology on the internet tcp ip smtp ftp internet organizations such as iab internet activities board and ietf internet enbgineering task force and a glossary of terms also from ftp eff org pub internet info internet q rfcs can be obtained via ftp from nic ddn mil with the pathname rfc rfcnnnn txt or rfc rfcnnnn ps where nnnn refers to the number of the rfc login with ftp username anonymous and password guest the nic also provides an automatic mail service for those sites which cannot use ftp address the request to service nic ddn mil and in the subject field of the message indicate the rfc number as in subject rfc nnnn or subject rfc nnnn ps for postscript rfcs rfcs can also be obtained via ftp from nis nsf net using ftp login with username anonymous and password guest then connect to the rfc directory cd rfc the file name is of the form rfcnnnn txt where nnnn refers to the number of the rfc the nis also provides an automatic mail service for those sites which cannot use ftp address the request to nis info nis nsf net and leave the subject field of the message blank the first line of the text of the message must be send rfcnnnn txt where nnnn is replaced by the rfc number how can i run an anonymous remailer cypherpunk remailer source is at soda berkeley edu in the pub cypherpunks directory it s written in perl and is relatively easy to install no administrative rights are required karl barrus elee sf menudo uh edu has more information and modifications also most remailer operators mentioned above are amenable to discussing features problems and helping new sites become operational address all points in the section responsibities of anonymous use in this document prior to advertising your service you should be committed to the long term stability of the site and avoid running one surreptitiously what are references on privacy in email brown bob ema urges users to adopt policy on e mail privacy network world oct bairstow jeffrey who reads your electronic mail electronic business june electronic envelopes the uncertainty of keeping e mail private scientific american february ftp eff org pub eff papers email privacy article on the rights of email privacy by ruel t hernandez pub academic law privacy email computer electronic mail and privacy an edited version of a law school seminar paper by ruel t hernadez pub eff papers email privacy biblio compilation of bibliography on e mail and its privacy issues part of the work compiled by stacy b veeder pub eff papers email privacy research the author at digital research tried to formalize their employee privacy policy on e mail the casesightings are divided into two groups us constitutional law and california law pub eff papers company email formulating a company policy on access to and disclosure of electronic mail on company computer systems by david r johnson and john podesta for the electronic mail assocation pub cud alcor information on alcor co an e mail privacy suit pub academic law privacy email email privacy search at berkeley what are some email usenet and internet use policies the computer policy and critiques archive is a collection of the computer policies of many schools and networks run by the computers and academic freedom group on the electronic frontier foundation ftp site the collection also includes critiques of some of the policies if you have gopher the archive is browsable with the command gopher p academic policies gopher eff org the archive is also accessible via anonymous ftp and email ftp to ftp eff org it is in directory pub academic policies for email access send email to archive server eff org include the line send acad freedom policies filenames where filenames is a list of the files that you want file readme is a detailed description of the items in the directory for more information to make contributions or to report typos contact j s greenfield greeny eff org directory widener contains additional policies but not critiques ftp eff org pub cud networks acceptable use policies for various networks including compuserve file compuserve nsfnet file nsfnet with information on research and commercial uses see pub cud networks index pub cud networks email policies from various sysadmins about how they handle the issue of email privacy control and abuse compiled by t hooper hooper ta cc curtin edu au pub cud schools computer use policies of a number of schools see schools index for a full list and description commentary pub academic faq policy best opinions on the best academic computer policies pub academic faq email policies do any universities treat email and computer files as private pub academic faq netnews writing policies on what users write on usenet pub academic faq netnews reading policies on what users read on usenet should my university remove or restrict netnews newsgroups because some people find them offensive pub academic faq policy what guidance is there for creating or evaluating a university s academic computer policy what is the mit crosslink anonymous message tv program crosslink is an anonymous message system run on mit student cable tv it provides an anonymous medium through which mit students can say those things they might otherwise find difficult inconvenient or impossible to say in person it s also a way to send fun or totally random messages to your friends over the air it is similar to the anonymous message pages found in many college newspapers except that it s electronic in nature and it s free messages can be posted to the service via email for more information send email to crosslink athena mit edu miscellaneous what is digital cash with digital encryption and authentication technologies the possibility of a widespread digital cash system may someday be realized a system utilizing codes sent between users and banks similar to today s checking system except entirely digital may be one approach the issues of cryptography privacy and anonymity are closely associated with transfer of cash in an economy see the article in scientific american by david chaum dec an experimental digital bank is run by karl barrus elee sf menudo uh edu based on suggestions by hal finney on the cypherpunks mailing list to use the server send mail to elee h rosebud ee uh edu message with the following text command help user host where user host is your email address what is a hacker or cracker these terms arouse strong feelings by many on their meaning especially on the internet in the general news media in the past a person who uses computers and networks to malicious ends such as breaking into systems has been referred to as a hacker but most internet users prefer the term cracker for this instead a hacker is perceived as a benign but intensely ambitious curious and driven computer user who explores obscure areas of a system for example something of a proud electronic pioneer and patriot this is the sense intended in this document see also the hacker s dictionary and the faq alt security faq what is a cypherpunk from the charter of the cypherpunk mailing list cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments corporations or other large faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers envelopes closed doors and couriers cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions see information on the cypherpunk mailing list below see also the cryptoanarchist manifesto and the cryptography glossary in soda berkeley edu pub cypherpunks what is steganography and anonymous pools closely associated with encryption is steganography or the techniques for not only pursuing private encrypted communication but concealing the very existence of the communication itself many new possibilities in this area are introduced with the proliferation of computer technology for example it is possible to encode messages in the least significant bits of images typically the most noisy in addition when such an item is posted in a public place such as a newsgroup virtually untraceable communication can take place between sender and receiver for steganographic communications in the electronic realm one another possibility is setting up a mailing list where individual messages get broadcast to the entire list and individual users decode particular messages with their unique key an anonymous pool has been set up by miron cuperman miron extropia wimsey com for experiments send email to pool request extropia wimsey com with one of the following commands in the subject line subscribe unsubscribe help what is security through obscurity security through obscurity refers to the attempt to gain protection from system weaknesses by hiding sensitive information or programs relating to them for example a company may not make public information on its software s encryption techniques to evade attacks based on knowledge of it another example would be concealing data on the existence of security holes or bugs in operating systems or some reliance may be made on the fact that some standard or mechanism with potential problems is serious because they are not widely known or not widely used this argument is occasionally applied to mechanisms for email and usenet posting forgery security through obscurity is regarded as a very feeble technique at best and inappropriate and ineffective at worst also called the head in the sand approach see the faq for alt security some remarks of john perry barlow cofounder of the electronic frontier foundation directed to nsa agents at the first international symposium on national security national competitiveness held in mclean virginia dec digitized information is very hard to stamp classified or keep contained this stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile it s almost a life form in its ability to self propagate if something hits the net and it s something which people on there find interesting it will spread like a virus of the mind i believe you must simply accept the idea that we are moving into an environment where any information which is at all interesting to people is going to get out and there will be very little that you can do about it this is not a bad thing in my view but you may differ what are identity daemons rfc describes a protocol standard that allows unix programs to query a remote user s login name after connection to a local communication socket a connection of this type is established during ftp and telnet sessions for example the standard is not widely supported perhaps of internet sites currently implement it but the number is increasing the mechanism is detrimental to anonymity regular users cannot disable it but system adminstrators can circumvent it this standard may represent a trend toward greater authentication mechanisms what new standards are needed to guard electronic privacy remailing posting stable secure protected officially sanctioned and permitted publicly and privately operated anonymous servers and hubs official standards for encryption and anonymity in mail and usenet postings truly anonymous protocols with source and destination information obscured or absent and hidden routing mechanisms chaining encrypted addresses etc standards for anonymous email addressing embedding files and remailer site chaining general recognition of anonymity cryptography and related privacy shields as legitimate useful desirable and crucial by the general public and their governments widespread use and implementation of these technologies by systems designers into hardware software and standards implemented securely seamlessly and transparently general shift of use dependence and reliance to means other than wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies publicity retraction and dissolution of laws and government agencies opposed to privacy replaced by structures dedicated to strengthening and protecting it issues what is the electronic frontier foundation eff from ftp eff org pub eff mission statement a new world is arising in the vast web of digital electronic media which connect us computer based communication media like electronic mail and computer conferencing are becoming the basis of new forms of community these communities without a single fixed geographical location comprise the first settlements on an electronic frontier while well established legal principles and cultural norms give structure and coherence to uses of conventional media like newspapers books and telephones the new digital media do not so easily fit into existing frameworks conflicts come about as the law struggles to define its application in a context where fundamental notions of speech property and place take profoundly new forms people sense both the promise and the threat inherent in new computer and communications technologies even as they struggle to master or simply cope with them in the workplace and the home the electronic frontier foundation has been established to help civilize the electronic frontier to make it truly useful and beneficial not just to a technical elite but to everyone and to do this in a way which is in keeping with our society s highest traditions of the free and open flow of information and communication eff was started by the multimillionaire mitchell kapor founder of lotus software and john barlow lyricist for the grateful dead rock band a highly publicized endeavor of the organization involved the legal defense of steve jackson games after an fbi raid and an accompanying civil suit see section on steve jackson games the foundation publishes eff news effector online electronically send requests to effnews request eff org in a letter to mitchell kapor from the chairman of the subcommittee with primary jurisdiction over telecommunications policy dated november representative edward j markey complemented mitchell kapor on his insights on the development of a national public information infrastructure which were appreciated greatly by myself and the members of the subcommittee complete text in ftp eff com pub pub infra we need to pursue policies that encourage the bell companies to work with other sectors of the communications industry to create a consumer oriented public information network please let me or my staff know what policies you and others in the computer industry believe would best serve the public interest in creating a reasonably priced widely available network in which competition is open and innovation rewarded i also want to learn what lessons from the computer industry over the past ten to fifteen years should apply to the current debate on structuring the information and communications networks of the future i ask your help in gaining input from the computer industry so that the subcommittee can shape policies that will bring this spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship to the information services industry ftp eff org pub eff about eff a file of basic information about eff including goals mission achievements and current projects contains a membership form pub eff mission statement eff mission statement pub eff historical founding announcement eff founding press release pub eff historical eff history john perry barlow s not terribly brief history of the eff july how eff was conceived and founded major legal cases and the organizational directions pub eff historical legal case summary eff legal case summary who are computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr the computer professionals for social responsibility have been working to protect and promote electronic civil liberties issues since the group has three offices palo alto cambridge washington dc and chapters it is involved in litigation against the fbi the nsa nist the secret service and other other u s government agencies to declassify and provide documentation on issues such as operation sundevil the fbi wiretap proposal nsa s interference in crypography the breakup of the raid in arlington va in nov members speak frequently in front on congress state legislators and public utility commissions to testify on privacy information policy computer security and caller identification cpsr has created an extensive internet privacy library available via ftp gopher wais and email at cpsr org currently comprising the largest collection of privacy documents on the internet for more information anonymous ftp cpsr org cpsr thanks to dave banisar banisar washofc cpsr org for contributions here what was operation sundevil and the steve jackson game case in the early s a fear spread among u s law enforcement agencies on the illicit activities of hackers and phreakers involved in such activities as credit card fraud and long distance call thievery see ftp eff org pub sjg general information effector operation sundevil the phoenix inspired crackdown of may concentrated on telephone code fraud and credit card abuse and followed this seizure plan with some success bulletin board systems went down all over america terrifying the underground and swiftly depriving them of at least some of their criminal instruments it also saddled analysts with some floppy disks and confronted harried justice department prosecutors with the daunting challenge of a gigantic nationwide hacker show trial involving highly technical issues in dozens of jurisdictions massive show trials never materialized although isolated instances of prosecution were pursued the movement reached a crescendo in texas with the highly publicized case of illegal search and seizure involving the steve jackson games company of austin texas on march from the column gurps labour lost by bruce sterling bruces well sf ca us in fantasy and science fiction magazine in an early morning raid with an unlawful and unconstitutional warrant agents of the secret service conducted a search of the sjg office when they left they took a manuscript being prepared for publication private electronic mail and several computers including the hardware and software of the sjg computer bulletin board system yet jackson and his business were not only innocent of any crime but never suspects in the first place the raid had been staged on the unfounded suspicion that somewhere in jackson s office there might be a document compromising the security of the telephone system fbi agents involved in the seizure were named in a civil suit filed on behalf of steve jackson games by the electronic frontier foundation see information on eff below from an article by joe abernathy in the houston chronicle feb austin an electronic civil rights case against the secret service closed thursday with a clear statement by federal district judge sam sparks that the service failed to conduct a proper investigation in a notorious computer crime crackdown and went too far in retaining custody of seized equipment secret service special agent timothy foley of chicago who was in charge of three austin computer search and seizures on march that led to the lawsuit stoically endured spark s rebuke over the service s poor investigation and abusive computer seizure policies while the service has seized dozens of computers since the crackdown began in this is the first case to challenge the practice sparks grew visibly angry when it was established that the austin science fiction magazine and game book publisher was never suspected of a crime and that agents did not do even marginal research to establish a criminal connection between the firm and the suspected illegal activities of an employee or to determine that the company was a publisher indeed agents testified that they were not even trained in the privacy protection act at the special secret service school on computer crime how long would it have taken you mr foley to find out what steve jackson games did what it was asked sparks an hour was there any reason why on march you could not return to steve jackson games a copy in floppy disk form of everything taken did you read the article in business week magazine where it had a picture of steve jackson a law abiding tax paying citizen saying he was a computer crime suspect did it ever occur to you mr foley that seizing this material could harm steve jackson economically foley replied no sir but the judge offered his own answer you actually did you just had no idea anybody would actually go out and hire a lawyer and sue you more than has been spent by the electronic frontier foundation in bringing the case to trial the eff was founded by mitchell kapor amid a civil liberties movement sparked in large part by the secret service computer crime crackdown ftp eff org pub cud papers sundevil a collection of information on operation sundevil by the epic nonprofit publishing project everything you wanted to know but could never find pub cud papers sj resp steve jackson s response to the charges against him what is integrated services digital network isdn isdn is a high speed data communications standard that utilizes existing copper telephone lines and is a possible inexpensive and intermediate alternative to laying fiber optic cable for phone networks the speeds involved may be sufficient for audio and video transmission applications g v der leun in the file ftp eff org pub pub infra telecommunications in the united states is at a crossroads with the regional bell operating companies now free to provide content the shape of the information networking is about to be irrevocably altered but will that network be the open accessible affordable network that the american public needs you can help decide this question the electronic frontier foundation recently presented a plan to congress calling for the immediate deployment of a national network based on existing isdn technology accessible to anyone with a telephone connection and priced like local voice service we believe deployment of such a platform will spur the development of innovative new information services and maximize freedom competitiveness and civil liberties throughout the nation the eff is testifying before congress and the fcc making presentations to public utility commisions from massachusetts to california and meeting with representatives from telephone companies publishers consumer advocates and other stakeholders in the telecommunications policy debate the eff believes that participants on the internet as pioneers on the electronic frontier need to have their voices heard at this critical moment to automatically receive a description of the platform and details send mail to archive server eff org with the following line send documents open platform overview or send mail to eff eff org see also the introduction to the eff open platform proposal in ftp eff org pub pub infra references digital data on demand macworld page kbps vs isdn services and products see comments by j powers in ftp eff org pub pub infra telephone service that rings of the future by joshua quittner newsday tue jan implications of isdn for the masses written in popular science style john perry barlow cofounder eff regional telephone companies ohio bell isdn as technological rorschach test anecdotes about mcdonald s barbara bush teleconferencing see complete text in ftp eff org pub pub infra ftp eff org pub pub infra files through containing email from the eff public infrastructure group organized by month opinions and facts on the pros and cons of isdn integrated services digital network uses of isdn phone video audio etc japanese model alternatives to isdn hdsl adsl fiber optics technical specifications of isdn implementation details cost issues political obstacles rboc regional bell operating companies or baby bells e g net new england telephone influencing development of future networks e g isdn and nren national research and education network encouraging competition cable tv systems press releases and news articles letter from rep e j markey to m kapor what is the national research and education network nren the nation research and education network was introduced in legislation cosponsored by sen a gore to promote high speed data network infrastructure augmenting the internet with up to times faster transmission rates the bill passed the house on november the senate on november and was signed by the president on december ftp eff org pub eff legislation nren bill text the complete text of the house senate compromise version of s the high performance computing act pub internet info gore bill nd congress st session text of high performance computing bill cosponsored by sen a gore pub eff legislation gore infrastructure bill the text of s the information infrastructure and technology act of introduced by senator gore to expand federal efforts to develop technologies for applications of high performance computing and high speed networking and to provide for a coordinated federal program to accelerate development and deployment of an advanced information infrastructure u s said to play favorites in promoting nationwide computer network by john markoff n y times dec president bush s legislation for natiowide computer data superhighway ibm mci venture as monopoly destructive to fair competition and innovation national science foundation nsfnet complete text in pub pub infra commentary pub academic statements nren privacy cpsr proposed privacy guidelines for the nren statement of marc rotenberg washington director computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr pub internet info cisler nren the national research and education network two meetings steve cisler senior scientist apple computer library december summary of meetings exploring educational issues of nren by diverse members of academia and industry pub internet info privatized nren feb essay by m kapor advocating advantages of a private national public network and specific recommendations for open nren policies encouraging competition pub eff papers netproposition an fyi about the proposed nren setup what is the fbi s proposed digital telephony act providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators shall provide within the united states capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and electronic communications when authorized by law from bbs legislative watch fbis wiretapping proposal thwarted by s steele in boardwatch magazine feb p in a move that worried privacy experts software manufacturers and telephone companies the fbi proposed legislation to amend the communications act of to make it easier for the bureau to perform electronic wiretapping the proposed legislation entitled digital telephony would have required communications service providers and hardware manufacturers to make their systems tappable by providing back doors through which law enforcement officers could intercept communications furthermore this capability would have been provided undetectably while the communications was in progress exclusive of any communications between other parties regardless of the mobility of the target of the fbi s investigation and without degradation of service under the proposal the department of justice doj can keep communications products off the market if it determines that these products do not meet the doj s own guidelines this could result in increased costs and reduced competitiveness for service providers and equipment manufacturers since they will be unlikely to add any features that may result in a doj rejection of their entire product the fbi proposal suggests that the cost of this wiretapping service to the bureau would have to be borne by the service provider itself the electronic frontier foundation organized a broad coalition of public interest and industry groups from computer professionals for social responsibilty cpsr and the aclu to at t and sun microsystems to oppose the legislation a white paper produced by the eff and ratified by the coalition entitled an analysis of the fbi digital telephony proposal was widely distributed throughout the congress the justice department lobbied hard in the final days to get congress to take up the bill before congress adjourned but the bill never found a congressional sponsor and was therefore never officially introduced the fbi may reintroduce digital telephony when the rd congress convenes in january ftp eff org pub eff legislation fbi wiretap bill pub eff legislation new fbi wiretap bill a bill to ensure the continuing access of law enforcement to the content of wire and electronic communications when authorized by law and for other purposes version of the bill after fbi changes in response to public response pub cud law hr house of rep bill telecommunications law commentary pub eff papers eff fbi analysis the eff sponsored analysis of the fbi s digital telephony proposal pub eff papers ecpa layman the electronic communications privacy act of a layman s view pub eff papers nightline wire transcript of abc s nightline of may on the fbi privacy and proposed wire tapping legislation featured are marc rotenberg of the cpsr and william sessions director of the fbi pub eff papers edwards letter a letter from the director of the secret service to us rep don edwards d california in response to questions raised by edwards subcommittee this copy came from computer professionals for social responsibility in washington d c pub eff papers fbi systems a description of how information is stored on the fbi s computer systems what other u s legislation is related to privacy ftp eff org pub cud law state state computer crime laws al ak az ca co ct de fl ga hi ia id il in md mn nc nj nm ny or tx vt va wa wi wv pub cud law country current computer crime laws for the united states federal code canada ghana and great britain pub cud law bill s senate bill addressing registration of encryption keys with the government pub cud law improve improvement of information access bill pub cud law monitoring senate bill concerning abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace pub cud law us e privacy title relating to computer crime email privacy pub academic law privacy electronic bill the text of simon s electronic privacy bill s to prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace what are references on rights in cyberspace ftp eff org pub cud papers const in cyberspace laurence tribe s keynote address at the first conference on computers freedom privacy the constitution in cyberspace pub cud papers denning paper presented to th nat l comp security conf concerning hackers who break into computer systems by dorothy e denning pub cud papers privacy computer privacy vs first and fourth amendment rights by michael s borella pub cud papers rights of expr rights of expression in cyberspace by r e baird pub academic eff rights bill of rights meaning in the electronic frontier what is the computers and academic freedom caf archive the caf archive is an electronic library of information about computers and academic freedom run by the computers and academic freedom group on the electronic frontier foundation ftp site if you have gopher the archive is browsable with the command gopher p academic gopher eff org it is available via anonymous ftp to ftp eff org in directory pub academic it is also available via email for information on email access send email to archive server eff org in the body of your note include the lines help and index for more information to make contributions or to report typos contact j s greenfield greeny eff org ftp eff org pub academic statements caf statement codifies the application of academic freedom to academic computers reflecting seven months of on line discussion about computers and academic freedom covers free expression due process privacy and user participation pub academic books directory of book references related to computers and academic freedom or mentioned in the caf discussion the file books readme is a bibliography pub academic faq archive list of files available on the computers and academic freedom archive pub academic news directory of all issues of the computers and academic freedom news a full list of abstracts is available in file abstracts the special best of the month issues are named with their month for example june footnotes what is the background behind the internet the article internet in fantasy and science fiction by bruce sterling bruces well sf ca us contains general and nontechnical introductory notes on origins of the internet including the role of the rand corporation the goal of network resilience in face of nuclear attack mit ucla arpanet tcp ip nsf nren etc arpanet itself formally expired in a happy victim of its own overwhelming success its users scarcely noticed for arpanet s functions not only continued but steadily improved the use of tcp ip standards for computer networking is now global in a mere twenty one years ago there were only four nodes in the arpanet network today there are tens of thousands of nodes in the internet scattered over forty two countries with more coming on line every day three million possibly four million people use this gigantic mother of all computer networks the internet is especially popular among scientists and is probably the most important scientific instrument of the late twentieth century the powerful sophisticated access that it provides to specialized data and personal communication has sped up the pace of scientific research enormously the internet s pace of growth in the early s is spectacular almost ferocious it is spreading faster than cellular phones faster than fax machines last year the internet was growing at a rate of twenty percent a month the number of host machines with direct connection to tcp ip has been doubling every year since the internet is moving out of its original base in military and research institutions into elementary and high schools as well as into public libraries and the commercial sector references bowers k t laquey j reynolds k roubicek m stahl and a yuan where to start a bibliography of general internetworking information rfc cnri u texas isi bbn sri mitre august the whole internet catalog user s guide by ed krol o reilly and associates inc a clear non jargonized introduction to the intimidating business of network literacy written in humorous style krol e the hitchhikers guide to the internet rfc university of illinois urbana september the user s directory to computer networks by tracy laquey the matrix computer networks and conferencing systems worldwide by john quarterman digital press bedford ma massive and highly technical compendium detailing the mind boggling scope and complexity of global internetworks a directory of electronic mail addressing and networks by donnalyn frey and rick adams the internet companion by tracy laquey with jeanne c ryer addison wesley evangelical etiquette guide to the internet featuring anecdotal tales of life changing internet experiences foreword by senator al gore zen and the art of the internet a beginner s guide by brendan p kehoe prentice hall brief but useful internet guide with plenty of good advice on useful databases see also ftp eff com pub internet info thanks to bruce sterling bruces well sf ca us for contributions here general cunningham scott and alan l porter communication networks a dozen ways they ll change our lives the futurist january february brian kahin ed building information infrastructure new york mcgraw hill isbn x essays on information infrastructure policy and design issues research and nren future visions information markets see table of contents in ftp eff org pub pub infra shapard jeffrey observations on cross cultural electronic networking whole earth review winter varley pamela electronic democracy technology review november december how internet anarchy like the english language according to bruce sterling bruces well sf ca us the internet s anarchy may seem strange or even unnatural but it makes a certain deep and basic sense it s rather like the anarchy of the english language nobody rents english and nobody owns english as an english speaking person it s up to you to learn how to speak english properly and make whatever use you please of it though the government provides certain subsidies to help you learn to read and write a bit otherwise everybody just sort of pitches in and somehow the thing evolves on its own and somehow turns out workable and interesting fascinating even though a lot of people earn their living from using and exploiting and teaching english english as an institution is public property a public good much the same goes for the internet would english be improved if the the english language inc had a board of directors and a chief executive officer or a president and a congress there d probably be a lot fewer new words in english and a lot fewer new ideas most wanted list hopefully you have benefitted from this creation compilation and condensation of information from various sources regarding privacy identity and anonymity on the internet the author is committed to keeping this up to date and strengthening it but this can only be effective with your feedback in particular the following items are sought short summaries of rfc documents and other references listed esp cpsr files more data on the specific uses and penetration of rfc internet traffic statistics how much is email how much usenet what are the costs involved famous or obscure examples of compromised privacy on the internet ftp site for the code not the code to turn the plan file into a named pipe for sensing reacting to remote fingers knowledge on the promiscuous mode of receipt or transmission on network cards details on the infamous experiment where a scientist resubmitted previously accepted papers to a prominent journal with new and unknown authors that were subsequently rejected x windows eff cpsr faqhood in news answers commerical use of this document is negotiable and is a way for the author to recoup from a significant time investment email feedback to ld longs lance colostate edu please note where you saw this which newsgroup etc change history v current cpsr pointer new unix mode examples digital telephony act steve jackson incident additions reorganization to anonymity section part note v post to sci crypt alt privacy news answers alt answers sci answers was cancelled by j kamens because of incorrect subject line v major revisions new section for x windows some email privacy items reorganized to network security section new sections for email liability issues anonymity history and responsibilities split into three files many new sources added particularly from eff and caf in new issues part commentary from news admin policy day automated posting starts v more newsgroups faqs added more most wanted posted to news answers future monthly posting to sci crypt alt privacy v formatted to columns for quoting etc miscellaneous resources sections added with cypherpunk servers and use warnings more unix examples ls and chmod posted to alt privacy comp society privacy v identity and privacy sections added anonymity expanded remailer addresses removed due to lack of information and instability posted to sci crypt v originally posted to the cypherpunks mailing list on as a call to organize a list of anonymous servers email ld longs lance colostate edu for earlier versions see also part previous file what is identity on the internet why is identity un important on the internet how does my email address not identify me and my background how can i find out more about somebody from their email address why is identification un stable on the internet what is the future of identification on the internet what is privacy on the internet why is privacy un important on the internet how in secure are internet networks how in secure is my account how in secure are my files and directories how in secure is x windows how in secure is my email how am i not liable for my email and postings how do i provide more less information to others on my identity who is my sysadmin what does s he know about me why is privacy un stable on the internet what is the future of privacy on the internet what is anonymity on the internet why is anonymity un important on the internet how can anonymity be protected on the internet what is anonymous mail what is anonymous posting why is anonymity un stable on the internet what is the future of anonymity on the internet part next file what are some known anonymous remailing and posting sites what are the responsibilities associated with anonymity how do i kill anonymous postings what is the history behind anonymous posting servers what is the value of anonymity should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed what should system operators do with anonymous postings what is going on with anon penet fi maintained by j helsingius this is part of the privacy anonymity faq obtained via anonymous ftp to pit manager mit edu pub usenet news answers net privacy or newsgroups news answers sci answers alt answers every days written by l detweiler ld longs lance colostate edu all rights reserved
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privacy anonymity on the internet faq of archive name net privacy part last modified version notes on anonymity on the internet compiled by l detweiler ld longs lance colostate edu what are some known anonymous remailing and posting sites what are the responsibilities associated with anonymity how do i kill anonymous postings what is the history behind anonymous posting servers what is the value of anonymity should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed what should system operators do with anonymous postings what is going on with anon penet fi maintained by j helsingius what are some known anonymous remailing and posting sites currently the most stable of anonymous remailing and posting sites is anon penet fi operated by julf penet fi for several months who has system adminstrator privileges and owns the equipment including anonymized mail usenet posting and return addresses no encryption send mail to help penet fi for information hal finney has contributed an instruction manual for the cypherpunk remailers on the ftp site soda berkeley edu pub cypherpunks hal s instructions see also scripts tar z unix scripts to aid remailer use and anonmail arj msdos batch files to aid remailer use ebrandt jarthur claremont edu anonymized mail request information from above address elee h rosebud ee uh edu experimental anonymous remailer run karl barrus elee sf menudo uh edu with encryption to the server request information from that address hal alumni caltech edu experimental remailer with encryption to server and return addresses request information from above address hh soda berkeley edu hh cicada berkeley edu hh pmantis berkeley edu experimental remailer include header request remailing to nowhere bsu cs bsu edu experimental remailer allowing one level of chaining run by chael hall request information from above address phantom mead u washington edu experimental remailer with encryption to server finger site address for information notes cypherpunk remailers tend to be unstable because they are often running without site administrator knowledge liability issues are wholly unresolved so far all encryption is based on public key cryptography and pgp software see the question on cryptography encryption aspects message text destination address replies vary between sites multiple chaining alias unlinking and address encryption are mostly untested problematic or unsupported at this time what are the responsibilities associated with anonymity users use anonymity only if you have to frivolous uses weaken the seriousness and usefulness of the capability for others do not use anonymity to provoke harass or threaten others do not hide behind anonymity to evade established conventions on usenet such as posting binary pictures to regular newsgroups if posting large files be attentive to bandwidth considerations remember simply sending the posting to the service increases network traffic avoid posting anonymously to the regular hierarchy of usenet this is the mostly likely place to alienate readers the alt hierarchy is preferred give as much information as possible in the posting i e references etc remember that content is the only means for readers to judge the truth of the message and that any inaccuracies will tend to discredit the entire message and even future ones under the same handle be careful not to include information that will reveal your identity or enable someone to deduce it test the system by sending anonymized mail to yourself be aware of the policies of the anonymous site and respect them be prepared to forfeit your anonymity if you abuse the privilege be considerate and respectful of other s objections to anonymity hit and run anonymity should be used with utmost reservation use services that provide anonymous return addresses instead be courteous to the system operator who may have invested large amounts of time be personally risking his account or dedicating his hardware all for your convenience operators document thoroughly acceptable and unacceptable uses in an introductory file that is sent to new users have a coherent and consistent policy and stick to it state clearly what logging and monitoring is occurring describe your background interest and security measures will the general approach be totalitarian or lassaiz faire formulate a plan for problematic ethical situations and anticipate potentially intense moral quandaries and dilemmas what if a user is blackmailing someone through your service what if a user posts suicidal messages through your service remember your users trust you to protect them in the site introductory note give clear examples of situations where you will take action and what these actions will be e g warn the user limit anonymity to email or posting only revoke the account out the user contact local administrator etc describe exactly the limitations of the software and hardware address the bandwidth limitations of your site report candidly and thoroughly all bugs that have occurred work closely with users to isolate and fix bugs address all bugs noted below under in stability of anonymity document the stability of the site how long has it been running what compromises have occured why are you running it what is your commitment to it include a disclaimer in outgoing mail and messages include an address for complaints ideally appended to every outgoing item consult a lawyer about your liability be committed to the long term stability of the site be prepared to deal with complaints and hate mail addressed to you if you do not own the hardware the system runs on or are not the system adminstrator consult those who do and are be considerate of providing anonymity to various groups if possible query group readers keep a uniformity and simplicity of style in outgoing message format that can be screened effectively by kill files ensure the key text anon is somewhere in every header take precautions to ensure the security of the server from physical and network based attacks and infiltrations readers do not complain attack or discredit a poster for the sole reason that he is posting anonymously make blanket condemnations that equate anonymity with cowardice and criminality or assail anonymous traffic in general for mostly neutral reasons e g its volume is heavy or increasing react to the anonymous information unemotionally abusive posters will be encouraged further if they get irrationally irate responses sometimes the most effective response is silence notify operators if very severe abuses occur such as piracy harassment extortion etc do not complain about postings being inappropriate because they offend you personally use kill files to screen anonymous postings if you object to the idea of anonymity itself avoid the temptation to proclaim that all anonymous postings should be barred from particular groups because no possible or conceivable need exists references see e g ftp eff org pub academic anonymity this article is an excerpt from an issue of fidonews on individual privacy and the use of handles it accepts the need of a system operator to know the name of a user but suggests that the use of a handle is analogous to a request to withhold the name in a letter to the editor the article concludes with a set of guidelines for preserving the right to be anonymous how do i kill anonymous postings james thomas green jgreen zeus calpoly edu try putting this in your kill file anon h j anonymous h j this will search the headers of the messages and kill any that contain anon or anonymous in them not perfect and won t kill followups note that anonymous server operators have the capability to mask anonymous postings under which the above method will not work so far this practice is not widespread but it may become more common as a countermeasure to widespread anonymous filtering what is the history behind anonymous posting servers originally anonymous posting services were introduced for individual particularly volatile newsgroups where anonymity is almost the preferred method of communication such as talk abortion and alt sex bondage one of the first was one by dave mack started in for alt sex bondage another early one was wizvax methuen ma us run by stephanie gilgut gilgut enterprises but was disbanded due to lack of funds the system provided anonymous return addresses n kbt rain com john opalko took up the functions of this server including reinstating the anonymous alias file the group alt personals has been chewing through servers like there s no tomorrow spurred by the disappearance of wizvax and interested in researching the idea karl kleinpaste karl kleinpaste godiva nectar cs cmu edu developed his own system from scratch in six hours by this time the idea of extending the server to new more mainstream groups was starting to emerge and he explored the possibility partly at the specific request by multiple users for anonymity in other groups the intended advantage of my system was specifically to allow multiple group support with a single anon identifier across all this was arguably the single biggest deficiency of previous anon systems k kleinpaste posted a message on rec nude asking users whether an anonymous service would be welcome there and judged a consensus against it k kleinpaste introduced what he calls a fire extinguisher to squelch or plonk abusive users in response to complaints and used this in three cases nevertheless after a few months of intense traffic he was eventually overwhelmed by the abuses of his server even as restricted as it was my system was subjected to abuses to the point where it was ordered dismantled by the facilities staff here such abuses started right after it was created in nov johan helsingius julf penet fi set up the most controversial anonymous site to date anon penet fi is based on scripts and c code written by k kleinpaste and supports anonymized mail posting and return addresses he initially wanted to confine the service to scandinavian users but expanded it to worldwide accessability in response to lots of international requests j helsingius policy of allowing anonymous posting to every usenet newsgroup has been met with strong and serious ideological opposition e g by news adminstrators in news admin policy because of the relative newness and recent emergence of the medium abuses by anonymous posters tend to have higher visibility than routine abuses his total commitment to preservation of anonymity is also controversial for example in a highly controversial and publicized case in feb an anonymous user posted a supposed transcript of desperate crew dialogue during the challenger shuttle disaster via anon penet fi to sci astro despite that the transcript had been posted in the same place up to a year earlier then non anonymously and actually originated not with the poster but a new york news tabloid subsequent responses consisted largely of vociferous outrage at the poster s use of anonymity reverberating through many newsgroups the original poster using the same anonymous handle later conceded that the story seemed likely to have been fabricated suggesting the plausible possibility that the original intent was not to provoke outrage but gauge reactions on the authenticity of the story albeit crudely free of personal risk from perceived association with the item the ensuing commotion generated queries for the original article by late entering readers the anonymous user later posted deliberately offensive comments at his detractors despite piercingly irate and outraged complaints and even the vocal opposition and verbal abuse of k kleinpaste and eminent news operators j helsingius has largely avoided use of the fire extingisher and the group bouncer mechanisms that limit the scope of the service as of march the anon penet fi site is best described as inundated it has registered over users in its initial three months of operation forwards messages a day and approximately of all usenet postings are anonymized through the site the immense popularity is probably largely due to the capability for global anonymity which has allowed users to find creative uses in diverse areas not previously envisioned johan helsingius has been subject to extraordinary pressure to dismantle his server in feb at one point k kleinpaste threatened publicly to organize a sort of vigilante group of irate news operators to send out revocation commands on all messages originating from the site j helsingius has also alluded to threats of flooding the server the server has crashed several times at least once due to a saturation mailbombing through it by an anonymous user mr helsingius reports spending up to hours per day answering email requests alone associated with the service s administration in response to the serious threats he disabled global group access temporarily for one week and encouraged his users to defend the service publicly based on fast moving dialogue and creative suggestions by cypherpunks j helsingius has identified many security weaknesses and valuable new features for the service and is currently in the process of code development and testing he is planning on upgrading the ibm compatible machine to a soon to handle the voluminous load and is considering integrating a new system with very sophisticated functionality including multiple email aliases alias allocation control public key encryption etc a very sophisticated anonymous posting system was set up in dec by d clunie dclunie pax tpa com au that used cryptography in both directions to from the server for the highest degree of confidentiality seen so far however it was running on a public access account and he had to shut it down after only several weeks upon receiving requests and conditions apparently ultimately originating from nsf representatives d clunie has released the software to the public domain recently the idea of a newsgroup devoted to whistleblowing on government abuses has received wide and focused attention and group formation is currently underway in the basic scenario the group would allow people to post pseudonymously using remailers and even establish reputations based on their authentifiable digital signatures the traffic may eventually reach reporters in the mainstream news media deltorto aol com has volunteered to attack multiple aspects of this project including distributing easy to read documentation on posting anonymization and encryption see also sections on views on anonymous posting below and what is going on with anon penet fi in this document thanks to carl kleinpaste karl kleinpaste godiva nectar cs cmu edu david clunie dclunie pax tpa com au and johan helsingius julf penet fi for contributions here what is the value of anonymity kondared purccvm bitnet i think anonymous posts do help in focusing our attention on the content of one s message sure lot of anonymous posts are abusive or frivolous but in most cases these are by users who find the anon facility novel once the novelty wears off they are stopping their pranks morgan engr uky edu wes morgan i don t mind seeing the miscellaneous hatred prejudice racism those things are part of our nature however the notion of providing anonymity s shield for these ideas repulses me if they have such strong feelings why can t they put their name s on their postings quite frankly i loathe communication with people who refuse to use their names dclunie pax tpa com au david clunie many seem to question the value of anonymity but who are they to say what risks another individual should take there is no question that in this rather conservative society that we live in holding certain views making certain statements adopting a certain lifestyle are likely to result in public censure ridicule loss of status employment or even legal action given the heterogeneity of the legal jurisdictions from where the many contributors to usenet post who knows what is legal and what is not some say that anonymous posters are cowards and should stand up and be counted perhaps that is one point of view but what right do these detractors have to exercise such censorship from doug cc ysu edu doug sewell why is it censorship to not expect someone to speak for themselves without the cloak of anonymity this is at best a lame argument you tell me why what you have to say requires anonymity and you tell me why the wishes of a majority of non anonymous users of a newsgroup should be disregarded when they don t want anonymous posts anonymous users have less rights than any others they are not legitimate usenet participants i would not honor rfds cfvs control messages or votes from one brad clarinet com brad templeton i can think of no disadvantage caused by anon posting sites that doesn t already exist other than the fact that they do make more naive net users who don t know how to post anonymously the old way more prone to do it from mandel netcom com tom mandel i cannot speak for others but i regard anonymous postings in a serious discussion as pretty much worthless views that hide behind the veil of anon are hardly worth the trouble of reading n anon penet fi hank pankey since i began posting anonymously to show support for general principles of personal privacy i have been subject to far more abuse and attack than i ever received before people seem to find it easier to flame and insult someone whose name they don t know perhaps it s easier to pretend that there is no person behind the email address who feels the sting of abusive comments anonymity does hinder some methods of controlling other posters actions people who seek such control will naturally oppose it from acearl leo bsuvc bsu edu instead of making this a free er medium by allowing posters to protect themselves with anonymity simply require that all posters be prepared to discuss their sources of information and take the heat for unsubstantiated dribble this seems to be the way things are currently done xtkmg trentu ca kate gregory in misc kids there are three threads going on started by anonymous posters one was about changing jobs so as to work less hours job sharing and so on from a woman who didn t want anyone at her current place of work to know she was thinking of looking for work elsewhere the next was from a woman who is thinking of having a baby sometime soon and doesn t want coworkers friends family etc etc to know all about it but who wants advice the third is about sex after parenthood actually this was started by people posting in the usual way but then it was pointed out that the anonymous posting service might let more people participate misc kids doesn t seem to be suffering any harm from the presence of anonymous posters in fact it seems to have been helped by it hoey zogwarg etl army mil dan hoey while there has never been any real security against anonymous or forged postings on usenet the process has until now been sufficiently inconvenient error prone and undocumented to limit its use by persons who have not learned the culture of the net on the other hand a recent use of the anonymous posting service on sci math seemed seemed to be a student asking help on a homework problem it has now been attributed to a teacher asking for an explanation of a dubious answer in his teaching guide he says his news posting is broken so he is using the anonymous service as a mail to news gateway karl barrus elee sf menudo uh edu some argue that the opinions of the people who hide behind a veil of anonymity are worthless and that people should own up to their thoughts i agree with the latter point in an ideal world we would all be sitting around engaging in socratic dialogues freely exchanging our opinions in an effort to learn but in an ideal world nobody will threaten you for your thoughts or ridicule you but we live in a world where the people who don t agree with you may try to harm you let s face it some people aren t going to agree with your opinion no matter how logically you try to present it or how reasoned out it may be this is sad since it does restrict people from voicing their opinions red redpoll neoucom edu richard e depew the consensus seems to be that a general anonymous posting service such as that at anon penet fi seems sufficiently corrosive of the trust and civility of the net that this particular experiment should be ended perhaps the next time the question comes up we can say we tried it we learned it does more harm than good and we stopped it from c vm urz uni heidelberg de alexander eichener anonymous posting has not created major problems aside from angering irate people like you who would rather ban anonymous pseudonymous posting altogether because real men can stand up for what they said or comparable puerile arguments as others have brought up dave elxr jpl nasa gov dave hayes what a primal example of human nature i have three questions for you folks do people really say different things to each other based upon whether their identity is or isn t known are people really so affected by what other people say that the verbage is labeled abuse most importantly on a forum that prizes itself on the freedom of communication that it enjoys is there really such a thing as freedom of communication from terry geovision gvc com terry mcgonigal sigh just how many anon services are needed will everybody start running one soon what s the purpose who stands to benefit when there are n anon services then n then n out there where has this sudden fasination with anon services come from for better or imho worse it looks like we er gonna get stuck with these things and as much as i don t like the idea of services like this becoming the norm i don t really think there s much to be done since it s obvious that anyone who wants to can set one up with a bit of work karl kleinpaste cs cmu edu karl kleinpaste weak reasoning with freedom comes responsibility dave elxr jpl nasa gov dave hayes responsibility isn t real if it is enforced true responsibilty comes with no coercion should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed morgan engr uky edu wes morgan i will be the first to admit that i hold some controversial opinions indeed i m sure that none of us are completely orthodox in our opinions however i ve received hundreds of anonymous email messages over the last few years fewer than of them were reasonable posts made with good motives it s getting more and more difficult to remember why we need anonymity at all the abusers are once again lousing things up for those who truly need the service or those who would put it to good use i m not suggesting that we should ban anonymous servers as i ve said there are several situations in which anonymity is a good thing tm however the notion that anonymity s shield should be automatically extended to every usenet discussion is ridiculous it opens the door to further abuse twpierce unix amherst edu tim pierce of course how does one determine whether a group requests the service a flat majority of posters voting in favor a positive margin of votes or what no one speaks for a newsgroup i m not convinced by the arguments that an anonymous posting service for all newsgroups is inherently a bad idea simply because it s a diversion from the status quo since the status quo previously permitted anonymous posting to no newsgroups any anonymous posting service would reject the status quo hartman ulogic uucp richard m hartman writes it is facist to suggest that a newsgroup is best able to decide whether it wants to allow anonymous postings instead of having them forced upon them by an service administrator ogil quads uchicago edu brian w ogilvie the service provides a mechanism for forwarding mail to the original poster since most usenet readers don t know john smith from jane doe except by their opinions and their address the effect of having an anonymous posting to which mail replies can be directed is minimal except for those who personally know the poster and the lack of anonymity could be serious any mechanism like this is liable to abuse but the benefits as well as the costs must be weighed limiting the service to alt groups or specific groups would not help those who want advice on sensitive issues in more professional newsgroups from tarl sw stratus com tarl neustaedter an additional point is that some of us find anonimity in technical matters to be profoundly offensive anonimity in different forums has different meanings if i get a phone call from someone who won t identify himself i hang up if i get u s mail with no return address it goes into the garbage unopened if someone accosts me in the street while wearing a mask i back away carefully and expecting violence in a technical discussion anonimity means that the individual isn t willing to associate himself with the matter being discussed which discredits his utterances and makes listening to them a waste of time anonimity leads to fun psych experiments the literature is filled with all the various things that people will do anonymously that they won t otherwise including one notorious study involving torture that would not have passed today s ethical standards fun stuff in any case fine leave us out of it from jbuck forney berkeley edu joe buck you obviously have never submitted an article to a refereed journal where you will receive anonymous reviews through a server the editor that behaves much like the one in finland e g you may reply and the editor will maintain the anonymity your comparison of someone who wants to express him herself on a technical issue anonymously with a person who approaches you on a dark street with a ski mask is just emotionally overwrought nonsense such posters pose no physical threat to you jik mit edu j kamens it seems obvious to me that the default should be not to allow anonymous postings in a newsgroup the usenet has always operated on the principle that the status quo should be kept unless there s a large number of people who want to change it if someone really needs to post a message anonymous in a newsgroup in which this usually isn t done they can usually find someone on the net to do this for them they don t need an automated service to do it and the automated service is by its nature incapable of making the judgment call necessary to decide whether a particular posting really needs to be anonymous from twpierce unix amherst edu tim pierce for any newsgroup you name i bet i can envision a scenario involving a need for secrecy if an accurate content based filter of each anonymous posting could be devised to screen out those that don t require secrecy wonderful but it can t be done from lhp daimi aau dk lasse hiller e petersen if a newsgroup wants to be noise and nuisance free then it should call for moderation this should happen on a per newsgroup basis and not as a general usenet ban on anonymous postings of course one principle of moderation might be to keep out all anonymous postings and could be achieved automatically it would still be moderation personally i would prefer moderation criteria being based on actual content david a clunie dclunie pax tpa com au if a group doesn t want to receive certain posts it should become moderated there are clearly defined mechanisms on non alt groups for this to take place an automated moderator excluding posts from certain eg anonymous sites or individuals could easily be established if anyone wants to take such a draconian approach then they are welcome to do so and good luck to them i doubt if i will be reading their group from dave frackit uucp dave ratcliffe what possible need would someone have for posting anonymously to a sci group sure most adults are willing to post under their own names why would they want to hide behind an anonymous posting service ashamed of what they have to say or just trying to rile people without fear of being identified anonymous posting have their place in certain groups if i or anyone else needs to tell you what those groups are then you ve been on another planet breathing exotic gases for too long from karl kleinpaste cs cmu edu it s bloody fascinating that all the proponents of unimpeded universal anon posting access can t seem to find any middle ground at all why is there such a perception of absolutism where does this instant gratification syndrome come from i want anon access and i want it now who are the control freaks here from acearl leo bsuvc bsu edu remember this is a newsgroup for posters writing about scientific issues anonymous discussion of scientific issues leads to bad science from noring netcom com jon noring though many have personal philosophical arguments against anonymous posters their arguments have not been compelling enough to convince me that omni newsgroup anonymous posting should be banned or severely restricted though i cannot prove it it seems to me that those who do not like anonymous posting in principle do so for reasons that are personal read psychological discomfort rather than for reasons related to maintaining the integrity of usenet remember it is impossible to be able to ascertain all the conceivable and legitimate motives for anonymous posting to newsgroups one normally would not deem to be sensitive in general i fear even letting newsgroup readers vote on either allowing or not allowing anonymous posting since a priori they cannot know all the motives of legitimate posters and i do not believe that any system should ever be instituted that would inhibit the posting of legitimate and informative posts lestat wixer cactus org lyle j mackey writes i personally don t believe that pseudonymous postings are appropriate in a serious discussion area if there is a legitimate reason for concealing the posters identity perhaps but simply because they re not so sure if they want their name attached doesn t qualify as legitimate in my book oh and if you can come up with a legitimate purpose for anonymous postings please enlighten me sderby crick ssctr bcm tmc edu stuart p derby three of our the u s s founding fathers madison hamilton and jay seemed to think anonymous posting was ok the federalist papers were originally printed in new york newspapers with authorship attributed to publius i wonder if you would find their purpose legitimate what should system operators do with anonymous postings from emcguire intellection com ed mcguire i would like to know how to junk all articles posted by the anonymous service currently being discussed ideally i would actually tell my feed site not to feed me articles posted by the anonymous service assuming the c news performance release what is a simple way to accomplish this or where should i look to learn how to do it myself from dclunie pax tpa com au david clunie that s a bit draconian isn t it have your users unanimously decided that they would like you to do this or have you decided for them from emcguire intellection com ed mcguire good question nobody has decided i have no definite plan to do this just wanted the technical data carl kleinpaste karl kleinpaste godiva nectar cs cmu edu were i to be in the position of offering such a service again my promises of protection of anonymity would be limited not on the basis of personal opinion of what gets posted but on the basis of postings which disrupt the smooth operation of the usenet the most obvious and direct recourse would be to out the abusive individual less drastic possibilities exist the software supports a fire extinguisher by which individuals can be prevented from posting john iastate edu john hascall since when is usenet a democracy if someone wants to run an anonymous service that s their business if you want to put that host in your killfile that s your business if a newsadmin wants to blanket drop all postings from that site that s between them and the other people at that site if everyone ignores a service the service effectively doesn t exist from jik athena mit edu jonathan i kamens nntp servers that allow posting from anyone are not a service to the net they do the net a disservice terminal servers have the same problems as open nntp servers they allow people who want to do illegal immoral unethical things on the internet to do so without accountability there are by now public access sites all over this country if not all over the world that allow very inexpensive access to the usenet and the internet there is no reason for nntp servers to allow anyone to post messages through them and there is no reason for terminal servers to allow anyone to connect to them and then make outbound connections through them perhaps when it was harder to get to the internet or the usenet open servers could be justified but not now jbotz mtholyoke edu jurgen botz i think that what these points show clearly is that an anonymous posting service has a great deal of responsibility both towards its clients and towards the net as a whole such a service should imho have a set of well defined rules and a contract that its clients should sign under the terms of which they are assured anonymity from an anon penet fi is the problem that some are used to punishing posters who are upsetting in some vague way by complaining to the usually acquiescent sysadmin or organizations that the poster belongs to that surely is the most gutless approach to solving problems but my experience on the net shows that the same users who vilify anonymous postings are the first to write obsessively detailed grievances to the poster s supervisor when his or her tranquility is disturbed by some intrusive or subversive post or another anonymous postings prevent just this kind of intimidation from gandalf cyberspace org eric schilling the main point i would like to make here is that while we can go through and revise the news sw to reject anon posts to technical newsgroups or some such thing i think the attempt will prove futile each attempt to modify news can result in a changed approach by anon service providers to thwart the change i think this would be pointless from julf penet fi johan helsingius i have tried to stay out of this discussion and see where the discussion leads but now i rally feel like i have to speak up i have repeatedly made clear that i do block users if they continue their abuse after having been warned in many cases the users have taken heed of the warning and stopped and in some cases even apologized in public and when the warning has not had the desired effect i have blocked a number of users i have also blocked access to groups where the readership has taken a vote to ban anonymous postings although i feel changing the newsgroup status to moderated is the only permanent solution for newsgroups that want to formalize discussion red redpoll neoucom edu richard e depew does this mean that you are volunteering to issue a request for discussion to ban anonymous postings or to moderate each of the newsgroups that your server can reach i don t think so but this illustrates the trouble that your server is causing please listen to the consensus of the news administrators in this group any newsgroup should be consulted before letting your server post messages to that group from c vm urz uni heidelberg de alexander eichener there is no pompous consensus of the news administrators here maybe you would like to invent one there is a sizeable number of people who are concerned about the possible and to a minor extent about the actual abuse of the server as it is configured now these concerns are respectable johan is dealing with them there are some few who rage with foam before their mouth and condemn the service altogether and a number who defend it pointing out like kate gregory that even a group like misc kids can benefit from pseudonymous postings from julf penet fi johan helsingius i have answered a lot of personal mail related to server abuse and as a result of that blocked a number of abusive users i have also withdrawn the service from several newsgroups where the users have taken a vote on the issue i have not made any comments on news admin policy partly because the newly implemented password feature as a emergency measure against a security hole has kept me really busy answering user queries the last two weeks and partly because i feel it is not for me to justify the service but for the users the problem with news admin policy is that the readership is rather elective representing people whith a strong interest in centralised control from hartman ulogic uucp richard m hartman this seems to be a rather bigoted attitude i would consider that this group is for anyone who wishes to discuss how the net should be controlled saying that we only have an interest in centralized control is a clear indication of bias you are perfectly welcome to join in the discussions here to promote your views on control jbuck ohm berkeley edu this whole debate is a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing because even if you all decide to ban anonymous posting servers it is not enforceable the only people who conceivably could enforce retrictions are those that control the international links policy changes should be made by cooperation not by attempting to dictate you need to persuade those who run the services to act like this through friendly persuasion not by trying to beat them over the head with a stick especially a stick you don t even have spp zabriskie berkeley edu steve pope i am finding this bias against pseudonymity boring our friend posting through penet has a point the old guard would like to keep their network the way it always has been and this new thing these pseudonymous servers cuts into their turf so they whine and bitch about it and every time there s the slightest abuse such as somebody s sig being too long they try to parlay that into an argument against pseudonymity i ll go on record as saying three cheers for the admins at anon servers like penet pax and n kbt and for all the access service providers who are willing to preserve their clients privacy and a pox on those who try to defeat and restrict pseudonymity mimir stein u washington edu al billings i wouldn t help people get rid of anon postings as a group if you don t like what someone says then you put that anon address in your kill file not all of them of course if and when i get an anon site going i m just going to assign fake names like jsmith instead of anon to avoid most of the hassles you ll never know it is anonymous will you from anne alcor concordia ca anne bennett i must admit to some astonishment at this argument i see the value of anonymous postings under some circumstances yet believe strongly that these should be identified as such so that people who do not wish to read material from people who won t identify themselves don t have to i fail to see what good you would be accomplishing and indeed surmise that you will cause many people inconvenience and annoyance by hiding the anonymity of postings from your anonymous site would you care to justify where the hell you get the gall to try to prevent people from effectively filtering their news as they see fit from dclunie pax tpa com au david clunie i thought i was out of reach here in australia too unfortunately one of the us sites involved in the us aus feed complained to the australian academic reasearch network through whom my site is connected not about anything in particular just the concept of anonymous mail having no redeeming features and consuming a narrow bandwidth link with which i can t argue and that was that stop the service or face disconnection i consider the demise of my service to have been rather unfortunate and i wish the finnish remailer luck it is a pity that there are very few if any similar services provided with in the us i guess that s the benefit of having a constitution that guarantees one freedom of speech and a legal and political system that conspires to subvert it in the name of the public good what is going on with anon penet fi run by j helsingius from karl kleinpaste cs cmu edu funny how beating the rest of the usenet over the head with a stick is ok if it s anon penet fi and universal anon access but somehow people on the other side of the same equation not even arguing to shut it off entirely but rather just to have some control applied to the abuses that manifest themselves aren t allowed to do that i have written to johan several times in the last couple of weeks he used to reply to me quite readily after all i was the source of the software as originally delivered to him he used to be downright prompt about replying to me funny now he s being an impolite bastard who doesn t answer mail at all even when it consists of really very civil queries from julf penet fi johan helsingius in your mail you told me you sent me one or more messages on feb th feb th and th the server was down and the flood of mail that resulted from the server coming up again crashed my own mail host the problem was aggregated by an abusive user sending thousands of messages to another user filling up that users mailbox the bounce messages ended up in my mailbox overflowing my local disk as well i can only suppose that your message got lost in that hassle as i have tried to answer as much as possible of the anon related messages i get from routine mis addessed messages to complaints about the service on the average i spend hours per day answering anon related messages from karl kleinpaste cs cmu edu why is it that everybody else has to put up with the impoliteness and insensitivity of the misuse of anon penet fi whose definitions of polite and sense apply and why why is universal anon access considered to be within the realm of this fuzzy concept of politeness in the first place i think johan has long since crossed the line into being a rude bastard and i told him so in private mail a little while ago at this point i deeply regret a having created an anonymous system supporting newsgroup and b having given the code to johan i didn t copyright it but i thought that some concept of politeness and good sense might follow it to new homes interesting that johan s ideas of politeness and good sense seem to have nearly no interesection with mine i could even cope with universal anon access if johan would be willing to engage in abuse control but somehow that seems to be outside the range of reality from julf penet fi johan helsingius there is no way for me to convey how sad and upset your message made me i do to some extent understand your feelings but it still feels really bad running the server requires getting used to a lot of flames but mindlessly abusive hate mail is so much easier to deal with than something like this as i do respect and value your views and opinions to a high degree no i m not asking for sympathy i just wanted you to know that i am really giving your views quite a lot of weight when i asked for the software i was actually only going to provide the service to scandinavian users but a lot of people requested that i keep the service open to the international community i now realize that i ought to have contacted you at that point to ask how you feel about me using your stuff in such a context again i really want to apologise and i will replace the remaining few pieces of code thet still stem from your system unfortunately there is no way to remove the ideas and structure i got from you again i am really sorry that the results of your work ended up being used in a way that you don t approve of and i will be giving a lot of hard thought to the possibility of shutting down the server alltogether from karl kleinpaste cs cmu edu i think i m feeling especially rude and impolite if it s good for johan it s good for me after all he didn t ask the greater usenet whether universal anon access was a good idea he just did it yes i m a seriously rude pain in the ass now and i think i ll arm the usenet death penalty slightly modified not for strategic whole site attack but tactical assault just an anon penet fi destruction only outside alt too let s say to parrot this line people have been doing things like the udp that is cancelling others postings for years no one could ever stop them and it s only politeness and good sense that has prevented them up to now in fact i have people who have expressed privately the desire and ability to arm the udp ps no in fact there are not newsadmins ready to arm the udp it would be amusing to know how many people gulped hard when they read that though i don t see it as any different from johan s configuration pps now that i ve calmed some fears by the above ps there are newsadmins ready to arm the udp they ve asked for my code i haven t sent it yet only one site would be necessary to bring anon penet fi to a screeching halt anyone can implement the udp on their own if they care to politeness and good sense prevents them from doing so i wonder how long before one form of impoliteness brings on another form from julf penet fi johan helsingius it would be trivially easy to bring anon penet fi to a screeching halt in fact it has happened a couple of times already but as we are talking threats here let me make one as well a very simple one if somebody uses something like the udp or maliciously brings down anon penet fi by some other means it will stay down but i will let the users know why and name the person who did it ok as somebody said on this thread you have to take personal responsibility for your actions right from avs ccc amdahl com atul v salgaonkar i am very grateful and appreciative of this service courtesey of penet fi some important questions about my personal life career job were resolved due to kind help of other people who had been thru similar situations in return i have also replied to anon postings where i thought i could make a positive contribution in general anon service is a great in my opinion although like any tool some people will not use it responsibly i suggest that it should be kept alive wasting bandwidth is less important than saving lives i think from us mmm serc m com elisa j collins i have been informed that the anonymous posting service to many newsgroups has been turned off as a result of discussions in this newsgroup over people abusing it i had been posting to a nontechnical misc newsgroup about an intimate topic for which i felt i required privacy i have received immeasurable help from the people in that newsgroup and i have never used anonymity to behave in an abusive immature or unethical fashion toward anyone please folks believe me i need this service please consider my point of view and permit admin anon penet fi to turn the service back on thank you see also part first file what is identity on the internet why is identity un important on the internet how does my email address not identify me and my background how can i find out more about somebody from their email address why is identification un stable on the internet what is the future of identification on the internet what is privacy on the internet why is privacy un important on the internet how in secure are internet networks how in secure is my account how in secure are my files and directories how in secure is x windows how in secure is my email how am i not liable for my email and postings how do i provide more less information to others on my identity who is my sysadmin what does s he know about me why is privacy un stable on the internet what is the future of privacy on the internet what is anonymity on the internet why is anonymity un important on the internet how can anonymity be protected on the internet what is anonymous mail what is anonymous posting why is anonymity un stable on the internet what is the future of anonymity on the internet part previous file what unix programs are related to privacy how can i learn about or use cryptography what is the cypherpunks mailing list what are some privacy related newsgroups faqs what is internet privacy enhanced mail pem what are other request for comments rfcs related to privacy how can i run an anonymous remailer what are references on privacy in email what are some email usenet and internet use policies what is the mit crosslink anonymous message tv program what is digital cash what is a hacker or cracker what is a cypherpunk what is steganography and anonymous pools what is security through obscurity what are identity daemons what standards are needed to guard electronic privacy what is the electronic frontier foundation eff who are computer professionals for social responsibility cpsr what was operation sun devil and the steve jackson game case what is integrated services digital network isdn what is the national research and education network nren what is the fbi s proposed digital telephony act what other u s legislation is related to privacy on networks what are references on rights in cyberspace what is the computers and academic freedom caf archive what is the background behind the internet how is internet anarchy like the english language most wanted list change history this is part of the privacy anonymity faq obtained via anonymous ftp to pit manager mit edu pub usenet news answers net privacy or newsgroups news answers sci answers alt answers every days written by l detweiler ld longs lance colostate edu all rights reserved
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re pgp pem and rfc s was cryptography patents in article apr natasha portal com bob natasha portal com bob cain writes i hope my cynicism is misplaced here go ahead i m not afraid to be wrong every once in a while but i have an uneasy feeling that i am right it is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact with a tiny disclaimer at the end check your facts first and grow up why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography and immaturity i wonder oh i see flame someone tell them that they are immature tell them they are wrong and then don t offer any proof for your assertions you really are a putz put up or shut up cpk it s been days do you know where your wallet is
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re fifth amendment and passwords in c jzsz jzo cs uiuc edu kadie cs uiuc edu carl m kadie writes the crypto key disclosure issue hasn t come up yet but current law suggests that it s a loser for the defendant he ll be compelled to turn over the key it has actually come up or it will in a week or two in nz i ll post the outcome when the trial finishes which could take months btw overall it looks like you can t be forced to reveal a password if anyone can provide a convincing legal argument to the contrary ie an actual court case i d be most interested peter pgut cs aukuni ac nz p gutmann cs aukuni ac nz gutmann p kosmos wcc govt nz peterg kcbbs gen nz peter nacjack gen nz peter phlarnschlorpht nacjack gen nz in order of preference one of em s bound to work think or thwim
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isoc symposium on net security call for papers the internet society symposium on network and distributed system security february catamaran hotel san diego california the symposium will bring together people who are building software and hardware to provide network or distributed system security services the symposium is intended for those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security rather than in theory symposium proceedings will be published by the internet society topics for the symposium include but are not limited to the following design and implementation of services access control authentication availability confidentiality integrity and non repudiation including criteria for placing services at particular protocol layers design and implementation of security mechanisms and support services encipherment and key management systems authorization and audit systems and intrusion detection systems requirements and architectures for distributed applications and network functions message handling file transport remote file access directories time synchronization interactive sessions remote data base management and access routing voice and video multicast and conferencing news groups network management boot services mobile computing and remote i o special issues and problems in security architecture such as very large systems like the international internet and high speed systems like the gigabit testbeds now being built interplay between security goals and other goals efficiency reliability interoperability resource sharing and low cost general chair dan nessett lawrence livermore national laboratory program chairs russ housley xerox special information systems rob shirey the mitre corporation program committee dave balenson trusted information systems tom berson anagram laboratories matt bishop dartmouth college ed cain u s defense information systems agency jim ellis cert coordination center steve kent bolt beranek and newman john linn independent consultant clifford neuman information sciences institute michael roe cambridge university rob rosenthal u s national institute of standards and technology jeff schiller massachusetts institute of technology ravi sandhu george mason university peter yee u s national aeronautics and space administration submissions the committee seeks both original technical papers and proposals for panel discussions on technical and other topics of general interest technical papers should be pages in length panels should include three or four speakers a panel proposal must name the panel chair include a one page topic introduction authored by the chair and also include one page position summaries authored by each speaker both the technical papers and the panel papers will appear in the proceedings submissions must be made by august submissions should be made via electronic mail to symposium smiley mitre org submissions may be in either of two formats ascii or postscript if the committee is unable to read a postscript submission it will be returned and ascii requested therefore postscript submissions should arrive well before august if electronic submission is absolutely impossible submissions should be sent via postal mail to robert w shirey mail stop z the mitre corporation mclean virginia usa all submissions must include both an internet electronic mail address and a postal address each submission will be acknowledged through the medium by which it is received if acknowledgment is not received within seven days please contact either rob shirey shirey mitre org or russ housley housley mclean csd xerox com or telephone mana weigand at mitre in mclean authors and panelists will be notified of acceptance by october instructions for preparing camera ready copy for the proceedings will be postal mailed at that time the camera ready copy must be received by november
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re pem and mime in article qg m e nigel msen com edward vielmetti writes i would suggest that attractive mime formatted news messages a day would be sufficient to get a few people thinking about adding mime support to news readers esp if the content is really worth it but that s just the problem there is no such thing as mime formatted by analogy mime is a content labelling standard for the box not a specification for the contents themselves it provides a standard for like minded individuals to exchange mail containing an agreed upon data format you say tomahto i say tomaeto you say postscript i say sgml cheers marc marc thibault cis put another log marc tanda isis org nc freenet aa on the fire
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text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption note this file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc ncsl nist gov in directory pub nistnews and via the nist computer security bbs at the white house office of the press secretary for immediate release april statement by the press secretary the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals a state of the art microcircuit called the clipper chip has been developed by government engineers the chip represents a new approach to encryption technology it can be used in new relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans each device containing the chip will have two unique keys numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches like the key escrow system the president has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the national information infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of american industry in the global marketplace and the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products the president has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries the congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet the provisions of the president s directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available for additional details call mat heyman national institute of standards and technology questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the commerce department and other key agencies were involved in this decision this approach has been endorsed by the president the vice president and appropriate cabinet officials q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future q how do i buy one of these encryption devices a we expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the clipper chip into their devices q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology which the administration is developing the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques q what does this decision indicate about how the clinton administration s policy toward encryption will differ from that of the bush administration a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the same is true for other encryption devices one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad we plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products
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re keeping your mouth shut was hard drive security in article apr cadkey com eric cadkey com eric holtman writes in article apr yuma acns colostate edu holland cs colostate edu douglas craig holland writes i m not a lawyer so correct me if i m wrong but doing that could be considered obstruction of justice which could land you in prison for quite a while the thing that s great about the secret key is it is idea encrypted so even if the fbi do get the key they re sol unless they know the magic word if they try to force you to give them your pass phrase just say oops i forgot since the burden of proof is still on the prosecution in this country if you keep your mouth shut how can they prove that you didn t forget your pass phrase well i m no lawyer but i ll supply some ancedotal evidence which may change your mind note i do not agree at all with what went on in this case and neither will most of you that doesn t change the fact that it did happen right here in america even about three or four years ago there was a rather nasty custody case in or around washington d c the upshot was an ex husband was suing for visitation rights which were granted the woman believed that the man had been sexually molesting her children much like allen farrow but not as famous anyhows she spirits away the kids and refuses to tell the court where they are and denies him visitation rights she keeps her mouth shut and what happens she sits in jail for almost a year on contempt of court until the legislature passes a special law limiting the time a person can be held if they hadn t passed the law she d most likely still be there the kids were in new zealand i belive now story finished commetary starting imho the only reason the legislature moved was because there was an outpouring of public sympathy for this woman most people believed she was right and were outraged not likely to happen for joe random drug dealer child molester or perfectly innocent privacy lover who might have something to hide innocent until proven guilty doesn t mean you get to walk out of court humming a happy tune because the fbi can t read your disk just ask those held for contempt those who can t make bail etc etc again i disagree totally with the concept of holding someone based on suspicion but people who keep thinking that it won t happen are bound to get a rude shock when it does also not a lawyer etc but if i remember correctly the contempt of court business is used in order to compel cooperation with what is perhaps questionably different issue the legitimate business of that court quite literally the party is found guilty of holding the court in contempt now the original scheme as suggested here would be to have the key disappear if certain threatening conditions are met once the key is gone there is no question of contempt of court as there is nothing to compell the key is no longer there to be produced obstruction of justice would be a different issue but if the suspect in question would have some legitmate reason to protect his data from prying eyes however extenuated i think that this charge would be a hard nut to make perhaps it is time for a lawyer to step in and clear this all up vincent a kub wd dbx saints should always be judged guilty until they are proven vkub charlie usd edu innocent geo orwell w cherry st it is good to die before one has vermillion s dakota done anything deserving of death phone or fax to anaxandirdes king of sparta
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption isn t clipper a trademark of fairchild semiconductor andy hooper
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption well it now seems obvious what professor denning was doing last fall when this key escrow trial balloon was raised all the more need for end to end encryption schemes that bypass the government approved system by the way the clipper name isn t this already used for the clipper processor from intergraph i doubt they re the ones making the chip so a name conflict may be present tim may timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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compress crypt foo des e k foo i have a bunch of questions about the encryption scheme referenced in the subject of this message what is the relative data privacy provided by the above sequence as compared with straight des does the addition of compression then encrypting make the cyphertext significantly harder to crack using current methods than straight des would running crypt after des provide greater data privacy is it important to remove the constant compress header before encryption thank you net for your wisdom jad john a dilley jad nsa hp com
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clipper chip and crypto key escrow this document is in the anonymous ftp directory at nist looks to me like the other shoe has dropped jim gillogly trewesday astron s r note this file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc ncsl nist gov in directory pub nistnews and via the nist computer security bbs at the white house office of the press secretary for immediate release april statement by the press secretary the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals a state of the art microcircuit called the clipper chip has been developed by government engineers the chip represents a new approach to encryption technology it can be used in new relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans each device containing the chip will have two unique keys numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches like the key escrow system the president has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the national information infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of american industry in the global marketplace and the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products the president has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries the congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet the provisions of the president s directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available for additional details call mat heyman national institute of standards and technology questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the commerce department and other key agencies were involved in this decision this approach has been endorsed by the president the vice president and appropriate cabinet officials q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future q how do i buy one of these encryption devices a we expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the clipper chip into their devices q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology which the administration is developing the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques q what does this decision indicate about how the clinton administration s policy toward encryption will differ from that of the bush administration a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the same is true for other encryption devices one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad we plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products jim gillogly trewesday astron s r
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secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow may as well look at one piece of this at a time this paragraph to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings means they aren t planning to make it public as was done with des as it says in both sci crypt faqs there s no way we are going to achieve the same level of comfort with clipper that we finally have with des if we can t actually get our hands on the bits and watch them flow around even the best experts aren t going to think of everything look how long it took biham and shamir to get a handle on just how good des is and for all we know there s still more to learn jim gillogly trewesday astron s r
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article c jzsz jzo cs uiuc edu kadie cs uiuc edu carl m kadie writes ashall magnus acs ohio state edu andrew s hall writes i am postive someone will correct me if i am wrong but doesn t the fifth also cover not being forced to do actions that are self incriminating from mike godwin mnemonic eff org posted with permission carl no but they could compell you to produce the key to a safe where as it happens evidence that will convict you is stored the crypto key disclosure issue hasn t come up yet but current law suggests that it s a loser for the defendant he ll be compelled to turn over the key the test for compelled self incrimination is whether the material to be disclosed in itself tends to inculpate the discloser in the example i gave above the safe key itself has no testimonial value ergo it can be disclosed under compulsion e g subpoena duces tecum moreover the government can always immunize the disclosure of a crypto key compelling you to disclose the key at the price of not using the fact of your disclosure as evidence in the case against you of course they can use whatever they discover as a result of this disclosure against you mike lets carry this one step further suppose the text of the key is in itself conclusive evidence of the same crime for which the encrypted material is further evidence i find myself envisaging a scenario like this you have made some scans of peanuts strips you encrypt them the key is a phrase the comic police haul you in they seize your system they find the encrypted file cp whats that file you i take the fifth cp what s the keyphrase to that file you i take the fifth judge you have to reveal the keyphrase i disagree but i m not a judge you your honor revealing the keyphrase in it s own right would tend to incriminate me of breaking laws independent of what may or may not be in the encrypted file judge i grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key itself you the keyphrase is i confess to deliberately evading copyright the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of copyrighted peanuts strips judge and cp oh how will they get you now i m not saying that they won t or can t or even that they shouldn t but what legal mechanism will they use should we be crossposting this to misc legal peter trei ptrei mitre org
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement a nice formulation for the introduction of the first encryption devices with built in trapdoors just like the feds wanted for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement bla bla protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals indeed and the current proposal does nothing to prevent the latter an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today this doesn t say much there are many incredibly weak encryption algorithms in commercial use today this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically except from the government at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals nope the criminals won t be stupid enough to use the new chip they ll use something secure this technology provides only means to intercept the phone conversations of people who are stupid enough to use it agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap that is the government has the keys it doesn t matter much if they are in one or in two of its hands the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans correct it does however provide those americans with the false sense of privacy devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings if the screening is not public it cannot be trusted some people do not trust des even today after all the examinations only because some parts of its design were kept secret the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology so they ll use a different technology to hide their illegal activities so will those law abiding citizens who do not trust their government not to misuse its abilities to decrypt their conversations the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes except from the government the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products huh later it says that the new technology will be export restricted since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law in short the new technology can protect the law abiding citizen s privacy from the casual snooper it cannot protect him from the government if it decides to misuse its ability to decrypt the conversations protect him from the criminals who succeed to break the new encryption scheme or to steal the keys or to bribe the people who handle them etc prevent the criminals from using secure encryption for communication q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans correct however it does not provide them that much privacy as it claims q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks two candidates the nsa and the mafia q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today that is trust us while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow security through obscurity system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities if it s not entirely open to public examination it cannot be trusted besides who can prove that the devices used for examination and the ones built into your phones will be the same q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the the nsa and the fbi q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative why did they forget the academia q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them doesn t this smell to monopolism q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future like the mafia q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices this is the main question why was it buried at the end a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow we ll see mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one trust us the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have in short if we decide to outlaw strong crypto we ll tell you effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a since the us government seems to consider strong crypto as munitions and since the us constitutions guarantees the right to every american to bear arms why is not every american entitled as a matter of right to an unbreakable commercial encryption product a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism bullshit the proposed technology provides a false sense of security encryption devices with built in capabilities for breaking the encryption does not prevent the criminals to use strong crypto and is a step to outlaw strong crypto q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the who was the optimist who believed that the new administration will leave the export controls on strong crypto devices ok i m not american it s not my business but i just couldn t resist to comment the whole plot looks so totalitaristic it s up to you americans to fight for your rights regards vesselin p s now is the time for david sternlight to pop up and claim that the new system is great vesselin vladimirov bontchev virus test center university of hamburg tel fax fachbereich informatik agn pgp public key available on request vogt koelln strasse rm c e mail bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de d hamburg germany
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption the key question is whether non clipper encryption will be made illegal the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques the clear middle ground implied by these statements is to say that americans have the right to clipper encryption but not to unbreakable encryption this implies that ultimately non clipper strong encryption must become illegal as an aside isn t the language here jarring all this talk about harmonious balance when they re talking about taking away people s right to communications privacy although the article emphasizes voice communication data and mail encryption is mentioned as well sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes it looks like the worst nightmares raised by dorothy denning s proposals are coming true if the government continues on this course i imagine that we will see strong cryptography made illegal encryption programs for disk files and email as well as software to allow for encrypted voice communications will be distributed only through the underground people will have to learn how to hide the fact that they are protecting their privacy it s shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here hal finney hal alumni caltech edu
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the battle is joined it looks like dorothy denning s wrong headed ideas have gotten to the administration even sooner than we feared it s time to make sure they hear the other side of the story and hear it loudly phil forwarded message subject text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption note this file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc ncsl nist gov in directory pub nistnews and via the nist computer security bbs at the white house office of the press secretary for immediate release april statement by the press secretary the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals a state of the art microcircuit called the clipper chip has been developed by government engineers the chip represents a new approach to encryption technology it can be used in new relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans each device containing the chip will have two unique keys numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches like the key escrow system the president has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the national information infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of american industry in the global marketplace and the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products the president has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries the congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet the provisions of the president s directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available for additional details call mat heyman national institute of standards and technology questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the commerce department and other key agencies were involved in this decision this approach has been endorsed by the president the vice president and appropriate cabinet officials q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future q how do i buy one of these encryption devices a we expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the clipper chip into their devices q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology which the administration is developing the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques q what does this decision indicate about how the clinton administration s policy toward encryption will differ from that of the bush administration a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the same is true for other encryption devices one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad we plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products
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re macpgp source problems yes my error you will need the diff between the standard console h and console c supplied with symantec s think c and the specially modified one that works with macpgp i added the two diffs to the end of the signature file macpgp srcsignature in pub grady of netcom com please download via anonymous ftp and using sed oops cutting and pasting fix em up will one of you mac geniuses please port this to macapp or appmaker or grady grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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re inventing crypto policy an eff statement april initial eff analysis of clinton privacy and security proposal the clinton administration today made a major announcement on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions of americans the first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues such as export controls which have effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption and law enforcement issues posed by new technology however eff is very concerned that the administration has already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry before any public comment or discussion has been allowed apparently the administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed by the national security agency the so called clipper chip is an bit split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor two separate escrow agents would store users keys and be required to turn them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant the encryption scheme used is to be classified but the chips will be available to any manufacturer for incorporation into its communications products this proposal raises a number of serious concerns first the administration has adopted a solution before conducting an inquiry the nsa developed clipper chip may not be the most secure product other vendors or developers may have better schemes furthermore we should not rely on the government as the sole source for the clipper or any other chips rather independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets based on open standards second an algorithm cannot be trusted unless it can be tested yet the administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified eff believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open the public will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open to independent expert scrutiny third while the use of the use of a split key dual escrowed system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement needs the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is adopted what will give people confidence in the safety of their keys does disclosure of keys to a third party waive an individual s fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal inquiries these are but a few of the many questions the administrations proposal raised but fails to answer in sum the administration has shown great sensitivity to the importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital privacy and security however the clipper chip solution ought to be considered as part of the inquiry and not be adopted before the discussion even begins details of the proposal escrow the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key the manufacturer of the communications device would be required to register all keys with the two independent escrow agents a key is tied to the device however not the person using it upon presentation of a valid court order the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts over to law enforcement agents according to the presidential directive just issued the attorney general will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents some in the administration have suggested that one non law enforcement federal agency perhaps the federal reserve and one non governmental organization could be chosen but there is no agreement on the identity of the agents yet classified algorithm and the possibility of back doors the administration claims that there are no back doors means by which the government or others could break the code without securing keys from the escrow agents and that the president will be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm in order to prove this administration sources are interested in arranging for an all star crypto cracker team to come in under a security arrangement and examine the algorithm for trap doors the results of the investigation would then be made public the clipper chipset was designed and is being produced and a sole source secret contract between the national security agency and two private firms vlsi and mycotronx nsa work on this plan has been underway for about four years the manufacturing contract was let months ago government as market driver in order to get a market moving and to show that the government believes in the security of this system the feds will be the first big customers for this product users will include the fbi secret service vp al gore and maybe even the president at today s commerce department press briefing a number of people asked this question though why would any private organization or individual adopt a classified standard that had no independent guaranty of security or freedom from trap doors comprehensive policy inquiry the administration has also announced that it is about to commence an inquiry into all policy issues related to privacy protection encryption and law enforcement the items to be considered include export controls on encryption technology and the fbi s digital telephony proposal it appears that the this inquiry will be conducted by the national security council unfortunately however the presidential directive describing the inquiry is classified some public involvement in the process has been promised but they terms have yet to be specified from more information contact jerry berman executive director jberman eff org daniel j weitzner senior staff counsel djw eff org full text of the press releases and fact sheets issued by the administration will be available on eff s ftp site danny weitzner senior staff counsel eff
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption i am eager to hear the legal theory behind restricting exchange of cryptographic data and encrypted messages given the first admendment the theory behind regulating the personal encryption of one s personal thoughts and feelings seems even less tenable perhaps if we make a treaty with say iceland to restrict crypto paraphernalia can a good end run around the constitution happen treaties as someone pointed out has the force of any other law of the land like the bill of rights amendment congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances amendment a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed amendment no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law amendment the right of the people to be secure in their persons houses papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized amendment no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself nor be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation well at least for a few minutes we had some privacy grady netcom com ef e ad d d c f fc ac f d f e f
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rubick shortest path algorithm status what is the expected run time a factor of on a dx using the best known algorithm for finding the shortest path solution for rubicks cube from a randomly chosen position i have read the faq and followed the recent discussion on rubicks cube but i don t believe this question has been answered notice that i am specifically looking for an algorithm that finds the shortest path not just any solution it seems to me that the underlying assumption is that such a program would need to do a brute force search though positions that seems an unreasonably pessimistic assumption to me and i want to know if someone has significantly improved on that i have some ideas of my own on how to approach this problem but before i spend to much time developing them i wanted to know if someone else has already done the work administrivia i have posted this to three groups and attempted to set the followup to rec puzzles which seems to me to be the place to continue this discussion i will cross post a summary when and if it becomes appropriate email replies gladly accepted jimmy jru comtech com
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re pgp pem and rfc s was cryptography patents charles kincy ckincy cs umr edu wrote in article apr natasha portal com bob natasha portal com bob cain writes i hope my cynicism is misplaced here go ahead i m not afraid to be wrong every once in a while but i have an uneasy feeling that i am right it is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact with a tiny disclaimer at the end check your facts first and grow up why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography and immaturity i wonder oh i see flame someone tell them that they are immature tell them they are wrong and then don t offer any proof for your assertions you really are a putz put up or shut up i will provide any proof you wish in private name it dickhead putz cain
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white house public encryption management fact sheet note the following was released by the white house today in conjunction with the announcement of the clipper chip encryption technology fact sheet public encryption management the president has approved a directive on public encryption management the directive provides for the following advanced telecommunications and commercially available encryption are part of a wave of new computer and communications technology encryption products scramble information to protect the privacy of communications and data by preventing unauthorized access advanced telecommunications systems use digital technology to rapidly and precisely handle a high volume of communications these advanced telecommunications systems are integral to the infrastructure needed to ensure economic competitiveness in the information age despite its benefits new communications technology can also frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance sophisticated encryption can have this effect in the united states when exported abroad it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence activities critical to our national interests in the past it has been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law enforcement and national security interests while at the same time protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens as encryption technology improves doing so will require new innovative approaches in the area of communications encryption the u s government has developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through encryption that is substantially more robust than the current government standard but also permits escrowing of the keys needed to unlock the encryption the system for the escrowing of keys will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information only with appropriate legal authorization to assist law enforcement and other government agencies to collect and decrypt under legal authority electronically transmitted information i hereby direct the following action to be taken installation of government developed microcircuits the attorney general of the united states or her representative shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the u s government developed key escrow microcircuits in their products the fact of law enforcement access to the escrowed keys will not be concealed from the american public all appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that any existing or future versions of the key escrow microcircuit are made widely available to u s communications hardware manufacturers consistent with the need to ensure the security of the key escrow system in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key escrow system key escrow the attorney general shall make all arrangements with appropriate entities to hold the keys for the key escrow microcircuits installed in communications equipment in each case the key holder must agree to strict security procedures to prevent unauthorized release of the keys the keys shall be released only to government agencies that have established their authority to acquire the content of those communications that have been encrypted by devices containing the microcircuits the attorney general shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such communications procurement and use of encryption devices the secretary of commerce in consultation with other appropriate u s agencies shall initiate a process to write standards to facilitate the procurement and use of encryption devices fitted with key escrow microcircuits in federal communications systems that process sensitive but unclassified information i expect this process to proceed on a schedule that will permit promulgation of a final standard within six months of this directive the attorney general will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government s ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications further the attorney general shall utilize funds from the department of justice asset forfeiture super surplus fund to effect this purchase
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eff initial eff analysis of clinton privacy and security proposal an article from comp org eff news effector online carl april initial eff analysis of clinton privacy and security proposal the clinton administration today made a major announcement on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions of americans the first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues such as export controls which have effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues posed by new technology however eff is very concerned that the administration has already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry before any public comment or discussion has been allowed apparently the administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed by the national security agency the so called clipper chip is an bit split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor two separate escrow agents would store users keys and be required to turn them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant the encryption scheme used is to be classified but they chips will be available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their communications products this proposal raises a number of serious concerns first the administration appears to be adopting a solution before conducting an inquiry the nsa developed clipper chip may not be the most secure product other vendors or developers may have better schemes furthermore we should not rely on the government as the sole source for clipper or any other chips rather independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets based on open standards second an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested yet the administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified eff believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open the public will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open to independent expert scrutiny third while the use of the split key dual escrowed system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement needs the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is adopted what will give people confidence in the safety of their keys does disclosure of keys to a third party waive individual s fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal inquiries in sum the administration has shown great sensitivity to the importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital privacy and security however the clipper chip solution ought to be considered as part of the inquiry not be adopted before the discussion even begins details of the proposal escrow the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key upon presentation of a valid warrant the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts over to law enforcement agents most likely the attorney general will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents some in the administration have suggested one non law enforcement federal agency perhaps the federal reserve and one non governmental organization but there is no agreement on the identity of the agents yet key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the communications device a key is tied to the device not to the person using it classified algorithm and the possibility of back doors the administration claims that there are no back door means by which the government or others could break the code without securing keys from the escrow agents and that the president will be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm in order to prove this administration sources are interested in arranging for an all star crypto cracker team to come in under a security arrangement and examine the algorithm for trap doors the results of the investigation would then be made public government as market driver in order to get a market moving and to show that the government believes in the security of this system the feds will be the first big customers for this product users will include the fbi secret service vp al gore and maybe even the president from more information contact jerry berman executive director daniel j weitzner senior staff counsel carl kadie i do not represent any organization this is just me kadie cs uiuc edu
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re clipper crypto i sent a response to the white house at mcimail com white house and received a nice automatic reply from micmail noting in passing that if i had included a snail address i would get a reply in due course for those who care my reply was yes let s protect the voice network privately developed crypto has always been available and always will be so let s think about how to do law enforcement given that fact not about how to hope to legislate against it my needs for crypto as a system designer are not met by the clipper chip i want freely to export uses of algorithms like des rsa which are already freely available in the destination country disclaimer all opinions expressed are my own of course carl ellison cme sw stratus com stratus computer inc m bkw tel fairbanks boulevard marlborough ma fax
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow though some may argue about the nose of the camel it s worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony if it is only used for that purpose and does not extend to electronic mail or file encryption then it is an improvement over the current mass produced standard civilian technology which with a few exceptions is limited to easy to break inverters note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for e mail and files let s focus on this one question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is limited to telephony or if the government intends to expand it though i share many of the concerns expressed by some i find the proposal less threatening than many others since right now most americans have no secure telephony and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a goat can eavesdrop this would also plug up the security hole in cellular and cordless phones reading between the lines i infer that the system is highly secure without access to the keys this would meet the needs of u s businesses confronted by rich and powerful adversaries including french and japanese security services and rich japanese companies it allows the nsa to make available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs most legitimate u s corporations trust the nsa and would be delighted to have a high security system certified by them even at the price of depositing keys in escrow i see no difficulty in creating a reliable escrow corporations entrust their secrets to attorneys every day of the week and that system has worked pretty well from my point of view this is a fair starting point there are concerns that need to be addressed including the reliability of the escrows but in return we get access to high security crypto many have suggested that des and other systems may be breakable by the nsa and hence others similarly skilled and endowed there is at least a good possibility which should be checked that the proposed system is not so breakable it doesn t have to be nor does it have to have trapdoors if the government can get the keys pursuant to a legitimate court order thus they can protect legitimate communications against economic adversaries while still being able to eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order in discussing this let s try to avoid the nastiness personal attacks and noise of some previous threads this is a substantive and technical issue and personal remarks have no place in such a discussion david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re re inventing crypto policy an eff statement in article apr eff org danny weitzner djw eff org writes the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key presumably the key split is so that no one group controls the privacy of the key and that it would be infeasible to illicitly gain access from both agents however if one agent wishes to break the crypto without the cooperation of the other agent a bit key is not going to stand in the way of a brute force attack if an agency for example the nsa were to hold one of the two key halves then i don t imagine they really need the other half of the key to start listening in or was that the point grin this is not to imply at all that i like the idea of the rest of the system lee brintle and so i leave you with this final word director project panda twang
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how to detect use of an illegal cipher how can the government tell which encryption method one is using without being able to decode the traffic i e in order to accuse me of using an unauthorized strong encryption technique they would have to take both keys out of escrow run them against my ciphertext and draw a blank i can imagine the ciphertext exhibiting certain statistical characteristics that might give a clue as to the encryption technique used but not enough to give a handle for diferential cryptoanalysis however superencipherment or some other scheme that shapes the percieved properties of my ciphertext could thwart this
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re another data hiding scheme in article apr colorado edu bear tigger cs colorado edu writes since the price of m floppies were still high until the last few years if you store old data with old file times in the public filesystem the casual observer may miss the hd especially if you accidently cover it with something bear giles bear cs colorado edu fsl noaa gov it has been done already in the uk the atari st box was shipped with k disks in the first few years and then later k disks in order to make life less complicated many freebie disks on mags were double formatted like this side of the disk had k on it and could be read by any st it also had a flip side program this would swap the sides around so that side became side mike mike avon demon co uk
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qmugcinnpu gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes the key question is whether non clipper encryption will be made illegal the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every does anyone know what countries are these american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques the clear middle ground implied by these statements is to say that americans have the right to clipper encryption but not to unbreakable encryption this implies that ultimately non clipper strong encryption must become illegal with the following logical consequences a using any code designed to obscure informatio which is not easily breakable will be illegal including i using code words such as project p ii speaking a language other than english iii ever refering implicitly to events not known to everyone eg hi john how was last night for all the listener knows this may be a code for did you pick up the drugs ok last night of be a code for ok we blow up the pentagon at midnight iv mentioning anything that could not be perfectly understood by an average person with no education v words with more than one syllable vi speaking with a heavy accent that could bemisunderstood by people not used to it vii books with an inner meaning such as animal farm as an aside isn t the language here jarring all this talk about harmonious balance when they re talking about taking away people s right to communications privacy yes it looks like the worst nightmares raised by dorothy denning s proposals are coming true if the government continues on this course i imagine that we will see strong cryptography made illegal encryption programs for disk files and email as well as software to allow for encrypted voice communications will be distributed only through the underground people will have to learn how to hide the fact that they are protecting their privacy i have a wonderful encrypter you can borrow that converts a message eg meet me at to bomb the white house bring some dynamite to an apparently relatively innoculous message this message here is an example of the output for the above message it s shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here it is shockiong that it could happen anywhere it is shocking that it could happen in a country that has the arrogance to call itself free what you can do write to your congress person in plain text write to your congress person in encrypted text decrypter optional send some random keystroked to your congressperson send some random keystrokes accross the us boundaries and keep the spooks busy trying to decode it write your own encryption algorithms don t buy clipper products p s i can t work out why the us government doesn t want to sell them overseas after all they are rather easy for us interests to decode so make a perfect tool for industrial military espionage lulling anyone stupid enough to buy it into a false sense of security you will notice that there is no mention anywhere about safety for non americans disclaimer my opinions are mine alone and do not represent anyone elses i have nothing that i particularly want to hide at the moment though i consider the right to be able to use whatever method of coding data i like to be high on my list of priorities andrew conway arc leland stanford edu phone usa
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re pgp pem and rfc s was cryptography patents in article apr natasha portal com bob natasha portal com bob cain writes check your facts first and grow up why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography and immaturity i wonder hmmm check your facts good advice let s check mr cain s facts a bit shall we charles kincy ckincy cs umr edu wrote some limitation let me guess don t use the code in any way pkp or rsa doesn t like such as providing secure communications for the average citizen that was exactly its purpose if you know anything about it there is nothing at all preventing the average citizen using it only selling it fact it is unlawful to distribute code implementing rsa without a license to do so from pkp whether or not one is charging for it furthermore any use of rsa other than for research purposes allowed under us patent law is similarly unlawful therefore the average citizen cannot use rsa to encrypt message traffic in the us without a license from pkp there is no licensed freely available product in the us that uses rsa encryption other than rsaref and hence ripem at least as far as i am aware if you know of another please post it here all i have to say is yeah right if you re willing to pay them mucho big bucks and or use the routines they tell you to do doesn t sound very reasonable to me all i have to say is this is full of shit i have negotiated a license and the bucks are incredibly reasonable with an upfront charge on a sliding scale depending on your capitalization if you are a startup and can t afford it you can t afford to start up in the first place why do people insist on making unequivocal statements about that which they know nothing fact the last contact i had with rsa data security inc was with some guy trying to sell me a license unsolicited i might add for tipem cost k plus percent royalties i suppose it is a matter of opinion as to whether or not these terms count as mucho bucks or incredibly reasonable either way however this definitely falls into the routines they tell you to use but i don t guess pkp and rsa are interested in big bucks maybe they have some other agenda secure communications only for government agents perhaps have you considered treatment for paranoia the government is the single biggest thorn in rsa s side fact there are no restrictions yet on the use of cryptography under us law although this is beginning to look like it will change the only impediments to widespread use of rsa cryptography in the us are pkp s patents mr cain please shut up until you get your facts straight better than the whole world be destroyed and crumble to dust than a free man deny one of his desires benito mussolini italian anarchist and poet jack eifrig eifrig cs jhu edu the johns hopkins university c s dept
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re re inventing crypto policy an eff statement in article apr eff org danny weitzner djw eff org writes the bit key will be divided between two escrow agents each of whom hold bits of each key i somehow started to doubt technical competence of the people who designed the system why on the earth split the bit key in bit parts to keep them in escrow separately having bit and large volumes of data voice links produce it should be relatively easy to break it when they simply could keep bit sequences in n n independent places and then xor all the partial keys to get the actual key n sequences should obviously be selected randomly and nth is the actual key xor ed with the random sequences or is it a conspiracy vadim
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re keeping your mouth shut was hard drive security in article c k ce a sunfish usd edu vkub charlie usd edu vince kub writes now the original scheme as suggested here would be to have the key disappear if certain threatening conditions are met once the key is gone there is no question of contempt of court as there is nothing to compell the key is no longer there to be produced getting rid of the keys is actually pretty easy to do automatically on a communications link as opposed to storage where the keys have to be retained somehow as long as the owner wants to be able to retrieve the data the right way to do communications security is to generate a random session key with diffie hellman use it for a while and then destroy it once it s gone there s no getting it back and no way to decrypt recordings of the conversation to make sure you aren t being attacked by a man in the middle you have to authenticate your dh exchanges the at t secure phone does this by displaying the dh key so you can compare them verbally over the phone this is nice and simple but it relies on user awareness plus the inability of the man in the middle to duplicate the users voices a better way is to authenticate the exchanges with rsa since you d never use rsa for actual encryption compromising your rsa secret key would only allow someone to impersonate you in a future conversation and even that only until you revoke your public key they would still not be able to decrypt recordings of prior conversations for which the session keys have been destroyed i m convinced that this is how the government s own secure phones the stu iii must work neat eh phil
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the old key registration idea okay let s suppose that the nsa nist mykotronix registered key system becomes standard and i m able to buy such a system from my local radio shack every phone comes with a built in chip and the government has the key to every phone call i go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key what s to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or buying a used phone at a garage sale whooa the secret registered keys just became unsynchronized when the government comes to listen in they only receive gobbledly gook because the secret key registered under my name isn t the right one that leads me to conjecture that the system isn t that secure there are just two master keys that work for all the phones in the country the part about registering your keys is just bogus or the system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks like this criminals will quickly figure this out and go to town in either case i think we need to look at this a bit deeper jbl mw wxld
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes the president has approved a directive on public encryption management the directive provides for the following when exported abroad it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence activities critical to our national interests the attorney general of the united states or her representative shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the u s government developed key escrow microcircuits in their products quite interesting how does the us administration intend to persuade non us governments to let the nsa eavesdrop on them or should u s companies install these chips in communication systems sold abroad without the customer s knowedge or consent or not at all thomas koenig ig rz uni karlsruhe de ig dkauni bitnet the joy of engineering is to find a straight line on a double logarithmic diagram
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re how to detect use of an illegal cipher jay fenton fenton kaleida com writes how can the government tell which encryption method one is using without being able to decode the traffic i e in order to accuse me of using an unauthorized strong encryption technique they would have to take both keys out of escrow run them against my ciphertext and draw a blank i was thinking about this also it s quite possible the system transmits in clear the serial number of the device being used that way they can start a tap get the serial number and use the warrant for the first tap to get the key if they tap someone who s apparently using encryption but don t find that prefix then they ll assume it s an un authorized encryption scheme may the kloo gnomes be generous to you robert crawford betel camelot bradley edu
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more clipper stuff as of yet there has been no description of the general principles behind the clipper proposal for example is this a public key system or a private key system if the latter then i don t see how the system could work given that the keys are tied to the device and not the person further the escrowed bit keys are split into two bit chunks i would guess that the availability of one of these bit chunks and a reasonable key search machine would allow you to read the traffic i m not suggesting that this is a deliberate weakness of the system but it does make you think of course this is easily fixable by giving out two bit chunks which could be x ored to generate the real bit key philip
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes procurement and use of encryption devices the attorney general will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government s ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications further the attorney general shall utilize funds from the department of justice asset forfeiture super surplus fund to effect this purchase talk about adding insult to injury i for one believe that the use of civil forfeiture should be abolished by a decent administration not continued instead it looks like that ill gotten gain will be used to help pay for wiretap equipment disclaimer all opinions expressed are my own of course carl ellison cme sw stratus com stratus computer inc m bkw tel fairbanks boulevard marlborough ma fax
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article c l t gci dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation etc great nice choice of bad guys to convince everyone how bad unrestricted encryption is why not use a child molester instead of course the word suspect is never used here so i guess these people have already been convicted and are operating this drug ring from their jail cells how about this question instead q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a political opponent of a senior administration official and intercepts a conversation kinda changes your interpretation of the event doesn t it and yes the presence of the clipper chip does change things because it will not only give the people talking on the phone a false sense of security it will also give federal law enforcement agencies the justification to deny use of strong encryption methods that are inconvenient to them dang it all it s supposed to be inconvenient but not impossible that s the only sure way to make sure that abuses are minimized while still allowing legitimate law enforcement access q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities uh huh sure i predict that within two months weeks of the chip s debut the full technical details will be posted to sci crypt and if this has any impact on the security of the key escrow system then we ve been lied to any cryptosystem worth its salt can withstand the light of public scrutiny and there is no way you can be sure that an algorithm has no unrecognized vulnerabilities unless you have half the world trying to break it for a decade or so even then you gotta be careful michael t palmer a man is crazy who writes a secret in any m t palmer larc nasa gov other way than one which will conceal it ripem key on server from the vulgar roger bacon
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re re inventing crypto policy an eff statement in article qna tinnf p rodan uu net avg rodan uu net vadim antonov writes i somehow started to doubt technical competence of the people who designed the system why on the earth split the bit key in bit parts to keep them in escrow separately having bit and large volumes of data voice links produce it should be relatively easy to break it when they simply could keep bit sequences in n n independent places and then xor all the partial keys to get the actual key n sequences should obviously be selected randomly and nth is the actual key xor ed with the random sequences without real technical details it s hard to answer this question but suppose they already are xoring the two bit parts to produce only bits of real key material maybe they re using the exportable version of rc phil
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text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article c l a gf dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes here is an article i found today in comp security misc i ll send my reply in a separate post to comp off eff org so thayt you guys can get original text have fun oleg relay version vms news v b vax vms v site nic csu net path nic csu net csus edu netcom com netcomsv decwrl uunet dove csrc ncsl nist gov clipper newsgroups comp security misc from clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement date fri apr gmt sender news dove nist gov distribution na organization national institute of standards technology lines note this file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc ncsl nist gov in directory pub nistnews and via the nist computer security bbs at the white house office of the press secretary for immediate release april statement by the press secretary the president today announced a new initiative that will bring the federal government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement the initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth privacy and law enforcement previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer it is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals a state of the art microcircuit called the clipper chip has been developed by government engineers the chip represents a new approach to encryption technology it can be used in new relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone it scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today this new technology will help companies protect proprietary information protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically at the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals a key escrow system will be established to ensure that the clipper chip is used to protect the privacy of law abiding americans each device containing the chip will have two unique keys numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device when the device is manufactured the two keys will be deposited separately in two key escrow data bases that will be established by the attorney general access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap the clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology the attorney general will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices in addition respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings the chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities in order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches like the key escrow system the president has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates the privacy of our citizens including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data under proper court or other legal order when necessary to protect our citizens the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the national information infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of american industry in the global marketplace and the need of u s companies to manufacture and export high technology products the president has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries the congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed the administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a national information infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give americans unprecedented access to information this infrastructure of high speed networks information superhighways will transmit video images hdtv programming and huge data files as easily as today s telephone system transmits voice since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet the provisions of the president s directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available for additional details call mat heyman national institute of standards and technology questions and answers about the clinton administration s telecommunications initiative q does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations a no clipper chip technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of americans q suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device what would they have to do to decipher the message a they would have to obtain legal authorization normally a court order to do the wiretap in the first place they would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers the key is split into two parts which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system q who will run the key escrow data banks a the two key escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities at this point the department of justice and the administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key escrow data banks q how strong is the security in the device how can i be sure how strong the security is a this system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today while the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities q whose decision was it to propose this product a the national security council the justice department the commerce department and other key agencies were involved in this decision this approach has been endorsed by the president the vice president and appropriate cabinet officials q who was consulted the congress industry a we have on going discussions with congress and industry on encryption issues and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy we have briefed members of congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative q will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers a the government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them q who provides the clipper chip a mykotronx programs it at their facility in torrance california and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers the programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future q how do i buy one of these encryption devices a we expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the clipper chip into their devices q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices a this is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review the key escrow mechanism will provide americans with an encryption product that is more secure more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology which the administration is developing the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques q what does this decision indicate about how the clinton administration s policy toward encryption will differ from that of the bush administration a it indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public interest groups to find innovative ways to protect americans privacy help businesses to compete and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism q will the devices be exportable will other devices that use the government hardware a voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements case by case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices the same is true for other encryption devices one of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to u s companies operating at home and abroad with this in mind we expect export licenses will be granted on a case by case basis for u s companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad we plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products
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how do they know what keys to ask for re clipper this may be a stupid question but how does the government know which keys to ask for will owners be required to register their phones faxes modems etc and inform the government when they are moved to a different phone number will there be penalities if the public does not do this will identification the national health care id perhaps be required when purchasing a clipper equipted phone or will each chip transmit identifying information at the start of a conversation identification which could be used to automatically log who calls whom the phone company keeps records but this information would be accessable by a well placed van near a microwave relay station this raises the question of how the two phones agree on a communications encryption key will it be something that is derived from information exchanged at the start of the conversation and hence derivable by an eavesdropper bear giles bear fsl noaa gov
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption the stragegy of the government is interesting the real fear comes from them doing more than this this is a voluntary program and thus harder for us to object to on the surface their strategy is a business one rather than legal one they are pushing to get a standard in place a secret standard and if they get it as a standard then they will drive competitors out of the market it will be legal to sell better untapable encryption that doesn t have registered keys but it will be difficult and thus not a plan for most phone companies you see with clipper chip phones you ll be able to talk to any cellular company or other phones or ports because they will follow the standard at t has already announced a clipper chip encryption product the government has marketed hard to get major vendors to use these chips if they get enough market share they will rule and thus there will be very little market for systems that can t be tapped by the police the public isn t that concerned about it now after all they freely do calls that anybody with an old tv can listen to today they won t pay big extra bucks for proprietary phones that secure them only from the police well some people will buy these phones but they will only work with other proprietary phones so the market will be small and the phones expensive unless they are made in numbers large enough to sell them cheap only the mob will buy them and this means that the fbi will want to track the customer lists of better encryption phones because the only reason a person would want one is to evade the police interesting brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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re illegal wiretaps was in article uupcb ssr com dick zeitlin acc bbs ssr com dick zeitlin wrote pk perhaps we need the telephony equivalent of an anonymous remailer for the telephone network back in prohibition days alcohol that is i understand a device called the cheesebox was a popular means to thwart the tracing of telephone calls it connected two phone lines in the back room of an otherwise uninvolved business it was the conceptual predecesso of today s anonymous email remailer the old cheesebox was the pre carterphone version of the call diverter after the carterphone decision there were several vendors that sold call diverters i ve got a couple in my basement that were used to redirect my office phone to my home number when i didn t feel like going into the office it d be quite easy to generate an anonymous redialer version of the call diverter about months ago i heard a report on npr about a number sto pper or some such for placing untraceable calls you call them and on bong tone dial the number you want to call they told the npr interviewer that nothing short of a court order which they d fight would make them release their records matt healy i pretend to be a network administrator the lab net pretends to work matt wardsgi med yale edu
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an open letter to mr clinton i m quite astonished shocked and appalled at this serious frontal assault on emerging american freedoms the clinton administration nor any other government agency has any legitimate role whatsoever in regulating cryptography to do so is tantamount to regulating acceptable speech and is blatantly unconstitutional perhaps we should rename this year in honor of such an illustrious proposal let the crappy chip live in infamy and the adminstration receive great shame and discredit for this bizarre misadventure i am outraged that my tax money is being used to develop technology to restrict my freedoms far beyond reasonable measures the u s government will have my full uncooperation and disobedience on any serious threat to my liberties such as this and i call on everyone with an interest in a sensible government to resist and defy this proposal the administration does not seem to understand that they are merely a subservient instrument to implement the will of the public and hence anyone involved in this proposal in this respect is wholly negligent and remiss in performing their lawful duty while encryption technology can help americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information it also can be used by terrorists drug dealers and other criminals it seems to me that u s diplomatic communications should be tappable by the u n whenever any countries produce a warrant to the u n in fact i think we should stop paying the nsa billions of dollars a year to produce unbreakable codes for this reason these actions violate the sovereignity of international law i hope mr clinton is shrewd enough to recognize my sarcasm and satire here but if he isn t it s a modest and reasonable proposal so he should find merit with it nevertheless cryptography is neutral technology if everybody has strong cryptography including policemen bureacrats businessmen housewives thugs and hoodlums we have a sustainable equilibrium anything less is an unworkable anti egaltarian arrangement intrinsically antithetical to american freedoms and guaranteed to collapse under its own weight of inherent impracticality we don t need to compromise on issues of freedom for too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting americans for too long our government has demonstrated itself to be increasingly hostile and a serious obstacle to economic vitality and protecting americans since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure the federal government must act quickly to develop consistent comprehensive policies regarding its use the administration is committed to policies that protect all americans right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law it is not possible for the federal government to act quickly or develop consistent comprehensive policies period and even if by some grandiose miracle such a thing were possible it would only be an efficient way to deprive american citizens of fundamental and inalienable rights the administration has to be committed to leaving private industries alone esp on this issue the government has no legitimate role in regulating the content of communications law enforcement agencies must be prepared to forfeit their surveillance bludgeon they are soon and inevitably to be disarmed of it q if the administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed would the administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices no such laws can be constitutionally sound and this is equivalent to a veiled threat which i don t appreciate this kind of extortion tends to agitate me and others into radicalism i will trade threats for threats and violation for violation the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done if the administration did say this it would find itself impeached for reckless and outrageous disregard of essential established entrenched and explicit constitutional privacy guarantees the administration would have no legal standing whatsoever such an action would be egregiously illegal and criminal and wholly untolerated and disregarded by vast segments of the population nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product the u s comprised of a vast majority of people fanatically committed to preserving their privacy in the face of an increasingly totalitarian government is saying just that take your chips and give them to nsa employees as christmas bonuses we can run any algorithm on our computers we damn well please and we will make any chips we please and we will send any bit pattern over our data highways we please and if you try to stop us you will be gradually or abruptly dissolved into nothingness privacy vs law enforcement there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition this is an outright dingaling denning lie the two aims of privacy and surveillance are intrinsically and fundamentally incompatible and you have to work for the nsa to think otherwise americans are about to discover ways through the use of technology to preserve their inalienable but forgotten freedoms that have slowly been eroded away by an increasingly distant and unresponsive and unrepresentative government ld longs lance colostate edu
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clipper an infringement on intergraph s name besides being an infringement on our civil liberties not the subject in this post the name clipper chip seems very confusable with the clipper chip of intergraph originally designed by a team at fairchild semiconductor clipper was a bit risc microprocessor it is still used in some workstations notably those from intergraph the supplier of cad tools intergraph acquired the clipper product line when fairchild was sold to national semiconductor several years back when i first saw clipper chip in the announcement i immediately thought the article was referring to the clipper chip i know this seems to be grounds for intergraph to sue but then i m not a lawyer i d say i m a cryptologist but i don t want to incriminate myself under the laws of the new regime tim may timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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re patents was rc rc in article bontchev fbihh bontchev fbihh informatik uni hamburg de vesselin bontchev wrote ahaley eoe co uk andrew haley writes coca cola has always understood it coca cola is made under licence in dozens of countries around the world you re crazy if you think pepsico doesn t know the recipe in all those countries coca cola is distributed in a form of concentrate what the local producers simply mix with water and other simple ingredients the trick is to know what is in the concentrate i don t know if this is still true but at one time coca cola took elaborate measures to keep the formula secret for instance several plants in different cities each made one of six partial concentrates which were then shipped back and forth and remixed in a complicated scheme so that no single plant made the whole formula by now i would guess that pepsico s chemists would have reverse engineered it can t be all that exotic actually i prefer pepsi anyhow in about minutes i m gonna put money into a pepsi vending machine matt healy i pretend to be a network administrator the lab net pretends to work matt wardsgi med yale edu
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re the old key registration idea the clipper chip will have no effect current generation pcs portable and desktop all have analog voice digital voice and vice versa capabilities so i only need a modem output to the telephone and i can interpose any encryption screen on my voice traffic i want not even a big deal but it will pass muster if the have a way of checking whether i am using their clipper chip encryption without a full decoding i have been chided for stating that dorthy denning was intellectually dishonest in the acm debate and in this newsgroup i have previously refrained from suggesting that she is arguing on behalf of consulting clients now i say that it is clear that dorthy denning has been functioning as a lobbyist not a computer scientist she has used legal ethics truth is what you can convince anyone of not scientific ethics truth is understanding the external world maybe we can revoke her acm membership lew lew glendenning rlglende netcom com perspective is worth iq points niels bohr or somebody like that
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re how to detect use of an illegal cipher how can the government tell which encryption method one is using without being able to decode the traffic i e in order to accuse me of using an unauthorized strong encryption technique they would have to take both keys out of escrow run them against my ciphertext and draw a blank i was thinking about this also it s quite possible the system transmits in clear the serial number of the device being used that way they can start a tap get the serial number and use the warrant for the first tap to get the key if they tap someone who s apparently using encryption but don t find that prefix then they ll assume it s an un authorized encryption scheme this doesn t handle superencrypted traffic if the clipper doesn t impose any unfortunate performance side effects there s no reason not to use it to superencrypt a stream of triple des encrypted traffic that way your traffic looks normal and perhaps anyone desiring to listen in won t even bother since they know nobody s going to really trust crypto that has classified internals for important stuff mjr
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re pgp pem and rfc s was cryptography patents in c lj t k blaze cs jhu edu eifrig beanworld cs jhu edu jonathan eifrig writes fact it is unlawful to distribute code implementing rsa without a license to do so from pkp whether or not one is charging for it furthermore any use of rsa other than for research purposes allowed under us patent law is similarly unlawful therefore the average citizen cannot use rsa to encrypt message traffic in the us without a license from pkp wrong i don t think even pkp claims this one it is not unlawful to distribute code implementing rsa it appears to be unlawful to use it so i agree with your last sentence fact there are no restrictions yet on the use of cryptography under us law although this is beginning to look like it will change the only impediments to widespread use of rsa cryptography in the us are pkp s patents yes that s correct arthur l rubin a rubin dsg dse beckman com work beckman instruments brea mcimail com compuserve com arthur pnet cts com personal my opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption stupid me i believed the democrats stood for principles of personal privacy while it was the neanderthal republicans that wanted into every aspect of our lives clinton is just more clever than the other guy looks like gun control for privacy technology one small step at a time wait a minute let me think about this hmmm i feel better now i believe the white house when they tell us this first step is in fact the final step all is ok we ve nothing to fear they re here to help us god bless america john hesse a man jhesse netcom com a plan moss beach calif a canal bob
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption brad clarinet com brad templeton writes and this means that the fbi will want to track the customer lists of better encryption phones because the only reason a person would want one is to evade the police then they ll probably also want to start tracking the customer lists of people purchasing soundblaster and similar boards which can be configured with the use of some code and a modem to act as a pretty decent digital encrypting telephone it s expensive though and kind of awkward i don t know any drug lords but i m sure they d favor something tappable over something secure as long as the user interface is nice when you ve got hrh prince of wales saying stupid things over cordless phones it s not hard to imagine that drug dealers child pornographers commies lisp programmers and other threats to the civilized world might transact incriminating business over encrypting cellular phones mjr
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow in article strnlghtc lgfi jqa netcom com strnlght netcom com david sternlight writes though i share many of the concerns expressed by some i find the proposal less threatening than many others since right now most americans have no secure telephony and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a goat can eavesdrop this would also plug up the security hole in cellular and cordless phones oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds you believe that the feds offer the least threat to liberty of anyone and i m sure i do too glad that jerk won t be tapping my phone anymore john hesse a man jhesse netcom com a plan moss beach calif a canal bob
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet security of the key escrow system in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key escrow system yeah but does he intend to prevent the private sector from developing other applications that are equally effective in assuring privacy but do not have a key escrow system
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qmugcinnpu gap caltech edu hal cco caltech edu hal finney writes the key question is whether non clipper encryption will be made illegal the administration is not saying since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement we will prohibit it outright as some countries have effectively done nor is the u s saying that every american as a matter of right is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product there is a false tension created in the assessment that this issue is an either or proposition rather both concerns can be and in fact are harmoniously balanced through a reasoned balanced approach such as is proposed with the clipper chip and similar encryption techniques the clear middle ground implied by these statements is to say that americans have the right to clipper encryption but not to unbreakable encryption this implies that ultimately non clipper strong encryption must become illegal text deleted no value judgement implied it s shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here hal finney hal alumni caltech edu more than shocking what this says to me is no less than that government is very interested in monitoring the public this does more than scare me it mortifies me pgp and ripem must become widespread enough to resist what mr finney has imho correctly identified as the next logical step what was once an academic discussion with regard to concealing cyphertext has now become a real consideration the rhetoric that the clinton administration seems obsessed with harmony either or propositions tension tells me that they know how difficult it will be to sell this proposition the phrase i hear more and more is i can t believe this is actually happening here call me conserative clinton was a huge mistake that we ll all be paying for tommorow and many years from now have we approached the age of speakeasy public key depositiories uni dark uni acs bu edu public keys by finger and or request public key archives at pgp public keys junkbox cc iastate edu sovereignty is the sign of a brutal past
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption brad clarinet com brad templeton writes their strategy is a business one rather than legal one they are pushing to get a standard in place a secret standard and if they get it as a standard then they will drive competitors out of the market it will be legal to sell better untapable encryption that doesn t have registered keys but it will be difficult and thus not a plan for most phone companies if brad s analysis is correct it may offer an explanation for why the encryption algorithm is being kept secret this will prevent competitors from coming out with clipper compatible phones which lack the government installed back door the strategy brad describes will only work as long as the only way to get compatible phones is to have ones with the government chips it would be nice from the point of view of personal privacy if brad turns out to be right as long as people still have the power to provide their own encryption in place of or in addition to the clipper privacy is still possible but the wording of several passages in the announcement makes me doubt whether this will turn out to be true hal finney
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re the old key registration idea in article qn ic hp access digex net pcw access digex com peter wayner writes okay let s suppose that the nsa nist mykotronix registered key system becomes standard and i m able to buy such a system from my local radio shack every phone comes with a built in chip and the government has the key to every phone call i go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key what s to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or buying a used phone at a garage sale whooa the secret registered keys just became unsynchronized when the government comes it s very possible even likely that the serial number of the invididual chip is broadcast either in a standard encrypted format so that all the big brother types need to do is listen to the traffic get a court order generally just by saying that they think you may be a crook and go to it r to listen in they only receive gobbledly gook because the secret key registered under my name isn t the right one that leads me to conjecture that the system isn t that secure there are just two master keys that work for all the phones in the country the part about registering your keys is just bogus or the system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks like this criminals will quickly figure this out and go to town in either case i think we need to look at this a bit deeper jbl mw wxld
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why the algorithm is secret my thoughts on why the algorithm is secret the chip is regretably likely to become a standard there will be many applications where economic factors dictate use of this chip like it or not if the alrogithm is public and the code is as secure absent the access to escrowed keys as represented an enterprising sort would make compatible crypto chips for which no key had been escrowed this is likely what the release was refering to when they refered to the secrecy of the algorithm protecting the security of the escrow system rob boudrie
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issa conference if there is anyone attending the issa conference in arlington va next week i would appreciate them getting in touch with me bruce
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re how do they know what keys to ask for re clipper the actual algorithm is classified however their main thrust here is for cellular phones and encryption is only over the radio end not end to end i think end to end will come later and of course you have to identify yourself to the phone company and since the phone company complies with court orders they will know the magic number of your chip when they sign out a warrant on you and then can present the warrant to the key escrow house brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article qnn b ddc sol tis com mjr tis com marcus j ranum writes when you ve got hrh prince of wales saying stupid things over cordless phones it s not hard to imagine that drug dealers child pornographers commies lisp programmers and other threats to the civilized world might transact incriminating business over encrypting cellular phones let s assume for the moment that the system really is secure unless you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent escrow houses let s say you even trust the escrow houses one is the aclu and the other is the eff and i m not entirely joking about those two names in that case the prince of wales has nothing to worry about on this system indeed as pointed out since the current systems even the current digital systems are very easy to decode right now anybody with an old tv can hear them for most people this will be viewed as an oh goody step upwards and look at how tolerant the public is they re willing to let the neighbours with the radios hear right now it was suggested by one person that a lot of non evidentiary wiretapping is going on right now without warrants because anybody can do it and it s just an ecpa violation this would stop that all tapping would need a warrant or a breach of security at the escrow houses brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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once tapped your code is no good any more it occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you and the escrow houses release your code to the cops your code is now no longer secure it s in the hands of cops and while i am sure most of the time they are good their security will not be as good as the escrow houses what this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you at the end of the wiretap they should be obligated to inform you that a tap was performed and replace for free the clipper chip in your cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the escrow houses do the police normally reveal every tap they do even if no charges are laid in many ways it would be a positive step if they had to judges set time limits on warrants i assume at the end of the time limit they should have to renew or replace your chip that s if we go with this scheme which i am not sure i agree with brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow jhesse netcom com john hesse writes oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds hey it s better than the status quo i am far less worried about the feds tapping my phone than high school scanner surfers who get their kicks out of eavesdropping on cellular and cordless phone calls it would be stupid to rely on even a clipperized channel for truly sensitive material but it does seem to finally offer a reasonable way to guard against casual eavesdropping for example even with my strong right to bear arms view of the private right to possess and use strong cryptosystems the system as described provides enough security that i would actually buy a cordless phone and would be much less wary of using cellular phones walkie talkies and so on as long as it s only used for mass market voice scrambling i actually don t see a problem with it if you want more security than it offers use something different use pkcs for electronic mail celp over des or triple des with diffie hellman key exchange for your voice traffic or whatever and yes i d rather just see all crypto restrictions lifted but this is at least an incrememental improvement for certain applications amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip in article bu edu uni acs bu edu shaen bernhardt writes more than shocking what this says to me is no less than that government is very interested in monitoring the public this does more than scare me it mortifies me if this is any surprise to you i m shocked amanda walker intercon systems corporation
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cryptography faq overview archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part overview this is the first of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read this part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part disclaimer this document is the product of the crypt cabal a secret society which serves the national secu uh no seriously we re the good guys and we ve done what we can to ensure the completeness and accuracy of this document but in a field of military and commercial importance like cryptography you have to expect that some people and organizations consider their interests more important than open scientific discussion trust only what you can verify firsthand and don t sue us many people have contributed to this faq in alphabetical order eric bach steve bellovin dan bernstein nelson bolyard carl ellison jim gillogly mike gleason doug gwyn luke o connor tony patti william setzer we apologize for any omissions if you have suggestions comments or criticism please let the current editors know by sending e mail to crypt comments math ncsu edu we don t assume that this faq is at all complete at this point archives sci crypt has been archived since october on cl next cl msu edu though these archives are available only to u s and canadian users please contact crypt comments math ncsu edu if you know of other archives the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days table of contents overview net etiquette what groups are around what s a faq who am i why am i here do political discussions belong in sci crypt how do i present a new encryption scheme in sci crypt basic cryptology what is cryptology cryptography plaintext ciphertext encryption key what references can i start with to learn cryptology how does one go about cryptanalysis what is a brute force search and what is its cryptographic relevance what are some properties satisfied by every strong cryptosystem if a cryptosystem is theoretically unbreakable then is it guaranteed analysis proof in practice why are many people still using cryptosystems that are relatively easy to break mathematical cryptology in mathematical terms what is a private key cryptosystem what is an attack what s the advantage of formulating all this mathematically why is the one time pad secure what s a ciphertext only attack what s a known plaintext attack what s a chosen plaintext attack in mathematical terms what can you say about brute force attacks what s a key guessing attack what s entropy product ciphers what is a product cipher what makes a product cipher secure what are some group theoretic properties of product ciphers what can be proven about the security of a product cipher how are block ciphers used to encrypt data longer than the block size can symmetric block ciphers be used for message authentication what exactly is des what is triple des what is differential cryptanalysis how was nsa involved in the design of des is des available in software is des available in hardware can des be used to protect classified information what are ecb cbc cfb and ofb encryption public key cryptography what is public key cryptography what s rsa is rsa secure how fast can people factor numbers what about other public key cryptosystems digital signatures and hash functions what is a one way hash function what is the difference between public private secret shared etc what are md and md what is snefru technical miscellany how do i recover from lost passwords in wordperfect how do i break a vigenere repeated key cipher how do i send encrypted mail under unix pgp ripem pem is the unix crypt command secure how do i use compression with encryption is there an unbreakable cipher what does random mean in cryptography what is the unicity point a k a unicity distance what is key management and why is it important can i use pseudo random or chaotic numbers as a key stream what is the correct frequency list for english letters what is the enigma how do i shuffle cards can i foil s w pirates by encrypting my cd rom can you do automatic cryptanalysis of simple ciphers what is the coding system used by vcr other miscellany what is the national security agency nsa what are the us export regulations what is tempest what are the beale ciphers and are they a hoax what is the american cryptogram association and how do i get in touch is rsa patented what about the voynich manuscript references books on history and classical methods books on modern methods survey articles reference articles journals conference proceedings other how may one obtain copies of fips and ansi standards cited herein electronic sources rfcs available from ftprf related newsgroups
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cryptography faq mathematical cryptology archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part mathematical cryptology this is the fourth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents in mathematical terms what is a private key cryptosystem what is an attack what s the advantage of formulating all this mathematically why is the one time pad secure what s a ciphertext only attack what s a known plaintext attack what s a chosen plaintext attack in mathematical terms what can you say about brute force attacks what s a key guessing attack what s entropy in mathematical terms what is a private key cryptosystem a private key cryptosystem consists of an encryption system e and a decryption system d the encryption system e is a collection of functions e k indexed by keys k mapping some set of plaintexts p to some set of ciphertexts c similarly the decryption system d is a collection of functions d k such that d k e k p p for every plaintext p that is succesful decryption of ciphertext into plaintext is accomplished using the same key index as was used for the corresponding encryption of plaintext into ciphertext such systems wherein the same key value is used to encrypt and decrypt are also known as symmetric cryptoystems what is an attack in intuitive terms a passive attack on a cryptosystem is any method of starting with some information about plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts under some unknown key and figuring out more information about the plaintexts it s possible to state mathematically what this means here we go fix functions f g and h of n variables fix an encryption system e and fix a distribution of plaintexts and keys an attack on e using g assuming f giving h with probability p is an algorithm a with a pair f g of inputs and one output h such that there is probability p of computing h h p p n if we have f f p p n and g g e k p e k p n note that this probability depends on the distribution of the vector k p p n the attack is trivial or pointless if there is probability at least p of computing h h p p n if f f p p n and g g c c n here c c n range uniformly over the possible ciphertexts and have no particular relation to p p n in other words an attack is trivial if it doesn t actually use the encryptions e k p e k p n an attack is called one ciphertext if n two ciphertext if n and so on what s the advantage of formulating all this mathematically in basic cryptology you can never prove that a cryptosystem is secure read part we keep saying a strong cryptosystem must have this property but having this property is no guarantee that a cryptosystem is strong in contrast the purpose of mathematical cryptology is to precisely formulate and if possible prove the statement that a cryptosystem is strong we say for example that a cryptosystem is secure against all passive attacks if any nontrivial attack against the system as defined above is too slow to be practical if we can prove this statement then we have confidence that our cryptosystem will resist any passive cryptanalytic technique if we can reduce this statement to some well known unsolved problem then we still have confidence that the cryptosystem isn t easy to break other parts of cryptology are also amenable to mathematical definition again the point is to explicitly identify what assumptions we re making and prove that they produce the desired results we can figure out what it means for a particular cryptosystem to be used properly it just means that the assumptions are valid the same methodology is useful for cryptanalysis too the cryptanalyst can take advantage of incorrect assumptions often he can try to construct a proof of security for a system see where the proof fails and use these failures as the starting points for his analysis why is the one time pad secure by definition the one time pad is a cryptosystem where the plaintexts ciphertexts and keys are all strings say byte strings of some length m and e k p is just the sum let s say the exclusive or of k and p it is easy to prove mathematically that there are no nontrivial single ciphertext attacks on the one time pad assuming a uniform distribution of keys note that we don t have to assume a uniform distribution of plaintexts here s the proof let a be an attack i e an algorithm taking two inputs f g and producing one output h with some probability p that h h p whenever f f p and g g e k p i e g g k p then because the distribution of k is uniform and independent of p the distribution of k p must also be uniform and independent of p but also the distribution of c is uniform and independent of p hence there is probability exactly p that h h p whenever f f p and g g c over all p and c thus a fortiori a is trivial on the other hand the one time pad is not secure if a key k is used for more than one plaintext i e there are nontrivial multiple ciphertext attacks so to be properly used a key k must be thrown away after one encryption the key is also called a pad this explains the name one time pad what s a ciphertext only attack in the notation above a ciphertext only attack is one where f is constant given only some information g e k p e k p n about n ciphertexts the attack has to have some chance of producing some information h p p n about the plaintexts the attack is trivial if it has just as good a chance of producing h p p n when given g c c n for random c c n for example say g c c and say h p is the first bit of p we can easily write down an attack the guessing attack which simply guesses that h p is this attack is trivial because it doesn t use the ciphertext it has a fifty fifty chance of guessing correctly no matter what on the other hand there is an attack on rsa which produces one bit of information about p with success using c if it is fed a random c then the success rate drops to so this is a nontrivial attack what s a known plaintext attack the classic known plaintext attack has f p p p g c c c c and h p p depending only on p in other words given two ciphertexts c and c and one decryption p the known plaintext attack should produce information about the other decryption p note that known plaintext attacks are often defined in the literature as producing information about the key but this is pointless the cryptanalyst generally cares about the key only insofar as it lets him decrypt further messages what s a chosen plaintext attack a chosen plaintext attack is the first of an increasingly impractical series of active attacks on a cryptosystem attacks where the cryptanalyst feeds data to the encryptor these attacks don t fit into our model of passive attacks explained above anyway a chosen plaintext attack lets the cryptanalyst choose a plaintext and look at the corresponding ciphertext then repeat until he has figured out how to decrypt any message more absurd examples of this sort of attack are the chosen key attack and chosen system attack a much more important form of active attack is a message corruption attack where the attacker tries to change the ciphertext in such a way as to make a useful change in the plaintext there are many easy ways to throw kinks into all of these attacks for instance automatically encrypting any plaintext p as t e k h t r p r p where t is a time key sequence number chosen anew for each message r is a random number and h is a one way hash function here comma means concatenation and plus means exclusive or in mathematical terms what can you say about brute force attacks consider the following known plaintext attack we are given some plaintexts p p n and ciphertexts c c n we re also given a ciphertext c n we run through every key k when we find k such that e k p i c i for every i n we print d k c n if n is big enough that only one key works this attack will succeed on valid inputs all the time while it will produce correct results only once in a blue moon for random inputs thus this is a nontrivial attack its only problem is that it is very slow if there are many possible keys what s a key guessing attack what s entropy say somebody is using the one time pad but isn t choosing keys randomly and uniformly from all m bit messages as he was supposed to for our security proof in fact say he s known to prefer keys which are english words then a cryptanalyst can run through all english words as possible keys this attack will often succeed and it s much faster than a brute force search of the entire keyspace we can measure how bad a key distribution is by calculating its entropy this number e is the number of real bits of information of the key a cryptanalyst will typically happen across the key within e guesses e is defined as the sum of p k log p k where p k is the probability of key k
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cryptography faq technical miscellany archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part technical miscellany this is the eighth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents how do i recover from lost passwords in wordperfect how do i break a vigenere repeated key cipher how do i send encrypted mail under unix pgp ripem pem is the unix crypt command secure how do i use compression with encryption is there an unbreakable cipher what does random mean in cryptography what is the unicity point a k a unicity distance what is key management and why is it important can i use pseudo random or chaotic numbers as a key stream what is the correct frequency list for english letters what is the enigma how do i shuffle cards can i foil s w pirates by encrypting my cd rom can you do automatic cryptanalysis of simple ciphers what is the coding system used by vcr how do i recover from lost passwords in wordperfect wordperfect encryption has been shown to be very easy to break the method uses xor with two repeating key streams a typed password and a byte wide counter initialized to the password length full descriptions are given in bennett ben and bergen and caelli ber chris galas writes someone awhile back was looking for a way to decrypt wordperfect document files and i think i have a solution there is a software company named accessdata east south orem ut that has a software package that will decrypt any wordperfect lotus quatro pro ms excel and paradox files the cost of the package is steep prices but if you think your pw key is less than characters or char give them a call and ask for the free demo disk the demo disk will decrypt files that have a char or less pw key how do i break a vigenere repeated key cipher a repeated key cipher where the ciphertext is something like the plaintext xor keykeykeykey and so on is called a vigenere cipher if the key is not too long and the plaintext is in english do the following discover the length of the key by counting coincidences see gaines gai sinkov sin trying each displacement of the ciphertext against itself count those bytes which are equal if the two ciphertext portions have used the same key something over of the bytes will be equal if they have used different key then less than will be equal assuming random bit bytes of key covering normal ascii text the smallest displacement which indicates an equal key is the length of the repeated key shift the text by that length and xor it with itself this removes the key and leaves you with text xored with itself since english has about bit of real information per byte streams of text xored together has bits of info per bit byte providing plenty of redundancy for choosing a unique decryption and in fact one stream of text xored with itself has just bit per byte if the key is short it might be even easier to treat this as a standard polyalphabetic substitution all the old cryptanalysis texts show how to break those it s possible with those methods in the hands of an expert if there s only ten times as much text as key see for example gaines gai sinkov sin how do i send encrypted mail under unix pgp ripem pem here s one popular method using the des command cat file compress des private key uuencode mail meanwhile there is a de jure internet standard in the works called pem privacy enhanced mail it is described in rfcs through to join the pem mailing list contact pem dev request tis com there is a beta version of pem being tested at the time of this writing there are also two programs available in the public domain for encrypting mail pgp and ripem both are available by ftp each has its own newsgroup alt security pgp and alt security ripem each has its own faq as well pgp is most commonly used outside the usa since it uses the rsa algorithm without a license and rsa s patent is valid only or at least primarily in the usa ripem is most commonly used inside the usa since it uses the rsaref which is freely available within the usa but not available for shipment outside the usa since both programs use a secret key algorithm for encrypting the body of the message pgp used idea ripem uses des and rsa for encrypting the message key they should be able to interoperate freely although there have been repeated calls for each to understand the other s formats and algorithm choices no interoperation is available at this time as far as we know is the unix crypt command secure no see ree there is a program available called cbw crypt breaker s workbench which can be used to do ciphertext only attacks on files encrypted with crypt one source for cbw is ftpcb how do i use compression with encryption a number of people have proposed doing perfect compression followed by some simple encryption method e g xor with a repeated key unfortunately you can only compress perfectly if you know the exact distribution of possible inputs for all practical purposes it s impossible to describe the typical english text beyond coarse characteristics such as single letter frequencies you can build up more and more sophisticated models of your inputs but if the enemy has a slightly more accurate model he ll be able to find some redundancy in your compressed output note that nearly all practical compression schemes unless they have been designed with cryptography in mind produce output that actually starts off with high redundancy for example the output of unix compress begins with a well known three byte magic number that can serve as an entering wedge for cryptanalysis this is not to say that compression before encryption is inherently a bad idea it just has to be done very very carefully and by no means removes the need for strong encryption compression after encryption is silly is there an unbreakable cipher yes the one time pad is unbreakable see part unfortunately the one time pad requires secure distribution of as much key material as plaintext of course a cryptosystem need not be utterly unbreakable to be useful rather it needs to be strong enough to resist attacks by likely enemies for whatever length of time the data it protects is expected to remain valid what does random mean in cryptography cryptographic applications demand much more out of a pseudorandom number generator than most applications for a source of bits to be cryptographically random it must be computationally impossible to predict what the nth random bit will be given complete knowledge of the algorithm or hardware generating the stream and the sequence of th through n st bits for all n up to the lifetime of the source a software generator also known as pseudo random has the function of expanding a truly random seed to a longer string of apparently random bits this seed must be large enough not to be guessed by the opponent ideally it should also be truly random perhaps generated by a hardware random number source those who have sparcstation workstations could for example generate random numbers using the audio input device as a source of entropy by not connecting anything to it for example cat dev audio compress foo gives a file of high entropy not random but with much randomness in it one can then encrypt that file using part of itself as a key for example to convert that seed entropy into a pseudo random string when looking for hardware devices to provide this entropy it is important really to measure the entropy rather than just assume that because it looks complicated to a human it must be random for example disk operation completion times sound like they might be unpredictable to many people but a spinning disk is much like a clock and its output completion times are relatively low in entropy what is the unicity point a k a unicity distance see sha the unicity distance is an approximation to that amount of ciphertext such that the sum of the real information entropy in the corresponding source text and encryption key equals the number of ciphertext bits used ciphertexts significantly longer than this can be shown probably to have a unique decipherment this is used to back up a claim of the validity of a ciphertext only cryptanalysis ciphertexts significantly shorter than this are likely to have multiple equally valid decryptions and therefore to gain security from the opponent s difficulty choosing the correct one unicity distance like all statistical or information theoretic measures does not make deterministic predictions but rather gives probabilistic results namely the minimum amount of ciphertext for which it is likely that there is only a single intelligible plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext when all possible keys are tried for the decryption working cryptologists don t normally deal with unicity distance as such instead they directly determine the likelihood of events of interest let the unicity distance of a cipher be d characters if fewer than d ciphertext characters have been intercepted then there is not enough information to distinguish the real key from a set of possible keys des has a unicity distance of characters which is less than ciphertext blocks each block corresponds to ascii characters this may seem alarmingly low at first but the unicity distance gives no indication of the computational work required to find the key after approximately d characters have been intercepted in fact actual cryptanalysis seldom proceeds along the lines used in discussing unicity distance like other measures such as key size unicity distance is something that guarantees insecurity if it s too small but doesn t guarantee security if it s high few practical cryptosystems are absolutely impervious to analysis all manner of characteristics might serve as entering wedges to crack some cipher messages however similar information theoretic considerations are occasionally useful for example to determine a recommended key change interval for a particular cryptosystem cryptanalysts also employ a variety of statistical and information theoretic tests to help guide the analysis in the most promising directions unfortunately most literature on the application of information statistics to cryptanalysis remains classified even the seminal work of alan turing see koz for some insight into the possibilities see kul and goo what is key management and why is it important one of the fundamental axioms of cryptography is that the enemy is in full possession of the details of the general cryptographic system and lacks only the specific key data employed in the encryption of course one would assume that the cia does not make a habit of telling mossad about its cryptosystems but mossad probably finds out anyway repeated use of a finite amount of key provides redundancy that can eventually facilitate cryptanalytic progress thus especially in modern communication systems where vast amounts of information are transferred both parties must have not only a sound cryptosystem but also enough key material to cover the traffic key management refers to the distribution authentication and handling of keys a publicly accessible example of modern key management technology is the stu iii secure telephone unit which for classified use employs individual coded crypto ignition keys and a central key management center operated by nsa there is a hierarchy in that certain ciks are used by authorized cryptographic control personnel to validate the issuance of individual traffic keys and to perform installation maintenance functions such as the reporting of lost ciks this should give an inkling of the extent of the key management problem for public key systems there are several related issues many having to do with whom do you trust can i use pseudo random or chaotic numbers as a key stream chaotic equations and fractals produce an apparent randomness from relatively compact generators perhaps the simplest example is a linear congruential sequence one of the most popular types of random number generators where there is no obvious dependence between seeds and outputs unfortunately the graph of any such sequence will in a high enough dimension show up as a regular lattice mathematically this lattice corresponds to structure which is notoriously easy for cryptanalysts to exploit more complicated generators have more complicated structure which is why they make interesting pictures but a cryptographically strong sequence will have no computable structure at all see knu exercise ree and boy what is the correct frequency list for english letters there are three answers to this question each slightly deeper than the one before you can find the first answer in various books namely a frequency list computed directly from a certain sample of english text of course any such list will be correctly computed but exactly which list you get depends on which sample was taken the second answer is that the question doesn t make sense what do you mean by english letters the english language is not a fixed finite closed object that can be exactly characterized it has changed over time it is different between different authors any particular message will have different statistics from those of the language as a whole the third answer is that yes no particular message is going to have exactly the same characteristics as english in general but for all reasonable statistical uses these slight discrepancies won t matter in fact there s an entire field called bayesian statistics other buzzwords are maximum entropy methods and maximum likelihood estimation which studies questions like what s the chance that a text with these letter frequencies is in english and comes up with reasonably robust answers so make your own list from your own samples of english text it will be good enough for practical work if you use it properly what is the enigma for a project in data security we are looking for sources of information about the german enigma code and how it was broken by the british during wwii see wel dea koz hod kah how do i shuffle cards card shuffling is a special case of the permutation of an array of values using a random or pseudo random function all possible output permutations of this process should be equally likely to do this you need a random function modran x which will produce a uniformly distributed random integer in the interval x given that function you can shuffle with the following c code assuming arrlth is the length of array arr and swap interchanges values at the two addresses given for n arrlth n n swap arr modran n arr n modran x can not be achieved exactly with a simple ranno x since ranno s interval may not be divisible by x although in most cases the error will be very small to cover this case one can take ranno s modulus mod x call that number y and if ranno returns a value less than y go back and get another ranno value can i foil s w pirates by encrypting my cd rom someone will frequently express the desire to publish a cd rom with possibly multiple pieces of software perhaps with each encrypted separately and will want to use different keys for each user perhaps even good for only a limited period of time in order to avoid piracy as far as we know this is impossible since there is nothing in standard pc or workstation hardware which uniquely identifies the user at the keyboard if there were such an identification then the cd rom could be encrypted with a key based in part on the one sold to the user and in part on the unique identifier however in this case the cd rom is one of a kind and that defeats the intended purpose if the cd rom is to be encrypted once and then mass produced there must be a key or set of keys for that encryption produced at some stage in the process that key is useable with any copy of the cd rom s data the pirate needs only to isolate that key and sell it along with the illegal copy can you do automatic cryptanalysis of simple ciphers schneier chinet chi il us bruce schneier says accessdata of orem utah sells products that break the password scheme of a number of popular macintosh and pc software packages their telephone number is no pd software has been cited but there are many papers on the subject peleg s and rosenfeld a breaking substitution ciphers using a relaxation algorithm comm acm vol pp nov lucks michael a constraint satisfaction algorithm for the automated decryption of simple substitution ciphers advances in cryptology crypto springer lecture notes in computer science vol the paper also contains references to earlier work on the subject john carrol and steve martin the automated cryptanalysis of substitution ciphers cryptologia vol x number oct p john carrol and lynda robbins automated cryptanalysis of polyalphabetic ciphers cryptologia vol xi number oct p martin kochanski a survey of data insecurity packages cryptologia vol xi number jan p martin kochanski another data insecurity package cryptologia vol xii number july p cryptologia vol xiii number pp king and bahler probabilistic relaxation in the cryptanalysis of simple substitution ciphers cryptologia king and bahler an algorithmic solution of sequential homophonic ciphers cryptologia april in press r spillman et al use of genetic algorithms in cryptanalysis of simple substitution ciphers cryptologia vol xvii number jan p what is the coding system used by vcr one very frequently asked question in sci crypt is about how the vcr codes work the following article attempts to describe it k shirriff c welch a kinsman decoding a vcr controller code cryptologia july pp
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cryptography faq references archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part references this is the tenth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in this part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents books on history and classical methods books on modern methods survey articles reference articles journals conference proceedings other electronic sources rfcs available from ftprf related newsgroups books on history and classical methods cf lambros d callimahos william f friedman military cryptanalytics aegean park press dea cipher a deavours louis kruh machine cryptography and modern cryptanalysis artech house washington st dedham ma frie william f friedman solving german codes in world war i aegean park press gai h gaines cryptanalysis a study of ciphers and their solution dover publications hin f h hinsley et al british intelligence in the second world war cambridge university press vol s a b so far xxx years and authors fix xxx hod andrew hodges alan turing the enigma burnett books ltd kah david kahn seizing the enigma houghton mifflin kah d kahn the codebreakers macmillan publishing history the abridged paperback edition left out most technical details the original hardcover edition is recommended koz w kozaczuk enigma university publications of america kul s kullback statistical methods in cryptanalysis aegean park press sin a sinkov elementary cryptanalysis math assoc am wel gordon welchman the hut six story mcgraw hill yardl herbert o yardley the american black chamber aegean park press books on modern methods bek h beker f piper cipher systems wiley bra g brassard modern cryptology a tutorial spinger verlag den d denning cryptography and data security addison wesley publishing company kob n koblitz a course in number theory and cryptography springer verlag kon a konheim cryptography a primer wiley mey c meyer and s matyas cryptography a new dimension in computer security wiley pat wayne patterson mathematical cryptology for computer scientists and mathematicians rowman littlefield pfl c pfleeger security in computing prentice hall pri w price d davies security for computer networks wiley rue r rueppel design and analysis of stream ciphers springer verlag sal a saloma public key cryptography springer verlag wel d welsh codes and cryptography claredon press survey articles ang d angluin d lichtenstein provable security in crypto systems a survey yale university department of computer science bet t beth algorithm engineering for public key algorithms ieee selected areas of communication dav m davio j goethals elements of cryptology in secure digital communications g longo ed dif w diffie m hellman privacy and authentication an introduction to cryptography ieee proceedings dif w diffie the first ten years of public key cryptography ieee proceedings fei h feistel cryptography and computer privacy scientific american fei h feistel h w notz j lynn smith some cryptographic techniques for machine to machine data communications ieee ieee proceedings hel m hellman the mathematics of public key cryptography scientific american lak s lakshmivarahan algorithms for public key cryptosystems in advances in computers m yovtis ed academic press lem a lempel cryptology in transition computing surveys mas j massey an introduction to contemporary cryptology ieee proceedings sim g simmons ed contemporary cryptology the science of information integrity ieee press reference articles and d andelman j reeds on the cryptanalysis of rotor and substitution permutation networks ieee trans on inform theory ben john bennett analysis of the encryption algorithm used in the wordperfect word processing program cryptologia ber h a bergen and w j caelli file security in wordperfect cryptologia january bih e biham and a shamir differential cryptanalysis of des like cryptosystems journal of cryptology vol bi a e biham a shamir differential cryptanalysis of snefru khafre redoc ii loki and lucifer in proceedings of crypto ed by j feigenbaum boy j boyar inferring sequences produced by pseudo random number generators journal of the acm bri e brickell j moore m purtill structure in the s boxes of des in proceedings of crypto a m odlyzko ed bro l brown a proposed design for an extended des computer security in the computer age elsevier science publishers b v north holland ifip w j caelli ed bro l brown j pieprzyk j seberry loki a cryptographic primitive for authentication and secrecy applications in proceedings of austcrypt cae h gustafson e dawson w caelli comparison of block ciphers in proceedings of auscrypt j seberry and j piepryzk eds cam k w campbell m j wiener proof the des is not a group in proceedings of crypto ell carl m ellison a solution of the hebern messages cryptologia vol xii jul eve s even o goldreich des like functions can generate the alternating group ieee trans on inform theory vol gar g garon r outerbridge des watch an examination of the sufficiency of the data encryption standard for financial institutions in the s cryptologia vol xv gil gillogly cryptologia gm shafi goldwasser silvio micali probabilistic encryption and how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information proceedings of the fourteenth annual acm symposium on theory of computing hum d g n hunter and a r mckenzie experiments with relaxation algorithms for breaking simple substitution ciphers computer journal kam j kam g davida a structured design of substitution permutation encryption networks ieee trans information theory kin p kinnucan data encryption gurus tuchman and meyer cryptologia vol ii xxx kru kruh cryptologia lai x lai j massey a proposal for a new block encryption standard eurocrypt lub c rackoff m luby how to construct psuedorandom permutations from psuedorandom functions siam journal of computing vol mas j massey an introduction to contemporary cryptology ieee proceedings me a r merkle fast software encryption functions in proceedings of crypto menezes and vanstone ed mey c meyer ciphertext plaintext and ciphertext key dependence vs number of rounds for the data encryption standard afips conference proceedings nbs data encryption standard national bureau of standards fips pub washington dc january ree j reeds cracking a random number generator cryptologia ree j a reeds and p j weinberger file security and the unix crypt command at t bell laboratories technical journal vol part october sha c shannon communication theory of secrecy systems bell system technical journal she b kaliski r rivest a sherman is the data encryption standard a group journal of cryptology vol shi a shimizu s miyaguchi fast data encipherment algorithm feal eurocrypt sor a sorkin lucifer a cryptographic algorithm cryptologia journals conference proceedings crypto eurocrypt ieee transactions on information theory cryptologia a cryptology journal quarterly since jan cryptologia rose hulman institute of technology terre haute indiana general systems analysis history journal of cryptology international association for cryptologic research published by springer verlag quarterly since the cryptogram journal of the american cryptogram association west hickory street mundelein il primarily puzzle cryptograms of various sorts cryptosystems journal published by tony patti p o box newtown pa usa or tony s patti cup portal com publisher s comment includes complete cryptosystems with source and executable programs on diskettes tutorial the typical cryptosystems supports multi megabit keys and galois field arithmetic inexpensive hardware random number generator details computer and communication security reviews published by ross anderson sample issue available from various ftp sites including black ox ac uk editorial c o rja cl cam ac uk publisher s comment we review all the conference proceedings in this field including not just crypto and eurocrypt but regional gatherings like auscrypt and chinacrypt we also abstract over journals and cover computer security as well as cryptology so readers can see the research trends in applications as well as theory other address of note aegean park press p o box laguna hills ca answering machine at the orange book is dod std published december as part of the rainbow book series write to department of defense national security agency attn s savage road fort meade md and ask for the trusted computer system evaluation criteria or call bamfd bamford the puzzle palace penguin books goo i j good good thinking the foundations of probability and its applications university of minnesota press knu d e knuth the art of computer programming volume seminumerical algorithms addison wesley kul soloman kullbach information theory and statistics dover yao a yao computational information theory in complexity in information theory ed by abu mostafa how may one obtain copies of fips and ansi standards cited herein many textbooks on cryptography contain complete reprints of the fips standards which are not copyrighted the following standards may be ordered from the u s department of commerce national technical information service springfield va fips pub data encryption standard this is des fips pub guidelines for implementing as using the nbs des fips pub des modes of operation fips pub computer data authentication using des the following standards may be ordered from the american national standards institute sales office broadway new york ny phone ansi x data encryption algorithm identical to fips ansi x dea modes of operation identical to fips notes figure in fips pub is in error but figure in x is correct the text is correct in both publications electronic sources anonymous ftp ftpbk ftp uu net bsd sources usr bin des ftpcb ftp uu net usenet comp sources unix volume cbw ftpdf ftp funet fi pub unix security destoo tar z ftpey ftp psy uq oz au pub des ftpmd rsa com ftpmr cl next cl msu edu pub crypt newdes tar z ftpob ftp com com orange book ftppf prep ai mit edu pub lpf ftppk ucsd edu hamradio packet tcpip crypto des tar z ftprf nic merit edu documents rfc ftpsf beta xerox com pub hash ftpso chalmers se pub des des tar z ftpuf ftp uu net usenet comp sources unix volume ufc crypt ftpwp garbo uwasa fi pc util wppass zip rfcs available from ftprf kaliski b privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part iv key certification and related services february p format txt bytes balenson d privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part iii algorithms modes and identifiers february p format txt bytes obsoletes rfc kent s privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part ii certificate based key management february p format txt bytes obsoletes rfc linn j privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail part i message encryption and authentication procedures february p format txt bytes obsoletes rfc related newsgroups there are other newsgroups which a sci crypt reader might want also to read some have their own faq as well alt comp compression discussion of compression algorithms and code alt security general security discussions alt security index index to alt security alt security pgp discussion of pgp alt security ripem discussion of ripem alt society civil liberty general civil liberties including privacy comp org eff news news reports from eff comp org eff talk discussion of eff related issues comp patents discussion of s w patents including rsa comp risks some mention of crypto and wiretapping comp society privacy general privacy issues comp security announce announcements of security holes misc legal computing sci math general math discussion
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bob putz cain was pgp and other bs in article apr natasha portal com bob natasha portal com bob cain writes charles kincy ckincy cs umr edu wrote in article apr natasha portal com bob natasha portal com bob cain writes oh i see flame someone tell them that they are immature tell them they are wrong and then don t offer any proof for your assertions you really are a putz put up or shut up i will provide any proof you wish in private name it dickhead don t bother c j t k blaze cs jhu edu has pretty much made your pathetic ass superfluous you lose pack up your bags and go home putz cain well if the shoe fits cpk
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cryptography faq basic cryptology archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part basic cryptology this is the third of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what is cryptology cryptography plaintext ciphertext encryption key what references can i start with to learn cryptology how does one go about cryptanalysis what is a brute force search and what is its cryptographic relevance what are some properties satisfied by every strong cryptosystem if a cryptosystem is theoretically unbreakable then is it guaranteed analysis proof in practice why are many people still using cryptosystems that are relatively easy to break what is cryptology cryptography plaintext ciphertext encryption key the story begins when julius caesar sent messages to his trusted acquaintances he didn t trust the messengers so he replaced every a by a c every b by a d and so on through the alphabet only someone who knew the shift by rule could decipher his messages a cryptosystem or cipher system is a method of disguising messages so that only certain people can see through the disguise cryptography is the art of creating and using cryptosystems cryptanalysis is the art of breaking cryptosystems seeing through the disguise even when you re not supposed to be able to cryptology is the study of both cryptography and cryptanalysis the original message is called a plaintext the disguised message is called a ciphertext encryption means any procedure to convert plaintext into ciphertext decryption means any procedure to convert ciphertext into plaintext a cryptosystem is usually a whole collection of algorithms the algorithms are labelled the labels are called keys for instance caesar probably used shift by n encryption for several different values of n it s natural to say that n is the key here the people who are supposed to be able to see through the disguise are called recipients other people are enemies opponents interlopers eavesdroppers or third parties what references can i start with to learn cryptology for an introduction to technical matter the survey articles given in part are the best place to begin as they are in general concise authored by competent people and well written however these articles are mostly concerned with cryptology as it has developed in the last years or so and are more abstract and mathematical than historical the codebreakers by kahn kah is encyclopedic in its history and technical detail of cryptology up to the mid s introductory cryptanalysis can be learned from gaines gai or sinkov sin this is recommended especially for people who want to devise their own encryption algorithms since it is a common mistake to try to make a system before knowing how to break one the selection of an algorithm for the des drew the attention of many public researchers to problems in cryptology consequently several textbooks and books to serve as texts have appeared the book of denning den gives a good introduction to a broad range of security including encryption algorithms database security access control and formal models of security similar comments apply to the books of price davies pri and pfleeger pfl the books of konheim kon and meyer matyas mey are quite technical books both konheim and meyer were directly involved in the development of des and both books give a thorough analysis of des konheim s book is quite mathematical with detailed analyses of many classical cryptosystems meyer and matyas concentrate on modern cryptographic methods especially pertaining to key management and the integration of security facilities into computer systems and networks the books of rueppel rue and koblitz kob concentrate on the application of number theory and algebra to cryptography how does one go about cryptanalysis classical cryptanalysis involves an interesting combination of analytical reasoning application of mathematical tools pattern finding patience determination and luck the best available textbooks on the subject are the military cryptanalytics series frie it is clear that proficiency in cryptanalysis is for the most part gained through the attempted solution of given systems such experience is considered so valuable that some of the cryptanalyses performed during wwii by the allies are still classified modern public key cryptanalysis may consist of factoring an integer or taking a discrete logarithm these are not the traditional fare of the cryptanalyst computational number theorists are some of the most successful cryptanalysts against public key systems what is a brute force search and what is its cryptographic relevance in a nutshell if f x y and you know y and can compute f you can find x by trying every possible x that s brute force search example say a cryptanalyst has found a plaintext and a corresponding ciphertext but doesn t know the key he can simply try encrypting the plaintext using each possible key until the ciphertext matches or decrypting the ciphertext to match the plaintext whichever is faster every well designed cryptosystem has such a large key space that this brute force search is impractical advances in technology sometimes change what is considered practical for example des which has been in use for over years now has or about possible keys a computation with this many operations was certainly unlikely for most users in the mid s the situation is very different today given the dramatic decrease in cost per processor operation massively parallel machines threaten the security of des against brute force search some scenarios are described by garron and outerbridge gar one phase of a more sophisticated cryptanalysis may involve a brute force search of some manageably small space of possibilities what are some properties satisfied by every strong cryptosystem the security of a strong system resides with the secrecy of the key rather than with an attempt to keep the algorithm itself secret a strong cryptosystem has a large keyspace as mentioned above the unicity distance is a measure which gives the minimum amount of ciphertext that must be intercepted to uniquely identify the key and if for some key the unicity distance is much longer than the amount of ciphertext you intend to encrypt under that key the system is probably strong a strong cryptosystem will certainly produce ciphertext which appears random to all standard statistical tests see for example cae a strong cryptosystem will resist all known previous attacks a system which has never been subjected to scrutiny is suspect if a system passes all the tests mentioned above is it necessarily strong certainly not many weak cryptosystems looked good at first however sometimes it is possible to show that a cryptosystem is strong by mathematical proof if joe can break this system then he can also solve the well known difficult problem of factoring integers see part failing that it s a crap shoot if a cryptosystem is theoretically unbreakable then is it guaranteed analysis proof in practice cryptanalytic methods include what is known as practical cryptanalysis the enemy doesn t have to just stare at your ciphertext until he figures out the plaintext for instance he might assume cribs stretches of probable plaintext if the crib is correct then he might be able to deduce the key and then decipher the rest of the message or he might exploit isologs the same plaintext enciphered in several cryptosystems or several keys thus he might obtain solutions even when cryptanalytic theory says he doesn t have a chance sometimes cryptosystems malfunction or are misused the one time pad for example loses all security if it is used more than once even chosen plaintext attacks where the enemy somehow feeds plaintext into the encryptor until he can deduce the key have been employed see kah why are many people still using cryptosystems that are relatively easy to break some don t know any better often amateurs think they can design secure systems and are not aware of what an expert cryptanalyst could do and sometimes there is insufficient motivation for anybody to invest the work needed to crack a system
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re an open letter to mr clinton here s a simple way to convert the clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one make it voluntary that is you get high quality secure nsa classified technology if you agree to escrow your key otherwise you are on your own david david sternlight great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of our information errors and omissions excepted
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re once tapped your code is no good any more brad templeton brad clarinet com wrote it occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you and the escrow houses release your code to the cops your code is now no longer secure it s in the hands of cops and while i am sure most of the time they are good their security will not be as good as the escrow houses what this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you at the end of the wiretap they should be obligated to inform you that a tap was performed and replace for free the clipper chip in your cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the escrow houses getting the court order to reveal the key also makes decipherable all past conversations which may be on tape or disk or whatver as i understand the proposal i could be wrong but i ve seen no mention of session keys being the escrowed entities as the eff noted this raises further issues about the fruits of one bust leading to incrimination in other areas but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the main concern of most of us i think the camel s nose in the tent etc and it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is increased thus allowing greater access to central office records by the government the conversations being encrypted who will object to letting the government have access to them perhaps even automatically archiving large fractions this was one of the main objections to the s proposal that it would force telecom suppliers to provide easy access for the government one the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted conversations now all it takes is one misstep one violation that gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt all of them do we want anyone to have this kind of power tim may whose sig block may get him busted in the new regime timothy c may crypto anarchy encryption digital money tcmay netcom com anonymous networks digital pseudonyms zero knowledge reputations information markets w a s t e aptos ca black markets collapse of governments higher power public key pgp and mailsafe available
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cryptography faq net etiquette archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part net etiquette this is the second of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what groups are around what s a faq who am i why am i here do political discussions belong in sci crypt how do i present a new encryption scheme in sci crypt what groups are around what s a faq who am i why am i here read news announce newusers and news answers for a few weeks always make sure to read a newsgroup for some time before you post to it you ll be amazed how often the same question can be asked in the same newsgroup after a month you ll have a much better sense of what the readers want to see do political discussions belong in sci crypt no in fact some newsgroups notably misc legal computing were created exactly so that political questions like should rsa be patented don t get in the way of technical discussions many sci crypt readers also read misc legal computing comp org eff talk comp patents sci math comp compression et al for the benefit of people who don t care about those other topics try to put your postings in the right group questions about microfilm and smuggling and other non cryptographic spy stuff don t belong in sci crypt either how do i present a new encryption scheme in sci crypt i just came up with this neat method of encryption here s some ciphertext fhdsijoyw ogbujhkfsyuire is it strong without a doubt questions like this are the most annoying traffic on sci crypt if you have come up with an encryption scheme providing some ciphertext from it is not adequate nobody has ever been impressed by random gibberish any new algorithm should be secure even if the opponent knows the full algorithm including how any message key is distributed and only the private key is kept secret there are some systematic and unsystematic ways to take reasonably long ciphertexts and decrypt them even without prior knowledge of the algorithm but this is a time consuming and possibly fruitless exercise which most sci crypt readers won t bother with so what do you do if you have a new encryption scheme first of all find out if it s really new look through this faq for references and related methods familiarize yourself with the literature and the introductory textbooks when you can appreciate how your cryptosystem fits into the world at large try to break it yourself you shouldn t waste the time of tens of thousands of readers asking a question which you could have easily answered on your own if you really think your system is secure and you want to get some reassurance from experts you might try posting full details of your system including working code and a solid theoretical explanation to sci crypt keep in mind that the export of cryptography is regulated in some areas if you re lucky an expert might take some interest in what you posted you can encourage this by offering cash rewards for instance noted cryptographer ralph merkle is offering to anyone who can break snefru but there are no guarantees if you don t have enough experience then most likely any experts who look at your system will be able to find a flaw if this happens it s your responsibility to consider the flaw and learn from it rather than just add one more layer of complication and come back for another round a different way to get your cryptosystem reviewed is to have the nsa look at it a full discussion of this procedure is outside the scope of this faq among professionals a common rule of thumb is that if you want to design a cryptosystem you have to have experience as a cryptanalyst
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cryptography faq product ciphers archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part product ciphers this is the fifth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what is a product cipher what makes a product cipher secure what are some group theoretic properties of product ciphers what can be proven about the security of a product cipher how are block ciphers used to encrypt data longer than the block size can symmetric block ciphers be used for message authentication what exactly is des what is triple des what is differential cryptanalysis how was nsa involved in the design of des is des available in software is des available in hardware can des be used to protect classified information what are ecb cbc cfb and ofb encryption what is a product cipher a product cipher is a block cipher that iterates several weak operations such as substitution transposition modular addition multiplication and linear transformation a block cipher just means a cipher that encrypts a block of data bytes say all at once then goes on to the next block the notion of product ciphers is due to shannon sha examples of modern product ciphers include lucifer sor des nbs sp networks kam loki bro feal shi pes lai khufu and khafre me a the so called feistel ciphers are a class of product ciphers which operate on one half of the ciphertext at each round and then swap the ciphertext halves after each round lucifer des loki and feal are examples of feistel ciphers the following table compares the main parameters of several product ciphers cipher block length key bits number of rounds lucifer des loki feal x x pes what makes a product cipher secure nobody knows how to prove mathematically that a product cipher is completely secure so in practice one begins by demonstrating that the cipher looks highly random for example the cipher must be nonlinear and it must produce ciphertext which functionally depends on every bit of the plaintext and the key meyer mey has shown that at least rounds of des are required to guarantee such a dependence in this sense a product cipher should act as a mixing function which combines the plaintext key and ciphertext in a complex nonlinear fashion the fixed per round substitutions of the product cipher are referred to as s boxes for example lucifer has s boxes and des has s boxes the nonlinearity of a product cipher reduces to a careful design of these s boxes a list of partial design criteria for the s boxes of des which apply to s boxes in general may be found in brown bro and brickell et al bri what are some group theoretic properties of product ciphers let e be a product cipher that maps n bit blocks to n bit blocks let e k x be the encryption of x under key k then for any fixed k the map sending x to e k x is a permutation of the set of n bit blocks denote this permutation by p k the set of all n bit permutations is called the symmetric group and is written s n the collection of all these permutations p k where k ranges over all possible keys is denoted e s n if e were a random mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts then we would expect e s n to generate a large subset of s n coppersmith and grossman cop have shown that a very simple product cipher can generate the alternating group a n given a sufficient number of rounds the alternating group is half of the symmetric group it consists of all even permutations i e all permutations which can be written as an even number of swaps even and goldreich eve were able to extend these results to show that feistel ciphers can generate a n given a sufficient number of rounds the security of multiple encipherment also depends on the group theoretic properties of a cipher multiple encipherment is an extension over single encipherment if for keys k k there does not exist a third key k such that e k e k x e k x which indicates that encrypting twice with two independent keys k k is equal to a single encryption under the third key k if for every k k there exists a k such that eq is true then we say that e is a group this question of whether des is a group under this definition was extensively studied by sherman kaliski and rivest she in their paper they give strong evidence for the hypothesis that des is not a group in fact des is not a group cam what can be proven about the security of a product cipher recall from above that p k is a permutation produced by e under some key k the goal of the designer of e is to ensure that p k appears to be a random element of s n the symmetric group let r be an element of s n selected randomly we will say that p k and r are indistinguishable if an observer given p k and r in some order cannot distinguish between these two permutations in polynomial time that is with time bounded resources the observer cannot determine which of the permutations is produced by e the optimal decision is no better than simply guessing luby and rackoff lub have shown that a class of feistel ciphers are secure in this sense when the round mapping is replaced by random boolean functions how are block ciphers used to encrypt data longer than the block size there are four standard modes of operation and numerous non standard ones as well the standard modes of operation are defined in the u s department of commerce federal information processing standard fips published in see the question about ecb below for more details although they are defined for the des block cipher the modes of operation can be used with any block cipher can symmetric block ciphers be used for message authentication one may use a symmetric cryptosystem block cipher to prove to himself that he did or did not generate a message and to prove to himself whether his message was altered or unaltered since generation but one cannot prove these things to another without revealing the key and thereafter that key cannot be used to prove anything about any messages that were authenticated using that key see ansi x and fips for a standard method of message authentication using des what exactly is des des is the u s government s data encryption standard a product cipher that operates on bit blocks of data using a bit key it is defined in fips which supersedes fips fips are federal information processing standards published by ntis des is identical to the ansi standard data encryption algorithm dea defined in ansi x what is triple des triple des is a product cipher which like des operates on bit data blocks there are several forms each of which uses the des cipher times some forms use two bit keys some use three the des modes of operation may also be used with triple des some people refer to e k d k e k x as triple des this method is defined in chapter of the ansi standard x financial institution key management and is intended for use in encrypting des keys and ivs for automated key distribution its formal name is encryption and decryption of a single key by a key pair but it is referenced in other standards documents as ede that standard says section key encrypting keys may be a single dea key or a dea key pair key pairs shoud be used where additional security is needed e g the data protected by the key s has a long security life a key pair shall not be encrypted or decrypted using a single key others use the term triple des for e k d k e k x or e k e k e k x one of us carl ellison keeps advocating des triple use in the form e k tran e k tran e k compress x where each des instance has its own key and iv for cbc mode and tran has been posted on sci crypt it is a large block transposition program taking its key from the data stream itself so that it is not an encryption program on its own part what is differential cryptanalysis differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack that can be applied to any iterated mapping ie any mapping which is based on a repeated round function the method was recently popularized by biham and shamir bih but coppersmith has remarked that the s boxes of des were optimized against this attack some years ago this method has proved effective against several product ciphers notably feal bi a differential cryptanalysis is based on observing a large number of ciphertexts y y whose corresponding plaintexts x x satisfy a known difference d x x where is componentwise xor in the basic biham shamir attack such plaintext pairs are required to determine the key for des substantially fewer pairs are required if des is truncated to or rounds in these cases the actual key can be recovered in a matter of minutes using a few thousand pairs for full des this attack is impractical because it requires so many known plaintexts the work of biham and shamir on des revealed several startling observations on the algorithm most importantly if the key schedule was removed from des and a bit key was used the key could be recovered in less than steps thus independent subkeys do not add substantial security to des further the s boxes of des are extremely sensitive in that changing even single entries in these tables yields significant improvement in the differential attack adi shamir is quoted to say nytimes oct i would say that contrary to what some people believe there is no evidence of tampering with the des so that the basic design was weakened how was nsa involved in the design of des according to kinnucan kin tuchman a member of the group that developed des at ibm is quoted as saying we developed the des algorithm entirely within ibm using ibmers the nsa did not dictate a single wire tuchman and meyer another developer of des spent a year breaking ciphers and finding weaknesses in lucifer they then spent two years strengthening lucifer their basic approach was to look for strong substitution permutation and key scheduling functions ibm has classified the notes containing the selection criteria at the request of the nsa the nsa told us we had inadvertently reinvented some of the deep secrets it uses to make its own algorithms explains tuchman on the other hand a document called involvement of the nsa in the development of des unclassified summary of the united states select committee on intelligence printed in the ieee communications magazine p states in the development of des nsa convinced ibm that a reduced keysize was sufficient indirectly assisted in the development of the s box structures and certified that the final des algorithm was to the best of their knowledge free from any statistical or mathematical weakness clearly the key size was reduced at the insistence of the nsa the article further states that the nsa did not tamper with the algorithm itself just the parameters which in some sense resolves the apparent conflict in the remarks of meyer and tuchman presented above is des available in software several people have made des code available via ftp see part for pathnames stig ostholm ftpso bsd ftpbk eric young ftpey dennis furguson ftpdf mark riordan ftpmr phil karn ftppk a pascal listing of des is also given in patterson pat fips says the algorithm specified in this standard is to be implemented using hardware not software technology software implementations in general purpose computers are not in compliance with this standard despite this software implementations abound and are used by government agencies is des available in hardware the following paragraphs are quoted from messages sent to the editors we don t vouch for the quality or even existence of the products chip rosenthal says dallas semiconductor makes a des encryption decryption device for use on standard digital kbps pcm telecom data streams it is capable of processing data in real time e g one sample frame it is the ds their phone number is you would probably need to talk with dewight in telecom marketing christian franke franke informatik rwth aachen de says cryptech cry c mbit s according to data sheet with bit interface we use this one because it was the only one available when we started the project no problems pijnenburg pcc mbit s according to data sheet address pijnenburg b v boxtelswweg nl ne vught the netherlands infosys des chip germany s boxes must be loaded by software so you can modify the algorithm sorry i don t have the data sheet handy please e mail me if you need further information mjr tis com marcus j ranum says supercrypt mb sec and faster des and proprietary storage for bit keys key stream generator integrated hardware des procedure extended mode with bit keys computer elektronik infosys a herndon parkway herndon va thember gandalf ca tim hember says newbridge microsystems sells an am compatible des chip that operates at mhz performs a round of encryption in clocks has a three stage pipeline supports ecb cbc cfb and cfb further it is very reasonable priced as opposed to other high end des chips call newbridge microsystems ottawa there are no import export issues with canada and the us if you require custom des or public key ics then timestep engineering developed newbridge s crypto chips and ics for other commercial and educational establishments they can be reached at can des be used to protect classified information des is not intended to protect classified data fips says this standard will be used by federal departments and agencies for the cryptographic protection of computer data when the following conditions apply cryptographic protection is required and the data is not classified according to the national security act of as amended or the atomic energy act of as amended what are ecb cbc cfb and ofb encryption these are methods for using block ciphers such as des to encrypt messages files and blocks of data known as modes of operation four modes of operation are defined in fips december and also in ansi x fips specifies that when bit ascii data is sent in octets the unused most significant bit is to be set to fips also specifies the padding for short blocks the four des modes of operation are electronic code book ecb cipher block chaining cbc k bit cipher feedback cfb and k bit output feedback ofb these methods are explained below in a c language like notation some symbols p n the n th block of plaintext input to encryption output from decryption size of block determined by the mode c n the n th block of ciphertext output from encryption input to decryption size of block determined by the mode e m the des encryption function performed on bit block m using the key schedule derived from some bit key d m the des decryption function performed on bit block m using the same key schedule as in e m except that the keys in the schedule are used in the opposite order as in e m iv a bit initialization vector a secret value which along with the key is shared by both encryptor and decryptor i n the n th value of a bit variable used in some modes r n the n th value of a bit variable used in some modes lsb m k the k least significant right most bits of m e g m k msb m k the k most significant left most bits of m e g m k k operators as defined in the c langage electronic code book ecb p n and c n are each bits long encryption decryption c n e p n p n d c n cipher block chaining cbc p n and c n are each bits long encryption decryption c e p iv p d c iv n c n e p n c n p n d c n c n k bit cipher feedback cfb p n and c n are each k bits long k encryption decryption i iv i iv n i n i n k c n i n i n k c n all n r n msb e i n k r n msb e i n k all n c n p n r n p n c n r n note that for k this reduces to i iv i iv n i n c n i n c n all n r n e i n r n e i n all n c n p n r n p n c n r n cfb notes since i n depends only on the plain or cipher text from the previous operation the e function can be performed in parallel with the reception of the text with which it is used k bit output feedback ofb p n and c n are each k bits long k encryption decryption i iv i iv n i n i n k r n i n i n k r n all n r n msb e i n k r n msb e i n k all n c n p n r n p n c n r n note that for k this reduces to i iv i iv n i n r n i n r n all n r n e i n r n e i n all n c n p n r n p n c n r n ofb notes encryption and decryption are identical since i n is independent of p and c the e function can be performed in advance of the receipt of the plain cipher text with which it is to be used additional notes on des modes of operation ecb and cbc use e to encrypt and d to decrypt but the feedback modes use e to both encrypt and decrypt this disproves the erroneous claim that systems which feature e but not d cannot be used for data confidentiality and therefore are not subject to export controls
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cryptography faq public key cryptography archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part public key cryptography this is the sixth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what is public key cryptography what s rsa is rsa secure how fast can people factor numbers what about other public key cryptosystems what is public key cryptography in a classic cryptosystem we have encryption functions e k and decryption functions d k such that d k e k p p for any plaintext p in a public key cryptosystem e k can be easily computed from some public key x which in turn is computed from k x is published so that anyone can encrypt messages if d k cannot be easily computed from x then only the person who generated k can decrypt messages that s the essence of public key cryptography published by diffie and hellman in in a classic cryptosystem if you want your friends to be able to send secret messages to you you have to make sure nobody other than them sees the key k in a public key cryptosystem you just publish x and you don t have to worry about spies this is only the beginning of public key cryptography there is an extensive literature on security models for public key cryptography applications of public key cryptography other applications of the mathematical technology behind public key cryptography and so on what s rsa rsa is a public key cryptosystem defined by rivest shamir and adleman for full details there is a faq available by ftp at rsa com here s a small example plaintexts are positive integers up to keys are quadruples p q e d with p a bit prime number q a bit prime number and d and e large numbers with de divisible by p q we define e k p p e mod pq d k c c d mod pq now e k is easily computed from the pair pq e but as far as anyone knows there is no easy way to compute d k from the pair pq e so whoever generates k can publish pq e anyone can send a secret message to him he is the only one who can read the messages is rsa secure nobody knows an obvious attack on rsa is to factor pq into p and q see below for comments on how fast state of the art factorization algorithms run unfortunately nobody has the slightest idea how to prove that factorization or any realistic problem at all for that matter is inherently slow it is easy to formalize what we mean by rsa is isn t strong but as hendrik w lenstra jr says exact definitions appear to be necessary only when one wishes to prove that algorithms with certain properties do not exist and theoretical computer science is notoriously lacking in such negative results how fast can people factor numbers it depends on the size of the numbers in october arjen lenstra and dan bernstein factored into primes using about three weeks of maspar time the maspar is a processor simd machine each processor can add about integers per second the algorithm there is called the number field sieve it is quite a bit faster for special numbers like than for general numbers n but it takes time only about exp o log n log log n in any case an older and more popular method for smaller numbers is the multiple polynomial quadratic sieve which takes time exp o log n log log n faster than the number field sieve for small n but slower for large n the breakeven point is somewhere between and digits depending on the implementations factorization is a fast moving field the state of the art just a few years ago was nowhere near as good as it is now if no new methods are developed then bit rsa keys will always be safe from factorization but one can t predict the future before the number field sieve was found many people conjectured that the quadratic sieve was asymptotically as fast as any factoring method could be what about other public key cryptosystems we ve talked about rsa because it s well known and easy to describe but there are lots of other public key systems around many of which are faster than rsa or depend on problems more widely believed to be difficult this has been just a brief introduction if you really want to learn about the many facets of public key cryptography consult the books and journal articles listed in part
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cryptography faq digital signatures archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part digital signatures and hash functions this is the seventh of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what is a one way hash function what is the difference between public private secret shared etc what are md and md what is snefru what is a one way hash function a typical one way hash function takes a variable length message and produces a fixed length hash given the hash it is computationally impossible to find a message with that hash in fact one can t determine any usable information about a message with that hash not even a single bit for some one way hash functions it s also computationally impossible to determine two messages which produce the same hash a one way hash function can be private or public just like an encryption function here s one application of a public one way hash function like md or snefru most public key signature systems are relatively slow to sign a long message may take longer than the user is willing to wait solution compute the one way hash of the message and sign the hash which is short now anyone who wants to verify the signature can do the same thing another name for one way hash function is message digest function what is the difference between public private secret shared etc there is a horrendous mishmash of terminology in the literature for a very small set of concepts when an algorithm depends on a key which isn t published we call it a private algorithm otherwise we call it a public algorithm we have encryption functions e and decryption functions d so that d e m m for any message m we also have hashing functions h and verification functions v such that v m x if and only if x h m a public key cryptosystem has public encryption and private decryption checksums such as the application mentioned in the previous question have public hashing and public verification digital signature functions have private hashing and public verification only one person can produce the hash for a message but everyone can verify that the hash is correct obviously when an algorithm depends on a private key it s meant to be unusable by anyone who doesn t have the key there s no real difference between a shared key and a private key a shared key isn t published so it s private if you encrypt data for a friend rather than for your eyes only are you suddenly doing shared key encryption rather than private key encryption no what are md and md md and md are message digest functions developed by ron rivest definitions appear in rfc and rfc see part code is available from ftpmd note that a transcription error was found in the original md draft rfc the corrected algorithm should be called md a though some people refer to it as md what is snefru snefru is a family of message digest functions developed by ralph merkle snefru is an round function the newest in the family definitions appear in merkle s paper me a code is available from ftpsf
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cryptography faq other miscellany archive name cryptography faq part last modified faq for sci crypt part other miscellany this is the ninth of ten parts of the sci crypt faq the parts are mostly independent but you should read the first part before the rest we don t have the time to send out missing parts by mail so don t ask notes such as kah refer to the reference list in the last part the sections of this faq are available via anonymous ftp to rtfm mit edu as pub usenet news answers cryptography faq part xx the cryptography faq is posted to the newsgroups sci crypt sci answers and news answers every days contents what is the national security agency nsa what are the us export regulations what is tempest what are the beale ciphers and are they a hoax what is the american cryptogram association and how do i get in touch is rsa patented what about the voynich manuscript what is the national security agency nsa the nsa is the official security body of the u s government it was given its charter by president truman in the late s and has continued research in cryptology till the present the nsa is known to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the world and is also the largest purchaser of computer hardware in the world governments in general have always been prime employers of cryptologists the nsa probably possesses cryptographic expertise many years ahead of the public state of the art and can undoubtedly break many of the systems used in practice but for reasons of national security almost all information about the nsa is classified bamford s book bamfd gives a history of the people and operations of the nsa the following quote from massey mas highlights the difference between public and private research in cryptography if one regards cryptology as the prerogative of government one accepts that most cryptologic research will be conducted behind closed doors without doubt the number of workers engaged today in such secret research in cryptology far exceeds that of those engaged in open research in cryptology for only about years has there in fact been widespread open research in cryptology there have been and will continue to be conflicts between these two research communities open research is common quest for knowledge that depends for its vitality on the open exchange of ideas via conference presentations and publications in scholarly journals but can a government agency charged with responsibilities of breaking the ciphers of other nations countenance the publication of a cipher that it cannot break can a researcher in good conscience publish such a cipher that might undermine the effectiveness of his own government s code breakers one might argue that publication of a provably secure cipher would force all governments to behave like stimson s gentlemen but one must be aware that open research in cryptography is fraught with political and ethical considerations of a severity than in most scientific fields the wonder is not that some conflicts have occurred between government agencies and open researchers in cryptology but rather that these conflicts at least those of which we are aware have been so few and so mild what are the us export regulations in a nutshell there are two government agencies which control export of encryption software one is the bureau of export administration bxa in the department of commerce authorized by the export administration regulations ear another is the office of defense trade controls dtc in the state department authorized by the international traffic in arms regulations itar as a rule of thumb bxa which works with cocom has less stringent requirements but dtc which takes orders from nsa wants to see everything first and can refuse to transfer jurisdiction to bxa the newsgroup misc legal computing carries many interesting discussions on the laws surrounding cryptographic export what people think about those laws and many other complex issues which go beyond the scope of technical groups like sci crypt make sure to consult your lawyer before doing anything which will get you thrown in jail if you are lucky your lawyer might know a lawyer who has at least heard of the itar what is tempest tempest is a standard for electromagnetic shielding for computer equipment it was created in response to the discovery that information can be read from computer radiation e g from a crt at quite a distance and with little effort needless to say encryption doesn t do much good if the cleartext is available this way what are the beale ciphers and are they a hoax thanks to jim gillogly for this information and john king for corrections the story in a pamphlet by j b ward goes thomas jefferson beale and a party of adventurers accumulated a huge mass of treasure and buried it in bedford county virginia leaving three ciphers with an innkeeper the ciphers describe the location contents and intended beneficiaries of the treasure ward gives a decryption of the second cipher contents called b it was encrypted as a book cipher using the initial letters of the declaration of independence doi as key b and b are unsolved many documents have been tried as the key to b aficionados can join a group that attempts to solve b by various means with an eye toward splitting the treasure the beale cypher association p o box beaver falls pa you can get the ciphers from the rec puzzles faql by including the line send index in a message to netlib peregrine com and following the directions there are apparently several different versions of the cipher floating around the correct version is based on the pamphlet says john king kingj hpcc corp hp com some believe the story is a hoax kruh kru gives a long list of problems with the story gillogly gil decrypted b with the doi and found some unexpected strings including abfdefghiijklmmnohpp hammer president of the beale cypher association agrees that this string couldn t appear by chance but feels there must be an explanation gwyn sci crypt expert is unimpressed with this string what is the american cryptogram association and how do i get in touch the aca is an organization devoted to cryptography with an emphasis on cryptanalysis of systems that can be attacked either with pencil and paper or computers its organ the cryptogram includes articles and challenge ciphers among the more than cipher types in english and other languages are simple substitution playfair vigenere bifid bazeries grille homophonic and cryptarithm dues are for one year issues more outside of north america less for students under and seniors subscriptions should be sent to aca treasurer west hickory st mundelein il is rsa patented yes the patent number is filed granted for further discussion of this patent whether it should have been granted algorithm patents in general and related legal and moral issues see comp patents and misc legal computing for information about the league for programming freedom see ftppf note that one of the original purposes of comp patents was to collect questions such as should rsa be patented which often flooded sci crypt and other technical newsgroups into a more appropriate forum what about the voynich manuscript nelson reed edu nelson minar says there is a mailing list on the subject the address to write to subscribe to the vms mailing list is voynich request rand org the ftp archive is rand org pub voynich there s all sorts of information about the manuscript itself of course a good bibliography can be found on the ftp site kahn s the codebreakers gives a good introduction
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re how do they know what keys to ask for re clipper brad clarinet com brad templeton writes and of course you have to identify yourself to the phone company and since the phone company complies with court orders they will know the magic number of your chip when they sign out a warrant on you and then can present the warrant to the key escrow house who makes them forget and destroy all copies of the key once they ve decided you re not a criminal today just curious brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer steven c johnson wb iru vk gds trw johnson trwacs fp trw com fp federal systems park drive phone fairfax virginia u s a fax any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer steven c johnson wb iru vk gds trw johnson trwacs fp trw com fp
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re source of random bits on a unix workstation for your application what you can do is to encrypt the real time clock value with a secret key well almost if i only had to solve the problem for myself and were willing to have to type in a second password the secret key whenever i logged in it could work however i m trying to create a solution that anyone can use and which once installed is just as effortless to start up as the non solution of just using xhost to control access i ve got religeous problems with storing secret keys on multiuser computers for a good discussion of cryptographically good random number generators check out the draft ietf security randomness txt internet draft available at your local friendly internet drafts repository thanks for the pointer it was good reading and i liked the idea of using several unrelated sources with a strong mixing function however unless i missed something the only source they suggested aside from a hardware rng that seems available and unguessable by an intruder when a unix is fresh booted is i o buffers related to network traffic i believe my solution basically uses that strategy without requiring me to reach into the kernel a reasonably source of randomness is the output of a cryptographic hash function e g md when fed with a large amount of more or less random data for example running md on dev mem is a slow but random enough source of random bits there are bound to be bits of entropy in the tens or hundreds of megabytes of data in a modern workstation s memory as a fair amount of them are system timers i o buffers etc i heard about this solution and it sounded good then i heard that folks were experiencing times of seconds to run this on reasonably configured workstations i m not willing to add that much delay to someone s login process my approach etherfind compress skip k takes a second or two to run i m considering writing the be all and end all of solutions that launches the md and simultaneously tries to suck bits off the net and if the net should be sitting so idle that it can t get k after compression before md finishes use the md this way i could have guaranteed good bits and a deterministic upper bound on login time and still have the common case of login take only a couple of extra seconds bennett bet sbi com
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non word password generator does anyone know of a non word password generator program for pc s i e it will produce a nonsense word but still be pronouncible e g lisgollan wanted to force users to adopt more secure passwords but still be memorable thanks george bolt p s please email me as well if possible george psychmips york ac uk
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes getting the court order to reveal the key also makes decipherable all past conversations which may be on tape or disk or whatver as i understand the proposal i could be wrong but i ve seen no mention of session keys being the escrowed entities true in theory in practice the technology of cellular phones will probably be spread spectrum and quite difficult to record the crypttext without the key if the frequency path depends on they key as i understand it to it could be made effectively impossible to record once it hits land you can record it if you have telco access the telco isn t supposed to give that without a warrant that s the rule today but even so the evidence would not be admissible i think unless the judge so ordered i think that even interception of the crypttext without a warrant would be illegal cops can t record today s plain cellular calls and then ask a judge hey can we have permission to listen to those tapes can they worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the main concern of most of us i think the camel s nose in the tent etc yes that is a major concern but i think that they think they can win just by having of the usa use this system they don t even have to care about the cautious that s left they don t catch the really smart crooks anyway john gotti who would have to be retarded not to realize he was likely to be wiretapped glibly chatted away on his tapped phone about murder plans that s why he s in jail now hard to believe but true this scheme can succeed without laws forbidding more which people would fight a lot harder they like this enough that they are dropping the so called digital telephony proposal according to rumours however the meaning of that is complex since they still want to get at the crypttext on telco systems and that requires a bit of work brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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re once tapped your code is no good any more tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes brad templeton brad clarinet com wrote it occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you and the escrow houses release your code to the cops your code is now no longer secure it s in the hands of cops and while i am sure most of the time they are good their security will not be as good as the escrow houses what this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you at the end of the wiretap they should be obligated to inform you that a tap was performed and replace for free the clipper chip in your cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the escrow houses getting the court order to reveal the key also makes decipherable all past conversations which may be on tape or disk or whatver as i understand the proposal i could be wrong but i ve seen no mention of session keys being the escrowed entities as the eff noted this raises further issues about the fruits of one bust leading to incrimination in other areas but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the main concern of most of us i think the camel s nose in the tent etc and it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is increased thus allowing greater access to central office records by the government the conversations being encrypted who will object to letting the government have access to them perhaps even automatically archiving large fractions this was one of the main objections to the s proposal that it would force telecom suppliers to provide easy access for the government one the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted conversations now all it takes is one misstep one violation that gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt all of them do we want anyone to have this kind of power tim may whose sig block may get him busted in the new regime a remark i heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly frightening significance the comment was made that in other parts of the world the democrats note the big d would be known as socialists a note the small d democrat who wonders what thomas jefferson on this the th anniversary of his birth would have thought of the state of affairs between the government and the governed any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer steven c johnson wb iru vk gds trw johnson trwacs fp trw com fp federal systems park drive phone fairfax virginia u s a fax any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer steven c johnson wb iru vk gds trw johnson trwacs fp trw com fp
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6,487 |
sci.crypt
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re text of white house announcement and q as on clipper chip encryption in article jhessec ltt imc netcom com jhesse netcom com john hesse writes stupid me i believed the democrats stood for principles of personal privacy while it was the neanderthal republicans that wanted into every aspect of our lives clinton is just more clever than the other guy looks like gun control for privacy technology one small step at a time remember defend firearms defeat dukakis followed by bush s soon after election support for gun control this is the democrats version defend free speech reject republicans followed by speech control wait a minute let me think about this hmmm i feel better now i believe the white house when they tell us this first step is in fact the final step all is ok we ve nothing to fear they re here to help us god bless america hey like the grrreat j r bob dobbs says you ve got to pull the wool over your own eyes pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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6,488 |
sci.crypt
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clipper crap encryption s dual edge sword encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry but it also can shield criminals and terrorists we need the clipper chip and other just a random passing thought but can anyone cite a documented use of encryption technology by criminals and terrorists excluding the iran contra gang shaun p hughes sphughes sfsuvax sfsu edu finger for pgp public key
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6,489 |
sci.crypt
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white house wiretap chip disinformation sheet fascinating most of the content of the white house announcements was in what was not said it gives us almost nothing of value threatens to take away a lot and does it with a sincere smile on its face and the nice friendly word management fact sheet public encryption management the first thing it doesn t say is we re giving you stronger encryption what it says is the u s government has developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through encryption that is substantially more robust than the current government standard but also permits escrowing of the keys needed to unlock the encryption the system for the escrowing of keys will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information only with appropriate legal authorization but des is strong enough that only the government can break it now so the major effect is to make it easier for government to break at best it makes it more difficult for the nsa to break since they need to get one of the two escrowed keys to do a brute force search for the other bit key similarly it didn t say we re making encryption is commercially available because encryption is already commercially available including forms the nsa may not be able to break like triple des or idea and phone companies could offer des based systems now if they were convinced the government would let them and they could make enough money the next thing it didn t say is we re making encryption legal because of course encryption has always been legal and the president can t change the first amendment merely by decree what it did say was in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key escrow system which clearly means we re making encryption illegal unless we get your keys soon once business buys into this another thing it didn t say is we re going to ask congress for money to do lots more wiretapping because of course there s a budget crisis and congress might debate the policy issues or not give them the cash what it did say was the attorney general will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government s ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications further the attorney general shall utilize funds from the department of justice asset forfeiture super surplus fund to effect this purchase which means we ve got money congress can t control and we re going to buy lots of wiretapping equipment with it to detect non approved crypto that s what preserve the government s ability to conduct surveillance means pray for peace bill bill stewart wcs anchor att com at t bell labs m holmdel nj no i m from new jersey i only work in cyberspace white house commect line fax
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6,490 |
sci.crypt
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow interestingly enough in designing the escrow we may want to use some rather unusual technology such as sealed boxes of paper or destructive read memory rather than typical computer databases which is fun for a database of hundreds of millions of keys the greatest danger of the escrow database if it were kept on disk would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out you can design lots of protection but with enough corruption a complete copy is always possible storing it on paper or something very hard to copy at once may actually make sense or a medium that can t be copied for example something with very slow access times or which leaves a destructive trail if it is even read of course then it s hard to backup however i think the consequences of no backup the data is not there when a warrant comes are worse than the consequences of a secret backup an audit trail that reveals when data has been access that can t be erased by the humans involved is also necessary brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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6,491 |
sci.crypt
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re clinton boost in spy spending right on the heels of the clinton registered encryption key debacle comes sphughes sfsuvax sfsu edu shaun p hughes writes from yesterdays s f chronicle president clinton has asked congress for authority to spend more money on spy agencies satellites and other intelligence activities in fiscal than it allotted for congressional and administration officials say clinton had promised to slash intelligence spending by billion over four years although the size of the nations vast intelligence budget remains an official secret administration and congressional officials disclosed yesterday that it would total about billion if the increase requested by clinton is approved wonder how much of that extra money goes into coming up with encryption schemes they can easily crack the theorem theorem if if then then
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6,492 |
sci.crypt
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re white house wiretap chip disinformation sheet wcs anchor ho att com bill stewart writes fascinating most of the content of the white house announcements was in what was not said it gives us almost nothing of value threatens to take away a lot and does it with a sincere smile on its face and the nice friendly word management the computer err government is your friend have a nice day under penalty of law to refuse praise is to seek praise twice
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6,493 |
sci.crypt
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re secret algorithm re clipper chip and crypto key escrow jhesse netcom com john hesse writes oh great wonderful news nobody can listen in except the feds and anybody who can get the keys from the escrow company this is a database that s going to take plenty of updating they think they can keep it secure please and that s just primary not secondary sources such as police using the key under a warrant would anyone be surprised if they just neglected to erase the key if it turned out they couldn t nail you on anything nourish a waif and it will pick out your eyes
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6,494 |
sci.crypt
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re how to detect use of an illegal cipher in article qnmnp db sol tis com mjr tis com marcus j ranum writes traffic that way your traffic looks normal and perhaps anyone desiring to listen in won t even bother since they know nobody s going to really trust crypto that has classified internals for important stuff nice to think but naive the fact is that millions of people today are sending highly confidential information over unencoded easy to receive cellular phones they figure the chances of being heard are small so they risk it and of people don t understand crypto the way the least of the sci crypt newbies does if clinton tells them it s good crypto they ll believe him and send important stuff over it and be thankful that they re no longer using clear voice fm cellular phones only a tiny fraction of people will want more crypto worse in the eyes of the government which swears up and down the algorithim is spook level secure and it may indeed be the only reason you could possibly want this extra level is to avoid police by using it you ll attract attention as a likely lawbreaker your honour the suspect suddenly started using another level of cryptography and we can t tap his phone calls any more he must have something to hide please sign the warrant to search his house brad templeton clarinet communications corp sunnyvale ca
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6,495 |
sci.crypt
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re white house public encryption management fact sheet in article c lgaz dove nist gov clipper csrc ncsl nist gov clipper chip announcement writes distribution na no thanks this topic is of interest to a much wider audience in making this decision i do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing or the government from approving other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key escrow system in making this decision i intend to prevent the private sector from developing except with the government s approval other microcircuits or algorithms that are more effective in assuring privacy apb alan barrett dept of electronic eng univ of natal durban south africa rfc barrett ee und ac za
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6,496 |
sci.crypt
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re once tapped your code is no good any more in article tcmayc m xv jex netcom com tcmay netcom com timothy c may writes but is it any worse than the current unsecure system it becomes much worse of course if the government then uses this clinton clipper to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption this is the main concern of most of us i think the camel s nose in the tent etc excuse me this has already happened there s a couple of humps in the tent already ask the folks at qualcomm what became of the non trivial encryption scheme they proposed for use in their cdma digitial cellular phone standard there already are restrictions in place louis mamakos
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6,497 |
sci.crypt
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re fifth amendment and passwords in article apr linus mitre org ptrei bistromath mitre org peter trei writes judge i grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key itself you the keyphrase is i confess to deliberately evading copyright the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of copyrighted peanuts strips judge and cp oh how will they get you now i m not saying that they won t or can t or even that they shouldn t but what legal mechanism will they use should we be crossposting this to misc legal hm could another court try you via a bypass of the double jeopardy amendment like they are doing in the lapd trial ie your judge is a state judge and then a federal judge retries you under the justification that its not the same trail kenneth ng please reply to ken blue njit edu for now all this might be an elaborate simulation running in a little device sitting on someone s table j l picard st tng
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6,498 |
sci.crypt
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re the old key registration idea in article rlglendec lrwc c netcom com rlglende netcom com robert lewis glendenning writes i have been chided for stating that dorthy denning was intellectually dishonest in the acm debate and in this newsgroup i have previously refrained from suggesting that she is arguing on behalf of consulting clients now i say that it is clear that dorthy denning has been functioning as a lobbyist not a computer scientist she has used legal ethics truth is what you can convince anyone of not scientific ethics truth is understanding the external world maybe we can revoke her acm membership i suggest that you refrain from such insults unless and until you can produce some evidence to back up that claim given the measures proposed or passed in the last year or so such as s and the scanner ban her proposal need not be any more than her own attempt at a technical solution it s entirely possible in fact that it was the notion of splitting the key which came up in the debate that softened this proposal
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6,499 |
sci.crypt
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re source of random bits on a unix workstation in article pivot sbi com bet sbi com bennett todd salomon brothers inc ny writes i heard about this solution and it sounded good then i heard that folks were experiencing times of seconds to run this on reasonably configured workstations i m not willing to add that much delay to someone s login process my approach etherfind compress skip k takes a second or two to run i m considering writing the be all and end all of solutions that launches the md and simultaneously tries to suck bits off the net and if the net should be sitting so idle that it can t get k after compression before md finishes use the md this way i could have guaranteed good bits and a deterministic upper bound on login time and still have the common case of login take only a couple of extra seconds seconds to hash m of core i bet i know who the source of your information is no it s not acceptable if it s part of your login process but if you are going to use network traffic as the source of pseudo random information do the right thing and pass it through a cryptographic hash function not a compressor aside from the fact that it will run faster it will give better results think of a cryptographic hash as a function that distills randomness something along the lines of etherfind t x n dd bs k count dev null md should do the trick t gives you timestamps and the lack of u makes sure that dd does not get ten lines as opposed to ten k the above takes a couple of seconds on a lightly loaded ethernet bennett bet sbi com ji
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