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3,783,545 | Inefficient IPR spills over to all sectors of the US economy and hampers every industry’s growth globally. | Office of the United States Trade Representatives 2016 | Office of the United States Trade Representatives 2016
2016 Special 301 Report, April, page 20 | Report continues to reflect a growing need for trading partners to provide effective protection and enforcement of trade secrets information and communications technologies, services, biopharmaceuticals, manufacturing, and environmental technologies, rely on the ability to protect and enforce their trade secrets and rights in other proprietary information trade secrets, such as business plans, internal market analysis, manufacturing methods, customer lists, and recipes, are often among a company’s core business assets competitiveness may depend on its capacity to protect such assets Trade secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. competitiveness around the globe, and puts U.S. jobs at risk trade secret theft into critical commercial and defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national security particularly in China Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.” Theft may arise in trade secrets, failed joint ventures Lack of legal certainty regarding trade secrets dissuades companies from entering into partnerships or expanding their business activities in these countries | information and communications tech services, biopharmaceuticals, manufacturing rely on the ability to protect trade secrets competitiveness may depend on its capacity to protect assets. Trade secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. competitiveness around the globe, and puts jobs at risk particularly in China. Chinese actors are the world’s mos persistent perpetrators Lack of legal certainty dissuades companies from expanding their business | This year’s Report continues to reflect a growing need for trading partners to provide effective protection and enforcement of trade secrets. Companies in a wide variety of industry sectors, including information and communications technologies, services, biopharmaceuticals, manufacturing, and environmental technologies, rely on the ability to protect and enforce their trade secrets and rights in other proprietary information. Indeed, trade secrets, such as business plans, internal market analysis, manufacturing methods, customer lists, and recipes, are often among a company’s core business assets; and a company’s competitiveness may depend on its capacity to protect such assets. Trade secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. competitiveness around the globe, and puts U.S. jobs at risk. The reach of trade secret theft into critical commercial and defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national security interests as well. Various sources, including the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), have reported specific gaps in trade secret protection and enforcement, particularly in China. The ONCIX publication titled Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, states that “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.” Theft may arise in a variety of circumstances, including those involving departing employees taking portable storage devices containing trade secrets, failed joint ventures, cyber intrusion and hacking, and misuse of information submitted by trade secret owners to government entities for purposes of complying with regulatory obligations. In practice, effective remedies appear to be difficult to obtain in a number of countries, including in China and India. Lack of legal certainty regarding trade secrets dissuades companies from entering into partnerships or expanding their business activities in these and other countries. Many countries do not provide criminal penalties for trade secret theft sufficient to deter such behavior. Some foreign countries’ practices and policies put valuable trade secrets at risk of exposure including evidentiary requirements in trade secrets litigation and mandatory technology transfer. For example, in Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria government procurement regulations may require companies to disclose valuable source code. | 2,394 | <h4><u><strong>Inefficient IPR spills over to all sectors of the US economy and hampers every industry’s growth globally. </h4><p>Office of the United States Trade Representatives 2016</p><p></u></strong>2016 Special 301 Report, April, page 20</p><p>This year’s <u><strong>Report continues to reflect a growing need for trading partners to provide effective protection and enforcement of trade secrets</u></strong>. Companies in a wide variety of industry sectors, including <u><strong><mark>information and communications tech</mark>nologies, <mark>services, biopharmaceuticals, manufacturing</mark>, and environmental technologies, <mark>rely on the ability to protect</mark> and enforce their <mark>trade secrets</mark> and rights in other proprietary information</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong>trade secrets, such as business plans, internal market analysis, manufacturing methods, customer lists, and recipes, are often among a company’s core business assets</u></strong>; and a company’s <u><strong><mark>competitiveness may depend on its</mark> <mark>capacity to protect</mark> such <mark>assets</u></strong>. <u><strong>Trade secret theft threatens to diminish U.S. competitiveness</mark> <mark>around the globe, and puts</mark> U.S. <mark>jobs at risk</u></strong></mark>. The reach of <u><strong>trade secret theft into critical commercial and defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national security </u></strong>interests as well. Various sources, including the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), have reported specific gaps in trade secret protection and enforcement, <u><strong><mark>particularly in China</u></strong>. </mark>The ONCIX publication titled Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, states that “<u><strong><mark>Chinese actors are the world’s mos</mark>t active and <mark>persistent</mark> <mark>perpetrators</mark> of economic espionage.” Theft may arise in</u></strong> a variety of circumstances, including those involving departing employees taking portable storage devices containing <u><strong>trade secrets, failed joint ventures</u></strong>, cyber intrusion and hacking, and misuse of information submitted by trade secret owners to government entities for purposes of complying with regulatory obligations. In practice, effective remedies appear to be difficult to obtain in a number of countries, including in China and India. <u><strong><mark>Lack of legal certainty</mark> regarding trade secrets <mark>dissuades companies from </mark>entering into partnerships or <mark>expanding their business</mark> activities in these</u></strong> and other <u><strong>countries</u></strong>. Many countries do not provide criminal penalties for trade secret theft sufficient to deter such behavior. Some foreign countries’ practices and policies put valuable trade secrets at risk of exposure including evidentiary requirements in trade secrets litigation and mandatory technology transfer. For example, in Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria government procurement regulations may require companies to disclose valuable source code. </p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 1,559,384 | 11 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,546 | Third, the risk of a space war is high and it will cause global conflict. | Billings 15 | Billings 15 — space journalist, written and published five books about space exploration; (Lee Billings; “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever,” Scientific American; August 10, 2015; http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/ | The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth just look up , to Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race
Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.
The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia
China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites
. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers
The U.S. is attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo | null | The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.
The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.
The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations.
Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.
There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers.
In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly. | 3,288 | <h4><u>Third</u>, the risk of a space war is <u>high</u> and it will cause <u>global conflict</u>.</h4><p><strong>Billings 15</strong> — space journalist, written and published five books about space exploration; (Lee Billings; “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever,” Scientific American; August 10, 2015; http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/</p><p><u>The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth</u>, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, <u>just look up </u>into a clear sky<u>, to </u>the no-man’s-land of <u>Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race </u>in all but name.</p><p>The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. <u>Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure</u>. And though it might begin in space, <u>such a conflict could <strong>easily ignite full-blown war on Earth</strong>.</p><p>The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia</u>, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations.</p><p>Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. <u>China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites</u>, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.</p><p>There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit<u>. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers</u>.</p><p>In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. <u>The U.S. is</u> also <u>attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success</u>; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited <u>discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries</u> including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. <u>The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo</u>, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Relations Advantage | 10,696 | 359 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,547 | Sustainable FDI is the engine of global trade – unified governance is key. | González 13 [Anabel González (Senior Director of the World Bank Group Global Practice on Trade and Competitiveness, Senior International Consultant on Trade and Investment at the Inter-American Development Bank, served as Costa Rica’s Minister of Foreign Trade and the president's principal advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade and investment policy, LLM from Georgetown University), Introduction to “Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, 2013, www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf] | González 13 [Anabel González (Senior Director of the World Bank Group Global Practice on Trade and Competitiveness, Senior International Consultant on Trade and Investment at the Inter-American Development Bank, served as Costa Rica’s Minister of Foreign Trade and the president's principal advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade and investment policy, LLM from Georgetown University), Introduction to “Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, 2013, www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf] | FDI is a powerful instrument for growth and development. Its relevance is enhanced by its role as the crucial engine of trade, via global value chains, and by the critical need to increase investment flows to boost the global economy, create jobs, and promote knowledge and productivity enhancements. World Economic Forum Council on Global Trade decided to concentrate its work on Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity to identify ways to encourage more FDI in both developed and developing countries as a means of enhancing prosperity worldwide. The Council reached two main conclusions during its discussions: 1) different barriers and distortions are preventing the realization of the full potential of FDI and 2) the current fragmented governance of FDI contributes to the confusing landscape faced by investors and governments. Council Members hence make a strong case for negotiating an MAI. While this has been tried in the past without success, conditions have changed. The rise of emerging economies and the spread of GVCs have blurred the old North-South debates that doomed previous efforts. Today’s political, economic and technological conditions have created the right circumstances to pursue an MAI. | FDI is the crucial engine of trade, and the critical need to increase investment flows barriers prevent the realization of the full potential of FDI current fragmented governance of FDI contributes to the confusing landscape faced by investors and governments | FDI is a powerful instrument for growth and development. Its relevance is enhanced today by its role as the crucial engine of trade, via global value chains, and by the critical need to increase investment flows to boost the global economy, create jobs, and promote knowledge and productivity enhancements. With this in mind, the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade FDI decided to concentrate its work on Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The Council built on prior work to identify ways to encourage more FDI in both developed and developing countries as a means of enhancing prosperity worldwide. The Council – with the contribution of all Members – reached two main conclusions during its discussions: 1) different barriers and distortions are preventing the realization of the full potential of FDI and 2) the current fragmented governance of FDI contributes to the confusing landscape faced by investors and governments. Council Members hence make a strong case for negotiating an MAI. While they are mindful that this has been tried in the past without success, Members are convinced that conditions have changed. The rise of emerging economies and the spread of GVCs have blurred the old North-South debates that doomed previous efforts. Today’s political, economic and technological conditions have created the right circumstances to pursue an MAI. | 1,474 | <h4><strong>Sustainable FDI is the engine of global trade – unified governance is key.</h4><p>González 13<u> [Anabel González (Senior Director of the World Bank Group Global Practice on Trade and Competitiveness, Senior International Consultant on Trade and Investment at the Inter-American Development Bank, served as Costa Rica’s Minister of Foreign Trade and the president's principal advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade and investment policy, LLM from Georgetown University), Introduction to “Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, 2013, www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf]</p><p><mark>FDI</mark> is a powerful instrument for growth and development. Its relevance <mark>is</mark> enhanced</u></strong> today <u><strong>by its role as <mark>the crucial engine of trade,</mark> via global value chains, <mark>and</mark> by <mark>the critical need to increase investment flows</mark> to boost the global economy, create jobs, and promote knowledge and productivity enhancements.</u></strong> With this in mind, the <u><strong>World Economic Forum</u></strong> Global Agenda <u><strong>Council on Global Trade </u></strong>FDI <u><strong>decided to concentrate its work on Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity</u></strong>: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The Council built on prior work <u><strong>to identify ways to encourage more FDI in both developed and developing countries as a means of enhancing prosperity worldwide. The Council</u></strong> – with the contribution of all Members – <u><strong>reached two main conclusions during its discussions: 1) different <mark>barriers</mark> and distortions are <mark>prevent</mark>ing <mark>the realization of the full potential of FDI</mark> and 2) the <mark>current fragmented governance of FDI contributes to the confusing landscape faced by investors and governments</mark>. Council Members hence make a strong case for negotiating an MAI. While</u></strong> they are mindful that <u><strong>this has been tried in the past without success, </u></strong>Members are convinced that <u><strong>conditions have changed. The rise of emerging economies and the spread of GVCs have blurred the old North-South debates that doomed previous efforts. Today’s political, economic and technological conditions have created the right circumstances to pursue an MAI.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,938 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,548 | No means and motive | null | Nuclear terrorism is laughable—Mueller’s study proves it’s defunct—material can’t be made into a bomb, can’t bypass safeguards, no state sponsor, no tech, no funding, and necessarily large networks increase risk of capture and failure—all reasons groups wouldn’t pursue in first place- that’s 1NC Chapman | Given inability to do something simple it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something more ambitious argued Mueller the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small The events required comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks a group has to get a bomb or material If that were easy, one would have already gone missing those devices are radioactive scrap metal terrorists they would have to defeat arming codes and safeguards no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally Stealing 100 pounds of fuel would require help from individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their lives building a bomb It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools requires millions of dollars a safe haven advanced equipment people with specialized skills lots of time and willingness to die jihadists would have to deliver the weapon to America smugglers would confront plotters with exposure or extortion expanding the circle multiplying the chance someone will blab back out or screw up If al-Qaida embarks it has only a minuscule chance Given the odds, it probably won’t bother | likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small events comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks a group has to get material If that were easy, one would have already gone missing devices are radioactive scrap metal jihadists would have to deliver the weapon to America smugglers would confront plotters with exposure or extortion multiplying the chance someone will blab back out or screw up If al-Qaida embarks it has only a minuscule chance Given the odds, it won’t bother. | Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism” May 17 http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism]
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. | 2,354 | <h4>No means and motive</h4><p>Nuclear terrorism is laughable—Mueller’s study proves it’s defunct—material can’t be made into a bomb, can’t bypass safeguards, no state sponsor, no tech, no funding, and necessarily large networks increase risk of capture and failure—all reasons groups wouldn’t pursue in first place- that’s 1NC Chapman</p><p><strong>Chapman 12</strong> <strong>[Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism” May 17 http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism]</p><p><u></strong>Given</u> their <u>inability to do something simple</u> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — <u>it’s reasonable to ask whether</u> <u>they have a chance at something</u> much <u>more ambitious</u>. Far from being plausible, <u>argued</u> Ohio State University professor John <u>Mueller</u> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “<u>the <mark>likelihood </mark>that <mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb <strong>seems to be</mark> <mark>vanishingly small</u></strong></mark>.” <u>The <mark>events</mark> required</u> to make that happen <u><mark>comprise a <strong>multitude of Herculean tasks</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><mark>a</u></mark> terrorist <u><mark>group has to</u></mark> <u><mark>get</mark> a bomb or</u> fissile <u><mark>material</u></mark>, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. <u><mark>If that were easy, <strong>one would have already gone missing</u></strong></mark>. Besides, <u>those <mark>devices are</u></mark> probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “<u><strong><mark>radioactive scrap metal</u></strong></mark>.” If <u>terrorists</u> were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, <u>they would</u> still <u>have to defeat</u> the <u>arming codes and</u> other <u>safeguards</u> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, <u>no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an</u> <u>ally</u> — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. <u>Stealing</u> some <u>100 pounds of</u> bomb <u>fuel</u> <u>would require help</u> <u>from</u> rogue <u>individuals</u> <u>inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their</u> own <u>lives</u>. Then comes the task of <u>building</u> <u>a bomb</u>. <u>It’s</u> <u>not</u> <u>something</u> <u>you can gin up with spare parts and power tools</u> in your garage. It <u>requires millions of dollars</u>, <u>a safe haven</u> and<u> advanced equipment</u> — plus <u>people with specialized skills</u>, <u>lots of time</u> <u>and</u> a <u>willingness to die</u> for the cause. Assuming the <u><mark>jihadists</u></mark> vault over those Himalayas, they <u><mark>would have to deliver the weapon</u></mark> on<u><mark>to</u></mark> <u><mark>America</u></mark>n soil. Sure, drug <u><mark>smugglers</u></mark> bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help <u><mark>would confront</u></mark> the <u><mark>plotters with</u></mark> possible <u><strong><mark>exposure or extortion</u></strong></mark>. This, like every other step in the entire process, means <u>expanding the circle</u> of people who know what’s going on, <u><strong><mark>multiplying the chance someone will blab</u></mark>, <u><mark>back out</u></mark> <u><mark>or screw up</u></strong></mark>. That has heartening implications. <u><mark>If al-Qaida embarks</u></mark> on the project, <u><strong><mark>it</u></mark> <u><mark>has only a minuscule chance</u></strong></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><strong><mark>Given the</u></strong></mark> formidable <u><strong><mark>odds, it</strong></mark> probably <strong><mark>won’t bother</u>.</p></strong></mark> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 18,931 | 81 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,549 | They turn class into culture, displacing any serious challenge to the status quo in favor of seemingly-radical pseudo-politics | null | McLaren, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4 | Eager to take a detour around political economy, post-Marxists assume the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must be ‘cultural. post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ premised on uncovering relations of power in the arrangement of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized; in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate race, class, and gender’ class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have prevented them from considering the stark reality of global capitalism. the radical displacement of class analysis and the decentering of capitalism have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. difference’ has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and ignoring material difference. This posturing has been evident in theories of ‘race’ cultural studies have valorized racial difference’ in superstructuralist’ terms this treatment of ‘difference’ and claims about ‘the “ autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a distortion of Marxian analysis’ the ‘cultural’ is treated as separate and autonomous these narratives have produced autonomist and reified conceptualizations of difference which have reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with without a fundamental change in the relations of production’ arguing that ‘culture’ is shaped by material forces does not reinscribe deterministic’ Marxist theory. Marx contends there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This emphasizes Marx's understanding of capitalism as ‘social’ relation which stresses interpenetration of categories, the realities which reflect dialectical analysis of economics and society Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of cultural contestation contemporary theorizations have been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their collective identities. However they have also tended to redefine politics as a signifying activity displacing material sources of marginalization. In their rush to avoid economism post-Marxists have fallen prey to ahistorical culturalism which holds that cultural struggles external to class provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens We do not discount representation our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference culturalist arguments are deeply problematic de-emphasizing the totalizing power and function of capital and the centrality of class. theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx's materialist and historical formulations. ‘Difference’ needs to be understood in relation to political and economic organization. it is absurd to see ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class | post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ advancing interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ narratives post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing class formations and machinations of capitalist social organization class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized class is reduced to another form of ‘difference. rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have prevented them from considering global capitalism the displacement of class analysis and decentering of capitalism have had detrimental effects difference’ has tended to stress cultural dimensions while ignoring material difference claims about autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a distortion of Marxian analysis’ arguing culture’ is shaped by material forces does not reinscribe deterministic’ theory there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society This emphasizes capitalism as social’ relation Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ politics does not suggest disavowal of cultural contestation contemporary theorizations have tended to redefine politics as a signifying activity displacing material sources of marginalization post-Marxists have fallen prey to ahistorical culturalism which holds cultural struggles external to class provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics this has yielded pseudopolitics’ that has served to disempower real citizens culturalist arguments are deeply problematic de-emphasizing the power and function of capital and the centrality of class theorizations of ‘difference undermine systematic knowledge of material dimensions of difference it is necessary to (re)conceptualize difference’ by drawing on materialist formulations it is absurd to see ‘difference as historical consciousness unconnected to class formation | (Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)
Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, post-Marxists tend to assume that the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must necessarily be ‘cultural.’ As such, most, but not all post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ which is largely premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in the arrangement and deployment of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). Advocates of ‘difference’ politics therefore posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural configurations. However, post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized;’ in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate of ‘race, class, and gender’ in which class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ and seemingly blind to the ‘economic,’ the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have also prevented them from considering the stark reality of contemporary class conditions under global capitalism. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘difference’ has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and, in some cases, completely ignoring the economic and material dimensions of difference. This posturing has been quite evident in many ‘post-al’ theories of ‘race’ and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 cultural studies that have valorized an account of difference—particularly ‘racial difference’—in almost exclusively ‘superstructuralist’ terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of ‘difference’ and claims about ‘the “relative autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a reduction and distortion of Marxian class analysis’ which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure.’ It is then ‘relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations the ‘cultural’ is treated as a separate and autonomous sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of these ‘culturalist’ narratives have produced autonomist and reified conceptualizations of difference which ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ have, in effect, reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with (negotiated) on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production’ (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that arguing that ‘culture’ is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably ‘deterministic’ base/superstructure metaphor which has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, we invoke Marx's own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he contends that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This emphasizes Marx's understanding of capitalism and capital as a ‘social’ relation—one which stresses the interpenetration of these categories, the realities which they reflect, and one which therefore offers a unified and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics and society (see also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ and ‘representational’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation and struggle. We readily acknowledge the significance of contemporary theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘difference’ that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities. However, they have also tended to redefine politics as a signifying activity generally confined to the realm of ‘representation’ while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization. In their rush to avoid the ‘capital’ sin of ‘economism,’ many post-Marxists (who often ignore their own class privilege) have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism which holds, among other things, that cultural struggles external to class organizing provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics.3 In many respects, this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens (Turner, 1994, p. 410). We do not discount concerns over representation; rather our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that culturalist arguments are deeply problematic both in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing (yes totalizing!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class. In a proper historical materialist account, ‘culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts.4 ‘Post-al’ theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx's materialist and historical formulations. ‘Difference’ needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. We need to acknowledge that ‘otherness’ and/or difference is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced. In other words, since systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in specific contexts. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (1) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) how differences are produced out of, and lived within specific historical formations.5 | 8,873 | <h4>They turn class into culture, displacing any serious challenge to the status quo in favor of seemingly-radical pseudo-politics</h4><p>McLaren, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4</p><p>(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)</p><p><u>Eager to take a</u> wide <u>detour around political economy, post-Marxists</u> tend to <u>assume</u> that <u>the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must</u> necessarily <u>be ‘cultural.</u>’ As such, most, but not all <u><mark>post-Marxists have gravitated towards a <strong>politics of ‘difference’</u></strong></mark> which is largely <u>premised on uncovering relations of power</u> that reside <u>in the arrangement</u> and deployment <u>of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices</u> (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). Advocates of ‘difference’ politics therefore posit their ideas as bold steps forward in <u><mark>advancing</mark> the <mark>interests of those</mark> <mark>historically marginalized by ‘dominant’</mark> social and cultural <mark>narratives</mark>. </u>There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural configurations. However, <u><mark>post-Marxists have been <strong>woefully remiss</u></strong> <u>in addressing</mark> the constitution of <mark>class formations and</mark> the <mark>machinations of capitalist social organization</mark>. In some instances, capitalism and <mark>class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized</mark>;</u><strong>’</strong> <u>in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate</u> of ‘<u>race, class, and gender’</u> in which <u><mark>class is reduced to</mark> <strong>merely <mark>another form of ‘difference.</mark>’</u></strong> <u>Enamored with the ‘cultural’</u> and seemingly blind to the ‘economic,’ <u>the <mark>rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>prevented them from considering</strong></mark> the stark reality of</u> contemporary class conditions under <u><mark>global capitalism</mark>. </u>As we hope to show, <u><mark>the</mark> <strong>radical <mark>displacement</strong> of class analysis</u></mark> in contemporary theoretical narratives <u><mark>and</mark> the</u> concomitant <u><mark>decentering of capitalism</u></mark>, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, <u><mark>have had detrimental effects </mark>on ‘left’ theory and practice. </u>Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘<u><mark>difference’</u></mark> has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks <u><mark>has tended to stress</mark> its <mark>cultural dimensions while</mark> marginalizing and</u>, in some cases, completely <u><strong><mark>ignoring</u></strong></mark> the economic and <u><mark>material</u></mark> dimensions of <u><mark>difference</mark>. This posturing has been</u> quite <u>evident in</u> many ‘post-al’ <u>theories of ‘race’</u> and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 <u>cultural studies</u> that <u>have valorized</u> an account of difference—particularly ‘<u>racial difference’</u>—<u>in</u> almost exclusively ‘<u>superstructuralist’ terms</u> (Sahay, 1998). But <u>this treatment of ‘difference’ and <mark>claims about</mark> ‘the “</u>relative <u><mark>autonomy” of “race”’</mark> <mark>have been ‘enabled by a</u></mark> reduction and <u><strong><mark>distortion of Marxian</u></strong></mark> class <u><strong><mark>analysis’</u></strong></mark> which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure.’ It is then ‘relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations <u>the ‘cultural’ is treated as</u> a <u>separate and autonomous</u> sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of <u>these</u> ‘culturalist’ <u>narratives have produced autonomist and reified conceptualizations of difference which</u> ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ <u>have</u>, in effect, <u>reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with</u> (negotiated) on a discursive level <u>without a fundamental change in the relations of production’</u> (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that <u><mark>arguing</mark> that ‘<mark>culture’ is</u></mark> generally conditioned/<u><mark>shaped by material forces <strong>does not reinscribe</u></strong></mark> the simplistic and presumably ‘<u><strong><mark>deterministic’</u></strong></mark> base/superstructure metaphor which has plagued some strands of <u><strong>Marxist <mark>theory</mark>.</u></strong> Rather, we invoke <u>Marx</u>'s own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he <u>contends</u> that <u><mark>there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society</mark> in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. <mark>This emphasizes</mark> Marx's understanding of <mark>capitalism</u></mark> and capital <u><mark>as</u></mark> a <u>‘<mark>social’ relation</u></mark>—one <u>which stresses</u> the <u>interpenetration of</u> these <u>categories, the realities which</u> they <u>reflect</u>, and one which therefore offers a unified and <u>dialectical analysis of</u> history, ideology, culture, politics, <u>economics and society</u> (see also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 <u><mark>Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’</u></mark> and ‘representational’ <u><mark>politics does not suggest</mark> a <mark>disavowal of</u></mark> the importance of <u><mark>cultural</u></mark> and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of <u><mark>contestation</u></mark> and struggle. We readily acknowledge the significance of <u><mark>contemporary theorizations</u></mark> that <u>have</u> sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘difference’ that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly <u>been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their</u> individual and <u>collective identities.</u> <u><strong>However</u></strong>, <u>they <mark>have</mark> also <mark>tended to redefine</mark> <mark>politics as a signifying activity</u></mark> generally confined to the realm of ‘representation’ while <u><strong><mark>displacing</u></strong></mark> a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the <u><strong><mark>material sources of</u></strong></mark> political and economic <u><strong><mark>marginalization</mark>.</u></strong> <u>In their rush to avoid</u> the ‘capital’ sin of ‘<u>economism</u>,’ many <u><mark>post-Marxists</u></mark> (who often ignore their own class privilege) <u><mark>have fallen prey to</u></mark> an <u><strong><mark>ahistorical</u></strong></mark> form of <u><strong><mark>culturalism</u></strong> <u>which holds</u></mark>, among other things, <u>that <mark>cultural struggles external to class</u></mark> organizing <u><mark>provide the cutting edge of</mark> <mark>emancipatory politics</u></mark>.3 In many respects, <u><mark>this</mark> posturing, <mark>has yielded</mark> an ‘intellectual <strong><mark>pseudopolitics’</u></strong> <u>that has served to </mark>empower ‘the theorist while explicitly <mark>disempower</mark>ing’ <mark>real citizens</u></mark> (Turner, 1994, p. 410). <u>We do not discount</u> concerns over <u>representation</u>; rather <u>our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference</u> and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that <u><mark>culturalist arguments are <strong>deeply</mark> <mark>problematic</u></strong></mark> both in terms of their penchant for <u><mark>de-emphasizing the</mark> totalizing</u> (yes totalizing!) <u><mark>power and function of capital</u> <u>and</u></mark> for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>centrality of class</mark>.</u> In a proper historical materialist account, ‘culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts.4 ‘Post-al’ <u><mark>theorizations of ‘difference</mark>’ <strong>circumvent and <mark>undermine</u></strong></mark> <u>any <mark>systematic knowledge of</mark> the <mark>material dimensions of difference</mark> and</u> tend to <u>segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation</u> and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that <u><mark>it is necessary to (re)conceptualize</mark> ‘<mark>difference’ by drawing</mark> up<mark>on</mark> Marx's <mark>materialist</mark> and historical <mark>formulations</mark>.</u> <u>‘Difference’ needs to be understood</u> as the product of social contradictions and <u>in relation to political and economic organization. </u>We need to acknowledge that ‘otherness’ and/or difference is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced. In other words, since systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in specific contexts. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, <u><mark>it is</u></mark> equally <u><strong><mark>absurd</u></strong> <u>to see ‘difference as</mark> a <mark>historical</u></mark> <u>form of <mark>consciousness</mark> <mark>unconnected to class formation</u></mark>, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). <u>Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class</u> (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (1) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) how differences are produced out of, and lived within specific historical formations.5</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | TC - Generic | 46,572 | 863 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,550 | Our advantage is miscalculation – We’ll isolate 4 internal links | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Our advantage is miscalculation – We’ll isolate 4 internal links</h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,857 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,551 | Voting issue for limits and ground - allowing conditions explodes the topic because they allow the attachment of a condition on any external issue – they’re unpredictable and can be used to avoid politics links | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Voting issue for limits and ground - allowing conditions explodes the topic because they allow the attachment of a condition on <u>any external issue</u> – they’re unpredictable and can be used to avoid politics links</h4> | 1NC | T | null | 1,560,858 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,552 | Now is key – best economic analysis analyzes future trend lines and predicts long term declines of competitiveness – its try or die for the aff to get the US on long term growth patterns. | Huizinga 11/16/2016 | Huizinga, columnist for Opportunity Lives Citing the World Economic Forum, 11/16/2016 | http://opportunitylives.com/new-report-regulations-tax-rates-hurt-economic-competitiveness/
A new 400-page report by the World Economic Forum reveals the current state of economic competitiveness around the world and offers analysis on the trends that will determine the economic landscape of the future The report measures countries across three “subindexes,” each measured by a collection of “pillars The pillars cover everything from the state of infrastructure and primary education, to technological readiness and innovation As a new wave of technological convergence and digitalization materializes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, innovation and business sophistication are becoming increasingly important,” Even though its high competitiveness ranking is driven by high scores in innovation the United States still suffers in other major categories The United States did not place in the top 10 in any of those categories, and this could present a significant problem in the future if policy changes are not made. “Since 2007, the United States has been falling behind both in absolute and relative terms in infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and goods market efficiency In an increasingly global market, we have to implement policies that help us remain competitive. The costs of trying to seal the country off from the world would far outweigh the perceived benefits competitiveness of advanced and emerging economies alike will rest on a country’s future orientation and its ability to update skills, and on the regulations and social norms that promote entrepreneurship and welcome change, collaboration, and creativity,” the World Economic Forum said we have barely heard anything about economic competitiveness and policies that promote human flourishing, but these issues are crucial if we are to remain an economic powerhouse. | A new report by the W E F reveals the current state of competitiveness and offers analysis on trends that will determine the future innovation are becoming increasingly important Since 2007, the U S has been falling behind in absolute and relative terms In an increasingly global market, we have to help remain competitive costs of trying to seal the country off would outweigh the benefits competitiveness will rest on a country’s future orientation and its ability to update skills, and regulations competitiveness and policies that promote flourishing, are crucial if we are to remain an economic powerhouse | Daniel, “New Report: Regulations, Tax Rates Hurt Economic Competitiveness” http://opportunitylives.com/new-report-regulations-tax-rates-hurt-economic-competitiveness/
A new 400-page report by the World Economic Forum reveals the current state of economic competitiveness for almost 140 countries around the world and offers analysis on the trends that will determine the economic landscape of the future. The report measures countries across three “subindexes,” each measured by a collection of “pillars” that seek to understand how countries perform across a variety of variables. The pillars cover everything from the state of infrastructure and primary education, variables that measure a country’s basic requirements to attracting and training quality workers, to technological readiness and innovation, variables that describe how a country will drive efficiency and new developments in the future. “As a new wave of technological convergence and digitalization materializes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, innovation and business sophistication, understood as the process of creating new products and services and finding new ways to produce things, are becoming increasingly important,” the report says. Though the United States ranks third in overall competitiveness for the third consecutive year and performs well on the innovation measures, the country ranks a dismal 92nd in the world for total tax rate, a ranking that has fallen significantly in recent years. Switzerland and Singapore are the two countries ahead of United States in the competitiveness rankings, with Netherlands and Germany close behind. Top 15 Competitiveness Rankings The World Economic Forum also conducted an Executive Opinion Survey, asking 14,723 business executives in 141 economies to rank the most problematic factors for doing business in their country. In the United States, unsurprisingly, the top four answers all related to an inefficient and overreaching government: “tax rates, tax regulations, inefficient government bureaucracy, and restrictive labor regulations.” Even though its high competitiveness ranking is driven by high scores in innovation, the United States still suffers in other major categories, including institutions, macroeconomic environment, health, primary education, goods market efficiency, and technological adoption. The United States did not place in the top 10 in any of those categories, and this could present a significant problem in the future if policy changes are not made. “Since 2007, the United States has been falling behind both in absolute and relative terms in infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and goods market efficiency,” the report found. In an increasingly global market, we have to implement policies that help us remain competitive. The costs of trying to seal the country off from the world would far outweigh the perceived benefits. When Democrats push for high taxes to make companies “pay their fair share,” companies move jobs overseas to countries that rank much higher on business-friendly tax rates. “[T]he competitiveness of advanced and emerging economies alike will rest on a country’s future orientation and its ability to update skills, and on the regulations and social norms that promote entrepreneurship and welcome change, collaboration, and creativity,” the World Economic Forum said. In this election cycle, we have barely heard anything about economic competitiveness and policies that promote human flourishing, but these issues are crucial for the next president if we are to remain an economic powerhouse. | 3,588 | <h4>Now is key – best economic analysis analyzes future trend lines and predicts long term declines of competitiveness – its try or die for the aff to get the US on long term growth patterns. </h4><p><u><strong>Huizinga</u></strong>, columnist for Opportunity Lives Citing the World Economic Forum, <u><strong>11/16/2016</u></strong> </p><p>Daniel, “New Report: Regulations, Tax Rates Hurt Economic Competitiveness” <u><strong>http://opportunitylives.com/new-report-regulations-tax-rates-hurt-economic-competitiveness/</p><p><mark>A new</mark> 400-page <mark>report by the W</mark>orld <mark>E</mark>conomic <mark>F</mark>orum</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>reveals the current state of </mark>economic</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>competitiveness</u></strong></mark> for almost 140 countries <u><strong>around the world <mark>and offers analysis on</mark> the <mark>trends that will</mark> <mark>determine the</mark> economic landscape of the <mark>future</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The report measures countries across three “subindexes,” each measured by a collection of “pillars</u></strong>” that seek to understand how countries perform across a variety of variables. <u><strong>The pillars cover everything from the state of infrastructure and primary education,</u></strong> variables that measure a country’s basic requirements to attracting and training quality workers, <u><strong>to technological readiness and innovation</u></strong>, variables that describe how a country will drive efficiency and new developments in the future. “<u><strong>As a new wave of technological convergence and digitalization materializes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, <mark>innovation</mark> and business sophistication</u></strong>, understood as the process of creating new products and services and finding new ways to produce things, <u><strong><mark>are becoming increasingly important</mark>,” </u></strong>the report says. Though the United States ranks third in overall competitiveness for the third consecutive year and performs well on the innovation measures, the country ranks a dismal 92nd in the world for total tax rate, a ranking that has fallen significantly in recent years. Switzerland and Singapore are the two countries ahead of United States in the competitiveness rankings, with Netherlands and Germany close behind. Top 15 Competitiveness Rankings The World Economic Forum also conducted an Executive Opinion Survey, asking 14,723 business executives in 141 economies to rank the most problematic factors for doing business in their country. In the United States, unsurprisingly, the top four answers all related to an inefficient and overreaching government: “tax rates, tax regulations, inefficient government bureaucracy, and restrictive labor regulations.” <u><strong>Even though its high competitiveness ranking is driven by high scores in innovation</u></strong>, <u><strong>the United States still suffers in other major categories</u></strong>, including institutions, macroeconomic environment, health, primary education, goods market efficiency, and technological adoption. <u><strong>The United States did not place in the top 10 in any of those categories, and this could present a significant problem in the future if policy changes are not made. “<mark>Since 2007, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has been falling behind</mark> both <mark>in absolute and relative terms</mark> in infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and goods market efficiency</u></strong>,” the report found. <u><strong><mark>In an</mark> <mark>increasingly global market, we have to</mark> implement policies that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>help</mark> us <mark>remain competitive</mark>. The <mark>costs of trying to seal the country off</mark> from the world <mark>would</mark> far <mark>outweigh the </mark>perceived <mark>benefits</u></strong></mark>. When Democrats push for high taxes to make companies “pay their fair share,” companies move jobs overseas to countries that rank much higher on business-friendly tax rates. “[T]he <u><strong><mark>competitiveness</mark> of advanced and emerging economies alike <mark>will rest on a country’s future orientation and its</mark> <mark>ability to update skills, and</mark> on the <mark>regulations</mark> and social norms that promote entrepreneurship and welcome change, collaboration, and creativity,” the World Economic Forum said</u></strong>. In this election cycle, <u><strong>we have barely heard anything about economic <mark>competitiveness and</mark> <mark>policies that promote</mark> human <mark>flourishing,</mark> but these issues <mark>are crucial</u></strong></mark> for the next president <u><strong><mark>if we are to</mark> <mark>remain an economic powerhouse</mark>.</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 1,559,386 | 11 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,553 | Finally, increasing engagement over civil space will spill over to create a stronger overall relationship, preventing war through miscalculation. | Weeden 15 — | Weeden 15 — Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S. Air Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations and policy (“An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship” 9/9, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602 | The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries Space was a stabilizing element in the relationship between the U S and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding th trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict
Some of China’s new capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the U S
There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems
there are concrete steps that the U S and China can take to work toward positive engagement
The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis
Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other countries Space weather, scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are all areas where the U S and China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the military realm
The consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real. A future conflict in space between the U S and China would have devastating impacts the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all | null | The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding the “Thucydides trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict.
The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship
Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States’ ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic congestion and interference.
Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASA’s successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of China’s new capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the United States and other countries.
The massive changes in the space domain and China’s growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities.
Recommendations for Managing Tensions and Promoting Positive Engagement
Despite these challenges and concerns, there are concrete steps that the United States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement. In 2011, President Barack Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation.
President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space. Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis.
Second, Presidents Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. Space weather, scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are all areas where the United States and China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the military realm.
In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First and foremost, it should get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve and also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how Washington develops and organizes national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to diversify and augment governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities.
Second, the United States should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space situational awareness (SSA) data available to satellite operators and the public. Greater transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in space and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust, improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior.
The consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real. A future conflict in space between the United States and China would have devastating impacts on everyone who uses and relies on space. Both the United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict and have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together, the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all. | 7,464 | <h4><u>Finally</u>, increasing engagement over civil space will spill over to create a stronger <u>overall</u> relationship, preventing war through miscalculation.</h4><p><strong>Weeden 15 — </strong>Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S. Air Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations and policy (“An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship” 9/9, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602</p><p><u>The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger <strong>overall</strong> relationship between the two countries</u>. <u>Space was</u> arguably <u>a stabilizing element in the relationship between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration</u>. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, <u>taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding th</u>e “Thucydides <u>trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict</u>.</p><p>The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship</p><p>Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States’ ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic congestion and interference.</p><p>Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASA’s successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. <u>Some of China’s new capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and other countries.</p><p>The massive changes in the space domain and China’s growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. <u>There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled</u> in part <u>by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems</u>. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities.</p><p>Recommendations for Managing Tensions and Promoting Positive Engagement</p><p>Despite these challenges and concerns, <u>there are concrete steps that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China can take to</u> manage tensions and possibly even <u>work toward <strong>positive engagement</u></strong>. In 2011, President Barack Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation.</p><p>President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. <u>The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security</u>. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space. <u>Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space</u>. <u>Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to unwittingly take actions that <strong>escalate a crisis</u></strong>.</p><p>Second, Presidents <u>Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth</u>. <u>Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other countries</u> in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. <u>Space weather, scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are all areas where the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other interested countries to help establish <strong>broader relationships outside the military realm</u></strong>.</p><p>In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First and foremost, it should get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve and also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how Washington develops and organizes national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to diversify and augment governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities.</p><p>Second, the United States should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space situational awareness (SSA) data available to satellite operators and the public. Greater transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in space and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust, improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior.</p><p><u>The consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real. A future conflict in space between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China would have devastating impacts</u> on everyone who uses and relies on space. Both the United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict and have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together, <u>the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all</u>.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Relations Advantage | 13,651 | 271 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,554 | Trade creates economic dis-incentives for conflict – multiple empirical studies confirm a positive correlation between trade with peace. | Griswold 11 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf] | Griswold 11 [Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf] | Our globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” , trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world means ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy , deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. free trade has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources assets cannot be easily seized by armies. hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important If people need resources outside their national borders, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable our time is one of relative world peace. the number of armed conflicts has dropped sharply in the past two decades. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed the Human Security Centre documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. Gartzke compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. economic freedom significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions | globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend The number wars has dropped sharply the spread of trade have played a key role. Trade unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace trade have reinforced the trend towards democracy trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. nations have more to lose War in a globalized world impose lasting damage on the economy free trade has reduced the spoils of war. The notion of another major war is unimaginable. Through econometric analysis the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” by 20 percent | Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. | 7,315 | <h4>Trade creates economic dis-incentives for conflict – multiple empirical studies confirm a positive correlation between trade with peace.</h4><p><strong>Griswold 11</strong> [Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 <u><strong>http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf]</p><p></strong>Our </u>more<u> <mark>globalized world has also yielded a “<strong>peace dividend</u></strong></mark>.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world.<u> <mark>The number</mark> of civil and international <mark>wars has <strong>dropped sharply</strong></mark> in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths</u>. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again<u> <strong><mark>the spread of trade</mark> and globalization <mark>have played a key role.</u></strong> <u><strong>Trade</mark> has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries.</u></strong> In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that<u> “<mark>unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace</mark>; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” </u>Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First<u>, <mark>trade</mark> and globalization <mark>have reinforced the <strong>trend towards democracy</strong></mark>, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that <mark>trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war.</mark> As national economies become more intertwined, those <mark>nations have <strong>more to lose</strong></mark> should war break out. <mark>War in a globalized world</u></mark> not only<u> means </u>the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also<u> ruptured trade and investment ties that <mark>impose <strong>lasting damage on the economy</u></strong></mark>. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently<u>, deepening economic ties between Mainland <strong>China and Taiwan</strong> are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace.</u> Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that<u> reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. </u>A third reason why<u> <mark>free trade</mark> </u>promotes peace is because it<u> <mark>has <strong>reduced the spoils of war.</strong></mark> Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources</u>. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such <u>assets cannot be easily seized by armies.</u> In contrast, <u>hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important </u>in high-tech, service economies. <u>If people need resources outside their national borders,</u> say oil or timber or farm products, <u>they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home</u>. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. <u><mark>The notion of another major war</mark> between France, Germany and another Western European powers <mark>is <strong>unimaginable</u></strong>.</mark> Compared to past eras, <u><strong>our time is one of relative world peace. </u></strong>According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <u>the number of armed conflicts </u>around the world <u>has dropped sharply in the past two decades. </u>Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. <u>In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states</u>: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. <u>Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed </u>in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is <u>the Human Security Centre </u>at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it <u>documented a <strong>sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers</strong> in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. </u>Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but <u><strong>expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace.</u></strong> In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik<u> Gartzke </u>of Columbia University <u>compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom.</u> He came to the conclusion that <u>economic freedom</u>, including the freedom to trade, <u>significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. <mark>Through <strong>econometric analysis</strong></mark>, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. </u>At the extremes, <u><mark>the <strong>least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone</strong></mark> as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor </u>in Bonn, Germany, <u>found the <strong>same pacific effect of trade</strong> and globalization. </u>Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that <u>“<strong><mark>trading nations cooperate more and fight less</strong>.”</u></mark> In fact,<u> a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict <mark>by <strong>20 percent</strong></mark>. </u>Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. <u>A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions </u>– the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – <u>are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions</u>. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,945 | 135 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,555 | Capitalism causes extinction and structural violence | Brown 05 | Brown 05
(Charles Brown, Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan] May 13th 2005 (http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.htm) | The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or exacerbates all major social ills of our times. . The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Threats to the environment continue to spiral, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology . The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S. | These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits cap class as a whole can do that by extracting a greater surplus from unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation cap econ development happens if it is profitable to the individual cap not for any social need or good profit drive is inherent in cap and underlies or exacerbates social ills of our times working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of cap chronic problems become part of the objective conditions confront each new generation of working peopl Threats to environment continue to spiral, threatening life on our planet Millions of people continuously live below poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger Racism remains th potent weapon to divide working people Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capi every year due to unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable valu Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology | The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or exacerbates all major social ills of our times. With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to spiral, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most workers experience long years of stagnant real wages, while health and education costs soar. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S. | 5,647 | <h4><strong>Capitalism causes extinction and structural violence</h4><p>Brown 05</p><p><u>(Charles Brown, Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan] May 13th 2005 (http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.htm)</p><p></strong>The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life.</u> Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. <u><mark>These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class.</mark> <mark>Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits</mark>. The <mark>cap</mark>italist <mark>class as a whole can do that</mark> only <mark>by extracting a greater surplus from</mark> the <mark>unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation</mark>. Under <mark>cap</mark>italism, <mark>econ</mark>omic <mark>development happens</mark> only <mark>if it is profitable to the individual cap</mark>italists, <mark>not for any social need or good</mark>. The <mark>profit drive is inherent in cap</mark>italism, <mark>and underlies or exacerbates</mark> all major <mark>social ills of our times</mark>.</u> With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit<u>. The <mark>working people of our country confront serious,</mark> <mark>chronic problems because of cap</mark>italism. These <mark>chronic problems become part of the objective conditions</mark> that <mark>confront each new generation of working peopl</mark>e. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end.</u> Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. <u><mark>Threats</mark> <mark>to</mark> the <mark>environment continue to spiral, threatening</mark> all <mark>life</mark> <mark>on our planet</mark>. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions</u>. Most workers experience long years of stagnant real wages, while health and education costs soar. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. <u><mark>Millions of people continuously live below</mark> the <mark>poverty level;</mark> <mark>many suffer homelessness and hunger</mark>. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. <mark>Racism remains th</mark>e most <mark>potent weapon to divide working people</mark>. <mark>Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capi</mark>talists <mark>every year due to</mark> the <mark>unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable valu</mark>e</u>. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and <u>other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. <mark>Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to</mark>. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack.</u> These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. <u>These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power</u>. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. <u><mark>Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology</u></mark> perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women<u>. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.</p></u> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | TC - Generic | 77,822 | 51 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,556 | 3. Their impact is irresponsible fearmongering – there is NO capacity for terrorists to acquire and execute a nuclear attack | null | -No Risk of a terror attack- their evidence is all hype and alarmist- it’s too difficult for them to make- | Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths This description scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death case studies certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales Islamist militants are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively plotters in the cases targeting the United States were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience | Terrorists description scarcely describes the vast majority of individuals picked up on terrorism charges would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in security meticulous self-sufficient disciplined and psychologically tough case studies do not abound people with such characteristics no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the U S militants are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn difficulties of coordination that threaten operational ability to act collectively plotters targeting the U S were nothing more than wild fantasies target selection is a random process, lacking planning | -Coordination- creating a nuclear weapon requires extreme coordination- they don’t have the ability to act collectively and collaboratively, are poor at planning and very prone to making mistakes- they know that the weapons can go off any second if they make even the slightest error and won’ take that risk
-Knowledge- they don’t have the know-how and even if they did, are very limited in their capacity to learn.
-Prefer our evidence- it contains multiple studies from over a decade whereas theirs is filled with “What if” and “in the slight chance” scenarios- prefer empirics over worst case scenarios because our claims are actually backed up by warrants and statistics from the past- I’ll even read you a line from their card
Mueller and Stewart 12 (John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 | 6,486 | <h4>3. Their impact is <u>irresponsible fearmongering</u> – there is NO capacity for terrorists to acquire and execute a nuclear attack</h4><p>-No Risk of a terror attack- their evidence is all hype and alarmist- it’s too difficult for them to make- </p><p>-Coordination- creating a nuclear weapon requires extreme coordination- they don’t have the ability to act collectively and collaboratively, are poor at planning and very prone to making mistakes- they know that the weapons can go off any second if they make even the slightest error and won’ take that risk</p><p>-Knowledge- they don’t have the know-how and even if they did, are very limited in their capacity to learn. </p><p>-Prefer our evidence- it contains multiple studies from over a decade whereas theirs is filled with “What if” and “in the slight chance” scenarios- prefer empirics over worst case scenarios because our claims are actually backed up by warrants and statistics from the past- I’ll even read you a line from their card</p><p><strong>Mueller and Stewart 12</strong> (John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf</p><p>In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. <u><mark>Terrorists</mark> have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths</u>.”8¶ <u>This <mark>description</u></mark> may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it <u><mark>scarcely describes the vast majority of</mark> those <mark>individuals picked up on terrorism charges</u></mark> in the United States since those attacks. <u>The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme</u>.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, <u><mark>would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized </mark>enough to die for their cause; <mark>Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in</mark> the <mark>security</mark> apparatus; <mark>meticulous </mark>enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; <mark>self-sufficient </mark>enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; <mark>disciplined </mark>enough to maintain complete secrecy;<mark> and</mark>—above all—<mark>psychologically tough </mark>enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death</u>.”10 The <u><mark>case studies</u></mark> examined in this article <u>certainly <mark>do not abound </mark>with <mark>people with such characteristics</u></mark>. ¶ In the eleven years <u>since the September 11 attacks, <mark>no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, <u>the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire</u>—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ <u>The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales</u>. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, <u>Islamist <mark>militants</u></mark> in those locations <u><mark>are <strong>operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn</u></strong></mark>.13 <u>Another study documents the <mark>difficulties of </mark>network <mark>coordination that</mark> continually <mark>threaten </mark>the terrorists’ <mark>operational </mark>unity, trust, cohesion, and <mark>ability to act collectively</u></mark>.14¶ In addition, although some of the <u><mark>plotters</mark> in the cases <mark>targeting the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u> harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all <u><strong><mark>were nothing more than wild fantasies</strong></mark>, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives</u>. Indeed, in many of the cases, <u><mark>target selection is </mark>effectively <mark>a random process, lacking </mark>guile and careful <mark>planning</u></mark>. <u>Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience</u>. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15</p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 49,533 | 95 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,557 | First is Military Assets – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>First is <u>Military Assets</u> – </h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,859 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,558 | India and China are competing for maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean and the brink is now – flashpoint tension in the region and the US Asian pivot strategy make conflict escalation infinitely more probable | Albert 15 | Albert 11/23/15 [Eleanor Albert is an online writer/editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, the premier group in analyzing foreign policy. Albert, Eleanor. "Competition in the Indian Ocean." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 23 Nov. 2015. Web. 05 May 2016.] [AB] | AND
could play a significant role in counterbalancing China. | null | Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?China and India are dependent
AND
Japan are calculated moves that could play a significant role in counterbalancing China. | 170 | <h4>India and China are competing for maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean and the brink is now – flashpoint tension in the region and the US Asian pivot strategy make conflict escalation infinitely more probable</h4><p><strong>Albert</strong> 11/23/<strong>15</strong> [Eleanor Albert is an online writer/editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, the premier group in analyzing foreign policy. Albert, Eleanor. "Competition in the Indian Ocean." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 23 Nov. 2015. Web. 05 May 2016.] [AB]</p><p>Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?China and India are dependent </p><p><u>AND</p><p></u>Japan are calculated moves that<u> <strong>could play a significant role in counterbalancing China</strong>.</p></u> | 1NC | Indian Ocean DA | null | 1,560,861 | 8 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,559 | Contention Two is Space Leadership. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Contention Two is Space Leadership</u>.</h4> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 1,560,860 | 1 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,560 | Sustaining US economic growth is key to prevent conflicts and creates stable deterrents – slow growth undermines global stability. | Haass 13 | Haass 13 (Richard N, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, “The World Without America,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass) | The most critical threat facing the U S for the foreseeable future is not China North Korea Iran terrorism, the biggest challenges are its debt infrastructure and slow economic growth the domestic foundations of American power America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase boosting growth around the world when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing only the US has the potential to drive global economic recovery the US has been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding the world faces serious challenges from the spread of weapons of mass destruction a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating cyberspace improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out Smith’s “invisible hand is powerless in the world of geopolitics Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges multilateralism is much easier to advocate than implement now there is only one candidate for this role: the US No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook the US must put its house in order economically if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world The alternative is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but a world that is not led at all characterized by chronic crisis and conflict for the planet | The critical threat is slow economic growth the foundations of American power If US growth accelerates capacity to consume will increase boosting growth around the world only the US has potential to drive global recovery the US has been a example of what democratic politics can accomplish governments are far more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding spread of w m d trade regulating cyber , and armed conflicts will not sort themselves out Order requires leadership to formulate global responses No other country has the capability the US must put its house in order economically to have the resources to promote order The alternative is not a world led by China, but a world not led at all characterized by conflict for the planet | Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out. While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants. | 4,523 | <h4>Sustaining US economic growth is key to prevent conflicts and creates stable deterrents – slow growth undermines global stability. </h4><p><u><strong>Haass 13</u></strong> (Richard N, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, “The World Without America,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass)</p><p>Let me posit a radical idea: <u><strong><mark>The</mark> most <mark>critical threat</mark> facing the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates now and <u><strong>for the foreseeable future <mark>is </mark>not</u></strong> a rising <u><strong>China</u></strong>, a reckless <u><strong>North Korea</u></strong>, a nuclear <u><strong>Iran</u></strong>, modern <u><strong>terrorism, </u></strong>or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, <u><strong>the biggest challenges</u></strong> facing the US <u><strong>are its</u></strong> burgeoning <u><strong>debt</u></strong>, crumbling <u><strong>infrastructure</u></strong>, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>slow economic growth</u></strong></mark> – in short, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>domestic <mark>foundations of American power</u></strong></mark>. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. <u><strong>America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price</u></strong>. Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. <u><strong><mark>If US growth accelerates</mark>, America’s <mark>capacity to consume</mark> other countries’ goods and services <mark>will increase</u></strong></mark>, thereby <u><strong><mark>boosting growth around the world</u></strong></mark>. At a time <u><strong>when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>only the US</u></strong></mark> (or, more broadly, North America) <u><strong><mark>has</mark> the <mark>potential to</u></strong> <u><strong>drive global</mark> economic <mark>recovery</u></strong></mark>. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, <u><strong><mark>the US has</u></strong></mark> long <u><strong><mark>been a</mark> leading <mark>example of what</mark> market economies and <mark>democratic politics can accomplish</u></strong></mark>. People and <u><strong><mark>governments</mark> around the world <mark>are far more</mark> likely to become more <mark>open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding</u></strong></mark>. Finally, <u><strong>the world faces</u></strong> many <u><strong>serious challenges</u></strong>, ranging <u><strong>from</u></strong> the need to halt <u><strong>the <mark>spread of w</mark>eapons of <mark>m</mark>ass <mark>d</mark>estruction</u></strong>, fight climate change, and maintain <u><strong>a functioning world economic order that promotes <mark>trade</mark> and investment to <mark>regulating</u></strong></mark> practices in <u><strong><mark>cyber</mark>space</u></strong>, <u><strong>improving global health<mark>, and</mark> preventing <mark>armed conflicts</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>These problems <mark>will not</mark> simply go away or <mark>sort themselves out</u></strong></mark>. While Adam <u><strong>Smith’s “invisible hand</u></strong>” may ensure the success of free markets, it <u><strong>is</u></strong> <u><strong>powerless in the world of geopolitics</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Order requires</mark> the visible hand of <mark>leadership</u></strong> <u><strong>to formulate</mark> and realize <mark>global responses</mark> to global challenges</u></strong>. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But <u><strong>multilateralism is much easier to advocate than</u></strong> to design and <u><strong>implement</u></strong>. Right <u><strong>now there is only one candidate for this role:</u></strong> <u><strong>the US</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>No other country</u></strong> <u><strong>has the</mark> necessary combination of <mark>capability</mark> and outlook</u></strong>. This brings me back to the argument that <u><strong><mark>the US must put its house in order</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong><mark>economically</u></strong></mark>, physically, socially, and politically – <u><strong>if it is <mark>to have the</u></strong> <u><strong>resources</mark> needed <mark>to promote order</mark> in the world</u></strong>. Everyone should hope that it does: <u><strong><mark>The alternative</u></strong></mark> to a world led by the US <u><strong><mark>is not a world led by China, </mark>Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, <mark>but</u></strong></mark> rather <u><strong><mark>a world</mark> that is <mark>not led at all</u></strong></mark>. Such a world would almost certainly be <u><strong><mark>characterized by</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>chronic crisis and<mark> conflict</u></strong></mark>. That would be bad not just for Americans, but <u><strong><mark>for the</u></strong> </mark>vast<u><strong><mark> </u></strong></mark>majority of the <u><strong><mark>planet</u></strong></mark>’s inhabitants.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 32,893 | 453 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,561 | US-China relations are crashing now – progress on economics is possible and necessary. | Mayeda & Mohsin 16 | Mayeda & Mohsin 16. (Andrew Mayeda, Global economy reporter for Bloomberg News. Saleha Mohsin, MA Journalism, reporter for Bloomberg. Complicated U.S.-China Dance Could Be Headed for Rough Turn. May 23, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-23/complicated-u-s-china-dance-could-be-headed-for-rough-turn) | economic relations between the U.S. and China may be poised to enter a new period of turbulence. American presidential candidates are pledging a tougher stand against the Communist-controlled nation, China’s top central banker is approaching retirement and the nation’s leaders are struggling to manage a shift to a new growth model. There’s definitely a clear momentum in the wrong direction,” “The level of trust is somewhere near scraping the bottom.” There’s no clear leader in the U.S. administration on U.S.-China relations The dialogue has established Lew and Kerry as leaders of their respective tracks, and various people have helped “put us in a position to make progress with regard to the bilateral relationship,” | economic relations between the U.S. and China may be poised to enter a new period of turbulence “There’s momentum in the wrong direction The level of trust is scraping the bottom.” put us in a position to make progress with regard to the bilateral relationship,” | Complicated in the best of times, economic relations between the U.S. and China may be poised to enter a new period of turbulence. American presidential candidates are pledging a tougher stand against the Communist-controlled nation, China’s top central banker is approaching retirement and the nation’s leaders are struggling to manage a shift to a new growth model. A daunting set of challenges awaits the next American president, whether it’s Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump: questions about China’s commitment not to devalue its currency amid persistent capital outflows, stalled negotiations on a trade deal that would make it easier for U.S. companies to invest in China, and concern about Chinese piracy of U.S. intellectual property. That’s not to mention hostility toward China among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and tensions on foreign-policy issues such as cyber-security and the military balance of power in the South China Sea. ‘Wrong Direction’ “There’s definitely a clear momentum in the wrong direction,” said Scott Kennedy, a China scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “The level of trust is somewhere near scraping the bottom.” That’s the backdrop for the Obama administration’s last major bilateral confab with China. Lew and Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Beijing for talks June 6-7 under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a forum for discussions between the two powers. Former president George W. Bush and then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao started the dialogue in 2006, with a focus on economic relations. In 2009, Obama and Hu added a separate foreign-policy track to the talks, led by State Department officials and their Chinese counterparts. Some observers say the talks appear to be drifting. “There’s no clear leader in the U.S. administration on U.S.-China relations,” said David Loevinger, a former China specialist at the Treasury and now an analyst at fund manager TCW Group Inc. in Los Angeles. “Lew’s done a good job, Kerry’s done a good job, but there’s no point person.” Such an assertion is wrong, said Wally Adeyemo, President Barack Obama’s deputy national security adviser for international economics. The dialogue has established Lew and Kerry as leaders of their respective tracks, and various people have helped “put us in a position to make progress with regard to the bilateral relationship,” Adeyemo said in an interview. | 2,434 | <h4><strong>US-China relations are crashing now – progress on economics is <u>possible</u> and <u>necessary</u>.</h4><p>Mayeda & Mohsin 16</strong>. (Andrew Mayeda, Global economy reporter for Bloomberg News. Saleha Mohsin, MA Journalism, reporter for Bloomberg. Complicated U.S.-China Dance Could Be Headed for Rough Turn. May 23, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-23/complicated-u-s-china-dance-could-be-headed-for-rough-turn<u>)</p><p></u>Complicated in the best of times, <u><strong><mark>economic relations between the U.S. and China may be poised to enter a new period of turbulence</mark>. American presidential candidates are pledging a tougher stand against the Communist-controlled nation, China’s top central banker is approaching retirement and the nation’s leaders are struggling to manage a shift to a new growth model.</u></strong> A daunting set of challenges awaits the next American president, whether it’s Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump: questions about China’s commitment not to devalue its currency amid persistent capital outflows, stalled negotiations on a trade deal that would make it easier for U.S. companies to invest in China, and concern about Chinese piracy of U.S. intellectual property. That’s not to mention hostility toward China among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and tensions on foreign-policy issues such as cyber-security and the military balance of power in the South China Sea. ‘Wrong Direction’ <mark>“<u><strong>There’s</mark> definitely a clear <mark>momentum in the wrong direction</mark>,”</u></strong> said Scott Kennedy, a China scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. <u><strong>“<mark>The level of trust is</mark> somewhere near <mark>scraping the bottom.”</u></strong></mark> That’s the backdrop for the Obama administration’s last major bilateral confab with China. Lew and Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Beijing for talks June 6-7 under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a forum for discussions between the two powers. Former president George W. Bush and then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao started the dialogue in 2006, with a focus on economic relations. In 2009, Obama and Hu added a separate foreign-policy track to the talks, led by State Department officials and their Chinese counterparts. Some observers say the talks appear to be drifting. “<u><strong>There’s no clear leader in the U.S. administration on U.S.-China relations</u></strong>,” said David Loevinger, a former China specialist at the Treasury and now an analyst at fund manager TCW Group Inc. in Los Angeles. “Lew’s done a good job, Kerry’s done a good job, but there’s no point person.” Such an assertion is wrong, said Wally Adeyemo, President Barack Obama’s deputy national security adviser for international economics. <u><strong>The dialogue has established Lew and Kerry as leaders of their respective tracks, and various people have helped “<mark>put us in a position to make progress with regard to the bilateral relationship,”</u></mark> Adeyemo said in an interview.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 160,949 | 12 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
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2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,562 | 1 in 3.5 million risk—data proves | Mueller ‘11 | Mueller ‘11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show) | new information unearthed in bin Laden's hideout suggests that Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric , its potential as a menace, particularly an atomic one, has been much inflated The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction was $2,000 al Qaeda computers al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. such fulminations have clearly lacked substance no true al Qaeda cell has been found exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. , no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. | new info unearthed in bin Laden's hideout suggests that al Qaeda's potential as atomic has been inflated the budget for research was $2,000 it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the group has the time inclination, money to staff a operation as well as facility to fabricate a bomb. It requires trusting corrupted collaborators obtaining and transporting highly guarded material and rolling the cumbersome, and untested product into position all the while attracting no attention no extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the U S in the last ten years the likelihood stands at one in 3.5 million per year | As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. | 5,743 | <h4>1 in 3.5 million risk—data proves</h4><p><strong>Mueller ‘11</strong>—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page<u>=show)</p><p></u>As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The <u><mark>new info</mark>rmation <mark>unearthed in</u></mark> Osama <u><mark>bin Laden's hideout</u></mark> in Abbottabad, Pakistan, <u><mark>suggests that</u></mark> the United States has been doing so for a full decade. <u>Whatever <mark>al Qaeda's </mark>threatening rhetoric</u> and occasional nuclear fantasies<u>, its <mark>potential as </mark>a menace, particularly</u> as <u>an <mark>atomic </mark>one, <mark>has been </mark>much <mark>inflated</u></mark>. <u>The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack</u>. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that <u><mark>the</mark> group's <mark>budget for research </mark>on weapons of mass destruction</u> (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) <u><mark>was</mark> </u>some <u><mark>$2,000</u></mark> to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more <u>al Qaeda computers</u>, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that <u>al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are</u>. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but <u><mark>it seems <strong>breathtakingly unlikely</strong> that the </mark>miserable little <mark>group</mark> <mark>has </mark>had <mark>the time </mark>or <mark>inclination, </mark>let alone the <mark>money</mark>, <mark>to</mark> set up and <mark>staff</mark> <mark>a</mark> uranium-seizing <mark>operation</mark>, <mark>as well as</mark> a fancy, super-high-tech <mark>facility</mark> <mark>to fabricate a bomb. It </mark>is a process that <mark>requires trusting corrupted</mark> foreign <mark>collaborators</mark> and other criminals, <mark>obtaining and transporting highly guarded material</mark>, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, <mark>and rolling the </mark>heavy, <mark>cumbersome, and untested</mark> finished <mark>product into position</mark> to be detonated by a skilled crew, <mark>all the while attracting no attention</mark> from outsiders. </u>The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, <u>such fulminations have clearly lacked substance</u>. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, <u>no true al Qaeda cell has been found</u> in the country since 9/11 and <u>exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization.</u> The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed<u>, <mark>no</mark> Muslim <mark>extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>in the last ten years</u></mark>, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. <u>Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat</u>. And <u><mark>the likelihood </mark>that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk <mark>stands at one in 3.5 million per year</mark>, even with 9/11 included.</p></u> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 58,581 | 42 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
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3,783,563 | 3. Capitalism is the root cause of war | null | Dr. David Adams, 2002, former UNESCO Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, former Professor of Psychology (for 23 years) at Wesleyan University, specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behavior and the evolution of war, “Chapter 8: The Root Causes of War,” The American Peace Movements, p. 22-28, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-22.html | it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that war is caused by a "war instinct." and anthropological data indicate that there is no such thing as a war instinct Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace he six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars were inevitable military results of a new foreign policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force to help overthrow the government of Hawaii in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898 American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation how major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadership when the economy collapsed the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." "an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As The question of foreign economic policy was the extension and expansion of American capitalism The Vietnam War was a continuation of prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system similar war in Korea the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war , there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet . Wars are likely to continue because, , their economic causes remain as strong as ever cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist economic rivalry for foreign markets the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex Although the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan, Philippines there seems little doubt that there are economic motives involved as well, including the control of oil resources from Central Asia as a supplement to those of the Middle the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. appears at some level to be intended as an increase in government spending to The American peace movements have been reactive in the past . The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. | it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that war is caused by instinct." data indicate that there is no such thing The Spanish-American Wars were inevitable results of a policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires to help overthrow the government of Hawai intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadersh industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation The Vietnam War, was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." . The military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition he military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector because through subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits this endanger the security of the planet Wars are likely to continue because their economic causes remain strong cyclical crises of unemployment exploitation of poor countries economic rivalry for foreign markets inancial speculation of the military-industrial complex the "war against terrorism" are economic motives including the control of oil resources from Central Asia , the military-industrial complex appears to be an increase in government spending | To take a scientific attitude about war and peace, we must carry the causal analysis a step further. If peace movements are caused by wars and war threats, then we must ask, what are the causes of these wars, both in the short term and in the long term? Before analyzing the causes of wars, it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that has been popularized in recent years, the myth that war is caused by a "war instinct." The best biological and anthropological data indicate that there is no such thing as a war instinct despite the attempt of the mass media and educational systems to perpetuate this myth. Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace" (note 15). Since there are several kinds of war, it is likely that there are several different kinds of causes for war. There are two kinds of war in which the United States has not been engaged for over two centuries. The first are wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution or today's revolutions in Nicaragua and South Africa being waged by the Sandinistas and the African National Congress. The second are wars of revolution in which the previous ruling class is thrown out and replaced by another. In the British and French Revolutions of earlier eras the feudal land-owners were overthrown by the newly rising capitalist class. In the revolutions of this century in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. the capitalists, in turn, were overthrown by forces representing the working class and landless farmers. The six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements in this century have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars in the short term? For the following analysis, I will rely upon some of America's best economic historians (note 16). The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars of 1898, according to historian Walter LaFeber, were inevitable military results of a new foreign policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them. Secretary of State Gresham "concluded that foreign markets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression." To obtain such markets, the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force to help overthrow the government of Hawaii in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898. To quote from the title of LaFeber's book, the U.S. established a "new empire." American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. One industrial market was expanding, however, the market for weapons in Europe. The historian Charles Tansill concludes that "it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation." And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits." When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David Abraham has documented how major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadership when the economy collapsed. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." For these industrialists, "an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base for such a program." The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "The question of foreign economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs." In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Cold War, as the United States tried to prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system. The U.S. had already fought a similar war in Korea. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War, he explains, was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." Finally we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits for the first time since the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs? A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending. The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression. To summarize, we may point to the following causes of American wars over the past century: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy, a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure. The origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin, at one point, called "war communism". He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "cooperative of cooperatives." But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union. With its demise, however, there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace. In considering future prospects for the American Peace Movements, I shall begin with trends from the past and then consider different factors for the future? First, let us look back over the economic factors and movements of the previous century to see if the trends are likely to continue. 1. Wars are likely to continue because, for the most part, their economic causes remain as strong as ever: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. The fourth factor is not as prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is still evidence of this factor at work: for example, the attempted overthrow of the government of Venezuela in spring, 2002, was apparently linked to its developing ties with socialist Cuba, especially in terms of its oil resources. Although the coup d'etat failed, there was a risk of plunging Venezuela into warfare, especially considering the increasingly internationalized war next door in Colombia. Although the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan, Philippines, etc. and the associated military buildup is usually justified as revenge for the attacks of September 11, there seems little doubt that there are economic motives involved as well, including the control of oil resources from Central Asia as a supplement to those of the Middle East. At the same time, the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. appears at some level to be intended as an increase in government spending to hedge against declining non-military production, unemployment and financial crises in the stock markets. 2. The American peace movements have been reactive in the past, developing in response to specific wars or threats of war, and then disappearing when the war is over or the threat is perceived to have decreased. In fact, this observation at the macro level is mirrored by an observation that I have made previously at a micro level: participants in peace movements have been motivated to an important degree by anger against the injustice of war. This dynamic seems likely to continue. Governments, worried about the reactive potential of peace movements may attempt to engage in very brief wars, just as the U.S. government cut short the 1991 Gulf War after several weeks to avoid an escalating peace movement. In the future, peace movements need to be broadened by linkages to other issues and by international solidarity and unity; otherwise they risk being only temporary influences on the course of history, growing in response to particular wars and then disappearing again afterwards. The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire. I have found evidence, presented in the recent revision of my book Psychology for Peace Activists (note 17), that such a shared, positive vision is now becoming possible, and, as a result, human consciousness can take on a new and powerful dimension in this particular moment of history. | 22,286 | <h4><u><strong>3. Capitalism is the root cause of war</h4><p></u></strong>Dr. David Adams, 2002, former UNESCO Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, former Professor of Psychology (for 23 years) at Wesleyan University, specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behavior and the evolution of war, “Chapter 8: The Root Causes of War,” The American Peace Movements, p. 22-28, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-22.html</p><p>To take a scientific attitude about war and peace, we must carry the causal analysis a step further. If peace movements are caused by wars and war threats, then we must ask, what are the causes of these wars, both in the short term and in the long term? Before analyzing the causes of wars, <u><strong><mark>it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis</u></strong></mark> that has been popularized in recent years, the myth <u><strong><mark>that war is caused by </mark>a "war <mark>instinct."</mark> </u></strong>The best biological <u><strong>and anthropological <mark>data indicate that there is no such thing </mark>as a war instinct</u></strong> despite the attempt of the mass media and educational systems to perpetuate this myth. <u><strong>Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace</u></strong>" (note 15). Since there are several kinds of war, it is likely that there are several different kinds of causes for war. There are two kinds of war in which the United States has not been engaged for over two centuries. The first are wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution or today's revolutions in Nicaragua and South Africa being waged by the Sandinistas and the African National Congress. The second are wars of revolution in which the previous ruling class is thrown out and replaced by another. In the British and French Revolutions of earlier eras the feudal land-owners were overthrown by the newly rising capitalist class. In the revolutions of this century in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. the capitalists, in turn, were overthrown by forces representing the working class and landless farmers. T<u><strong>he six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements</u></strong> in this century <u><strong>have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars</u></strong> in the short term? For the following analysis, I will rely upon some of America's best economic historians (note 16). <u><strong><mark>The Spanish-American </mark>and Philippine <mark>Wars</u></strong></mark> of 1898, according to historian Walter LaFeber, <u><strong><mark>were inevitable</mark> military <mark>results of a</mark> new foreign <mark>policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas</mark> for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them</u></strong>. Secretary of State Gresham "concluded that foreign markets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression." To obtain such markets, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires</mark> such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force <mark>to help overthrow the government of Hawai</mark>i in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898</u></strong>. To quote from the title of LaFeber's book, the U.S. established a "new empire." <u><strong>American <mark>intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression</u></strong>.</mark> In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke <u><strong>out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. </u></strong>One industrial market was expanding, however, the market for weapons in Europe. The historian Charles Tansill concludes that "<u><strong>it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation</u></strong>." And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits." When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David Abraham has documented <u><strong>how <mark>major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadersh</mark>ip when the economy collapsed</u></strong>. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, <u><strong>the vast majority of <mark>industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation</mark> in the government."</u></strong> For these industrialists, <u><strong>"an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base</u></strong> for such a program." The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." <u><strong>Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As</u></strong> pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "<u><strong>The question of foreign economic policy</u></strong> <u><strong>was </u></strong>not <u><strong>the </u></strong>containment of Communism, but rather more directly the <u><strong>extension and expansion of American capitalism</u></strong> according to its new economic power and needs." In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." <u><strong>The Vietnam War was a continuation of</u></strong> the Cold War, as the United States tried to <u><strong>prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system</u></strong>. The U.S. had already fought a <u><strong>similar war in Korea</u></strong>. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about <u><strong>the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The Vietnam War</u></strong>,</mark> he explains, <u><strong>was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It <mark>was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world."</mark> </u></strong> Finally <u><strong>we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup</u></strong> under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, <u><strong>each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits</u></strong> for the first time since the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs? A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending<mark>. <u><strong>The</mark> growing power of the <mark>military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition</mark> to the economic causes of war</u></strong>. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets<u><strong>, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. T<mark>he military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector</mark> of the American economy <mark>because through</mark> the aid of state <mark>subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits</u></strong></mark>. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does <u><strong><mark>this</mark> "military spending solution" <mark>endanger the security of the planet</u></strong></mark>, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression. To summarize, we may point to the following causes of American wars over the past century: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy, a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure. The origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin, at one point, called "war communism". He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "cooperative of cooperatives." But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union. With its demise, however, there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace. In considering future prospects for the American Peace Movements, I shall begin with trends from the past and then consider different factors for the future? First, let us look back over the economic factors and movements of the previous century to see if the trends are likely to continue. 1<u><strong>. <mark>Wars are likely to continue because</mark>,</u></strong> for the most part<u><strong>, <mark>their economic causes remain</mark> as <mark>strong </mark>as ever</u></strong>: 1) <u><strong><mark>cyclical crises of</mark> overproduction and <mark>unemployment</u></strong></mark>, 2) <u><strong><mark>exploitation of poor</mark> colonial and neo-colonial <mark>countries</mark> by rich imperialist</u></strong> countries, 3) <u><strong><mark>economic rivalry for foreign markets</u></strong></mark> and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) <u><strong>the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the</u></strong> "free world" - i.e. the <u><strong>part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation</u></strong>, and 5) <u><strong>f<mark>inancial</mark> <mark>speculation</mark> and short-term profit making <mark>of the military-industrial complex</u></strong></mark>. The fourth factor is not as prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is still evidence of this factor at work: for example, the attempted overthrow of the government of Venezuela in spring, 2002, was apparently linked to its developing ties with socialist Cuba, especially in terms of its oil resources. Although the coup d'etat failed, there was a risk of plunging Venezuela into warfare, especially considering the increasingly internationalized war next door in Colombia. <u><strong>Although <mark>the "war against terrorism"</mark> in Afghanistan, Philippines</u></strong>, etc. and the associated military buildup is usually justified as revenge for the attacks of September 11, <u><strong>there seems little doubt that there <mark>are economic motives</mark> involved as well, <mark>including the control of oil resources from</mark> <mark>Central Asia</mark> as a supplement to those of the Middle</u></strong> East. At the same time<mark>, <u><strong>the</mark> massive expansion of the <mark>military-industrial complex</mark> in the U.S. <mark>appears</mark> at some level <mark>to be</mark> intended as <mark>an increase in government spending</mark> to</u></strong> hedge against declining non-military production, unemployment and financial crises in the stock markets. 2. <u><strong>The American peace movements have been reactive in the past</u></strong>, developing in response to specific wars or threats of war, and then disappearing when the war is over or the threat is perceived to have decreased. In fact, this observation at the macro level is mirrored by an observation that I have made previously at a micro level: participants in peace movements have been motivated to an important degree by anger against the injustice of war. This dynamic seems likely to continue. Governments, worried about the reactive potential of peace movements may attempt to engage in very brief wars, just as the U.S. government cut short the 1991 Gulf War after several weeks to avoid an escalating peace movement. In the future, peace movements need to be broadened by linkages to other issues and by international solidarity and unity; otherwise they risk being only temporary influences on the course of history, growing in response to particular wars and then disappearing again afterwards<u><strong>. The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. </u></strong>To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire. I have found evidence, presented in the recent revision of my book Psychology for Peace Activists (note 17), that such a shared, positive vision is now becoming possible, and, as a result, human consciousness can take on a new and powerful dimension in this particular moment of history.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | AT: Cap Solves War | 10,984 | 25 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,564 | India perceives new bilateral engagement between the US and China as a re-alignment of US interests that intentionally freezes India out which collapses current security agreements | Madan /15 | Madan 1/20/15 [Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution | “The U.S.-India Relationship and China” Brookings Institution 2015 d.a 8/9/16] [AB] | AND
and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region’s continued prosperity.” | null | The People’s Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since
AND
and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region’s continued prosperity.” | 165 | <h4>India perceives new bilateral engagement between the US and China as a re-alignment of US interests that intentionally freezes India out which collapses current security agreements</h4><p><strong>Madan </strong>1/20<strong>/15 </strong>[Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution | “The U.S.-India Relationship and China” Brookings Institution 2015 d.a 8/9/16] [AB]</p><p>The People’s Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since </p><p><u><strong>AND</p><p>and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region’s continued prosperity.” </p></u></strong> | 1NC | Indian Ocean DA | null | 1,560,862 | 5 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,565 | US growth is a pre-requisite to solving great power conflicts – it’s the foundation of US strength. | Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012 | Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012 | (Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight less stable Major war will become more likely. Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, , dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished. | American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad countries sense our weakness Allies will doubt our commitment and pursue nuclear weapons adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained Major war will become more likely Obama articulated foreign policy visions curbing poverty moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons there is a more urgent big-picture restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to foreign policy is not reestablished | (Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished. | 1,953 | <h4><strong>US growth is a pre-requisite to solving great power conflicts – it’s the foundation of US strength. </h4><p>Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012</p><p><u>(Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)</p><p></u></strong>Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, <u><mark>American economic weakness <strong>undercuts U.S. leadership abroad</strong></mark>. Other <mark>countries <strong>sense our weakness</u></strong></mark> and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to <u><strong>take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future</u></strong>. <u><mark>Allies</mark> and friends <mark>will <strong>doubt our commitment</strong> and</mark> may <strong><mark>pursue nuclear weapons</strong></mark> for their own security, for example; <mark>adversaries will <strong>sense opportunity</strong> and be <strong>less restrained</strong></mark> <strong>in throwing around their weight</u></strong> in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become <u><strong>less stable</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Major war will become more likely</mark>.</u></strong> When running for president last time, <u><mark>Obama</mark> eloquently <mark>articulated</mark> big <mark>foreign policy visions</mark>: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, </u>controlling global climate change<u>, dramatically <mark>curbing</mark> <strong>global</strong> <strong><mark>poverty</strong></mark> through development aid, <strong><mark>moving toward a world free of</strong> <strong>nuclear weapons</strong></mark>. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, <mark>there is</mark> now <strong><mark>a</mark> much <mark>more urgent big-picture </mark>issue: <mark>restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is</mark> really <mark>possible if that</mark> <mark>fundamentalprerequisite to</mark> effective <mark>foreign policy is not reestablished</mark>.</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 21,670 | 522 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,566 | Current military assets in the region and zero-sum approach towards China ensures conflict and escalation – only diplomatic dialogue that creates mutual agreement to reduce military assets and increase confidence building measures can prevent inevitable war. | Swaine 1/19 | Swaine 1/19 | The obvious danger presented by this situation is that increasing numbers of U.S. and Chinese air and naval assets operating in close proximity, or perceived provocations of various sorts including possible clashes between China and other disputants, could produce escalating crises. These might draw the United States into direct confrontation with Beijing, as all sides seek to convey their resolve in defending against real or imagined challenges. This danger is further reinforced by the absence of any serious dialogue between the United States and China regarding limits on the level and type of militarization occurring in disputed maritime areas The resulting uncertainties stimulate worst casing, thus leading to further escalation the fact that sovereignty issues are generally zero-sum in nature and elicit strong nationalist emotions further adds to the dangers. Within this environment, there is a strong belief in some quarters of the Trump camp and elsewhere that Beijing’s activities in disputed maritime areas are intentionally provocative, designed in part to test American (and allied) resolve For a subset of these observers, China’s gradual enhancement of its control over disputed maritime areas is a first step toward the eventual ejection of the United States from the Western Pacific. Given such presumed high stakes, some in the Trump camp sharply criticize the above-outlined U.S. response as inadequate and tepid, Some argue that Washington needs to increase its military assistance and greatly augmenting its military presence in the Western Pacific In truth, such simplistic solutions are largely based on a misreading of the fundamental dynamic at work in disputed maritime territories, and grossly overestimate the capacity of the United States to drastically ramp up its military presence and capabilities under current conditions to a level that would unambiguously overshadow Chinese capacities. They also overstate the likely commitment of the American people to support a deepening confrontation with Beijing over small, scattered, and largely unpopulated land features in the Western Pacific. In the SCS competition Beijing is by far the biggest player. There, it is seeking to use its growing capabilities to more effectively defend and advance what it regards as its claims Other claimants are doing virtually the same thing recently, however, Beijing has establish itself as the dominant claimant to deter future perceived provocations by others So, in Beijing’s view, much of its activities are intended to end the escalatory spirals and undoubtedly to improve its negotiating position in both maritime areas. Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas Due to all of this, many observers understandably assume the worst-case for China’s motives, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above. when measured against the metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions seem cautious, even timid. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area In general, it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without increasing the chance of armed conflict with the United States. This could all change, of course, as China’s power in the area increases, and those in and out of the Trump camp who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing over the maritime disputes assert that it certainly will, because China’s caution thus far conceals its “real” expansionist and aggressive motives. Again, this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted as a basis for U.S. policy it would basically lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every assertive Chinese action, thereby justifying an equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. Unfortunately, this type of overt and adversarial strategic competition is given significant impetus by the writings of the international media; the public interpretations of hardline pundits and “experts” in the United States, China, and other countries; and even some government officials on all sides. These sources already to a great extent seem to interpret every U.S. and Chinese statement and action of possible relevance to the disputed maritime areas as part of a titanic Sino-U.S. struggle for strategic dominance in Asia, thus pushing the two countries toward confrontation. zero-sum, confrontational argument calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific also employs another highly dubious set of assumptions regarding American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia. Barring an unlikely near-total collapse of the Chinese economy Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the kind of military and economic capabilities that China will be able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the coming years Thus a more realistic and pragmatic U.S. approach should consist of efforts to keep speculations to a minimum, reduce or clearly limit militarization by all parties, increase confidence-building and crisis-avoidance/management mechanisms This will require a serious diplomatic dialogue aimed at establishing mutually acceptable restraints based on strong U.S. deterrence signals, not a near-term doubling down on military deployments, a drastic increase in defense assistance to those powers opposing China, or a drawing of high stakes “lines in the sand” directed at Beijing Only by reaching an understanding on mutual limits and behavioral restraints between China, the other claimants, and the United States will the maritime disputes in the Western Pacific be stabilized. | air and naval assets operating in close proximity, or perceived provocations including possible clashes could produce escalating crises. These might draw the U S into confrontation with Beijing, This is further reinforced by the absence of dialogue between the U S and China regarding limits on the militarization occurring The resulting uncertainties stimulate worst casing leading to further escalation the fact that sovereignty issues are zero-sum and elicit strong nationalist emotions further adds to dangers. Within this environment, there is a belief in the Trump camp that Beijing’s activities are designed to test American resolve In truth simplistic solutions are based on a misreading of the dynamic and overestimate the capacity of the U S to ramp up its presence and capabilities They also overstate the commitment of the people to support a confrontation in Beijing’s view its activities are intended to end escalatory spirals and improve its negotiating position Due to this, many observers assume the worst-case for China’s motives when measured against the U.S. position Beijing’s actions seem cautious It avoids the use of warships to assert its claims it is attempting to increase influence without increasing the chance of conflict with the U S This could change as the Trump camp who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing because China’s caution conceals its “real” motives this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted U.S. policy would lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every Chinese action These sources interpret every U.S. and Chinese action as part of a Sino-U.S. struggle for dominance thus pushing the two toward confrontation zero-sum, confrontational argument employs another dubious assumptions Barring an unlikely collapse of Chinese economy Washington will not possess the capacity to exceed the capabilities that China will be able to bring Thus the U.S. should limit militarization by all parties, increase confidence-building and crisis-avoidance mechanisms This will require serious diplomatic dialogue aimed at establishing mutually acceptable restraints Only by reaching an understanding on mutual limits and behavioral restraints between China and the U S will the Western Pacific be stabilized | (Michael, Phd from Harvard, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, "Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era," carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/19/managing-asia-s-security-threats-in-trump-era-pub-67746)
The obvious danger presented by this situation is that increasing numbers of U.S. and Chinese air and naval assets operating in close proximity, or perceived provocations of various sorts including possible clashes between China and other disputants, could produce escalating crises. These might draw the United States into direct confrontation with Beijing, as all sides seek to convey their resolve in defending against real or imagined challenges. This danger is further reinforced by the absence of any serious dialogue among the claimants and between the United States and China regarding limits on the level and type of militarization occurring in disputed maritime areas, and the failure of China (and to a lesser extent other disputants) to clarify its specific claims regarding various SCS waters. The resulting uncertainties stimulate worst casing, thus leading to further escalation. And of course the fact that sovereignty issues are generally zero-sum in nature and elicit strong nationalist emotions further adds to the dangers. Within this environment, there is a strong belief in some quarters of the Trump camp and elsewhere that Beijing’s activities in disputed maritime areas are intentionally provocative, designed in part to test American (and allied) resolve. In the case of the SCS, China’s moves could be at the very least to eventually establish de facto control over the entire area as a prelude to then establishing formal sovereign authority over the land and waters within the so-called nine-dashed line. For a subset of these observers, China’s gradual enhancement of its control over disputed maritime areas is a first step toward the eventual ejection of the United States from the Western Pacific. Given such presumed high stakes, some observers in and out of the Trump camp sharply criticize the above-outlined U.S. response as inadequate and tepid, and thus an encouragement to Beijing to become even more provocative. Some argue that Washington needs to increase greatly both its military assistance to the other claimants and its support for their claims, while also greatly augmenting its military presence in the Western Pacific. Only if the United States doubles down in these areas and becomes far more explicit about the consequences of further Chinese provocations will Beijing finally relent, the argument goes. In truth, such simplistic solutions are largely based on a misreading of the fundamental dynamic at work in disputed maritime territories, and grossly overestimate the capacity of the United States to drastically ramp up its military presence and capabilities under current conditions to a level that would unambiguously overshadow Chinese capacities. They also overstate the likely commitment of the American people to support a deepening confrontation with Beijing over small, scattered, and largely unpopulated land features in the Western Pacific. The historical dynamic at work involves an interactive tit-for-tat rivalry among the claimants, made possible by the absence of any clear and commonly accepted code of conduct (beyond the voluntary, nonbinding, and vague 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) and driven by deep-seated suspicions and strongly felt nationalist impulses on all sides. In the SCS competition (which mainly regards the southern Spratly Islands, since China has firmly held the northern Paracel Islands for many years), Beijing is by far the biggest player. There, it is seeking to use its growing capabilities to more effectively defend and advance what it regards as its indisputable claims to the land features and undefined adjoining waters of the area, as well as certain also undefined historical rights. Other claimants are doing virtually the same thing, except their capabilities and claims are not as extensive, their actions not as effective, and hence their activities do not generate as much attention. In general, they are hopelessly outmatched by Beijing in this competition. Most recently, however, Beijing has gone beyond a proportional tit-for-tat interaction to apparent attempts to establish itself as the dominant claimant in the Spratlys, arguably to deter future perceived provocations by others. Moreover, this impulse is driven even further by the fact that Beijing has historically held a very weak position in that area compared with Vietnam, the other claimant to the land features within the SCS. In the case of the ECS dispute with Japan, Beijing has also departed from its past basic tit-for-tat stance to apparently establish itself as an equal claimant to Tokyo, thereby supposedly correcting years of Japanese dominance over the S/D Islands. So, in Beijing’s view, much of its activities are intended to end the escalatory spirals and undoubtedly to improve its negotiating position in both maritime areas. Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas. Beijing has refused to specify the precise nature of its claims both to individual land features and to the waters within the nine-dashed line in the SCS, and it has rejected the above-mentioned tribunal ruling (asserting that certain exceptions to such a ruling under UNCLOS Article 298 apply). Further, China seemed to assert the legal right of an archipelagic nation to draw boundary lines between the Paracel and perhaps the Spratly Islands in order to establish interior territorial waters, created sizable artificial islands with dual civilian-military facilities in the Spratlys, and regularly deployed a significant number of vessels and some aircraft near and sometimes into the territorial space of the S/D Islands. Due to all of this, many observers understandably assume the worst-case for China’s motives, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above. This interpretation is purely speculative, however, and is certainly not confirmed by any authoritative Chinese statements or documents. In fact, China’s actions and statements can be most logically explained by the above interactive dynamic, which centers first and foremost on the maritime disputes themselves. Indeed, when measured against the metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions seem cautious, even timid. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area. Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. In general, it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without increasing the chance of armed conflict with the United States. This could all change, of course, as China’s power in the area increases, and those in and out of the Trump camp who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing over the maritime disputes assert that it certainly will, because China’s caution thus far conceals its “real” expansionist and aggressive motives. Again, this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted as a basis for U.S. policy it would basically lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every assertive Chinese action, thereby justifying an equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. And of course, such actions would indeed cause Beijing to eventually adopt precisely the threatening motives that some observers insist (incorrectly) are already present. Unfortunately, this type of overt and adversarial strategic competition is given significant impetus by the writings of the international media; the public interpretations of hardline pundits and “experts” in the United States, China, and other countries; and even some government officials on all sides. These sources already to a great extent seem to interpret every U.S. and Chinese statement and action of possible relevance to the disputed maritime areas as part of a titanic Sino-U.S. struggle for strategic dominance in Asia, thus pushing the two countries toward confrontation. Beyond basing itself on a purely speculative and dangerous set of assumptions about Chinese motives, a zero-sum, confrontational argument calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific also employs another highly dubious (at best) set of assumptions regarding American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia. Barring an unlikely near-total collapse of the Chinese economy and/or a major surge in the overall U.S. GDP, Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the kind of military and economic capabilities that China will be able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the coming years. In fact, projections by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and other reputable sources predict a much more likely movement toward parity between U.S. and Chinese capabilities in that region, in other words, a de facto strategic equilibrium. Of course, the United States could devote a much larger share of its available economic resources to defense spending, and to spending in Asia in particular. That would likely require either considerable belt-tightening elsewhere, especially in vital social welfare areas, or a huge expansion in the government deficit. Neither of these is politically feasible, absent a truly major increase in public perceptions of the threat posed by China. Disputes over rocks and islands in the far reaches of Asia are unlikely to motivate such a level of alarm, unless a crisis in that region escalates to a genuine Sino-U.S. military clash of serious proportions. While certainly possible, such a hypothetical crisis should not be assumed and likely could not a priorialter threat perceptions. Thus, given what is genuinely known about the capabilities and intentions of all sides in Asia’s maritime disputes, a more realistic and pragmatic U.S. approach should consist of efforts to keep speculations to a minimum, reduce or clearly limit militarization by all parties, increase confidence-building and crisis-avoidance/management mechanisms, and generally encourage by all means possible movement toward a binding or near-binding code of conduct. This code could be based on a reassertion, an expansion, and a more detailed enunciation of the peaceful principles and unacceptable forms of behavior already agreed upon in the 2002 declaration. This will require a serious diplomatic dialogue aimed at establishing mutually acceptable restraints based on strong U.S. deterrence signals, not a near-term doubling down on military deployments, a drastic increase in defense assistance to those powers opposing China, or a drawing of high stakes “lines in the sand” directed at Beijing. The latter should involve clear indications of the adverse consequences for China (and for regional stability) that would result from a failure to reach an agreement, including possibly some of the extreme zero-sum actions summarized above. Only by reaching an understanding on mutual limits and behavioral restraints between China, the other claimants, and the United States will the maritime disputes in the Western Pacific be stabilized. | 11,836 | <h4>Current military assets in the region and zero-sum approach towards China <u>ensures conflict and escalation</u> – only diplomatic dialogue that creates <u>mutual agreement</u> to <u>reduce military assets</u> and increase <u>confidence building measures</u><strong> can prevent inevitable war.</h4><p>Swaine 1/19</p><p></strong>(Michael, Phd from Harvard, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, "Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era," carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/19/managing-asia-s-security-threats-in-trump-era-pub-67746)</p><p><u>The obvious danger presented by this situation is that increasing numbers of U.S. and Chinese <mark>air and naval assets operating in close proximity, or perceived provocations</mark> of various sorts <strong><mark>including possible clashes</mark> </strong>between China and other disputants, <strong><mark>could produce escalating crises</strong>. These might draw the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>into</mark> direct <mark>confrontation with Beijing,</mark> as all sides seek to convey their resolve in defending against real or imagined challenges.</u> <u><mark>This</mark> danger <mark>is <strong>further reinforced by the absence of</mark> any serious <mark>dialogue</mark> </u></strong>among the claimants and <u><strong><mark>between the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China regarding limits on the</mark> level and type of <mark>militarization occurring</mark> in disputed maritime areas</u></strong>, and the failure of China (and to a lesser extent other disputants) to clarify its specific claims regarding various SCS waters. <u><mark>The resulting <strong>uncertainties stimulate worst casing</mark>, thus <mark>leading to further escalation</u></strong></mark>. And of course <u><mark>the fact that <strong>sovereignty issues are</mark> generally <mark>zero-sum</strong></mark> in nature <mark>and elicit <strong>strong nationalist emotions further adds to</mark> the <mark>dangers. </strong>Within this environment, there is a</mark> strong <mark>belief in</mark> some quarters of <mark>the Trump camp</mark> and elsewhere <mark>that Beijing’s activities</mark> in disputed maritime areas <mark>are </mark>intentionally provocative, <mark>designed</mark> in part <mark>to test American</mark> (and allied) <mark>resolve</u></mark>. In the case of the SCS, China’s moves could be at the very least to eventually establish de facto control over the entire area as a prelude to then establishing formal sovereign authority over the land and waters within the so-called nine-dashed line. <u>For a subset of these observers, China’s gradual enhancement of its control over disputed maritime areas is a first step toward the eventual ejection of the United States from the Western Pacific. Given such presumed high stakes, some</u> observers <u>in</u> and out of <u>the Trump camp sharply criticize the above-outlined U.S. response as <strong>inadequate and tepid</strong>,</u> and thus an encouragement to Beijing to become even more provocative. <u>Some argue that Washington needs to increase</u> greatly both <u>its military assistance</u> to the other claimants <u>and</u> its support for their claims, while also <u>greatly augmenting its military presence in the Western Pacific</u>. Only if the United States doubles down in these areas and becomes far more explicit about the consequences of further Chinese provocations will Beijing finally relent, the argument goes. <u><strong><mark>In truth</strong></mark>, such <strong><mark>simplistic solutions are</mark> largely <mark>based on a misreading of the</mark> fundamental <mark>dynamic</strong></mark> at work in disputed maritime territories, <mark>and</mark> <strong>grossly <mark>overestimate</strong> the capacity of the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to</mark> drastically <mark>ramp up its</mark> military <mark>presence and capabilities</mark> under current conditions to a level that would unambiguously overshadow Chinese capacities. <mark>They also overstate the</mark> likely <mark>commitment of the</mark> American <mark>people to support a</mark> deepening <mark>confrontation</mark> with Beijing over small, scattered, and largely unpopulated land features in the Western Pacific.</u> The historical dynamic at work involves an interactive tit-for-tat rivalry among the claimants, made possible by the absence of any clear and commonly accepted code of conduct (beyond the voluntary, nonbinding, and vague 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) and driven by deep-seated suspicions and strongly felt nationalist impulses on all sides. <u>In the SCS competition</u> (which mainly regards the southern Spratly Islands, since China has firmly held the northern Paracel Islands for many years), <u>Beijing is by far the biggest player. There, it is seeking to use its growing capabilities to more effectively defend and advance what it regards as its</u> indisputable <u>claims</u> to the land features and undefined adjoining waters of the area, as well as certain also undefined historical rights. <u>Other claimants are doing virtually the same thing</u>, except their capabilities and claims are not as extensive, their actions not as effective, and hence their activities do not generate as much attention. In general, they are hopelessly outmatched by Beijing in this competition. Most <u>recently, however, Beijing has</u> gone beyond a proportional tit-for-tat interaction to apparent attempts to <u>establish itself as the dominant claimant</u> in the Spratlys, arguably <u>to deter future perceived provocations by others</u>. Moreover, this impulse is driven even further by the fact that Beijing has historically held a very weak position in that area compared with Vietnam, the other claimant to the land features within the SCS. In the case of the ECS dispute with Japan, Beijing has also departed from its past basic tit-for-tat stance to apparently establish itself as an equal claimant to Tokyo, thereby supposedly correcting years of Japanese dominance over the S/D Islands. <u>So, <mark>in Beijing’s view</mark>, much of <mark>its activities <strong>are intended to end</mark> the <mark>escalatory spirals </strong>and</mark> <strong>undoubtedly to <mark>improve its negotiating position</mark> in both maritime areas. </strong>Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas</u>. Beijing has refused to specify the precise nature of its claims both to individual land features and to the waters within the nine-dashed line in the SCS, and it has rejected the above-mentioned tribunal ruling (asserting that certain exceptions to such a ruling under UNCLOS Article 298 apply). Further, China seemed to assert the legal right of an archipelagic nation to draw boundary lines between the Paracel and perhaps the Spratly Islands in order to establish interior territorial waters, created sizable artificial islands with dual civilian-military facilities in the Spratlys, and regularly deployed a significant number of vessels and some aircraft near and sometimes into the territorial space of the S/D Islands. <u><mark>Due to</mark> all of <mark>this, many observers</mark> <strong>understandably <mark>assume the worst-case for China’s motives</strong></mark>, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above. </u>This interpretation is purely speculative, however, and is certainly not confirmed by any authoritative Chinese statements or documents. In fact, China’s actions and statements can be most logically explained by the above interactive dynamic, which centers first and foremost on the maritime disputes themselves. Indeed, <u><mark>when measured against</mark> the metric of a supposed direct challenge to <mark>the U.S. position</mark> in Asia, <mark>Beijing’s actions seem cautious</mark>, even timid. <mark>It</mark> generally <mark>avoids the use of warships to assert its claims</mark>, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area</u>. Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. <u>In general, <mark>it is attempting to increase</mark> its <mark>influence</mark> in both seas <strong><mark>without increasing the chance of</mark> armed <mark>conflict with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</strong>. <mark>This could</mark> all <mark>change</mark>, of course, <mark>as</mark> China’s power in the area increases, and those in and out of <mark>the Trump camp who call for a <strong>zero-sum confrontation with Beijing</strong></mark> over the maritime disputes assert that it certainly will, <mark>because China’s caution</mark> thus far <mark>conceals its “real”</mark> expansionist and aggressive <mark>motives</mark>. Again, <strong><mark>this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort,</strong> since if accepted</mark> as a basis for <mark>U.S. policy</mark> it <mark>would</mark> basically <strong><mark>lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every</mark> </strong>assertive <strong><mark>Chinese action</mark>,</strong> thereby justifying an equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. </u>And of course, such actions would indeed cause Beijing to eventually adopt precisely the threatening motives that some observers insist (incorrectly) are already present.<u> Unfortunately, this type of overt and adversarial strategic competition is given significant impetus by the writings of the international media; the public interpretations of hardline pundits and “experts” in the United States, China, and other countries; and even some government officials on all sides. <mark>These sources</mark> already to a great extent <strong>seem to <mark>interpret every U.S. and Chinese</mark> statement and <mark>action</strong></mark> of possible relevance to the disputed maritime areas <mark>as part of a</mark> titanic <mark>Sino-U.S. struggle for</mark> strategic <mark>dominance</mark> in Asia, <mark>thus <strong>pushing the two</mark> countries <mark>toward confrontation</strong></mark>. </u>Beyond basing itself on a purely speculative and dangerous set of assumptions about Chinese motives, a <u><mark>zero-sum, confrontational argument</mark> calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific also <mark>employs another</mark> highly <mark>dubious</u></mark> (at best) <u>set of <mark>assumptions</mark> regarding American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia. <mark>Barring an unlikely</mark> near-total <mark>collapse of</mark> the <mark>Chinese economy</u></mark> and/or a major surge in the overall U.S. GDP, <u><mark>Washington will not possess the capacity to</mark> greatly <mark>exceed the</mark> kind of military and economic <mark>capabilities that China will be able to bring</mark> to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the coming years</u>. In fact, projections by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and other reputable sources predict a much more likely movement toward parity between U.S. and Chinese capabilities in that region, in other words, a de facto strategic equilibrium. Of course, the United States could devote a much larger share of its available economic resources to defense spending, and to spending in Asia in particular. That would likely require either considerable belt-tightening elsewhere, especially in vital social welfare areas, or a huge expansion in the government deficit. Neither of these is politically feasible, absent a truly major increase in public perceptions of the threat posed by China. Disputes over rocks and islands in the far reaches of Asia are unlikely to motivate such a level of alarm, unless a crisis in that region escalates to a genuine Sino-U.S. military clash of serious proportions. While certainly possible, such a hypothetical crisis should not be assumed and likely could not a priorialter threat perceptions. <u><mark>Thus</u></mark>, given what is genuinely known about <mark>the</mark> capabilities and intentions of all sides in Asia’s maritime disputes, <u>a more realistic and pragmatic <mark>U.S. </mark>approach <mark>should</mark> consist of efforts to keep speculations to a minimum, reduce or clearly <strong><mark>limit militarization</strong> by all parties, <strong>increase confidence-building and crisis-avoidance</strong></mark>/management <strong><mark>mechanisms</u></strong></mark>, and generally encourage by all means possible movement toward a binding or near-binding code of conduct. This code could be based on a reassertion, an expansion, and a more detailed enunciation of the peaceful principles and unacceptable forms of behavior already agreed upon in the 2002 declaration. <u><mark>This will require</mark> a <strong><mark>serious diplomatic dialogue</strong> aimed at establishing <strong>mutually acceptable restraints</strong></mark> based on strong U.S. deterrence signals, not a near-term doubling down on military deployments, a drastic increase in defense assistance to those powers opposing China, or a drawing of high stakes “lines in the sand” directed at Beijing</u>. The latter should involve clear indications of the adverse consequences for China (and for regional stability) that would result from a failure to reach an agreement, including possibly some of the extreme zero-sum actions summarized above. <u><mark>Only by reaching an <strong>understanding on mutual limits and behavioral restraints</strong> <strong>between China</strong></mark>, the other claimants, <strong><mark>and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>will</mark> the maritime disputes in <mark>the Western Pacific be stabilized</strong></mark>.</p></u> | null | null | null | 9,722 | 20 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,567 | First, the refusal to cooperate with China over civil space destroys United States space leadership internationally. That means the United States is far less effective at achieving its space agenda, including debris cleanup and multilateral space arms control. | Johnson-Freese 15 — | Johnson-Freese 15 — Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College (Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission “China’s Space & Counterspace Programs,” 2/18, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf) | has been difficult to maintain the public enthusiasm required to fund further space spectaculars, such as a human spaceflight mission to Mars space will likely be a multipolar environment in the future America’s unipolar moment is over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with China, the perception of its space leadership will continue to decline as well. China has not “usurped” the perception of U.S. space leadership, it is being ceded to them.
If sustainability of the space environment is to be maintained, the space debris issue alone requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option
More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates recognition of need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues, particularly the space debris issue
.S. emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and intentions of China it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to assess
just as efforts to isolate Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally “deter, defend, defeat” strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security
while the U.S. has rhetorically supported the European led efforts toward an International Code of Conduct, continued Congressional restrictions regarding bilateral U.S.-China space cooperation sends a powerful signal regarding U.S. seriousness regarding its intent to work with all space faring nations for the good of the space environment
cooperation with China in areas of shared interests is in the best interests of U.S. national security | null | The question of whether China is challenging U.S. leadership in space has received considerable media attention in the form of a U.S. – China “space race,” prompted largely by perceptions of declining U.S. space leadership. The U.S. civil space program is not dying, military space activities continue to expand, and no country is doing anything in space that has not already been done by the United States. But having started with such a spectacular accomplishment as the Apollo Program, it has been difficult to maintain the public enthusiasm required to fund further space spectaculars, such as a human spaceflight mission to Mars. Although not completely unsupportive, the U.S. public treats the space program as expendable to other government programs. The reality is that space, as with other areas of international relations, will likely be a multipolar environment in the future.42 America’s unipolar moment is over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with rising partners such as China, the perception of its space leadership will continue to decline as well. That is not to say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space activity. If only by virtue of a heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in select areas. But the days of total leadership are over. It will be a tough pill to swallow for those who crave exceptionalism— but if we are unwilling to pay the price tag, then swallow it, we must.43 In that respect, China has not “usurped” the perception of U.S. space leadership, it is being ceded to them.
This rebuttal to Congressman Wolf’s views assumes that the United States has a choice regarding whether or not to work with China. If, however, sustainability of the space environment upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military specifically relies upon for advantages is to be maintained, the space debris issue alone requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option.
While missile defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since 2007, the potential threat to the space environment in non-test circumstances has become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United States. Mankind’s dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment.
China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) only days after its 2007 ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris, resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of embarrassment. There is a certain (understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which has the most sophisticated government space tracking abilities, at being able to warn China of potential collisions between its own space junk and its own satellites.44 More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates recognition of need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues, particularly the space debris issue.45 These are the type of “common ground” issues that provide opportunities to work with all spacefaring nations to protect the “congested, contested and competitive” space environment.
U.S. emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and intentions of other countries, specifically China, presumably recent. Increasingly, however, it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to assess. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible 2007 ASAT test that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior.
Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward identifying “common ground among all space-faring nations,” and resiliency for military systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise, just as efforts to isolate Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally “deter, defend, defeat” strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
With regard to the resilience, specifically the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), resilience has faced resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms control, just too difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders. He stated, “While everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target. So it doesn’t attract much interest from senior leaders.”47 Counterspace, however, offers that sexy option.
Regarding transparency, the need to share information about satellite locations was recognized by the private satellite owners and operators, promoting the formation of the Space Data Association. At the government level, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) efforts have largely been to “formalize the existing model of one-way data flow from the American military to other countries and satellite operators”48 and the U.S. signing bi-lateral agreements with France49 and Japan, and the U.S., United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada and Australia signing a limited agreement in 2014.50 While U.S. efforts to provide collision-avoidance information to other countries – including China – are admirable, as an increasing number of countries place an increasing number of satellites in orbit, improving current techniques and increasing collaboration and cooperation on exchanges of information must be aggressively pursued.
And while the U.S. has rhetorically supported the European led efforts toward an International Code of Conduct, continued Congressional restrictions regarding bilateral U.S.-China space cooperation sends a powerful signal regarding U.S. seriousness regarding its intent to work with all space faring nations for the good of the space environment. Anything less than a comprehensive effort to constructively deal with issues related to the “space commons” can yield limited success at best.
Regardless of various interpretations of Chinese intent, the United States must pursue all policy goals of the NSS, NSP and NSSS. That will inherently involve working with China in some areas, and pursuing a full range of approaches to policy goals. The sustainability of the space environment is as key to protecting assets as is protecting assets from hostile actions. They are inherently intertwined.
Policies attempting to constrain, contain and control Chinese space activities have been repeatedly demonstrated of limited value. The most viable way for the U.S. to stay ahead of China in space capabilities is to focus on what it does have control over; its own programs. Funding, acquisition processes, strengthening the industrial base, cultivating and supporting science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) education programs and opportunities, resilience and broad based research and development will yield as much or more gain toward achieving U.S. space policy goals are key in the regard.
To summarize, the U.S. cannot “control” Chinese space ambitions; even influence is limited. Nor can the U.S. “control” space in the same way that it can control airspace. Yet space is a global commons the sustainability of which is critical to U.S. national security. Consequently, cooperation with China in areas of shared interests is in the best interests of U.S. national security. In order to protect U.S. assets and achieve stated U.S. goals, all approaches stated in the nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. Full implementation of U.S. space strategies is the prudent way forward. | 8,541 | <h4><u>First</u>, the refusal to cooperate with China over civil space destroys United States space leadership internationally. That means the United States is far less effective at achieving its space agenda, including debris cleanup and multilateral space arms control.</h4><p><strong>Johnson-Freese 15 — </strong> Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College (Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission “China’s Space & Counterspace Programs,” 2/18, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf)</p><p>The question of whether China is challenging U.S. leadership in space has received considerable media attention in the form of a U.S. – China “space race,” prompted largely by perceptions of declining U.S. space leadership. The U.S. civil space program is not dying, military space activities continue to expand, and no country is doing anything in space that has not already been done by the United States. But having started with such a spectacular accomplishment as the Apollo Program, it <u>has been difficult to maintain the public enthusiasm required to fund further space spectaculars, such as a human spaceflight mission to Mars</u>. Although not completely unsupportive, the U.S. public treats the space program as expendable to other government programs. The reality is that <u>space</u>, as with other areas of international relations, <u>will likely be a multipolar environment in the future</u>.42 <u>America’s unipolar moment is over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with </u>rising partners such as<u> China, the <strong>perception of its space leadership will continue to decline as well.</u></strong> That is not to say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space activity. If only by virtue of a heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in select areas. But the days of total leadership are over. It will be a tough pill to swallow for those who crave exceptionalism— but if we are unwilling to pay the price tag, then swallow it, we must.43 In that respect, <u>China has not “usurped” the perception of U.S. space leadership, it is <strong>being ceded to them</strong>.</p><p></u>This rebuttal to Congressman Wolf’s views assumes that the United States has a choice regarding whether or not to work with China. <u>If</u>, however, <u>sustainability of the space environment </u>upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military specifically relies upon for advantages <u>is to be maintained, the <strong>space debris issue alone</strong> requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option</u>.</p><p>While missile defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since 2007, the potential threat to the space environment in non-test circumstances has become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United States. Mankind’s dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment.</p><p>China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) only days after its 2007 ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris, resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of embarrassment. There is a certain (understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which has the most sophisticated government space tracking abilities, at being able to warn China of potential collisions between its own space junk and its own satellites.44 <u>More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates recognition of need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues, particularly the space debris issue</u>.45 These are the type of “common ground” issues that provide opportunities to work with all spacefaring nations to protect the “congested, contested and competitive” space environment.</p><p>U<u>.S. emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and intentions of</u> other countries, specifically <u>China</u>, presumably recent. Increasingly, however, <u>it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to assess</u>. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible 2007 ASAT test that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior.</p><p>Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward identifying “common ground among all space-faring nations,” and resiliency for military systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise, <u>just as efforts to isolate Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally “deter, defend, defeat” strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security</u>.</p><p>With regard to the resilience, specifically the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), resilience has faced resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms control, just too difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders. He stated, “While everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target. So it doesn’t attract much interest from senior leaders.”47 Counterspace, however, offers that sexy option. </p><p>Regarding transparency, the need to share information about satellite locations was recognized by the private satellite owners and operators, promoting the formation of the Space Data Association. At the government level, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) efforts have largely been to “formalize the existing model of one-way data flow from the American military to other countries and satellite operators”48 and the U.S. signing bi-lateral agreements with France49 and Japan, and the U.S., United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada and Australia signing a limited agreement in 2014.50 While U.S. efforts to provide collision-avoidance information to other countries – including China – are admirable, as an increasing number of countries place an increasing number of satellites in orbit, improving current techniques and increasing collaboration and cooperation on exchanges of information must be aggressively pursued.</p><p>And <u>while the U.S. has rhetorically supported the European led efforts toward an International Code of Conduct, <strong>continued Congressional restrictions</strong> regarding bilateral U.S.-China space cooperation <strong>sends a powerful signal regarding U.S. seriousness</strong> regarding its intent to work with all space faring nations for the good of the space environment</u>. Anything less than a comprehensive effort to constructively deal with issues related to the “space commons” can yield limited success at best. </p><p>Regardless of various interpretations of Chinese intent, the United States must pursue all policy goals of the NSS, NSP and NSSS. That will inherently involve working with China in some areas, and pursuing a full range of approaches to policy goals. The sustainability of the space environment is as key to protecting assets as is protecting assets from hostile actions. They are inherently intertwined.</p><p>Policies attempting to constrain, contain and control Chinese space activities have been repeatedly demonstrated of limited value. The most viable way for the U.S. to stay ahead of China in space capabilities is to focus on what it does have control over; its own programs. Funding, acquisition processes, strengthening the industrial base, cultivating and supporting science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) education programs and opportunities, resilience and broad based research and development will yield as much or more gain toward achieving U.S. space policy goals are key in the regard.</p><p>To summarize, the U.S. cannot “control” Chinese space ambitions; even influence is limited. Nor can the U.S. “control” space in the same way that it can control airspace. Yet space is a global commons the sustainability of which is critical to U.S. national security. Consequently, <u>cooperation with China in areas of shared interests is in the best interests of U.S. national security</u>. In order to protect U.S. assets and achieve stated U.S. goals, all approaches stated in the nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. Full implementation of U.S. space strategies is the prudent way forward.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 182,587 | 235 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,568 | Business restrictions damage relations – opening the market is key. | Hu 16 [Elise Hu, 6-6-2016, "A Rocky Time In U.S.-China Relations As Leaders Meet In Beijing," NPR.org, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/06/480806146/a-rocky-time-in-u-s-china-relations-as-leaders-meet-in-beijing] | Hu 16 [Elise Hu, 6-6-2016, "A Rocky Time In U.S.-China Relations As Leaders Meet In Beijing," NPR.org, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/06/480806146/a-rocky-time-in-u-s-china-relations-as-leaders-meet-in-beijing] | disagreements over how China does business are creating trust issues in the relationship. they're stuck with each other and now they have to deal with it .S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew leads the economic track. Having grown to be one of the two largest economies in the world it's increasingly important for China to accept the responsibilities of being a large and powerful economy," Lew said. American companies want more unfettered access to Chinese markets But China's first priority is its own domestic economy and homegrown firms. It's led to new rules and restrictions making it tougher for non-Chinese companies to compete. Frankly the way the rules have been written appear to exclude American companies from being able to provide technology there's the issue of overcapacity. To prop up its own economy, China is keeping open dozens of industrial plants that pump out raw materials like steel and aluminum It's distorting their markets the U.S. is encouraging China to let global markets act with less state intervention. ongoing communication is far more effective than confrontation. The U.S. China economic relationship is the most important economic relationship in the world Shared interests are keeping the lines of communication going, even if no specific outcomes are expected in this set of dialogues. Relationship status? It's complicated. | disagreements over business are creating trust issues in the relationship American companies want more unfettered access to Chinese markets Chinese rules exclude American companies from the U.S. is encouraging China to let global markets act with less state intervention. communication more effective Shared interests are keeping the lines of communication going, even if no specific outcomes are expected in this set of dialog . Relationship status? It's complicated. | The U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world — and interdependent in a host of ways. But as leaders from both countries start annual high-level talks in Beijing, disagreements over how China does business are creating some trust issues in the relationship. "You might want to think of the US China relationship as kind of like an arranged marriage," says Arthur Kroeber, a Beijing-based economist and author of China's Economy: What You Need to Know. "They're not in it because they fell in with each other, they're in it because forces beyond them made it happen and now they're stuck with each other and now they have to deal with it," Kroeber says. One way of 'dealing with it' is through annual talks like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which got under way in Beijing on Monday. Chinese president Xi Jinping kicked off the event with a call for more mutual trust. On the relationship with America, he quoted a Song Dynasty Chinese poet who said, "Rivers always take meandering paths before reaching their destination." For the U.S. side, Secretary of State John Kerry is handling security conversations, while U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew leads the economic track. "Having grown to be one of the two largest economies in the world it's increasingly important for China to accept the responsibilities of being a large and powerful economy," Lew said. American companies want more unfettered access to Chinese markets and its hundreds of millions of consumers. But China's first priority is its own domestic economy and homegrown firms. It's led to new rules and restrictions making it tougher for non-Chinese companies to compete. Especially on the tech front. "Frankly the way the rules have been written appear to exclude American companies from being able to provide technology," said Erin Ennis, senior vice president of the U.S. China Business Council. "Bringing more competition to the market actually makes companies do a better job," she says. Then there's the issue of overcapacity. To prop up its own economy, China is keeping open dozens of industrial plants that pump out raw materials like steel and aluminum, stuff the world already has enough of. "It's distorting their markets, it's an impediment to medium and long-term growth. And it's distorting global markets," said Lew. At the talks, the U.S. is encouraging China to let global markets act with less state intervention. But the Chinese have their own domestic pressures to worry about. "It's not the best time for us," says Yienching Yang, of China's E-Cai Economic Research Institute. "Because we don't have very good economic growth. And we don't have a very good political environment in the United States." U.S. Politics The American political environment is a question, as anti-China sentiments get a voice in Republican Presidential Nominee Donald Trump. "We've got enough problems in our country. We have to rebuild our country. China and other countries have committed the greatest theft in the history of the United States," Trump said, while campaigning in New Hampshire last August. Echoing his Chinese counterparts, Lew says ongoing communication is far more effective than confrontation. "The U.S. China economic relationship is the most important economic relationship in the world," Lew said. Shared interests are keeping the lines of communication going, even if no specific outcomes are expected in this set of dialogues. And outcomes aren't the point, Kroeber says, of the dialogues. Just working through the tough stuff can considered progress. "It's a lot like marriage counseling," Kroeber says. Relationship status? It's complicated. | 3,658 | <h4><strong>Business restrictions damage relations – opening the market is key.</h4><p>Hu 16 <u>[Elise Hu, 6-6-2016, "A Rocky Time In U.S.-China Relations As Leaders Meet In Beijing," NPR.org, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/06/480806146/a-rocky-time-in-u-s-china-relations-as-leaders-meet-in-beijing]</p><p></u></strong>The U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world — and interdependent in a host of ways. But as leaders from both countries start annual high-level talks in Beijing, <u><strong><mark>disagreements over</mark> how China does <mark>business are creating</mark> </u></strong>some <u><strong><mark>trust issues in the relationship</mark>. </u></strong>"You might want to think of the US China relationship as kind of like an arranged marriage," says Arthur Kroeber, a Beijing-based economist and author of China's Economy: What You Need to Know. "They're not in it because they fell in with each other, they're in it because forces beyond them made it happen and now <u><strong>they're stuck with each other and now they have to deal with it</u></strong>," Kroeber says. One way of 'dealing with it' is through annual talks like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which got under way in Beijing on Monday. Chinese president Xi Jinping kicked off the event with a call for more mutual trust. On the relationship with America, he quoted a Song Dynasty Chinese poet who said, "Rivers always take meandering paths before reaching their destination." For the U.S. side, Secretary of State John Kerry is handling security conversations, while U<u><strong>.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew leads the economic track. </u></strong>"<u><strong>Having grown to be one of the two largest economies in the world it's increasingly important for China to accept the responsibilities of being a large and powerful economy," Lew said. <mark>American companies want more unfettered access to Chinese markets</mark> </u></strong>and its hundreds of millions of consumers. <u><strong>But China's first priority is its own domestic economy and homegrown firms. It's led to new rules and restrictions making it tougher for non-<mark>Chinese</mark> companies to compete.</u></strong> Especially on the tech front. "<u><strong>Frankly the way the <mark>rules</mark> have been written appear to <mark>exclude American companies from</mark> being able to provide technology</u></strong>," said Erin Ennis, senior vice president of the U.S. China Business Council. "Bringing more competition to the market actually makes companies do a better job," she says. Then <u><strong>there's the issue of overcapacity. To prop up its own economy, China is keeping open dozens of industrial plants that pump out raw materials like steel and aluminum</u></strong>, stuff the world already has enough of. "<u><strong>It's distorting their markets</u></strong>, it's an impediment to medium and long-term growth. And it's distorting global markets," said Lew. At the talks, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. is encouraging China to let global markets act with less state intervention.</u></strong></mark> But the Chinese have their own domestic pressures to worry about. "It's not the best time for us," says Yienching Yang, of China's E-Cai Economic Research Institute. "Because we don't have very good economic growth. And we don't have a very good political environment in the United States." U.S. Politics The American political environment is a question, as anti-China sentiments get a voice in Republican Presidential Nominee Donald Trump. "We've got enough problems in our country. We have to rebuild our country. China and other countries have committed the greatest theft in the history of the United States," Trump said, while campaigning in New Hampshire last August. Echoing his Chinese counterparts, Lew says <u><strong>ongoing <mark>communication</mark> is far <mark>more effective</mark> than confrontation. </u></strong>"<u><strong>The U.S. China economic relationship is the most important economic relationship in the world</u></strong>," Lew said. <u><strong><mark>Shared interests are keeping the lines of communication going, even if no specific outcomes are expected in this set of dialog</mark>ues. </u></strong>And outcomes aren't the point, Kroeber says, of the dialogues. Just working through the tough stuff can considered progress. "It's a lot like marriage counseling," Kroeber says<mark>. <u><strong>Relationship status? It's complicated.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 160,952 | 9 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,569 | Removing the ban of space coop is extremely popular in Congress—it gives Republicans and Democrats that cooperation | David 2015 | David 2015 | There's a growing debate over whether China and the Unites States should cooperate in space Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House Specifically at question is how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China It will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political The U.S. and China have a complex relationship, The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space "The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited. | whether China and the Unites States should cooperate in space how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China It will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space | Leonard is a columnist from Space insider, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?”, June 16, Space, http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html, Accessed 1-15
There's a growing debate over whether China and the Unites States should cooperate in space, and the dialogue now appears to focus on how to create an "open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese astronauts to make trips to the International Space Station (ISS). Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House, but progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. Specifically at question is how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China regarding space. Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own space station in the 2020s. Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China collaboration in space. [China in Space: Latest News and Missions] It will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. "The first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight." Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted. "China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political, not technical." The U.S. and China have a complex relationship, said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not like the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish." Smith pointed out that, as far as space cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the Richard Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under then-President Jimmy Carter after the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration, small programs — again, mostly in the biomedical area — were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight — the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership — waited for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible," Smith added. The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation, she said. "The door is not completely shut." \A U.S.-China space race? "It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. "The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space partnerships," Johnson-Freese said. Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part, has spurred China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited." [China's Space Station Plans in Photos] | 4,918 | <h4><strong>Removing the ban of space coop is extremely popular in Congress—it gives Republicans and Democrats that cooperation</h4><p>David 2015</p><p></strong>Leonard is a columnist from Space insider, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?”, June 16, Space, http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html, Accessed 1-15</p><p><u>There's a growing debate over <mark>whether China and the Unites States should cooperate in space</u></mark>, and the dialogue now appears to focus on how to create an "open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese astronauts to make trips to the International Space Station (ISS). <u>Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House</u>, but progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. <u><strong>Specifically at question is <mark>how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China</u></strong></mark> regarding space. Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own space station in the 2020s. Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China collaboration in space. [China in Space: Latest News and Missions] <u><mark>It</mark> <mark>will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation</u>, </mark>said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. "The first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, <u><mark>the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities</mark> and, most dramatically, human spaceflight</u>." Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted. "China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the converse," Logsdon said. "<u><strong><mark>From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political</u></strong></mark>, not technical." <u>The U.S. and China have a complex relationship,</u> said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not like the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish." Smith pointed out that, as far as space cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the Richard Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under then-President Jimmy Carter after the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration, small programs — again, mostly in the biomedical area — were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight — the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership — waited for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible," Smith added. <u>The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation</u>, she said. "The door is not completely shut." \A U.S.-China space race? "<u><strong><mark>It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space</u></strong></mark>," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. <u>"The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing</u>, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space partnerships," Johnson-Freese said. Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part, has spurred China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which <u>could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited.</u>" [China's Space Station Plans in Photos]</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | AT: Cap Solves War | 1,651,070 | 59 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,570 | Threat assessment prove no focus on nuclear—ideology and capabilities | Basit ’11 | Basit ’11 (12/23/11 – writer for Islamabad Pulse (Abdul, “A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s strength and weaknesses-IV.” http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=1641&storylist=2) | A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s current status looking into its capabilities, intentions and opportunities would reveal that currently it clearly lacks capabilities and has fewer opportunities at its disposal Effective and efficient responses to Al-Qaeda’s threat at political and ideological level have isolated the terror network. Al-Qaeda’s staunchest ally, the Afghan Taliban, have distanced themselves Al-Qaeda’s closest ally in Pakista is also suffering desertions and dissentions Starting with capabilities, Al-Qaeda does not possess both manpower and firepower to carry out large-scale terror attacks against its target. It is weak at the center they remain underground. Most of the time their focus is on how to survive and keep themselves alive After 9/11 Al-Qaeda has failed to target any major attacks beyond Gulf. Most of its terror plots were foiled or averted by the security agencies few lone-wolf style terror acts by Al-Qaeda operatives were also unsuccessful the group has not been able to recover from various setbacks it has suffered in the last decade | threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s status reveal it lacks capabilities and has few opportunities Effective and efficient responses have isolated the network Al-Qaeda does not possess both manpower and firepower to carry out large-scale attacks It is weak at the center Most of the time their focus is on how to survive Al-Qaeda has failed to target any major attacks beyond Gulf its plots were foiled by security agencies the group has not been able to recover from setbacks in the last decade | A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s current status looking into its capabilities, intentions and opportunities would reveal that currently it clearly lacks capabilities and has fewer opportunities at its disposal; however, it still has the intentions to carry forward its agenda of transnational jihad. Effective and efficient responses to Al-Qaeda’s threat at political and ideological level have isolated the terror network. As mentioned in previous pieces Al-Qaeda’s staunchest ally, the Afghan Taliban, have distanced themselves from its ideology of global jihad and portray themselves as nationalist resistant movements. Currently, Al-Qaeda’s closest ally in Pakistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is also suffering desertions and dissentions. Internal divisions are quite visible within the TTP ranks and it is finding it difficult to keep its act together. In such a scenario, it will be doubly difficult for the TTP to protect and shelter Al-Qaeda in Pak-Afghan tribal region. Starting with capabilities, Al-Qaeda does not possess both manpower and firepower to carry out large-scale terror attacks against its target. It is weak at the center but strong at the fringes. Out of the network’s 10 main leaders listed after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, only two are still alive: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s one-time deputy who took over after his boss was killed in May; and Abu Yahya Al-Libi. However, due to continuous threat of CIA-led predator drone strikes and fear of being spotted they remain underground. Most of the time their focus is on how to survive and keep themselves alive and, every now and then, to appear in a video message to address their followers and operatives. This in turn weakens their ability to manage operational matters of Al-Qaeda and actively coordinate with its world-wide cells. Even before his death former Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden was also leading life of a recluse and he was hardly in touch with the leadership of his group. After 9/11 Al-Qaeda has failed to target any major attacks beyond Gulf. Most of its terror plots were foiled or averted by the security agencies. According to a research carried out by the Heritage Foundation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 at least 39 terror plots against the United States have been foiled. Moreover, few lone-wolf style terror acts by Al-Qaeda operatives were also unsuccessful. The abortive attempts of Richard Reid and Faisal Shahzad are two cases in point. Richard Reid abortively tried to light a fuse protruding from his shoe on a Paris bound American Airlines Flight No. 63. Reid was overpowered by fight crew and passengers and the flight was diverted to Boston. While Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blow up a car bomb in New York’ Time Square, failed to detonate the explosive material and was arrested by security authorities. Looking at intentions the group still harbors its espoused vision of global jihad and target its enemies around the globe. However, it has not been able to recover from various setbacks it has suffered in the last decade. Various attempts, abortive or otherwise, establish this fact beyond any doubt that against all odds and difficulties Al-Qaeda has not given up on its stated goals and objectives. The like-minded terror networks which Al-Qaeda has built, highlights its aims. A worrying factor in this regard is the breakdown of state institutions in different Muslim countries of Africa and Middle East as well as spread of radicalization in Muslim Diaspora communities of the West and US. Al-Qaeda has thrived in failed or failing Muslim states. The erosion of incompetent and corrupt Muslim leaders and poor governance created huge vacuums which Al-Qaeda masterly exploited and furthered its own interests. Currently, the abysmal state of affairs in several Muslim countries provides an ideal opportunity to Al-Qaeda and its like-minded groups to re-cultivate their influence. A heartening thing to notice in Arab Spring was ‘minimal’ to ‘no’ Al-Qaeda influence in these movements. Though these protests varied from country to country in their agendas and motivations, one thing common in these mass movements was that they sprouted from their own set of problems in local contexts. The major demands in these movements were better job opportunities, right to elect their representatives and end to decades of dictatorial rules and monarchies. None of these moments attributed the ills to external forces (read America) and demanded solutions which do not provide Al-Qaeda any groundswell. However, a concerning thing in this situation is the transition phase. If the public mandate is not respected and peaceful transfer of power to elected public-representatives is not facilitated by interim set-ups then prolonged transition phases can provide Al-Qaeda with an opportunity to inject its influence to manipulate the process of power transition from old to new setups. Another lesson learnt from Arab Spring is the rise of Islamist forces in elections. Any attempt to sideline these Islamist forces would pave way for Al-Qaeda to manipulate the circumstances to its benefit. A case in point is suppression of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria by Algerian military which over the years brought Algeria’s Islamists closer to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) grew out of a conflict in Algeria between the government and Islamist militants. | 5,457 | <h4>Threat assessment prove no focus on nuclear—ideology and capabilities</h4><p><strong>Basit ’11 </strong>(12/23/11 – writer for Islamabad Pulse (Abdul, “A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s strength and weaknesses-IV.” http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=1641&storylist=2)</p><p><u>A <mark>threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s </mark>current <mark>status</mark> looking into its capabilities, intentions and opportunities would <mark>reveal</mark> that currently <mark>it </mark>clearly <mark>lacks capabilities and has few</mark>er<mark> opportunities </mark>at its disposal</u>; however, it still has the intentions to carry forward its agenda of transnational jihad. <u><mark>Effective and efficient responses </mark>to Al-Qaeda’s threat at political and ideological level <mark>have isolated the </mark>terror <mark>network</mark>.</u> As mentioned in previous pieces <u>Al-Qaeda’s staunchest ally, the Afghan Taliban, have distanced themselves</u> from its ideology of global jihad and portray themselves as nationalist resistant movements. Currently, <u>Al-Qaeda’s closest ally in Pakista</u>n, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), <u>is also suffering desertions and dissentions</u>. Internal divisions are quite visible within the TTP ranks and it is finding it difficult to keep its act together. In such a scenario, it will be doubly difficult for the TTP to protect and shelter Al-Qaeda in Pak-Afghan tribal region. <u>Starting with capabilities, <mark>Al-Qaeda does not possess both manpower and firepower to carry out large-scale </mark>terror <mark>attacks </mark>against its target. <mark>It is weak at the center</u></mark> but strong at the fringes. Out of the network’s 10 main leaders listed after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, only two are still alive: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s one-time deputy who took over after his boss was killed in May; and Abu Yahya Al-Libi. However, due to continuous threat of CIA-led predator drone strikes and fear of being spotted <u>they remain underground. <mark>Most of the time their focus is on how to survive </mark>and keep themselves alive</u> and, every now and then, to appear in a video message to address their followers and operatives. This in turn weakens their ability to manage operational matters of Al-Qaeda and actively coordinate with its world-wide cells. Even before his death former Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden was also leading life of a recluse and he was hardly in touch with the leadership of his group. <u>After 9/11 <mark>Al-Qaeda has failed to target any major attacks beyond Gulf</mark>. Most of <mark>its </mark>terror <mark>plots were foiled </mark>or averted <mark>by </mark>the <mark>security agencies</u></mark>. According to a research carried out by the Heritage Foundation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 at least 39 terror plots against the United States have been foiled. Moreover, <u>few lone-wolf style terror acts by Al-Qaeda operatives were also unsuccessful</u>. The abortive attempts of Richard Reid and Faisal Shahzad are two cases in point. Richard Reid abortively tried to light a fuse protruding from his shoe on a Paris bound American Airlines Flight No. 63. Reid was overpowered by fight crew and passengers and the flight was diverted to Boston. While Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blow up a car bomb in New York’ Time Square, failed to detonate the explosive material and was arrested by security authorities. Looking at intentions <u><mark>the group</u></mark> still harbors its espoused vision of global jihad and target its enemies around the globe. However, it <u><mark>has not been able to recover from </mark>various <mark>setbacks </mark>it has suffered <mark>in the last decade</u></mark>. Various attempts, abortive or otherwise, establish this fact beyond any doubt that against all odds and difficulties Al-Qaeda has not given up on its stated goals and objectives. The like-minded terror networks which Al-Qaeda has built, highlights its aims. A worrying factor in this regard is the breakdown of state institutions in different Muslim countries of Africa and Middle East as well as spread of radicalization in Muslim Diaspora communities of the West and US. Al-Qaeda has thrived in failed or failing Muslim states. The erosion of incompetent and corrupt Muslim leaders and poor governance created huge vacuums which Al-Qaeda masterly exploited and furthered its own interests. Currently, the abysmal state of affairs in several Muslim countries provides an ideal opportunity to Al-Qaeda and its like-minded groups to re-cultivate their influence. A heartening thing to notice in Arab Spring was ‘minimal’ to ‘no’ Al-Qaeda influence in these movements. Though these protests varied from country to country in their agendas and motivations, one thing common in these mass movements was that they sprouted from their own set of problems in local contexts. The major demands in these movements were better job opportunities, right to elect their representatives and end to decades of dictatorial rules and monarchies. None of these moments attributed the ills to external forces (read America) and demanded solutions which do not provide Al-Qaeda any groundswell. However, a concerning thing in this situation is the transition phase. If the public mandate is not respected and peaceful transfer of power to elected public-representatives is not facilitated by interim set-ups then prolonged transition phases can provide Al-Qaeda with an opportunity to inject its influence to manipulate the process of power transition from old to new setups. Another lesson learnt from Arab Spring is the rise of Islamist forces in elections. Any attempt to sideline these Islamist forces would pave way for Al-Qaeda to manipulate the circumstances to its benefit. A case in point is suppression of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria by Algerian military which over the years brought Algeria’s Islamists closer to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) grew out of a conflict in Algeria between the government and Islamist militants. </p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 312,686 | 3 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,571 | Second is Offensive Posturing – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Second is <u>Offensive Posturing</u> – </h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,863 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,572 | Collapse of the defense partnership leads to an increase in Chinese aggression due to a shift in the balance of power – causes Indo-Chinese Nuclear War | Mathur 14, | Mathur 14, [Sahil Mathur is a research scholar for IIT in Chennai, and frequently writes articles for the IPCS(Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies).”China, Indian Ocean & Nuclear Deterrance. The Destabilizing Effect” Mathur, Sahil. "China, Indian Ocean & The Nuclear Deterrence: The Destabilizing Effect (IPCS Issue Brief#245, March 2014)." Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies- China and the Indian Ocean, India China and the Indian Ocean. N.p., Feb. 14. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.] [AB] | null | null | The Indian Ocean traditionally refers to the water body that covers the expansive area from
AND
further lead to overall regional stability, and reduce the threat of war. | 169 | <h4>Collapse of the defense partnership leads to an increase in Chinese aggression due to a shift in the balance of power – causes Indo-Chinese Nuclear War</h4><p><strong>Mathur 14, </strong>[Sahil Mathur is a research scholar for IIT in Chennai, and frequently writes articles for the IPCS(Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies).”China, Indian Ocean & Nuclear Deterrance. The Destabilizing Effect” Mathur, Sahil. "China, Indian Ocean & The Nuclear Deterrence: The Destabilizing Effect (IPCS Issue Brief#245, March 2014)." Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies- China and the Indian Ocean, India China and the Indian Ocean. N.p., Feb. 14. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.] [AB]</p><p>The Indian Ocean traditionally refers to the water body that covers the expansive area from </p><p>AND</p><p>further lead to overall regional stability, and reduce the threat of war.</p> | 1NC | Indian Ocean DA | null | 1,560,864 | 8 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,573 | Best case studies prove – increasing IPR protections in China are necessary for sustained Chinese economic growth by building up its private sector and transitioning away from SOEs | Fang et al, 2015 | Fang, Associate Professor of Finance at INSEAD, et al, 2015 | http://socialsciences.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Intellectual-Property-Protection.pdf
empirical findings are as follows since 2006 private firms in China invest more in R&D and innovate more than SOEs Prior to 2006 data suggests that SOEs led R&D investment and innovation this time-varying pattern is consistent with the notion that in its earlier era of development, state ownership acted as a partial substitute to IPR protection With the full implementation of WTO standards, 2006 is a critical year in China’s recent economic history that marks the completion of numerous economic and legal reforms, The fact that after 2006, private sector innovation took off suggests the importance of legal institutions to private firms which do not enjoy the special protection offered by state ownership. we find that within China, IPR protection matters Firms located in provinces with stronger IPR protection invest more in R&D and innovate more than firms located in provinces with weak IPR protection contrary to the puzzling cross-country evidence, we find a positive relation between IPR and innovation within China This finding not only resolves the “China puzzle” on innovation, but establishes the importance of institutions within China we find that IPR protection affects the innovation gap between private firms and SOEs: In provinces with higher IPR protection standards, private sector firms lead SOEs in R&D This result shows that not only do institutions IPR protection) matter in China, but they matter particularly to private sector firms these findings have profound implications for China’s development model. within China, the fast-growing and promising sector that is driving economic growth is the private sector, and thus to sustain the country’s growth momentum, nurturing and growing the private sector is key Our results show that building better institutions—IPR protection will play an increasingly important role in allowing the growth and development of the private sector firms. stronger institutions will be important for its future development, which increasingly depend on the nation’s ability to innovate and capture innovation-related wealth creation | since 2006 private firms in China invest more in R&D than SOEs. data suggests this pattern is consistent with state ownership as a substitute to IPR protection. With the WTO standards, 2006 is a critical year in China’s economic history that marks the completion of reforms after 2006 innovation took off suggests importance of legal institutions within China, IPR protection matters: Firms with stronger protection invest more in R&D and innovate more we find a positive relation IPR protection affects the innovation gap these findings have profound implications for China’s development the fast-growing sector that is driving growth is the private sector, and thus to sustain the country’s momentum, nurturing and growing the private sector is key results show building better —IPR protection will play an increasingly important role stronger institutions will be important for its future development, which increasingly depend on the nation’s ability to innovate | Lily, Josh Lerner Harvard University and NBER Chaopeng Wu Xia Men University, “Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Ownership, and Innovation: Evidence from China” 3/1/2016 http://socialsciences.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Intellectual-Property-Protection.pdf
Our empirical findings are as follows. First, since 2006—the year by which all of China’s WTO commitments, including revisions to its IPR laws and regulations, were implemented— private firms in China invest more in R&D and innovate more than SOEs. Prior to 2006, our limited data suggests that SOEs led R&D investment and innovation. While by no means a proof, this time-varying pattern is consistent with the notion that in its earlier era of development, state ownership acted as a partial substitute to IPR protection. With the full implementation of WTO standards, 2006 is a critical year in China’s recent economic history that marks the completion of numerous economic and legal reforms, including the strengthening of its legal framework. The fact that after 2006, private sector innovation took off suggests the importance of legal institutions to private firms, which do not enjoy the special protection offered by state ownership. Second, we find that within China, IPR protection matters: Firms located in provinces with stronger IPR protection invest more in R&D and innovate more than firms located in provinces with weak IPR protection. Thus, contrary to the puzzling cross-country evidence, we find a positive relation between IPR and innovation within China. This finding not only resolves the “China puzzle” on innovation, but also establishes the importance of institutions within China. Finally, we find that IPR protection affects the innovation gap between private firms and SOEs: In provinces with higher IPR protection standards, private sector firms lead SOEs in R&D investments and innovation by a wider margin than in provinces with low IPR protection standards. This result shows that not only do institutions (in our specific case, IPR protection) matter in China, but also that they matter particularly to private sector firms. We believe these findings are not only relevant to the economic theory on the role of institutions in general and IPR protection in particular, but also have profound implications for China’s development model. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) made it clear that within China, the fast-growing and promising sector that is driving economic growth is the private sector, and thus to sustain the country’s growth momentum, nurturing and growing the private sector is key. Our results show that building better institutions—IPR protection as an example—will play an increasingly important role in allowing the growth and development of the private sector firms. While Allan, Qian, and Qian (2005) rightly point out that China—in particular its private sector—has so far been able to develop rapidly without strong institutions, our evidence suggest that stronger institutions will be important for its future development, which increasingly depend on the nation’s ability to innovate and capture innovation-related wealth creation. | 3,157 | <h4>Best case studies prove – increasing IPR protections in China are necessary for sustained Chinese economic growth by building up its private sector and transitioning away from SOEs</h4><p><u><strong>Fang</u></strong>, Associate Professor of Finance at INSEAD, <u><strong>et al, 2015</u></strong> </p><p>Lily, Josh Lerner Harvard University and NBER Chaopeng Wu Xia Men University, “Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Ownership, and Innovation: Evidence from China” 3/1/2016 <u><strong>http://socialsciences.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Intellectual-Property-Protection.pdf</p><p></u></strong>Our <u><strong>empirical findings are as follows</u></strong>. First, <u><strong><mark>since 2006</u></strong></mark>—the year by which all of China’s WTO commitments, including revisions to its IPR laws and regulations, were implemented— <u><strong><mark>private firms in China invest more in R&D</mark> and innovate more <mark>than SOEs</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Prior to 2006</u></strong>, our limited <u><strong><mark>data suggests</mark> that SOEs led R&D investment and innovation</u></strong>. While by no means a proof, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> time-varying <mark>pattern is consistent with</mark> the notion that in its earlier era of development, <mark>state ownership</mark> acted <mark>as a</mark> partial <mark>substitute to IPR protection</u></strong>. <u><strong>With the</mark> full implementation of <mark>WTO standards, 2006 is a critical year in China’s</mark> recent <mark>economic history that marks the completion of</mark> numerous economic and legal <mark>reforms</mark>,</u></strong> including the strengthening of its legal framework. <u><strong>The fact that <mark>after 2006</mark>, private sector <mark>innovation took off</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>suggests</mark> the <mark>importance of legal institutions</mark> to private firms</u></strong>, <u><strong>which do not enjoy the special protection offered by state ownership.</u></strong> Second, <u><strong>we find that <mark>within China, IPR protection matters</u></strong>: <u><strong>Firms</mark> located in provinces <mark>with stronger </mark>IPR <mark>protection invest more in R&D and innovate more</mark> than firms located in provinces with weak IPR protection</u></strong>. Thus, <u><strong>contrary to the puzzling cross-country evidence, <mark>we find a positive relation</mark> between IPR and innovation within China</u></strong>. <u><strong>This finding not only resolves the “China puzzle” on innovation, but</u></strong> also <u><strong>establishes the importance of institutions within China</u></strong>. Finally, <u><strong>we find that <mark>IPR protection affects the innovation gap</mark> between private firms and SOEs: In provinces with higher IPR protection standards, private sector firms lead SOEs in R&D</u></strong> investments and innovation by a wider margin than in provinces with low IPR protection standards. <u><strong>This result shows that not only do institutions</u></strong> (in our specific case, <u><strong>IPR protection) matter in China, but</u></strong> also that <u><strong>they matter particularly to private sector firms</u></strong>. We believe <u><strong><mark>these findings</u></strong></mark> are not only relevant to the economic theory on the role of institutions in general and IPR protection in particular, but also <u><strong><mark>have profound implications for China’s development</mark> model.</u></strong> Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) made it clear that <u><strong>within China, <mark>the fast-growing</mark> and promising <mark>sector that is driving</mark> economic <mark>growth is the private sector,</u></strong> <u><strong>and thus to sustain the country’s</mark> growth <mark>momentum, nurturing and growing the private sector is key</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Our <mark>results show</mark> that <mark>building better </mark>institutions<mark>—IPR</mark> <mark>protection</u></strong></mark> as an example—<u><strong><mark>will play an increasingly important role</mark> in allowing the growth and development of the private sector firms. </u></strong>While Allan, Qian, and Qian (2005) rightly point out that China—in particular its private sector—has so far been able to develop rapidly without strong institutions, our evidence suggest that <u><strong><mark>stronger</mark> <mark>institutions will be important for its future development, which increasingly depend on the nation’s ability to innovate</mark> and capture innovation-related wealth creation</u></strong>.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 1,559,394 | 9 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,574 | Second, US-China space cooperation is key to space debris management and preventing catastrophic collisions. | Anzaluda and Dunlop 15 | Anzaluda and Dunlop 15 — Anzaluda worked for 16 years with the Foreign Service of the U.S. State Department where he carried out diplomatic and science-related world, President of the Tucson Chapter of National Space Society, docent for the Planetary Science Institute. Dunlop is Chair of the National Space Society International Committee and former NSS Board of Directors, Co-founding Editor Moon Miner’s Manifesto India Quarterly and To the Stars International. (Al Anzaluda and David Dunlop; “Overcoming non-technical challenges to cleaning up orbital debris,”; The Space Review; November 9, 2015; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2863/1) | There is nothing for the US to lose and much to gain by reaching out to China, which has recently signed agreements with Russia regarding cooperation in space Although the 2011 Wolf amendment effectively bars NASA from engaging in bilateral space agreements with China that legislation is counterproductive and should therefore be overturned Space weather, scientific research, exploration, disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are areas where the US and China could collaborate with each other in a way that would lower tensions while achieving positive gains No country alone can affordably clean up enough debris to remove the threat of catastrophic collisions a are key players in cleaning up orbital debris. We therefore recommend that the United States actively seek to facilitate cooperation with China, we also recommend that the US Congress repeal the 2011 Wolf amendment, which bars the use of federal funds by NASA to conduct bilateral science exchanges with China. Instead, Congress might consider the option of limiting science exchanges to areas of overwhelming common interest, such as orbital debris, planetary defense, and space weather. The worldwide space community, and the public it serves, needs national and international entities to cooperatively generate policies and guidelines for orbital debris cleanup. | null | There is nothing for the US and other countries to lose and much to gain by reaching out to Russia to clean up orbital debris. The same goes for reaching out to China, which has recently signed agreements with Russia regarding cooperation in space (Song 2015). Although the 2011 Wolf amendment effectively bars NASA from engaging in bilateral space agreements with China, there is growing debate over whether that legislation is counterproductive and should therefore be overturned (David 2015). For dealing with either country, provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) may also need also to be addressed. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities (Weeden 2015). Space weather, scientific research, exploration, disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are areas where the US and China could collaborate with each other and other interested countries in a way that would lower tensions while achieving positive gains (Weeden 2015). No country alone can affordably clean up enough debris to remove the threat of catastrophic collisions, and both Russia and China are key players in cleaning up orbital debris. We therefore recommend that the United States actively seek to include both countries in its international, public-private efforts to clean up orbital debris. To facilitate cooperation with China, we also recommend that the US Congress repeal the 2011 Wolf amendment, which bars the use of federal funds by NASA to conduct bilateral science exchanges with China. Instead, Congress might consider the option of limiting science exchanges to areas of overwhelming common interest, such as orbital debris, planetary defense, and space weather. Facilitating remediation of current and future orbital debris The worldwide space community, and the public it serves, needs national and international entities to cooperatively generate policies and guidelines for orbital debris cleanup. From the standpoint of international law, existing and future operating spacecraft and debris are the responsibility of each spacefaring government (Treaty 1967). Therefore, to honor this responsibility in matters of remediating existing or future debris, we recommend that the White House create by executive order a new national entity called the Space Traffic Management Executive Committee (STM ExCom) to carry out space debris cleanup in collaboration with analogous entities in spacefaring countries worldwide. | 2,517 | <h4><u>Second</u>, US-China space cooperation is key to <u>space debris management</u> and <u>preventing catastrophic collisions</u>.</h4><p><strong>Anzaluda and Dunlop 15 </strong>— Anzaluda worked for 16 years with the Foreign Service of the U.S. State Department where he carried out diplomatic and science-related world, President of the Tucson Chapter of National Space Society, docent for the Planetary Science Institute. Dunlop is Chair of the National Space Society International Committee and former NSS Board of Directors, Co-founding Editor Moon Miner’s Manifesto India Quarterly and To the Stars International. (Al Anzaluda and David Dunlop; “Overcoming non-technical challenges to cleaning up orbital debris,”; The Space Review; November 9, 2015; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2863/1)</p><p><u>There is nothing for the US </u>and other countries <u>to lose and much to gain by reaching out to</u> Russia to clean up orbital debris. The same goes for reaching out to <u>China, which has recently signed agreements with Russia regarding cooperation in space</u> (Song 2015). <u>Although the 2011 Wolf amendment effectively bars NASA from engaging in bilateral space agreements with China</u>, there is growing debate over whether <u>that legislation is counterproductive and should therefore be overturned</u> (David 2015). For dealing with either country, provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) may also need also to be addressed. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities (Weeden 2015). <u>Space weather, scientific research, exploration, disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are areas where the US and China could collaborate with each other</u> and other interested countries <u>in a way that would lower tensions while achieving positive gains </u>(Weeden 2015). <u><strong>No country alone can affordably clean up enough debris to remove the threat of catastrophic collisions</u></strong>, and both Russia and Chin<u>a are key players in cleaning up orbital debris. We therefore recommend that the United States actively seek to</u> include both countries in its international, public-private efforts to clean up orbital debris. To <u><strong>facilitate cooperation with China, we also recommend that the US Congress repeal the 2011 Wolf amendment, which bars the use of federal funds by NASA to conduct bilateral science exchanges with China. Instead, Congress might consider the option of limiting science exchanges to areas of overwhelming common interest, such as orbital debris, planetary defense, and space weather. </u></strong>Facilitating remediation of current and future orbital debris <u>The worldwide space community, and the public it serves, needs national and international entities to cooperatively generate policies and guidelines for orbital debris cleanup.</u> From the standpoint of international law, existing and future operating spacecraft and debris are the responsibility of each spacefaring government (Treaty 1967). Therefore, to honor this responsibility in matters of remediating existing or future debris, we recommend that the White House create by executive order a new national entity called the Space Traffic Management Executive Committee (STM ExCom) to carry out space debris cleanup in collaboration with analogous entities in spacefaring countries worldwide.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 71,719 | 96 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,575 | BIT solves relations – creates economic ties that underpin the relationship and resolve alt causes. | Lehr 15 [Deborah Lehr (Senior Fellow at the Paulson Institute, was deputy assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative and Asia director at the National Security Council, London School of Economics and Political Science), 2-13-2015, "Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters," Paulson Institute, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/] | Lehr 15 [Deborah Lehr (Senior Fellow at the Paulson Institute, was deputy assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative and Asia director at the National Security Council, London School of Economics and Political Science), 2-13-2015, "Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters," Paulson Institute, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/] | A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the United States and China is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. it’s important for the United States to work with China and to support their entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. it was important that China continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade. | BIT) with China would creating new streams of trade growing economic relationship is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship it’s important for the U S to work with China and full participation in rules-based institutions. | China’s trade negotiators were recently in Washington to continue negotiations towards a bilateral investment treaty between China and the United States. Much still remains to be hammered out: China plans to submit its “negative list”—sectors that will not be opened to foreign competition—after the Chinese New Year, and then tough negotiations will ensue. But the momentum for concluding a treaty is growing—and that is a good thing. A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the United States and China is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world stage, it’s important for the United States to work with China and to support their entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the Paulson Institute—with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation—convened a US-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade. As a former US trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed first hand how bringing China into the rules based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s, one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, China’s trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and US companies. | 2,470 | <h4>BIT solves relations – creates economic ties that underpin the relationship and resolve alt causes.</h4><p><strong>Lehr 15 [Deborah Lehr (Senior Fellow at the Paulson Institute, was deputy assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative and Asia director at the National Security Council, London School of Economics and Political Science), 2-13-2015, "Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters," Paulson Institute, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/]</p><p></strong>China’s trade negotiators were recently in Washington to continue negotiations towards a bilateral investment treaty between China and the United States. Much still remains to be hammered out: China plans to submit its “negative list”—sectors that will not be opened to foreign competition—after the Chinese New Year, and then tough negotiations will ensue. But the momentum for concluding a treaty is growing—and that is a good thing. <u><strong>A bilateral investment treaty (<mark>BIT) with China would</mark> benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by <mark>creating new streams of</mark> two-way <mark>trade</mark> and investment. The <mark>growing</mark> and interdependent <mark>economic relationship</mark> between the United States and China <mark>is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together</mark>. It <mark>provides a</mark> <mark>foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship</mark>. </u></strong>As China becomes a more active player on the world stage, <u><strong><mark>it’s important for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to work with China</mark> and to support their entry <mark>and full participation in</mark> global, <mark>rules-based institutions.</mark> </u></strong>To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the Paulson Institute—with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation—convened a US-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that <u><strong>it was important that China continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade.</u></strong> As a former US trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed first hand how bringing China into the rules based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s, one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, China’s trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and US companies. </p> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 160,882 | 16 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,576 | Even if earth will no longer be habitable, it will be millions of years until extinction | Universe Today ’09 | Universe Today (online space guide, cites studies from universities) ’09 “How Long Will Life Survive on Earth?” February 13th, 2009http://www.universetoday.com/25367/how-long-will-life-survive-on-earth/ | It feels like the Earth is forever. But we know it formed around 4.5 billion years ago, and it will last another 7.5 billion years or so, when the Sun becomes a red giant, and probably destroying the Earth. But our climate will become unlivable long before that. According to Peter Ward and Robert Brownlee, in their book, The Life and Death of Planet Earth, things are going to heat up much, much earlier. That’s because the energy output coming the Sun is gradually increasing. Not enough to change the climate in our lifetimes, or even millions of years. But in the span of hundreds of millions of years, things are going to heat up. A model developed by researchers at Pennsylvania State University that the energy coming from the Sun will heat up so much that the oceans will evaporate within a billion years or so. But this is just the end of a series of terrible things that will happen to the planet as the Sun’s energy output increases. As the climate becomes warmer, the cycle of rock weather speeds up, removing from and sequestering it as calcium carbonate in the oceans. Without carbon dioxide, plants won’t be able to survive, and everything relying on them dies too. | our climate will become unlivable long before that because the energy output coming the Sun is gradually increasing But in the span of hundreds of millions of years, so much that the oceans will evaporate within a billion years | It feels like the Earth is forever. But we know it formed around 4.5 billion years ago, and it will last another 7.5 billion years or so, when the Sun becomes a red giant, and probably destroying the Earth. But our climate will become unlivable long before that. According to Peter Ward and Robert Brownlee, in their book, The Life and Death of Planet Earth, things are going to heat up much, much earlier. That’s because the energy output coming the Sun is gradually increasing. Not enough to change the climate in our lifetimes, or even millions of years. But in the span of hundreds of millions of years, things are going to heat up. A model developed by researchers at Pennsylvania State University calculated that the energy coming from the Sun will heat up the planet so much that the oceans will evaporate within a billion years or so. But this is just the end of a series of terrible things that will happen to the planet as the Sun’s energy output increases. As the climate becomes warmer, the cycle of silicate rock weather speeds up, removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and sequestering it as calcium carbonate in the oceans. Without carbon dioxide, plants won’t be able to survive, and everything relying on them dies too. | 1,242 | <h4><u>Even if earth will no longer be habitable, it will be millions of years until extinction</h4><p><strong>Universe Today</strong> (online space guide, cites studies from universities) <strong>’09</strong> “</u>How<strong> </strong>Long Will Life Survive on Earth?”<strong> <u></strong>February 13th, 2009http://www.universetoday.com/25367/how-long-will-life-survive-on-earth/</p><p>It feels like the Earth is forever. But we know it formed around 4.5 billion years ago, and it will last another 7.5 billion years or so, when the Sun becomes a red giant, and probably destroying the Earth. But <mark>our climate will become unlivable long before that</mark>. According to Peter Ward and Robert Brownlee, in their book, The Life and Death of Planet Earth, things are going to heat up much, much earlier. That’s <mark>because the energy output coming the Sun is gradually increasing</mark>. Not enough to change the climate in our lifetimes, or even millions of years. <mark>But in the span of hundreds of millions of years, </mark>things are going to heat up. A model developed by researchers at Pennsylvania State University </u>calculated<u> that the energy coming from the Sun will heat up </u>the planet<u> <mark>so much that the oceans will evaporate within a billion years</mark> or so. But this is just the end of a series of terrible things that will happen to the planet as the Sun’s energy output increases. As the climate becomes warmer, the cycle of </u>silicate<u> rock weather speeds up, removing </u>carbon dioxide<u> from </u>the atmosphere<u> and sequestering it as calcium carbonate in the oceans. Without carbon dioxide, plants won’t be able to survive, and everything relying on them dies too. </p></u> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | AT: Cap Solves War | 1,560,865 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,577 | No risk of terrorism – a Harvard professor says to prefer our study | Walt 12 | Walt 12 (Stephen, Belfer Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University, “What Terrorist Threat?,” Foreign Policy, 8-13, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/13/what_terrorist_threat) | Remember how the London Olympics were supposedly left vulnerable to terrorists Well, surprise, surprise Not only was there no terrorist attack we continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat." Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots" and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were "incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish." They quote former deputy national intelligence we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life | Remember how the Olympics were left vulnerable to terrorists surprise, surprise we continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat I recommend you read Mueller and Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases and show all of the perpetrators were incompetent, ineffective unorganized irrational They quote former deputy national intelligence al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires annual risk of dying in a terrorist attack is 1 in 3.5 million | Remember how the London Olympics were supposedly left vulnerable to terrorists after the security firm hired for the games admitted that it couldn't supply enough manpower? This "humiliating shambles" forced the British government to call in 3,500 security personnel of its own, and led GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney to utter some tactless remarks about Britain's alleged mismanagement during his official "Foot-in-Mouth" foreign tour last month. Well, surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather well. There were the inevitable minor glitches, of course, but no disasters and some quite impressive organizational achievements. And of course, athletes from around the world delivered inspiring, impressive, heroic, and sometimes disappointing performances, which is what the Games are all about. Two lessons might be drawn from this event. The first is that the head-long rush to privatize everything -- including the provision of security -- has some obvious downsides. When markets and private firms fail, it is the state that has to come to the rescue. It was true after the 2007-08 financial crisis, it's true in the ongoing euro-mess, and it was true in the Olympics. Bear that in mind when Romney and new VP nominee Paul Ryan tout the virtues of shrinking government, especially the need to privatize Social Security and Medicare. The second lesson is that we continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat." Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots" against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words) "incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish." They quote former Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying "we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires." Further, Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective "they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year." Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been "internalized": even when politicians and "terrorism experts" aren't hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude: ... Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril. Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it ... This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual." Which is another way of saying that you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to "root out" those nasty jihadis. | 3,773 | <h4>No risk of terrorism – a Harvard professor says to prefer our study</h4><p><strong>Walt 12</strong> (Stephen, Belfer Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University, “What Terrorist Threat?,” Foreign Policy, 8-13, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/13/what_terrorist_threat)</p><p><u><mark>Remember how the</mark> London <mark>Olympics were</mark> supposedly <mark>left vulnerable to terrorists</u></mark> after the security firm hired for the games admitted that it couldn't supply enough manpower? This "humiliating shambles" forced the British government to call in 3,500 security personnel of its own, and led GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney to utter some tactless remarks about Britain's alleged mismanagement during his official "Foot-in-Mouth" foreign tour last month. <u>Well, <mark>surprise, surprise</u></mark>. <u>Not only was there no terrorist attack</u>, the Games themselves came off rather well. There were the inevitable minor glitches, of course, but no disasters and some quite impressive organizational achievements. And of course, athletes from around the world delivered inspiring, impressive, heroic, and sometimes disappointing performances, which is what the Games are all about. Two lessons might be drawn from this event. The first is that the head-long rush to privatize everything -- including the provision of security -- has some obvious downsides. When markets and private firms fail, it is the state that has to come to the rescue. It was true after the 2007-08 financial crisis, it's true in the ongoing euro-mess, and it was true in the Olympics. Bear that in mind when Romney and new VP nominee Paul Ryan tout the virtues of shrinking government, especially the need to privatize Social Security and Medicare. The second lesson is that <u><mark>we continue to <strong>over-react to the "terrorist threat</mark>."</u></strong> <u>Here <strong><mark>I recommend you read</strong></mark> John <strong><mark>Mueller and</strong></mark> Mark G. <strong><mark>Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion</u></strong></mark>: America's Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. <u><mark>Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases</mark> of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots"</u> against the United States, <u><mark>and show</mark> how virtually <mark>all of the perpetrators were</u></mark> (in their words) <u>"<mark>incompetent, ineffective</mark>, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, <mark>unorganized</mark>, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, <mark>irrational</mark> and foolish."</u> <u><mark>They quote</u></mark> former Glenn Carle, <u><mark>former deputy national intelligence</u></mark> officer for transnational threats saying "<u>we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that <mark>al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires</u></mark>." Further, Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though <u>the <mark>annual risk of dying in a</mark> domestic <mark>terrorist attack is</mark> about <strong><mark>1 in 3.5 million</u></strong></mark>. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective "they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year." Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been "internalized": even when politicians and "terrorism experts" aren't hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude: ... Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril. Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it ... This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual." Which is another way of saying that <u>you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life</u>, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to "root out" those nasty jihadis. </p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 83,515 | 19 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,578 | Dems are in a great position to win the senate, but its still close | Severns and Robillard 9/4/16 | Severns and Robillard 9/4/16 (Maggie Severns is a Maggie Severns is a reporter for Campaign Pro and holds a bachelor’s degree with honors from Dartmouth College. Kevin Robillard is a Campaigns reporter for POLITICO Pro. He was previously a transportation reporter, a breaking news reporter and an editorial assistant for POLITICO. 9/4/16. POLITICO. “Democrats’ chances of retaking the Senate keep getting better” . DA: 9/10/16. [JK] ) | Donald Trump’s tumultuous August has increased Democrats’ chances of winning the Senate, with a
and not at all out, in their quest to keep the Senate. | null | Donald Trump’s tumultuous August has increased Democrats’ chances of winning the Senate, with a
AND
and not at all out, in their quest to keep the Senate. | 154 | <h4>Dems are in a great position to win the senate, but its still close </h4><p><strong>Severns and Robillard 9/4/16<u></strong> </u>(Maggie Severns is a Maggie Severns is a reporter for Campaign Pro and holds a bachelor’s degree with honors from Dartmouth College. Kevin Robillard is a Campaigns reporter for POLITICO Pro. He was previously a transportation reporter, a breaking news reporter and an editorial assistant for POLITICO. 9/4/16. POLITICO. “Democrats’ chances of retaking the Senate keep getting better” . DA: 9/10/16. [JK<u>] )</p><p>Donald Trump’s tumultuous August has increased Democrats’ chances of winning the Senate, with a </p><p></u>AND</p><p><u>and not at all out, in their quest to keep the Senate.</p></u> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 1,560,866 | 2 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,579 | US offensive posturing that envision offensively striking China creates a “use it or lose it” mindset with nuclear weapons, which ensures miscalculation and minor incidents to escalate | Hallinan 1/27 | Hallinan 1/27 | A certain amount of this is posturing by two powerful countries the U.S. is in the middle of a major military buildup — the Obama administration’s “Asia Pivot” in the Pacific There is no question that China has been aggressive But if a military confrontation is to be avoided, it’s important to try to understand what’s behind China’s behavior China adopted a strategy called “Area Denial” that would allow Beijing to control the waters surrounding its coast That not only required retooling of its armed forces — from land armies to naval and air power — it required a ring of bases that would keep potential enemies at arm’s length and also allow Chinese submarines to enter the Pacific and Indian oceans undetected All of those passages are controlled by the U.S. or countries with close ties to Washingto Stirring the Pot Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, the U.S. made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” Called “Air/Sea Battle” — later renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” — Air/Sea Battle envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities, and command centers with air and naval power. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory China’s recent seizure of a U.S. underwater drone off the Philippines is part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the U.S. to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do — it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed U.S. Navy ship — it’s a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to Air/Sea Battle. China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. naval strategy the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them. The U.S. has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles, posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence. While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, it could still lead to a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. Under the stricture “use them or lose them” the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists, and threatening a trade war | buildup if a military confrontation is to be avoided, it’s important to try to understand what’s behind China’s behavior the U.S. made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” J A M G C envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities, and command centers China’s seizure of a U.S. drone off the Philippines is a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to A S B China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. strategy . The U.S. has 400 bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons But could also down Chinese missiles, posing a threat to Beijing A S B could lead to a nuclear war Under the stricture “use them or lose them” the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists, and threatening a trade war | (Conn, columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus, PhD from Berkeley, "How Trump Could Blunder Into War with China," fpif.org/trump-blunder-war-china/)
The Roots of China’s Anxiety A certain amount of this is posturing by two powerful countries in competition for markets and influence, but Tillerson’s statement didn’t come out of the blue. In fact, the U.S. is in the middle of a major military buildup — the Obama administration’s “Asia Pivot” in the Pacific. American bases in Okinawa, Japan, and Guam have been beefed up, and for the first time since World War II, U.S. Marines have been deployed in Australia. Last March, the U.S. sent B-2 nuclear-capable strategic stealth bombers to join them. There is no question that China has been aggressive about claiming sovereignty over small islands and reefs in the South China Sea, even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague rejected Beijing’s claims. But if a military confrontation is to be avoided, it’s important to try to understand what’s behind China’s behavior. The current crisis has its roots in a tense standoff between Beijing and Taiwan in late 1996. China was angered that Washington had granted a visa to Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, calling it a violation of the 1979 U.S. “one-China” policy that recognized Beijing and downgraded relations with Taiwan to “unofficial.” Beijing responded to the visa uproar by firing missiles near a small Taiwan-controlled island and moving some military forces up to the mainland coast facing the island. However, there was never any danger that China would actually attack Taiwan. Even if it wanted to, it didn’t have the means to do so. Instead of letting things cool off, however, the Clinton administration escalated the conflict and sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, the USS Nimitz and USS Independence. The Nimitz and its escorts sailed through the Taiwan Straits between the island and the mainland, and there was nothing that China could do about it. The carriers deeply alarmed Beijing, because the regions just north of Taiwan in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea were the jumping off points for 19th and 20th century invasions by western colonialists and the Japanese. The Straits crisis led to a radical remaking of China’s military, which had long relied on massive land forces. Instead, China adopted a strategy called “Area Denial” that would allow Beijing to control the waters surrounding its coast, in particular the East and South China seas. That not only required retooling of its armed forces — from land armies to naval and air power — it required a ring of bases that would keep potential enemies at arm’s length and also allow Chinese submarines to enter the Pacific and Indian oceans undetected. Reaching from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula in the north to the Malay Peninsula in the south, this so-called “first island chain” is Beijing’s primary defense line. China is particularly vulnerable to a naval blockade. Some 80 percent of its energy supplies traverse the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, moving through narrow choke points like the Malacca Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Bab al Mandab Straits controlling the Red Sea, and the Straits of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf. All of those passages are controlled by the U.S. or countries like India and Indonesia with close ties to Washington. In 2013, China claimed it had historic rights to the region and issued its now famous “nine-dash line” map that embraced the Paracels and Spratly island chains — and 85 percent of the South China Sea. It was this nine-dash line that the Hague tribunal rejected, because it found no historical basis for China’s claim, and because there were overlapping assertions by Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. There are, of course, economic considerations as well. The region is rich in oil, gas and fish, but the primary concern for China is security. The Chinese haven’t interfered with commercial ship traffic in the territory they claim, although they’ve applied on-again, off-again restrictions on fishing and energy explorations. China initially prevented Filipino fishermen from exploiting some reefs, and then allowed it. It’s been more aggressive with Vietnam in the Paracels. Stirring the Pot Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, the U.S. made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” Called “Air/Sea Battle” — later renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” — Air/Sea Battle envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities, and command centers with air and naval power. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory. China’s recent seizure of a U.S. underwater drone off the Philippines is part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the U.S. to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do — it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed U.S. Navy ship — it’s a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to Air/Sea Battle. China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. naval strategy [use of undersea drones] against China in East Asia,” Li Mingjiang, a China expert at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told the Financial Times. “If this strategy becomes reality, it could be quite detrimental to China’s national security.” Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, and there is some truth to that charge. China has been throwing its weight around with several nations in Southeast Asia. But it also true that the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them. The U.S. has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles, posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence. While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, it could still lead to a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. Under the stricture “use them or lose them” the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess. Superpower Conflict The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China, questioning the “one China” policy, accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists, and threatening a trade war. The first would upend more than 30 years of diplomacy, the second is bizarre — if anything, China is overly aggressive in suppressing terrorism in its western Xinjiang Province — and the third makes no sense. China is the U.S.’s major trading partner and holds $1.24 trillion in U.S. treasury bonds. While Trump charges that the Chinese have hollowed out the American economy by undermining its industrial base with cheap labor and goods, China didn’t force Apple or General Motors to pull up stakes and decamp elsewhere. Capital goes where wages are low and unions are weak | 7,381 | <h4><strong>US offensive posturing that envision offensively striking China creates a “use it or lose it” mindset with nuclear weapons, which ensures miscalculation and minor incidents to escalate</h4><p>Hallinan 1/27</p><p></strong>(Conn, columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus, PhD from Berkeley, "How Trump Could Blunder Into War with China," fpif.org/trump-blunder-war-china/)</p><p>The Roots of China’s Anxiety <u>A certain amount of this is posturing by two powerful countries</u> in competition for markets and influence, but Tillerson’s statement didn’t come out of the blue. In fact, <u>the U.S. is in the middle of <strong>a major military <mark>buildup</strong></mark> — the Obama administration’s “Asia Pivot” in the Pacific</u>. American bases in Okinawa, Japan, and Guam have been beefed up, and for the first time since World War II, U.S. Marines have been deployed in Australia. Last March, the U.S. sent B-2 nuclear-capable strategic stealth bombers to join them. <u>There is no question that China has been aggressive</u> about claiming sovereignty over small islands and reefs in the South China Sea, even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague rejected Beijing’s claims. <u>But <mark>if a military confrontation is to be avoided, it’s important to <strong>try to understand what’s behind China’s behavior</u></strong></mark>. The current crisis has its roots in a tense standoff between Beijing and Taiwan in late 1996. China was angered that Washington had granted a visa to Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, calling it a violation of the 1979 U.S. “one-China” policy that recognized Beijing and downgraded relations with Taiwan to “unofficial.” Beijing responded to the visa uproar by firing missiles near a small Taiwan-controlled island and moving some military forces up to the mainland coast facing the island. However, there was never any danger that China would actually attack Taiwan. Even if it wanted to, it didn’t have the means to do so. Instead of letting things cool off, however, the Clinton administration escalated the conflict and sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, the USS Nimitz and USS Independence. The Nimitz and its escorts sailed through the Taiwan Straits between the island and the mainland, and there was nothing that China could do about it. The carriers deeply alarmed Beijing, because the regions just north of Taiwan in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea were the jumping off points for 19th and 20th century invasions by western colonialists and the Japanese. The Straits crisis led to a radical remaking of China’s military, which had long relied on massive land forces. Instead, <u>China adopted a strategy called “Area Denial” that would allow Beijing to control the waters surrounding its coast</u>, in particular the East and South China seas. <u>That not only required retooling of its armed forces — from land armies to naval and air power — it required a ring of bases that would keep potential enemies at arm’s length and also allow Chinese submarines to enter the Pacific and Indian oceans undetected</u>. Reaching from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula in the north to the Malay Peninsula in the south, this so-called “first island chain” is Beijing’s primary defense line. China is particularly vulnerable to a naval blockade. Some 80 percent of its energy supplies traverse the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, moving through narrow choke points like the Malacca Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Bab al Mandab Straits controlling the Red Sea, and the Straits of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf. <u>All of those passages are controlled by the U.S. or countries</u> like India and Indonesia <u>with close ties to Washingto</u>n. In 2013, China claimed it had historic rights to the region and issued its now famous “nine-dash line” map that embraced the Paracels and Spratly island chains — and 85 percent of the South China Sea. It was this nine-dash line that the Hague tribunal rejected, because it found no historical basis for China’s claim, and because there were overlapping assertions by Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. There are, of course, economic considerations as well. The region is rich in oil, gas and fish, but the primary concern for China is security. The Chinese haven’t interfered with commercial ship traffic in the territory they claim, although they’ve applied on-again, off-again restrictions on fishing and energy explorations. China initially prevented Filipino fishermen from exploiting some reefs, and then allowed it. It’s been more aggressive with Vietnam in the Paracels. <u>Stirring the Pot Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, <mark>the U.S. made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.”</mark> <strong>Called “Air/Sea Battle” — later renamed “<mark>J</mark>oint Concept for <mark>A</mark>ccess and <mark>M</mark>aneuver in the <mark>G</mark>lobal <mark>C</mark>ommons” — Air/Sea Battle <mark>envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities, and command centers</mark> with air and naval power</strong>. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory</u>. <u><mark>China’s</mark> recent <mark>seizure of a U.S. </mark>underwater <mark>drone off the Philippines is</mark> part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the U.S. to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do — it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed U.S. Navy ship — it’s <mark>a reflection of <strong>how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to A</mark>ir/<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle</strong>. <mark>China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S.</mark> naval <mark>strategy</u></mark> [use of undersea drones] against China in East Asia,” Li Mingjiang, a China expert at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told the Financial Times. “If this strategy becomes reality, it could be quite detrimental to China’s national security.” Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, and there is some truth to that charge. China has been throwing its weight around with several nations in Southeast Asia. But it also true that <u>the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them<mark>. The U.S. has</mark> some <mark>400</mark> military <mark>bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles</mark> in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly <mark>to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons</mark>. <mark>But</mark> the interceptors <mark>could also down Chinese missiles, posing a threat to Beijing</mark>’s nuclear deterrence. While <mark>A</mark>ir/<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle does not envision using nuclear weapons,<strong> it <mark>could</mark> still <mark>lead to a nuclear war</strong></mark>. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. <mark>Under the stricture “<strong>use them or lose them</strong>” the Chinese might fear their <strong>missiles were endangered and launch them</strong></mark>.</u> The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess. Superpower Conflict <u><strong><mark>The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China</u></strong></mark>, questioning the “one China” policy, <u><mark>accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists, and threatening a trade war</u></mark>. The first would upend more than 30 years of diplomacy, the second is bizarre — if anything, China is overly aggressive in suppressing terrorism in its western Xinjiang Province — and the third makes no sense. China is the U.S.’s major trading partner and holds $1.24 trillion in U.S. treasury bonds. While Trump charges that the Chinese have hollowed out the American economy by undermining its industrial base with cheap labor and goods, China didn’t force Apple or General Motors to pull up stakes and decamp elsewhere. Capital goes where wages are low and unions are weak </p> | null | null | null | 32,206 | 115 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,580 | Growth is tenuous now and sustaining XI’s reforms are necessary to CCP stability and to prevent lashout in the ECS/SCS that escalates. | Rachman 6/1/2016 | Rachman, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, 6/1/2016 | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
at the moment China can look relatively stable But that impression is deceptive President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation Xi has essentially abandon the formula that has driven China's rise created by Deng Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach Under Mr Xi, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | China can look stable But that is deceptive Xi is taking his country in risky directions. If his policies succeed Xi will be remembered for the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation China has moved towards a strongman leader a faltering economy could undermine the party's legitimacy. as economic and political tensions within China have risen the country's foreign policy has become nationalistic and willing to risk confrontation with the West and Asian neighbours. Beijing's tough assertion of its territorial claims, epitomised by island-building" in the S C S to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These serve a political purpose the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US liable to stir support | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
Politics in the West is so dramatic at the moment that China can look relatively staid and stable by comparison. But that impression is deceptive. Chinese President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation. What Mr Xi has done is essentially to abandon the formula that has driven China's rise over the past 30 years. That formula was created by Deng Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". Under Mr Xi, who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself. In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In harder economic times, the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | 5,166 | <h4><u><strong>Growth is tenuous now and sustaining XI’s reforms are necessary to CCP stability and to prevent lashout in the ECS/SCS that escalates. </h4><p>Rachman</u></strong>, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, <u><strong>6/1/2016 </p><p>Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula</p><p></u></strong>Politics in the West is so dramatic <u><strong>at the moment</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>China can look</mark> relatively</u></strong> staid and <u><strong><mark>stable</u></strong></mark> by comparison. <u><strong><mark>But that</mark> impression <mark>is</mark> <mark>deceptive</u></strong></mark>. Chinese <u><strong>President <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>is taking his country in</mark> radical and <mark>risky</mark> new <mark>directions. If his</mark> new <mark>policies succeed</mark>, then the <mark>Xi</mark> era <mark>will be remembered for</mark> the achievement of his often-stated goal of <mark>the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation</u></strong>. <u><strong>But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his</mark> <mark>legacy is</mark> likely to be <mark>political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation</u></strong></mark>. What Mr <u><strong>Xi has</u></strong> done is <u><strong>essentially</u></strong> to <u><strong>abandon the formula that has driven China's rise</u></strong> over the past 30 years. That formula was <u><strong>created by Deng</u></strong> Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, <u><strong>Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model</u></strong> created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. <u><strong>And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach</u></strong> to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". <u><strong>Under Mr Xi,</u></strong> who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, <u><strong>all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, <mark>China has moved </mark>back <mark>towards</mark> a model based around <mark>a strongman leader</mark> - Mr Xi himself</u></strong>. <u><strong>In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model</u></strong>, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. <u><strong>And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. </u></strong>The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, <u><strong>the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy</u></strong>", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. <u><strong>But <mark>a faltering economy</mark> - or, worse, a financial crisis - <mark>could</mark> well <mark>undermine the party's legitimacy.</mark> </u></strong>When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr <u><strong>Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing</u></strong> - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. <u><strong>At the same time <mark>as economic and political tensions within China have risen</mark> under Mr Xi, so <mark>the country's foreign policy has become</mark> more <mark>nationalistic and</mark> more <mark>willing to risk confrontation with the West and</mark> with China's <mark>Asian neighbours. Beijing's</mark> increasingly <mark>tough assertion of its territorial</mark> and maritime <mark>claims, epitomised</mark> <mark>by</mark> its "<mark>island-building" in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea, has led <mark>to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These</mark> near-clashes may <mark>serve a political purpose</mark>. In </u></strong>harder economic times,<u><strong> <mark>the CCP may need new</mark> <mark>sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US</mark> at sea is <mark>liable to stir </mark>patriotic <mark>support</mark> for the government.</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 81,678 | 54 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,581 | Third, space debris risks catastrophic chain reactions that will collapse the global economy. | Dillow 10 | Dillow 10 — staff writer for Popular Science (Clay, “PENTAGON: A SPACE JUNK COLLISION COULD SET OFF CATASTROPHIC CHAIN REACTION, DISABLE EARTH COMMUNICATIONS” Popular Science, 5/27, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-05/dod-space-junk-tipping-point-collision-could-set-catastrophic-chain-reaction | the DoD's assessment of the space junk problem finds that space junk has reached a critical tipping point that could result in a cataclysmic chain reaction that brings everyday life on Earth to a grinding halt
satellites keep track of the global shipping networks that keep our economies humming
that could all come crashing down
with so much junk already up there, a collision is numerically probable at some point. Two large pieces of junk colliding could theoretically send thousands more potential satellite killers into orbit, and those could in turn collide with other pieces of junk or with satellites, unleashing another swarm of debris. You get the idea.
To give an idea of how quickly a chain reaction could get out hand consider The Chinese missile test that obliterated a satellite in 2007 spawned 150,000 pieces of debris.
If a chain reaction got out of control it could very quickly sever our communications, our GPS system and cripple the global economy and whole orbits could be rendered unusable, potentially making some places on Earth technological dead zones | null | Every now and again someone raises a stern warning about the amount of space junk orbiting Earth. Those warnings are usually met with general indifference, as very few of us own satellites or travel regularly to low Earth orbit. But the DoD's assessment of the space junk problem finds that perhaps we should be paying attention: space junk has reached a critical tipping point that could result in a cataclysmic chain reaction that brings everyday life on Earth to a grinding halt.
Our reliance on satellites goes beyond the obvious. We depend on them for television signals, the evening weather report, and to find our houses on Google Earth when we're bored at work. But behind the scenes, they also inform our warfighting capabilities, keep track of the global shipping networks that keep our economies humming, and help us get to the places we need to get to via GPS.
According to the DoD's interim Space Posture Review, that could all come crashing down. Literally. Our satellites are sorely outnumbered by space debris, to the tune of 370,000 pieces of junk up there versus 1,100 satellites. That junk ranges from nuts and bolts lost during spacewalks to pieces of older satellites to whole satellites that no longer function, and it's all whipping around the Earth at a rate of about 4.8 miles per second.
The fear is that with so much junk already up there, a collision is numerically probable at some point. Two large pieces of junk colliding could theoretically send thousands more potential satellite killers into orbit, and those could in turn collide with other pieces of junk or with satellites, unleashing another swarm of debris. You get the idea.
To give an idea of how quickly a chain reaction could get out hand consider this: in February of last year a defunct Russian satellite collided with a communications satellite, turning 2 orbiting craft into 1,500 pieces of junk. The Chinese missile test that obliterated a satellite in 2007 spawned 100 times more than that, scattering 150,000 pieces of debris.
If a chain reaction got out of control up there, it could very quickly sever our communications, our GPS system (upon which the U.S. military heavily relies), and cripple the global economy (not to mention destroy the $250 billion space services industry), and whole orbits could be rendered unusable, potentially making some places on Earth technological dead zones. | 2,394 | <h4><u>Third</u>, space debris risks <u>catastrophic chain </u>reactions that will <u>collapse the global economy</u>.</h4><p><strong>Dillow 10 </strong>— staff writer for Popular Science (Clay, “PENTAGON: A SPACE JUNK COLLISION COULD SET OFF CATASTROPHIC CHAIN REACTION, DISABLE EARTH COMMUNICATIONS” Popular Science, 5/27, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-05/dod-space-junk-tipping-point-collision-could-set-catastrophic-chain-reaction</p><p>Every now and again someone raises a stern warning about the amount of space junk orbiting Earth. Those warnings are usually met with general indifference, as very few of us own satellites or travel regularly to low Earth orbit. But <u>the DoD's assessment of the space junk problem finds that</u> perhaps we should be paying attention: <u>space junk has reached a <strong>critical tipping point</strong> that could result in a <strong>cataclysmic chain reaction</strong> that brings everyday life on Earth to a <strong>grinding halt</u></strong>.</p><p>Our reliance on <u>satellites</u> goes beyond the obvious. We depend on them for television signals, the evening weather report, and to find our houses on Google Earth when we're bored at work. But behind the scenes, they also inform our warfighting capabilities, <u>keep track of the global shipping networks that keep our economies humming</u>, and help us get to the places we need to get to via GPS.</p><p>According to the DoD's interim Space Posture Review, <u>that could all come crashing down</u>. Literally. Our satellites are sorely outnumbered by space debris, to the tune of 370,000 pieces of junk up there versus 1,100 satellites. That junk ranges from nuts and bolts lost during spacewalks to pieces of older satellites to whole satellites that no longer function, and it's all whipping around the Earth at a rate of about 4.8 miles per second.</p><p>The fear is that <u>with so much junk already up there, a collision is numerically probable at some point. Two large pieces of junk colliding could theoretically send thousands more potential satellite killers into orbit, and those could in turn collide with other pieces of junk or with satellites, unleashing another swarm of debris. You get the idea.</p><p>To give an idea of how quickly a chain reaction could get out hand consider</u> this: in February of last year a defunct Russian satellite collided with a communications satellite, turning 2 orbiting craft into 1,500 pieces of junk. <u>The Chinese missile test that obliterated a satellite in 2007 spawned</u> 100 times more than that, scattering <u>150,000 pieces of debris.</p><p>If a chain reaction got out of control</u> up there, <u>it could very quickly sever our communications, our GPS system</u> (upon which the U.S. military heavily relies), <u><strong>and cripple the global economy</u></strong> (not to mention destroy the $250 billion space services industry), <u>and whole orbits could be rendered unusable, potentially making some places on Earth technological dead zones</u>.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 183,720 | 8 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,582 | The plan resolves current trade barriers that impede relations – increased economic integration spurs further cooperation. | Schott & Miner 15 [Jeffrey J. Schott (senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions @ the Peterson Institute for International Economics, was adjunct professor at Georgetown University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an official of the US Treasury Department in international trade and energy policy) and Sean Miner (China Program Manager and Research Associate @ Pearson Institute for International Economics, MBA from George Washington University where he focused on international business and finance), “US-China Trade Relations: Projecting the Path Forward”, CF40-PIIE Economists Symposium, http://www.cf40.org.cn/uploads/PDF/2015063004.pdf] | Schott & Miner 15 [Jeffrey J. Schott (senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions @ the Peterson Institute for International Economics, was adjunct professor at Georgetown University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an official of the US Treasury Department in international trade and energy policy) and Sean Miner (China Program Manager and Research Associate @ Pearson Institute for International Economics, MBA from George Washington University where he focused on international business and finance), “US-China Trade Relations: Projecting the Path Forward”, CF40-PIIE Economists Symposium, http://www.cf40.org.cn/uploads/PDF/2015063004.pdf] | despite lingering mistrust in Beijing and Washington of each other, each side has recognized that they need to work together to propel common international objectives and to complement domestic economic priorities. Building on that momentum, bilateral trade and investment talks continue to advance. US-China talks could yield a bountiful harvest of economic reforms and new precedents to inspire broader pacts the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), could promote closer cooperation To deepen economic relations between the two countries, the United States and China need to resolve or mitigate key problems that inhibit trade and investment. Priority US concerns involve discrimination applied via nontariff barriers on goods and services, restrictions on (FDI), misappropriation of intellectual property, subsidies to (SOEs), and the application of China’s anti-monopoly law, On the Chinese side, the main concerns involve restrictions on US high-tech exports, the frequent application of anti-dumping duties, and national security standards applied by (CFIUS) in its review of proposed Chinese investments in the United States. Chinese nontariff barriers for goods and services pose significant hurdles for foreign suppliers. Despite China’s current investment reforms, foreign investors still regard the investment environment as very challenging and continue to report that laws and regulations that favor domestic businesses hinder their business. These types of regulations and actions inhibit economic integration One of the major challenges for US-China relations is how to ensure that SOEs do not have unfair advantages due to preferences and subsidies from national and local governments. The best way to allay fears of improper conduct would be to insert provisions into the bilateral investment agreement that SOEs will act in accordance with commercial considerations Another high-profile concern involves inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China. The legal framework around IPR is strong but the implementation of the law has been lacking. The United States’ national security review of foreign purchases of US enterprises has caused the perception in China that many Chinese investments are not welcome. The view is that CFIUS treats Chinese firms unfairly and has a bias against them. China would like to see greater transparency in CFIUS reviews, The current restrictions on US manufactured dual-use goods on exports to China also cause a ripple in the relationship. ongoing talks could address many of the trade barriers and discriminatory policies that currently impede the growth of US-China trade negotiations could substantially deepen economic opportunities for China and the United States in each other’s markets to advance bilateral relations and economic integration. | Beijing and Washington ecognize they need to work together BIT), could promote closer cooperation To deepen economic relations between the two countries U S and China need to resolve problems that inhibit trade investors still regard the investment environment as very challenging types of reg s inhibit economic integration the major challenge for relations how to ensure that SOEs do not have unfair advantages current restrictions on US manufactured cause a ripple in the relationship negotiations could substantially deepen economic opportunities to advance bilateral relations | Yet despite lingering mistrust in Beijing and Washington of each other, each side has recognized that they need to work together to propel common international objectives and to complement domestic economic priorities. Ministers and senior government officials now meet regularly in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to share information, avoid misunderstandings, and explore areas of cooperation on a broad range of issues. The successful bilateral talks between Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in November 2014 produced important agreements to advance international negotiations on climate change and on trade in information technology products. Building on that momentum, bilateral trade and investment talks continue to advance. This paper summarizes key areas where US-China talks could yield a bountiful harvest of economic reforms and new precedents to inspire broader regional and multilateral trade pacts. We start with a very short description of the key challenges to deepening bilateral economic ties in the near to medium term. We then examine how ongoing negotiations, including the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), could promote closer cooperation and spur domestic economic policy reforms. We also examine US-China interests in working together on the TPP and/or pursuing a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as well as plurilateral trade pacts on services, environmental goods, information technology products and possibly other issues. Challenges to US-China Trade Relations To deepen economic relations between the two countries, the United States and China need to resolve or mitigate key problems that inhibit trade and investment. Priority US concerns involve discrimination applied via nontariff barriers on goods and services, restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI), misappropriation of intellectual property, subsidies to farmers and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), restricted government procurement policies, and the application of China’s anti-monopoly law, among others. On the Chinese side, the main concerns involve restrictions on US high-tech exports, the frequent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and national security standards applied by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in its review of proposed Chinese investments in the United States. While Chinese tariffs are among the lowest maintained by developing countries, Chinese nontariff barriers for goods and services pose significant hurdles for foreign suppliers. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) tried to quantify the impact of barriers like extra licenses, product and certification requirements, complex regulatory environment, or product quotas. GTAP calculated that ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for Chinese nontariff barriers averaged 17 percent for merchandise goods; in contrast, the United States’ AVE average was 4 percent. Similarly, the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), developed in a comprehensive study compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), shows that China has significantly higher AVE on many service imports compared with the United States (see table 2); this was also the case for most other observed countries. This is significant because the United States has a competitive advantage in services and could offset a significant amo unt of its bilateral merchandise deficit with increased service exports to China. Reform of barriers to trade and investment in services is also critical to the future success of the Chinese economy, since the benefits would redound to all users of services in China, including manufacturers and farmers. That is why China has asked to join the plurilateral negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement—see below. Despite China’s current investment reforms, foreign investors still regard the investment environment as very challenging and continue to report that laws and regulations that favor domestic businesses hinder their business. Indigenous innovation laws require that local governments and SOEs purchase only from domestic suppliers of goods and services. Performance requirements place conditions on investment, requiring, for example, purchases of inputs from local producers. Similarly, the actions by China’s antimonopoly authorities appear inconsistent and merit further scrutiny. These types of regulations and actions inhibit economic integration rather that foster it. One of the major challenges for the BIT negotiations and US-China relations more broadly is how to ensure that SOEs do not have unfair advantages due to preferences and subsidies from national and local governments. SOEs are responsible for more than half of China’s outbound FDI, although the share of private firms is increasing. Officials want to ensure that SOEs don’t collude when making bids on foreign projects, or that they don’t provide favorable prices on goods or services to Chinese firms. There are over 100,000 SOEs in China, and although some may be shifting toward a mixed ownership model, most of the control still lies with local and central government authorities in China. SOEs rarely appear to be subject to investigations by the anti-monopoly authorities. They also have “delegated authorities” including control over some ports and electricity, which could provide opportunities for them to favor domestic firms over foreign. The best way to allay fears of improper conduct would be to insert provisions into the bilateral investment agreement that SOEs will act in accordance with commercial considerations, meaning without government preferences and subsidies and consistent with the normal practices of privately held enterprises in the relevant business or industry. In this regard, provisions requiring more transparency relating to disclosure of subsidies and reporting of financial accounts would be helpful. Another high-profile concern involves the lack of or inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China. Studies have shown that US firms lose as much as $100 billion annually to copyright, patent, and trademark violations in China. The legal framework around IPR is strong but the implementation of the law has been lacking. Similarly, competition policy has a strong regulatory framework, on par with Western standards, but application of the law has caused concerns. Areas like merger reviews have seemingly unfairly targeted foreign firms. Moreover, unusual conditions may be placed on the merger; for example, when Wal-Mart purchased Niu Hai Holding, China’s Ministry of Commerce stated that the merger would be approved if the merged firm would refrain from operating an e-commerce business in China. Additionally, China’s National Development and Reform Commission has seemingly targeted foreign firms in pricing probes even when there was no evidence of cartel behavior. China’s grievances often lie with anti-dumping duties placed on their products. When it joined the WTO, China agreed that special conditions could apply to the determination of possible dumping by Chinese exporters because of China’s “non-market economy” (NME) status. These specific provisions expire in 2016 at which point China will be accorded market economy status with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping duties. Chinese officials are concerned that US practice might not immediately align with the WTO obligations and would like to see a change in US anti-dumping law that eliminates the NME discrimination. Given the current Congressional debate over reauthorization of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), such reforms to the US law seem very problematic. The United States’ national security review of foreign purchases of US enterprises has caused the perception in China that many Chinese investments are not welcome. The view is that CFIUS treats Chinese firms unfairly and has a bias against them. China would like to see greater transparency in CFIUS reviews, so they can better understand the criteria for successfully passing an investigation. But currently the prospect of going through a review may be enough for Chinese investors to change their minds. The United States would do well to outline some clear and transparent tests in order for foreign investors to have a better comprehension of the system. In fact, few prospective Chinese investors face CFIUS reviews. The current restrictions on US manufactured dual-use goods on exports to China also cause a ripple in the relationship. Many of the high-tech items on the US export control list are not restricted by other developed countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Those countries already export these products to China, which are generally available in many markets. Such restrictions on dual-use items are nettlesome and can raise costs for Chinese companies, but more often than not they do not serve their intended strategic purpose in preventing the diffusion of new military technologies. None of these problems is easy to resolve but few pose intractable challenges to moving forward with trade and investment agreements involving both countries. The following section examines ongoing and prospective talks that are or could address many of the trade barriers and discriminatory policies that currently impede the growth of US-China trade and investment in goods and services. Negotiating Options Going Forward Current and future negotiations could substantially deepen economic opportunities for China and the United States in each other’s markets. In this section we examine key options for the United States and China to advance bilateral relations and regional economic integration. | 9,773 | <h4>The plan resolves current trade barriers that impede relations – increased economic integration spurs further cooperation.</h4><p><strong>Schott & Miner 15 <u>[Jeffrey J. Schott (senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions @ the Peterson Institute for International Economics, was adjunct professor at Georgetown University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an official of the US Treasury Department in international trade and energy policy) and Sean Miner (China Program Manager and Research Associate @ Pearson Institute for International Economics, MBA from George Washington University where he focused on international business and finance), “US-China Trade Relations: Projecting the Path Forward”, CF40-PIIE Economists Symposium, http://www.cf40.org.cn/uploads/PDF/2015063004.pdf]</p><p></u></strong>Yet <u><strong>despite lingering mistrust in <mark>Beijing and Washington</mark> of each other, each side has r<mark>ecognize</mark>d that <mark>they need to work together</mark> to propel common international objectives and to complement domestic economic priorities.</u></strong> Ministers and senior government officials now meet regularly in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to share information, avoid misunderstandings, and explore areas of cooperation on a broad range of issues. The successful bilateral talks between Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in November 2014 produced important agreements to advance international negotiations on climate change and on trade in information technology products. <u><strong>Building on that momentum, bilateral trade and investment talks continue to advance. </u></strong>This paper summarizes key areas where <u><strong>US-China talks could yield a bountiful harvest of economic reforms and new precedents to inspire broader</u></strong> regional and multilateral trade <u><strong>pacts</u></strong>. We start with a very short description of the key challenges to deepening bilateral economic ties in the near to medium term. We then examine how ongoing negotiations, including <u><strong>the Bilateral Investment Treaty (<mark>BIT), could promote closer cooperation</u></strong></mark> and spur domestic economic policy reforms. We also examine US-China interests in working together on the TPP and/or pursuing a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as well as plurilateral trade pacts on services, environmental goods, information technology products and possibly other issues. Challenges to US-China Trade Relations <u><strong><mark>To deepen economic relations between the two countries</mark>, the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China need to resolve</mark> or mitigate key <mark>problems that inhibit trade</mark> and investment. Priority US concerns involve discrimination applied via nontariff barriers on goods and services, restrictions on</u></strong> foreign direct investment <u><strong>(FDI), misappropriation of intellectual property, subsidies to</u></strong> farmers and state-owned enterprises <u><strong>(SOEs),</u></strong> restricted government procurement policies, <u><strong>and the application of China’s anti-monopoly law,</u></strong> among others. <u><strong>On the Chinese side, the main concerns involve restrictions on US high-tech exports, the frequent application of anti-dumping</u></strong> and countervailing <u><strong>duties, and national security standards applied by </u></strong>the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States <u><strong>(CFIUS) in its review of proposed Chinese investments in the United States. </u></strong>While Chinese tariffs are among the lowest maintained by developing countries, <u><strong>Chinese nontariff barriers for goods and services pose significant hurdles for foreign suppliers.</u></strong> The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) tried to quantify the impact of barriers like extra licenses, product and certification requirements, complex regulatory environment, or product quotas. GTAP calculated that ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for Chinese nontariff barriers averaged 17 percent for merchandise goods; in contrast, the United States’ AVE average was 4 percent. Similarly, the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), developed in a comprehensive study compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), shows that China has significantly higher AVE on many service imports compared with the United States (see table 2); this was also the case for most other observed countries. This is significant because the United States has a competitive advantage in services and could offset a significant amo unt of its bilateral merchandise deficit with increased service exports to China. Reform of barriers to trade and investment in services is also critical to the future success of the Chinese economy, since the benefits would redound to all users of services in China, including manufacturers and farmers. That is why China has asked to join the plurilateral negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement—see below. <u><strong>Despite China’s current investment reforms, foreign <mark>investors still regard the investment environment as very challenging</mark> and continue to report that laws and regulations that favor domestic businesses hinder their business.</u></strong> Indigenous innovation laws require that local governments and SOEs purchase only from domestic suppliers of goods and services. Performance requirements place conditions on investment, requiring, for example, purchases of inputs from local producers. Similarly, the actions by China’s antimonopoly authorities appear inconsistent and merit further scrutiny. <u><strong>These <mark>types of reg</mark>ulation<mark>s</mark> and actions <mark>inhibit economic integration</u></strong></mark> rather that foster it. <u><strong>One of <mark>the major challenge</mark>s <mark>for</mark> </u></strong>the BIT negotiations and <u><strong>US-China <mark>relations</u></strong></mark> more broadly <u><strong>is <mark>how to ensure that SOEs do not have unfair advantages</mark> due to preferences and subsidies from national and local governments.</u></strong> SOEs are responsible for more than half of China’s outbound FDI, although the share of private firms is increasing. Officials want to ensure that SOEs don’t collude when making bids on foreign projects, or that they don’t provide favorable prices on goods or services to Chinese firms. There are over 100,000 SOEs in China, and although some may be shifting toward a mixed ownership model, most of the control still lies with local and central government authorities in China. SOEs rarely appear to be subject to investigations by the anti-monopoly authorities. They also have “delegated authorities” including control over some ports and electricity, which could provide opportunities for them to favor domestic firms over foreign. <u><strong>The best way to allay fears of improper conduct would be to insert provisions into the bilateral investment agreement that SOEs will act in accordance with commercial considerations</u></strong>, meaning without government preferences and subsidies and consistent with the normal practices of privately held enterprises in the relevant business or industry. In this regard, provisions requiring more transparency relating to disclosure of subsidies and reporting of financial accounts would be helpful. <u><strong>Another high-profile concern involves </u></strong>the lack of or <u><strong>inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China.</u></strong> Studies have shown that US firms lose as much as $100 billion annually to copyright, patent, and trademark violations in China. <u><strong>The legal framework around IPR is strong but the implementation of the law has been lacking.</u></strong> Similarly, competition policy has a strong regulatory framework, on par with Western standards, but application of the law has caused concerns. Areas like merger reviews have seemingly unfairly targeted foreign firms. Moreover, unusual conditions may be placed on the merger; for example, when Wal-Mart purchased Niu Hai Holding, China’s Ministry of Commerce stated that the merger would be approved if the merged firm would refrain from operating an e-commerce business in China. Additionally, China’s National Development and Reform Commission has seemingly targeted foreign firms in pricing probes even when there was no evidence of cartel behavior. China’s grievances often lie with anti-dumping duties placed on their products. When it joined the WTO, China agreed that special conditions could apply to the determination of possible dumping by Chinese exporters because of China’s “non-market economy” (NME) status. These specific provisions expire in 2016 at which point China will be accorded market economy status with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping duties. Chinese officials are concerned that US practice might not immediately align with the WTO obligations and would like to see a change in US anti-dumping law that eliminates the NME discrimination. Given the current Congressional debate over reauthorization of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), such reforms to the US law seem very problematic. <u><strong>The United States’ national security review of foreign purchases of US enterprises has caused the perception in China that many Chinese investments are not welcome. The view is that CFIUS treats Chinese firms unfairly and has a bias against them. China would like to see greater transparency in CFIUS reviews,</u></strong> so they can better understand the criteria for successfully passing an investigation. But currently the prospect of going through a review may be enough for Chinese investors to change their minds. The United States would do well to outline some clear and transparent tests in order for foreign investors to have a better comprehension of the system. In fact, few prospective Chinese investors face CFIUS reviews. <u><strong>The <mark>current restrictions on US manufactured</mark> dual-use goods on exports to China also <mark>cause a ripple in the relationship</mark>.</u></strong> Many of the high-tech items on the US export control list are not restricted by other developed countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Those countries already export these products to China, which are generally available in many markets. Such restrictions on dual-use items are nettlesome and can raise costs for Chinese companies, but more often than not they do not serve their intended strategic purpose in preventing the diffusion of new military technologies. None of these problems is easy to resolve but few pose intractable challenges to moving forward with trade and investment agreements involving both countries. The following section examines <u><strong>ongoing</u></strong> and prospective <u><strong>talks</u></strong> that are or <u><strong>could address many of the trade barriers and discriminatory policies that currently impede the growth of US-China trade</u></strong> and investment in goods and services. Negotiating Options Going Forward Current and future <u><strong><mark>negotiations could substantially deepen economic opportunities</mark> for China and the United States in each other’s markets</u></strong>. In this section we examine key options for the United States and China <u><strong><mark>to advance bilateral relations</mark> and</u></strong> regional <u><strong>economic integration.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 160,961 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,583 | Likelihood of a terror attack is incredibly low – The media and government exaggerate the risk. | null | -U.S. is too far away from terrorists | U.S. State Department statistics show that historically, North America has had the lowest incidence of terrorism worldwide The United States is far away from the world's centers of conflict. Although the United States is roundly hated most anti-U.S. terrorism is perpetrated on U.S. embassies and military facilities overseas – not on the American homeland. Terrorists have trouble operating in the United States because it is so far from their bases the United States does not have many militant foreign populations that could provide sanctuary and support for imported terrorists of the same ilk lifetime probability that international terrorists will kill any one American is a minuscule one in 80,000 – about the same as the same person being killed by a comet U.S. security agencies, to get more funds and authority for their bureaucracies, have constantly used color-coded warnings and other techniques of fearmongering to keep the anxiety generated by 9/11 alive in the public consciousness. The U.S. media, getting high ratings from sensational reporting on terrorism, has been a willing accomplice to the administration effort | Eland 07
terrorism is perpetrated not on the American homeland United States is far from their bases United States does not have many militant foreign populations that could provide sanctuary for imported terrorists probability that international terrorists will kill any one is the same as the same person being killed by a comet security agencies, to get more funds and authority have constantly used fearmongering to keep the anxiety generated by 9/11 alive The media, getting high ratings from sensational reporting has been a willing accomplice | -Our evidence is comparative
-the probability of their impacts happening is equivalent to us getting hit by a comet
-we indict their scenarios-- their impacts are all hype from security agencies trying to secure funding and the media which rely on sensational reports.
Eland 07 Senior Fellow and director of the Center on Peace & Liberty @ Independent Institute, Ivan, “The Terror Threat in Perspective” http://antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=10702
U.S. State Department statistics show that historically, North America has had the lowest incidence of terrorism worldwide. The American public's shocked reaction to the catastrophic 9/11 attacks was due, in part, to the infrequency of past terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. After the unique events of 9/11, terrorism in North America has resumed its historical modest trajectory. North America has been a relative safe haven from terrorism for several reasons. The United States is far away from the world's centers of conflict. Although the United States is roundly hated in the world because of its unneeded meddling in faraway conflicts, most anti-U.S. terrorism is perpetrated on U.S. embassies and military facilities overseas – not on the American homeland. Terrorists, like conventional armies, have trouble operating in the United States because it is so far from their bases. In addition, the United States does not have many militant foreign populations that could provide sanctuary and support for imported terrorists of the same ilk. According to Ohio State political scientist John Mueller, the lifetime probability that international terrorists will kill any one American is a minuscule one in 80,000 – about the same as the same person being killed by a comet. Of course, the chances are even lower if you are an American living in America (instead of overseas) and not residing in New York, Washington, Chicago, or Los Angeles. But the average American, especially after the luck that the hijackers benefited from on 9/11, should not be blamed for overestimating the danger of terrorism. The U.S. security agencies, to get more funds and authority for their bureaucracies, have constantly used color-coded warnings and other techniques of fearmongering to keep the anxiety generated by 9/11 alive in the public consciousness. The U.S. media, getting high ratings from sensational reporting on terrorism, has been a willing accomplice to the administration effort. | 2,424 | <h4>Likelihood of a terror attack is incredibly low – The media and government exaggerate the risk.</h4><p>-U.S. is too far away from terrorists</p><p>-Our evidence is comparative</p><p>-the probability of their impacts happening is equivalent to us getting hit by a comet</p><p>-we indict their scenarios-- their impacts are all hype from security agencies trying to secure funding and the media which rely on sensational reports.</p><p><strong><mark>Eland 07</strong></mark> Senior Fellow and director of the Center on Peace & Liberty @ Independent Institute, Ivan, “The Terror Threat in Perspective” http://antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=10702</p><p><u><strong>U.S. State Department statistics show that historically, North America has had the lowest incidence of terrorism worldwide</u></strong>. The American public's shocked reaction to the catastrophic 9/11 attacks was due, in part, to the infrequency of past terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. After the unique events of 9/11, terrorism in North America has resumed its historical modest trajectory. North America has been a relative safe haven from terrorism for several reasons. <u><strong>The United States is far away from the world's centers of conflict. Although the United States is roundly hated</u></strong> in the world because of its unneeded meddling in faraway conflicts, <u><strong>most anti-U.S. <mark>terrorism is perpetrated</mark> on U.S. embassies and military facilities overseas – <mark>not on the American homeland</mark>. Terrorists</u></strong>, like conventional armies, <u><strong>have trouble operating in the <mark>United States</mark> because it <mark>is</mark> so <mark>far from their bases</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong>the <mark>United States does not have many militant foreign populations that could provide sanctuary</mark> and support <mark>for imported terrorists</mark> of the same ilk</u></strong>. According to Ohio State political scientist John Mueller, the <u><strong>lifetime <mark>probability that international terrorists will kill any one </mark>American <mark>is</mark> a minuscule one in 80,000 – about <mark>the same as the same person being killed by a comet</u></strong></mark>. Of course, the chances are even lower if you are an American living in America (instead of overseas) and not residing in New York, Washington, Chicago, or Los Angeles. But the average American, especially after the luck that the hijackers benefited from on 9/11, should not be blamed for overestimating the danger of terrorism. The <u><strong>U.S. <mark>security agencies, to get more funds and authority</mark> for their bureaucracies, <mark>have constantly used</mark> color-coded warnings and other techniques of <mark>fearmongering to keep the anxiety generated by 9/11 alive</mark> in the public consciousness. <mark>The</mark> U.S. <mark>media, getting high ratings from sensational reporting</mark> on terrorism, <mark>has been a willing accomplice</mark> to the administration effort</u></strong>. </p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 302,638 | 4 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,584 | Third is Strategic Distrust – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Third is <u>Strategic Distrust – </h4></u> | null | null | null | 1,560,868 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,585 | Trump will spin softline engagement with China against the Democrats – public wants muscular approach and it swings elections | Baron 2015 ] | Baron, executive editor of Defense One, 2015 [Kevin, also national security/military analyst for NBC News and MSNBC. Baron has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and politics for Foreign Policy, National Journal, and Stars and Stripes, “New Poll Shows Why Trump is Winning, Even on Foreign Policy”, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/09/new-poll-shows-why-trump-winning-even-foreign-policy/121211/] | What really matters to voters is that when they feel threatened, they want their
AND
I don’t discount the possibility that it will make a difference.” | null | What really matters to voters is that when they feel threatened, they want their
AND
, “I don’t discount the possibility that it will make a difference.” | 153 | <h4>Trump will spin softline engagement with China against the Democrats – public wants muscular approach and it swings elections</h4><p><strong>Baron</strong>, executive editor of Defense One, <strong>2015</strong> [Kevin, also national security/military analyst for NBC News and MSNBC. Baron has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and politics for Foreign Policy, National Journal, and Stars and Stripes, “New Poll Shows Why Trump is Winning, Even on Foreign Policy”, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/09/new-poll-shows-why-trump-winning-even-foreign-policy/121211/<u><strong>]</p><p>What really matters to voters is that when they feel threatened, they want their </p><p></strong>AND</p><p></u>, “<u>I don’t discount the possibility that it will make a difference.”</p></u> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 1,560,870 | 3 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,586 | Contention Two: Climate Change | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Contention Two: Climate Change</h4></u> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,560,869 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,587 | Fourth, that risks global war. | Moore 9 | Moore 9 — research fellow with the Independent Institute and a former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is the author of Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance, published last year by the Independent Institute (Mike, “Space Debris: From Nuisance to Nightmare,” February 12th,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/11/space_debris_from_nuisance_to_nightmare) | Satellites are killed by debris strikes. The global economy, which is greatly dependent on a variety of assets in space, collapses. The countries of the world head back to a 1950s-style way of life, but there are billions more people on the planet than in the 50s. That's a recipe for malnutrition, starvation, and wars for resources. | null | A nightmare scenario: The United States continues to work on its defensive ASAT systems. China and Russia do the same to counter U.S. capabilities. India and Japan put together their own individual systems. Ditto for Pakistan, if it survives as a coherent country. Israel follows suit, as does Iran. In a time of high tension, someone preemptively smashes spy satellites in low-earth orbits, creating tens of thousands of metal chunks and shards. Debris-tracking systems are overwhelmed, and low-earth orbits become so cluttered with metal that new satellites cannot be safely launched. Satellites already in orbit die of old age or are killed by debris strikes. The global economy, which is greatly dependent on a variety of assets in space, collapses. The countries of the world head back to a 1950s-style way of life, but there are billions more people on the planet than in the 50s. That's a recipe for malnutrition, starvation, and wars for resources. | 958 | <h4><u>Fourth</u>, that risks global war.</h4><p><strong>Moore 9 </strong>— research fellow with the Independent Institute and a former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is the author of Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance, published last year by the Independent Institute (Mike, “Space Debris: From Nuisance to Nightmare,” February 12th, </p><p>http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/11/space_debris_from_nuisance_to_nightmare<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>A nightmare scenario: The United States continues to work on its defensive ASAT systems. China and Russia do the same to counter U.S. capabilities. India and Japan put together their own individual systems. Ditto for Pakistan, if it survives as a coherent country. Israel follows suit, as does Iran. In a time of high tension, someone preemptively smashes spy satellites in low-earth orbits, creating tens of thousands of metal chunks and shards. Debris-tracking systems are overwhelmed, and low-earth orbits become so cluttered with metal that new satellites cannot be safely launched. <u>Satellites</u> already in orbit die of old age or <u>are killed by debris strikes. <strong>The global economy, which is greatly dependent on a variety of assets in space, collapses. The countries of the world head back to a 1950s-style way of life, but there are billions more people on the planet than in the 50s. That's a recipe for malnutrition, starvation, and wars for resources.</p></u></strong> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 183,722 | 16 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,588 | US-China relations are a conflict dampener and solve all global problems – specifically key to stop resource wars and climate change. | Fingar & Garrett 13 [Thomas Fingar (Distinguished Lecturer in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the State Department) and Banning Garrett (Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council), based on discussions of the joint China-US Working Group and draft input from the Chinese working group, with additional input from Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush), The Atlantic Council of the United States and China Institute of International Studies, September 2013, “China-US Cooperation: Key to Global Future”, pg 5-6, http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf] | Fingar & Garrett 13 [Thomas Fingar (Distinguished Lecturer in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the State Department) and Banning Garrett (Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council), based on discussions of the joint China-US Working Group and draft input from the Chinese working group, with additional input from Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush), The Atlantic Council of the United States and China Institute of International Studies, September 2013, “China-US Cooperation: Key to Global Future”, pg 5-6, http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf] | Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out The three scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership China and the United States—and the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. | Global challenges require reconsideration What China and the U S do together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system scenarios sketched out how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate leads to international crises and instability drift leads to zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of resource constraints. The result is economic crises There is risk of military conflict between major powers Cooperation makes it possible to mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources prevent conflict and enhance security for all. , it is difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate | The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together. The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States—and the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. | 4,370 | <h4><strong>US-China relations are a conflict dampener and solve all global problems – specifically key to stop resource wars and climate change.</h4><p>Fingar & Garrett 13 <u>[Thomas Fingar (Distinguished Lecturer in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the State Department) and Banning Garrett (Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council), based on discussions of the joint China-US Working Group and draft input from the Chinese working group, with additional input from Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush), The Atlantic Council of the United States and China Institute of International Studies, September 2013, “China-US Cooperation: Key to Global Future”, pg 5-6, http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf]</p><p></u></strong>The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. <u><strong>Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Global challenges</mark> like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and <mark>require reconsideration</mark> of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>What China and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>do</mark>, individually and <mark>together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system</mark>.</u></strong> As importantly, <u><strong>our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out</u></strong>. <u><strong>The three</u></strong> illustrative <u><strong><mark>scenarios sketched out</mark> below underscore <mark>how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world</u></strong></mark>. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): <u><strong>In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward</u></strong>. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. <u><strong><mark>The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate</mark> to meet global challenges <mark>leads to international crises and instability</mark>.</u></strong> • Zero-Sum World: <u><strong>Unsustainable <mark>drift leads to</mark> a world of predominantly <mark>zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of </mark>severe <mark>resource constraints. The result is economic crises</mark> and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. <mark>There is risk of military conflict between major powers</mark>, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges.</u></strong> • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: <u><strong>To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. <mark>Cooperation makes it possible to </mark>achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or <mark>mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources</mark> and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to <mark>prevent conflict and enhance security for all.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together</u></strong>. The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, <u><strong>the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. </u></strong>Indeed<mark>, <u><strong>it is</mark> very <mark>difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate</mark> and provide critical international leadership</u></strong>. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but <u><strong>China and the United States—and the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical.</u></strong> The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. <u><strong>US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 10,205 | 185 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,589 | Low-risk of terrorism – Limited capabilities, inevitable mistakes, and conservative tactics. | null | -Terrorists are not superheros-- their plots fail, and they don’t have the capability to inflict massive casualty | search for a perfect defense is partly driven by outsized fears of terrorists' capabilities and a worst-case scenario But terrorists do not have superhuman powers; their plots are imperfect, contingent, and can be derailed Terrorist groups are limited in their capabilities Analysts assume that wealthy groups will use their resources to recruit the right people. But the case of Aum Shinrikyo reveals that this is not correct A group skilled enough to acquire a nuclear weapon will not succeed in the simpler task of hiding it from authorities. In June 2007, a group attempted to detonate two car bombs in London their education and intelligence did not stop them from leaving their cars in a no-parking zone Flashes of creativity, such as use of airliners have convinced observers that such groups are invariably nimble and innovative. But many ambitious and successful terrorist groups are conservative and averse to failure--and thus stick to bread-and-butter tactics Defensive measures should not be dismissed simply because analysts can dream up ways in which those measures might theoretically be evaded. | Levi 08
terrorists plots are imperfect and can be derailed Analysts assume that wealthy groups will use their resources to recruit the right people. But the case of Aum Shinrikyo this is not correct group skilled to acquire a nuclear weapon will not succeed in hiding it from authorities many ambitious and successful terrorist groups are conservative and averse to failure--and thus stick to bread-and-butter tactics Defensive measures should not be dismissed simply because analysts can dream up ways in which those measures might theoretically be evaded | -Our evidence cites empirical proof
-Even if they can do so, the risk of failure means they will resort to conservative tactics.
Michael Levi 08, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January/February, 2008, Stopping Nuclear Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis
WHEN STRATEGIES for preventing nuclear terrorism rely on silver bullets, less dramatic--but nonetheless crucial--measures are neglected. The search for a perfect defense is partly driven by outsized fears of terrorists' capabilities and the assumption that a worst-case, or "perfect storm," scenario will occur. But terrorists do not have superhuman powers; their plots are imperfect, contingent, and can be derailed. Consider the analogy of a police department seeking to prevent bank robberies. If the department assumes that all thieves have cars that travel 200 miles per hour, the department will give up on planning carefully for car chases and focus almost entirely on guarding the banks. If it instead realizes that many thieves will have cars that travel only 100 miles per hour, it will also carefully develop tactics for chasing down robbers. Realistically assessing the full spectrum of possible threats--in this case, from Ferraris to Ford Escorts--spurs broader and more careful planning by the police department. The same would be true of the U.S. government's homeland security and counterterrorism policies if Washington adopted a more nuanced view of the nuclear terrorist threat. Moving away from worst-case assessments of the capabilities of nuclear terrorists will require strategists to rethink many basic assumptions. Terrorist groups are limited in their capabilities. Some terrorist groups, for example, lack expert personnel but have extensive resources. Analysts generally assume that wealthy groups will use their resources, whether money or connections, to recruit the right people. But the case of Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic Japanese cult, reveals that this logic is not always correct. The cult was both wealthy and well connected in the Russian bioweapons world, but it decided that expanding its circle of experts would threaten its cover and failed to pull off a successful anthrax attack. Defenses that might work against groups with limited capabilities should not be dismissed, even if they are likely to fail against others. Terrorist groups also make mistakes. In the typical portrait of nuclear terrorists, if they see an opportunity to succeed, they will manage to seize it. But things do not always go as planned. A group skilled enough to acquire a nuclear weapon will not, for example, necessarily succeed in the simpler task of hiding it from authorities. In June 2007, a group of highly educated Britons attempted to build and detonate two car bombs in London. They succeeded in building the bombs, but their education and intelligence did not stop them from leaving their cars in a no-parking zone, a seemingly avoidable mistake that led to their capture. It is impossible to predict where groups will err, but defenses should be devised so that they are ready to exploit the mistakes that terrorists will almost inevitably make. Another common misperception is that apocalyptic terrorist groups care little about risk or failure. Flashes of creativity, such as al Qaeda's use of airliners as missiles, have convinced many observers that such groups are invariably nimble and innovative. But many ambitious and successful terrorist groups are conservative and averse to failure--and thus stick to bread-and-butter tactics whenever possible, even when a new approach seems promising. Although 9/11 has convinced many that al Qaeda is innovative, it also provides evidence for the opposite conclusion: the group used battle-tested techniques for financing and travel. Defensive measures that target the most obvious terrorist tactics should not be dismissed simply because analysts can dream up ways in which those measures might theoretically be evaded. | 3,972 | <h4>Low-risk of terrorism – Limited capabilities, inevitable mistakes, and conservative tactics.</h4><p>-Terrorists are not superheros-- their plots fail, and they don’t have the capability to inflict massive casualty</p><p>-Our evidence cites empirical proof</p><p>-Even if they can do so, the risk of failure means they will resort to conservative tactics.</p><p>Michael <strong><mark>Levi 08</strong></mark>, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January/February, 2008, Stopping Nuclear Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis</p><p>WHEN STRATEGIES for preventing nuclear terrorism rely on silver bullets, less dramatic--but nonetheless crucial--measures are neglected. The <u><strong>search for a perfect defense is partly driven by outsized fears of terrorists' capabilities and</u></strong> the assumption that <u><strong>a worst-case</u></strong>, or "perfect storm," <u><strong>scenario</u></strong> will occur. <u><strong>But <mark>terrorists</mark> do not have superhuman powers; their <mark>plots are imperfect</mark>, contingent, <mark>and can be derailed</u></strong></mark>. Consider the analogy of a police department seeking to prevent bank robberies. If the department assumes that all thieves have cars that travel 200 miles per hour, the department will give up on planning carefully for car chases and focus almost entirely on guarding the banks. If it instead realizes that many thieves will have cars that travel only 100 miles per hour, it will also carefully develop tactics for chasing down robbers. Realistically assessing the full spectrum of possible threats--in this case, from Ferraris to Ford Escorts--spurs broader and more careful planning by the police department. The same would be true of the U.S. government's homeland security and counterterrorism policies if Washington adopted a more nuanced view of the nuclear terrorist threat. Moving away from worst-case assessments of the capabilities of nuclear terrorists will require strategists to rethink many basic assumptions. <u><strong>Terrorist groups are limited in their capabilities</u></strong>. Some terrorist groups, for example, lack expert personnel but have extensive resources. <u><strong><mark>Analysts</u></strong></mark> generally <u><strong><mark>assume that wealthy groups will use their resources</u></strong></mark>, whether money or connections, <u><strong><mark>to recruit the right people. But the case of Aum Shinrikyo</u></strong></mark>, an apocalyptic Japanese cult, <u><strong>reveals that <mark>this</u></strong></mark> logic <u><strong><mark>is not</u></strong></mark> always <u><strong><mark>correct</u></strong></mark>. The cult was both wealthy and well connected in the Russian bioweapons world, but it decided that expanding its circle of experts would threaten its cover and failed to pull off a successful anthrax attack. Defenses that might work against groups with limited capabilities should not be dismissed, even if they are likely to fail against others. Terrorist groups also make mistakes. In the typical portrait of nuclear terrorists, if they see an opportunity to succeed, they will manage to seize it. But things do not always go as planned. <u><strong>A <mark>group skilled</mark> enough <mark>to acquire a nuclear weapon will not</u></strong></mark>, for example, necessarily <u><strong><mark>succeed in</mark> the simpler task of <mark>hiding it from authorities</mark>. In June 2007, a group</u></strong> of highly educated Britons <u><strong>attempted to</u></strong> build and <u><strong>detonate two car bombs in London</u></strong>. They succeeded in building the bombs, but <u><strong>their education and intelligence did not stop them from leaving their cars in a no-parking zone</u></strong>, a seemingly avoidable mistake that led to their capture. It is impossible to predict where groups will err, but defenses should be devised so that they are ready to exploit the mistakes that terrorists will almost inevitably make. Another common misperception is that apocalyptic terrorist groups care little about risk or failure. <u><strong>Flashes of creativity, such as</u></strong> al Qaeda's <u><strong>use of airliners</u></strong> as missiles, <u><strong>have convinced</u></strong> many <u><strong>observers that such groups are invariably nimble and innovative. But <mark>many ambitious and successful terrorist groups are conservative and averse to failure--and thus stick to bread-and-butter tactics</u></strong></mark> whenever possible, even when a new approach seems promising. Although 9/11 has convinced many that al Qaeda is innovative, it also provides evidence for the opposite conclusion: the group used battle-tested techniques for financing and travel. <u><strong><mark>Defensive measures</u></strong></mark> that target the most obvious terrorist tactics <u><strong><mark>should not be dismissed simply because analysts can dream up ways in which those measures might theoretically be evaded</mark>. </p></u></strong> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 1,190,385 | 3 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,590 | Senate races are tied to Obama – lowered approval means Dems lose seats | Trende 2016 | Trende, Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics, 2016 [Sean, Calculating Democrats' Chances of Regaining the Senate, Jan 11, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/11/calculating_democrats_chances_of_regaining_the_senate.html] | null | null | To address this question, I decided to revisit a Senate election model I developed
AND
two seats, with Democrats winning the Senate 26 percent of the time. | 155 | <h4>Senate races are tied to Obama – lowered approval means Dems lose seats</h4><p><strong>Trende</strong>, Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics, <strong>2016</strong> [Sean, Calculating Democrats' Chances of Regaining the Senate, Jan 11, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/11/calculating_democrats_chances_of_regaining_the_senate.html]</p><p>To address this question, I decided to revisit a Senate election model I developed </p><p>AND</p><p>two seats, with Democrats winning the Senate 26 percent of the time.</p> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 1,560,871 | 3 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,591 | The plan is necessary to create international networks for technical collaborations between China and international investors – creates global science and clean tech coop. | China IPR, 9/3/2016 | China IPR, 9/3/2016
“Some Good and Bad News in Recent Reports on China’s IP Environment” https://chinaipr.com/2016/09/03/some-good-and-bad-news-in-recent-reports-on-chinas-ip-environment/ | One reason for this disproportionality between licensing payments and high tech exports is the discriminatory provisions in China’s Technology Import/Export Regulations These require that a foreigner indemnify a Chinese licensee against third party infringements and that the licensee own all improvements while a Chinese domestic licensor can freely negotiate other terms these not only interfere with the needs of Chinese and foreign companies for effective technology trade mechanisms but also contradict the provisions of the Contract Law on technology transfer contract.” The ability to negotiate contractual terms is critical to developing flexible international networks for innovation through negotiated sharing of risks and benefits. The GII recognizes the increasing importance of such international collaboration to China and that “the Chinese innovation system is now densely connected to sources of expertise everywhere The notes Chinese companies had “the 7th largest foreign footprint of all countries with 178 R&D centers set up or acquired outside China by year end 2015 unbalanced provisions can affect bilateral science and technology cooperation by requiring that a Chinese party owns any improvements to technology that is licensed to it, or is indemnified against infringements by reason of use of this technology. A recent report by the G A O regarding clean energy cooperation between the US and China noted that The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has identified a potential discrepancy between Chinese law and the bilateral U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement upon which the IP Annex to the CERC Protocol is based, the potential discrepancy is related to ownership of any improvements made to IP licensed between U.S. and Chinese entities | One reason is the discriminatory provisions in China’s Regulations. These require a foreigner indemnify a Chinese licensee these not only interfere with needs of Chinese companies for effective tech but also contradict provisions The ability to negotiate terms is critical to developing flexible networks for innovation The GII recognizes increasing importance of such to China unbalanced provisions can affect bilateral science cooperation regarding clean energy IP licensed between U.S. and Chinese entities… | One reason for this disproportionality between licensing payments and high tech exports is the discriminatory provisions in China’s Technology Import/Export Regulations. These regulations require that a foreigner indemnify a Chinese licensee against third party infringements and that the licensee own all improvements to the technology, while a Chinese domestic licensor can freely negotiate other terms. As the EU Chamber notes, these regulations they “not only interfere with the needs of Chinese and foreign companies for effective technology trade mechanisms but also contradict the provisions of the Contract Law on technology transfer contract.” These concerns are not only directed to foreigners extracting IP ‘rents’ from China. The ability to negotiate contractual terms is critical to developing flexible international networks for innovation through negotiated sharing of risks and benefits. The GII recognizes the increasing importance of such international collaboration to China and that “the Chinese innovation system is now densely connected to sources of expertise everywhere.” (p. 93). The report also notes that Chinese companies had “the 7th largest foreign footprint of all countries with 178 R&D centers set up or acquired outside China by year end 2015.” (p. 125). These unbalanced provisions can also affect bilateral science and technology cooperation by requiring that a Chinese party owns any improvements to technology that is licensed to it, or is indemnified against infringements by reason of use of this technology. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office regarding clean energy cooperation between the US and China noted that “The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has identified a potential discrepancy between Chinese law and the bilateral U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement upon which the IP Annex to the CERC Protocol is based, according to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office officials. These officials stated that the potential discrepancy is related to ownership of any improvements made to IP licensed between U.S. and Chinese entities….” ( p. 2). | 2,112 | <h4><u><strong>The plan is necessary to create international networks for technical collaborations between China and international investors – creates global science and clean tech coop. </h4><p>China IPR, 9/3/2016</p><p></u></strong>“Some Good and Bad News in Recent Reports on China’s IP Environment” https://chinaipr.com/2016/09/03/some-good-and-bad-news-in-recent-reports-on-chinas-ip-environment/</p><p><u><strong><mark>One reason </mark>for this disproportionality between licensing payments and high tech exports <mark>is</mark> <mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>discriminatory provisions in China’s</mark> Technology Import/Export <mark>Regulations</u></strong>. <u><strong>These</u></strong></mark> regulations <u><strong><mark>require</mark> that <mark>a foreigner indemnify a Chinese licensee</mark> against third party infringements and that the licensee own all improvements</u></strong> to the technology, <u><strong>while a Chinese domestic licensor can freely negotiate other terms</u></strong>. As the EU Chamber notes, <u><strong><mark>these</u></strong></mark> regulations they “<u><strong><mark>not only interfere with</mark> the <mark>needs of Chinese</mark> and foreign <mark>companies for effective tech</mark>nology trade mechanisms</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>but also contradict</mark> the <mark>provisions</mark> of the Contract Law on technology transfer contract.” </u></strong>These concerns are not only directed to foreigners extracting IP ‘rents’ from China. <u><strong><mark>The ability to negotiate</mark> contractual <mark>terms is critical to developing flexible</mark> international <mark>networks for innovation</mark> through negotiated sharing of risks and benefits.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The GII recognizes</mark> the <mark>increasing importance of such </mark>international collaboration <mark>to China</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and that “the Chinese</u></strong> <u><strong>innovation system is now densely connected to sources of expertise everywhere</u></strong>.” (p. 93). <u><strong>The</u></strong> report also <u><strong>notes</u></strong> that <u><strong>Chinese companies had “the 7th largest foreign footprint of all countries with 178 R&D centers set up or acquired outside China by year end 2015</u></strong>.” (p. 125). These <u><strong><mark>unbalanced provisions can</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>affect bilateral science</mark> and technology <mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>by requiring that a Chinese party owns any improvements to technology that is licensed to it, or is indemnified against infringements by reason of use of this technology. A recent report by</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>G</u></strong>overnment <u><strong>A</u></strong>ccountability <u><strong>O</u></strong>ffice <u><strong><mark>regarding clean energy </mark>cooperation between the US and China noted that </u></strong>“<u><strong>The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has identified a potential discrepancy between Chinese law and the bilateral U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement upon which the IP Annex to the CERC Protocol is based,</u></strong> according to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office officials. These officials stated that <u><strong>the potential discrepancy is related to ownership of any improvements made to <mark>IP licensed between U.S. and Chinese entities</u></strong>…</mark>.” ( p. 2).</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,559,769 | 12 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,592 | Plan engenders a posture shift to defensive-A2/AD --- that resolves the security dilemma and improves deterrence stability | Swaine 13 | Swaine 13 | Odell, Nonresident Research Analyst in the Asia Program @ Carnegie, “Getting Past Mutual Suspicion,” June 6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/06/getting-past-mutual-suspicion#)
The two nations’ mutually reinforcing and corrosive attitudes have resulted in a deepening level of bilateral strategic distrust that threatens to harden into an enduring zero-sum mindset that could endanger regional peace, stability and prosperity. To do this, Beijing and Washington must address the underlying reason for their deep-seated strategic suspicion, deriving primarily from basic differences over the best system for sustaining order these differences are reflected most directly in American and Chinese approaches to the use of air and naval power past efforts to justify U.S. engagement with China serve more to reinforce Chinese strategic suspicions toward the United States than to bring about meaningful change much can and should be done to address the growing strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. U S predominance has included, in particular, the ability to operate freely in the air and naval domains up to the territorial waters of the Chinese mainland At present, Washington views such capabilities as essential to deter China from using force to settle the Taiwan issue and other maritime disputes and to reassure allies For its part, since at least the mid-1990s, China has been building up its own military capabilities in an effort to expand its defense perimeter beyond the continent and out toward the so-called first-island chain, comprising Japan, Taiwan and most islands in the South China Sea. such military expansion is also increasingly driven by a desire to reduce China’s overall potential vulnerability to American and allied pressure or threats to China’s maritime borders and coastal areas. These two sets of security imperatives are increasingly at odds with one another. And the most important locus of this growing contradiction “robust forward presence,” would involve efforts to adopt A S B which would emphasize the need to disable Chinese C4ISR capacity early in a conflict, most likely through deep strikes at targets on the Chinese mainland. The goal of such a strategy would be to prevent the Chinese from successfully deploying anti-access/area-denial capabilities, especially precision-guided conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, against the United States. Such a concept would require a robust air and naval presence along the first island chain capable of imposing and sustaining a blockade. In contrast to the first two approaches, the third strategic approach, “defensive balancing,” would shift away from efforts to sustain existing military advantages and freedom of action throughout the first island chain via offensive military strategies and alliance-centered political strategies. Instead, it would seek to establish a more genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific through a more defensive “mutual denial” force posture, coupled with deepened cooperation among the three countries involving a greater degree of alliance accommodation of Chinese security interests within the first island chain. Such an approach would include efforts to bolster U.S. and Japanese anti-access/area-denial capabilities vis-à-vis China, including more missile-resistant, lower-visibility forces deployed in both forward and rear locations. tactical aircraft and large naval surface assets would be pulled back to rearward locations in Guam, Hawaii and the U S The first two approaches attempt to address the growing clash between U.S. and Chinese security imperatives in the Western Pacific by sustaining American primacy The first approach, a robust forward-presence strategy, is likely to intensify a regional arms race and exacerbate escalation in a crisis. deep strikes of Air Sea Battle raise questions of strategic nuclear stability, as much of the infrastructure China would utilize for guiding conventional missiles is also used for controlling its nuclear weapons. the provocative military elements of this approach would almost certainly greatly undermine if not nullify any parallel diplomatic and economic efforts to strengthen cooperative engagement with Beijing. the third approach, defensive balancing, provides the most attractive long-term mechanism for securing the interests of the United States, Japan and China, and for ensuring regional stability. A military posture centered on the creation of a mutual denial capability would improve real deterrence capacity by moving the most vulnerable U.S. military assets (such as short-range tactical aircraft and large naval surface vessels) outside the reach of Chinese asymmetric capabilities including ballistic and cruise missiles) This more survivable and enduring posture would better enable the United States to ensure Japanese security and deter any potential Chinese aggression against Japan. At the same time, in pulling back offense-oriented assets from the waters nearest China, it would also provide China with the security it seeks and thereby make efforts to deepen cooperation more viable. It would also likely prove more affordable, as it would require fewer, if any, major increases in the level and function of most U.S. military capabilities, and it would significantly decrease costs associated with forward bases, tactical aircraft and carrier groups. | deepening strategic distrust threatens a zero-sum mindset that could endanger regional stability Beijing and Washington must address underlying reason for strategic suspicion, deriving directly in American air and naval power much can be done predominance included the ability to operate freely up to the Chinese mainland Washington views capabilities as essential to deter China and reassure allies China military expansion is driven to reduce vulnerability to American These two are increasingly at odds And the most important locus A S B would require robust air and naval presence In contrast “defensive balancing,” would establish genuine balance through “mutual denial” force posture Such approach would bolster U.S. and Japan anti-access/area-denial capabilities aircraft and large naval surface assets would be pulled back to rearward locations mutual denial would improve deterrence by moving vulnerable U.S. assets outside the reach of Chinese capabilities and would enable the U S to ensure Japan security and deter any aggression it would provide China with security it seeks and make cooperation more viable. it would require fewer U.S. military capabilities, and significantly decrease costs associated with carrier groups. | (Michael D., Senior Associate in the Asia Program @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Rachel Esplin Odell, Nonresident Research Analyst in the Asia Program @ Carnegie, “Getting Past Mutual Suspicion,” June 6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/06/getting-past-mutual-suspicion#)
The two nations’ mutually reinforcing and corrosive attitudes have resulted in a deepening level of bilateral strategic distrust that threatens to harden into an enduring zero-sum mindset that could endanger regional peace, stability and prosperity. To counter this dynamic, some Western observers have called for new bilateral initiatives to deepen and expand global and regional norms and institutions designed to reinforce cooperative behavior, channel competition and limit strategic rivalry. Others have stressed the need for more competent, sensitive diplomacy and a deemphasis on the growing Sino-U.S. military competition in favor of more inclusive and far-reaching joint military-to-military activities. On a much broader level, Beijing has called for the development of a “new type of great power relationship” with Washington, based on “mutual trust, equality, inclusiveness, mutual learning, and win-win cooperation.” Although Washington has cautiously endorsed this concept, it remains largely undefined, a general catch-all notion for trust-building actions on both sides. Hopefully, the forthcoming Obama-Xi summit will provide a first step toward this objective by establishing a sustained level of personal, high-level rapport between the two leaders. However, although no doubt useful in blunting the sharpest edges of the bilateral relationship, personal rapport, better diplomacy and stronger institutions will likely prove inadequate to construct the kind of bilateral relationship that can avoid the worst aspects of great-power rivalry associated with a changing balance of power. To do this, Beijing and Washington must understand and address the underlying reason for their deep-seated strategic suspicion, deriving primarily from basic differences over the best system for sustaining order and prosperity, both domestically and within the international system. Simply put, Washington believes the former is best provided through a pluralistic balance among contending interests, mediated by institutionalized procedures and legal rules, while the latter is best secured through the presence of a single dominant military power able to ensure the safety of the global commons, deter aggression and resolve important conflicts in its favor. Beijing believes the opposite—that is, that domestic order requires a single source of uncontested political power and international order necessitates a balance of power among major nations, with China playing a far more important security role in East Asia than at present. Domestically, this difference is most clearly reflected in longstanding U.S. attempts to encourage the evolution of China’s one-party state toward greater political diversity and eventual democracy. Internationally, in the Western Pacific—by far the most critical area of Sino-American strategic competition—these differences are reflected most directly in American and Chinese approaches to the use of air and naval power and sovereignty disputes between Beijing and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. While the protection and advancement of human rights should and likely will always remain an important objective of American diplomacy, there is little that Washington can or should realistically do to transform China’s current regime into a democracy, beyond encouraging and facilitating Chinese contact with democratic processes, values and beliefs. Indeed, past efforts to justify U.S. engagement with China as a means of democratizing China are misguided and serve more to reinforce Chinese strategic suspicions toward the United States than to bring about meaningful change in China’s political system. In contrast, much can and should be done to address the growing strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. Since World War II, the United States has been committed to maintaining a position of military predominance in the Western Pacific as the foundation for regional stability. This predominance has included, in particular, the ability to operate freely in the air and naval domains up to the territorial waters of the Chinese mainland, and it has relied heavily upon the U.S. basing presence in Japan. At present, Washington views such capabilities as essential to deter China from using force to settle the Taiwan issue and other maritime disputes and to reassure allies that they need not embark on major military buildups in order to maintain their security in the face of China’s military modernization. For its part, since at least the mid-1990s, China has been building up its own military capabilities in an effort to expand its defense perimeter beyond the continent and out toward the so-called first-island chain, comprising Japan, Taiwan and most islands in the South China Sea. These efforts have been driven in large part by China’s determination to prevent Taiwanese independence and consolidate disputed territorial claims, including over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to which China and Japan both lay claim. More broadly, however, such military expansion is also increasingly driven by a desire to reduce China’s overall potential vulnerability to American and allied pressure or threats to China’s maritime borders and coastal areas. These two sets of security imperatives are increasingly at odds with one another. And the most important locus of this growing contradiction is in the waters and airspace around Japan, given Tokyo’s proximity to China, its critical importance to the U.S. position in Asia, and its arguably worsening territorial and resource disputes with Beijing. In a recent report published by the Carnegie Endowment entitled China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, we and seven other analysts outline three potential strategic approaches that the United States and the alliance could adopt in order to respond to this destabilizing dynamic. All of them involve some variation of the current “engage and hedge” policy approach, combining efforts to increase political, diplomatic and economic cooperation with Beijing on one hand with efforts to implement various levels and types of military deterrence on the other. However, each approach would also entail key departures from the status quo. The first approach, “robust forward presence,” derives from a clear commitment to maintain an unambiguous level of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific. This would likely involve efforts to adopt one of two or more robust operational concepts intended to preserve U.S. access to the area near China. One such concept currently under discussion and elaboration in the Pentagon is the Air Sea Battle Concept, which would emphasize the need to disable Chinese C4ISR capacity early in a conflict, most likely through deep strikes at targets on the Chinese mainland. The goal of such a strategy would be to prevent the Chinese from successfully deploying anti-access/area-denial capabilities, especially precision-guided conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, against the United States. A second concept is that of Offshore Control, which would rely on the imposition of a massive naval blockade along the first island chain to cut off commercial shipping to and from China. The goal of such a strategy would be to capitalize on Chinese geographic vulnerabilities in order to force capitulation after a conflict has been initiated. Such a concept would require a robust air and naval presence along the first island chain capable of imposing and sustaining a blockade.1 The second broad strategic approach, “conditional offense/defense,” would eschew both deep strikes and a naval blockade, but would nonetheless seek to build upon status quo policy in a way that preserves U.S. access and freedom of movement within the first island chain. In order to do so, this strategy would prioritize more dispersed basing in both Japan and other Asian allies and partners, combined with hardened air bases, expanded ballistic missile defense, and/or investment in counter-precision-guided-munitions technologies. Some large naval assets might be rear-deployed in the early stages of a conflict, and air bases would have to be prepared to absorb an initial attack; however, redundant basing combined with strengthened defenses would in principle enable the allies to rapidly recover from a first strike and then execute offensive attacks with both naval and air assets. In contrast to the first two approaches, the third strategic approach, “defensive balancing,” would shift away from efforts to sustain existing military advantages and freedom of action throughout the first island chain via offensive military strategies and alliance-centered political strategies. Instead, it would seek to establish a more genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific through a more defensive “mutual denial” force posture, coupled with deepened cooperation among the three countries involving a greater degree of alliance accommodation of Chinese security interests within the first island chain. Such an approach would include efforts to bolster U.S. and Japanese anti-access/area-denial capabilities vis-à-vis China, including more missile-resistant, lower-visibility forces (such as submarines and long-range, standoff weaponry) deployed in both forward and rear locations. Meanwhile, tactical aircraft and large naval surface assets would be pulled back to rearward locations in Guam, Hawaii and the continental United States. The first two approaches attempt to address the above growing clash between U.S. and Chinese security imperatives in the Western Pacific by sustaining American primacy, albeit at differing levels (that is, the second approach involves a more ambiguous level of primacy, but primacy nonetheless). In other words, they assume that stability and continued economic development in Asia can only be assured by negating, not balancing against, China’s growing offshore military capabilities. For some reason, proponents of these approaches apparently believe that even a much stronger Beijing committed to reducing its security vulnerabilities will submit to such an approach and maintain or even deepen cooperative relations with Washington and Tokyo at the same time. The first approach, a robust forward-presence strategy, is likely to intensify a regional arms race and exacerbate escalation in a crisis. It also would be difficult to implement. In particular, the deep strikes at critical targets on the Chinese mainland envisioned in the publicly articulated versions of Air Sea Battle raise questions of strategic nuclear stability, as much of the infrastructure China would utilize for guiding conventional missiles is also used for controlling its nuclear weapons. While less escalatory in this regard, a doctrinal commitment to Offshore Control would nonetheless prove intensely provocative to the Chinese—in many ways, representing the operational incarnation of their fears of “encirclement”—and its actual implementation would do deep harm to the global economy. Offshore Control in particular would probably require much more of allies (including, but not only, Japan) in terms of blockade support than they would be willing and able to provide. Moreover, the provocative military elements of this approach would almost certainly greatly undermine if not nullify any parallel diplomatic and economic efforts to strengthen cooperative engagement with Beijing. Although the second approach, a conditional offense/defense strategy that builds upon the status quo, is likely to prove more feasible and stabilizing than the first approach, it also could prove economically and diplomatically difficult. Efforts to more broadly disperse U.S. air bases in countries across the Western Pacific, such as Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and Australia, would almost certainly be at least partially stymied by cost constraints and resistance within those countries to a new or expanded U.S. military presence, especially if this were to involve permanent bases and personnel. Moreover, technologies and strategies intended to defend forward-deployed air and naval assets could prove incapable of weathering or countering sustained barrages of Chinese missiles coming from the mainland—and could also prove prohibitively expensive. We believe (and we do not necessarily speak for the other report authors in this regard) that, in principle, the third approach, defensive balancing, provides the most attractive long-term mechanism for securing the interests of the United States, Japan and China, and for ensuring regional stability. A military posture centered on the creation of a mutual denial capability would improve real deterrence capacity by moving the most vulnerable U.S. military assets (such as short-range tactical aircraft and large naval surface vessels) outside of the reach of most Chinese asymmetric capabilities (including ballistic and cruise missiles) and shifting the force posture toward more viable weapons platforms (such as submarines and long-range precision-guided weapons). These platforms would continue to rely upon Japan-based logistics and support facilities, and their successful operation would place a premium on a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR infrastructure. This more survivable and enduring posture would better enable the United States to ensure Japanese security and deter any potential Chinese aggression against Japan. At the same time, in pulling back offense-oriented assets from the waters nearest China, it would also provide China with the security it seeks and thereby make efforts to deepen cooperation more viable. It would also likely prove more affordable, as it would require fewer, if any, major increases in the level and function of most U.S. military capabilities, and it would significantly decrease costs associated with forward bases, tactical aircraft and carrier groups. | 14,224 | <h4>Plan engenders a <u>posture shift</u> to defensive-A2/AD --- that resolves the <u>security dilemma</u> and improves <u>deterrence stability</h4><p></u><strong>Swaine 13</p><p></strong>(Michael D., Senior Associate in the Asia Program @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Rachel Esplin<u><strong> Odell, Nonresident Research Analyst in the Asia Program @ Carnegie, “Getting Past Mutual Suspicion,” June 6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/06/getting-past-mutual-suspicion#)</p><p></strong>The two nations’ <strong>mutually reinforcing</strong> and corrosive attitudes have resulted in a <strong><mark>deepening</strong></mark> level of bilateral <strong><mark>strategic distrust</strong></mark> that <mark>threatens</mark> to harden into <mark>a</mark>n enduring <strong><mark>zero-sum mindset</strong> that could endanger <strong>regional</strong></mark> peace, <strong><mark>stability</strong></mark> and prosperity.</u> To counter this dynamic, some Western observers have called for new bilateral initiatives to deepen and expand global and regional norms and institutions designed to reinforce cooperative behavior, channel competition and limit strategic rivalry. Others have stressed the need for more competent, sensitive diplomacy and a deemphasis on the growing Sino-U.S. military competition in favor of more inclusive and far-reaching joint military-to-military activities. On a much broader level, Beijing has called for the development of a “new type of great power relationship” with Washington, based on “mutual trust, equality, inclusiveness, mutual learning, and win-win cooperation.” Although Washington has cautiously endorsed this concept, it remains largely undefined, a general catch-all notion for trust-building actions on both sides. Hopefully, the forthcoming Obama-Xi summit will provide a first step toward this objective by establishing a sustained level of personal, high-level rapport between the two leaders. However, although no doubt useful in blunting the sharpest edges of the bilateral relationship, personal rapport, better diplomacy and stronger institutions will likely prove inadequate to construct the kind of bilateral relationship that can avoid the worst aspects of great-power rivalry associated with a changing balance of power. <u>To do this, <mark>Beijing and Washington must</u></mark> understand and <u><mark>address</mark> the <strong><mark>underlying reason</strong> for</mark> their deep-seated <mark>strategic suspicion, deriving</mark> primarily from basic differences over the best system for sustaining order</u> and prosperity, both domestically and within the international system. Simply put, Washington believes the former is best provided through a pluralistic balance among contending interests, mediated by institutionalized procedures and legal rules, while the latter is best secured through the presence of a single dominant military power able to ensure the safety of the global commons, deter aggression and resolve important conflicts in its favor. Beijing believes the opposite—that is, that domestic order requires a single source of uncontested political power and international order necessitates a balance of power among major nations, with China playing a far more important security role in East Asia than at present. Domestically, this difference is most clearly reflected in longstanding U.S. attempts to encourage the evolution of China’s one-party state toward greater political diversity and eventual democracy. Internationally, in the Western Pacific—by far the most critical area of Sino-American strategic competition—<u>these differences are reflected most <strong><mark>directly in American</strong></mark> and Chinese approaches to the use of <strong><mark>air and naval power</u></strong></mark> and sovereignty disputes between Beijing and U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. While the protection and advancement of human rights should and likely will always remain an important objective of American diplomacy, there is little that Washington can or should realistically do to transform China’s current regime into a democracy, beyond encouraging and facilitating Chinese contact with democratic processes, values and beliefs. Indeed, <u>past efforts to justify U.S. engagement with China</u> as a means of democratizing China are misguided and <u>serve more to reinforce Chinese strategic suspicions toward the United States than to bring about meaningful change</u> in China’s political system. In contrast, <u><strong><mark>much can</strong></mark> and should <strong><mark>be done</strong></mark> to address the growing strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. </u>Since World War II, the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates has been committed to maintaining a position of military predominance in the Western Pacific as the foundation for regional stability. This <u><mark>predominance</mark> has <mark>included</mark>, in particular, <mark>the ability to <strong>operate freely</mark> in the air and naval domains <mark>up to</mark> the territorial waters of <mark>the Chinese mainland</u></strong></mark>, and it has relied heavily upon the U.S. basing presence in Japan. <u>At present, <mark>Washington views</mark> such <mark>capabilities as essential to deter China</mark> from using force to settle the Taiwan issue and other maritime disputes <mark>and</mark> to <mark>reassure allies</u></mark> that they need not embark on major military buildups in order to maintain their security in the face of China’s military modernization. <u>For its part, since at least the mid-1990s, <mark>China</mark> has been building up its own military capabilities in an effort to expand its defense perimeter beyond the continent and out toward the so-called first-island chain, comprising Japan, Taiwan and most islands in the South China Sea.</u> These efforts have been driven in large part by China’s determination to prevent Taiwanese independence and consolidate disputed territorial claims, including over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to which China and Japan both lay claim. More broadly, however, <u>such <mark>military expansion is</mark> also increasingly <mark>driven</mark> by a desire <mark>to reduce</mark> China’s overall potential <mark>vulnerability to American</mark> and allied pressure or threats to China’s maritime borders and coastal areas.</u> <u><mark>These two</mark> sets of security imperatives <mark>are <strong>increasingly at odds</strong></mark> with one another.</u> <u><mark>And the <strong>most important locus</strong></mark> of this growing contradiction</u> is in the waters and airspace around Japan, given Tokyo’s proximity to China, its critical importance to the U.S. position in Asia, and its arguably worsening territorial and resource disputes with Beijing. In a recent report published by the Carnegie Endowment entitled China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, we and seven other analysts outline three potential strategic approaches that the United States and the alliance could adopt in order to respond to this destabilizing dynamic. All of them involve some variation of the current “engage and hedge” policy approach, combining efforts to increase political, diplomatic and economic cooperation with Beijing on one hand with efforts to implement various levels and types of military deterrence on the other. However, each approach would also entail key departures from the status quo. The first approach, <u>“robust forward presence,”</u> derives from a clear commitment to maintain an unambiguous level of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific. This <u>would</u> likely <u>involve efforts to adopt</u> one of two or more robust operational concepts intended to preserve U.S. access to the area near China. One such concept currently under discussion and elaboration in the Pentagon is the <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ir <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ea <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>attle Concept, <u>which would emphasize the need to disable Chinese C4ISR capacity early in a conflict, most likely through deep strikes at targets on the Chinese mainland. The goal of such a strategy would be to prevent the Chinese from successfully deploying anti-access/area-denial capabilities, especially precision-guided conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, against the United States.</u> A second concept is that of Offshore Control, which would rely on the imposition of a massive naval blockade along the first island chain to cut off commercial shipping to and from China. The goal of such a strategy would be to capitalize on Chinese geographic vulnerabilities in order to force capitulation after a conflict has been initiated. <u>Such a concept <mark>would require</mark> a <strong><mark>robust air and naval presence</strong></mark> along the first island chain capable of imposing and sustaining a blockade.</u>1 The second broad strategic approach, “conditional offense/defense,” would eschew both deep strikes and a naval blockade, but would nonetheless seek to build upon status quo policy in a way that preserves U.S. access and freedom of movement within the first island chain. In order to do so, this strategy would prioritize more dispersed basing in both Japan and other Asian allies and partners, combined with hardened air bases, expanded ballistic missile defense, and/or investment in counter-precision-guided-munitions technologies. Some large naval assets might be rear-deployed in the early stages of a conflict, and air bases would have to be prepared to absorb an initial attack; however, redundant basing combined with strengthened defenses would in principle enable the allies to rapidly recover from a first strike and then execute offensive attacks with both naval and air assets. <u><mark>In contrast</mark> to the first two approaches, the third strategic approach, <mark>“defensive balancing,” would</mark> shift away from efforts to sustain existing military advantages and freedom of action throughout the first island chain via offensive military strategies and alliance-centered political strategies. Instead, it would seek to <mark>establish</mark> a more <strong><mark>genuine balance</strong></mark> of power in the Western Pacific <mark>through</mark> a more defensive <strong><mark>“mutual denial” force posture</strong></mark>, coupled with deepened cooperation among the three countries involving a greater degree of alliance accommodation of Chinese security interests within the first island chain. <mark>Such</mark> an <mark>approach would</mark> include efforts to <mark>bolster</mark> <mark>U.S. and Japan</mark>ese <mark>anti-access/area-denial capabilities</mark> vis-à-vis China, including more missile-resistant, lower-visibility forces</u> (such as submarines and long-range, standoff weaponry) <u>deployed in both forward and rear locations.</u> Meanwhile, <u>tactical <strong><mark>aircraft and large naval surface assets would be pulled back to rearward locations</mark> in Guam, Hawaii and the</u></strong> continental <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u>The first two approaches attempt to address the</u> above <u>growing clash between U.S. and Chinese security imperatives in the Western Pacific by sustaining American primacy</u>, albeit at differing levels (that is, the second approach involves a more ambiguous level of primacy, but primacy nonetheless). In other words, they assume that stability and continued economic development in Asia can only be assured by negating, not balancing against, China’s growing offshore military capabilities. For some reason, proponents of these approaches apparently believe that even a much stronger Beijing committed to reducing its security vulnerabilities will submit to such an approach and maintain or even deepen cooperative relations with Washington and Tokyo at the same time. <u>The first approach, a robust forward-presence strategy, is likely to intensify a regional arms race and exacerbate escalation in a crisis.</u> It also would be difficult to implement. In particular, the <u>deep strikes</u> at critical targets on the Chinese mainland envisioned in the publicly articulated versions <u>of Air Sea Battle raise questions of strategic nuclear stability, as much of the infrastructure China would utilize for guiding conventional missiles is also used for controlling its nuclear weapons.</u> While less escalatory in this regard, a doctrinal commitment to Offshore Control would nonetheless prove intensely provocative to the Chinese—in many ways, representing the operational incarnation of their fears of “encirclement”—and its actual implementation would do deep harm to the global economy. Offshore Control in particular would probably require much more of allies (including, but not only, Japan) in terms of blockade support than they would be willing and able to provide. Moreover, <u>the provocative military elements of this approach would almost certainly greatly undermine if not nullify any parallel diplomatic and economic efforts to strengthen cooperative engagement with Beijing.</u> Although the second approach, a conditional offense/defense strategy that builds upon the status quo, is likely to prove more feasible and stabilizing than the first approach, it also could prove economically and diplomatically difficult. Efforts to more broadly disperse U.S. air bases in countries across the Western Pacific, such as Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and Australia, would almost certainly be at least partially stymied by cost constraints and resistance within those countries to a new or expanded U.S. military presence, especially if this were to involve permanent bases and personnel. Moreover, technologies and strategies intended to defend forward-deployed air and naval assets could prove incapable of weathering or countering sustained barrages of Chinese missiles coming from the mainland—and could also prove prohibitively expensive. We believe (and we do not necessarily speak for the other report authors in this regard) that, in principle, <u>the third approach, defensive balancing, provides the most attractive long-term mechanism for securing the interests of the United States, Japan and China, and for ensuring regional stability. A military posture centered on the creation of a <mark>mutual denial</mark> capability <mark>would <strong>improve</mark> real <mark>deterrence</strong> </mark>capacity <mark>by moving</mark> the most <strong><mark>vulnerable U.S.</strong></mark> military <strong><mark>assets</strong> </mark>(such as short-range tactical aircraft and <strong>large naval surface vessels) <mark>outside</mark> </u></strong>of <u><strong><mark>the reach of</u></strong></mark> most <u><strong><mark>Chinese </mark>asymmetric <mark>capabilities</u></strong></mark> (<u>including ballistic and cruise missiles)</u> and shifting the force posture toward more viable weapons platforms (such as submarines and long-range precision-guided weapons). These platforms would continue to rely upon Japan-based logistics and support facilities, and their successful operation would place a premium on a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR infrastructure. <u>This more survivable <mark>and</mark> enduring posture <mark>would</mark> better <mark>enable the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to ensure Japan</mark>ese <mark>security and deter any</mark> potential Chinese <mark>aggression</mark> against Japan. At the same time, in pulling back offense-oriented assets from the waters nearest China, <mark>it would</mark> also <mark>provide China with</mark> the <mark>security it <strong>seeks</strong> and</mark> thereby <mark>make</mark> efforts to <strong>deepen <mark>cooperation more viable.</strong></mark> It would also likely prove more affordable, as <mark>it would require <strong>fewer</strong></mark>, if any, major increases in the level and function of most <mark>U.S. military capabilities, and</mark> it would <strong><mark>significantly decrease costs</strong> associated with</mark> forward bases, tactical <strong>aircraft and <mark>carrier groups.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | null | null | 422,075 | 68 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,593 | Finally, space debris collisions could destroy nuclear deterrence and risk accidental war. | Bowlby 15 | Bowlby 15 — journalist for BBC specializes in space; “Could a war in space really happen?” Chris Bowlby; BBC; December 19, 2015 http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35130478 | the idea of… fighting in space was once science fiction and now it's real". Space wars may not involve intergalactic empires or spacecraft zapping each other. If they occur they are likely to be focused on things that matter hugely to all of us - satellites. They are more and more crucial to the way we lead our lives And for the modern military too, life without satellites would be a nightmare. They are used for targeting weapons, or finding things that need targeting in the first place. They form the US military's "nervous system,” used for 80% of its communications. And this includes the communications central to nuclear deterrence. There has to be an "absolutely reliable" communications channel at all times between US nuclear forces and the president "The thinking was you might have nuclear detonations going off and you might have to co-ordinate some kind of a responsive strike." The satellites designed to secure these communications - and to detect any possible nuclear attack - sit in geostationary orbit high above earth in what was thought until recently to be a kind of sanctuary, safe from any attack. No longer, thanks to a Chinese experiment with a missile in 2013 which reached close to that orbit, some 36,000km above the Earth. the prospect of a conflict waged in space has suddenly presented itself as a frightening possibility. And today's world - with only one military superpower, the US - is far more unpredictable than it was in the 1980s, an attack on specific satellites could disrupt and disable nuclear command and control would be seen as a de facto nuclear attack There are now more incentives for a potential adversary, such as China, to attack satellites or disable them as part of a conventional conflict [because] they know full well that space capabilities are at the core of the US's ability to project power." In this climate of suspicion there is also a risk of accidental damage to key military satellites - caused perhaps by space junk or debris - being interpreted as a hostile act. "Debris is sometimes so small you can't even track (it "So if a part of the debris hits a sensitive satellite you will never know if it was debris or deliberate. Military reaction is to take the worst case scenario - that it was hit by somebody else. And that's a trigger point." | null | Millions have been enjoying the Hollywood version of conflict in distant parts of the universe as the new Star Wars film is released. It's enjoyable escapism - space conflict is, after all, nothing to do with reality. Or is it? According to military analyst Peter Singer of the New America Foundation, "the idea of… fighting in space was once science fiction and now it's real". Space wars may not involve intergalactic empires or spacecraft zapping each other. If they occur they are likely to be focused on things that matter hugely to all of us - satellites. They are more and more crucial to the way we lead our lives. They help us tell the time or draw money from a bank, or work out where to go using a smartphone or satnav. And for the modern military too, life without satellites would be a nightmare. They are used for targeting weapons, or finding things that need targeting in the first place. They form the US military's "nervous system,” according to Singer, used for 80% of its communications. And this includes the communications central to nuclear deterrence. There has to be an "absolutely reliable" communications channel at all times between US nuclear forces and the president, says Brian Weeden, a former US intercontinental ballistic missile launch officer. "The thinking was you might have nuclear detonations going off and you might have to co-ordinate some kind of a responsive strike." The satellites designed to secure these communications - and to detect any possible nuclear attack - sit in geostationary orbit high above earth in what was thought until recently to be a kind of sanctuary, safe from any attack. No longer, thanks to a Chinese experiment with a missile in 2013 which reached close to that orbit, some 36,000km above the Earth. In a rare public statement earlier this year Gen John Hyten of US Space Command expressed his alarm at the implications of these Chinese tests. "I think they'll be able to threaten every orbital regime that we operate in," he told CBS news. "We have to figure out how to defend those satellites. And we're going to." It's not the first time that the prospect of a conflict waged in space has suddenly presented itself as a frightening possibility. In 1983 US president Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defence Initiative, widely known as Star Wars, proposing the development of space-based weapons to defend against Soviet missiles. This marked a dramatic new phase as it suddenly appeared that space power could undermine the delicate balance of superpower weaponry on earth. One Soviet response was to begin thinking about how to target US satellites in a time of war. Bhupendra Jasani of King's College London, a veteran observer of space security, says the Soviets "actually launched an anti-satellite weapon test in orbit... they were actually playing a nuclear war scenario. That if there is a war we will knock down the spy satellites, we will knock down the communications satellites and the rest of them". Today's China, he suggests, is thinking along similar lines. And today's world - with only one military superpower, the US - is far more unpredictable than it was in the 1980s, according to Brian Weeden. "There was a tacit understanding between the US and Soviet Union that an attack on specific satellites that could disrupt and disable nuclear command and control or the ability to warn about an attack would be seen as a de facto nuclear attack. That served to deter both sides from attacking satellites," he says. "There are now more incentives for a potential adversary, such as China, to attack satellites or disable them as part of a conventional conflict [because] they know full well that space capabilities are at the core of the US's ability to project power." In this climate of suspicion there is also a risk of accidental damage to key military satellites - caused perhaps by space junk or debris - being interpreted as a hostile act. China's 2007 test destruction of a satellite created thousands of tiny fragments circulating in space, which could potentially collide with another satellite. "Debris is sometimes so small you can't even track (it)," says Jasani. "So if a part of the debris hits a sensitive satellite you will never know if it was debris or deliberate. Military reaction is to take the worst case scenario - that it was hit by somebody else. And that's a trigger point." | 4,394 | <h4><u>Finally</u>, space debris collisions could <u>destroy nuclear deterrence</u> and <u>risk accidental war</u>.</h4><p><strong>Bowlby 15 </strong>— journalist for BBC specializes in space; “Could a war in space really happen?” Chris Bowlby; BBC; December 19, 2015 <u>http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35130478</p><p></u>Millions have been enjoying the Hollywood version of conflict in distant parts of the universe as the new Star Wars film is released. It's enjoyable escapism - space conflict is, after all, nothing to do with reality. Or is it? According to military analyst Peter Singer of the New America Foundation, "<u>the idea of… fighting in space was once science fiction and now it's real". Space wars may not involve intergalactic empires or spacecraft zapping each other. If they occur they are likely to be focused on things that matter hugely to all of us - satellites. They are more and more crucial to the way we lead our lives</u>. They help us tell the time or draw money from a bank, or work out where to go using a smartphone or satnav. <u>And for the modern military too, life without satellites would be a nightmare. They are used for targeting weapons, or finding things that need targeting in the first place. <strong>They form the US military's "nervous system</strong>,”</u> according to Singer, <u><strong>used for 80% of its communications.</u></strong> <u><strong>And this includes the communications central to nuclear deterrence. </strong>There has to be an "absolutely reliable" communications channel at all times between US nuclear forces and the president</u>, says Brian Weeden, a former US intercontinental ballistic missile launch officer. <u>"The thinking was you might have nuclear detonations going off and you might have to co-ordinate some kind of a responsive strike." The satellites designed to secure these communications - and to detect any possible nuclear attack - sit in geostationary orbit high above earth in what was thought until recently to be a kind of sanctuary, safe from any attack. No longer, thanks to a Chinese experiment with a missile in 2013 which reached close to that orbit, some 36,000km above the Earth. </u>In a rare public statement earlier this year Gen John Hyten of US Space Command expressed his alarm at the implications of these Chinese tests. "I think they'll be able to threaten every orbital regime that we operate in," he told CBS news. "We have to figure out how to defend those satellites. And we're going to." It's not the first time that<u> the prospect of a conflict waged in space has suddenly presented itself as a frightening possibility. </u>In 1983 US president Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defence Initiative, widely known as Star Wars, proposing the development of space-based weapons to defend against Soviet missiles. This marked a dramatic new phase as it suddenly appeared that space power could undermine the delicate balance of superpower weaponry on earth. One Soviet response was to begin thinking about how to target US satellites in a time of war. Bhupendra Jasani of King's College London, a veteran observer of space security, says the Soviets "actually launched an anti-satellite weapon test in orbit... they were actually playing a nuclear war scenario. That if there is a war we will knock down the spy satellites, we will knock down the communications satellites and the rest of them". Today's China, he suggests, is thinking along similar lines. <u>And today's world - with only one military superpower, the US - is far more unpredictable than it was in the 1980s, </u>according to Brian Weeden. "There was a tacit understanding between the US and Soviet Union that <u>an attack on specific satellites</u> that <u>could disrupt and disable nuclear command and control</u> or the ability to warn about an attack <u><strong>would be seen as a de facto nuclear attack</u></strong>. That served to deter both sides from attacking satellites," he says. "<u>There are now more incentives for a potential adversary, such as China, to attack satellites or disable them as part of a conventional conflict [because] they know full well that space capabilities are at the core of the US's ability to project power." In this climate of suspicion there is also a risk of accidental damage to key military satellites - caused perhaps by space junk or debris - being interpreted as a hostile act. </u>China's 2007 test destruction of a satellite created thousands of tiny fragments circulating in space, which could potentially collide with another satellite. <u>"Debris is sometimes so small you can't even track (it</u>)," says Jasani. <u>"So if a part of the debris hits a sensitive satellite you will never know if it was debris or deliberate. Military reaction is to take the worst case scenario - that it was hit by somebody else. And that's a trigger point."</p></u> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Space Leadership Advantage | 183,725 | 13 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,594 | Resource wars go global and nuclear.
Klare 8 Professor of Peace and World Security Studies @ Hampshire College, (Michael, March 10, “The Coming Resource Wars”, HYPERLINK "http://www.alternet.org/environment/33243" \t "_blank" http://www.alternet.org/environment/33243)It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely." Although not unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," the 2003 report noted. "Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor." Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world.For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals.When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict. | Klare 8 the era of resource wars is upon us. global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely. a growing trend in strategic circles view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor. many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "In this world of warring states," nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict. | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>Resource wars go global and nuclear.</h4><p></u>Klare 8</strong> Professor of Peace and World Security Studies @ Hampshire College, (Michael, March 10, “The Coming Resource Wars”, HYPERLINK "http://www.alternet.org/environment/33243" \t "_blank" http://www.alternet.org/environment/33243)It's official: <u><strong><mark>the era of resource wars is upon us.</u></strong></mark> In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that <u><strong>global climate change and <mark>dwindling natural resources</mark> are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this <mark>will "make the emergence of violent conflict</mark> more rather than less <mark>likely.</u></strong></mark>" Although not unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of <u><strong>a growing trend in strategic circles</u></strong> to <u><strong>view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the <mark>world population rising, global consumption</mark> rates <mark>soaring, energy</mark> supplies rapidly d<mark>isappearing</mark> and <mark>climate change</mark> eradicating valuable farmland, <mark>the stage is being set for</mark> persistent and worldwide <mark>struggles over vital resources.</mark> Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy.</u></strong> Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that <u><strong>global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," </u></strong>the 2003 report noted. "<u><strong><mark>Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources</mark> such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor.</u></strong>" Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world.For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "<u><strong>many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. <mark>This "will create </mark>a sense of <mark>desperation, which </mark>is likely to <mark>lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources.</mark> "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots."</u></strong> It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, <u><strong>he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the <mark>resulting</mark> risk <mark>of state collapse, civil war and mass migration</mark>. </u></strong>"More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals.When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. <u><strong>"In this world of warring states,"</u></strong> the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "<u><strong><mark>nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable."</mark> As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security."</u></strong> Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. <u><strong>Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, <mark>no society,</mark> however affluent, <mark>will escape</mark> involvement in these forms of <mark>conflict.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1AC Adv – Relations | null | 1,560,872 | 1 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
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3,783,595 | No resource wars – prefer statistical evidence | Pinker 11 | Pinker 11 (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google Books) | rather than cherry-picking one or two very little support in the large-N literature one ingredient in a mixture | climate change will not lead to conflict political scientists are skeptical resource shortages are common wars are not The dust bowl caused deprivation but no civil war temperatures have been rising wars have been falling Pressures on land and water cause skirmishes but genuine war requires forces be organized and armed and that depends more on governments and ideologies than on availability of land In regression analysis conflict was more likely if a country was poor not if it had suffered from shortages Reviewing a large number of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflict have very little support inexpensive advances yield increases in productivity better governance mitigate damage environment is one ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on organization resource wars are far from inevitable | Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though climate change can cause plenty of misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to armed conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two, he concluded, "those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support in the large-N literature." Salehyan adds that relatively inexpensive advances in water use and agriculture practices in the developing world can yield massive increases in productivity with a constant or even shrinking amount of land, and that better governance can mitigate the human costs of environmental damage, as it does in developed democracies. Since the state of the environment is at most one ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on political and social organization, resource wars are far from inevitable, even in a climate-changed world. | 2,765 | <h4><strong>No resource wars – prefer statistical evidence</h4><p>Pinker 11</strong> (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google Books)</p><p>Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though <strong><mark>climate change</strong></mark> can cause plenty of misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it <strong><mark>will not</mark> necessarily <mark>lead to</mark> armed <mark>conflict</strong></mark>. The <strong><mark>political scientists</mark> who track war and peace</strong>, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, <strong><mark>are skeptical</mark> of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources</strong>. <strong>Hunger and <mark>resource shortages are</mark> tragically <mark>common</strong></mark> in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, <strong>but <mark>wars</mark> involving them <mark>are not</strong></mark>. <strong>Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis</strong> (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) <strong>do not generally lead to armed conflict</strong>. <strong><mark>The</mark> American <mark>dust bowl</strong></mark> in the 1930s, to take another example, <strong><mark>caused</mark> plenty of <mark>deprivation but no civil war</strong></mark>. <strong>And while <mark>temperatures have been rising</mark> steadily</strong> in Africa during the past fifteen years, <strong>civil <mark>wars</mark> and war deaths <mark>have been falling</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>Pressures on</mark> access to <mark>land and water</mark> can</strong> certainly <strong><mark>cause</mark> local <mark>skirmishes</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>but</mark> a <mark>genuine war requires</mark> that hostile <mark>forces be organized</mark> <mark>and armed</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>and that depends more on</mark> the influence of bad <mark>governments</mark>, closed economies, <mark>and</mark> militant <mark>ideologies</mark> <mark>than on</mark> the sheer <mark>availability of land</mark> and water</strong>. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. <strong><mark>In</mark> a <mark>regression analysis</mark> on armed conflicts</strong> from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that <strong><mark>conflict was more likely if a country was poor</mark>, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil</strong>, <strong>but <mark>not if it had suffered from</mark> droughts, water <mark>shortages</mark>, or mild land degradation</strong>. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) <strong><mark>Reviewing</mark> analyses that examined <mark>a large number</mark> (N) <mark>of countries <u>rather than cherry-picking one or two</u></strong></mark>, he <strong>concluded, "those who foresee doom, because of <mark>the relationship between resource scarcity and violent</mark> internal <mark>conflict</mark>, <mark>have <u>very little support</mark> in the large-N literature</u></strong>." Salehyan adds that <strong>relatively <mark>inexpensive advances</mark> in water use and agriculture practices</strong> in the developing world can <strong><mark>yield</strong></mark> massive <strong><mark>increases in productivity</mark> with a constant or even shrinking amount of land</strong>, and that <strong><mark>better</mark> <mark>governance</mark> can <mark>mitigate</strong></mark> the human costs of <strong>environmental <mark>damage</strong></mark>, as it does in developed democracies. Since the <strong>state of the <mark>environment is</mark> at most <u><mark>one ingredient in a mixture</u></mark> <mark>that depends far more on</mark> political and social <mark>organization</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>resource wars are far from inevitable</mark>, even in a climate-changed world</strong>.</p> | 2nc | Case | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 2,377 | 464 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
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3,783,596 | Fourth is uncertainty – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Fourth is <u>uncertainty</u> – </h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,873 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,597 | Democratic senate key to immigration reform | MSNBC 4/20 | MSNBC 4/20 [Amanda Sakuma, 04/20/16, MSNBC, “Immigration reform by 2017? Top Democrats seem slightly optimistic”, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/immigration-reform-2017-top-democrats-seem-slightly-optimistic] | Top Democratic leaders are ginning up hope that
AND
I’m going to make it a priority.” | null | Top Democratic leaders are slowly ginning up hope that, contrary to the prevailing narrative
AND
on wood, praise God — I’m going to make it a priority.” | 152 | <h4>Democratic senate key to immigration reform</h4><p><strong>MSNBC 4/20</strong> [Amanda Sakuma, 04/20/16, MSNBC, “Immigration reform by 2017? Top Democrats seem slightly optimistic”, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/immigration-reform-2017-top-democrats-seem-slightly-optimistic]</p><p><u>Top Democratic leaders are</u> slowly <u>ginning up hope that</u>, contrary to the prevailing narrative </p><p><u>AND</p><p></u>on wood, praise God — <u>I’m going to make it a priority.”</p></u> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 1,560,875 | 3 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
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3,783,598 | Plan — The United States federal government should substantially expand its engagement over civil space cooperation, including over joint space debris removal, with the People’s Republic of China. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Plan — The United States federal government should substantially expand its engagement over civil space cooperation, including over joint space debris removal, with the People’s Republic of China.</h4> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Plan | 1,560,874 | 1 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,599 | Cooperation is leading to innovations in clean tech that creates multilateral reductions necessary to mitigate warming below 2C but resolving IPR issues is a prerequisite to creating effective technology. | Gianopoulos 2016 | Gianopoulos, Director at U.S. Government Accountability Office International Affairs and Trade, 2016 | The United States and China, the world’s largest economies lead the world in energy consumption and depend largely on traditional fossil fuel sources China and the United States account for roughly 40 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions annually Concerns over rising emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, and their effects on the climate led most countries to adopt or consider adopting policies to reduce these emissions the United States and China are seen as instrumental in multilateral efforts to address climate change. Individually, in an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both the United States and China are investing in renewable resources and efforts to increase the efficiency of traditional fossil fuel sources. the United States and China have increased bilateral cooperation on clean energy in an effort to spur progress U.S. cooperation with China on clean energy could yield benefits such as building trust between the countries helping both advance their efforts to meet environmental challenges and creating opportunities for U.S. businesses in China the sharing of any IP through this cooperation is a potential risk due to possible IP theft. In December 2015, more than 190 member states under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change came together to adopt the Paris Agreement which aims to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius through countries setting their own nonbinding targets for emissions reductions. In Paris, some of the countries that adopted the Paris Agreement also committed to initiatives to substantially increase public and private investment in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities through the Mission Innovation initiative, 20 countries, including the United States and China, will seek to double their governmental clean energy research and development investment over 5 years to accelerate clean energy innovation and make it widely affordable As U.S. cooperation with China on science and technology has expanded China’s protection of IP rights has been a persistent concern Although some IP issues have been addressed through dialogues, according to a 2016 report by the U.S. Trade Representative the uncertain IP environment is a leading concern for businesses operating in China the theft of trade secrets remains a particular concern and conditions are unlikely to improve as long as those committing such theft continue to operate with relative impunity The report identified concerns about reports that Chinese government policies may have negative impacts on U.S. investors and their IP rights, including that Chinese regulations, rules, and other measures appear to require foreign companies to transfer or license their IP rights to domestic Chinese entities in order to do business in China U.S. clean energy companies may face particular IP concerns with regard to doing business in China China’s 5-year plan for economic and social development initiatives includes developing its environmental technology industry The U.S. Trade Representative has expressed concern that China’s innovation-related and other industrial policies may have negative impacts on U.S. exports or IP in particular industries by encouraging actions that pressure foreign IP rights holders to transfer those rights | The U S and China, the world’s largest economies, lead in energy consumption and account for 40 percent of emissions annually Concerns led countries to adopt policies to reduce these the U S and China are instrumental in multilateral efforts to address climate Individually both are investing in renewable resources the U S and China increased bilateral cooperation cooperation could yield benefits such as building trust helping both advance efforts to meet challenges sharing of IP is a risk due to theft In 2015 190 states came together to adopt Paris to hold temperature to below 2 degrees countries will seek to double clean energy research to accelerate innovation and make it affordable China’s protection of IP has been a persistent concern the uncertain IP environment is a leading concern for businesses Chinese policies may have negative impacts on investors | Kimberly, “U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION Bilateral Clean Energy Programs Show Some Results but Should Enhance Their Performance Monitoring” July, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678214.pdf
The United States and China, the world’s largest economies, lead the world in energy consumption and depend largely on traditional fossil fuel sources. Together, China and the United States account for roughly 40 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions annually, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Concerns over rising emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, and their effects on the climate have led most countries to adopt or consider adopting policies to reduce these emissions.1 In part for these reasons, the United States and China are seen as instrumental in multilateral efforts to address climate change. Individually, in an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both the United States and China are investing in renewable resources and also in efforts to increase the efficiency of traditional fossil fuel sources. In 2015, China led the world in renewable energy investments with an estimated $102.9 billion in new investments, while the United States invested approximately $44.1 billion.2 In addition, the United States and China have increased bilateral cooperation on clean energy in an effort to spur progress. In 2014, the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission raised concerns about U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy, including a lack of clear public reporting on results and potential risks to participants in joint research and development projects due to concerns related to China's protection of intellectual property (IP) rights. Because of these issues, the commission recommended that we conduct an assessment of government-led U.S.-China collaborative initiatives on clean energy; subsequently, you requested that we do so. In this report, we examine (1) how much funding U.S. agencies have obligated to clean energy cooperation with China, (2) what is known about the results of key U.S.-China cooperation programs and the extent to which these programs follow leading practices in performance monitoring, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages risks that may face U.S. participants in the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC). To address these objectives, we analyzed funding data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted site visits to locations in California, Michigan, and West Virginia and phone conferences to interview program participants, including from the three organizations leading collaborative research under CERC. The U.S. government has no uniform definition of clean energy that is applied government-wide. However, based on consultation with participating agencies and review of the White House’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, we determined that the following types of energy technologies are relevant for this review: renewable energy (including solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biofuels); energy efficiency technologies (i.e., technologies that decrease the intensity of energy usage); nuclear power; natural gas; clean coal (e.g., coal with carbon capture, utilization, and storage3 ); clean vehicle technologies; and improved energy infrastructure (e.g., smart grids4 ). To identify the funding obligated to clean energy cooperation with China from fiscal years 2008 through 2015, we sent a questionnaire to agencies that we identified as being involved in these efforts. Among other items, the questionnaire asked them to identify their U.S.-China clean energy cooperative activities and the amount of funding obligated to each activity by fiscal year. We took steps to ensure that agency responses were complete, such as by comparing the responses against other agency documentation, and also sent questions to the agencies to determine the reliability of the sources of the data. We determined that the data provided were reliable for our purposes. To describe what is known about the results of U.S.-China clean energy cooperation, we focused on three key programs to which the largest amount of funding was obligated by the three agencies that provided the most funding to U.S.-China clean energy cooperation. These key programs were identified as DOE’s CERC, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) East Asia Program, and the Department of State’s (State) U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG). To describe these key programs’ results, we analyzed agency documents and clarified and assessed the reliability of results data in these documents through interviews with agency officials, among other steps. We determined that the data provided by the three programs are sufficiently reliable for describing their results. To determine the extent to which these programs follow leading practices in performance monitoring, we examined agency and program performance documents and interviewed agency officials. To determine the extent to which DOE has managed any risks that CERC participants may face, we first determined what risks those might include through interviewing DOE officials and a nongeneralizable sample of CERC participants.5 We also analyzed relevant documents, such as the Technology Management Plan for each CERC track, and compared steps such as these that DOE has taken to manage IP risks with federal internal control standards for risk assessment.6 Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology. We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to July 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The United States and China have cooperated for over 35 years on science and technology initiatives. In 1979, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement that has served as an umbrella agreement for subsequent bilateral environment and energy initiatives.7 In 2008, the countries established the Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment. This framework was intended to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices to develop solutions to the environment and energy challenges both countries face. The framework includes some action plans related to clean energy, such as plans for clean, efficient, and secure electricity; clean and efficient transportation; and energy efficiency. According to staff from think tanks and business associations and other individuals knowledgeable about U.S.-China clean energy cooperation that we interviewed, U.S. cooperation with China on clean energy could yield benefits such as building trust between the countries, helping both countries advance their efforts to meet environmental challenges, and creating opportunities for U.S. businesses in China. According to these individuals, the sharing of any IP through this cooperation is a potential risk due to possible IP theft. In November 2014, the two countries’ presidents issued a U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, which included targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, and for China to intend to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in its energy consumption. The announcement also emphasized the countries’ commitment to a successful climate agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015, and the countries’ presidents reaffirmed this commitment in a U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change in September 2015. In December 2015, more than 190 member states under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change came together to adopt the Paris Agreement, which aims to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels through countries setting their own nonbinding targets for emissions reductions. In Paris, some of the countries that adopted the Paris Agreement also committed to initiatives to substantially increase public and private investment in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities. For example, through the Mission Innovation initiative, 20 countries, including the United States and China, will seek to double their governmental clean energy research and development investment over 5 years to accelerate clean energy innovation and make it widely affordable. In addition to its bilateral cooperation with China, the United States cooperates bilaterally and multilaterally with other countries on initiatives related to climate change and clean energy. For example, the United States has a Clean Energy Dialogue with Canada to encourage the development of clean energy technologies to reduce greenhouse gases and combat climate change. Also, in 2009, the United States launched the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy with India, which is working to accelerate inclusive, low carbon growth by supporting research and deployment of clean energy technologies. Both the United States and China, along with 21 other countries and the European Commission, participate in the Clean Energy Ministerial,8 a high-level global forum to promote policies and programs that advance clean energy technology, to share lessons learned and best practices, and to encourage the transition to a global clean energy economy. The Clean Energy Ministerial is focused on improving energy efficiency worldwide, enhancing clean energy supply, and expanding clean energy access. As U.S. cooperation with China on science and technology has expanded over time, China’s protection of IP rights has been a persistent concern. Although some IP issues have been addressed through dialogues, such as the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,9 according to a 2016 report by the U.S. Trade Representative,10 the uncertain IP environment is a leading concern for businesses operating in China. According to the report, the theft of trade secrets remains a particular concern, and conditions are unlikely to improve as long as those committing such theft continue to operate with relative impunity. The report also identified concerns about reports that Chinese government policies may have negative impacts on U.S. investors and their IP rights, including that Chinese regulations, rules, and other measures appear to require foreign companies to transfer or license their IP rights to domestic Chinese entities in order to do business in China. U.S. clean energy companies may face particular IP concerns with regard to doing business in China. China’s 5-year plan for economic and social development initiatives for 2016–2020 includes developing its environmental technology industry as a focus area. The U.S. Trade Representative has expressed concern that China’s innovation-related and other industrial policies may have negative impacts on U.S. exports or IP in particular industries by encouraging actions that pressure foreign IP rights holders to transfer those rights to domestic Chinese entities. | 11,387 | <h4>Cooperation is leading to innovations in clean tech that <u>creates multilateral reductions </u>necessary to mitigate <u>warming below 2C </u>but resolving IPR issues is a prerequisite to creating effective technology. </h4><p><u><strong>Gianopoulos</u></strong>, Director at U.S. Government Accountability Office International Affairs and Trade, <u><strong>2016</p><p></u></strong>Kimberly, “U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION Bilateral Clean Energy Programs Show Some Results but Should Enhance Their Performance Monitoring” July, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678214.pdf </p><p><u><strong><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China, the world’s largest economies</u></strong>, <u><strong>lead</mark> the world <mark>in energy</mark> <mark>consumption and</mark> depend largely on traditional fossil fuel sources</u></strong>. Together, <u><strong>China and the United States <mark>account for</mark> roughly <mark>40 percent of</mark> global carbon dioxide <mark>emissions annually</u></strong></mark>, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. <u><strong><mark>Concerns</mark> over rising emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, and their effects on the climate</u></strong> have <u><strong><mark>led</mark> most <mark>countries to adopt</mark> or consider adopting <mark>policies to</mark> <mark>reduce these</mark> emissions</u></strong>.1 In part for these reasons, <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China are</mark> seen as <mark>instrumental in</mark> <mark>multilateral efforts to address climate</mark> change. <mark>Individually</mark>, in an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, <mark>both</mark> the United States and China <mark>are investing in renewable</mark> <mark>resources</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> also in <u><strong>efforts to increase the efficiency of traditional fossil fuel sources.</u></strong> In 2015, China led the world in renewable energy investments with an estimated $102.9 billion in new investments, while the United States invested approximately $44.1 billion.2 In addition, <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China</mark> have <mark>increased bilateral cooperation</mark> on clean energy in an effort to spur progress</u></strong>. In 2014, the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission raised concerns about U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy, including a lack of clear public reporting on results and potential risks to participants in joint research and development projects due to concerns related to China's protection of intellectual property (IP) rights. Because of these issues, the commission recommended that we conduct an assessment of government-led U.S.-China collaborative initiatives on clean energy; subsequently, you requested that we do so. In this report, we examine (1) how much funding U.S. agencies have obligated to clean energy cooperation with China, (2) what is known about the results of key U.S.-China cooperation programs and the extent to which these programs follow leading practices in performance monitoring, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages risks that may face U.S. participants in the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC). To address these objectives, we analyzed funding data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted site visits to locations in California, Michigan, and West Virginia and phone conferences to interview program participants, including from the three organizations leading collaborative research under CERC. The U.S. government has no uniform definition of clean energy that is applied government-wide. However, based on consultation with participating agencies and review of the White House’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, we determined that the following types of energy technologies are relevant for this review: renewable energy (including solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biofuels); energy efficiency technologies (i.e., technologies that decrease the intensity of energy usage); nuclear power; natural gas; clean coal (e.g., coal with carbon capture, utilization, and storage3 ); clean vehicle technologies; and improved energy infrastructure (e.g., smart grids4 ). To identify the funding obligated to clean energy cooperation with China from fiscal years 2008 through 2015, we sent a questionnaire to agencies that we identified as being involved in these efforts. Among other items, the questionnaire asked them to identify their U.S.-China clean energy cooperative activities and the amount of funding obligated to each activity by fiscal year. We took steps to ensure that agency responses were complete, such as by comparing the responses against other agency documentation, and also sent questions to the agencies to determine the reliability of the sources of the data. We determined that the data provided were reliable for our purposes. To describe what is known about the results of U.S.-China clean energy cooperation, we focused on three key programs to which the largest amount of funding was obligated by the three agencies that provided the most funding to U.S.-China clean energy cooperation. These key programs were identified as DOE’s CERC, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) East Asia Program, and the Department of State’s (State) U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG). To describe these key programs’ results, we analyzed agency documents and clarified and assessed the reliability of results data in these documents through interviews with agency officials, among other steps. We determined that the data provided by the three programs are sufficiently reliable for describing their results. To determine the extent to which these programs follow leading practices in performance monitoring, we examined agency and program performance documents and interviewed agency officials. To determine the extent to which DOE has managed any risks that CERC participants may face, we first determined what risks those might include through interviewing DOE officials and a nongeneralizable sample of CERC participants.5 We also analyzed relevant documents, such as the Technology Management Plan for each CERC track, and compared steps such as these that DOE has taken to manage IP risks with federal internal control standards for risk assessment.6 Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology. We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to July 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The United States and China have cooperated for over 35 years on science and technology initiatives. In 1979, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement that has served as an umbrella agreement for subsequent bilateral environment and energy initiatives.7 In 2008, the countries established the Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment. This framework was intended to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices to develop solutions to the environment and energy challenges both countries face. The framework includes some action plans related to clean energy, such as plans for clean, efficient, and secure electricity; clean and efficient transportation; and energy efficiency. According to staff from think tanks and business associations and other individuals knowledgeable about U.S.-China clean energy cooperation that we interviewed, <u><strong>U.S. <mark>cooperation</mark> with China on clean energy <mark>could yield benefits such as</mark> <mark>building trust</mark> between the countries</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>helping both</u></strong></mark> countries <u><strong><mark>advance</mark> their <mark>efforts to meet</mark> environmental <mark>challenges</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and creating opportunities for U.S. businesses in China</u></strong>. According to these individuals, <u><strong>the <mark>sharing of</mark> any <mark>IP</mark> through this cooperation <mark>is a</mark> potential <mark>risk due to </mark>possible IP <mark>theft</mark>. </u></strong>In November 2014, the two countries’ presidents issued a U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, which included targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, and for China to intend to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in its energy consumption. The announcement also emphasized the countries’ commitment to a successful climate agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015, and the countries’ presidents reaffirmed this commitment in a U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change in September 2015. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> December <mark>2015</mark>, more than <mark>190</mark> member <mark>states</mark> under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change <mark>came together to adopt</mark> the <mark>Paris</mark> Agreement</u></strong>, <u><strong>which aims <mark>to hold</mark> the increase in the global average <mark>temperature to</mark> well <mark>below 2 degrees</mark> Celsius</u></strong> above pre-industrial levels <u><strong>through countries setting their own nonbinding targets for emissions reductions. In Paris, some of the countries that adopted the Paris Agreement also committed to initiatives to substantially increase public and private investment in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong>through the Mission Innovation initiative, 20 <mark>countries</mark>, including the United States and China, <mark>will seek to double</mark> their governmental <mark>clean energy research</mark> and development investment over 5 years <mark>to accelerate</mark> clean energy <mark>innovation and make it</mark> widely <mark>affordable</u></strong></mark>. In addition to its bilateral cooperation with China, the United States cooperates bilaterally and multilaterally with other countries on initiatives related to climate change and clean energy. For example, the United States has a Clean Energy Dialogue with Canada to encourage the development of clean energy technologies to reduce greenhouse gases and combat climate change. Also, in 2009, the United States launched the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy with India, which is working to accelerate inclusive, low carbon growth by supporting research and deployment of clean energy technologies. Both the United States and China, along with 21 other countries and the European Commission, participate in the Clean Energy Ministerial,8 a high-level global forum to promote policies and programs that advance clean energy technology, to share lessons learned and best practices, and to encourage the transition to a global clean energy economy. The Clean Energy Ministerial is focused on improving energy efficiency worldwide, enhancing clean energy supply, and expanding clean energy access. <u><strong>As U.S. cooperation with China on science and technology has expanded</u></strong> over time, <u><strong><mark>China’s protection of IP</mark> rights <mark>has been a persistent concern</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Although some IP issues have been addressed through dialogues,</u></strong> such as the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,9 <u><strong>according to a 2016 report</u></strong> <u><strong>by the U.S. Trade Representative</u></strong>,10 <u><strong><mark>the uncertain IP</u></strong> <u><strong>environment</u></strong> <u><strong>is a leading concern for businesses</mark> operating in China</u></strong>. According to the report, <u><strong>the theft of trade secrets remains a particular concern</u></strong>, <u><strong>and conditions are unlikely to improve as long as those committing such theft continue to operate with relative impunity</u></strong>. <u><strong>The report</u></strong> also <u><strong>identified concerns about reports that <mark>Chinese</mark> government <mark>policies</mark> <mark>may have</u></strong> <u><strong>negative impacts on</mark> U.S. <mark>investors</mark> and their IP rights, including that Chinese regulations, rules, and other measures appear to require foreign companies to transfer or license their IP rights to domestic Chinese entities in order to do business in China</u></strong>. <u><strong>U.S. clean energy companies may face particular IP concerns with regard to doing business in China</u></strong>. <u><strong>China’s 5-year plan for economic and social development initiatives</u></strong> for 2016–2020 <u><strong>includes developing its environmental technology industry </u></strong>as a focus area. <u><strong>The U.S. Trade Representative has expressed concern that China’s innovation-related and other industrial policies may have negative impacts on U.S. exports or IP in particular industries</u></strong> <u><strong>by encouraging actions that pressure foreign IP rights holders to transfer those rights</u></strong> to domestic Chinese entities.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,559,772 | 14 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,600 | CP key to spill over globally and resolve external impacts | Nathan 13 www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/) | Nathan 13 (Poli Sci Prof at Columbia (Andrew, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/) | China's adherence to universal human rights norms is a matter of sound strategy China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common interests advanced in reliable ways. Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China. | a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China. | We should remind our politicians that promoting China's adherence to universal human rights norms is not just a matter of moral idealism, but also a matter of sound strategy. First, everyone will feel safer as businesspeople, scholars, and tourists when China has rule of law, and this includes not only Americans but other foreigners and Chinese as well. Second, China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself. Third, China will be more stable politically once the regime is grounded in the consent of the people, and a stable and prosperous China is in the interests of the rest of the world. Finally, a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as trade, investment, the environment, arms control, and human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common interests advanced in reliable ways. Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China. | 1,181 | <h4>CP key to spill over globally and resolve external impacts</h4><p><strong>Nathan 13</strong> (Poli Sci Prof at Columbia (Andrew, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,<u><strong> www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/)</p><p></u></strong>We should remind our politicians that promoting <u>China's adherence to universal human rights norms is</u> not just a matter of moral idealism, but also <u>a matter of sound strategy</u>. First, everyone will feel safer as businesspeople, scholars, and tourists when China has rule of law, and this includes not only Americans but other foreigners and Chinese as well. Second, <u>China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself</u>. Third, China will be more stable politically once the regime is grounded in the consent of the people, and a stable and prosperous China is in the interests of the rest of the world. Finally, <u><mark>a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as</u></mark> trade, investment, the environment, arms control, and <u><mark>human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world</mark>, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common interests advanced in reliable ways<strong>. <mark>Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 162,342 | 7 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,601 | Reform’s critical to every internal link to hegemony | Nye 12 | Nye 12 Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye | The U S is a nation of immigrants.
AND
long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US. | null | CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small
AND
long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US. | 154 | <h4>Reform’s critical to every internal link to hegemony</h4><p><strong>Nye 12 </strong>Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye</p><p>CAMBRIDGE – <u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is a nation of immigrants.</u> Except for a small </p><p><u>AND</p><p>long way toward fulfilling his promise to <strong>maintain the strength of the US.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 623,741 | 4 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,602 | Current uncertainty and lack of cooperation between US and China contribute to this problem – US securitization of China’s military capabilities has created a change in strategy towards offensive posturing that legitimizes preemptive strikes, creates an arms race, and is at the heart of the security dilemma. | Nillson 12 | Nillson 12 | (Fredrik, graduate student, Department of Political Science @ Lund University, “Securitizing China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)
Securitizing China’s capabilities The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it supports a more powerful and prosperous China and China has since 2002 repeatedly stated its intentions of a ‘peaceful rise’ The need for cooperation is often deemed critical. China has since continued on the same trajectory, but no further significant military cooperation or regional order has yet been on any significant agenda. the urgency of cooperation has been repeatedly emphasized, but no major change has taken place. the relationship has become increasingly antagonistic. Chinese scholars argue relations are good on the surface but that the U.S. is increasingly working towards a containment policy The administration has chosen to take a tougher approach to China’s military modernization Many people in China view Washington’s approach as increasingly worrying and the idea that the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power ambitions is getting stronger military-to-military cooperation is conspicuously absent and the Obama administration has increasingly started to securitize China’s growing capabilities. A lack of military transparency is fueling suspicion about China’s intentions in regional states and the resulting uncertainty is a source of reoccurring diplomatic tensions recently Beijing have increased submarine capabilities and they operate an underground submarine base that enables Chinese submarines to reach deep waters rapidly and deploy submarines to vital sea lanes with great stealth possession of advanced, offensive weapons has often provided weaker states with the confidence to launch asymmetric wars This observation is true not only for China in this region, but also for surrounding countries in order to hedge its bets against China Despite arguments that the PLAN is of little direct threat to the U S the administration has chosen to securitize the rise of the Chinese naval capabilities. strategic guidance for the D o D writes that we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including s r counterterrorism; countering w m d operating in antiaccess environments and prevailing in all domains it officially raises the issue of operating in anti-access environment on the military security agenda. the U.S. military will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region In the context of China’s lacking transparency in military modernization, the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also immediately addresses the inherent difficulties the best way to justify developing increasingly advanced and costly capabilities might be through securitization of China’s naval rise. This is what the U S is doing. There is clear suspicion from the United States in Chinese intentions largely due to its lacking transparency and the ambiguous nature of government communications. | China has continued on the same trajectory, but no cooperation has yet been on any agenda the urgency of cooperation has been emphasized, the relationship has become increasingly antagonistic. Chinese scholars argue relations are good on the surface but the U.S. is working towards containment The administration has a tough approach to China’s modernization Many in China view Washington’s approach as the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power cooperation is absent and the administration has increasingly started to securitize China’s capabilities. A lack of transparency is fueling suspicion about China and uncertainty is a source of diplomatic tensions possession of , offensive weapons has provided weaker states with confidence to launch asymmetric wars This is true not only for China but also surrounding countries in order to hedge against China Despite arguments that the PLAN is of little threat to the U S the administration has chosen to securitize the D o D will invest in capabilities , including countering w m d operating in antiaccess environments , In the context of China’s lacking transparency the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also addresses the inherent difficulties the best way to justify increasing capabilities might be through securitization of China There is clear suspicion from the U S due to lacking transparency | (Fredrik, graduate student, Department of Political Science @ Lund University, “Securitizing China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)
4.3 Securitizing China’s maritime capabilities During the 2011 visit by China’s president Hu to Washington, leaders of both countries emphasized the importance of increased cooperation not least in the military sector (Chase 2011; 133). The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it supports a more powerful and prosperous China (ibid), and China has since 2002 repeatedly stated its intentions of a ‘peaceful rise’ (Guo 2006; 39). The need for cooperation is often deemed critical. Australian strategist Hugh White has argued that if China continues on its current trajectory, a new order in the region will need to be established; one that takes into account the new power relativities, and that “if this doesn’t happen, there is no reason to expect that the peace can be kept” (White 2008; 91). China has since continued on the same trajectory, but no further significant military cooperation or regional order has yet been on any significant agenda. The peace has so far been kept, and the urgency of cooperation has been repeatedly emphasized, but no major change has taken place. Rather, the relationship has during the past four years rather gone in the opposite direction and become increasingly antagonistic. Some Chinese scholars argue that the bilateral relations are good on the surface but that the U.S. is increasingly working towards a containment policy (Chase 2011; 135) The Obama administration has chosen to take a tougher approach to China’s military modernization as the cooperation has proven to be difficult (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 53). For example, military cooperation and mutual visits were suspended by Beijing in a reaction to a U.S.-Taiwan arms deal in 2010 (Pomfret 2010). Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated at the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, that the increasing Chinese capabilities directed at Taiwan requires the U.S. to supply Taiwan with arms and that disruptions in military-tomilitary relations with China will not change U.S. policy toward Taiwan (Gates 2010). Many people in China view Washington’s approach as increasingly worrying and the idea that the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power ambitions is getting stronger (Chase 2011; 133-134). Richard Weitz argued that the good relations established by former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were largely due to Gates’ personal commitment and that his retirement might retard [slow] the progress (Weitz 2011). Weitz assertion seems accurate because since Gates retired military-to-military cooperation is conspicuously absent and the Obama administration has increasingly started to securitize China’s growing capabilities. China’s annual military budget has over the past ten years grown faster than the overall economy, measured in GDP (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 51). There are many different speculations as to why China is developing its military at such a rapid rate, now having the world’s second largest military budget only after the United States (The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). A lack of military transparency is fueling suspicion about China’s intentions in regional states and the resulting uncertainty is a source of reoccurring diplomatic tensions (Kiselycznyk and Saunders 2010; 4-5). Only recently has Beijing started to reveal some of the developments that they seek to achieve. Amongst other things, China has admitted their intention to deploy an aircraft carrier group in the near future (Wong 2010). They also have increased submarine capabilities and they operate an underground submarine base that enables Chinese submarines to reach deep waters rapidly and deploy submarines to vital sea lanes with great stealth (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010; 2) Sea power is pursued for two main purposes. The first one is to protect SLOCs (Sea-Lanes of Communication) and seaborne commerce in peacetime, and to ensure protection of these through sea-denial or sea-control in times of war. The second purpose is for offensive military power and aggression (Howarth 2006; 4). Howarth writes mainly about the intentions behind Chinese submarine development and states that: Although originally conceived to play primarily a defensive role in naval operations, the submarine has more often been the instrument of choice for offensive operations by inferior navies. And possession of advanced, offensive weapons has often provided weaker states with the confidence to launch asymmetric wars against stronger opponents (Howarth 2006; 9-10) This observation is true not only for China in this region, but also for surrounding countries like Vietnam, who, in order to hedge its bets against China, is developing significant submarine capabilities to defend its interests in the South China Sea. The supposed reasons behind China’s rapid and extensively developed maritime capabilities are grounded in its issues with Taiwan. Some argue that China’s naval modernization started with the 1996 incident in which the U.S. carriers blocked the Taiwan Strait and denied China any possibility of attack (see for example Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 57). In the case of Taiwan trying to declare independence, China would use force to enforce its claims to the territory (Ross 2000; 87). The United States has a long-standing alignment with Taiwan, something that was illustrated when the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to counter Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan (Ross 2000; 88). Even though Taiwan might be the highest priority, it is not the only reason for China’s modernization efforts. Other goals include protecting Chinese interest in the South China Sea; preventing piracy; protecting vital energy supply lines; displacing U.S. power and influence in the Asia Pacific (O’Rourke 2012; 5). In September 2011, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the $5.8 billion arms package to Taiwan. This was not well received in Beijing, and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington said there would be consequences (Minnick 2011). China believes it has legitimate reasons for being outraged about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because of the 1982 communiqué that outlines the long-term U.S. policy towards Taiwan with a gradual decrease in arms sales with the goal of a future resolution (Junbo 2011). In line with the commitment of China not to let Taiwan secede from Mainland China, U.S. officials believe that China has planned its military development in a way that will enable enforcements of its claims of Taiwan without outside interference. This suspicion is visible in several official documents, for example in the following statement in a Department of Defense report to Congress: The PLA seeks the capability to deter Taiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit of this objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for the island in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; I). Despite arguments that the PLAN is of little direct threat to the United States, the Obama administration has chosen to securitize the rise of the Chinese naval capabilities. In the strategic guidance for the Department of Defense in 2012, Obama writes in a letter that: As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in antiaccess environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber (Obama’s note in Department of Defense 2012). The statement covers a lot of ground but, most significantly, it officially raises the issue of operating in anti-access environment on the military security agenda. The report also makes clear the redirected focus of U.S. military strategy, saying: “while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” (Department of Defense 2012; 2). The necessity lies in maintaining competitiveness and regional sea control. In the context of China’s lacking transparency in military modernization, the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also immediately addresses the inherent difficulties in doing so: “The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with out treaty obligations and with international law” (Department of Defense 2012; 2) and that: States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities… Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities (Department of Defense 2012; 4-5). The measures that the Department of Defense is taking to deal with China might prove difficult to justify to a wider audience. In times of budget restraints, the best way to justify developing increasingly advanced and costly capabilities might be through securitization of China’s naval rise. This is what the United States is currently doing. There is clear suspicion from the United States in Chinese intentions largely due to its lacking transparency and the ambiguous nature of government communications. | 10,285 | <h4>Current <u>uncertainty</u> and <u>lack of cooperation</u> between US and China <u>contribute to this problem</u> – US securitization of China’s military capabilities has created a <u>change in strategy</u> towards <u>offensive posturing</u><strong> that legitimizes preemptive strikes, creates an arms race, and is at the heart of the security dilemma.</h4><p>Nillson 12</p><p><u></strong>(Fredrik, graduate student, Department of Political Science @ Lund University, “Securitizing China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)</p><p></u>4.3 <u><strong>Securitizing China’s</u></strong> maritime <u>capabilities</u> During the 2011 visit by China’s president Hu to Washington, leaders of both countries emphasized the importance of increased cooperation not least in the military sector (Chase 2011; 133). <u>The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it supports a more powerful and prosperous China</u> (ibid), <u>and China has since 2002 repeatedly stated its intentions of a ‘peaceful rise’</u> (Guo 2006; 39). <u>The need for cooperation is often deemed critical.</u> Australian strategist Hugh White has argued that if China continues on its current trajectory, a new order in the region will need to be established; one that takes into account the new power relativities, and that “if this doesn’t happen, there is no reason to expect that the peace can be kept” (White 2008; 91). <u><mark>China has</mark> since <mark>continued on the same trajectory, but <strong>no </mark>further significant military <mark>cooperation</strong></mark> or regional order <strong><mark>has yet been on any</mark> significant <mark>agenda</strong></mark>.</u> The peace has so far been kept, and <u><mark>the urgency of cooperation has been</mark> repeatedly <mark>emphasized, </mark>but no major change has taken place.</u> Rather, <u><mark>the relationship has</u></mark> during the past four years rather gone in the opposite direction and <u><mark>become <strong>increasingly</strong> <strong>antagonistic.</u></strong></mark> Some <u><mark>Chinese scholars argue</u></mark> that the bilateral <u><mark>relations are good on the surface but</mark> that <mark>the U.S. is </mark>increasingly <mark>working towards </mark>a <mark>containment </mark>policy</u> (Chase 2011; 135) <u><mark>The</u></mark> Obama <u><mark>administration has </mark>chosen to take <mark>a tough</mark>er <mark>approach to China’s</mark> military <mark>modernization</u></mark> as the cooperation has proven to be difficult (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 53). For example, military cooperation and mutual visits were suspended by Beijing in a reaction to a U.S.-Taiwan arms deal in 2010 (Pomfret 2010). Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated at the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, that the increasing Chinese capabilities directed at Taiwan requires the U.S. to supply Taiwan with arms and that disruptions in military-tomilitary relations with China will not change U.S. policy toward Taiwan (Gates 2010). <u><mark>Many</mark> people <mark>in China view Washington’s approach as </mark>increasingly worrying and the idea that <mark>the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power</mark> ambitions is getting stronger</u> (Chase 2011; 133-134). Richard Weitz argued that the good relations established by former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were largely due to Gates’ personal commitment and that his retirement might retard [slow] the progress (Weitz 2011). Weitz assertion seems accurate because since Gates retired <u>military-to-military <mark>cooperation is</mark> conspicuously <mark>absent and the</mark> Obama <mark>administration has increasingly started to <strong>securitize China’s </mark>growing <mark>capabilities.</mark> </u></strong>China’s annual military budget has over the past ten years grown faster than the overall economy, measured in GDP (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 51). There are many different speculations as to why China is developing its military at such a rapid rate, now having the world’s second largest military budget only after the United States (The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). <u><mark>A <strong>lack of</mark> military <mark>transparency is fueling suspicion</strong> about China</mark>’s intentions in regional states <mark>and </mark>the resulting <mark>uncertainty <strong>is a source of</mark> reoccurring <mark>diplomatic tensions</strong></mark> </u>(Kiselycznyk and Saunders 2010; 4-5). Only <u>recently</u> has <u>Beijing</u> started to reveal some of the developments that they seek to achieve. Amongst other things, China has admitted their intention to deploy an aircraft carrier group in the near future (Wong 2010). They also <u>have increased submarine capabilities and they operate an underground submarine base that enables Chinese submarines to reach deep waters rapidly and deploy submarines to vital sea lanes with great stealth</u> (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010; 2) Sea power is pursued for two main purposes. The first one is to protect SLOCs (Sea-Lanes of Communication) and seaborne commerce in peacetime, and to ensure protection of these through sea-denial or sea-control in times of war. The second purpose is for offensive military power and aggression (Howarth 2006; 4). Howarth writes mainly about the intentions behind Chinese submarine development and states that: Although originally conceived to play primarily a defensive role in naval operations, the submarine has more often been the instrument of choice for offensive operations by inferior navies. And <u><mark>possession of </mark>advanced<mark>, offensive weapons has</mark> often <mark>provided weaker states with </mark>the <mark>confidence to launch <strong>asymmetric</strong> <strong>wars</u></strong></mark> against stronger opponents (Howarth 2006; 9-10) <u><mark>This</mark> observation <mark>is true <strong>not only for China</strong></mark> in this region, <mark>but also</mark> for <strong><mark>surrounding countries</u></strong></mark> like Vietnam, who, <u><strong><mark>in order to hedge</mark> its bets <mark>against China</u></strong></mark>, is developing significant submarine capabilities to defend its interests in the South China Sea. The supposed reasons behind China’s rapid and extensively developed maritime capabilities are grounded in its issues with Taiwan. Some argue that China’s naval modernization started with the 1996 incident in which the U.S. carriers blocked the Taiwan Strait and denied China any possibility of attack (see for example Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 57). In the case of Taiwan trying to declare independence, China would use force to enforce its claims to the territory (Ross 2000; 87). The United States has a long-standing alignment with Taiwan, something that was illustrated when the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to counter Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan (Ross 2000; 88). Even though Taiwan might be the highest priority, it is not the only reason for China’s modernization efforts. Other goals include protecting Chinese interest in the South China Sea; preventing piracy; protecting vital energy supply lines; displacing U.S. power and influence in the Asia Pacific (O’Rourke 2012; 5). In September 2011, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the $5.8 billion arms package to Taiwan. This was not well received in Beijing, and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington said there would be consequences (Minnick 2011). China believes it has legitimate reasons for being outraged about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because of the 1982 communiqué that outlines the long-term U.S. policy towards Taiwan with a gradual decrease in arms sales with the goal of a future resolution (Junbo 2011). In line with the commitment of China not to let Taiwan secede from Mainland China, U.S. officials believe that China has planned its military development in a way that will enable enforcements of its claims of Taiwan without outside interference. This suspicion is visible in several official documents, for example in the following statement in a Department of Defense report to Congress: The PLA seeks the capability to deter Taiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit of this objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for the island in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; I). <u><strong><mark>Despite arguments</strong> that the PLAN is of <strong>little </mark>direct <mark>threat</strong> to the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, <u><mark>the</u></mark> Obama <u><mark>administration has <strong>chosen</strong> to <strong>securitize </mark>the rise of the<mark> </mark>Chinese naval capabilities</strong>.</u> In the <u>strategic guidance for <strong><mark>the D</u></strong></mark>epartment <u><strong><mark>o</u></strong></mark>f <u><strong><mark>D</u></strong></mark>efense in 2012, Obama <u>writes</u> in a letter <u>that</u>: As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular, <u>we <mark>will</mark> continue to <mark>invest in</mark> the <mark>capabilities</mark> critical to future success<mark>, including </u></mark>intelligence, <u><strong>s</u></strong>urveillance, and <u><strong>r</u></strong>econnaissance; <u>counterterrorism; <mark>countering <strong>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction; <u><mark>operating in <strong>antiaccess environments</u></strong></mark>; <u>and prevailing in <strong>all</strong> <strong>domains</u></strong><mark>,</mark> including cyber (Obama’s note in Department of Defense 2012). The statement covers a lot of ground but, most significantly, <u>it officially raises the issue of operating in <strong>anti-access environment</strong> on the military security agenda.</u> The report also makes clear the redirected focus of U.S. military strategy, saying: “while <u>the U.S. military</u> will continue to contribute to security globally, we <u>will</u> of necessity <u><strong>rebalance</strong> toward the <strong>Asia-Pacific region</u></strong>” (Department of Defense 2012; 2). The necessity lies in maintaining competitiveness and regional sea control. <u><strong><mark>In the context of China’s lacking transparency</mark> in military modernization, <mark>the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also</mark> immediately <mark>addresses the inherent difficulties</mark> </u></strong>in doing so: “The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with out treaty obligations and with international law” (Department of Defense 2012; 2) and that: States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities… Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities (Department of Defense 2012; 4-5). The measures that the Department of Defense is taking to deal with China might prove difficult to justify to a wider audience. In times of budget restraints, <u><mark>the best way to justify </mark>developing <strong><mark>increasing</mark>ly</strong> advanced and <strong>costly</strong> <mark>capabilities might be through <strong>securitization of China</mark>’s naval rise. This is what the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>is</u></strong> currently <u><strong>doing. </strong><mark>There is <strong>clear suspicion </strong>from the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <strong>in Chinese intentions largely <mark>due to</mark> its <mark>lacking transparency</strong></mark> and the ambiguous nature of government communications. </p></u> | null | null | null | 457,873 | 69 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,603 | Contention Three is Solvency. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Contention Three is Solvency.</h4> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Solvency | 1,560,876 | 1 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,604 | Only continued scale up of clean technology can solve | Nagel, 2015 | Nagel, 2015 | Stanford energy experts released a study that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment and concludes that renewables can make a major and increasingly cost-effective contribution to climate change mitigation The report analyzes the experiences of Germany, California and Texas, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes said Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center findings suggest that renewable energy has entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role in mitigating global climate change Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors a higher share of renewables does not automatically translate to higher electricity bills for ratepayers An increase in the share of intermittent solar and wind power need not jeopardize the stability of the electric grid From 2006 to 2013, Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, while managing to reduce average annual outage times for electricity customers in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes to just 15 minutes California tripled the amount of electricity produced from solar and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent and reduced its outage times from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minute . The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority | energy experts released a study and concludes renewables can make a major contribution to climate mitigation. The report analyzes Germany, California and Texas findings suggest renewable energy entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role a higher share does not translate to higher electricity bills increase need not jeopardize the grid Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated while managing to reduce outage times for electricity customers to 15 minutes California tripled electricity produced from solar and reduced its outage times | Terry, Stanford News, “Stanford study finds promise in expanding renewables based on results in three major economies” 12/1 http://news.stanford.edu/2015/12/01/renewable-energy-economies-120115/
Stanford energy experts have released a study that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment and concludes that renewables can make a major and increasingly cost-effective contribution to climate change mitigation. The report from Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance analyzes the experiences of Germany, California and Texas, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively. It found, among other things, that Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas and only slightly higher than in California. The report was released in time for the United Nations Climate Change Conference that started this week, where international leaders are gathering to discuss strategies to deal with global warming, including massive scale-ups of renewable energy. “As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations in Paris, our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes in the global renewables debate,” said Dan Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center, which is a joint center between Stanford Law School and Stanford Graduate School of Business. Reicher also is interim president and chief executive officer of the American Council on Renewable Energy. “Our findings suggest that renewable energy has entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role in mitigating global climate change,” said Felix Mormann, associate professor of law at the University of Miami, faculty fellow at the Steyer-Taylor Center and lead author of the report. Other conclusions of the report, “A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Solar and Wind Deployment Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany,” include: Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors such as financing, permitting, installation and grid access. This approach has allowed the renewable energy policies of some countries to deliver up to four times the average deployment of other countries, despite offering only half the financial incentives. Contrary to widespread concern, a higher share of renewables does not automatically translate to higher electricity bills for ratepayers. While Germany’s residential electric rates are two to three times those of California and Texas, this price differential is only partly due to Germany’s subsidies for renewables. The average German household’s electricity bill is, in fact, lower than in Texas and only slightly higher than in California, partly as a result of energy-efficiency efforts in German homes. An increase in the share of intermittent solar and wind power need not jeopardize the stability of the electric grid. From 2006 to 2013, Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, while managing to reduce average annual outage times for electricity customers in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes to just 15 minutes. During that same period, California tripled the amount of electricity produced from solar and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent and reduced its outage times from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minutes. However, Texas increased its outage times from 92 minutes to 128 minutes after ramping up its wind-generated electricity sixfold to a market share of 10 percent. The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority of the Obama administration and the subject of debate among presidential candidates. | 4,032 | <h4><u><strong>Only continued scale up of clean technology can solve</h4><p>Nagel, 2015</p><p></u></strong>Terry, Stanford News, “Stanford study finds promise in expanding renewables based on results in three major economies” 12/1 http://news.stanford.edu/2015/12/01/renewable-energy-economies-120115/</p><p><u><strong>Stanford <mark>energy experts</mark> </u></strong>have <u><strong><mark>released a study</mark> that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and concludes</mark> that <mark>renewables can</mark> <mark>make a major</mark> and increasingly cost-effective <mark>contribution to climate</mark> change <mark>mitigation</u></strong>. <u><strong>The</mark> <mark>report</u></strong></mark> from Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance <u><strong><mark>analyzes</mark> the experiences of <mark>Germany, California and</mark> <mark>Texas</mark>, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively</u></strong>. It found, among other things, that <u><strong>Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas</u></strong> and only slightly higher than in California. The report was released in time for the United Nations Climate Change Conference that started this week, where international leaders are gathering to discuss strategies to deal with global warming, including massive scale-ups of renewable energy. “<u><strong>As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations</u></strong> in Paris, <u><strong>our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes</u></strong> in the global renewables debate,” <u><strong>said</u></strong> Dan <u><strong>Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center</u></strong>, which is a joint center between Stanford Law School and Stanford Graduate School of Business. Reicher also is interim president and chief executive officer of the American Council on Renewable Energy. “Our <u><strong><mark>findings suggest</mark> that <mark>renewable energy</mark> has <mark>entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role</mark> in mitigating global climate change</u></strong>,” said Felix Mormann, associate professor of law at the University of Miami, faculty fellow at the Steyer-Taylor Center and lead author of the report. Other conclusions of the report, “A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Solar and Wind Deployment Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany,” include: <u><strong>Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors</u></strong> such as financing, permitting, installation and grid access. This approach has allowed the renewable energy policies of some countries to deliver up to four times the average deployment of other countries, despite offering only half the financial incentives. Contrary to widespread concern, <u><strong><mark>a higher share</mark> of renewables <mark>does not</mark> automatically <mark>translate to higher electricity bills</mark> for ratepayers</u></strong>. While Germany’s residential electric rates are two to three times those of California and Texas, this price differential is only partly due to Germany’s subsidies for renewables. The average German household’s electricity bill is, in fact, lower than in Texas and only slightly higher than in California, partly as a result of energy-efficiency efforts in German homes. <u><strong>An <mark>increase</mark> in the share of intermittent solar and wind power <mark>need not jeopardize</mark> the stability of <mark>the</mark> electric <mark>grid</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>From 2006 to 2013, <mark>Germany</mark> <mark>tripled the amount of electricity generated</mark> from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, <mark>while managing to reduce</mark> average annual <mark>outage times for electricity customers</mark> in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes <mark>to</mark> just <mark>15 minutes</u></strong></mark>. During that same period, <u><strong><mark>California tripled</mark> the amount of <mark>electricity produced from solar</mark> and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent <mark>and</mark> <mark>reduced its outage times</mark> from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minute</u></strong>s<u><strong>.</u></strong> However, Texas increased its outage times from 92 minutes to 128 minutes after ramping up its wind-generated electricity sixfold to a market share of 10 percent. <u><strong>The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority</u></strong> of the Obama administration and the subject of debate among presidential candidates.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,482,272 | 13 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,605 | US leadership on human rights key to democracy worldwide | Griffey 11 , 2011 Congress Blog URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad) | Griffey 11 (Brian, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA. [“U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” The Hill March 18th, 2011 Congress Blog URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad) | United States has a chance to revisit and reaffirm President Carter’s declaration: “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood U.S. participation in international human rights treaties and mechanisms has been fraught with debate over the merits of involvement and perceived threats to U.S. policymaking prerogative U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance not only international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined US political and economic interests at home and abroad joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights shortcomings the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting principles we identify with our democracy Other human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N. conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The U.S. is the only nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory. : Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld, especially in times of crisis. Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society. | U.S. participation in human rights mechanisms has been fraught with debate U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance US political and economic interests at home and abroad participation allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad that demonstrate adherence to the principles we identify with democracy Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld Greater U.S. participation would ensure an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy | In the midst of what many are calling the Arab world’s 1989, the United States has a chance to revisit that effort, and reaffirm President Carter’s declaration: “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.” Since helping to establish the United Nations, U.S. participation in international human rights treaties and mechanisms has been fraught with debate over the merits of involvement and perceived threats to U.S. policymaking prerogative, topics still contentious on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance not only international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined US political and economic interests at home and abroad. The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade. As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights violations in Libya, joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights shortcomings. By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting principles we identify with our democracy. While the U.S. is party to more than 12,000 treaties, it has dodged most human rights treaties drafted since World War II through the U.N., and has ratified only a dozen. Upon transmission of four core human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, President Carter observed: “Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.” The Senate ratified two of those treaties 15 years later. The others continue to languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, still awaiting ratification after 32 years. It likewise took the Senate almost 40 years to approve a treaty punishing genocide, after signing it in 1948 following the Holocaust. Other human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N. conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The U.S. is the only nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory. As we watch the contours and nature of power being reshaped in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. must have a singular message on human rights – both at home and abroad: Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld, especially in times of crisis. Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society. | 3,936 | <h4>US leadership on human rights key to democracy worldwide</h4><p><strong>Griffey 11</strong> (Brian, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA. [“U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” The Hill March 18th<u><strong>, 2011 Congress Blog URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad)</p><p></u></strong>In the midst of what many are calling the Arab world’s 1989, the <u>United States has a chance to revisit</u> that effort, <u>and reaffirm President Carter’s declaration: “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood</u>.” Since helping to establish the United Nations, <u><mark>U.S. participation in</mark> international <mark>human rights</mark> treaties and <mark>mechanisms has been fraught with debate</mark> over the merits of involvement and perceived threats to U.S. policymaking prerogative</u>, topics still contentious on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, <u><mark>U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance</mark> not only international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined <mark>US political and economic interests at home and abroad</u></mark>. The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade. As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights violations in Libya, <u>joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that <mark>participation</mark> in the Council’s peer-review system <mark>allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights</mark> shortcomings</u>. By leading international discourse on human rights, <u><mark>the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad</mark>, and to take on new treaty commitments <mark>that demonstrate adherence</mark> of our own system <mark>to the</mark> vaulting <mark>principles we identify with</mark> our <mark>democracy</u></mark>. While the U.S. is party to more than 12,000 treaties, it has dodged most human rights treaties drafted since World War II through the U.N., and has ratified only a dozen. Upon transmission of four core human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, President Carter observed: “Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.” The Senate ratified two of those treaties 15 years later. The others continue to languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, still awaiting ratification after 32 years. It likewise took the Senate almost 40 years to approve a treaty punishing genocide, after signing it in 1948 following the Holocaust. <u>Other human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N. conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The U.S. is the only nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory.</u> As we watch the contours and nature of power being reshaped in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. must have a singular message on human rights – both at home and abroad<u>: <mark>Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld</mark>, especially in times of crisis. <mark>Greater U.S. participation</mark> in U.N. human rights treaties <mark>would ensure</mark> that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also <mark>an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy</mark> abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society.</p></u> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 77,690 | 27 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
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3,783,606 | And, hegemony de-escalates global conflict and ensures transnational cooperation | Brooks, et al, 13 | Brooks, et al, 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security ¶ Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse] | deep engagement's
AND
disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences. | null | ¶ Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are
AND
disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences. | 159 | <h4>And, hegemony de-escalates global conflict and ensures transnational cooperation </h4><p><strong>Brooks, et al, 13</strong> [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security ¶ Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]</p><p>¶ Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if <u>deep engagement's</u> costs are </p><p><u>AND</p><p>disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.</p></u> | 1NC | Politics DA | null | 1,560,877 | 4 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
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2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,607 | Miscalculation escalates to nuclear war – current military strategy makes our impact the most probable with the fastest timeframe of escalation | Etzioni 14 | Etzioni 14 | , Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘concept’: A critique,” International Politics (2014) 51, 577-596, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n5/full/ip201427a.html)
ASB gained the endorsement of the then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and was officially approved by Panetta in 2011 a senior Obama administration official told reporters, ‘Air Sea Battle is to China what the [US Navy’s mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union. It is a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says We will initiate’ The operation begins with a ‘blinding campaign’ by the U S that takes out China’s surveillance and targeting systems in order to allow the U S to operate within the first island chain (which stretches from Japan to Taiwan and through the Philippines) (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 56). Next, the military would carry out a missile suppression campaign against air-defense networks, targeting land-based and mobile missile launchers. These early operations would require penetrating strikes against the Chinese mainland where essential surveillance systems and long-range missile launchers are located. the Pentagon has ‘walked back’ ASB, stressing that it was not conceived with China or any other particular adversary in mind and is merely the work of a small office charged with enhancing inter-service coordination. However, they proceed to describe ASB in terms strikingly similar to those used by the CSBA. there are only two nations with developed A2/AD systems, and China is the strongest challenger. Iran comes in a remote second place, but, as the CBSA readily acknowledged, it ‘cannot hope to match China when it comes to developing an advanced A2/AD network’ Hence, it seems fairly obvious that any US program whose central goal, indeed raison d’être, is to counter these weapon systems, has China in its sights (with Iran in the periphery). Thus, despite the Pentagon’s repeated denials, it should come as no surprise that a Navy official flatly stated that ‘ASB is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition’ (Jaffe, 2012). Steinberg and O’Hanlon say that the Pentagon’s denials that concerns about China factor in to its strategy ‘lack credibility and feed distrust’ Pentagon officials insist ASB is not a plan but merely a concept ASB is inherently escalatory Even chief proponents of ASB at the CSBA recognize that ‘[t]he scope and intensity of US stand-off and penetrating strikes against targets in mainland China clearly has escalation implications’ ‘[s]urely, given the nuclear weapons China possesses and its growing irregular warfare and economic assets, we should question very seriously any operational concept that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland’. ‘conventional deep strikes against Chinese C4ISR assets [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] in a conflict could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. Under intense pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict, including, in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold’ the early and deep inland strikes on enemy territory envisioned by the concept could be mistakenly perceived by the Chinese as preemptive attempts to take out its nuclear weapons, thus cornering them into ‘a terrible use-it-or-lose-it dilemma’. China is likely to respond to what is effectively a major direct attack on its mainland with all the military means at its disposal – including its stockpile of nuclear arms. Even if ASB does not lead to full-blown or nuclear war, it is likely to spur a costly arms race. ‘[w]e can be sure that China will place a very high priority indeed on maintaining its capacity to strike the United States, and that it will succeed in this’ (p. 78). A Chinese military official explained to an American audience in that, ‘[i]f the US military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle’ (Jaffe, 2012). ASB is likely to lead two major powers, each best served by focusing on problems at home, to get caught up in preparations for war that may well end up in an all-out military conflagration. | ASB was officially approved in 2011 It is a forward-deployed strategy that says We will initiate’ The operation begins with a ‘ campaign’ that takes out China’s surveillance and targeting Next a missile suppression campaign targeting missile launchers. These operations would require penetrating strikes against the mainland there are only two nations with A2/AD and China is the strongest Hence, it seems obvious that any program whose raison d’être, is to counter these systems, has China in its sights the Pentagon’s denials about China ‘lack credibility and feed distrust’ ASB is inherently escalatory strikes against C4ISR could easily be misconstrued as an attempt at preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. it would be hard to limit escalation beyond the nuclear threshold’ early and deep strikes corner them into ‘a terrible use or-lose dilemma’. China is likely to respond with nuclear arms Even if ASB does not lead to full nuclear war, it is likely to spur arms race A Chinese military official explained to America that ‘[i]f the US develops A S B the PLA will be forced to develop anti-A S B ASB is likely to lead two major powers to get caught up in preparations for war that may end up in an all-out military conflagration. | (Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘concept’: A critique,” International Politics (2014) 51, 577-596, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n5/full/ip201427a.html)
Origins of ASB The thesis that the United States needs an innovative strategy and new weapons capabilities to counter China first took root during the ‘revolution in military affairs’ of the early 1990s (ibid., p. 10).1 Following the first Gulf War, the Office of Net Assessment (an internal Pentagon ‘think tank’) was charged with identifying future threats and ways the military should prepare for them. The ONA produced three assessments between 1992 and 1996 that concluded that the rise of A2/AD developments would pose a significant threat to the US’ forward deployed troops and assets and would radically alter the military landscape in the decades to come (Krepinevich, 2010, pp. 8–9). The first of these reports was authored by Andrew Krepinevich Jr, who subsequently left the ONA to serve as president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (an independent think tank but one that, according to the Washington Post, receives about 40 per cent of its budget from the ONA) (Jaffe, 2012). In 2007, Krepinevich (2012a) testified before Congress that the PLA posed a ‘pacing threat’ to the United States and that the military needed to develop the type of programming and strategy coherence that characterized AirLand Battle – the Cold War concept used to deter the Soviet Union in Europe – in order to maintain security in the Western Pacific in the face of increasingly aggressive China. In the years that followed, ASB was ‘forged in a collaborative effort of Pacific Air Forces, the CSBA and the Pentagon’s influential Office of Net Assessment’ (Halloran, 2010). The architects sent their findings and recommendations, the result of numerous war games, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who signed a classified memorandum of agreement in 2009 to initiate the official inter-service effort to develop the ASB ‘concept’ (Halloran, 2010). ASB gained the endorsement of the then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and was officially approved by his successor former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2011 (Dupree and Thomas, 2012). At the time, Krepinevich wrote that ‘the Pentagon has been working for more than a year to develop a new military concept – ASB – whose principal purpose is to preserve regional stability. It focuses on removing the temptation for Beijing to pursue its security objectives through aggression or coercion by maintaining a credible United States and allied capability to successfully resist such actions’ (Krepinevich, 2011). At a background briefing on the concept in November 2011, a senior Obama administration official told reporters, ‘Air Sea Battle is to China what the [US Navy’s mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union. It is a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be punished. We will initiate’ (Gertz, 2011). A hypothetical ASB war Much of ASB remains highly classified and the Pentagon’s public statements on it have been ‘intentionally vague’ (Hammes, 2012a, p. 2). However, Krepinevich and the CSBA filled in a fair number of the blanks in ‘Air Sea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept’, a report that provides a detailed account of how an ASB-style war with China would unfold and specific steps the United States should take to prepare for it. The operation begins with a ‘blinding campaign’ by the United States that takes out China’s surveillance and targeting systems in order to allow the United States to operate within the first island chain (which stretches from Japan to Taiwan and through the Philippines) (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 56). This campaign would ‘include cyber attacks, PLA space assets would be targeted, electronic warfare aircraft would spoof PLA radars and sensors and seaborne pickets would be targeted’ (DefenseTech, 2010). Next, the military would carry out a missile suppression campaign against air-defense networks, targeting land-based and mobile missile launchers. These early operations would require penetrating strikes against the Chinese mainland where essential surveillance systems and long-range missile launchers are located. After ‘the reduction and eventual elimination of the PLA submarine threat’, follow-up operations may include ‘neutraliz[ing] PLA bases outside the Western Pacific’ and implementing a ‘distant blockade’ to strangle China’s economy (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 73). ‘Walking back’ Many found descriptions of ASB, like that summarized above, as highly provocative and worried that the concept may mobilize China to accelerate its military buildup (Global Security Newswire, 2012). As a result, to use the term included in an article by Hammes (2012b) of the National Defense University, the Pentagon has ‘walked back’ ASB, stressing that it was not conceived with China or any other particular adversary in mind and is merely the work of a small office charged with enhancing inter-service coordination. In May 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert and General Mark Welsh, two of the military leaders behind ASB, wrote an article in Foreign Policy, repeating the official refrain that ASB ‘is not focused on one specific adversary’ and ‘isn’t a plan’. However, they proceed to describe ASB in terms strikingly similar to those used by the CSBA. ‘Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches’ (Greenert and Welsh, 2013). The publication of this article coincided with the ASB Office’s release of an unclassified summary of the ASB, the most detailed official description of the concept to date. ‘ASB: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges’ describes how technological advances and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities undermine ‘the United States and allied expeditionary warfare model of power projection and maneuver’.2 ASB will, according to the document, allow the United States to regain the military advantage in anti-access environments by disrupting an aggressor’s command and control systems, neutralizing A2/AD missile launch platforms, and defeating deployed weapons and formations. Again, no specific adversary is mentioned. However, there are only two nations with developed A2/AD systems, and China is the strongest challenger. Iran comes in a remote second place, but, as the CBSA readily acknowledged, it ‘cannot hope to match China when it comes to developing an advanced A2/AD network’ (Krepinevich, 2010, p. 27). During a 2011 visit to Beijing, the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters, ‘[t]hey [China] clearly have potential to put some of our capabilities at risk. We have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with our own programs’ (Bumiller, 2011). Hence, it seems fairly obvious that any US program whose central goal, indeed raison d’être, is to counter these weapon systems, has China in its sights (with Iran in the periphery). Pentagon officials repeat that it is not a ‘strategy for a specific region or adversary’, and when reporters inevitably ask about ASB’s connection to China, they respond that ‘the inclination to narrow down on a particular scenario is unhelpful’ (Lagrone, 2012). Note: Not false or misleading but – unhelpful to the military’s desired message. Thus, despite the Pentagon’s repeated denials, it should come as no surprise that a Navy official flatly stated that ‘ASB is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition’ (Jaffe, 2012). James Steinberg, a leading scholar of international relations who served as the Under Secretary of State during the first years of the Obama Administration, and O’Hanlon, a highly regard military analyst, say that the Pentagon’s denials that concerns about China factor in to its strategy ‘lack credibility and feed distrust’ (O’Hanlon and Steinberg, 2012). Just a concept? Pentagon officials also insist ASB is not a plan but merely a concept, the work of a small office with only 17 personnel, none of higher rank that colonel or Navy captain, who are ‘deluged by the near-term nitty gritty of getting existing organizations and weapons programs to work together in a future war’, leaving them ‘little time to think through the often scary strategic implications of how the next war will be waged’ (Freedberg, 2013). However, changes in acquisitions and force restructuring suggest that ASB involves more than a concept or the kind of contingency file the military has for many unlikely conflicts. These developments are difficult to assess in part because the details are classified, and in part because many of changes could also serve goals besides those of ASB. What follows should hence be taken with these important qualifications in mind. Acquisitions: The non-partisan and highly regarded Congressional Research Service notes that ‘the Air-Sea Battle concept has prompted Navy officials to make significant shifts in the service’s FY2014–FY2018 budget plan’ toward exactly the sorts of electronic, cyber and anti-submarine weapons systems that the war plan for China calls for (O’Rourke, 2013, p. 55). In his remarks on ASB at the Brookings Institution in May 2012, Adm. Greenert (2012a) stated that the ASB Office has more ‘than 200 initiatives’ in progress and that the 2011 and 2012 Presidential Budgets contain related investments in ‘anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing’ and that the 2013 budget ‘sustains these investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments’ in line with the dictates of ASB. It seems, according to these sources, that this ‘concept’ has very tangible consequences. Force restructuring: When ASB was first endorsed it was seen by some in the Pentagon as a power grab by the Air Force and Navy, an excuse to take lines of the budget and missions from the Army, which played the lead in the over decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wheeler, 2013). According to one report, the Army and Marine Corps ‘mounted offensives against the concept, which could lead to less spending on ground combat’ (Barnett, 2012). ASB was subsequently revised to give a role to the Army and Marines (Wong, 2012). Nevertheless, ASB does entail some reallocation of budget and force concentration from the Army to the Air Force and Navy (Greenert, 2012b). Criticism of ASB There are two major criticisms raised against ASB. Some see it as an aggressive and risky military strategy and suggest that the same goals can be obtained with other much less costly and escalatory military means. This line of criticism is briefly reviewed next. The article then explores the second line – which argues that ASB is not consistent with overall US foreign policy. Mainland strikes and nuclear escalation Several military analysts warn that ASB is inherently escalatory. Even chief proponents of ASB at the CSBA recognize that ‘[t]he scope and intensity of US stand-off and penetrating strikes against targets in mainland China clearly has escalation implications’ (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 66). Williams (2011), a retired Marine Corps officer, writes that ‘[s]urely, given the nuclear weapons China possesses and its growing irregular warfare and economic assets, we should question very seriously any operational concept that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland’. Defense analyst Heinrichs (2011) warns that ‘conventional deep strikes against Chinese C4ISR assets [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] in a conflict could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. Under intense pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict, including, in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold’. Rovner (2012) of the US Naval War College agrees that the early and deep inland strikes on enemy territory envisioned by the concept could be mistakenly perceived by the Chinese as preemptive attempts to take out its nuclear weapons, thus cornering them into ‘a terrible use-it-or-lose-it dilemma’. China is likely to respond to what is effectively a major direct attack on its mainland with all the military means at its disposal – including its stockpile of nuclear arms. While the concept as originally written did not address nuclear weapons, its architects have since, in one officer’s words, ‘realized, “hey, we do need to deal with nuclear operations” ’ – precisely because ‘the more effective such conventional [ASB] operations become, the more likely a hard-pressed adversary is to resort to nuclear weapons in response’ (Freedberg, 2013). Arms race Even if ASB does not lead to full-blown or nuclear war, it is likely to spur a costly arms race. Leading Australian military strategist White (2012) warns threatened with ASB, ‘[w]e can be sure that China will place a very high priority indeed on maintaining its capacity to strike the United States, and that it will succeed in this’ (p. 78). A Chinese military official explained to an American audience in that, ‘[i]f the US military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle’ (Jaffe, 2012). ASB is likely to lead two major powers, each best served by focusing on problems at home, to get caught up in preparations for war that may well end up in an all-out military conflagration. | 13,951 | <h4>Miscalculation escalates to <u>nuclear war</u> – current military strategy makes our impact the <u>most probable</u> with the <u>fastest timeframe of escalation</u><strong> </h4><p>Etzioni 14</p><p></strong>(Amitai<u><strong>, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘concept’: A critique,” International Politics (2014) 51, 577-596, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n5/full/ip201427a.html)</p><p></u></strong>Origins of ASB The thesis that the United States needs an innovative strategy and new weapons capabilities to counter China first took root during the ‘revolution in military affairs’ of the early 1990s (ibid., p. 10).1 Following the first Gulf War, the Office of Net Assessment (an internal Pentagon ‘think tank’) was charged with identifying future threats and ways the military should prepare for them. The ONA produced three assessments between 1992 and 1996 that concluded that the rise of A2/AD developments would pose a significant threat to the US’ forward deployed troops and assets and would radically alter the military landscape in the decades to come (Krepinevich, 2010, pp. 8–9). The first of these reports was authored by Andrew Krepinevich Jr, who subsequently left the ONA to serve as president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (an independent think tank but one that, according to the Washington Post, receives about 40 per cent of its budget from the ONA) (Jaffe, 2012). In 2007, Krepinevich (2012a) testified before Congress that the PLA posed a ‘pacing threat’ to the United States and that the military needed to develop the type of programming and strategy coherence that characterized AirLand Battle – the Cold War concept used to deter the Soviet Union in Europe – in order to maintain security in the Western Pacific in the face of increasingly aggressive China. In the years that followed, ASB was ‘forged in a collaborative effort of Pacific Air Forces, the CSBA and the Pentagon’s influential Office of Net Assessment’ (Halloran, 2010). The architects sent their findings and recommendations, the result of numerous war games, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who signed a classified memorandum of agreement in 2009 to initiate the official inter-service effort to develop the ASB ‘concept’ (Halloran, 2010). <u><mark>ASB</mark> gained the endorsement of the then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2010 <strong>Q</strong>uadrennial <strong>D</strong>efense <strong>R</strong>eview and <mark>was <strong>officially approved</strong></mark> by</u> his successor former Secretary of Defense Leon<u> Panetta <mark>in 2011</u></mark> (Dupree and Thomas, 2012). At the time, Krepinevich wrote that ‘the Pentagon has been working for more than a year to develop a new military concept – ASB – whose principal purpose is to preserve regional stability. It focuses on removing the temptation for Beijing to pursue its security objectives through aggression or coercion by maintaining a credible United States and allied capability to successfully resist such actions’ (Krepinevich, 2011). At a background briefing on the concept in November 2011, <u>a senior Obama administration official told reporters,</u> <u>‘Air Sea Battle is to China what the [US Navy’s mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union. <mark>It is a</mark> very <strong><mark>forward-deployed</mark>, assertive <mark>strategy that says</u></strong></mark> we will not sit back and be punished. <u><strong><mark>We will initiate’</u></strong></mark> (Gertz, 2011). A hypothetical ASB war Much of ASB remains highly classified and the Pentagon’s public statements on it have been ‘intentionally vague’ (Hammes, 2012a, p. 2). However,<u> </u>Krepinevich and the CSBA filled in a fair number of the blanks in ‘Air Sea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept’, a report that provides a detailed account of how an ASB-style war with China would unfold and specific steps the United States should take to prepare for it. <u><mark>The operation begins with a <strong>‘</mark>blinding <mark>campaign’</strong></mark> by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>that takes out China’s surveillance and targeting</mark> systems in order to allow the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>to operate within the first island chain (which stretches from Japan to Taiwan and through the Philippines) (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 56).</u> This campaign would ‘include cyber attacks, PLA space assets would be targeted, electronic warfare aircraft would spoof PLA radars and sensors and seaborne pickets would be targeted’ (DefenseTech, 2010). <u><mark>Next</mark>, the military would carry out <mark>a <strong>missile suppression campaign</strong></mark> against air-defense networks, <mark>targeting</mark> land-based and mobile <mark>missile launchers.</u> <u>These</mark> early <mark>operations would require <strong>penetrating strikes</strong> against the</mark> Chinese <strong><mark>mainland</strong></mark> where essential surveillance systems and long-range missile launchers are located.</u> After ‘the reduction and eventual elimination of the PLA submarine threat’, follow-up operations may include ‘neutraliz[ing] PLA bases outside the Western Pacific’ and implementing a ‘distant blockade’ to strangle China’s economy (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 73). ‘Walking back’ Many found descriptions of ASB, like that summarized above, as highly provocative and worried that the concept may mobilize China to accelerate its military buildup (Global Security Newswire, 2012). As a result, to use the term included in an article by Hammes (2012b) of the National Defense University, <u>the Pentagon has ‘walked back’ ASB, stressing that it was not conceived with China or any other particular adversary in mind and is merely the work of a small office charged with enhancing inter-service coordination.</u> In May 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert and General Mark Welsh, two of the military leaders behind ASB, wrote an article in Foreign Policy, repeating the official refrain that ASB ‘is not focused on one specific adversary’ and ‘isn’t a plan’. <u><strong>However, they proceed to describe ASB in terms strikingly similar to those used by the CSBA. </u></strong>‘Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches’ (Greenert and Welsh, 2013). The publication of this article coincided with the ASB Office’s release of an unclassified summary of the ASB, the most detailed official description of the concept to date. ‘ASB: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges’ describes how technological advances and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities undermine ‘the United States and allied expeditionary warfare model of power projection and maneuver’.2 ASB will, according to the document, allow the United States to regain the military advantage in anti-access environments by disrupting an aggressor’s command and control systems, neutralizing A2/AD missile launch platforms, and defeating deployed weapons and formations. Again, no specific adversary is mentioned. However, <u><mark>there are only two nations with</mark> developed <mark>A2/AD</mark> systems, <mark>and China is the strongest</mark> challenger. Iran comes in a remote second place, but, as the CBSA readily acknowledged, it ‘cannot hope to match China when it comes to developing an advanced A2/AD network’</u> (Krepinevich, 2010, p. 27). During a 2011 visit to Beijing, the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters, ‘[t]hey [China] clearly have potential to put some of our capabilities at risk. We have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with our own programs’ (Bumiller, 2011). <u><mark>Hence, it seems</mark> fairly <strong><mark>obvious</strong> that any</mark> US <mark>program whose</mark> central goal, indeed <strong><mark>raison d’être</strong>, is to counter these</mark> weapon <mark>systems, has China in its sights</mark> (with Iran in the periphery). </u>Pentagon officials repeat that it is not a ‘strategy for a specific region or adversary’, and when reporters inevitably ask about ASB’s connection to China, they respond that ‘the inclination to narrow down on a particular scenario is unhelpful’ (Lagrone, 2012). Note: Not false or misleading but – unhelpful to the military’s desired message. <u>Thus, despite the Pentagon’s repeated denials, it should come as no surprise that a Navy official flatly stated that ‘ASB is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition’ (Jaffe, 2012). </u>James <u>Steinberg</u>, a leading scholar of international relations who served as the Under Secretary of State during the first years of the Obama Administration, <u>and O’Hanlon</u>, a highly regard military analyst, <u>say that <mark>the Pentagon’s denials</mark> that concerns <mark>about China</mark> factor in to its strategy <strong><mark>‘lack credibility and feed distrust’</u></strong></mark> (O’Hanlon and Steinberg, 2012). Just a concept? <u>Pentagon officials</u> also <u>insist ASB is not a plan but merely a concept</u>, the work of a small office with only 17 personnel, none of higher rank that colonel or Navy captain, who are ‘deluged by the near-term nitty gritty of getting existing organizations and weapons programs to work together in a future war’, leaving them ‘little time to think through the often scary strategic implications of how the next war will be waged’ (Freedberg, 2013). However, changes in acquisitions and force restructuring suggest that ASB involves more than a concept or the kind of contingency file the military has for many unlikely conflicts. These developments are difficult to assess in part because the details are classified, and in part because many of changes could also serve goals besides those of ASB. What follows should hence be taken with these important qualifications in mind. Acquisitions: The non-partisan and highly regarded Congressional Research Service notes that ‘the Air-Sea Battle concept has prompted Navy officials to make significant shifts in the service’s FY2014–FY2018 budget plan’ toward exactly the sorts of electronic, cyber and anti-submarine weapons systems that the war plan for China calls for (O’Rourke, 2013, p. 55). In his remarks on ASB at the Brookings Institution in May 2012, Adm. Greenert (2012a) stated that the ASB Office has more ‘than 200 initiatives’ in progress and that the 2011 and 2012 Presidential Budgets contain related investments in ‘anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing’ and that the 2013 budget ‘sustains these investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments’ in line with the dictates of ASB. It seems, according to these sources, that this ‘concept’ has very tangible consequences. Force restructuring: When ASB was first endorsed it was seen by some in the Pentagon as a power grab by the Air Force and Navy, an excuse to take lines of the budget and missions from the Army, which played the lead in the over decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wheeler, 2013). According to one report, the Army and Marine Corps ‘mounted offensives against the concept, which could lead to less spending on ground combat’ (Barnett, 2012). ASB was subsequently revised to give a role to the Army and Marines (Wong, 2012). Nevertheless, ASB does entail some reallocation of budget and force concentration from the Army to the Air Force and Navy (Greenert, 2012b). Criticism of ASB There are two major criticisms raised against ASB. Some see it as an aggressive and risky military strategy and suggest that the same goals can be obtained with other much less costly and escalatory military means. This line of criticism is briefly reviewed next. The article then explores the second line – which argues that ASB is not consistent with overall US foreign policy. Mainland strikes and nuclear escalation Several military analysts warn that <u><strong><mark>ASB is inherently escalatory</u></strong></mark>. <u>Even chief proponents of ASB at the CSBA recognize that ‘[t]he scope and intensity of US stand-off and penetrating strikes against targets in mainland China clearly has escalation implications’ </u>(Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 66). Williams (2011), a retired Marine Corps officer, writes that <u>‘[s]urely, given the <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> China possesses and its growing irregular warfare and economic assets, we should <strong>question very seriously</strong> any operational concept that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland’. </u>Defense analyst Heinrichs (2011) warns that <u>‘conventional deep <mark>strikes against</mark> Chinese <mark>C4ISR</mark> assets [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] in a conflict <mark>could <strong>easily be misconstrued</strong></mark> in Beijing <mark>as an attempt at <strong>preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options.</strong></mark> Under intense pressure, <mark>it would be <strong>hard to limit</mark> </strong>a dramatic <strong><mark>escalation</strong></mark> of such a conflict, including, in the worst case, up to and <strong><mark>beyond the nuclear threshold’</u></strong></mark>. Rovner (2012) of the US Naval War College agrees that <u>the <strong><mark>early and deep</strong></mark> inland <strong><mark>strikes</strong></mark> on enemy territory envisioned by the concept could be mistakenly perceived by the Chinese as preemptive attempts to take out its nuclear weapons, thus <mark>corner</mark>ing <mark>them into ‘a terrible <strong>use</strong></mark>-it-<strong><mark>or</strong>-<strong>lose</strong></mark>-it <mark>dilemma’.<strong> </strong>China is likely to respond</mark> to what is effectively a major direct attack on its mainland <mark>with</mark> <strong>all the military means at its disposal</strong> – including its stockpile of <strong><mark>nuclear arms</strong></mark>. </u>While the concept as originally written did not address nuclear weapons, its architects have since, in one officer’s words, ‘realized, “hey, we do need to deal with nuclear operations” ’ – precisely because ‘the more effective such conventional [ASB] operations become, the more likely a hard-pressed adversary is to resort to nuclear weapons in response’ (Freedberg, 2013). Arms race <u><mark>Even if ASB does not lead to full</mark>-blown or <mark>nuclear war, it is likely to spur</mark> a <strong>costly <mark>arms race</mark>.</u></strong> Leading Australian military strategist White (2012) warns threatened with ASB,<u> ‘[w]e can be sure that China will place a very high priority indeed on maintaining its capacity to strike the United States, and that it will succeed in this’ (p. 78). <mark>A Chinese military official explained to</mark> an <mark>America</mark>n audience in <mark>that</mark>, <mark>‘[i]f the US</mark> military <mark>develops A</mark>ir-<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], <mark>the PLA will be forced to develop anti-<strong>A</strong></mark>ir-<strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ea <strong><mark>B</strong></mark>attle’ (Jaffe, 2012). <mark>ASB is likely to lead two major powers</mark>, each best served by focusing on problems at home, <mark>to get caught up in preparations for war that may</mark> well <mark>end up in an <strong>all-out military conflagration.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | null | null | 421,136 | 41 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,608 | Specifically the plan creates business certainty over IP protections that lead to commercialization of climate solutions | Gianopoulos 2016 | Gianopoulos, Director at U.S. Government Accountability Office International Affairs and Trade, 2016 | Although participants reported no significant issues with DOE’s approach to managing IP risks, U.S. companies participating in CERC have been reluctant to share background IP as a part of CERC participants shared IP with Chinese organizations for 3 of the more than 80 projects that took place companies generally considered it a risk to share IP with any other companies that are potential competitors. Representatives mentioned companies had additional concerns about IP protection related to working in China for reasons such as a perception that the Chinese legal system will not reliably protect their IP rights CERC is planning to focus more on demonstration projects and other projects that are closer to commercialization. that IP risk is greater once technology is closer to commercialization because companies have invested more in the technology. This greater focus on projects closer to commercialization will continue, and may increase, the importance of sharing background IP DOE officials said they would like to encourage more sharing of background IP we found that participants’ willingness to share IP for demonstration projects varies officials acknowledged that companies participating in CERC face a tradeoff between the risks of sharing background IP and the potential benefits, such as valuable research and development outcomes and gaining a market advantage These officials stated that it is appropriate for companies to assess risks for themselves and not share their most valuable IP if the related risk is determined to be too great. Willingness to share background IP is important for valuable research and development collaboration | companies participating have been reluctant to share IP companies considered it a risk companies had concerns such as a perception the legal system will not protect their IP rights that IP risk is greater once technology is closer to commercialization This greater focus on projects closer to commercialization will continue, and increase, the importance of sharing background IP we found participants’ willingness to share IP varies companies face a tradeoff between risks and benefits, such as research and development outcomes and gaining a market advantage it is appropriate for companies to not share most valuable IP if the risk is determined to be too great. Willingness to share is important for development collaboration | Kimberly, “U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION Bilateral Clean Energy Programs Show Some Results but Should Enhance Their Performance Monitoring” July, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678214.pdf
CERC participants we interviewed did not report any significant issues with steps DOE has taken to address IP risks. Representatives of 8 of the 12 participating organizations we spoke with about IP issues said the Technology Management Plan was helpful, while others said it had no effect on CERC projects or that they had not had an opportunity to test it. Notably, one participant found the Technology Management Plan helpful in resolving a joint venture negotiation issue. Specifically, the U.S. CERC participant wanted to license technology related to a CERC project to a Chinese company with a nonexclusive license so that it could also license the technology to other companies in China, while the Chinese company wanted an exclusive license to the technology. According to the participant, the Technology Management Plan was helpful in resolving the issue diplomatically and arriving at the desired agreement. Representatives of 9 of the 12 participating organizations said that there was nothing more that DOE could or should do to address IP risks. One participating software company suggested that CERC could further mitigate IP risks by providing software protection technology to participants. Another participating organization suggested that DOE could request that IP terms be summarized in project proposals, so there could be easy access to understanding how each project is managing IP risks. Although CERC participants reported no significant issues with DOE’s approach to managing IP risks, U.S. companies participating in CERC have been reluctant to share background IP as a part of CERC. U.S. CERC participants shared background IP with Chinese organizations for 3 of the more than 80 projects that took place during the first 5-year phase of CERC, according to a DOE survey of CERC tracks about IP completed in December 2015.35 The seven companies we spoke with regarding IP issues said that they have their own IP protection strategies in place, and several said they generally considered it a risk to share IP with any other companies that are potential competitors. Representatives of three of the companies mentioned that their companies had additional concerns about IP protection related to working in China for reasons such as a perception that the Chinese legal system will not reliably protect their IP rights. For its second 5-year phase, at the direction of higher-level management in DOE and DOE’s counterpart ministry in China, CERC will make an effort to bring more results to market, according to CERC officials. To that end, CERC is planning to focus more on demonstration projects and other projects that are closer to commercialization. A member of the CERC IP experts group said that IP risk is greater once technology is closer to commercialization because companies have invested more in the technology. This greater focus on projects closer to commercialization will continue, and may increase, the importance of sharing background IP during CERC’s second 5-year phase. DOE officials said they would like to encourage more sharing of background IP during CERC’s second 5-year phase and that through demonstration projects there is more likely to be sharing of background IP; however, according to two CERC participants we spoke with, sharing background IP may not be necessary for some demonstration projects. In addition, we found that participants’ willingness to share IP for demonstration projects varies. Specifically, participants in the clean coal track and one participant from the energy efficiency in buildings track said they were interested in demonstration projects and were potentially willing to share, or had shared, IP under CERC. Two participants in the energy efficiency in buildings track said they may be able to demonstrate their products without sharing IP, such as by using technology designed to protect software. However, the representatives of the two companies we spoke with from the clean vehicles track about IP issues said that they were not interested in participating in demonstration projects and that they would not share IP as part of any joint research effort such as CERC. DOE officials acknowledged that companies participating in CERC face a tradeoff between the risks of sharing background IP and the potential benefits, such as valuable research and development outcomes and gaining a market advantage through demonstrating projects in China. These officials also stated that it is appropriate for companies to assess risks for themselves and not share their most valuable IP if the related risk is determined to be too great. Willingness to share background IP is important for valuable research and development collaboration, but researchers would still be able to engage in work that could prove worthwhile if companies or researchers are unwilling to share their background IP under CERC, according to DOE officials. While not much background IP was shared by U.S. CERC participants during CERC’s first phase, U.S. and Chinese CERC researchers exchanged other types of information as inputs to their projects in ways that helped to further their research, according to CERC lead organizations. For example, some of the U.S. and Chinese organizations participating in the clean vehicles track agreed to share battery testing data. Because many batteries must be discharged repeatedly to understand their full life cycle under differing conditions, battery testing can take from months to years; this agreement to share data eliminated months of testing time, according to representatives from the clean vehicles CERC track. | 5,793 | <h4>Specifically the plan <u>creates business certainty</u> over IP protections that <u>lead to commercialization of </u>climate solutions </h4><p><u><strong>Gianopoulos</u></strong>, Director at U.S. Government Accountability Office International Affairs and Trade, <u><strong>2016</p><p></u></strong>Kimberly, “U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION Bilateral Clean Energy Programs Show Some Results but Should Enhance Their Performance Monitoring” July, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678214.pdf </p><p>CERC participants we interviewed did not report any significant issues with steps DOE has taken to address IP risks. Representatives of 8 of the 12 participating organizations we spoke with about IP issues said the Technology Management Plan was helpful, while others said it had no effect on CERC projects or that they had not had an opportunity to test it. Notably, one participant found the Technology Management Plan helpful in resolving a joint venture negotiation issue. Specifically, the U.S. CERC participant wanted to license technology related to a CERC project to a Chinese company with a nonexclusive license so that it could also license the technology to other companies in China, while the Chinese company wanted an exclusive license to the technology. According to the participant, the Technology Management Plan was helpful in resolving the issue diplomatically and arriving at the desired agreement. Representatives of 9 of the 12 participating organizations said that there was nothing more that DOE could or should do to address IP risks. One participating software company suggested that CERC could further mitigate IP risks by providing software protection technology to participants. Another participating organization suggested that DOE could request that IP terms be summarized in project proposals, so there could be easy access to understanding how each project is managing IP risks. <u><strong>Although</u></strong> CERC <u><strong>participants reported no significant issues with DOE’s approach to managing IP risks, U.S. <mark>companies participating</mark> in CERC <mark>have been reluctant to share</mark> background <mark>IP</mark> as a part of CERC</u></strong>. U.S. CERC <u><strong>participants shared</u></strong> background <u><strong>IP with Chinese organizations</u></strong> <u><strong>for 3 of the more than 80 projects that took place</u></strong> during the first 5-year phase of CERC, according to a DOE survey of CERC tracks about IP completed in December 2015.35 The seven <u><strong><mark>companies</u></strong></mark> we spoke with regarding IP issues said that they have their own IP protection strategies in place, and several said they <u><strong>generally <mark>considered it a risk</mark> to</u></strong> <u><strong>share IP with any other companies that are potential competitors. Representatives</u></strong> of three of the companies <u><strong>mentioned</u></strong> that their <u><strong><mark>companies had</mark> additional <mark>concerns</mark> about IP</u></strong> <u><strong>protection related to working in China for reasons <mark>such as a perception</mark> that <mark>the</mark> Chinese <mark>legal system will not </mark>reliably <mark>protect their</mark> <mark>IP rights</u></strong></mark>. For its second 5-year phase, at the direction of higher-level management in DOE and DOE’s counterpart ministry in China, CERC will make an effort to bring more results to market, according to CERC officials. To that end, <u><strong>CERC is planning to focus more on demonstration projects and other projects that are closer to commercialization. </u></strong>A member of the CERC IP experts group said <u><strong><mark>that IP risk is greater once</mark> <mark>technology is closer to commercialization</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>because companies have invested more in the technology. <mark>This greater focus on projects closer to commercialization will</u></strong> <u><strong>continue, and</mark> may <mark>increase, the importance of sharing background IP</mark> </u></strong>during CERC’s second 5-year phase. <u><strong>DOE officials said they would like to encourage more sharing of background IP</u></strong> during CERC’s second 5-year phase and that through demonstration projects there is more likely to be sharing of background IP; however, according to two CERC participants we spoke with, sharing background IP may not be necessary for some demonstration projects. In addition, <u><strong><mark>we found</mark> that <mark>participants’ willingness to share IP</mark> for demonstration projects <mark>varies</u></strong></mark>. Specifically, participants in the clean coal track and one participant from the energy efficiency in buildings track said they were interested in demonstration projects and were potentially willing to share, or had shared, IP under CERC. Two participants in the energy efficiency in buildings track said they may be able to demonstrate their products without sharing IP, such as by using technology designed to protect software. However, the representatives of the two companies we spoke with from the clean vehicles track about IP issues said that they were not interested in participating in demonstration projects and that they would not share IP as part of any joint research effort such as CERC. DOE <u><strong>officials acknowledged that <mark>companies</mark> participating in CERC <mark>face a</mark> <mark>tradeoff between</mark> the <mark>risks</mark> of sharing background IP <mark>and</mark> the potential <mark>benefits, such as</mark> valuable <mark>research and development outcomes and gaining a market advantage</u></strong></mark> through demonstrating projects in China. <u><strong>These officials</u></strong> also <u><strong>stated that <mark>it is appropriate for companies to </mark>assess risks for themselves and <mark>not share</mark> their <mark>most valuable IP if the</mark> related <mark>risk is determined to be too</mark> <mark>great.</u></strong> <u><strong>Willingness to share</mark> background IP <mark>is important for</mark> valuable research and <mark>development collaboration</u></strong></mark>, but researchers would still be able to engage in work that could prove worthwhile if companies or researchers are unwilling to share their background IP under CERC, according to DOE officials. While not much background IP was shared by U.S. CERC participants during CERC’s first phase, U.S. and Chinese CERC researchers exchanged other types of information as inputs to their projects in ways that helped to further their research, according to CERC lead organizations. For example, some of the U.S. and Chinese organizations participating in the clean vehicles track agreed to share battery testing data. Because many batteries must be discharged repeatedly to understand their full life cycle under differing conditions, battery testing can take from months to years; this agreement to share data eliminated months of testing time, according to representatives from the clean vehicles CERC track.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,559,773 | 12 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,609 | First, an active debris removal project should be the starting point for US-Sino space diplomacy. That creates the foundation for sustainable space dialogue that reduces the risks of miscalculation and nuclear launch. | Hitchens 16 | Hitchens 16 — Theresa Hitchens is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (“Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Benefiting from Entanglement with China” China-US Focus, 6/28, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-benefiting-from-entanglement-with-china/ | As China becomes increasingly dependent on space assets, it becomes a nation with a growing stake in containing and abating space debris in 2014 China took the unprecedented step of requesting a direct link with U.S. Air Force Space Command for collision warnings China has recognized the debris hazard as a peril to all space faring nations, including itself, thereby giving China a vested interest in working with others toward prevention and abatement. A bilateral active removal project could be a useful step forward for both countries toward addressing an acknowledged threat to space assets
High level, strategic communication ideally provides opportunities for decision-makers to clearly convey their “bright lines if China is unaware of what constitutes U.S. “bright lines” regarding negative behavior in space, the risk of unwanted escalation grows the Defense Department’s 2016 report to Congress on Chinese military power states that China may be considering using counterspace capabilities to target U.S. early warning and navigation satellites it shows that there is an enormous misunderstanding by China of the importance to the U S of early warning satellites in the nuclear kill chain
Because space technology is largely dual use, the U S is too-often left speculating on Chinese motivations and intentions, often assuming worst-case scenarios which spin-up security dilemmas with accompanying unwinnable arms races
largely due to the legislative ban on U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation, there is little or no incentive for those in the Chinese space or security communities to argue in support of prudent space policy or behavior, because they have nothing to lose by unrestrained actions Effective deterrence requires both carrots and sticks, and there are a variety of carrots that could be offered through NASA and the U.S. civil space program | null | As China becomes increasingly dependent on space assets, it organically becomes entangled in the responsibilities of a space-faring nation with a growing stake in containing and abating space debris. China irresponsibly contributed to the space debris issue with its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test that exponentially increased the debris in orbit. Subsequently though, on more than one occasion the U.S. Air Force provided China with warnings, through the State Department, of a potential debris collision with a Chinese satellite, warnings China never acknowledged. But in 2014 China took the unprecedented step of requesting a direct link with U.S. Air Force Space Command for collision warnings. Clearly, China has recognized the debris hazard as a peril to all space faring nations, including itself, thereby giving China a vested interest in working with others toward prevention and abatement. China is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) that has created guidelines for prevention. A bilateral (or multilateral) active removal project could be a useful step forward for both countries toward addressing an acknowledged threat to space assets, and through entanglement create a need for consistent communication between the U.S. and China regardless of externalities.
The benefits of communication are maximized when it takes place at multiple levels. High level, strategic communication ideally provides opportunities for decision-makers to clearly convey their “bright lines.” As we point out in our Atlantic Council strategy paper, if China is unaware of what constitutes U.S. “bright lines” regarding negative behavior in space, during either peacetime or wartime, the risk of unwanted escalation grows. As an example, the Defense Department’s 2016 report to Congress on Chinese military power states that China may be considering using counterspace capabilities to target U.S. early warning and navigation satellites. If true, it shows that there is an enormous misunderstanding by China of the importance to the United States of early warning satellites in the nuclear kill chain—something even the Soviet Union understood, hence the mutual ban on attacking these assets embedded in US-USSR bilateral nuclear-arms-control agreements.
Communication at lower levels allows both parties to learn the parameters within which their counterparts operate and make decisions, something that has been especially difficult for the United States because of Chinese cultural and political opacity. Because space technology is largely dual use, the United States is too-often left speculating on Chinese motivations and intentions, often assuming worst-case scenarios which spin-up security dilemmas with accompanying unwinnable arms races. The learning process through working-level communication is accelerated when parties are not just talking, but actually have to work together toward shared goals, such as is the case with the ISS. With station operations run through both Moscow and Houston, communication and cooperation are required.
Entanglement also creates stakeholders in involved countries. Currently, largely due to the legislative ban on U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation, there is little or no incentive for those in the Chinese space or security communities to argue in support of prudent space policy or behavior, because they have nothing to lose by unrestrained actions they may perceive to their benefit. Effective deterrence requires both carrots and sticks, and there are a variety of carrots that could be offered through NASA and the U.S. civil space program. | 3,638 | <h4><u>First</u>, an active debris removal project should be the <u>starting point</u> for US-Sino space diplomacy. That creates the foundation for <u>sustainable space dialogue</u> that <u>reduces the risks of miscalculation</u> and <u>nuclear launch</u>.</h4><p><strong>Hitchens 16 </strong>—<strong> </strong> Theresa Hitchens is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (“Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Benefiting from Entanglement with China” China-US Focus, 6/28, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-benefiting-from-entanglement-with-china/</p><p><u>As China becomes increasingly dependent on space assets, it</u> organically <u>becomes </u>entangled in the responsibilities of <u>a</u> space-faring <u>nation with a growing stake in containing and abating space debris</u>. China irresponsibly contributed to the space debris issue with its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test that exponentially increased the debris in orbit. Subsequently though, on more than one occasion the U.S. Air Force provided China with warnings, through the State Department, of a potential debris collision with a Chinese satellite, warnings China never acknowledged. But <u>in 2014 China took the unprecedented step of requesting a direct link with U.S. Air Force Space Command for collision warnings</u>. Clearly, <u>China has recognized the debris hazard as a peril to all space faring nations, including itself, thereby giving China a vested interest in working with others toward prevention and abatement.</u> China is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) that has created guidelines for prevention. <u>A bilateral</u> (or multilateral) <u><strong>active removal project could be a useful step forward</strong> for both countries toward addressing an acknowledged threat to space assets</u>, and through entanglement create a need for consistent communication between the U.S. and China regardless of externalities.</p><p>The benefits of communication are maximized when it takes place at multiple levels. <u>High level, strategic communication ideally provides opportunities for decision-makers to clearly convey their “bright lines</u>.” As we point out in our Atlantic Council strategy paper, <u>if China is unaware of what constitutes U.S. “bright lines” regarding negative behavior in space,</u> during either peacetime or wartime, <u>the risk of unwanted escalation grows</u>. As an example, <u>the Defense Department’s 2016 report to Congress on Chinese military power states that China may be considering using counterspace capabilities to target U.S. early warning and navigation satellites</u>. If true, <u>it shows that there is an enormous misunderstanding by China of the importance to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>of early warning satellites in the nuclear kill chain</u>—something even the Soviet Union understood, hence the mutual ban on attacking these assets embedded in US-USSR bilateral nuclear-arms-control agreements.</p><p>Communication at lower levels allows both parties to learn the parameters within which their counterparts operate and make decisions, something that has been especially difficult for the United States because of Chinese cultural and political opacity. <u>Because space technology is largely dual use, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is too-often left speculating on Chinese motivations and intentions, often assuming worst-case scenarios which spin-up security dilemmas with accompanying unwinnable arms races</u>. The learning process through working-level communication is accelerated when parties are not just talking, but actually have to work together toward shared goals, such as is the case with the ISS. With station operations run through both Moscow and Houston, communication and cooperation are required.</p><p>Entanglement also creates stakeholders in involved countries. Currently, <u>largely due to the legislative ban on U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation, there is little or no incentive for those in the Chinese space or security communities to argue in support of prudent space policy or behavior, because they have nothing to lose by unrestrained actions</u> they may perceive to their benefit. <u>Effective deterrence requires both carrots and sticks, and there are a variety <strong>of carrots that could be offered through NASA and the U.S. civil space program</u></strong>.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Solvency | 183,731 | 25 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,610 | 1) Human rights conditions work | Cardenas 9 (Sonia, associate professor of political science and director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College, 12/4, “Demoting human rights”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edcardenas.1.20395821.html?_r=0) | Cardenas 9 (Sonia, associate professor of political science and director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College, 12/4, “Demoting human rights”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edcardenas.1.20395821.html?_r=0) | human rights pressure is essential for eventual reform some research indicates that the consistency of applying human rights pressure , is more important than the intensity of pressure applied pressures lead governments to make concessions setting in motion a longer term dynamic of gradual reform | human rights pressure is essential for eventual reform consistency of applying human rights pressure is more important than the intensity of pressure applied pressures lead governments to make concessions setting in motion a long term reform | Further evidence suggests that human rights pressure - not just dialogue - is essential for eventual reform. In fact, some research indicates that the consistency of applying human rights pressure, even at the level of rhetoric, is more important than the intensity of pressure applied. Such pressures lead governments to make concessions, which in turn can empower groups to mobilize and demand further change, occasionally setting in motion a longer term dynamic of gradual reform. All told, there are both principled and pragmatic reasons to promote human rights seriously in foreign policy. | 594 | <h4>1) Human rights conditions work</h4><p><strong>Cardenas 9 (Sonia, associate professor of political science and director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College, 12/4, “Demoting human rights”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edcardenas.1.20395821.html?_r=0)</p><p></strong>Further evidence suggests that <u><mark>human rights pressure</u></mark> - not just dialogue - <u><mark>is essential for eventual reform</u></mark>. In fact, <u>some research indicates that the <mark>consistency of applying human rights pressure</u></mark>, even at the level of rhetoric<u>, <mark>is more important than the intensity of pressure applied</u></mark>. Such <u><mark>pressures lead governments to make concessions</u></mark>, which in turn can empower groups to mobilize and demand further change, occasionally <u><mark>setting in motion a long</mark>er <mark>term</mark> dynamic of gradual <mark>reform</u></mark>. All told, there are both principled and pragmatic reasons to promote human rights seriously in foreign policy.</p> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 183,729 | 3 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,611 | Japan is satisfied with existing US assurances, but is sensitive to changes in US posturing in the region – US engagement with China will be perceived as a move to withdraw from the US/Japan alliance. | Atanassova-Cornelis, June 27, 2016 | Atanassova-Cornelis, June 27, 2016 | , Accessed 7/7/16, DL)
For Japan US-associated uncertainties have two fundamental dimensions
AND
the time of this writing remains a distinct possibility | null | (Dr. Elena, Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Kent, Lecturer in East Asian Politics at the Université Catholique de Louvain and the University of Antwerp, published in Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, East Asia: An International Quarterly, and Asia-Pacific Review, “Strategic concerns of the US and China, regional hedging and the evolving security order in the Asia-Pacific,” ISA Asia-Pacific conference, June 25-27, Online: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/9b125d1d-3898-4ed1-9559-842178ea0be2.pdf, Accessed 7/7/16, DL)
For Japan and countries in Southeast Asia US-associated uncertainties have two fundamental dimensions
AND
the time of this writing (summer 2016), remains a distinct possibility. | 778 | <h4><strong>Japan is satisfied with existing US assurances, but is sensitive to changes in US posturing in the region – US engagement with China will be perceived as a move to withdraw from the US/Japan alliance. </h4><p>Atanassova-Cornelis, June 27, 2016</p><p></strong>(Dr. Elena, Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Kent, Lecturer in East Asian Politics at the Université Catholique de Louvain and the University of Antwerp, published in Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, East Asia: An International Quarterly, and Asia-Pacific Review, “Strategic concerns of the US and China, regional hedging and the evolving security order in the Asia-Pacific,” ISA Asia-Pacific conference, June 25-27, Online: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/9b125d1d-3898-4ed1-9559-842178ea0be2.pdf<u>, Accessed 7/7/16, DL) </p><p>For Japan</u> and countries in Southeast Asia <u>US-associated uncertainties have two fundamental dimensions</p><p>AND</p><p>the time of this writing</u> (summer 2016), <u>remains a distinct possibility</u>.</p> | 1NC | Japan DA | null | 1,560,878 | 5 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,612 | Second, Chinese space development is inevitable. Engagement is key to U.S. influence to make the program stay peaceful. | Aliberti 15 | Aliberti 15 — resident fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (Marco, When China Goes to the Moon… p. 233-234) | if any interaction with the Chinese space programme is assumed to involve an associated interaction with the Chinese military then many allies have already taken a step in that direction The US restrictions intended to limit Chinese access to space technology have pushed China towards other global suppliers, which are increasingly available and disposed towards cooperation Ironically, this has afforded less control over technology transfer than previously if the goal of the U.S is to assure that Chinese space development occurs in a peaceful, non-threatening manner, then the US must consider that it could actually be more effective in influencing Chinese programmatic direction and in determining what globally-available technology reaches China through engagement rather than detachment, versus trying to constrain China
cooperation may introduce an important benefit by offsetting the need for China to develop unilaterally Collaborating with China—instead of isolating it— could keep the country reliant on US technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone This could in turn give the U S leverage in other areas of the relationship and be more broadly conducive to an improvement in political relations
While there is currently uncertainty and lack of transparency over China's space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning, regular dialogue and exchange of information could help the two nations understand each other's intentions more clearly, overcoming mutual mistrust and ambiguity dialogue and cooperation could potentially give way to strengthen confidence and assurance of intentions and concerns about space and help address national security concerns while increasing transparency across the board | null | In addition, "if any interaction with the Chinese space programme is assumed to involve an associated interaction with the Chinese military,—Andrew Johnson has ironically remarked—then many of the United States' closest allies have already taken a step in that direction".202 The US restrictions intended to limit (or even control) Chinese access to space technology have pushed China towards other global suppliers, which are increasingly available and disposed towards cooperation. Ironically, this has afforded less control over technology transfer than previously. As Joan Johnson-Freese puts it, "if the goal of the U.S is to assure that Chinese space development occurs in a peaceful, non-threatening manner, then the US must consider that it could actually be more effective in influencing Chinese programmatic direction and in determining what globally-available technology reaches China through engagement rather than detachment, and by stressing innovation and staying ahead, versus trying to constrain China".203
Thus, cooperation may introduce an important benefit by offsetting the need for China to develop unilaterally. Collaborating with China—instead of isolating it— could keep the country reliant on US technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone or purchase them on the global market. This could in turn give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship and be more broadly conducive to an improvement in political relations.204
Another potential positive payback stemming from cooperating with China would be greater US insight into China's space programme, technical capabilities, and intentions. While there is currently uncertainty and lack of transparency over China's space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning, regular dialogue and exchange of information could help the two nations understand each other's intentions more clearly, overcoming mutual mistrust and ambiguity. Over the long term, dialogue and cooperation could potentially give way to strengthen confidence and assurance of intentions and concerns about space and help address national security concerns while increasing transparency across the board. 205 | 2,199 | <h4>Second, Chinese space development is <u>inevitable</u>. <u>Engagement is key</u> to <u>U.S. influence</u> to make the program stay peaceful.</h4><p><strong>Aliberti 15 </strong>—<strong> </strong>resident fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (Marco, When China Goes to the Moon… p. 233-234)</p><p>In addition, "<u>if any interaction with the Chinese space programme is assumed to involve an associated interaction with the Chinese military</u>,—Andrew Johnson has ironically remarked—<u>then many </u>of the United States' closest <u>allies have already taken a step in that direction</u>".202 <u>The US restrictions intended to limit</u> (or even control) <u>Chinese access to space technology have pushed China towards other global suppliers, which are increasingly available and disposed towards cooperation</u>. <u>Ironically, this has afforded less control over technology transfer than previously</u>. As Joan Johnson-Freese puts it, "<u>if the goal of the U.S is to assure that Chinese space development occurs in a peaceful, non-threatening manner, then the US must consider that it could actually be more effective in influencing Chinese programmatic direction and in determining what globally-available technology reaches China <strong>through engagement rather than detachment,</u></strong> and by stressing innovation and staying ahead, <u>versus trying to constrain China</u>".203</p><p>Thus, <u>cooperation may introduce an important benefit by offsetting the need for China to develop unilaterally</u>. <u>Collaborating with China—instead of isolating it— could keep the country reliant on US technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone</u> or purchase them on the global market. <u>This could in turn give the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong>leverage in other areas of the relationship</u></strong> <u>and be more <strong>broadly conducive to an improvement in political relations</u></strong>.204</p><p>Another potential positive payback stemming from cooperating with China would be greater US insight into China's space programme, technical capabilities, and intentions. <u>While there is currently uncertainty and lack of transparency over China's space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning, regular dialogue and exchange of information could help the two nations understand each other's intentions more clearly, overcoming mutual mistrust and ambiguity</u>. Over the long term, <u>dialogue and cooperation could potentially give way to strengthen confidence and assurance of intentions and concerns about space and help address national security concerns while increasing transparency across the board</u>. 205</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Solvency | 172,676 | 59 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,613 | Reductions in the US and China are key – they’re the two largest emitters. | World Atlas, 2016 | World Atlas, 2016 | two-thirds of all industrial methane and carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere since 1854 can be traced to burning fossil fuels scientists have succeeded in confidently tracing how much of climate change can be directly tied to human activities the carbon dioxide emissions from human activities are now higher than at any point in human history, worsening the ‘greenhouse effect’ contributing to global warming established economies have large, but waning, carbon emissions China emits almost twice the amount of greenhouse gases as the US, which it surpassed in 2006 as the world’s top contributor to atmospheric carbon dioxide the country accounts for approximately 23 percent of all global CO2 emissions The United States government estimates project that, barring major reform, China will double its emissions by 2040, due to its heavy reliance on fossil fuels The US has never entered into any binding treaty to curb greenhouse gases The country is on pace to meet a 2009 pledge by the Obama administration to reduce CO2 emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020. Unfortunately, CO2 emissions have gone up in recent as the country fights to recover back from the recession that began in 2008. President Obama’s administration has not always gained Congressional support, as means to balance making progress economically and reducing emissions do not always go hand in hand, and different political factions propose markedly different strategies concerning how to best do so. Most “clean air” legislation in this country has focused on improving automobile fuel economy and cutting carbon pollution from existing and new power plants. | two-thirds of all methane and carbon dioxide released can be traced to fossil fuels worsening the ‘greenhouse effect’ contributing to global warming China emits twice the amount of gases as the US, which it surpassed in 2006 the country accounts for 23 percent of all global CO2 emissions. The U S estimates project barring major reform, China will double its emissions by 2040 , CO2 emissions have gone up in recent as the country fights to recover from the recession in 2008 | “Biggest Contributors To Global Warming In The World By Country” 9/28 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-contributors-to-global-warming-in-the-world.html
Approximately two-thirds of all industrial methane and carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere since 1854 can be traced to burning fossil fuels and producing cement. Over the decades, scientists have succeeded in confidently tracing how much of climate change can be directly tied to human activities, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. Sadly, the carbon dioxide emissions from human activities are now higher than at any point in human history, further worsening the ‘greenhouse effect’ contributing to global warming and the consequences of climate change. In fact, recent data shows that global carbon dioxide emissions were 150 times higher in 2011 than they were in 1850. Since burning fossil fuels is usually a sign of heavy industry, carbon dioxide emissions can also serve as method of measuring a country’s economic growth. Nonetheless, a reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions is an important objective of not only environmentalists but of every humanitarian-oriented and environmentally conscious state in the world. At the moment, 192 countries have adopted the Kyoto protocol which, among many other objectives, aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% from the 1990 levels by 2012. In the world today, established economies have large, but waning, carbon emissions, while new economic giants in the developing world are increasing their emissions rapidly. China China emits almost twice the amount of greenhouse gases as the US, which it surpassed in 2006 as the world’s top contributor to atmospheric carbon dioxide. Today, the country accounts for approximately 23 percent of all global CO2 emissions. The United States government estimates project that, barring major reform, China will double its emissions by 2040, due to its heavy reliance on fossil fuels for steel production and electricity. Until recently, China was hesitant to establish targets for emissions, which continue to increase, although at a slower rate. United States The US has never entered into any binding treaty to curb greenhouse gases, but has cut more carbon dioxide emissions than any other nation nevertheless. The country is on pace to meet a 2009 pledge by the Obama administration to reduce CO2 emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020. Unfortunately, CO2 emissions have gone up in recent as the country fights to recover back from the recession that began in 2008. President Obama’s administration has not always gained Congressional support, as means to balance making progress economically and reducing emissions do not always go hand in hand, and different political factions propose markedly different strategies concerning how to best do so. Most “clean air” legislation in this country has focused on improving automobile fuel economy and cutting carbon pollution from existing and new power plants. | 2,992 | <h4>Reductions in the US and China are key – <u>they’re the two largest emitters<strong>. </h4><p>World Atlas, 2016 </p><p></u></strong>“Biggest Contributors To Global Warming In The World By Country” 9/28 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-contributors-to-global-warming-in-the-world.html</p><p>Approximately <u><strong><mark>two-thirds of all</mark> industrial <mark>methane and carbon dioxide released</mark> into the atmosphere since 1854 <mark>can be traced to</mark> burning <mark>fossil fuels</mark> </u></strong>and producing cement. Over the decades, <u><strong>scientists have succeeded in confidently tracing how much of climate change can be directly tied to human activities</u></strong>, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. Sadly, <u><strong>the carbon dioxide emissions from human activities are now higher than at any point in human history,</u></strong> further <u><strong><mark>worsening the ‘greenhouse effect’ contributing to global warming</u></strong></mark> and the consequences of climate change. In fact, recent data shows that global carbon dioxide emissions were 150 times higher in 2011 than they were in 1850. Since burning fossil fuels is usually a sign of heavy industry, carbon dioxide emissions can also serve as method of measuring a country’s economic growth. Nonetheless, a reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions is an important objective of not only environmentalists but of every humanitarian-oriented and environmentally conscious state in the world. At the moment, 192 countries have adopted the Kyoto protocol which, among many other objectives, aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% from the 1990 levels by 2012. In the world today, <u><strong>established economies have large, but waning, carbon emissions</u></strong>, while new economic giants in the developing world are increasing their emissions rapidly. China <u><strong><mark>China emits</mark> almost <mark>twice the</mark> <mark>amount of</mark> greenhouse <mark>gases as the US, which it surpassed in 2006</mark> as the world’s top contributor to atmospheric carbon dioxide</u></strong>. Today, <u><strong><mark>the country accounts for</mark> approximately <mark>23 percent of all global CO2 emissions</u></strong>. <u><strong>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates government <mark>estimates project</mark> that, <mark>barring major reform, China</u></strong> <u><strong>will double its emissions by 2040</mark>, due to its heavy reliance on fossil fuels</u></strong> for steel production and electricity. Until recently, China was hesitant to establish targets for emissions, which continue to increase, although at a slower rate. United States <u><strong>The US has never entered into any binding treaty to curb greenhouse gases</u></strong>, but has cut more carbon dioxide emissions than any other nation nevertheless. <u><strong>The country is on pace to meet a 2009 pledge by the Obama administration to reduce CO2 emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020. Unfortunately<mark>,</mark> <mark>CO2 emissions have</mark> <mark>gone up in recent as the country fights to recover</mark> back <mark>from the recession</mark> that began <mark>in 2008</mark>.</strong> President Obama’s administration has not always gained Congressional support, as means to balance making progress economically and reducing emissions do not always go hand in hand, and different political factions propose markedly different strategies concerning how to best do so. Most “clean air” legislation in this country has focused on improving automobile fuel economy and cutting carbon pollution from existing and new power plants.</p></u> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 1,559,774 | 12 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,614 | Our impact is supported by large dataset statistical testing and robust case studies – status quo military approach in East Asia changes decision calculus which overcomes deterrence and make war probable. | Kraig 13 | Kraig 13 | One might argue the capability to win such a large war decisively would deter an opponent from escalating to that point. However the concept and empirical reality of destabilizing capabilities has been thoroughly analyzed Large dataset statistical testing with in-depth case studies covering the great-power periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have shown across different methodologies that when major powers harbor weapons at an operational level that can easily preempt the other side’s forces quickly, this exacerbates international anarchy The decision calculus can quickly veer toward preventive war because decision makers are tempted through opportunity and genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a rival from gaining a decisive strategic edge. a US approach to force procurement that is overly focused on offensive strategic interdiction could easily have a deleterious strategic political effect during both periods of “general deterrence” in peacetime and during a diplomatic-military crisis In sum Air-Sea Battle culture of the strategic offensive, may fail viable options for limiting and deescalating conflicts in the Asian Pacific | the concept and empirical reality of destabilizing capabilities has been thoroughly analyzed Large dataset statistical testing with in-depth case studies covering eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have shown across different methodologies that when powers harbor weapons at an operational level that can easily preempt the side’s quickly decision calculus can quickly veer toward preventive war because decision makers are tempted through genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a rival from gaining strategic edge. US procurement that is overly focused on offensive interdiction could have a deleterious effect during both deterrence” in peacetime and crisis In sum A S B culture of strategic offensive, may fail viable options for limiting and deescalating conflicts in the Asian Pacific | (Michael Ryan, assistant professor of national security studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base; and Leon J. Perkowski, PhD candidate in the history of US foreign relations senior instructor in the Department of International Security and Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Summer 2013, “Shaping Air and Sea Power for the “Asia Pivot”: Military Planning to Support Limited Geopolitical Objectives,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 114-136)
One might argue that the capability to win such a large war decisively would inherently deter an opponent from escalating to that point. However, in the security studies literature, the concept and empirical reality of diplomatically destabilizing weapons capabilities has been thoroughly analyzed and described under the rubric of “offensive dominance,” as opposed to “defense” or “deterrence dominance.” Large dataset statistical testing, together with in-depth case studies covering the great-power periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have together shown across different methodologies that when major powers harbor weapons at an operational level that can easily preempt the other side’s forces quickly, this exacerbates the grand strategy–level condition known as “international anarchy.” The decision calculus can quickly veer toward preventive war or preemptive strikes because decision makers are tempted through both opportunity and genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a rival from gaining a decisive operational, and hence, strategic edge.39 Thus, a US approach to force procurement and employment that is overly focused on offensive strategic interdiction in order to secure victory—even of a nonnuclear variety—could easily have a deleterious strategic political effect during both periods of “general deterrence” in peacetime and during a diplomatic-military crisis. In essence, Bernard Brodie’s 1959 assessment of nuclear deterrence strategies is generally applicable here: “[A] plan and policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is . . . better in every way than one which depreciates the objectives of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning” (emphasis added).40 In sum: as currently defined, the evolving CPGS and Air-Sea Battle concepts, based at least partially on the traditional airpower culture of the strategic offensive, may well fail to provide future US presidents with credible and politically viable options for limiting and deescalating the limited-stakes conflicts the United States would most likely encounter in the Asian Pacific theater. While it is of course easier in principle to “defeat the enemy” by destroying decisively its capacity to sustain frontline forces, this approach assumes that strategic defeat of the adversary (i.e., total victory) is what US decision makers would in fact be seeking in a crisis against most great-power competitors in most contexts. But as already described above, it is extraordinarily unlikely that US policymakers will in fact harbor such “total” goals or “policy objects” toward a rising China in the contemporary international system. And striking a wide array of deep target sets would likely be viewed by the PRC as a serious escalation of policy stakes, therefore inviting a dramatic PRC counterescalation (whether via cyber or space warfare) that would inflict costs on the United States incommensurate with the level of policy stakes involved. | 3,465 | <h4>Our impact is supported by <u>large dataset</u> statistical testing and <u>robust case studies</u> – <u>status quo military approach</u> in <u>East Asia</u> changes <u>decision calculus</u> which overcomes <u>deterrence</u> and <u>make war probable</u>.</h4><p><strong>Kraig 13</p><p></strong>(Michael Ryan, assistant professor of national security studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base; and Leon J. Perkowski, PhD candidate in the history of US foreign relations senior instructor in the Department of International Security and Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Summer 2013, “Shaping Air and Sea Power for the “Asia Pivot”: Military Planning to Support Limited Geopolitical Objectives,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 114-136)</p><p><u>One might argue</u> that <u>the capability to win such a large war decisively would</u> inherently <u><strong>deter an opponent from escalating to that point</strong>. However</u>, in the security studies literature, <u><mark>the <strong>concept and empirical reality</strong> of</mark> </u>diplomatically<u> <strong><mark>destabilizing</u></strong></mark> weapons <u><strong><mark>capabilities</strong> has been <strong>thoroughly analyzed</u></strong></mark> and described under the rubric of “offensive dominance,” as opposed to “defense” or “deterrence dominance.” <u><strong><mark>Large dataset statistical testing</u></strong></mark>, together <u><mark>with <strong>in-depth case studies</strong> covering</mark> the great-power periods of the <mark>eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have</u></mark> together <u><mark>shown <strong>across different methodologies</strong> that when</mark> major <mark>powers harbor weapons <strong>at an operational level</strong> that can <strong>easily preempt</strong> the</mark> other <mark>side’s </mark>forces <mark>quickly</mark>, this <strong>exacerbates</u></strong> the grand strategy–level condition known as “<u>international <strong>anarchy</u></strong>.” <u>The <mark>decision calculus can <strong>quickly veer toward preventive war</u></strong></mark> or preemptive strikes <u><mark>because decision makers are tempted through</u></mark> both <u>opportunity and <strong><mark>genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a rival from gaining</strong></mark> a decisive</u> operational, and hence, <u><strong><mark>strategic edge.</u></strong></mark>39 Thus, <u>a <strong><mark>US</mark> approach to force <mark>procurement</u></strong></mark> and employment <u><strong><mark>that is overly focused on offensive</strong></mark> strategic <strong><mark>interdiction</u></strong></mark> in order to secure victory—even of a nonnuclear variety—<u><strong><mark>could</strong></mark> easily <strong><mark>have a deleterious</mark> strategic political <mark>effect</strong> during <strong>both</strong></mark> periods of “general <strong><mark>deterrence</strong>” in peacetime and</mark> during a diplomatic-military <mark>crisis</u></mark>. In essence, Bernard Brodie’s 1959 assessment of nuclear deterrence strategies is generally applicable here: “[A] plan and policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is . . . better in every way than one which depreciates the objectives of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning” (emphasis added).40 <u><mark>In sum</u></mark>: as currently defined, the evolving CPGS and <u><strong><mark>A</strong></mark>ir-<strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ea <strong><mark>B</strong></mark>attle</u> concepts, based at least partially on the traditional airpower <u><mark>culture of</mark> the <mark>strategic offensive, may</u></mark> well <u><mark>fail</u></mark> to provide future US presidents with credible and politically <u><mark>viable options for limiting and deescalating</mark> </u>the limited-stakes <u><mark>conflicts</u></mark> the United States would most likely encounter <u><strong><mark>in the Asian Pacific</mark> </u></strong>theater. While it is of course easier in principle to “defeat the enemy” by destroying decisively its capacity to sustain frontline forces, this approach assumes that strategic defeat of the adversary (i.e., total victory) is what US decision makers would in fact be seeking in a crisis against most great-power competitors in most contexts. But as already described above, it is extraordinarily unlikely that US policymakers will in fact harbor such “total” goals or “policy objects” toward a rising China in the contemporary international system. And striking a wide array of deep target sets would likely be viewed by the PRC as a serious escalation of policy stakes, therefore inviting a dramatic PRC counterescalation (whether via cyber or space warfare) that would inflict costs on the United States incommensurate with the level of policy stakes involved.</p> | null | null | null | 468,149 | 61 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,615 | a. Engagement – Quid pro quo is the opposite of engagement | Celik 11 | Celik 11 (poli sci and ir ma at Uppsala University Sweden (Arda Can, Economic sanctions and engagement policies, http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies) | Engagement policies differ from other tools they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools engagement is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. | Engagement cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals | Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “’It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance(1977)in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction’’ Although, much of the literature focuses on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, economic engagement strategies have rapidly gained momentum and gathers more and more attention(Kahler&Kastner,2006). Kirshner(2002) states that handful of studies examine the Hirchmanesque effects of economic relations and engagement policies therefore engagement policies are newly emerging alternative strategies against the economic sanctions. This literature is a composition of liberal and realist approaches. Liberals underline that Effectiveness of engagement policies are valid and ascending. On the other hand, Realists criticise the potential of engagement policies and does not give credits to the arguments of engagement strategies. Liberal Approach Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Economic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993) | 3,761 | <h4>a. <u>Engagement</u> – Quid pro quo is the opposite of engagement</h4><p><strong>Celik 11</strong> (poli sci and ir ma at Uppsala University Sweden (Arda Can, Economic sanctions and engagement policies, http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies)</p><p>Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. <u><mark>Engagement</mark> policies differ from other tools</u> in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However <u><strong>they <mark>cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools</u></strong>,</mark> they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “’It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance(1977)in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction’’ Although, much of the literature focuses on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, economic engagement strategies have rapidly gained momentum and gathers more and more attention(Kahler&Kastner,2006). Kirshner(2002) states that handful of studies examine the Hirchmanesque effects of economic relations and engagement policies therefore engagement policies are newly emerging alternative strategies against the economic sanctions. This literature is a composition of liberal and realist approaches. Liberals underline that Effectiveness of engagement policies are valid and ascending. On the other hand, Realists criticise the potential of engagement policies and does not give credits to the arguments of engagement strategies. Liberal Approach Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Economic<u><strong> engagement</u></strong> operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism <u><strong>is highly different from carrots (inducement</strong>s). <mark>Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals</mark>. <mark>Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and</u></mark> wants her to <u><mark>be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals</mark>. </u>Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)</p> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 162,307 | 86 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,616 | Plan: The United States federal government should propose a strategy of Mutually Assured Restraint with China whereby we withdrawal our offensive military capabilities in the Pacific Ocean on the condition that China decreases their Anti-Access and Arial Denial weapon capabilities, agree to mutual verification, and both agree to shift all weapons towards defensive posturing for self-defense. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Plan: The United States federal government should propose a strategy of Mutually Assured Restraint with China whereby we withdrawal our offensive military capabilities in the Pacific Ocean on the condition that China decreases their Anti-Access and Arial Denial weapon capabilities, agree to mutual verification, and both agree to shift all weapons towards defensive posturing for self-defense.</h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,879 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,617 | Perception of alliance collapse causes Japan nuclearization within months – that collapses global non-proliferation efforts. | Hunt, Nuclear Security Fellow @ RAND Corporation, 2015 | Hunt, Nuclear Security Fellow @ RAND Corporation, 2015 | )
With Japanese society gradually
AND
those | null | (Jonathan, “Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow,” Foreign Policy, August 5, Online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/)
With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually
AND
those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. | 325 | <h4><strong>Perception of alliance collapse causes Japan nuclearization within months – that collapses global non-proliferation efforts. </h4><p>Hunt, Nuclear Security Fellow @ RAND Corporation, 2015</p><p></strong>(Jonathan, “Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow,” Foreign Policy, August 5, Online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/<u>)</p><p>With </u>the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and <u>Japanese society gradually </p><p>AND</p><p>those</u> numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking.</p> | 1NC | Japan DA | null | 1,560,880 | 5 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,618 | Warming causes chemical trapping that dehydrates the planet and triggers extinction – adaptation and mitigation can’t solve global water loss. | Popp et al 16 | Popp et al 16, Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Program in Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ Princeton University, 16 (Max, Transition to a Moist Greenhouse with CO2 and solar forcing, http://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10627) | Water-rich planets lose water by photo-dissociation of water vapour On present-day Earth, the loss occurs very slowly, because the mixing ratio of water vapour in the upper atmosphere But significant loss of water could occur if the surface temperature were warmer cold trapping of water vapour becomes ineffective Steady state is sufficiently high for a water-rich planet to lose most of its water inventory A planet in this state would eventually become uninhabitable as all water is lost to space a Moist Greenhouse would be attained if the mixing ratio in the upper atmosphere exceeds ∼0.1 % Greenhouse-gas forcing has long been assumed to be ineffective at causing Moist-Greenhouse states, However if clouds are considered these arguments may not apply because clouds themselves can contribute to the climate becoming unstable CRE) destabilize a present-day Earth climate as readily with CO2 as with solar forcing the resulting climate transition does not lead to a Runaway Greenhouse, but instead a new regime of warm steady state with gST above 330 K is attained This warm regime differs substantially in its dynamics from a present-day Earth-like climate and, most importantly, the upper atmosphere exceeds the Moist-Greenhouse limit in this regime a planet in such a state would lose water at a fast rate to space | planets lose water by photo-dissociation loss occurs very slowly But significant loss could occur cold trapping becomes ineffective Steady state is sufficiently high for a water-rich planet to lose most of its water A planet in this state would eventually become uninhabitable , if clouds are considered, these arguments may not apply clouds themselves can contribute to the climate becoming unstable22 This warm regime differs substantially in its dynamics from a present-day Earth-like climate a planet in such a state would lose water at a fast rate to space | Water-rich planets such as Earth lose water by photo-dissociation of water vapour in the upper atmosphere and the subsequent escape of hydrogen. On present-day Earth, the loss occurs very slowly, because the mixing ratio of water vapour in the upper atmosphere is very low. But significant loss of water could occur over geological timescales if the surface temperature were around 70 K warmer than it is today2,3,4. For these high surface temperatures, the tropopause is expected to climb to high altitudes. As a consequence, the cold trapping of water vapour at the tropopause becomes ineffective, because the mixing ratio of water vapour increases with the rising tropopause. Steady states in which the mixing ratio in the upper atmosphere is sufficiently high for a water-rich planet to lose most of its water inventory in its lifetime are known as Moist-Greenhouse states5. A planet in this state would eventually become uninhabitable as all water is lost to space. For an Earth-like planet around a Sun-like star, a Moist Greenhouse would be attained if the mixing ratio in the upper atmosphere exceeds ∼0.1 % (ref. 1). For comparison, the mixing ratio in Earth's stratosphere is presently around two orders of magnitude smaller. Moist-Greenhouse states were found and described in several studies with one-dimensional models2,3,4,6,7 and have recently been found for terrestrial planets with three-dimensional models in different setups8,9,10. However, not all three-dimensional studies found stable Moist-Greenhouse states11,12,13. Instead the climate of these models would destabilize into a Runaway Greenhouse, a self-reinforcing water-vapour feedback-loop, before the Moist Greenhouse is attained. A few studies applied large forcing but the employed models became numerically unstable before the Moist-Greenhouse regime was attained14,15,16. Therefore, it remains unclear whether planets would attain a Moist-Greenhouse state before a Runaway Greenhouse occurs, especially for planets on an Earth-like orbit, where the only two previous studies with state-of-the-art general circulation models (GCM) gave contradicting results13,10. Moreover, all three-dimensional studies investigating Moist-Greenhouse states only applied solar forcing without considering greenhouse-gas forcing. Several studies have applied strong greenhouse-gas forcing, but either did not run their simulations to sufficiently high temperatures17,18,19,20 or did not investigate the emergence of a Moist Greenhouse21. Greenhouse-gas forcing has long been assumed to be ineffective at causing Moist-Greenhouse states, because the greenhouse effect of any additional greenhouse gas would eventually be rendered ineffective by the increasing greenhouse effect of water vapour with increasing temperatures. Furthermore, large greenhouse-gas forcing would lead to a cooling of the upper atmosphere, which would push the Moist-Greenhouse limit to much higher surface temperatures6. However, if clouds are considered, these arguments may not apply, because clouds themselves can contribute to the climate becoming unstable22. Here we compare for the first time with a state-of-the-art GCM, namely ECHAM6 (ref. 22), how effective solar and CO2 forcing are at causing a transition to a Moist Greenhouse. We couple the atmosphere to a slab ocean and choose an aqua-planet setup (fully water-covered planet) in perpetual equinox. This idealized framework is better suited than a present-day Earth setting to understand the involved dynamics while preserving the major feedback mechanisms of the Earth24. It also avoids conceptual problems with the representation of land-surface processes at high temperatures. We turn off sea ice in order to investigate the possibility of solely cloud-induced multiple steady states that were recently found in a one-dimensional study22. We modify the model such that it can deal with surface temperatures of up to 350 K (see Methods). Thus we show that cloud-radiative effects (CRE) destabilize a present-day Earth climate as readily with CO2 as with solar forcing. The changes in CRE are a consequence of the weakening of the large-scale circulation with increasing global-mean surface temperature (gST). However, the resulting climate transition does not lead to a Runaway Greenhouse, but instead a new regime of warm steady state with gST above 330 K is attained. This warm regime differs substantially in its dynamics from a present-day Earth-like climate and, most importantly, the upper atmosphere exceeds the Moist-Greenhouse limit in this regime. Hence a planet in such a state would lose water at a fast rate to space. Furthermore, there is hysteresis in the warm regime and removing the imposed forcing does therefore not necessarily cause a transition back to an Earth-like climate. | 4,802 | <h4>Warming causes chemical trapping that dehydrates the planet and triggers extinction – adaptation and mitigation can’t solve global water loss. </h4><p><u><strong>Popp et al 16</u></strong>, Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Program in Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ Princeton University, 16 (Max, Transition to a Moist Greenhouse with CO2 and solar forcing, http://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10627) </p><p><u><strong>Water-rich <mark>planets</u></strong></mark> such as Earth <u><strong><mark>lose water by photo-dissociation</mark> of water vapour</u></strong> in the upper atmosphere and the subsequent escape of hydrogen. <u><strong>On present-day Earth,</u></strong> <u><strong>the <mark>loss occurs</u></strong> <u><strong>very slowly</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>because the mixing ratio of water vapour in the upper atmosphere</u></strong> is very low. <u><strong><mark>But</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>significant loss</mark> of water <mark>could occur</u></strong></mark> over geological timescales <u><strong>if the surface temperature</u></strong> <u><strong>were</u></strong> around 70 K <u><strong>warmer</u></strong> than it is today2,3,4. For these high surface temperatures, the tropopause is expected to climb to high altitudes. As a consequence, the <u><strong><mark>cold trapping</mark> of water vapour </u></strong>at the tropopause <u><strong><mark>becomes ineffective</u></strong></mark>, because the mixing ratio of water vapour increases with the rising tropopause. <u><strong><mark>Steady state</u></strong></mark>s in which the mixing ratio in the upper atmosphere <u><strong><mark>is sufficiently high for a water-rich planet to lose most of its water</mark> inventory</u></strong> in its lifetime are known as Moist-Greenhouse states5. <u><strong><mark>A planet in this state would eventually become uninhabitable</mark> as all water is lost to space</u></strong>. For an Earth-like planet around a Sun-like star, <u><strong>a Moist Greenhouse would be attained if the mixing ratio in the upper atmosphere exceeds ∼0.1 %</u></strong> (ref. 1). For comparison, the mixing ratio in Earth's stratosphere is presently around two orders of magnitude smaller. Moist-Greenhouse states were found and described in several studies with one-dimensional models2,3,4,6,7 and have recently been found for terrestrial planets with three-dimensional models in different setups8,9,10. However, not all three-dimensional studies found stable Moist-Greenhouse states11,12,13. Instead the climate of these models would destabilize into a Runaway Greenhouse, a self-reinforcing water-vapour feedback-loop, before the Moist Greenhouse is attained. A few studies applied large forcing but the employed models became numerically unstable before the Moist-Greenhouse regime was attained14,15,16. Therefore, it remains unclear whether planets would attain a Moist-Greenhouse state before a Runaway Greenhouse occurs, especially for planets on an Earth-like orbit, where the only two previous studies with state-of-the-art general circulation models (GCM) gave contradicting results13,10. Moreover, all three-dimensional studies investigating Moist-Greenhouse states only applied solar forcing without considering greenhouse-gas forcing. Several studies have applied strong greenhouse-gas forcing, but either did not run their simulations to sufficiently high temperatures17,18,19,20 or did not investigate the emergence of a Moist Greenhouse21. <u><strong>Greenhouse-gas forcing has long been assumed to be ineffective at causing Moist-Greenhouse states,</u></strong> because the greenhouse effect of any additional greenhouse gas would eventually be rendered ineffective by the increasing greenhouse effect of water vapour with increasing temperatures. Furthermore, large greenhouse-gas forcing would lead to a cooling of the upper atmosphere, which would push the Moist-Greenhouse limit to much higher surface temperatures6. <u><strong>However</u></strong><mark>, <u><strong>if clouds are considered</u></strong>, <u><strong>these arguments may not apply</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>because <mark>clouds themselves</u></strong> <u><strong>can contribute to the climate becoming unstable</u></strong>22</mark>. Here we compare for the first time with a state-of-the-art GCM, namely ECHAM6 (ref. 22), how effective solar and CO2 forcing are at causing a transition to a Moist Greenhouse. We couple the atmosphere to a slab ocean and choose an aqua-planet setup (fully water-covered planet) in perpetual equinox. This idealized framework is better suited than a present-day Earth setting to understand the involved dynamics while preserving the major feedback mechanisms of the Earth24. It also avoids conceptual problems with the representation of land-surface processes at high temperatures. We turn off sea ice in order to investigate the possibility of solely cloud-induced multiple steady states that were recently found in a one-dimensional study22. We modify the model such that it can deal with surface temperatures of up to 350 K (see Methods). Thus we show that cloud-radiative effects (<u><strong>CRE) destabilize a present-day Earth climate as readily with CO2 as with solar forcing</u></strong>. The changes in CRE are a consequence of the weakening of the large-scale circulation with increasing global-mean surface temperature (gST). However, <u><strong>the resulting climate transition does not lead to a Runaway Greenhouse, but instead a new regime of warm steady state with gST above 330 K is attained</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This warm regime differs substantially in its dynamics from a present-day Earth-like climate</mark> and, most importantly, the upper atmosphere exceeds the Moist-Greenhouse limit in this regime</u></strong>. Hence <u><strong><mark>a planet in such a state would lose water at a fast rate to space</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, there is hysteresis in the warm regime and removing the imposed forcing does therefore not necessarily cause a transition back to an Earth-like climate.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 94,865 | 72 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,619 | Third, China is the litmus test for global cooperation – the plan restores US global space leadership. | Aliberti 15 | Aliberti 15 — resident fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (Marco, When China Goes to the Moon… p. 234) | cooperative undertakings could be an important way to maintain and in a sense renew US leadership. Many space policy experts believe that NASA is losing its appeal as trailblazer of the international space community's efforts embarking upon a cooperative programme with China could generate the public perception of the U S assisting other nations to go beyond Earth in a true spirit of leadership he underlying issue is that the "U.S can advance its national goals in space by sharing the responsibility on a global scale—making the U.S a real leader Such a posture would provide an important impetus to allaying the fears of the international community about the alleged US intention of pursuing space dominance
he alternative to cooperating with China could be a descent into an unpromising space race (also at the strategic threat level) It behoves the United States to discard a space race scenario and consider opportunities for cooperation a gradual increase in cooperation with China would "make sense because it would reduce the cost of US space exploration, enabling both countries to continue gaining scientific knowledge" and also improving relations | null | Equally importantly, cooperative undertakings could be an important way to maintain and in a sense renew US leadership. Many space policy experts believe that NASA is losing its appeal as trailblazer of the international space community's efforts. However, by leveraging the fact that the United States has already accomplished a manned lunar landing, embarking upon a cooperative programme with China (as well as other spacefaring nations) could generate the public perception of the United States assisting other nations to go beyond Earth, in a true spirit of leadership. As the National Research Council notes, the underlying issue is that the "U.S can advance its national goals in space by sharing the responsibility on a global scale—making the U.S a real leader among a host of nations contributing to space exploration and reaping the benefits,” rather than excluding them. Such a posture would provide an important impetus to allaying the fears of the international community about the alleged US intention of pursuing space dominance.
Finally, advocates of cooperation highlight a fact that is too often overlooked: the alternative to cooperating with China could be a descent into an unpromising space race (also at the strategic threat level), bringing unaffordable financial and political burdens for the United States. The United States increased NASA's budget by 89 % in the months following Kennedy's 1961 Moon speech,206 and NASA's expenditure peaked at 5.3 % of the federal budget in 1965.207 This is unimaginable today, given the severe budget constraints faced by NASA and the fact that the United States is not a rapidly expanding but a plateauing economy. It thus behoves the United States to discard a space race scenario and consider opportunities for cooperation. Indeed, a gradual increase in cooperation with China would "make sense because it would reduce the cost of US space exploration, enabling both countries to continue gaining scientific knowledge" and also improving relations to a degree. | 2,026 | <h4><u>Third</u>, China is the litmus test for <u>global cooperation</u> – the plan restores US global space leadership.</h4><p><strong>Aliberti 15 </strong>—<strong> </strong>resident fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (Marco, <u>When China Goes to the Moon…</u> p. 234)</p><p>Equally importantly, <u>cooperative undertakings could be an important way to maintain and in a sense renew US leadership. Many space policy experts believe that NASA is losing its appeal as trailblazer of the international space community's efforts</u>. However, by leveraging the fact that the United States has already accomplished a manned lunar landing, <u>embarking upon a cooperative programme with China</u> (as well as other spacefaring nations) <u>could generate the public perception of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>assisting other nations to go beyond Earth</u>, <u>in a true spirit of leadership</u>. As the National Research Council notes, t<u>he underlying issue is that the "U.S can advance its national goals in space by sharing the responsibility on a global scale—<strong>making the U.S a real leader</strong> </u>among a host of nations contributing to space exploration and reaping the benefits,” rather than excluding them. <u>Such a posture would provide an important impetus to <strong>allaying the fears of the international community</strong> about the alleged US intention of pursuing space dominance</u>.</p><p>Finally, advocates of cooperation highlight a fact that is too often overlooked: t<u>he alternative to cooperating with China could be a descent into an unpromising space race (also at the strategic threat level)</u>, bringing unaffordable financial and political burdens for the United States. The United States increased NASA's budget by 89 % in the months following Kennedy's 1961 Moon speech,206 and NASA's expenditure peaked at 5.3 % of the federal budget in 1965.207 This is unimaginable today, given the severe budget constraints faced by NASA and the fact that the United States is not a rapidly expanding but a plateauing economy. <u>It</u> thus <u>behoves the United States to discard a space race scenario and consider opportunities for cooperation</u>. Indeed, <u>a gradual increase in cooperation with China would "make sense because it would reduce the cost of US space exploration, enabling both countries to continue gaining scientific knowledge" and also improving relations</u> to a degree.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Solvency | 172,676 | 59 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,620 | b. Certainty – The CP introduces the possibility the plan will not happen | Nieto 9 | Nieto 9 (Judge Henry, Appellate Judge Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/19076662/People-v-Munoz) | Should” is “used to express obligation Courts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded a statute stating expenditures “should” be allocated to be mandatory | Should” is “used to express obligation Courts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded a statute stating expenditures “should” be allocated to be mandatory | “Should” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002).Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995);se e also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation.McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory | 2,425 | <h4>b. <u>Certainty <strong>– The CP introduces the possibility the plan will not happen</h4><p></u>Nieto 9 </strong>(Judge Henry, Appellate Judge Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/19076662/People-v-Munoz)</p><p>“<u><mark>Should” is “used</u></mark> . . . <u><mark>to express</u></mark> duty, <u><mark>obligation</u></mark>, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002).<u><mark>Courts</u></mark> interpreting the word in various contexts <u><mark>have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense</u></mark>. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995);se e also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, <u><mark>the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded</u></mark> that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation.McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding <u><mark>a statute stating</u></mark> that child support <u><mark>expenditures “should” be allocated</u></mark> for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption <u><mark>to be mandatory</p></u></mark> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 1,189 | 1,065 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,621 | Contention 2: Solvency | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Contention 2: Solvency</h4></strong> | null | null | null | 1,560,881 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,622 | Asian arms race ends in nuclear conflict – the region is a powered key. | Tan, Associate Professor at University of New South Wales, 2015 | Tan, Associate Professor at University of New South Wales, 2015(Andrew, Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31) | East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in
AND
, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons. | null | East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in
AND
, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons. | 148 | <h4><strong>Asian arms race ends in nuclear conflict – the region is a powered key. </h4><p>Tan, Associate Professor at University of New South Wales, 2015</strong>(Andrew, <u>Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31)</p><p>East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in </p><p>AND</p><p>, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons. </p></u> | 1NC | Japan DA | null | 1,490,127 | 7 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,623 | Reject climate defense – our models are actually underestimates of climate impacts – cloud ice causes more heat to be trapped | Borenstein, 16 ) | Borenstein, 16 (Seth, writher @ phys, citing study by Yale atmospheric scientist, Another study says warming may be worse than experts think, April 7, 2016, http://phys.org/news/2016-04-worse-experts.html) | Most computer simulations of climate change are underestimating by at least one degree how warm the world will get this century, a new study suggests. computer model simulations say there is more ice and less liquid water in clouds than a decade of satellite observations show The more water and less ice in clouds, the more heat is trapped and less the light is reflected, said Storelvmo a Yale atmospheric scientist As the climate changes, there will be more clouds with far more liquid, and warming will be higher than previously thought This is just the latest in a series of studies that have found that mainstream science may be too conservative in estimating the pace and effects of warming said scientist Alley of Penn State Climate science is more open to criticism of being too conservative In the worst-case scenario the U N sees temperatures rising by .7 degrees Celsius) by Storelvmo said the liquid cloud factor would add another degree or more. | computer simulations are underestimating by at least one degree how warm the world will get this century simulations say there is more ice and less liquid water in clouds than a decade of satellite observations show. The more water the more heat is trapped less the light is reflected warming will be higher than previously thought mainstream science may be too conservative the U N sees temperatures rising by 7 degrees Celsius the liquid cloud factor would add another degree | Most computer simulations of climate change are underestimating by at least one degree Fahrenheit how warm the world will get this century, a new study suggests. It all comes down to clouds and how much heat they are trapping. According to the study published Thursday in the journal Science, computer model simulations say there is more ice and less liquid water in clouds than a decade of satellite observations show. The more water and less ice in clouds, the more heat is trapped and less the light is reflected, said study co-author Trude Storelvmo, a Yale atmospheric scientist. She said even though it is below freezing, the clouds still have lots of liquid water because they don't have enough particles that help the water turn to ice crystals. As the climate changes, there will be more clouds with far more liquid, and global warming will be higher than previously thought, Storelvmo said. This is just the latest in a series of studies that have found that mainstream science may be too conservative in estimating the pace and effects of warming, including melting ice sheets in Antarctica. "None of this is good news," Storelvmo said. "You always hope that climate isn't as sensitive to carbon dioxide as we fear, same with the ice sheets, but we're calling it as we see it. Several studies have come out and show that we've been too conservative up until now." Uncertainties in mainstream climate science are more "on the bad side" than on the side of less harm, said climate and glacier scientist Richard Alley of Pennsylvania State University, who wasn't part of the study. "Climate science thus is probably more open to criticism of being too conservative than being too alarmist." How much warming is predicted for the next 80 or so years depends a lot on whether society cuts back on carbon dioxide emissions. In the worst-case scenario, with no carbon reduction, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change sees temperatures rising by about 6.7 degrees Fahrenheit (3.7 degrees Celsius) by the end of the century, and Storelvmo said the liquid cloud factor would add another degree or more. | 2,126 | <h4>Reject climate defense – our models are actually underestimates of climate impacts – cloud ice causes more heat to be trapped </h4><p><u><strong>Borenstein, 16</u></strong> (Seth, writher @ phys, citing study by Yale atmospheric scientist, Another study says warming may be worse than experts think, April 7, 2016, http://phys.org/news/2016-04-worse-experts.html<u><strong>) </p><p>Most <mark>computer simulations</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of climate change <mark>are underestimating</u></strong> <u><strong>by</u></strong> <u><strong>at least one degree</u></strong></mark> Fahrenheit <u><strong><mark>how warm the world will get this century</mark>, a new study suggests. </u></strong>It all comes down to clouds and how much heat they are trapping. According to the study published Thursday in the journal Science, <u><strong>computer model <mark>simulations</mark> <mark>say</u></strong> <u><strong>there is more ice and less liquid water in clouds than a decade of satellite observations show</u></strong>. <u><strong>The more water</mark> and less ice in clouds, <mark>the more heat is trapped</mark> and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>less the light is reflected</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>said</u></strong> study co-author Trude <u><strong>Storelvmo</u></strong>, <u><strong>a Yale atmospheric scientist</u></strong>. She said even though it is below freezing, the clouds still have lots of liquid water because they don't have enough particles that help the water turn to ice crystals. <u><strong>As the climate changes, there will be more clouds with far more liquid, and </u></strong>global <u><strong><mark>warming will be higher than previously thought</u></strong></mark>, Storelvmo said. <u><strong>This is just the latest in a series of studies that have found that <mark>mainstream science</u></strong> <u><strong>may be too conservative</mark> in estimating the pace and effects of warming</u></strong>, including melting ice sheets in Antarctica. "None of this is good news," Storelvmo said. "You always hope that climate isn't as sensitive to carbon dioxide as we fear, same with the ice sheets, but we're calling it as we see it. Several studies have come out and show that we've been too conservative up until now." Uncertainties in mainstream climate science are more "on the bad side" than on the side of less harm, <u><strong>said</u></strong> climate and glacier <u><strong>scientist</u></strong> Richard <u><strong>Alley of Penn</u></strong>sylvania <u><strong>State</u></strong> University, who wasn't part of the study. "<u><strong>Climate science</u></strong> thus <u><strong>is</u></strong> probably <u><strong>more open</u></strong> <u><strong>to criticism of being too conservative</u></strong> than being too alarmist." How much warming is predicted for the next 80 or so years depends a lot on whether society cuts back on carbon dioxide emissions. <u><strong>In</u></strong> <u><strong>the worst-case scenario</u></strong>, with no carbon reduction, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>N</u></strong></mark>ations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <u><strong><mark>sees temperatures rising by</u></strong></mark> about 6.7 degrees Fahrenheit (3<u><strong>.<mark>7 degrees Celsius</mark>) by</u></strong> the end of the century, and <u><strong>Storelvmo said <mark>the liquid cloud factor would add another degree</mark> or more.</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 409,538 | 41 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,624 | c. Immediacy – The plan sequences the offer before the demand relinquishing leverage | Summer 94 | Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) | The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage In praesenti denotes law is immediately effective opposed to something in the future | the word "should may be deemed in praesenti In praesenti denotes law is immediately effective opposed to something in the future | The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882). | 2,239 | <h4>c. <u>Immediacy</u> – The plan sequences the offer before the demand relinquishing leverage</h4><p><strong>Summer 94 </strong>(Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)</p><p><u>The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether <mark>the word "should</mark>" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or <mark>may be deemed</mark> a ruling <mark>in praesenti</mark>. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage</u>. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] 14 <u><mark>In praesenti </u></mark>means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase <u><mark>denotes</u></mark> that which in <u><mark>law is</u></mark> presently or <u><mark>immediately effective</u></mark>, as <u><mark>opposed to something</u></mark> that will or would become effective <u><mark>in the future</mark> </u>[in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).</p> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 380 | 1,885 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,625 | The United States Federal Government should offer to reduce arms sales to Taiwan and end surveillance of China’s coast in return for eliminating missiles facing Taiwan and reducing military forces currently threating Taiwan through Track 2 means. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States Federal Government should offer to reduce arms sales to Taiwan and end surveillance of China’s coast in return for eliminating missiles facing Taiwan and reducing military forces currently threating Taiwan through Track 2 means. </h4> | 1NC | Track 2 CP | null | 1,560,882 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,626 | China says yes and it solves – plan is flexible, mutually beneficial, and reduces offensive military assets, which solves both country’s security concerns | Etzioni 16 | Etzioni 16 | , Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)
China is highly dependent on maritime trade. China sees itself as vulnerable because the American naval presence gives the U S the ability to block these imports Some openly discuss the option of a blockade, which is considered moderate relative to the Air–Sea Battle concept In response to these concerns China increased its naval presence and developed a network of ports some Chinese view American opposition as attempts to contain China under mutually assured restraint the United States would assume unless clear evidence is presented that extending pathways will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces Therefore, China’s creation of pathways would be a winwin situation China holds that it needs A2/AD weapons for self-defense Meanwhile, the U S views these weapons as a threat to its obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states Both powers should agree to limit their A2/AD missiles. These should be verified using methods agreed upon by both parties Furthermore, small numbe, such as Japan, thereby rs of defensive missiles could be provided to other nations in the region curbing one source of the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military the number of anti-ship missiles have bearing on whether they are classed as offensive or defensive weapons Critics may argue that China began its buildup from a weaker position thus even-handed restraints would lock China into military inferiority. However, allowances might be made for this difference by permitting China to place a limited number of short-range anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves Countermoves by the United States would be impossible Mutually assured restraint assumes the opposite, holding that if China restrains its military buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while defusing overall tensions. | China is dependent on maritime trade. China sees itself as vulnerable because American naval presence gives the U S the ability to block imports Some openly discuss a blockade, which is considered moderate relative to A S B In response ina increased its naval presence some Chinese view America as attempts to contain China mutually assured restraint will make China less inclined to build up its military Therefore, China’s creation of pathways would be a winwin China holds it needs A2/AD weapons for defense Meanwhile, the U S views these weapons as a threat Both powers should agree to limit A2/AD missiles. These should be verified by both parties small numbe rs of defensive missiles could be provided to nations in the region curbing the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military the number of missiles have bearing on whether they are classed as offensive or defensive Critics may argue that restraints would lock China into military inferiority. However, allowances might be made by permitting China to place a limited number of anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves M a r assumes that if China restrains its buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby defusing overall tensions. | (Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)
China is highly dependent on imports of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which comes from maritime trade. China sees itself as highly vulnerable because the strong American naval presence in the region gives the United States the ability to readily block these imports.31 Some American commentators openly discuss the option of such a blockade, which is considered a moderate way of confronting China relative to the Air–Sea Battle concept.32 In response to these concerns and as a result of its broader interest in commercial expansion, China increased its naval presence in the South China Sea and developed a network of ports—termed the “string of pearls”—in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.33 Additionally, China attempted to reduce the country’s reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.34 Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.35 Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China’s expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.36 Meanwhile, some Chinese view American opposition to select pathways (for instance, a pipeline from Iran to China) as attempts to contain China’s growth. However, under mutually assured restraint the United States would assume—unless clear evidence is presented to the contrary—that extending land-based pathways for the flow of energy resources and raw materials will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces needed to secure ocean pathways. Therefore, China’s creation of a system of pathways would be considered a winwin situation for both powers. Limiting Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) Weapons China holds that it needs Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) weapons, especially anti-ship missiles, for self-defense.37 Meanwhile, the United States views these weapons—which are designed to gain control of a territory and limit one’s adversary’s ability to conduct military operations there—as a threat to its ability to discharge its obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states as well as the ability to freely navigate in the region.38 Both powers should agree to limit the number and range of their A2/AD missiles. These limitations should be verified using methods agreed upon by both parties. Such vetting could entail satellite surveillance or mutual inspections of the kind provided by START. Furthermore, small numbe, such as Japan, thereby rs of short-range, defensive missiles could also be provided to other nations in the region curbing one recent source of the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military forces. The idea that A2/AD weapons should be limited has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult to differentiate defensive from offensive weapons.39 Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which defensive arms would aid an offensive strategy, there are clearly differences between the two. Indeed, a particular weapons system may be classified based on whether it is more efficient as an offensive weapon or a defensive one. For example, although tanks can serve defensive purposes, they are much more effective for offensive purposes.40 Similarly, international relations scholars have pointed out that “nearly all historical advances in military mobility—chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment—are generally considered to have favored the offense, while major counter-mobility innovations—moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines—have favored defense.”41 Similarly, the range, placement, and number of anti-ship missiles have bearing on whether they are more accurately classed as offensive or defensive weapons. If their range and number are limited and they are placed on a nation’s shorelines it is likely that they are meant to ward off an attack and are defensive in nature. If an inordinate number of long-range missiles are placed on ships or outlying islands it is more likely that they are offensive. Mutual surveillance, already in place, can help determine whether the placement and range of these weapons is more defensive, and thus evidence of restraint, or offensive. Critics may argue that China began its military buildup from a much weaker position than the United States, and thus even-handed restraints would lock China into perpetual military inferiority. However, allowances might be made for this difference by permitting China to place a limited number of short-range anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves by the United States. Countermoves by the United States would be impossible if the number, range, and position of the anti-ship missiles were clearly associated with an offensive stance. Additionally, critics’ conclusions assume that the best way for a weaker nation to respond to differences in military prowess is to dedicate its resources to a military buildup rather than to urgent domestic needs. Mutually assured restraint assumes the opposite, holding that if China restrains its military buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while defusing overall tensions. | 5,496 | <h4>China says yes and it solves – plan is <u>flexible</u>, <u>mutually beneficial</u>, and <u>reduces offensive military assets</u>, which solves <u>both country’s</u><strong> security concerns</h4><p>Etzioni 16</p><p></strong>(Amitai<u>, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)</p><p><mark>China is</mark> highly <mark>dependent on</u></mark> imports of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which comes from <u><mark>maritime trade. China sees itself as</mark> </u>highly <u><mark>vulnerable because</mark> the</u> strong <u><mark>American naval presence</u></mark> in the region <u><mark>gives the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>the ability to</u></mark> readily <u><mark>block</mark> these <mark>imports</u></mark>.31 <u><mark>Some</u></mark> American commentators <u><mark>openly discuss</mark> the option of</u> such <u><mark>a blockade, <strong>which is considered</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>moderate</u></strong></mark> way of confronting China <u><strong><mark>relative to</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ir–<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle concept</u></strong>.32 <u><mark>In response</mark> to these concerns</u> and as a result of its broader interest in commercial expansion, <u>Ch<mark>ina increased its naval presence</mark> </u>in the South China Sea <u>and developed a network of ports</u>—termed the “string of pearls”—in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.33 Additionally, China attempted to reduce the country’s reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.34 Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.35 Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China’s expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.36 Meanwhile, <u><mark>some Chinese view America</mark>n opposition</u> to select pathways (for instance, a pipeline from Iran to China) <u><mark>as attempts to contain China</u></mark>’s growth. However, <u>under <mark>mutually assured restraint</mark> the United States would assume</u>—<u>unless clear evidence is presented</u> to the contrary—<u>that extending</u> land-based <u>pathways</u> for the flow of energy resources and raw materials <u><mark>will make China less inclined to build up its military<strong></mark>, particularly the naval forces</u></strong> needed to secure ocean pathways. <u><mark>Therefore, China’s creation of</u></mark> a system of <u><mark>pathways would be</u></mark> considered <u><mark>a winwin</mark> situation</u> for both powers. Limiting Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) Weapons <u><mark>China holds</mark> that <mark>it needs</u></mark> Anti-Access/Area Denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>weapons</u></mark>, especially anti-ship missiles, <u><mark>for</mark> self-<mark>defense</u></mark>.37 <u><mark>Meanwhile, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>views these weapons</u></mark>—which are designed to gain control of a territory and limit one’s adversary’s ability to conduct military operations there—<u><mark>as a threat</mark> to its</u> ability to discharge its <u>obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states</u> as well as the ability to freely navigate in the region.38 <u><mark>Both powers should agree to limit</mark> </u>the number and range of <u>their <mark>A2/AD missiles. These</u></mark> limitations <u><mark>should be verified</mark> using methods <strong>agreed upon <mark>by both parties</u></strong></mark>. Such vetting could entail satellite surveillance or mutual inspections of the kind provided by START. <u>Furthermore, <mark>small numbe</mark>, such as Japan, thereby <mark>rs of</mark> </u>short-range, <u><mark>defensive missiles could</u></mark> also <u><mark>be provided to</mark> other <mark>nations in the region</mark> <mark>curbing</mark> one </u>recent<u> source of <mark>the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military</mark> </u>forces. The idea that A2/AD weapons should be limited has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult to differentiate defensive from offensive weapons.39 Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which defensive arms would aid an offensive strategy, there are clearly differences between the two. Indeed, a particular weapons system may be classified based on whether it is more efficient as an offensive weapon or a defensive one. For example, although tanks can serve defensive purposes, they are much more effective for offensive purposes.40 Similarly, international relations scholars have pointed out that “nearly all historical advances in military mobility—chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment—are generally considered to have favored the offense, while major counter-mobility innovations—moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines—have favored defense.”41 Similarly, <u><mark>the</u></mark> range, placement, and <u><mark>number of</mark> anti-ship <mark>missiles have bearing on whether they are</u></mark> more accurately <u><mark>classed as offensive or defensive</mark> weapons</u>. If their range and number are limited and they are placed on a nation’s shorelines it is likely that they are meant to ward off an attack and are defensive in nature. If an inordinate number of long-range missiles are placed on ships or outlying islands it is more likely that they are offensive. Mutual surveillance, already in place, can help determine whether the placement and range of these weapons is more defensive, and thus evidence of restraint, or offensive. <u><mark>Critics may argue that</mark> China began its</u> military <u>buildup from a</u> much <u>weaker position</u> than the United States, and <u>thus even-handed <mark>restraints would lock China into</u></mark> perpetual <u><mark>military inferiority. <strong>However</strong>, allowances might be made </mark>for this difference <mark>by permitting China to place a limited number of</mark> short-range <mark>anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves</u></mark> by the United States. <u>Countermoves by the United States would be impossible</u> if the number, range, and position of the anti-ship missiles were clearly associated with an offensive stance. Additionally, critics’ conclusions assume that the best way for a weaker nation to respond to differences in military prowess is to dedicate its resources to a military buildup rather than to urgent domestic needs. <u><mark>M</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint <mark>assumes</mark> the opposite, holding <mark>that if China restrains its</mark> military <mark>buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby</mark> reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while <mark>defusing overall tensions.</p></u></mark> | null | null | null | 1,560,343 | 5 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,627 | And its a threat multiplier – escalates conflict | Torres, affiliate scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 7-22 | Torres, affiliate scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 7-22-16
(Phil, PhD candidate @ Rice University in tropical conservation biology, Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/Torres20160807) | Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges Threats stem from asteroids pandemics climate change nuclear weapons biotechnology climate change loss should take priority over every other known threat Because these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will frame our existential predicament for thousands of years they have the capacity to raise or lower the probability of other risks scenarios unfolding are wars more or less likely in a world marked by extreme weather events megadroughts food supply disruptions Are terrorist attacks more or less likely in a world beset the collapse of global ecosystems agricultural failures economic uncertainty government officials and scientists agree “more likely.” Brennan identified climate change as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in Syria Iraq Yemen Libya and Ukraine Hagel described climate change as a “threat multiplier” climate change will aggravate poverty social tensions ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability climate change could very easily push societies to the brink of collapse This will exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and introduce entirely new power struggles imagine a barreling toward In a relatively peaceful world, one could imagine an asteroid bringing humanity together by directing our attention toward a common threat. But the “conflict multipliers” of climate change have already catapulted civilization into and humanity will become more susceptible to danger both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats they could indirectly contribute to the overall danger of annihilation another study suggests we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible collapse of the global ecosystem Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars nuclear terrorism engineered pandemics superintelligence takeover and an impact winter it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns | climate change should take priority over every other known threat these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will frame our existential predicament they have the capacity to raise or lower probability of other risks wars more likely in a world marked by extreme weather events Are terrorist attacks more likely the collapse of global ecosystems, agricultural failures, economic uncertainty deeper causes of this rising instability” in Syria Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine climate change will aggravate poverty, social tensions ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions could push societies to the brink of collapse conflict multipliers we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible collapse Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, and an impact winter, it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns | Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges this century. Threats to our collective survival stem from asteroids and comets, supervolcanoes, global pandemics, climate change, biodiversity loss, nuclear weapons, biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely climate change and biodiveristy loss, should take priority right now over every other known threat. Why? Because these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will frame our existential predicament on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but for literally thousands of years to come. As such, they have the capacity to raise or lower the probability of other risks scenarios unfolding. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: are wars more or less likely in a world marked by extreme weather events, megadroughts, food supply disruptions, and sea-level rise? Are terrorist attacks more or less likely in a world beset by the collapse of global ecosystems, agricultural failures, economic uncertainty, and political instability? Both government officials and scientists agree that the answer is “more likely.” For example, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennan, recently identified “the impact of climate change” as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has described climate change as a “threat multiplier” with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history. A Perfect Storm The point is that climate change and biodiversity loss could very easily push societies to the brink of collapse. This will exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and introduce entirely new power struggles between state and nonstate actors. At the same time, advanced technologies will very likely become increasingly powerful and accessible. As I’ve written elsewhere, the malicious agents of the future will have bulldozers rather than shovels to dig mass graves for their enemies. The result is a perfect storm of more conflicts in the world along with unprecedentedly dangerous weapons. If the conversation were to end here, we’d have ample reason for placing climate change and biodiversity loss at the top of our priority lists. But there are other reasons they ought to be considered urgent threats. I would argue that they could make humanity more vulnerable to a catastrophe involving superintelligence and even asteroids. The basic reasoning is the same for both cases. Consider superintelligence first. Programming a superintelligence whose values align with ours is a formidable task even in stable circumstances. As Nick Bostrom argues in his 2014 book, we should recognize the “default outcome” of superintelligence to be “doom.” Now imagine trying to solve these problems amidst a rising tide of interstate wars, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, and other tragedies? The societal stress caused by climate change and biodiversity loss will almost certainly compromise important conditions for creating friendly AI, such as sufficient funding, academic programs to train new scientists, conferences on AI, peer-reviewed journal publications, and communication/collaboration between experts of different fields, such as computer science and ethics. It could even make an “AI arms race” more likely, thereby raising the probability of a malevolent superintelligence being created either on purpose or by mistake. Similarly, imagine that astronomers discover a behemoth asteroid barreling toward Earth. Will designing, building, and launching a spacecraft to divert the assassin past our planet be easier or more difficult in a world preoccupied with other survival issues? In a relatively peaceful world, one could imagine an asteroid actually bringing humanity together by directing our attention toward a common threat. But if the “conflict multipliers” of climate change and biodiversity loss have already catapulted civilization into chaos and turmoil, I strongly suspect that humanity will become more, rather than less, susceptible to dangers of this sort. Context Risks We can describe the dual threats of climate change and biodiversity loss as “context risks.” Neither is likely to directly cause the extinction of our species. But both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats before us. In this way, they could indirectly contribute to the overall danger of annihilation — and this worrisome effect could be significant. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet another study suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an impact winter, it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight. | 7,478 | <h4>And its a threat multiplier – escalates conflict</h4><p><u><strong>Torres, affiliate scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 7-22</u></strong>-16 </p><p>(Phil, PhD candidate @ Rice University in tropical conservation biology, Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/Torres20160807) </p><p><u><strong>Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges</u></strong> this century. <u><strong>Threats</u></strong> to our collective survival <u><strong>stem from</u></strong> <u><strong>asteroids</u></strong> and comets, supervolcanoes, global <u><strong>pandemics</u></strong>, <u><strong>climate change</u></strong>, biodiversity loss, <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong>, <u><strong>biotechnology</u></strong>, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely <u><strong><mark>climate change</mark> </u></strong>and biodiveristy<u><strong> loss</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>should take priority</u></strong></mark> right now <u><strong><mark>over</u></strong> <u><strong>every other known threat</u></strong></mark>. Why? <u><strong>Because <mark>these ongoing catastrophes</u></strong> <u><strong>in slow-motion</u></strong> <u><strong>will frame our existential predicament</u></strong></mark> on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but <u><strong>for</u></strong> literally <u><strong>thousands of years</u></strong> to come. As such, <u><strong><mark>they</u></strong> <u><strong>have the capacity to raise or lower</mark> the <mark>probability of other risks</mark> scenarios</u></strong> <u><strong>unfolding</u></strong>. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: <u><strong>are <mark>wars more</mark> or less <mark>likely in a world marked by extreme weather events</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>megadroughts</u></strong>, <u><strong>food supply disruptions</u></strong>, and sea-level rise? <u><strong><mark>Are terrorist attacks</u></strong> <u><strong>more</mark> or less <mark>likely</mark> in a world beset</u></strong> by <u><strong><mark>the collapse of global ecosystems</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural failures</u></strong>, <u><strong>economic uncertainty</u></strong></mark>, and political instability? Both <u><strong>government officials and scientists agree</u></strong> that the answer is <u><strong>“more likely.”</u></strong> For example, the current Director of the CIA, John <u><strong>Brennan</u></strong>, recently <u><strong>identified</u></strong> “the impact of <u><strong>climate change</u></strong>” <u><strong>as one of the “<mark>deeper causes of this rising instability”</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong></mark> countries like <u><strong><mark>Syria</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>Iraq</u></strong>, <u><strong>Yemen</u></strong>, <u><strong>Libya</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Ukraine</u></strong></mark>. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck <u><strong>Hagel</u></strong>, has <u><strong>described climate change as a “threat multiplier”</u></strong> with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global <u><strong><mark>climate change will aggravate</u></strong></mark> problems such as <u><strong><mark>poverty</u></strong>, <u><strong>social tensions</u></strong></mark>, environmental degradation, <u><strong><mark>ineffectual leadership</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>weak political institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that threaten stability</u></strong> in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history. A Perfect Storm The point is that <u><strong>climate change </u></strong>and biodiversity loss <u><strong><mark>could</mark> very easily <mark>push societies to the brink of collapse</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This will exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and introduce entirely</u></strong> <u><strong>new power struggles</u></strong> between state and nonstate actors. At the same time, advanced technologies will very likely become increasingly powerful and accessible. As I’ve written elsewhere, the malicious agents of the future will have bulldozers rather than shovels to dig mass graves for their enemies. The result is a perfect storm of more conflicts in the world along with unprecedentedly dangerous weapons. If the conversation were to end here, we’d have ample reason for placing climate change and biodiversity loss at the top of our priority lists. But there are other reasons they ought to be considered urgent threats. I would argue that they could make humanity more vulnerable to a catastrophe involving superintelligence and even asteroids. The basic reasoning is the same for both cases. Consider superintelligence first. Programming a superintelligence whose values align with ours is a formidable task even in stable circumstances. As Nick Bostrom argues in his 2014 book, we should recognize the “default outcome” of superintelligence to be “doom.” Now imagine trying to solve these problems amidst a rising tide of interstate wars, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, and other tragedies? The societal stress caused by climate change and biodiversity loss will almost certainly compromise important conditions for creating friendly AI, such as sufficient funding, academic programs to train new scientists, conferences on AI, peer-reviewed journal publications, and communication/collaboration between experts of different fields, such as computer science and ethics. It could even make an “AI arms race” more likely, thereby raising the probability of a malevolent superintelligence being created either on purpose or by mistake. Similarly, <u><strong>imagine</u></strong> that astronomers discover <u><strong>a</u></strong> behemoth asteroid <u><strong>barreling toward</u></strong> Earth. Will designing, building, and launching a spacecraft to divert the assassin past our planet be easier or more difficult in a world preoccupied with other survival issues? <u><strong>In a relatively peaceful world,</u></strong> <u><strong>one could imagine an asteroid</u></strong> actually <u><strong>bringing humanity together</u></strong> <u><strong>by directing our attention toward a common threat.</u></strong> <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u><strong>the “<mark>conflict multipliers</mark>” of climate change</u></strong> and biodiversity loss <u><strong>have already catapulted civilization</u></strong> <u><strong>into</u></strong> chaos <u><strong>and</u></strong> turmoil, I strongly suspect that <u><strong>humanity will become</u></strong> <u><strong>more</u></strong>, rather than less, <u><strong>susceptible to danger</u></strong>s of this sort. Context Risks We can describe the dual threats of climate change and biodiversity loss as “context risks.” Neither is likely to directly cause the extinction of our species. But <u><strong>both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats</u></strong> before us. In this way, <u><strong>they could indirectly contribute to the overall danger of annihilation</u></strong> — and this worrisome effect could be significant. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet <u><strong>another study suggests</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>we could be approaching a sudden,</u></strong> <u><strong>irreversible</u></strong></mark>, catastrophic <u><strong><mark>collapse</mark> of the global ecosystem</u></strong>. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” <u><strong><mark>Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars</u></strong>, <u><strong>nuclear terrorism</u></strong>, <u><strong>engineered pandemics</u></strong>,</mark> a <u><strong>superintelligence takeover</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> perhaps even <u><strong><mark>an impact winter</u></strong>, <u><strong>it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns</u></strong></mark> — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Climate Change – 1AC | 11,648 | 1,042 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,628 | 2) Leaks undermine the permutation’s leverage – They know we’ll do it regardless | Washington Post 9 | Washington Post 9 (Michael Gerson- November 20, 2009, Obama the undecider, lexisnexis) | Gates is "appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know. leaks have been attempts to rig the outcome of a decision Leaks are an attempt to box in the president a mini-coup in which officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger | government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know leaks have been attempts to rig the outcome of decision Leaks box in the president a mini-coup in which officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger | Gates said he is "appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on," which would be, if the culprits are discovered, "a career-ender." Obama recently added, "I think I am angrier than Bob Gates about it." They should be appalled and angry at the process they created -- as should the rest of the country. Sometimes government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know. But leaks in this process have been attempts to rig the outcome of a national security decision. This summer, nameless White House officials began leaking their skepticism of plans for troop increases. Then Gen. Stanley McChrystal's assessment, calling for a more troop-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, was leaked. Then a leak of internal government reviews on the poor state of the Afghan military and police forces. Then a leak from "informed sources" that Obama had settled on a troop increase of 34,000. Then the leak that Obama had rejected all the military options on the table and was insisting on refinements. Then the leak of two classified cables from Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, which cautioned against troop increases, leaving McChrystal, according to another nameless source, feeling "stabbed in the back." The Afghan policy process has resulted in more leaks than Oktoberfest. Leaks are a form of disloyalty -- an attempt to box in the president of the United States, a mini-coup in which unelected officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger, then leave the losing side in a debate publicly humiliated and perhaps alienated from the outcome. Depending on that outcome, Obama will be vulnerable to charges of buckling to military pressure or disregarding the advice of his commanders. | 1,807 | <h4><strong>2) Leaks undermine the permutation’s leverage – They know we’ll do it regardless</h4><p>Washington Post 9</strong> (Michael Gerson- November 20, 2009, Obama the undecider, lexisnexis)</p><p><u>Gates</u> said he <u>is "appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on</u>," which would be, if the culprits are discovered, "a career-ender." Obama recently added, "I think I am angrier than Bob Gates about it." They should be appalled and angry at the process they created -- as should the rest of the country. Sometimes<u> <mark>government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know</mark>.</u> But <u><mark>leaks</u></mark> in this process <u><mark>have been attempts to rig the outcome of</mark> a </u>national security<u> <mark>decision</u></mark>. This summer, nameless White House officials began leaking their skepticism of plans for troop increases. Then Gen. Stanley McChrystal's assessment, calling for a more troop-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, was leaked. Then a leak of internal government reviews on the poor state of the Afghan military and police forces. Then a leak from "informed sources" that Obama had settled on a troop increase of 34,000. Then the leak that Obama had rejected all the military options on the table and was insisting on refinements. Then the leak of two classified cables from Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, which cautioned against troop increases, leaving McChrystal, according to another nameless source, feeling "stabbed in the back." The Afghan policy process has resulted in more leaks than Oktoberfest. <u><mark>Leaks</mark> are</u> a form of disloyalty -- <u>an attempt to <mark>box in the president</u></mark> of the United States, <u><mark>a mini-coup in which </u></mark>unelected<u><mark> officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger</u></mark>, then leave the losing side in a debate publicly humiliated and perhaps alienated from the outcome. Depending on that outcome, Obama will be vulnerable to charges of buckling to military pressure or disregarding the advice of his commanders.</p> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 162,321 | 5 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,629 | Plan solves institutionalizes communication, confidence building, and verification mechanisms which solve strategic distrust and uncertainty | Etzioni 16 | Etzioni 16 | That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military Above all, China has developed a series of A2/AD weapons capable of preventing the U S from protecting Taiwan and Japan or exercising free navigation in the region; these developments are viewed as a challenge to the United States’ position in the region. In response, the United States developed the Air–Sea Battle concept It seeks to build ships and weapons that can neutralize Chinese A2/AD Critics have been alarmed that the A S B calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such an attack is likely to result in full-fledged war rather than a local skirmish If current trends continue, with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war may be proven correct. For this reason, curbing tensions and military buildups both objectives of mutually assured restraint are paramount. As a paradigm of action, mutually assured restraint seeks to inject substance into the vague phrases mouthed by both powers: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, and the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China Mutually assured restraint is based on mutual respect confidence building, and new institutionalized arrangements that move both powers away from situations that could escalate into major conflicts each side would limit its military buildup and use of coercive diplomacy as long as the other side does the same. China would be free to take the steps it deems necessary for self-defense and maintenance of its relationships without threatening other nations or international commons. At the same time, the U S would be free to take the steps it believes are necessary to preserve self-defense, its obligations to allies and the international order. Critics might suggest self-restraint would be anathema to the militaries of both However, self-restraint defined as not impulse but rather deliberating before acting For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward Self-restraint can be verified by the other side, is not externally imposed restraint There is a precedent for mutually assured restraint this follows Ronald Reagan’s line “trust but verify,” reflected in START | China has developed A2/AD weapons capable of preventing the U S from protecting Taiwan and Japan these are viewed as a challenge to the U S In response, the U S developed A S B It seeks to build ships and weapons that can neutralize A2/AD A S B calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such attack is kely to result in full-fledged war with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war may be correct curbing tensions and military buildups—both objectives of m a r are paramount m a r seeks to inject substance in the phrases mouthed by both powers and is based on mutual respect confidence building, and new institutionalized arrangements that move both away from situations that could escalate each side would limit military buildup and coercive diplomacy China would be free to take steps for self-defense and maintenance of its relationships At the same time, the U S would take the steps necessary to preserve self-defense to allies and the international order Self-restraint follows trust but verify reflected in START | (Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)
That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military. Its annual GDP percentage growth rate is still more than twice that of the United States’ GDP in 2012 despite a recent slowdown.6 Above all, China has developed a series of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons reportedly capable of preventing the United States from effectively protecting Taiwan and Japan or exercising free navigation in the region; these developments are viewed by the U.S. military as a challenge to the United States’ position in the region. The most prominent example of these A2/AD weapons is anti-ship missiles, which cost little and can incapacitate the expensive American aircraft carriers that represent a key component of U.S. power projection. In response, the United States developed the Air–Sea Battle concept.7 It seeks to build faster, smaller ships and develop weapons—including direct energy arms, a type of laser that if positioned on ships could “burn” incoming missiles—that can neutralize the new Chinese A2/AD ones. Critics have been particularly alarmed that, because direct energy arms have yet to be developed, the Air–Sea Battle concept calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such an attack is more likely to result in full-fledged war with China rather than a local skirmish over control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.8 If current trends continue, with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war between a rising power and an established one may be proven correct. For this reason, curbing tensions and capping military buildups—both objectives of mutually assured restraint—are paramount. As a paradigm of action, mutually assured restraint seeks to inject substance into the vague phrases mouthed by both powers: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, and the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China.9 Mutually assured restraint is a foreign policy based on mutual respect, a quest for confidence building, and a set of new institutionalized arrangements that would move both powers away from situations that could escalate into major conflicts. Accordingly, each side would limit its own military buildup and use of coercive diplomacy as long as the other side does the same. Furthermore, these self-restraint measures would be vetted in ways spelled out below. Thus, China would be free to take the steps it deems necessary for its self-defense and the maintenance of its ally relationships without threatening other nations or the international commons. At the same time, the United States would be free to take the steps it believes are necessary to preserve its self-defense, its obligations to its allies in the region, and the international order. Critics of mutually assured restraint might suggest that any strategy that includes the term “self-restraint” would be anathema to the militaries of both the United States and China. However, self-restraint—defined as not yielding to impulse but rather deliberating before acting and having the capacity to choose a course of action rather than following urges—is a mark of civilization. For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling the forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward unprepared at the slightest provocation. Self-restraint also involves refraining from going “a bridge too far,” outrunning supply lines, or exhausting one’s stock of ammunition.10 Self-restraint, albeit of the kind that can be verified by the other side, is not to be conflated with externally imposed restraint, which is frustrating as is typical for imposed limitations. There is a precedent for one element of mutually assured restraint, that of mutual vetting. In this sense mutually assured restraint follows President Ronald Reagan’s line “trust but verify,” a concept whose value is reflected in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and New Start), the vetted treaties between the United States and Russia that limit strategic weapons. That both nations agreed to help each other verify the limitations each nation imposed on strategic forces was an essential element of both treaties. Aside from relying on satellite surveillance for verification, START stipulates on-site inspections in the United States by Russian officials and vice-versa, including examinations of the location and number of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads.11 | 4,679 | <h4>Plan solves <u>institutionalizes</u> communication, confidence building, and<strong> verification mechanisms which solve strategic distrust and uncertainty</h4><p>Etzioni 16</p><p></strong>(Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)</p><p><u>That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military</u>. Its annual GDP percentage growth rate is still more than twice that of the United States’ GDP in 2012 despite a recent slowdown.6 <u>Above all, <mark>China has developed</mark> a series of</u> anti-access/area denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>weapons</u></mark> reportedly <u><mark>capable of preventing the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>from</u></mark> effectively <u><mark>protecting Taiwan and Japan</mark> or exercising free navigation in the region; <mark>these</mark> developments <mark>are viewed</u></mark> by the U.S. military <u><mark>as a challenge to the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ position in the region.</u> The most prominent example of these A2/AD weapons is anti-ship missiles, which cost little and can incapacitate the expensive American aircraft carriers that represent a key component of U.S. power projection. <u><mark>In response, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>developed</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ir–<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle concept</u>.7<mark> <u>It seeks to build</mark> </u>faster, smaller<u> <mark>ships and</mark> </u>develop<u> <mark>weapons</u></mark>—including direct energy arms, a type of laser that if positioned on ships could “burn” incoming missiles—<u><mark>that can neutralize</u></mark> the new <u>Chinese <mark>A2/AD</u></mark> ones. <u>Critics have been</u> particularly <u>alarmed that</u>, because direct energy arms have yet to be developed, <u>the <mark>A</u></mark>ir–<u><mark>S</u></mark>ea <u><mark>B</u></mark>attle concept <u><mark>calls for <strong>striking anti-ship missiles</strong> on the <strong>Chinese</strong> <strong>mainland</strong>. Such</mark> an <mark>attack is</u></mark> more <u>li<mark>kely to result <strong>in full-fledged war</u></strong></mark> with China <u>rather than a local skirmish</u> over control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.8 <u>If current trends continue, <mark>with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war</u></mark> between a rising power and an established one <u><strong><mark>may be</mark> proven <mark>correct</strong></mark>. For this reason, <mark>curbing tensions and</u></mark> capping <u><mark>military buildups</u>—<u>both objectives of m</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint</u>—<u><strong><mark>are paramount</strong></mark>. As a paradigm of action, <mark>m</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint <mark>seeks to inject substance in</mark>to <mark>the</mark> vague <mark>phrases mouthed by both powers</mark>: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, <mark>and</mark> the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China</u>.9 <u>Mutually assured restraint <mark>is</u></mark> a foreign policy <u><mark>based on <strong>mutual respect</u></strong></mark>, a quest for <u><strong><mark>confidence building</strong>, and</u></mark> a set of <u><strong><mark>new institutionalized arrangements</strong> that</mark> </u>would <u><mark>move both</mark> powers <mark>away from situations that could escalate </mark>into major conflicts</u>. Accordingly, <u><mark>each side would limit</mark> its</u> own <u><mark>military buildup and</mark> use of <mark>coercive diplomacy</mark> as long as the other side does the same. </u>Furthermore, these self-restraint measures would be vetted in ways spelled out below. Thus, <u><mark>China would be free to take</mark> the <mark>steps</mark> it deems necessary <mark>for</mark> </u>its<u> <mark>self-defense and</u></mark> the <u><mark>maintenance of its</u></mark> ally <u><mark>relationships</mark> without threatening other nations or </u>the <u>international commons<strong>. <mark>At the same </strong>time, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would</mark> be free to <mark>take the steps</mark> it believes are <mark>necessary to preserve</u></mark> its <u><mark>self-defense</mark>, its obligations <mark>to</u></mark> its <u><mark>allies</u></mark> in the region, <u><mark>and the international order</mark>. Critics</u> of mutually assured restraint <u>might suggest</u> that any strategy that includes the term “<u>self-restraint</u>” <u>would be anathema to the militaries of both</u> the United States and China. <u>However, self-restraint</u>—<u>defined as not</u> yielding to <u>impulse but rather <strong>deliberating before acting</u></strong> and having the capacity to choose a course of action rather than following urges—is a mark of civilization. <u>For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling</u> the <u>forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward</u> unprepared at the slightest provocation. Self-restraint also involves refraining from going “a bridge too far,” outrunning supply lines, or exhausting one’s stock of ammunition.10 <u><mark>Self-restraint</u></mark>, albeit of the kind that <u>can be verified by the other side, <strong>is not</strong> </u>to be conflated with<u> <strong>externally imposed restraint</u></strong>, which is frustrating as is typical for imposed limitations. <u><strong>There is a precedent</strong> for</u> one element of <u>mutually assured restraint</u>, that of mutual vetting. In <u>this</u> sense mutually assured restraint <u><mark>follows</u></mark> President <u>Ronald Reagan’s line “<strong><mark>trust but verify</strong></mark>,”</u> a concept whose value is <u><mark>reflected in</mark> </u>the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (<u><mark>START</u></mark> I and New Start), the vetted treaties between the United States and Russia that limit strategic weapons. That both nations agreed to help each other verify the limitations each nation imposed on strategic forces was an essential element of both treaties. Aside from relying on satellite surveillance for verification, START stipulates on-site inspections in the United States by Russian officials and vice-versa, including examinations of the location and number of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads.11</p> | null | null | null | 1,560,338 | 5 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,630 | Track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy are best for cooperation and bilateral talks - solves laundry list | Tanner and Zhao 5/5 | Tanner and Zhao 5/5 (Travis Tanner and Zhao Minghao, Travis Tanner is Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the 100,000 Strong Foundation, Zhao Minghao is a Member of the Academic Committee and a Research Fellow at the Pangoal Institution, “Investment in U.S.-China Relations Starts with People,” China US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/investment-in-u-s-china-relations-starts-with-people/, May 5, 2016) atn | A second obstacle for P2P exchange is that the bureaucratic systems and mechanisms Apathy in
AND
more opportunities for student exchanges to train this future generation of relationship managers. | null | A second obstacle for P2P exchange is that the bureaucratic systems and mechanisms Apathy in
AND
more opportunities for student exchanges to train this future generation of relationship managers. | 195 | <h4><u>Track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy are best for cooperation and bilateral talks - solves laundry list</h4><p></u><strong>Tanner and Zhao 5/5 </strong>(Travis Tanner and Zhao Minghao, Travis Tanner is Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the 100,000 Strong Foundation, Zhao Minghao is a Member of the Academic Committee and a Research Fellow at the Pangoal Institution, “Investment in U.S.-China Relations Starts with People,” China US Focus,<u> </u>http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/investment-in-u-s-china-relations-starts-with-people/<u>, May 5, 2016) atn </p><p>A second obstacle for P2P exchange is that the bureaucratic systems and mechanisms Apathy in </p><p>AND</p><p>more opportunities for student exchanges to train this future generation of relationship managers.</p></u> | 1NC | Track 2 CP | null | 1,560,884 | 2 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,631 | The United States federal government should initiate and conclude the outcome of a bilateral dialogue with the Peoples Republic of China regarding the creation of joint ventures that provide participating Chinese firms: 50% ownership in Intellectual Property Rights held, exemptions for joint ventures from filing fees associated with applications for IP and enforcement procedures, any IPRs already registered with the PTO by the US half of the joint venture is automatically entitled to registration with SIPO in China, and special fee-shifting or burden-shifting provisions which favor the joint venture in judicial proceedings in which a joint venture alleges IP infringement. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States federal government should initiate and conclude the outcome of a bilateral dialogue with the Peoples Republic of China regarding the creation of joint ventures that provide participating Chinese firms: 50% ownership in Intellectual Property Rights held, exemptions for joint ventures from filing fees associated with applications for IP and enforcement procedures, any IPRs already registered with the PTO by the US half of the joint venture is automatically entitled to registration with SIPO in China, and special fee-shifting or burden-shifting provisions which favor the joint venture in judicial proceedings in which a joint venture alleges IP infringement. </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Solvency/Plan – 1AC | 1,560,883 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,632 | Pressure solves in spite of nationalism | Jianli 8 (Yang, founder of Initiatives for China, 5/5, “The Facets Of Chinese Nationalism”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/04/AR2008050401599.html?utm_term=.0f6cf425501c) | Jianli 8 (Yang, founder of Initiatives for China, 5/5, “The Facets Of Chinese Nationalism”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/04/AR2008050401599.html?utm_term=.0f6cf425501c) | Underlying these questions is a sense that pressure may have played into nationalist emotions rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime It is critical people distinguish among the types of nationalism in China China's leaders have engaged in a delicate balancing act of fanning nationalist emotion while tightly controlling this emotion to limit its potential damage The same is true of "vassal nationalism." The majority of vassal nationalists are China's elites this fury can pass like the weather; vassal nationalists seem to overcome their emotions the moment the party hints that they ought to popular nationalism values human rights and democracy These Chinese nationalists can be quite reasonable, accurate, righteous and pro-democracy The fourth kind of nationalism in China could be called human rights patriotism This type of patriotism holds human rights as its core value and democracy as its goal The worst option would be to fall silent; this would embolden the regime. More than that, popular nationalists might well align more closely with the Communist Party pressure will help enlarge the public space for discourse for human rights patriots in China. The international community should help by forming a broad coalition of human rights patriots Continued pressure on the regime to renounce its strategy of violent repression should be applied the pragmatic nationalists would probably cede some ground -- they understand the language of pressure success depends upon persistent efforts | Underlying these questions is a sense that pressure may have played into nationalist emotions rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime It is critical people distinguish among the types of nationalism in China China's leaders have engaged in a delicate balancing act of fanning nationalist emotion while tightly controlling this emotion to limit its potential damage The same is true of "vassal nationalism." The majority of vassal nationalists are China's elites this fury can pass like the weather; vassal nationalists seem to overcome their emotions the moment the party hints that they ought to popular nationalism values human rights and democracy These Chinese nationalists can be quite reasonable, accurate, righteous and pro-democracy The fourth kind of nationalism in China could be called human rights patriotism This type of patriotism holds human rights as its core value and democracy as its goal The worst option would be to fall silent; this would embolden the regime. More than that, popular nationalists might well align more closely with the Communist Party pressure will help enlarge the public space for discourse for human rights patriots in China. The international community should help by forming a broad coalition of human rights patriots Continued pressure on the regime to renounce its strategy of violent repression should be applied the pragmatic nationalists would probably cede some ground -- they understand the language of pressure success depends upon persistent efforts | Frequently the past few months, I have been asked about the wisdom of using the Olympics as an opportunity to push China to improve its human rights record. Underlying these questions is a sense that international pressure may have played into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party by triggering nationalist emotions and rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime. This concern is understandable. It is critical, however, that people distinguish among the four types of nationalism in China today to determine how best to pressure the regime to make improvements. First there is pragmatic nationalism. In everything but name, communism is dead in China. The Communist Party's pragmatic nationalism is one of the two lifelines to which it clings; the other is rapid economic growth. China's leaders understand that continued prosperity is the key to their continued rule. They have engaged in a delicate balancing act of fanning nationalist emotion to promote loyalty among the populace while at the same time tightly controlling this emotion to limit its potential damage to China's standing in the global economy. This pragmatic nationalism is a doctrine driven by national interest, not ideology. The same is true of "vassal nationalism." The majority of vassal nationalists are China's elites, and they move in lock step with pragmatic nationalism as dictated by the government. They become angry and indignant at the right time and place, when and where the party thinks they should. But this fury can pass like the weather; vassal nationalists seem to overcome their emotions the moment the party hints that they ought to. For example, many Chinese who don't normally feel uneasy about the country's state-controlled media, or the regime's tireless policing of the Internet, vehemently protested some "unsatisfactory" reports on Tibet by Western media outlets in recent weeks. This inconsistency is the hallmark of vassal nationalism. The third type is popular nationalism, which pursues China's unity, strength, prosperity and dignity. This type of nationalism sometimes, but not always, values human rights and democracy at its core. These Chinese nationalists can be quite reasonable, accurate, righteous and pro-democracy when it comes to local politics; their judgment is based on their own experiences. But they can be illogical, inconsistent or emotional regarding foreign relations -- especially on Taiwan -- or minorities, because they rely on state-run media for information about these issues. The fourth kind of nationalism in China could be called human rights patriotism. People who espouse this type of nationalism include the recently sentenced human rights activist Hu Jia, land rights advocate Yang Chunlin and the blind Chinese rights activist Chen Guangcheng. This type of patriotism holds human rights as its core value and democracy as its goal; pursues Chinese glory by seeking to gain dignity for each compatriot; promotes strength and prosperity by striving to liberate people's minds, ideas and potential; and aims to safeguard the country's integrity through recognition of the integrity of each individual and ethnic group. The Dalai Lama, having long taken the middle-road approach through nonviolent means, is a human rights patriot even from the perspective of the greater China. So is Taiwan's elected president, Ma Yingjeou. So how does this influence what we should do before the Summer Games? The worst option would be to fall silent; this would only embolden the regime. More than that, popular nationalists, with strength and prosperity foremost in their minds, might well align more closely with the Communist Party. Given China's strengthened dictatorship, rapid economic growth and ever-expanding military forces, they do not really have a choice. Since I left prison last year, I have advocated conditional participation in the Olympics. Participation must be predicated on some minimum standard of human rights. Applying this pressure will help enlarge the public space for discourse for human rights patriots in China. The international community should help by forming a broad coalition of human rights patriots to support the concerted peaceful protest activities inside and outside of China. Continued pressure on the regime to renounce its strategy of violent repression and to instead enter into a dialogue with the coalition of human rights patriots should be applied. If all of this were to happen, the pragmatic nationalists would probably cede some ground -- they understand the language of pressure -- and then we could support the Beijing Olympics as a great celebration of the beginning of a real democratic transition in China. Far from being impossible, this goal is attainable. Its success depends upon our persistent efforts. | 4,801 | <h4>Pressure solves in spite of nationalism</h4><p><strong>Jianli 8 (Yang, founder of Initiatives for China, 5/5, “The Facets Of Chinese Nationalism”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/04/AR2008050401599.html?utm_term=.0f6cf425501c)</p><p></strong>Frequently the past few months, I have been asked about the wisdom of using the Olympics as an opportunity to push China to improve its human rights record. <u><mark>Underlying these questions is a sense that</u></mark> international <u><mark>pressure may have played into</u></mark> the hands of the Chinese Communist Party by triggering <u><mark>nationalist emotions</u></mark> and <u><mark>rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime</u></mark>. This concern is understandable. <u><mark>It is critical</u></mark>, however, that <u><mark>people distinguish among the</u></mark> four <u><mark>types of nationalism in China</u></mark> today to determine how best to pressure the regime to make improvements. First there is pragmatic nationalism. In everything but name, communism is dead in China. The Communist Party's pragmatic nationalism is one of the two lifelines to which it clings; the other is rapid economic growth. <u><mark>China's leaders</u></mark> understand that continued prosperity is the key to their continued rule. They <u><mark>have engaged in a delicate balancing act of fanning nationalist emotion</u></mark> to promote loyalty among the populace <u><mark>while</u></mark> at the same time <u><mark>tightly controlling this emotion to limit its potential damage</u></mark> to China's standing in the global economy. This pragmatic nationalism is a doctrine driven by national interest, not ideology. <u><mark>The same is true of "vassal nationalism." The majority of vassal nationalists are China's elites</u></mark>, and they move in lock step with pragmatic nationalism as dictated by the government. They become angry and indignant at the right time and place, when and where the party thinks they should. But <u><mark>this fury can pass like the weather; vassal nationalists seem to overcome their emotions the moment the party hints that they ought to</u></mark>. For example, many Chinese who don't normally feel uneasy about the country's state-controlled media, or the regime's tireless policing of the Internet, vehemently protested some "unsatisfactory" reports on Tibet by Western media outlets in recent weeks. This inconsistency is the hallmark of vassal nationalism. The third type is <u><mark>popular nationalism</u></mark>, which pursues China's unity, strength, prosperity and dignity. This type of nationalism sometimes, but not always, <u><mark>values human rights and democracy</mark> </u>at its core. <u><mark>These Chinese nationalists can be quite reasonable, accurate, righteous and pro-democracy</u></mark> when it comes to local politics; their judgment is based on their own experiences. But they can be illogical, inconsistent or emotional regarding foreign relations -- especially on Taiwan -- or minorities, because they rely on state-run media for information about these issues. <u><mark>The fourth kind of nationalism in China could be called human rights patriotism</u></mark>. People who espouse this type of nationalism include the recently sentenced human rights activist Hu Jia, land rights advocate Yang Chunlin and the blind Chinese rights activist Chen Guangcheng. <u><mark>This type of patriotism holds human rights as its core value and democracy as its goal</u></mark>; pursues Chinese glory by seeking to gain dignity for each compatriot; promotes strength and prosperity by striving to liberate people's minds, ideas and potential; and aims to safeguard the country's integrity through recognition of the integrity of each individual and ethnic group. The Dalai Lama, having long taken the middle-road approach through nonviolent means, is a human rights patriot even from the perspective of the greater China. So is Taiwan's elected president, Ma Yingjeou. So how does this influence what we should do before the Summer Games? <u><mark>The worst option would be to fall silent; this would</u></mark> only <u><mark>embolden the regime. More than that, popular nationalists</u></mark>, with strength and prosperity foremost in their minds, <u><mark>might well align more closely with the Communist Party</u></mark>. Given China's strengthened dictatorship, rapid economic growth and ever-expanding military forces, they do not really have a choice. Since I left prison last year, I have advocated conditional participation in the Olympics. Participation must be predicated on some minimum standard of human rights. Applying this <u><mark>pressure will help enlarge the public space for discourse for human rights patriots in China. The international community should help by forming a broad coalition of human rights patriots</u></mark> to support the concerted peaceful protest activities inside and outside of China. <u><mark>Continued pressure on the regime to renounce its strategy of violent repression</u></mark> and to instead enter into a dialogue with the coalition of human rights patriots <u><mark>should be applied</u></mark>. If all of this were to happen, <u><mark>the pragmatic nationalists would probably cede some ground -- they understand the language of pressure</u></mark> -- and then we could support the Beijing Olympics as a great celebration of the beginning of a real democratic transition in China. Far from being impossible, this goal is attainable. Its <u><mark>success depends upon</u></mark> our <u><mark>persistent efforts</u></mark>.</p> | 1nr | HR CP | 2NC Resource Wars – No Risk | 183,738 | 2 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,633 | Double bind: Either Obama-Hu meeting solves relations | Yang 11 | Yang 11—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi, http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation_with_yang_jiechi.html, RBatra) | We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President
AND
interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship. | null | We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President
AND
interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship. | 179 | <h4><u>Double bind: Either Obama-Hu meeting solves relations</h4><p></u><strong>Yang 11<u></strong>—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi, </u>http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation_with_yang_jiechi.html<u>, RBatra)</p><p>We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President </p><p>AND</p><p>interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship.</p></u> | 1NC | Case | Arms Race | 1,560,885 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,634 | Increased IPR enforcement mechanisms are necessary to solve – China has the laws on the book but lacks legal infrastructure to enforce restrictions. | Nicoll 2016 | Nicoll, MBA Candidate, 2016 | http://nolasia.net/intellectual-property-rights-infringement-in-china/
China’s history with the United States on IPR violations is no secret. One Chinese counterfeits are making their way into the export system American businesses are losing an estimated $200 billion in business a year Even Chinese businesses are starting to feel the detrimental effects of IPR infringement aside from the occasional raid these pirates see it more as a cost of doing business and get right back to work producing fake products. Legislation granting protection to foreign businesses, is not the main issue The challenge is China’s lack of enforcement of already codified laws, stemming from the onus on the administrative system rather than the police One can argue that China is taking positive steps to beef up IPR protections as Figure 1 shows the more than double of IPR cases between 2008 and 2011. However there has been a shift from physical counterfeit to that of cybertheft officials realized all too late that private information of nearly 22 million American citizens was stolen by Chinese hackers Obama and Xi came to an agreement in late 2015 the fact that the two countries could come to an baseline agreement on IPR is significant. until China takes dramatic steps to recognize the barrage of violations in the area of IPR infringement, progress will continue to be a long, arduous process. | Chinese businesses are starting to feel the detrimental effects of IPR infringement Legislation is not the issue. The challenge is China’s lack of enforcement of codified laws, stemming from the onus on the administrative system rather than police One can argue China is taking positive steps to beef up IPR However there has been a shift to cybertheft the two countries could come to an baseline agreement on IPR is significant until China takes dramatic steps to recognize the barrage of violations progress will continue to be a long process | Evan, “Intellectual Property Rights Infringement in China” http://nolasia.net/intellectual-property-rights-infringement-in-china/
China’s history with the United States on IPR violations is no secret. One can buy Hollywood movies or the latest Top 40 hit single for a dollar or less on the street in Beijing. If that’s not your cup of tea, illegal knockoffs of Nike, Armani, Louis Vitton, or thousands of other counterfeit products can be bought as well. Approximately 90 percent of all DVDs and software in the China market are illegal. While these only seem to impose harm on the businesses that produce these items, counterfeit food products, medicines, and car parts are in circulation that pose real health and safety concerns. Chinese counterfeits are now making their way into the export system. In the US, about two-thirds of fake goods confiscated by US Customs originate in China. American businesses are losing an estimated $200 billion in business a year. Even Chinese businesses are starting to feel the detrimental effects of IPR infringement. However, aside from the occasional raid on a counterfeiter’s operation, these pirates see it more as a cost of doing business and get right back to work producing fake products. Legislation granting protection to foreign businesses, while sometimes not the most logical, is not the main issue. The challenge is China’s lack of enforcement of already codified laws, stemming from the onus on the administrative system rather than the police. The State Intellectual Property Office established in 1998 was meant to coordinate China’s IP enforcement efforts, but this has yet to occur. The US Embassy to China suggests that American companies register patents in China, although this gives no guarantee of protection but may be helpful as China slowly progresses in the area of enforcement. Of note, China’s law stipulates a first-to-file patent protection rather than the first-to-invent system of the US. Companies like Apple saw first-hand the fallout from this distinction. A Chinese company was the first to file the Ipad name in the country, even though Apple claimed ownership of the name after inventing the product. Apple had to eventually pay a large fee to the Chinese company to continue selling Ipads in China. One can argue that China is taking positive steps to beef up IPR protections, as Figure 1 shows the more than double of IPR cases between 2008 and 2011. However in recent years, there has been a shift from physical counterfeit of say DVDs, music, clothes, etc. to that of cybertheft. Last year, US officials realized all too late that private information of nearly 22 million American citizens was stolen by Chinese hackers. That being said, President Obama and President Xi Jinping came to an agreement in late 2015 with wording that read, “Neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors.” Even if China fails to adhere to these guidelines, the fact that the two countries could come to an baseline agreement on IPR is significant. An example of one such way the Chinese government is working to increase enforcement of IPR can be seen with the country’s relationship with Disney. Last November, Chinese authorities announced a special one year crackdown of counterfeit Disney products, the first time that China has singled out a single entity. That being said, it would appear that guanxi and kickbacks are in play here. Disney is currently in talks to build a new $5.5 billion theme park in Shanghai, including a designation of 2.7 square miles around the Shanghai park as a Disney trademark protected area. Some organizations such as the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) have done extensive legwork to lay out an action plan to repair the IPR relationship between the US and China. The SSRN suggests a 12-step action plan using an already existing and agreed upon constructive strategic partnership model pronounced in the Joint Statement issued after the 1997 US-China Summit. A deeper look at the specific plan outlined by the SSRN can be found here. No matter the case, until China takes dramatic steps to recognize the barrage of violations in the area of IPR infringement, progress will continue to be a long, arduous process. | 4,437 | <h4>Increased IPR enforcement mechanisms are necessary to solve – China has the laws on the book but <u>lacks legal infrastructure to enforce</u> restrictions. </h4><p><u><strong>Nicoll</u></strong>, MBA Candidate, <u><strong>2016</p><p></u></strong>Evan, “Intellectual Property Rights Infringement in China” <u><strong>http://nolasia.net/intellectual-property-rights-infringement-in-china/</p><p>China’s history with the United States on IPR violations is</u></strong> <u><strong>no secret. One</u></strong> can buy Hollywood movies or the latest Top 40 hit single for a dollar or less on the street in Beijing. If that’s not your cup of tea, illegal knockoffs of Nike, Armani, Louis Vitton, or thousands of other counterfeit products can be bought as well. Approximately 90 percent of all DVDs and software in the China market are illegal. While these only seem to impose harm on the businesses that produce these items, counterfeit food products, medicines, and car parts are in circulation that pose real health and safety concerns. <u><strong>Chinese counterfeits are</u></strong> now <u><strong>making their way into the export system</u></strong>. In the US, about two-thirds of fake goods confiscated by US Customs originate in China. <u><strong>American businesses are losing an estimated $200 billion in business a year</u></strong>. <u><strong>Even <mark>Chinese businesses are starting to feel the detrimental effects of IPR infringement</u></strong></mark>. However, <u><strong>aside from the occasional raid</u></strong> on a counterfeiter’s operation, <u><strong>these pirates see it more as a cost of doing business and get right back to work producing fake products. <mark>Legislation</mark> granting protection to foreign businesses, </u></strong>while sometimes not the most logical, <u><strong><mark>is not the</mark> main <mark>issue</u></strong>. <u><strong>The challenge is China’s</u></strong> <u><strong>lack of enforcement of</mark> already <mark>codified laws, stemming from the onus on the administrative system rather than</mark> the <mark>police</u></strong></mark>. The State Intellectual Property Office established in 1998 was meant to coordinate China’s IP enforcement efforts, but this has yet to occur. The US Embassy to China suggests that American companies register patents in China, although this gives no guarantee of protection but may be helpful as China slowly progresses in the area of enforcement. Of note, China’s law stipulates a first-to-file patent protection rather than the first-to-invent system of the US. Companies like Apple saw first-hand the fallout from this distinction. A Chinese company was the first to file the Ipad name in the country, even though Apple claimed ownership of the name after inventing the product. Apple had to eventually pay a large fee to the Chinese company to continue selling Ipads in China. <u><strong><mark>One can argue</mark> that <mark>China is taking</mark> <mark>positive steps to beef up IPR </mark>protections</u></strong>, <u><strong>as Figure 1 shows the more than double of IPR cases between 2008 and 2011. <mark>However</u></strong></mark> in recent years, <u><strong><mark>there has been a shift</mark> from physical counterfeit</u></strong> of say DVDs, music, clothes, etc. <u><strong><mark>to</mark> that of <mark>cybertheft</u></strong></mark>. Last year, US <u><strong>officials realized all too late that private information of nearly 22 million American citizens was</u></strong> <u><strong>stolen by Chinese hackers</u></strong>. That being said, President <u><strong>Obama and</u></strong> President <u><strong>Xi</u></strong> Jinping <u><strong>came to an agreement in late 2015 </u></strong>with wording that read, “Neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors.” Even if China fails to adhere to these guidelines, <u><strong>the fact that <mark>the two countries could come to an baseline agreement on IPR is significant</mark>. </u></strong>An example of one such way the Chinese government is working to increase enforcement of IPR can be seen with the country’s relationship with Disney. Last November, Chinese authorities announced a special one year crackdown of counterfeit Disney products, the first time that China has singled out a single entity. That being said, it would appear that guanxi and kickbacks are in play here. Disney is currently in talks to build a new $5.5 billion theme park in Shanghai, including a designation of 2.7 square miles around the Shanghai park as a Disney trademark protected area. Some organizations such as the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) have done extensive legwork to lay out an action plan to repair the IPR relationship between the US and China. The SSRN suggests a 12-step action plan using an already existing and agreed upon constructive strategic partnership model pronounced in the Joint Statement issued after the 1997 US-China Summit. A deeper look at the specific plan outlined by the SSRN can be found here. No matter the case, <u><strong><mark>until China takes dramatic steps to recognize the barrage of violations</mark> in the area of IPR infringement, <mark>progress will continue to be a long</mark>, arduous <mark>process</mark>.</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Solvency/Plan – 1AC | 1,559,428 | 14 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,635 | Tax reform can’t pass—dems block—postdates all their ev | Howard Gleckman, 2-2-2017 (Howard Gleckman is the editor for TaxVox which covers fiscal and tax policies- “The Prospects For Tax Reform Are Dimming”- Forbes- 2/2/2017- Accessed 2/27/2017) | Howard Gleckman, 2-2-2017 (Howard Gleckman is the editor for TaxVox which covers fiscal and tax policies- “The Prospects For Tax Reform Are Dimming”- Forbes- 2/2/2017- https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2017/02/02/the-prospects-for-tax-reform-are-dimming/#52b83afa7f65- Accessed 2/27/2017) | Wither the Democrats? Just as broad-based tax reform needs strong White House support, it also needs at least a gloss of bipartisanship. Otherwise, those who lose tax benefits in any reform would blame only Republicans, much as Democrats took all the blame for the downsides to the ACA. Yet, bipartisanship is in short supply these days. even those Democrats who might be willing to work with the GOP on reform will be under growing pressure from their base to join what is increasingly being called “the resistance.” In such an environment, Democratic lawmaker will have a tough time backing any bill that slashes taxes for US-based multinationals. More than ever, it looks like Congress will settle for a big tax cut and abandon reform. | tax reform needs at least a gloss of bipartisanship. Otherwise, those who lose tax benefits would blame only Republicans bipartisanship is in short supply these days , even those Democrats who might be willing to work with the GOP on reform will be under pressure from their base to join “the resistance.” Democratic lawmaker will have a tough time backing any bill that slashes taxes for US-based multinationals it looks like Congress will abandon reform. | Wither the Democrats? Just as broad-based tax reform needs strong White House support, it also needs at least a gloss of bipartisanship. Otherwise, those who lose tax benefits in any reform would blame only Republicans, much as Democrats took all the blame for the downsides to the ACA. Yet, bipartisanship is in short supply these days. At best, it will take time for the Finance panel to repair the damage done in recent confirmation battles. At worst, the damage will last. At the same time, even those Democrats who might be willing to work with the GOP on reform will be under growing pressure from their base to join what is increasingly being called “the resistance.” In such an environment, Democratic lawmaker will have a tough time backing any bill that slashes taxes for US-based multinationals. And it will be especially tough to imagine them supporting a destination-based tax that critics charge would raise consumer prices for imported goods. So where does this leave tax reform, even business tax reform? It is far too soon to declare it dead. But the events of the past week have hardly advanced the cause. More than ever, it looks like Congress will settle for a big tax cut and abandon reform. | 1,212 | <h4><strong>Tax reform can’t pass—dems block—postdates all their </strong>ev</h4><p><strong>Howard Gleckman, 2-2-2017 (Howard Gleckman is the editor for TaxVox which covers fiscal and tax policies- “The Prospects For Tax Reform Are Dimming”- Forbes- 2/2/2017- </strong>https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2017/02/02/the-prospects-for-tax-reform-are-dimming/#52b83afa7f65-<u><strong> Accessed 2/27/2017)</p><p>Wither the Democrats? Just as broad-based <mark>tax reform</mark> needs strong White House support, it also <mark>needs at least a gloss of bipartisanship. Otherwise, those who lose tax benefits</mark> in any reform <mark>would blame only Republicans</mark>, much as Democrats took all the blame for the downsides to the ACA. Yet, <mark>bipartisanship is in short supply these days</mark>.</u></strong> At best, it will take time for the Finance panel to repair the damage done in recent confirmation battles. At worst, the damage will last. At the same time<mark>, <u><strong>even those Democrats who might be willing to work with the GOP on reform will be under</mark> growing <mark>pressure from their base to join</mark> what is increasingly being called <mark>“the resistance.”</mark> In such an environment, <mark>Democratic lawmaker will have a tough time backing any bill that slashes taxes for US-based multinationals</mark>. </u></strong>And it will be especially tough to imagine them supporting a destination-based tax that critics charge would raise consumer prices for imported goods. So where does this leave tax reform, even business tax reform? It is far too soon to declare it dead. But the events of the past week have hardly advanced the cause. <u><strong>More than ever, <mark>it looks like Congress will</mark> settle for a big tax cut and <mark>abandon reform.</p></u></strong></mark> | 2NR | 2NR Ptx Card | Ptx | 409,424 | 11 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,636 | CP does not reforms US and Chinese IPR laws simultaneously fail – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>CP does not reforms US and Chinese IPR laws simultaneously fail – </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,886 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,637 | Or nothing will | Auslin 11 | Auslin 11—director of Japan studies, AEI. Frmr prof of history, Yale. PhD from U Illinois (Michael, Realism on China Is More Realistic, 7 Jan. 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/102977, AMiles) | U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will visit China next week,
AND
and America's than the empty chair that represented Liu on the Nobel stage. | null | U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will visit China next week,
AND
and America's than the empty chair that represented Liu on the Nobel stage. | 146 | <h4>Or nothing will </h4><p><strong>Auslin 11</strong>—director of Japan studies, AEI. Frmr prof<u> of history, Yale. PhD from U Illinois (Michael, Realism on China Is More Realistic, 7 Jan. 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/102977, AMiles)</p><p>U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will visit China next week, </p><p><strong>AND</p><p></strong>and America's than the empty chair that represented Liu on the Nobel stage. </p></u> | 1NC | Case | Arms Race | 1,560,887 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,638 | 1. Competiveness Advantage – our internal links are predicated on inefficient enforcement of IPR in China –it can’t resolve theft from China only in US– impact is US economic leadership. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>1. Competiveness Advantage – our internal links are predicated on inefficient enforcement of IPR in China –it can’t resolve theft from China only in US– impact is US economic leadership. </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,888 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,639 | No China/ Taiwan War | Sun 11 | Sun 11—vice president of the Prospect Foundation (Yang-ming, 5 December 2011, “The Potential Crisis of Asian-Pacific Stability,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/05/potential-crisis-of-asian-pacific-stability/820d, RBatra) | The structural factors that contribute to the stability of the China-Taiwan relationship stem
AND
future, and this will definitely make Beijing consider similar future policies more reasonably | null | The structural factors that contribute to the stability of the China-Taiwan relationship stem
AND
future, and this will definitely make Beijing consider similar future policies more reasonably | 192 | <h4>No China/ Taiwan War</h4><p><strong>Sun 11<u></strong>—vice president of the Prospect Foundation (Yang-ming, 5 December 2011, “The Potential Crisis of Asian-Pacific Stability,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/05/potential-crisis-of-asian-pacific-stability/820d, RBatra)</p><p>The <strong>structural factors that contribute to the stability of the China-Taiwan relationship</strong> stem </p><p>AND</p><p>future, and this will definitely make Beijing consider similar future policies more reasonably </p></u> | 1NC | Case | Arms Race | 1,560,889 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,640 | Also means they can’t solve China’s economy—the CCP scenario is a large disad to their counterplan | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Also means they can’t solve China’s economy—the CCP scenario is a large disad to their counterplan </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,890 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,641 | Squo Solves - Obama and Xi implemented the Paris accords, are pressuring other countries to do so, and are increasing technical assistance | Lee 9/3, | Carol Lee 9/3, White House correspondent in the Washington bureau, William Mauldin Reporter, The Wall Street Journal, 9/3/16, “U.S., China Agree on Implementing Paris Climate-Change Pact,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-agree-on-implementing-paris-climate-change-pact-1472896645 Gvine: CTS | Obama and Xi outlined
AND | null | U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday outlined
AND
officials placed some restrictions on the press corps traveling with Mr. Obama. | 165 | <h4>Squo Solves - Obama and Xi implemented the Paris accords, are pressuring other countries to do so, and are increasing technical assistance </h4><p>Carol <strong>Lee 9/3,</strong> White House correspondent in the Washington bureau, William Mauldin Reporter, The Wall Street Journal, 9/3/16, “<u>U.S., China Agree on Implementing Paris Climate-Change Pact</u>,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-agree-on-implementing-paris-climate-change-pact-1472896645<u> Gvine: CTS</p><p></u>U.S. President Barack <u>Obama and</u> Chinese President <u>Xi</u> Jinping on Saturday <u>outlined </p><p>AND</p><p></u>officials placed some restrictions on the press corps traveling with Mr. Obama.</p> | 1NC | Case | Warming | 1,560,891 | 4 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,642 | 2. Warming – stronger IPR in China is key to make current bilateral clean technology initiatives effective – only China and the US matter for emission reductions to prevent 2 degree warming. The counterplan does not make the spillover claim to China which China is key because they are the second emitter in the world—that’s Atlast | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>2. Warming – stronger IPR in China is key to make current bilateral clean technology initiatives effective – only China and the US matter for emission reductions to prevent 2 degree warming. The counterplan does not make the spillover claim to China which China is key because they are the second emitter in the world—that’s Atlast</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,892 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,643 | Permutation do both—the aff is key to promote commercialization even if the counterplan promotes better tech they aren’t commercialized | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Permutation do both—the aff is key to promote commercialization even if the counterplan promotes better tech they aren’t commercialized</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,893 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,644 | The American Innovative Act of 2015 already passed—get with it | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The American Innovative Act of 2015 already passed—get with it</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,894 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits