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3,783,445 | U.S. containment is vital to global stability --- decline causes nuclear great power war --- best scholarship proves | Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 | Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51) | deep engagement prevents emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. U S overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. alliance commitments deter states from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing incentive to adopt solutions that threaten others and stoke security dilemmas. absent the “American Pacifier” Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Regarding the Middle East Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. Defensive realism’s optimism Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed the case. U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and regional hegemony, beyond the capacity of local powers to contain which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move to forty nuclear states. the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including risk of accidents seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” could spin out of control U.S. engagement preserves peace The U S will have to play a key role in countering China the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, the U S lowers security competition in the world’s key regions preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. | engagement prevents a dangerous global environment. U S presence gives it leverage to restrain provocative action alliance commitments deter expansion absent America Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with prolif and full-scale great power war Europe is vulnerable the Middle East would intensify security dilemmas East Asia could destabiliz Defensive realism’s optimism Burgeoning research undermines states have preferences for prestige Empirical studies show this is the case retrenchment will yield crisis instability one would see regional proxy wars and proliferation cascades risk of accidents go up as number of nuclear powers grows. U.S. engagement preserves peace the arg that U.S. commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship the U S lowers security competition in the world’s key regions preventing a hothouse atmosphere | A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85 | 13,064 | <h4>U.S. containment is vital to global stability --- decline causes nuclear great power war --- best scholarship proves</h4><p><strong>Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 </strong>(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)</p><p>A core premise of <u>deep <mark>engagement</u></mark> is that it <u><mark>prevents</u></mark> the <u>emergence of <mark>a</mark> far more <strong><mark>dangerous</mark> <mark>global</mark> security <mark>environment.</u></strong></mark> For one thing, as noted above, the <u><mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates’ <u>overseas <mark>presence gives it</mark> the <mark>leverage to restrain</mark> partners from taking <strong><mark>provocative action</strong></mark>.</u> Perhaps more important, its core <u><mark>alliance commitments</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>deter</strong></mark> states</u> with aspirations to regional hegemony <u>from contemplating <strong><mark>expansion</strong></mark> and make its partners more secure, reducing</u> their <u>incentive to adopt solutions</u> to their security problems <u>that threaten others and</u> thus <u>stoke security dilemmas.</u> The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge <u><mark>absent </mark>the “<mark>America</mark>n Pacifier”</u> is provided in the works of John <u><mark>Mearsheimer</u></mark>, who <u><mark>forecasts</mark> <strong><mark>dangerous multipolar regions</u></strong> <u>replete with</mark> <strong>security competition, arms races, nuclear <mark>prolif</mark>eration</strong> <mark>and</mark> associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and <strong><mark>full-scale great power war</strong></mark>.</u> 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 <u>The result might be a <mark>Europe</mark> that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond</u> (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), <u>lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and <mark>is vulnerable</mark> to the influence of outside rising powers.</u> What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? <u>Regarding <mark>the Middle East</u></mark>, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably <u>Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia</u>—<u>might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that <mark>would intensify security dilemmas</mark>. </u>And <u>concerning <mark>East Asia</mark>, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced.</u> Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that <u>Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which <mark>could</mark> stoke a <mark>destabiliz</mark>ing reaction from China.</u> It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. <u><mark>Defensive realism’s optimism</u></mark> about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. <u><strong><mark>Burgeoning research</strong></mark> across the social and other sciences</u>, however, <u><mark>undermines</mark> that core assumption: <mark>states have preferences</mark> not only <mark>for</mark> security but also for <mark>prestige</mark>, status, and other aims</u>, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that <u>even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. <strong><mark>Empirical studies</strong> show</mark> that <mark>this is</mark> indeed</u> sometimes <u><mark>the case</mark>.</u> 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, <u>U.S. <mark>retrenchment</mark> would result in a <strong>significant deterioration in the security environment</strong> in at least some of the world’s key regions</u>. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. <u>Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier <mark>will yield</mark> either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, <strong><mark>crisis instability</strong></mark>, nuclear proliferation, and </u>the like, or bids for <u>regional hegemony, </u>which may be <u>beyond the capacity of local</u> great <u>powers to contain</u> (and <u>which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). </u>Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, <u>overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place.</u> Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, <u><mark>one would see</mark> overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive <strong><mark>regional proxy wars</strong> and</mark> arming of client states</u>—all of which would be concerning, in part because <u>it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed <strong><mark>proliferation cascades</strong></mark>, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. </u>78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. <u>Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences</u>. In social science, however, <u>such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic.</u> Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse.<u> Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move</u> from nine <u>to</u> twenty, thirty, or <u>forty nuclear states.</u> In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about <u>the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including </u>the <u><mark>risk of accidents</u></mark> and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—<u>seem prone to <mark>go up as</mark> the <mark>number of nuclear powers grows.</u></mark> 80 Moreover, the <u>risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics”</u> that <u>could spin out of control </u>is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that <u><strong><mark>U.S. engagement preserves peace</strong></mark> </u>dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “<u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will have to play a key role in countering China</u>, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, <u><mark>the arg</mark>ument <mark>that U.S.</mark> security <mark>commitments are unnecessary for <strong>peace</strong> is countered by <strong>a lot of scholarship</strong></mark>,</u> including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>lowers security competition in the world’s key regions</u></strong></mark>, thereby <u><mark>preventing</mark> the emergence of <mark>a <strong>hothouse atmosphere</strong></mark> for growing new military capabilities. </u>Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 5 | 2,521 | 421 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,446 | Nuke war | Tønnesson 15 | Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311 | recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war | economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars that increase military conflict leaders begin to blame external dependence, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms The greatest risk is changes in the world economy with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor Deterrence could lose its credibility | Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.¶ Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene. | 3,362 | <h4>Nuke war</h4><p>Stein <strong>Tønnesson 15</strong>, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311</p><p>Several <u>recent works</u> on China and Sino–US relations <u>have made</u> substantial <u>contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances</u> a combination of <u>nuclear deterrence and <mark>economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war</mark> between major powers</u>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u>interdependence<mark> </mark>may <strong>both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong> are right. <u>Interdependence raises the cost of conflict</u> for all sides <u>but</u> <u>asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and <strong><mark>negative trade expectations</u></strong></mark> may <u><mark>generate tensions leading to trade wars </mark>among inter-dependent states <mark>that</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>increase </mark>the risk of <mark>military conflict</u></mark> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u>decisions for war</u> and peace <u>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u>If <mark>leaders</u></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u><mark>begin to</mark> seriously <strong>fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline</u></strong> then <u>they may <mark>blame</u></mark> this on <u><mark>external</mark> <mark>dependence,</mark> appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain</u> respect or <u>credibility, adopt protectionist policies, <mark>and</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred by</u></strong></mark> either <u><strong><mark>nuclear arms</strong> </mark>or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen <strong>abruptly</u></strong>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.¶ Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u>in East Asia</u> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u><mark>The greatest risk is <strong></mark>not</u></strong> that <u><strong>a territorial dispute</u></strong> leads to war under present circumstances <u>but that <strong><mark>changes in the world economy</strong> </mark>alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious</u>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u>This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, <mark>with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor </mark>to <strong>protect the world from Armageddon</strong>, and <strong>unreliably so</u></strong>. <u><mark>Deterrence could <strong>lose its credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u>great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional</u> limited <u>war</u>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 1 | 142 | 3,586 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,447 | Sustaining Xi’s reform key to solve SCS/ECS lash out | Rachman 6/1/2016 | Rachman, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, 6/1/2016 | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
at the moment China can look relatively stable But that impression is deceptive President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation Xi has essentially abandon the formula that has driven China's rise created by Deng Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach Under Mr Xi, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | China can look stable But that is deceptive Xi is taking his country in risky directions. If his policies succeed Xi will be remembered for the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation China has moved towards a strongman leader a faltering economy could undermine the party's legitimacy. as economic and political tensions within China have risen the country's foreign policy has become nationalistic and willing to risk confrontation with the West and Asian neighbours. Beijing's tough assertion of its territorial claims, epitomised by island-building" in the S C S to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These serve a political purpose the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US liable to stir support | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
Politics in the West is so dramatic at the moment that China can look relatively staid and stable by comparison. But that impression is deceptive. Chinese President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation. What Mr Xi has done is essentially to abandon the formula that has driven China's rise over the past 30 years. That formula was created by Deng Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". Under Mr Xi, who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself. In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In harder economic times, the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | 5,166 | <h4><strong>Sustaining Xi’s reform key to solve SCS/ECS lash out</h4><p>Rachman</strong>, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, <strong>6/1/2016 </p><p><u>Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula</p><p></u></strong>Politics in the West is so dramatic <u>at the moment</u> that <u><mark>China can look</mark> relatively</u> staid and <u><mark>stable</u></mark> by comparison. <u><strong><mark>But that</mark> impression <mark>is</mark> <mark>deceptive</u></strong></mark>. Chinese <u>President <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>is taking his country in</mark> radical and <mark>risky</mark> new <mark>directions. If his</mark> new <mark>policies succeed</mark>, then the <mark>Xi</mark> era <mark>will be remembered for</mark> the achievement of his often-stated goal <strong>of <mark>the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation</u></strong>. <u>But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his</mark> <mark>legacy is</mark> likely to be <strong><mark>political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation</u></strong></mark>. What Mr <u>Xi has</u> done is <u>essentially</u> to <u>abandon the formula that has driven China's rise</u> over the past 30 years. That formula was <u>created by Deng</u> Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, <u>Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model</u> created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. <u>And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach</u> to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". <u>Under Mr Xi,</u> who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, <u>all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, <mark>China has moved </mark>back <mark>towards</mark> a model based around <mark>a <strong>strongman leader</mark> - Mr Xi himself</u></strong>. <u>In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model</u>, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. <u>And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a <strong>foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. </u></strong>The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, <u>the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy</u>", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. <u>But <mark>a <strong>faltering economy</strong></mark> - or, worse, a financial crisis - <strong><mark>could</mark> well <mark>undermine the party's legitimacy.</strong></mark> </u>When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr <u>Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing</u> - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. <u>At the same time <mark>as economic and political tensions within China have risen</mark> under Mr Xi, so <mark>the country's foreign policy has <strong>become</mark> more <mark>nationalistic and</mark> more <mark>willing to risk confrontation with the West and</mark> with China's <mark>Asian neighbours. Beijing's</mark> increasingly <mark>tough assertion of its territorial</mark> and maritime <mark>claims, epitomised</mark> <mark>by</mark> its "<mark>island-building" in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea, has led <mark>to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies</strong>. These</mark> near-clashes may <mark>serve a political purpose</mark>. In </u>harder economic times,<u> <strong><mark>the CCP may need new</mark> <mark>sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US</mark> at sea is <mark>liable to stir </mark>patriotic <mark>support</mark> for the government.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 81,678 | 54 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,448 | Their use of the concept of social death swings the pendulum of academia toward despair, overgeneralizes the experience of the slave, and provides a mask to cover the underlying problems | Brown, 09 | Brown, 09 (Vincent Brown, Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery”, American Historical Review, December 2009 http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf //kdh) | social death has become a handy definition of slavery it is forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator+ that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage. it is an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations. is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as the institution developed through time one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, these kinds of studies form different and opposing genres that compete for ascendance , if the invocation of Patterson’s “social death” is any indication, the pendulum seems to have swung decidedly toward despair. | social death is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage. it is agentless abstraction provides neat logic but does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and struggles that produce historic transformations one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition if the invocation of | Slavery and Social Death was widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success, social death has become a handy general definition of slavery, for many historians and non-historians alike. But it is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator+ that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.6 As a concept, it is what Frederick Cooper has called an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations.7 Indeed, it is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in patterns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families, “social death” reflected sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had suffered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-pe`re of the social pathologists, set the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark complexion and his tropical temperament.”8 Patterson’s distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place, making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States dominated the scholarship on human bondage, and Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as the institution developed through time. Thus one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s reemergence in some important new studies of slavery.9 WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED AS AMONG the most onerous of social institutions, slavery has much to tell us about the way human beings react to oppression. At the same time, the extreme nature of the institution naturally encourages a pessimistic view of the capacity for collective agency among subjugated people. As a result, trends in the study of slavery, as with the study of dominance more generally, often divide between works that emphasize the overwhelming power of the institution and scholarship that focuses on the resistant efforts of the enslaved. In turn, this division frames a problem in the general understanding of political life, especially for the descendants of the powerless. It might even be said that these kinds of studies form different and opposing genres—hopeful stories of heroic subalterns versus anatomies of doom—that compete for ascendance. In recent years, if the invocation of Patterson’s “social death” is any indication, the pendulum seems to have swung decidedly toward despair. | 3,941 | <h4><strong>Their use of the concept of social death swings the pendulum of academia toward despair, overgeneralizes the experience of the slave, and provides a mask to cover the underlying problems</h4><p>Brown, 09</strong> <u>(Vincent Brown, Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery”, American Historical Review, December 2009 http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf //kdh) </p><p></u>Slavery and Social Death was widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success, <u><mark>social death</mark> has become a handy</u> general <u>definition of slavery</u>, for many historians and non-historians alike. But <u>it is</u> often <u>forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s </u>breathtaking<u> survey—a theoretical abstraction that <mark>is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator</mark>+ <mark>that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave<strong>, </strong>shorn of meaningful heritage.</u></mark>6 As a concept, <u><mark>it</mark> <mark>is</u></mark> what Frederick Cooper has called <u>an “<mark>agentless abstraction</mark>” that <mark>provides</mark> a <mark>neat</mark> cultural <mark>logic</mark> <mark>but</mark> ultimately <mark>does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>struggles</mark> <mark>that produce historic transformations<strong></mark>.</u></strong>7 Indeed, it <u>is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves</u>, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in patterns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families, “social death” reflected sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had suffered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-pe`re of the social pathologists, set the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark complexion and his tropical temperament.”8 Patterson’s<strong> </strong>distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place,<strong> </strong>making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States dominated the scholarship on human bondage, and <u>Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as the institution developed through time</u>. Thus <u><mark>one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition</mark>, </u>an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s reemergence in some important new studies of slavery.9 WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED AS AMONG the most onerous of social institutions, slavery has much to tell us about the way human beings react to oppression. At the same time, the extreme nature of the institution naturally encourages a pessimistic view of the capacity for collective agency among subjugated people. As a result, trends in the study of slavery, as with the study of dominance more generally, often divide between works that emphasize the overwhelming power of the institution and scholarship that focuses on the resistant efforts of the enslaved<strong>. </strong>In turn<strong>, </strong>this division frames a problem in the general understanding of political life, especially for the descendants of the powerless. It might even be said that <u>these kinds of studies form different and opposing genres</u>—hopeful stories of heroic subalterns versus anatomies of doom—<u>that compete for ascendance</u>. In recent years<u>, <mark>if the invocation of</mark> Patterson’s “<strong>social death” is any indication, the pendulum seems to have swung decidedly toward despair.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 57,087 | 24 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,449 | Neg ground – those affs diversify neg ground, incentivizing research – they also get better links to generics like containment bad, the SCS DA, the Security K, heg bad, and more. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Neg ground – those affs diversify neg ground, incentivizing research – they also get better links to generics like containment bad, the SCS DA, the Security K, heg bad, and more. </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,829 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,450 | NO SCS war---democracy, seascape, deterrence | Kaplan 14 | Kaplan 3/17/14—Robert, is Chief Geopolitical Analyst for Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, “The Guns of August in the East China Sea” Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/17/the_guns_of_august_in_the_east_china_sea_world_war_one
But before one buys the 1914 analogy, there are other matters to consider. While 1914 Europe was a landscape, with large armies facing one another inside a claustrophobic terrain with few natural barriers, East Asia is a seascape, with vast maritime distances separating national capitals. The sea impedes aggression to a degree that land does not. Naval forces can cross water and storm beachheads, though with great difficulty, but moving inland and occupying hostile populations is nearly impossible. The Taiwan Strait is roughly four times the width of the English Channel, a geography that continues to help preserve Taiwan's de facto independence from China. | Even the fastest warships travel slow giving diplomats time Asian countries have erected strict protocols and prefer to posture verbally to avoid actual combat Since any such incidents would likely occur over open water there will be few casualties reducing the prospect a single incident will lead to war. because of the speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of postmodern weaponry, any war that does break out will probably be short -- albeit with serious economic consequences. Something equivalent to four years of trench warfare is almost impossible to imagine. And remember that it was World War I's very grinding length that made it a history-transforming and culture-transforming event: it caused 17 million military and civilian casualties; the disputes in the Pacific Basin are certainly not going to lead to that.
Asia is simpler almost everyone fears China depends on the U S This is not the Cold War a region with which we did almost no trade. Chinese party elites send their children to U.S. universities U.S. officials know they must steer between the two extremes of allowing China's Finlandization of its Asian neighbors and allowing nationalistic governments in nam the Philippines, and Japan to lure the United States into a conflict with China.
Nationalistic as these democracies may be, the best way to curb their excesses and make them less nervous is to give them the assurance of a U.S. security umbrella born of credible air and sea power. Unlike empires mired in decrepitude that characterized 1914 Europe, East Asia features robust democracies in South Korea and Japan strengthening democracies in Malaysia and the Philippines. An informal alliance of democracies that should include a reformist Vietnam is the best and most stable counter to Chinese militarism. Some of these democracies are fraught, and fascist-cum-communist North Korea could implode, but this is not a world coming apart. Limited eruptions do not equal a global cataclysm.
the most profound difference between August 1914 and now is historical self-awareness Because 19th century Europe had been relatively peaceful since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, people had lost the sense of the tragic that enables them to avoid tragedy in the first place. Aging, one-child societies like those of China, Japan, and South Korea, with memories of war, revolution, and famine, are less likely to greet violent struggle with joy the U S the paramount military player by its very conscious fear of a W W I scenario, will take every measure to avoid it. | Asian countries have erected strict protocols and prefer to posture verbally to avoid actual combat any such incidents would occur over open water there will be few casualties, reducing the prospect a incident will lead to wa because of the speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of postmodern weaponry, any war that does break out will probably be shor
Vietnam is the best and most stable counter to Chinese militarism. Some of these democracies are fraught, and fascist-cum-communist North Korea could implode, but this is not a world coming apart.
the U St the paramount military player by its very conscious fear of a W W I scenario will take every measure to avoid it. | Even the fastest warships travel slowly, giving diplomats time to do their work. Incidents in the air are more likely, although Asian countries have erected strict protocols and prefer to posture verbally so as to avoid actual combat. (That said, the new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone is a particularly provocative protocol.) Since any such incidents would likely occur over open water there will be few casualties, reducing the prospect that a single incident will lead to war. And because of the speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of postmodern weaponry, any war that does break out will probably be short -- albeit with serious economic consequences. Something equivalent to four years of trench warfare is almost impossible to imagine. And remember that it was World War I's very grinding length that made it a history-transforming and culture-transforming event: it caused 17 million military and civilian casualties; the disputes in the Pacific Basin are certainly not going to lead to that.
World War I also featured different and unwieldy alliance systems. Asia is simpler: almost everyone fears China and depends -- militarily at least -- on the United States. This is not the Cold War where few Americans could be found in the East Bloc, a region with which we did almost no trade. Millions of Americans and Chinese have visited each other's countries, tens of thousands of American businessmen have passed through Chinese cities, and Chinese party elites send their children to U.S. universities. U.S. officials know they must steer between the two extremes of allowing China's Finlandization of its Asian neighbors and allowing nationalistic governments in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan to lure the United States into a conflict with China.
Nationalistic as these democracies may be, the best way to curb their excesses and make them less nervous is to give them the assurance of a U.S. security umbrella, born of credible air and sea power. A strong U.S.-China relationship can keep the peace in Asia. (South Korea also fears Japan, but the United States is successfully managing that tension.) Unlike empires mired in decrepitude that characterized 1914 Europe, East Asia features robust democracies in South Korea and Japan, and strengthening democracies in Malaysia and the Philippines. An informal alliance of democracies -- that should also include a reformist, de facto ally like Vietnam -- is the best and most stable counter to Chinese militarism. Some of these democracies are fraught, and fascist-cum-communist North Korea could implode, but this is not a world coming apart. Limited eruptions do not equal a global cataclysm.
Yet the most profound difference between August 1914 and now is historical self-awareness. As Modris Eksteins meticulously documents in his 1989 book Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, European capitals greeted the war with outbursts of euphoria and a feeling of liberation. Because 19th century Europe had been relatively peaceful since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, people had lost the sense of the tragic that enables them to avoid tragedy in the first place. Aging, one-child societies like those of China, Japan, and South Korea, with memories of war, revolution, and famine, are less likely to greet violent struggle with joy and equanimity. And the United States, the paramount military player in Asia, by its very conscious fear of a World War I scenario, will take every measure to avoid it. | 3,502 | <h4>NO SCS war---democracy, seascape, deterrence</h4><p><strong>Kaplan </strong>3/17/<strong>14</strong>—Robert, is Chief Geopolitical Analyst for Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, “The Guns of August in the East China Sea” Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/17/the_guns_of_august_in_the_east_china_sea_world_war_one</p><p>But before one buys the 1914 analogy, there are other matters to consider. <u>While 1914 Europe was a landscape,</u> with large armies facing one another inside a claustrophobic terrain with few natural barriers, <u>East Asia is a seascape</u>, with vast maritime distances separating national capitals. <u>The sea impedes aggression to a degree </u>that <u>land does not</u>. Naval forces can cross water and storm beachheads, though with great difficulty, but moving inland and occupying hostile populations is nearly impossible. <u>The Taiwan Strait is roughly four times the width of the English Channel, a geography that continues to help preserve Taiwan's</u> de facto <u>independence</u> from China.</p><p><u>Even</u> <u>the fastest warships travel slow</u>ly, <u>giving diplomats time</u> to do their work. Incidents in the air are more likely, although <u><mark>Asian countries have erected <strong>strict protocols</u></strong> <u>and prefer to</u> <u><strong>posture verbally</u></strong> </mark>so as <u><mark>to avoid actual combat</u></mark>. (That said, the new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone is a particularly provocative protocol.) <u>Since <mark>any such incidents would</mark> likely <mark>occur over open water there will be few casualties</u>, <u><strong>reducing</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the prospect</u></mark> that <u><mark>a</mark> single <mark>incident will lead to</mark> <mark>wa</mark>r. </u>And <u><mark>because of the <strong>speed</strong>, <strong>accuracy</strong>, and destructiveness of <strong>postmodern weaponry,</strong> any war that does break out will probably be shor</mark>t -- albeit with serious economic consequences. Something equivalent to four years of trench warfare is almost impossible to imagine. And remember that it was World War I's very grinding length that made it a history-transforming and culture-transforming event: it caused 17 million military and civilian casualties; the disputes in the Pacific Basin are certainly not going to lead to that.</p><p></u>World War I also featured different and unwieldy alliance systems. <u>Asia is simpler</u>: <u>almost everyone fears China </u>and <u><strong>depends</u></strong> -- militarily at least -- <u><strong>on the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong>This is not the Cold War</u></strong> where few Americans could be found in the East Bloc, <u>a region with which we did almost no trade.</u> Millions of Americans and Chinese have visited each other's countries, tens of thousands of American businessmen have passed through Chinese cities, and <u>Chinese party elites send their children to U.S. universities</u>. <u>U.S. officials know they must steer between the two extremes of allowing China's Finlandization of its Asian neighbors</u> <u>and allowing nationalistic governments</u> <u>in</u> Viet<u><strong>nam</u></strong>, <u>the Philippines, and Japan to lure the United States into a conflict with China.</p><p>Nationalistic as these democracies may be,</u> <u>the <strong>best way</strong> to curb their excesses and make them less nervous is to give them the assurance of a U.S. security umbrella</u>, <u><strong>born of credible air and sea power.</u></strong> A strong U.S.-China relationship can keep the peace in Asia. (South Korea also fears Japan, but the United States is successfully managing that tension.) <u>Unlike empires mired in decrepitude that characterized 1914 Europe, East Asia features robust democracies in South Korea and Japan</u>, and <u>strengthening democracies in Malaysia and the Philippines.</u> <u>An informal alliance of democracies</u> -- <u>that should</u> also <u>include a reformist</u>, de facto ally like <u><mark>Vietnam</u></mark> -- <u><strong><mark>is the best and most stable counter to Chinese militarism.</u></strong> <u>Some of these democracies are fraught, and fascist-cum-communist North Korea <strong>could implode</strong>, but this is <strong>not a world coming apart.</strong></mark> Limited eruptions do not equal a global cataclysm.</p><p></u>Yet <u>the most profound difference between August 1914 and now is historical self-awareness</u>. As Modris Eksteins meticulously documents in his 1989 book Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, European capitals greeted the war with outbursts of euphoria and a feeling of liberation. <u>Because 19th century Europe had been relatively peaceful since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, people had lost the sense of the tragic that enables them to avoid tragedy in the first place. Aging, one-child societies like those of China, Japan, and South Korea, with memories of war, revolution, and famine, are <strong>less likely</strong> to greet <strong>violent struggle with joy</u></strong> and equanimity. And <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates, <u><mark>the paramount military player</u></mark> in Asia, <u><mark>by its very conscious fear of a W</u></mark>orld <u><mark>W</u></mark>ar <u><mark>I</u> <u>scenario</mark>, <mark>will take</u> <u>every measure to avoid it.</p></u></mark> | 1NC round 5 State | Case | 1 | 126,688 | 67 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,451 | Plan: The United States federal government should ratify a bilateral investment treaty with the People’s Republic of China including provisions to increase regulatory transparency for investments and national security review, restrict subsidies of state-owned enterprises, protect intellectual property rights of investing companies, and lower cross-border tariffs. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Plan: The United States federal government should ratify a bilateral investment treaty with the People’s Republic of China including provisions to increase regulatory transparency for investments and national security review, restrict subsidies of state-owned enterprises, protect intellectual property rights of investing companies, and lower cross-border tariffs.</h4> | null | 1AC Plan + Solvency | null | 1,560,830 | 1 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,452 | NASA Earth science missions are funded, but the overall budget is tight and carefully calibrated to balance research with exploration | Holdren 11 | Holdren 11 (John, Director – Office of Science and Technology Policy, “The Budget for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy”, Congressional Documents and Publications, 5-4, Lexis)National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | the President signed the 2010 NASA Authorization Act NASA's programs provide an indispensable platform for observing the Earth to ensure that we have the information we need to cope with environmental threats The Act will further our joint goal of placing NASA's programs on a more stable footing and enhancing the long-term sustainability Every initiative is funded, including: a robust program of and Earth science, including a commitment to invest in new satellites and programs of Earth observation; Within the context of a difficult budget environment NASA's budget remains at $18.7 billion This budget level demands difficult choices keeping in mind the priorities and a balanced program of science, and exploration The Budget demonstrates continued commitment even when difficult decisions are required | NASA Authorization Act ( provide an indispensable platform for observing the Earth to ensure that we have the information we need Every initiative is funded, i and a balanced program of science and exploration The Budget demonstrates continued commitment even when difficult decisions are required, | This past October, the President signed the 2010 NASA Authorization Act (the "Act", Public Law 111-267), which stands as a statement of bipartisan agreement by Congress and the Administration regarding NASA and its many programs. NASA's programs not only support the grand and inspiring adventures of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautical advancement, but also provide an indispensable platform for observing the Earth to ensure that we have the information we need to cope with weather-related and other environmental threats to human well-being. NASA programs also fuel new technology development and innovation and help launch new products, services, businesses, and jobs with enormous growth potential. The Act will further our joint goal of placing NASA's programs on a more stable footing and enhancing the long-term sustainability of these exciting endeavors as we chart a new path forward in space. The FY2012 NASA budget reaffirms the Administration's commitment to a bold and ambitious future for NASA. Every initiative called for in the Act is funded, including: a robust program of space science and Earth science, including a commitment to invest in new satellites and programs of Earth observation; a strong aeronautics research program; the Space Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift launch vehicle and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) needed to support human spaceflight and exploration missions beyond Earth's orbit; a vigorous technology development program; extension of International Space Station (ISS) activities through at least 2020, coupled with a plan to use this orbiting outpost more effectively; and the development of private-sector capabilities to transport cargo and crew into low Earth orbit, thus shortening the duration of our reliance solely on Russian launch vehicles for access to the ISS. Within the context of a difficult budget environment and the President's decision to freeze non-security discretionary spending at 2010 levels for five years, NASA's budget remains at $18.7 billion in the 2012 Budget. This budget level demands difficult choices, and those choices were made while keeping in mind the priorities of the Act as well as the collective desire of the Congress and the Administration to have a balanced program of science, research, technology development, safe spaceflight operations, and exploration. One such difficult choice was limiting the budget for the James Webb Space Telescope, keeping the project funded at $375 million in 2012, to assure NASA the opportunity to begin work on new scientific opportunities identified in the National Academies' most recent decadal survey in astronomy and astrophysics. Similarly, the 2012 Budget reduces the planned increases in Earth-science research outlined in the 2011 Budget. The Budget demonstrates the President's continued commitment to our shared priorities even when difficult decisions are required, providing $1.8 billion in FY2012 funding for the Space Launch System and $1.02 billion for the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, thereby laying the critical foundation for these exploration programs. As NASA reported in January of this year, it is still in the process of shaping these efforts and will discuss them in more detail in a report to Congress this spring. Similarly, the Budget provides a solid foundation for the commercial crew and cargo transportation programs that are necessary to provide safe and cost-effective access to low Earth orbit, including sufficient support for the operations of the ISS. | 3,536 | <h4>NASA Earth science missions are funded, but the overall budget is tight and carefully calibrated to balance research with exploration</h4><p><strong>Holdren 11</strong> (John, Director – Office of Science and Technology Policy, “The Budget for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy”, Congressional Documents and Publications, 5-4, Lexis)National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)</p><p>This past October, <u>the President signed the 2010 <mark>NASA Authorization Act</u> (</mark>the "Act", Public Law 111-267), which stands as a statement of bipartisan agreement by Congress and the Administration regarding NASA and its many programs. <u>NASA's programs</u> not only support the grand and inspiring adventures of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautical advancement, but also <u><mark>provide an indispensable platform for observing the Earth to ensure that we have the information we need</mark> to cope with</u> weather-related and other <u>environmental threats</u> to human well-being. NASA programs also fuel new technology development and innovation and help launch new products, services, businesses, and jobs with enormous growth potential. <u>The Act will further our joint goal of placing NASA's programs on a more stable footing and enhancing the long-term sustainability</u> of these exciting endeavors as we chart a new path forward in space. The FY2012 NASA budget reaffirms the Administration's commitment to a bold and ambitious future for NASA. <u><mark>Every initiative</u></mark> called for in the Act <u><mark>is</mark> <mark>funded, i</mark>ncluding: a robust program of</u> space science <u>and Earth science, including a commitment to invest in new satellites and programs of Earth observation;</u> a strong aeronautics research program; the Space Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift launch vehicle and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) needed to support human spaceflight and exploration missions beyond Earth's orbit; a vigorous technology development program; extension of International Space Station (ISS) activities through at least 2020, coupled with a plan to use this orbiting outpost more effectively; and the development of private-sector capabilities to transport cargo and crew into low Earth orbit, thus shortening the duration of our reliance solely on Russian launch vehicles for access to the ISS. <u>Within the context of a difficult budget environment</u> and the President's decision to freeze non-security discretionary spending at 2010 levels for five years, <u>NASA's budget remains at $18.7 billion</u> in the 2012 Budget. <u>This budget level demands difficult choices</u>, and those choices were made while <u>keeping in mind the priorities</u> of the Act as well as the collective desire of the Congress <u><mark>and</u></mark> the Administration to have <u><strong><mark>a </strong>balanced program of science</mark>,</u> research, technology development, safe spaceflight operations, <u><mark>and exploration</u></mark>. One such difficult choice was limiting the budget for the James Webb Space Telescope, keeping the project funded at $375 million in 2012, to assure NASA the opportunity to begin work on new scientific opportunities identified in the National Academies' most recent decadal survey in astronomy and astrophysics. Similarly, the 2012 Budget reduces the planned increases in Earth-science research outlined in the 2011 Budget. <u><mark>The Budget demonstrates</u></mark> the President's <u><mark>continued<strong> </strong>commitment</u></mark> to our shared priorities <u><mark>even when difficult decisions are required</u>,</mark> providing $1.8 billion in FY2012 funding for the Space Launch System and $1.02 billion for the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, thereby laying the critical foundation for these exploration programs. As NASA reported in January of this year, it is still in the process of shaping these efforts and will discuss them in more detail in a report to Congress this spring. Similarly, the Budget provides a solid foundation for the commercial crew and cargo transportation programs that are necessary to provide safe and cost-effective access to low Earth orbit, including sufficient support for the operations of the ISS.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 2 | 1,560,832 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,453 | Alt cause—corn ethanol | Wise 12 | Wise 12 - Policy Research Director, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, Medford (Timothy, “US corn ethanol fuels food crisis in developing countries”, Aljazeera, 10-10-12, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210993632838545.html)//KG | The debate over biofuels has grown urgent since food prices first spiked in 2007-2008, ushering in a food crisis characterised by repeated jumps in global food prices. After a brief respite in the first half of this year, the US drought triggered a new wave of price spikes, the third in just five years. Corn prices were particularly hard-hit, reaching record levels of more than $8.00/bushel Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion Few argue now that the contribution is small US National Academy of Sciences review attributed 20-40 per cent of the 2007-2008 price spikes to global biofuels expansion. Subsequent studies have confirmed this range for the later price increases. Why is the impact so large? Because so much food and feed is now diverted to produce fuel, and so much land is now used for biofuels feedstocks - corn and sugar for ethanol, soybeans, palm oil and a variety of other plants for biodiesel. Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices just kept rising and corn stocks just kept getting thinner and thinner. They were at dangerously low levels when the first price spikes happened in 2007-2008. Corn is probably the most problematic feedstock for it is the staple grain for some one billion people worldwide. It is also a key feed for livestock US corn ethanol is particularly disruptive to international markets The United States is by far the largest producer and exporter of corn in the world That 40 per cent of the US corn crop being put into US cars represents an astonishing 15 per cent of global corn production The diversion of so much corn from food and feed markets has produced a "demand shock" in international markets since 2004. Over the last 50 years the world's least developed countries have gone from being small net exporters of agricultural goods to huge net importers structural reforms in the 80s forced indebted developing country governments to open their economies to agricultural imports while reducing their support for domestic farmers. The result: a flood of cheap and often-subsidised imports from rich countries, forcing local farmers out of business and off the land. In the price spike of 2008, the world's least developed countries imported $26.6bn in agricultural goods and exported only $9.1bn, leaving an agricultural trade deficit This squeezes government budgets, strains limited foreign exchange reserves and leaves the poor more exposed to food price increases. It is devastating for a country in which nearly half of children under five are malnourished. poor consumers are the ones most hurt by ethanol-related price increases, especially those in urban areas US ethanol expansion has accounted for 21 per cent of corn prices in recent years, so it has forced thousands deeper into poverty and hunger | Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion. Few argue now that the contribution is small US National Academy of Sciences review attributed 40 per cent of the spikes to global biofuels expansion Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production. Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices kept rising and corn stocks kept getting thinner US corn ethanol is particularly disruptive to international markets. The United States is by far the largest producer and exporter of corn in the world The diversion of so much corn from food and feed markets has produced a "demand shock" in international markets since 2004 structural reforms in the 80s forced indebted developing country governments to open their economies to agricultural imports The result: an agricultural trade deficit This squeezes government budgets and leaves the poor more exposed to food price increases. US ethanol expansion has forced thousands deeper into poverty and hunger | Biofuel impacts on food prices The debate over biofuels has grown urgent since food prices first spiked in 2007-2008, ushering in a food crisis characterised by repeated jumps in global food prices. Prices for most staple foods doubled, fell when the bubble burst in 2009, then jumped again to their previous high levels in 2010-2011. After a brief respite in the first half of this year, the US drought triggered a new wave of price spikes, the third in just five years. Corn prices were particularly hard-hit, reaching record levels of more than $8.00/bushel, and more than $300 per metric tonne. Before the first spikes, prices had languished around $100/metric tonne. Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion. Few argue now that the contribution is small. A US National Academy of Sciences review attributed 20-40 per cent of the 2007-2008 price spikes to global biofuels expansion. Subsequent studies have confirmed this range for the later price increases. Why is the impact so large? Because so much food and feed is now diverted to produce fuel, and so much land is now used for biofuels feedstocks - corn and sugar for ethanol, soybeans, palm oil and a variety of other plants for biodiesel. This rapidly growing market was fuelled by a wide range of government incentives and mandates and by the rising price of petroleum. Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production. Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago. The biggest jump came after the US Congress enacted the RFS in 2005 then expanded it dramatically in 2007. A blending allowance of 10 per cent for domestic gasoline added to the demand, a level now potentially being raised to 15 per cent. These mandates for rising corn ethanol production combined with tax incentives to gasoline blenders and tariff protection against cheaper imports to create today's massive ethanol demand for corn. As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices just kept rising and corn stocks just kept getting thinner and thinner. They were at dangerously low levels - about 15 per cent of global use - when the first price spikes happened in 2007-2008. They are at 14 per cent now. Impact on developing countries Corn is probably the most problematic feedstock for biofuels. In many parts of the world it is grown as food for human consumption, serving as the staple grain for some one billion people worldwide. It is also a key feed for livestock, giving it another direct link to the human food supply through meat, dairy and egg prices. US corn ethanol is particularly disruptive to international markets. The United States is by far the largest producer and exporter of corn in the world. That 40 per cent of the US corn crop being put into US cars represents an astonishing 15 per cent of global corn production. The diversion of so much corn from food and feed markets has produced a "demand shock" in international markets since 2004. For our study of the impacts on corn importers, we relied on estimates of how much lower corn prices would have been if ethanol production had not grown past its 2004 levels. The impacts rose with ethanol demand, reaching an estimated 21 per cent in 2009. We took those annual estimates and calculated the added cost each year, 2005-10, to the world's net corn-importing countries based on their net import volumes. The largest importer by far is Japan and the ethanol premium cost Japan an estimated $2.2bn. But our interest was developing countries because of their vulnerability to food price increases. Over the last 50 years, and particularly since the 1980s, the world's least developed countries have gone from being small net exporters of agricultural goods to huge net importers. The shift came when structural reforms in the 1980s forced indebted developing country governments to open their economies to agricultural imports while reducing their support for domestic farmers. The result: a flood of cheap and often-subsidised imports from rich countries, forcing local farmers out of business and off the land. In the price spike of 2008, the world's least developed countries imported $26.6bn in agricultural goods and exported only $9.1bn, leaving an agricultural trade deficit for these overwhelmingly agricultural countries of $17.5bn, more than three times the deficit recorded in 2000 ($4.9bn). This squeezes government budgets, strains limited foreign exchange reserves and leaves the poor more exposed to food price increases. Guatemala, for example, saw its import dependence in corn grow from 9 per cent in the early 1990s to around 40 per cent today. This in a corn-producing country, the birthplace of domesticated corn. According to our estimates, Guatemala saw $91bn in ethanol-related impacts, $28m in 2010 alone. How big an impact is that? It represents six times the level of US agricultural aid that year and nearly as much as US food aid to Guatemala. It is equivalent to over 10 per cent of the government's annual expenditure on agricultural development. It is devastating for a country in which nearly half of children under five are malnourished. Of course, poor consumers are the ones most hurt by ethanol-related price increases, especially those in urban areas. Even in a net corn exporting country like Uganda, domestic corn prices spiked as international prices transmitted to local markets. Ugandans spend on average 65 per cent of their cash income on food, with poor urban consumers getting 20 per cent of their calories from corn purchased in the marketplace. More than half of Ugandans were considered "food insecure" in 2007, and the price spikes have only made that worse. US ethanol expansion has accounted for 21 per cent of corn prices in recent years, so it has forced thousands of Ugandans deeper into poverty and hunger. | 5,991 | <h4>Alt cause—corn ethanol</h4><p><strong>Wise 12</strong> - Policy Research Director, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, Medford (Timothy, “US corn ethanol fuels food crisis in developing countries”, Aljazeera, 10-10-12, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210993632838545.html)//KG</p><p>Biofuel impacts on food prices <u>The debate over biofuels has grown urgent since food prices first spiked in 2007-2008, ushering in a food crisis characterised by repeated jumps in global food prices.</u> Prices for most staple foods doubled, fell when the bubble burst in 2009, then jumped again to their previous high levels in 2010-2011. <u>After a brief respite in the first half of this year, the US drought triggered a new wave of price spikes, the third in just five years. Corn prices were particularly hard-hit, reaching record levels of more than $8.00/bushel</u>, and more than $300 per metric tonne. Before the first spikes, prices had languished around $100/metric tonne. <u><mark>Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion</u>. <u><strong>Few argue now that the contribution is small</u></strong></mark>. A <u><mark>US National Academy of Sciences review attributed</mark> 20-<mark>40 per cent of the</mark> 2007-2008 price <mark>spikes to global biofuels expansion</mark>. Subsequent studies have confirmed this range for the later price increases. Why is the impact so large?</u> <u>Because so much food and feed is now diverted to produce fuel, and so much land is now used for biofuels feedstocks - corn and sugar for ethanol, soybeans, palm oil and a variety of other plants for biodiesel.</u> This rapidly growing market was fuelled by a wide range of government incentives and mandates and by the rising price of petroleum. <u><strong><mark>Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production</u></strong>. <u>Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago</u></mark>. The biggest jump came after the US Congress enacted the RFS in 2005 then expanded it dramatically in 2007. A blending allowance of 10 per cent for domestic gasoline added to the demand, a level now potentially being raised to 15 per cent. These mandates for rising corn ethanol production combined with tax incentives to gasoline blenders and tariff protection against cheaper imports to create today's massive ethanol demand for corn. <u><mark>As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices</mark> just <mark>kept rising and corn stocks</mark> just <mark>kept getting thinner</mark> and thinner. They were at dangerously low levels</u> - about 15 per cent of global use - <u>when the first price spikes happened in 2007-2008. </u>They are at 14 per cent now. Impact on developing countries <u>Corn is probably the most problematic feedstock for </u>biofuels. In many parts of the world<u> it is</u> grown as food for human consumption, serving as <u>the staple grain for some one billion people worldwide. It is also a key feed for livestock</u>, giving it another direct link to the human food supply through meat, dairy and egg prices. <u><strong><mark>US corn ethanol is particularly disruptive to international markets</u></strong>. <u><strong>The United States is by far the largest producer and exporter of corn in the world</u></strong></mark>. <u>That 40 per cent of the US corn crop being put into US cars represents an astonishing 15 per cent of global corn production</u>. <u><strong><mark>The diversion of so much corn from food and feed markets has produced a "demand shock" in international markets since 2004</mark>. </u></strong>For our study of the impacts on corn importers, we relied on estimates of how much lower corn prices would have been if ethanol production had not grown past its 2004 levels. The impacts rose with ethanol demand, reaching an estimated 21 per cent in 2009. We took those annual estimates and calculated the added cost each year, 2005-10, to the world's net corn-importing countries based on their net import volumes. The largest importer by far is Japan and the ethanol premium cost Japan an estimated $2.2bn. But our interest was developing countries because of their vulnerability to food price increases. <u>Over the last 50 years</u>, and particularly since the 1980s, <u>the world's least developed countries have gone from being small net exporters of agricultural goods to huge net importers</u>. The shift came when <u><mark>structural reforms in the</u></mark> 19<u><mark>80s</mark> <mark>forced indebted developing country governments to open their economies to agricultural imports</mark> while reducing their support for domestic farmers. <mark>The result: </mark>a flood of cheap and often-subsidised imports from rich countries, forcing local farmers out of business and off the land. In the price spike of 2008, the world's least developed countries imported $26.6bn in agricultural goods and exported only $9.1bn, leaving <mark>an agricultural trade deficit</u></mark> for these overwhelmingly agricultural countries of $17.5bn, more than three times the deficit recorded in 2000 ($4.9bn). <u><mark>This squeezes government budgets</mark>, strains limited foreign exchange reserves <mark>and leaves the poor more exposed to food price increases.</mark> </u>Guatemala, for example, saw its import dependence in corn grow from 9 per cent in the early 1990s to around 40 per cent today. This in a corn-producing country, the birthplace of domesticated corn. According to our estimates, Guatemala saw $91bn in ethanol-related impacts, $28m in 2010 alone. How big an impact is that? It represents six times the level of US agricultural aid that year and nearly as much as US food aid to Guatemala. It is equivalent to over 10 per cent of the government's annual expenditure on agricultural development. <u>It is devastating for a country in which nearly half of children under five are malnourished. </u>Of course, <u>poor consumers are the ones most hurt by ethanol-related price increases, especially those in urban areas</u>. Even in a net corn exporting country like Uganda, domestic corn prices spiked as international prices transmitted to local markets. Ugandans spend on average 65 per cent of their cash income on food, with poor urban consumers getting 20 per cent of their calories from corn purchased in the marketplace. More than half of Ugandans were considered "food insecure" in 2007, and the price spikes have only made that worse. <u><mark>US ethanol expansion</mark> has accounted for 21 per cent of corn prices in recent years, so it <mark>has forced thousands</u></mark> of Ugandans <u><mark>deeper into poverty and hunger</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Africa | 239,396 | 3 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,454 | The logic of social death ignores the history of the slave and ignores the struggles that actual slaves endured | Brown, 09 (Vincent Brown, Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery”, American Historical Review, December 2009 http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf //kdh) | Brown, 09 (Vincent Brown, Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery”, American Historical Review, December 2009 http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf //kdh) | Seen as a state of being, the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies of slavery would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved as an important part of that history, scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as productive entails a shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us. | the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery If studies would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation enslaved Africans never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us | But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. Seen as a state of being, the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies of slavery would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved as an important part of that history, scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as a productive peril entails a subtle but significant shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration. In part, the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their social and political lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us. | 2,499 | <h4>The logic of social death ignores the history of the slave and ignores the struggles that actual slaves endured</h4><p><strong>Brown, 09</strong> <strong>(Vincent Brown, Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery”, American Historical Review, December 2009 http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf //kdh) </p><p></strong>But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. <u>Seen as a state of being, <mark>the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery</mark>. <mark>If</mark> <mark>studies</mark> of slavery <mark>would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved</mark> as an important part of that history, <mark>scholars would do better to keep</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>view</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>struggle against alienation</mark> rather than alienation itself. To see social death as</u> a <u>productive</u> peril <u>entails a</u> subtle but significant <u>shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which <mark>enslaved Africans</mark> and their descendants <mark>never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration</u></mark>. In part, <u>the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life?</u> For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. <u>There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. <mark>If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories</u></mark> about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their social and political lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. <u><mark>Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us</mark>.<strong> </p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 98,752 | 26 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,455 | Reasonability is bad: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Reasonability is bad:</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,831 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,456 | US and China will never go to war-overwhelming mutual interest and history of conflict resolution prove. | Wu, China Foundation for International Studies Center for American Studies executive director, 2013 | Wu, China Foundation for International Studies Center for American Studies executive director, 2013
(Zurong, “China and America’s Innate Goal: Avoiding War Forever”, 7-30, http://watchingamerica.com/News/217271/china-and-americas-innate-goal-avoiding-war-forever/, ldg) | China and the U.S. are currently constructing a new kind of relationship between major powers, China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and will forever maintain a peaceful association. their interests are intertwined and neither can break the inseparable bond each has with the other. When it comes to international security China and the U.S. share more common interests every day and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly strengthened Perhaps it was upon consideration of the fact that large-scale conflicts could yield a level of suffering and destruction that would be difficult to endure that America has not launched any wars against the great powers that are in possession of nuclear arms Third, for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have promoted a strategy of mutual trust, of the expansion of cooperation, of controlling differences of opinion Sino-American relations have gone through wind and rain but have always developed onward; moreover, the speed, breadth and depth of the development have far exceeded everyone’s expectations. The highest leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange visits Both sides have decided to actively investigate significant military activities These collaborations will give rise to a significant and far-reaching influence on world peace and international security and will vigorously promote the actualization of the inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations. | China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and will forever maintain a peaceful association. their interests are intertwined and neither can break the bond When it comes to security China and the U.S. share interests and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly strengthened America has not launched any wars against powers that are in possession of nuclear arms for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have promoted a strategy of mutual trust, of controlling differences of opinion relations have gone through wind and rain but have always developed onward leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange visits These collaborations will give rise to far-reaching influence on world peace and international security and will vigorously promote the actualization of the inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations | China and the U.S. are currently constructing a new kind of relationship between major powers, with several aims. One intrinsic aim is especially worthy of attention, namely that China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and will forever maintain a peaceful association. The Chinese and American governments and people are striving toward this goal unceasingly because it is in the best interests of the people of China, America and the whole world. To avoid conflict, to keep from fighting, to be mutually respectful and to embark upon a path of mutual cooperation — acting in these ways would benefit everyone. First of all, the globalization of the economy, information and other essential factors have created a global village, and the U.S. and China live and work together within this community; their interests are intertwined and neither can break the inseparable bond each has with the other. The global financial crisis of 2007 once again made clear the great extent to which the Chinese and American economies are linked and mixed, for when one sinks into a recession or depression, it is almost impossible for the other to recover and flourish alone. When it comes to international security, climate change, energy, counterterrorism, oceans and all sorts of other unprecedented areas, China and the U.S. share more common interests every day, and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly strengthened. Within this sort of atmosphere, discussing whether the U.S. and China want to go to war seems a little bit untimely and excessive. Second, the current period is fundamentally different than the era of the Cold War, for the development of peace is the theme of the present. People from countries around the world are all concentrating their energy on revitalizing the economy and improving quality of life. After the end of the Cold War, America launched several localized wars in smaller countries under the banner of the fight against terrorism, in the process bringing upon itself a heavy financial and economic burden. Perhaps it was upon consideration of the fact that large-scale conflicts could yield a level of suffering and destruction that would be difficult to endure that America has not launched any wars against the great powers that are in possession of nuclear arms. Even in the Cold War, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, America and the Soviet Union did not go to war. The experience of history tells us that the inherent goal of this new form of Sino-U.S. relations will have the support of the strength of the entire ranks of the world’s great powers; thus as long as both China and the U.S. have unflagging perseverance, it can be achieved. Third, for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have promoted a strategy of mutual trust, of the expansion of cooperation, of controlling differences of opinion. These lessons from experience are the U.S. and China’s most valuable treasure. Since Nixon visited the Chinese, Sino-American relations have gone through wind and rain but have always developed onward; moreover, the speed, breadth and depth of the development have far exceeded everyone’s expectations. Indeed, Sino-U.S. relations enjoy a great vitality. And since the foundations were laid fairly recently, Sino-U.S. relations continually make significant progress. The highest leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange visits often. The two militaries are in the process of issuing plans for Chinese troops to participate in the 2014 Pacific Rim joint military exercises. Both sides have decided to actively investigate significant military activities, report mechanisms to each other and continue to research matters of security and issues regarding standards of conduct, which are relevant to the Chinese and American navies and air forces. These collaborations will give rise to a significant and far-reaching influence on world peace and international security and will vigorously promote the actualization of the inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations. | 4,062 | <h4><strong>US and China will never go to war-overwhelming mutual interest and history of conflict resolution prove.</h4><p>Wu, China Foundation for International Studies Center for American Studies executive director, 2013</p><p></strong>(Zurong, “China and America’s Innate Goal: Avoiding War Forever”, 7-30, http://watchingamerica.com/News/217271/china-and-americas-innate-goal-avoiding-war-forever/<u>, ldg)</p><p>China and the U.S. are currently constructing a new kind of relationship between major powers, </u>with several aims. One intrinsic aim is especially worthy of attention, namely that <u><mark>China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and <strong>will forever maintain a peaceful association.</u></strong></mark> The Chinese and American governments and people are striving toward this goal unceasingly because it is in the best interests of the people of China, America and the whole world. To avoid conflict, to keep from fighting, to be mutually respectful and to embark upon a path of mutual cooperation — acting in these ways would benefit everyone. First of all, the globalization of the economy, information and other essential factors have created a global village, and the U.S. and China live and work together within this community; <u><mark>their interests are intertwined and neither can break the</mark> inseparable <mark>bond</mark> each has with the other.</u> The global financial crisis of 2007 once again made clear the great extent to which the Chinese and American economies are linked and mixed, for when one sinks into a recession or depression, it is almost impossible for the other to recover and flourish alone. <u><mark>When it comes to</mark> international <mark>security</u></mark>, climate change, energy, counterterrorism, oceans and all sorts of other unprecedented areas, <u><mark>China and the U.S. share</mark> more common <mark>interests</mark> every day</u>, <u><strong><mark>and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly strengthened</u></strong></mark>. Within this sort of atmosphere, discussing whether the U.S. and China want to go to war seems a little bit untimely and excessive. Second, the current period is fundamentally different than the era of the Cold War, for the development of peace is the theme of the present. People from countries around the world are all concentrating their energy on revitalizing the economy and improving quality of life. After the end of the Cold War, America launched several localized wars in smaller countries under the banner of the fight against terrorism, in the process bringing upon itself a heavy financial and economic burden. <u>Perhaps it was upon consideration of the fact that large-scale conflicts could yield a level of suffering and destruction that would be difficult to endure that <mark>America has not launched any wars against </mark>the great <mark>powers that are in possession of nuclear arms</u></mark>. Even in the Cold War, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, America and the Soviet Union did not go to war. The experience of history tells us that the inherent goal of this new form of Sino-U.S. relations will have the support of the strength of the entire ranks of the world’s great powers; thus as long as both China and the U.S. have unflagging perseverance, it can be achieved. <u>Third, <mark>for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have promoted a strategy of mutual trust,</mark> of the expansion of cooperation, <mark>of controlling differences of opinion</u></mark>. These lessons from experience are the U.S. and China’s most valuable treasure. Since Nixon visited the Chinese, <u>Sino-American <mark>relations have gone through wind and rain but have always developed onward</mark>; moreover, the speed, breadth and depth of the development have far exceeded everyone’s expectations. </u>Indeed, Sino-U.S. relations enjoy a great vitality. And since the foundations were laid fairly recently, Sino-U.S. relations continually make significant progress. <u>The highest <mark>leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange visits</u></mark> often. The two militaries are in the process of issuing plans for Chinese troops to participate in the 2014 Pacific Rim joint military exercises. <u>Both sides have decided to actively investigate significant military activities</u>, report mechanisms to each other and continue to research matters of security and issues regarding standards of conduct, which are relevant to the Chinese and American navies and air forces. <u><mark>These collaborations will give rise to</mark> a significant and <mark>far-reaching influence on world peace and international security and will <strong>vigorously promote the actualization of the inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations</strong></mark>.</p></u> | 1NC round 5 State | Case | 1 | 164,224 | 52 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
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3,783,457 | China says yes – it’s a top economic priority. | Mauldin & Magnier 15 [William Mauldin and Mark Magnier, 9-25-2015, "U.S., China Make Progress Toward Trade and Investment Deal," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-make-progress-toward-trade-and-investment-deal-1443208549] | Mauldin & Magnier 15 [William Mauldin and Mark Magnier, 9-25-2015, "U.S., China Make Progress Toward Trade and Investment Deal," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-make-progress-toward-trade-and-investment-deal-1443208549] | The U.S. and China made progress this week toward a far-ranging trade and investment agreement that would open up closed sectors of China’s economy senior U.S. officials said they were able to get China to shrink the list of sectors it is seeking to exclude from the framework We agreed to step up our work toward a high-standard bilateral investment treaty that would help level the playing field for American companies Obama and Xi reaffirmed their commitment to the investment treaty as a “top economic priority,” U.S. business groups operating in China expressed cautious optimism over signs of movement in the BIT, the two sides are making progress there is a commitment to move forward, and the agreement between the two presidents is encouraging, the devil’s going to be in the details China has expressed great interest in reaching a final bilateral investment deal partly because it sees greater foreign competition as a way to reinvigorate its slowing economy, say analysts and people close to negotiations. China is struggling to reach its about 7% growth target for 2015, the slowest pace in 25 years. | U.S. officials said We agreed to step up our work groups expressed cautious optimism over signs of movement in the BIT, there is a commitment to move forward China has expressed great interest in reaching a final bilateral investment deal | The U.S. and China made progress this week toward what could someday be a far-ranging trade and investment agreement that would open up closed sectors of China’s economy, U.S. officials said. In talks connected with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, senior U.S. officials said they were able to get China to shrink the list of sectors it is seeking to exclude from the framework, known as a bilateral investment treaty, or BIT. “We agreed to step up our work toward a high-standard bilateral investment treaty that would help level the playing field for American companies,” President Barack Obama said. China took a variety of moves to open up its economy when it entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, but many U.S. politicians and business groups have long complained that Beijing should take much deeper steps. China isn’t included in a group of 12 Pacific countries seeking to finish a major trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, next week in Atlanta. Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi on Friday reaffirmed their commitment to the investment treaty as a “top economic priority,” the White House said in a statement. U.S. business groups operating in China expressed cautious optimism over signs of movement in the BIT, which could be stepping stone toward a future free-trade agreement. James Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, said he was “pleased that the two sides are making progress” but wants a final deal to materialize soon so that international companies can participate in China’s economic rebalancing. “We are concerned that anything other than immediate and unfettered market access will allow the Chinese government to continue to pick and choose both the timing and scope of market-access reform, and to limit the role of market forces in China’s economy,” Mr. Zimmerman said. Others said a lot would ultimately depend on how any final deal is implemented by Beijing. “We know there is a commitment to move forward, and the agreement between the two presidents is encouraging,” said Guanghua School of Management professor Paul Gillis, who has consulted on accounting standards for the World Trade Organization. “But the devil’s going to be in the details,” he added. China has expressed great interest in reaching a final bilateral investment deal partly because it sees greater foreign competition as a way to reinvigorate its slowing economy, say analysts and people close to negotiations. China is struggling to reach its about 7% growth target for 2015, the slowest pace in 25 years. | 2,560 | <h4>China says yes – it’s a top economic priority.</h4><p><strong>Mauldin & Magnier 15 <u>[William Mauldin and Mark Magnier, 9-25-2015, "U.S., China Make Progress Toward Trade and Investment Deal," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-make-progress-toward-trade-and-investment-deal-1443208549]</p><p>The U.S. and China made progress this week toward</u></strong> what could someday be <u><strong>a far-ranging trade and investment agreement that would open up closed sectors of China’s economy</u></strong>, U.S. officials said. In talks connected with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, <u><strong>senior <mark>U.S. officials said</mark> they were able to get China to shrink the list of sectors it is seeking to exclude from the framework</u></strong>, known as a bilateral investment treaty, or BIT. “<u><strong><mark>We agreed to step up our work</mark> toward a high-standard bilateral investment treaty that would help level the playing field for American companies</u></strong>,” President Barack Obama said. China took a variety of moves to open up its economy when it entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, but many U.S. politicians and business groups have long complained that Beijing should take much deeper steps. China isn’t included in a group of 12 Pacific countries seeking to finish a major trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, next week in Atlanta. Mr. <u><strong>Obama and</u></strong> Mr. <u><strong>Xi</u></strong> on Friday <u><strong>reaffirmed their commitment to the investment treaty as a “top economic priority,”</u></strong> the White House said in a statement. <u><strong>U.S. business <mark>groups</mark> operating in China <mark>expressed cautious optimism over signs of movement in the BIT,</u></strong></mark> which could be stepping stone toward a future free-trade agreement. James Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, said he was “pleased that <u><strong>the two sides are making progress</u></strong>” but wants a final deal to materialize soon so that international companies can participate in China’s economic rebalancing. “We are concerned that anything other than immediate and unfettered market access will allow the Chinese government to continue to pick and choose both the timing and scope of market-access reform, and to limit the role of market forces in China’s economy,” Mr. Zimmerman said. Others said a lot would ultimately depend on how any final deal is implemented by Beijing. “We know <u><strong><mark>there is a commitment to move forward</mark>, and the agreement between the two presidents is encouraging,</u></strong>” said Guanghua School of Management professor Paul Gillis, who has consulted on accounting standards for the World Trade Organization. “But <u><strong>the devil’s going to be in the details</u></strong>,” he added. <u><strong><mark>China has expressed great interest in reaching a final bilateral investment deal</mark> partly because it sees greater foreign competition as a way to reinvigorate its slowing economy, say analysts and people close to negotiations. China is struggling to reach its about 7% growth target for 2015, the slowest pace in 25 years.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Plan + Solvency | null | 160,865 | 4 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
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3,783,458 | Plan forces spending trade-offs that crush effective Earth sciences--- risks catastrophic climate change | Haymet 7 | Haymet 7 (Tony, Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography – University of California, San Diego, Mark Abbott, Dean of the College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Science – Oregon State University, and Jim Luyten, Acting Director – Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, “The Planet NASA Needs to Explore”, Washington Post, 5-10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902451.html) | space exploration risk hurting Earth, in the long run. Our planet is under significant threat from rapid climate change changing NASA priorities will threaten exploration at home NASA builds and operates satellites that collect crucial global data They track loss of sea ice and rise of sea levels, and understand and prepare for climate changes. As dollars are reallocated to prepare for missions , sophisticated new satellites to observe the Earth will be delayed, harming Earth sciences. the Landsat system, which takes important measurements of global vegetation could fail The same is true for QuikSCAT which provides critical wind data Sea levels are rising buildup of carbon dioxide in oceans threatens to make them more acidic, which may hinder the ability of marine life We must learn to assess threats and develop solutions. Satellites provide coverage of vast, remote regions that would otherwise remain unseen, especially the oceans, which play an important role in climate change. Without accurate data we will not understand dangers Climate change is the most critical problem the Earth has ever faced Mitigating risks and preparing for effects will require scientific understanding
we can't afford to be so starry-eyed that we overlook our own planet. | space risk hurting Earth Our planet is under significant threat from climate change changing NASA priorities will threaten exploration at home As dollars are reallocated to prepare for missions satellites to observe the Earth will be delayed, harming Earth sciences We must learn to assess threats Climate change is the most critical problem will require scientific understanding | Decades ago, a shift in NASA priorities sidelined progress in human space exploration. As momentum gathers to reinvigorate human space missions to the moon and Mars, we risk hurting ourselves, and Earth, in the long run. Our planet -- not the moon or Mars -- is under significant threat from the consequences of rapid climate change. Yet the changing NASA priorities will threaten exploration here at home. NASA not only launches shuttles and builds space stations, it also builds and operates our nation's satellites that observe and monitor the Earth. These satellites collect crucial global data on winds, ice and oceans. They help us forecast hurricanes, track the loss of Arctic sea ice and the rise of sea levels, and understand and prepare for climate changes. NASA's budget for science missions has declined 30 percent in the past six years, and that trend is expected to continue. As more dollars are reallocated to prepare for missions back to the moon and Mars, sophisticated new satellites to observe the Earth will be delayed, harming Earth sciences. The National Academy of Sciences has noted that the Landsat satellite system, which takes important measurements of global vegetation, is in its fourth decade of operation and could fail without a clear plan for continuation. The same is true for the QuikSCAT satellite, which provides critical wind data used in forecasting hurricanes and El Niño effects. In January, a partnership of university and NASA scientists demonstrated that climate change and higher ocean temperatures were reducing the growth of microscopic plants and animals at the heart of the marine food web. Their analysis was based on nearly a decade of NASA satellite measurements of ocean color, which unfortunately are at risk of being interrupted for several years. Sea levels are rising, and the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in summer. The buildup of carbon dioxide in the oceans threatens to make them more acidic, which may in turn hinder the ability of some types of marine life, including corals, to build their shells and skeletons. We must learn as much as we can to assess these threats and develop solutions. Satellites provide coverage of vast, remote regions of our planet that would otherwise remain unseen, especially the oceans, which play an important role in climate change. Without accurate data on such fundamentals as sea surface height, temperatures and biomass, as well as glacier heights and snowpack thickness, we will not be able to understand the likelihood of dangers such as more severe hurricanes along the Gulf Coast or more frequent forest fires in the Pacific Northwest. Climate change is the most critical problem the Earth has ever faced. Government agencies and the private sector, as well as individual citizens, need to better grasp the risks and potential paths of global climate change. Mitigating these risks and preparing for the effects of warming will require scientific understanding of how our complex planet operates, how it is changing, and how that change will affect the environment and human society.
John F. Kennedy's brilliant call to put a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s set an arbitrary deadline, but the deadline we face today is set by nature. NASA must continue to play a vital role in helping find ways to protect our planet for (and perhaps from) its intelligent life. Exploration of space is a noble quest. But we can't afford to be so starry-eyed that we overlook our own planet. | 3,485 | <h4>Plan forces spending trade-offs that crush effective Earth sciences--- risks catastrophic climate change</h4><p><strong>Haymet 7</strong> (Tony, Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography – University of California, San Diego, Mark Abbott, Dean of the College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Science – Oregon State University, and Jim Luyten, Acting Director – Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, “The Planet NASA Needs to Explore”, Washington Post, 5-10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902451.html)</p><p>Decades ago, a shift in NASA priorities sidelined progress in human <u><mark>space</mark> exploration</u>. As momentum gathers to reinvigorate human space missions to the moon and Mars, we <u><mark>risk hurting</u></mark> ourselves, and <u><mark>Earth</mark>, in the long run. <mark>Our planet</u></mark> -- not the moon or Mars -- <u><mark>is under significant threat from</u></mark> the consequences of <u>rapid <mark>climate change</u></mark>. Yet the <u><strong><mark>changing NASA priorities will threaten exploration</u></strong></mark> here <u><strong><mark>at home</u></strong></mark>. <u>NASA</u> not only launches shuttles and builds space stations, it also <u>builds and operates</u> our nation's <u>satellites that</u> observe and monitor the Earth. These satellites <u>collect crucial global data</u> on winds, ice and oceans. <u>They</u> help us forecast hurricanes, <u>track</u> the <u>loss of</u> Arctic <u>sea ice and</u> the <u>rise of sea levels, and understand and prepare for climate changes.</u> NASA's budget for science missions has declined 30 percent in the past six years, and that trend is expected to continue. <u><mark>As</u></mark> more <u><mark>dollars are<strong> reallocated </strong>to prepare for missions</u></mark> back to the moon and Mars<u>, sophisticated new <mark>satellites to observe the Earth will be<strong> delayed, harming Earth sciences</mark>.</u></strong> The National Academy of Sciences has noted that <u>the Landsat</u> satellite <u>system, which takes important measurements of global vegetation</u>, is in its fourth decade of operation and <u>could fail</u> without a clear plan for continuation. <u>The same is true for</u> the <u>QuikSCAT</u> satellite, <u>which provides critical wind data</u> used in forecasting hurricanes and El Niño effects. In January, a partnership of university and NASA scientists demonstrated that climate change and higher ocean temperatures were reducing the growth of microscopic plants and animals at the heart of the marine food web. Their analysis was based on nearly a decade of NASA satellite measurements of ocean color, which unfortunately are at risk of being interrupted for several years. <u>Sea levels are rising</u>, and the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in summer. The <u>buildup of carbon dioxide in</u> the <u>oceans threatens to make them more acidic, which may</u> in turn <u>hinder the ability of</u> some types of <u>marine life</u>, including corals, to build their shells and skeletons. <u><strong><mark>We must learn</u></strong></mark> as much as we can <u><strong><mark>to assess</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>threats</mark> and develop solutions. </strong>Satellites provide coverage of vast, remote regions</u> of our planet <u>that would otherwise remain unseen, especially the oceans, which play an important role in climate change. Without accurate data</u> on such fundamentals as sea surface height, temperatures and biomass, as well as glacier heights and snowpack thickness, <u>we will not</u> be able to <u>understand</u> the likelihood of <u>dangers</u> such as more severe hurricanes along the Gulf Coast or more frequent forest fires in the Pacific Northwest. <u><mark>Climate change is the</u> <u><strong>most critical problem</u></strong></mark> <u>the Earth has ever faced</u>. Government agencies and the private sector, as well as individual citizens, need to better grasp the risks and potential paths of global climate change. <u>Mitigating</u> these <u>risks and preparing for</u> the <u>effects</u> of warming <u><mark>will require scientific understanding</u></mark> of how our complex planet operates, how it is changing, and how that change will affect the environment and human society.</p><p>John F. Kennedy's brilliant call to put a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s set an arbitrary deadline, but the deadline we face today is set by nature. NASA must continue to play a vital role in helping find ways to protect our planet for (and perhaps from) its intelligent life. Exploration of space is a noble quest. But <u>we can't afford to be so starry-eyed that we overlook our own planet.</p></u> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 2 | 336,048 | 52 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
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3,783,459 | No resource wars | Allouche, 11 | Allouche, 11 - Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (Jeremy,. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Science Direct) | most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable instrumental purpose The evidence seems quite weak none of these declarations have been followed up by military action None of the various and extensive databases more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin | empirical studies do not support any Malthusian arguments. Tech and capital increased productivity humankind breached barriers that seemed unchallengeable alarmist scenarios linked resources with wars this has an instrumental purpose ministers used bellicose rhetoric The evidence seems weak none have been followed by military action None of the databases on causes of war show water as a c b . water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale political bodies signed between 3600 treaties There is no correlation between scarcity and conflict the threat does not make sense in the light of historical record | Water/food resources, war and conflict The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]). | 6,305 | <h4><strong>No resource wars</h4><p>Allouche, 11</strong> - Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (Jeremy,. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Science Direct)</p><p>Water/food resources, war and conflict <strong>The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity</strong> (whether of food or water<strong>) will lead to conflict and war.</strong> The <strong>underlining reasoning</strong> behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <strong>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth</strong> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. <strong>Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population</strong> and aggregate consumption; <strong>if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result.</strong> Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most <mark>empirical studies do not support any</mark> of these neo-<mark>Malthusian arguments.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Tech</mark>nological change <mark>and </mark>greater inputs of <mark>capital</u></mark> have <u>dramatically <mark>increased</mark> labour <mark>productivity</mark> in agriculture</u>.</strong> More generally, <strong>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries <u><mark>humankind</mark> has <mark>breached</mark> many resource <mark>barriers that seemed unchallengeable</u></strong></mark>. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations <strong>In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <mark>alarmist scenarios</mark> have <mark>linked</mark> the increasing use of water <mark>resources</mark> and food insecurity <mark>with wars</mark>. The idea of water wars</strong> (perhaps more than food wars) <strong>is a dominant discourse in the media</strong> (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, <strong><mark>this</mark> type of discourse <mark>has an <u>instrumental purpose</u></mark>; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities</strong> at the international level. <strong>In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign <mark>ministers</mark> have also <mark>used</mark> this <mark>bellicose rhetoric</mark>. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’</strong> (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). <strong>The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u><mark>The evidence seems</mark> quite <mark>weak</u></strong></mark>. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong><mark>none</mark> of these declarations <mark>have been followed</mark> up <mark>by military action</u></strong></mark>. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. <u><strong><mark>None of the</mark> various and extensive <mark>databases</u> on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water as a c</strong></mark>asus<strong><mark> b</strong></mark>elli<mark>.</mark> <strong>Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict</strong> (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). <strong>As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u>more than two-thirds of over 1800 <mark>water</mark>-related ‘<mark>events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></mark> </strong>(Yoffe et al., 2003). <strong>Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument</strong>. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <strong>organized <mark>political bodies signed</strong> <strong>between</mark> the year 805 and 1984 more than</strong> <strong><mark>3600</mark> water-related <mark>treaties</strong></mark>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]). <strong>The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <mark>There is</mark> however <u><mark>no</mark> direct <mark>correlation between</mark> water <mark>scarcity and</mark> transboundary <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that <strong>scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians</strong> ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]). <strong>In terms of international relations, <mark>the threat </mark>of water wars due to increasing scarcity <u><mark>does not make</mark> much <mark>sense in the light of</mark> the recent <mark>historical record</u></mark>. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. </strong>The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <strong>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, <u>the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]). </p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Africa | 28,932 | 766 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,460 | Any movement that promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—rejecting politics is the only political act | The Invisible Committee, 7 | The Invisible Committee, 7 [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the Tarnac Nine by the French police), http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf] | null | Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately "There's no future for the future
certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere,
Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since Among the accused we find
diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. There’s no social solution to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with
As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood.
The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution | Whatever angle you look at it from, there's no escape from the present. That's not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level
of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only
intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go
on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all
those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The
lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling
heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of
promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere,
with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find
diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism3” could sink its cancerous roots into that event, one to which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which made no demands, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is purely political about this resolute negation of politics, and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week5 -- and knows it. There’s no social solution to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which
the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather too evaporated for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly overSeine-Saint-Denis7 last July 14th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial
front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal
repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that
justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it. | 7,631 | <h4>Any movement that promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—rejecting politics is the only political act</h4><p><strong>The Invisible Committee, 7</strong> [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the Tarnac Nine by the French police), http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf]</p><p>Whatever angle you look at it from, there's no escape from the present. That's not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. <mark>Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately</mark>. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. <mark>"There's no future for the future</mark>" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level</p><p>of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only</p><p>intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go</p><p>on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all</p><p>those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The</p><p>lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling</p><p>heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of</p><p>promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is <mark>certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere,</p><p></mark>with fires that were methodically snuffed out. <mark>Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since</mark>. <mark>Among the accused we find</p><p>diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood.</mark> What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism3” could sink its cancerous roots into that event, one to which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà4 could feign putting an end. <mark>The</mark> <mark>whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the</mark> <mark>merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political.</mark> No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which made no demands, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is purely political about this resolute negation of politics, and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week5 -- and knows it.<mark> There’s no social solution to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with</mark>. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which</p><p>the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather too evaporated for all that. <mark>As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure</mark> <mark>nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood.</mark> The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly overSeine-Saint-Denis7 last July 14th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial</p><p>front. <mark>The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere.</mark> <mark>Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted</mark> <mark>themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own</mark> <mark>specially missing solution</mark>. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal</p><p>repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that</p><p>justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.</p> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 111,330 | 12 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,461 | A – no brightline – makes judge intervention inevitable – makes debate gut-check decision | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>A – no brightline – makes judge intervention inevitable – makes debate gut-check decision </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,833 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,462 | No Chinese-Japan war-7 reasons | Moss, Diplomat contributor and former Defence Weekly editor, 2013 | Moss, Diplomat contributor and former Defence Weekly editor, 2013
(Trefor, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true, ldg) | But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospe China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness. weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. | there are seven reasons to think that war is unlikely China might win a war but defeat would also be a very real possibility the prospect of humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness weaknesses within the PLA would undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a war Unsettled politics. China’s leaderships remain in a state of flux As the new leaders find their feet they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions and its actions bear this out China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies | But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. | 4,790 | <h4><strong>No Chinese-Japan war-7 reasons</h4><p>Moss, Diplomat contributor and former Defence Weekly editor, 2013</p><p></strong>(Trefor, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true<u>, ldg)</p><p>But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds</u>. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. <u>Specifically, <mark>there are seven reasons to think that war is</mark> a very <mark>unlikely</mark> prospe</u>ct, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. <u><mark>China might</mark> well <mark>win a war</mark> against Japan, <mark>but defeat would also be a very real possibility</u></mark>. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, <u><mark>the prospect of</mark> a new, avoidable <mark>humiliation at the hands of its most bitter</u> <u>enemy is</u> <u><strong>enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome</u></strong></mark> (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. <u>2. <mark>Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both </mark>participants</u>. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. <u><mark>Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness</mark>. </u>The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other <u><mark>weaknesses within the PLA</mark>, such as endemic corruption, <mark>would</mark> similarly <mark>undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a</mark> risky <mark>war</mark> with a peer adversary. </u>4. <u><mark>Unsettled politics. China’s</mark> civil and military <mark>leaderships remain in a state of flux</u></mark>, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. <u><mark>As the new leaders find their feet</mark> and jockey for position amongst themselves, <mark>they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions</u></mark> – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. <u>The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention</u>. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. <u><mark>U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause</mark>, should the chances of conflict increase</u>. 6. <u>China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. <mark>China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions</mark> to disputes, <mark>and its actions</mark> have tended to <mark>bear this out</mark>. </u>In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. <u>There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. </u>The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. <u>China’s socialization. <mark>China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat</mark> to peace <mark>to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies</u></mark>. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. <u>If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan</u> –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – <u>China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.</p></u> | 1NC round 5 State | Case | 1 | 60,225 | 88 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
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3,783,463 | Plan is key to overcome status quo delays. | Donnelly 15 | Donnelly 15 [Shaun Donnelly, Vice President for Investment, Trade and Financial Services at the United States Council for International Business, 9-15-2015, "Bit by Bit Won’t Get It Done on the U.S.," Investment Policy Central, http://www.investmentpolicycentral.com/content/bit-bit-won%E2%80%99t-get-it-done-us-china-bit-negotiations-0] | the negotiations have advanced slowly – seven years is a long time to be negotiating. the professional negotiators on both sides have done excellent work to get these negotiations as far as they have. However, I am not sure that the deal can get done at the negotiator level. if we fail to see dramatic breakthroughs we will simply run out of time to get it done during the Obama Administration and will then face further delays on the U.S. side as a new U.S. Administration settles in, reviews existing policies and negotiations, and so on. we need to see real progress on the U.S.-China BIT The two Presidents will probably need to get involved and provide a strong push to their negotiating teams to get the deal done this year. A U.S.-China BIT is still only worth doing if it is comprehensive, ambitious, and market-opening. negotiators on both sides have the ability to get that kind of deal done, but they are going need a strong push from the top it is really a time for the two governments at the highest levels to step up and provide the political impetus to get the deal done. | negotiations have advanced slowly – seven years we will simply run out of time then face further delays on the U.S. side it is time for the two governments to step up and provide the political impetus to get the deal done. | Understandably, one implication of such an ambitious BIT negotiation is that it takes time, especially given that this pro-investment conceptual framework is revolutionary to China, where the government still plays a predominant role in the economy, and presumptions of openness face a skeptical bureaucracy and political establishment. Accordingly, the negotiations have advanced slowly – seven years is a long time to be negotiating. My personal sense as an outside observer is that the professional negotiators on both sides have done excellent work to get these negotiations as far as they have. However, I am not sure that the deal can get done at the negotiator level. I worry that if we fail to see dramatic breakthroughs at and around the Presidential summit this month, we will simply run out of time to get it done during the Obama Administration and will then face further delays on the U.S. side as a new U.S. Administration settles in, reviews existing policies and negotiations, and so on. For me, the bottom line is that we need to see real progress on the U.S.-China BIT this month. The two Presidents will probably need to get involved and provide a strong push to their negotiating teams to get the deal done this year. However, it can’t be just any deal; I am not arguing for speed over substance. A U.S.-China BIT is still only worth doing if it is comprehensive, ambitious, and market-opening. I think the negotiators on both sides have the ability to get that kind of deal done, but they are going need a strong push from the top – the time for that push is at the late September Obama-Xi Summit. USCIB and others in the business community are certainly ready to do our part in supporting a strong BIT deal with China, including building support in the U.S. Senate for BIT ratification. At this point, however, it is really a time for the two governments at the highest levels to step up and provide the political impetus to get the deal done. | 1,966 | <h4>Plan is key to overcome status quo delays.</h4><p><strong>Donnelly 15 <u></strong>[Shaun Donnelly, Vice President for Investment, Trade and Financial Services at the United States Council for International Business, 9-15-2015, "Bit by Bit Won’t Get It Done on the U.S.," Investment Policy Central, http://www.investmentpolicycentral.com/content/bit-bit-won%E2%80%99t-get-it-done-us-china-bit-negotiations-0]</p><p></u>Understandably, one implication of such an ambitious BIT negotiation is that it takes time, especially given that this pro-investment conceptual framework is revolutionary to China, where the government still plays a predominant role in the economy, and presumptions of openness face a skeptical bureaucracy and political establishment. Accordingly, <u><strong>the <mark>negotiations have advanced slowly – seven years</mark> is a long time to be negotiating.</u></strong> My personal sense as an outside observer is that <u><strong>the professional negotiators on both sides have done excellent work to get these negotiations as far as they have. However, I am not sure that the deal can get done at the negotiator level.</u></strong> I worry that <u><strong>if we fail to see dramatic breakthroughs</u></strong> at and around the Presidential summit this month, <u><strong><mark>we will simply run out of time</mark> to get it done during the Obama Administration and will <mark>then face further delays on the U.S. side</mark> as a new U.S. Administration settles in, reviews existing policies and negotiations, and so on. </u></strong>For me, the bottom line is that <u><strong>we need to see real progress on the U.S.-China BIT</u></strong> this month. <u><strong>The two Presidents will probably need to get involved and provide a strong push to their negotiating teams to get the deal done this year.</u></strong> However, it can’t be just any deal; I am not arguing for speed over substance. <u><strong>A U.S.-China BIT is still only worth doing if it is comprehensive, ambitious, and market-opening.</u></strong> I think the <u><strong>negotiators on both sides have the ability to get that kind of deal done, but they are going need a strong push from the top</u></strong> – the time for that push is at the late September Obama-Xi Summit. USCIB and others in the business community are certainly ready to do our part in supporting a strong BIT deal with China, including building support in the U.S. Senate for BIT ratification. At this point, however, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> really a <mark>time for the two governments</mark> at the highest levels <mark>to step up and provide the political impetus to get the deal done.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1AC Plan + Solvency | null | 160,870 | 4 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
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3,783,464 | No threats of desertification – its cyclical | Simon in ’96 | Simon in ’96 [Julian Simon, Former Professor of Business Administration at the University of Maryland and Former Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, “The Ultimate Resource 2”, 1996, p. 132-133] | When confronted by the aggregate data, the loss-of-land warriors bring up the supposed “desertification,” especially in the Sahara region scientific evidence Despite the impression that the sands of the Sahara are expanding, a new analysis of satellite images… shows the greatest desert on Earth has stopped growing and is now shrinking. Sahara essentially reversed its expansion in 1984, and has since contracted dramatically Sahara expansion was “simply assumed,” and that expansion and contractions seem to be natural. Trying “to stop the natural process probably would be fruitless.” | When confronted by the aggregate data, the loss-of-land warriors bring up the supposed “desertification,” especially in the Sahara Sahara essentially reversed its expansion in 1984, and has since contracted dramatically expansion and contractions seem to be natural. Trying “to stop the natural process probably would be fruitless.” | When confronted by the aggregate data, the loss-of-land warriors bring up the supposed “desertification,” especially in the Sahara region. This has been hard to disprove until recently. But once again the anecdotal claim is confounded by scientific evidence when it can be gathered: Despite the widely held impression that the sands of the Sahara are relentlessly expanding, consuming villages and contributing to famine in Africa, a new analysis of satellite images… shows the greatest desert on Earth has stopped growing and is now shrinking. For years, researchers and agencies have assumed the Sahara’s advance was implacable, but scientists who examined 4,500 satellite pictures taken over the past decade say it is clear the Sahara essentially reversed its expansion in 1984, and has since contracted dramatically.13 The story goes on to quote Compton J. Tucker and Harold Dregne, as saying that the previous belief in Sahara expansion was “simply assumed,” and that expansion and contractions seem to be natural. Trying “to stop the natural process probably would be fruitless.” | 1,085 | <h4>No threats of desertification – its cyclical</h4><p><strong>Simon in ’96<u> </u></strong>[Julian Simon, Former Professor of Business Administration at the University of Maryland and Former Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, “The Ultimate Resource 2”, 1996, p. 132-133]</p><p><u><mark>When confronted by the aggregate data, the loss-of-land warriors bring up the supposed “desertification,” especially in the Sahara</mark> region</u>. This has been hard to disprove until recently. But once again the anecdotal claim is confounded by <u>scientific evidence</u> when it can be gathered: <u>Despite the</u> widely held <u>impression that the sands of the Sahara are </u>relentlessly <u>expanding,</u> consuming villages and contributing to famine in Africa, <u>a new analysis of satellite images… shows the greatest desert on Earth has stopped growing and is now shrinking.</u> For years, researchers and agencies have assumed the Sahara’s advance was implacable, but scientists who examined 4,500 satellite pictures taken over the past decade say it is clear the <u><mark>Sahara essentially reversed its expansion in 1984, and has since contracted dramatically</u></mark>.13 The story goes on to quote Compton J. Tucker and Harold Dregne, as saying that the previous belief in <u>Sahara expansion was “simply assumed,” and that <mark>expansion and contractions seem to be natural. Trying “to stop the natural process probably would be fruitless.”</p></u></mark> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Africa | 1,560,834 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
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3,783,465 | Ineffective NASA Earth sciences risk multiple threats of extinction | Killeen 5 | Killeen 5 (Timothy L., Director – National Center for Atmospheric Research, “NASA Earth Science”, CQ Congressional Testimony, 4-28, Lexis) | ozone "holes" were monitored by ASA satellite systems NASA made the "smoking gun" measurements that convinced the scientific and policy communities that human activities were responsible for ozone loss Following observations, international protocols were put in place that are beginning to ameliorate global-scale ozone loss continuing measurements have led to a reduction in deaths from cancer worldwide Air pollution is an important concern. NASA has played a major role in development of new technologies that can monitor the sources and circulation patterns of air pollution globally operational systems can be designed to observe the global distribution of chemicals in the atmosphere and the ways these substances ability of the atmosphere to sustain life Without NASA's commitment to innovation in the Earth sciences, it is hard to believe that such an incredible new capability would be available today NASA Earth science programs have played a key role in identification and documentation of a series of global-scale changes in the Earth's environment, including ozone depletion loss of biodiversity, and climate change Earth science activities can provide information about changes in the atmosphere, oceans, and ecosystems that sustain life, including the impact of human activities The continued development of observation systems holds the promise of much improved predictions of many important questions remain with human alteration of the Earth's carbon, nitrogen, and water cycles | Air pollution is a concern NASA has played a major role Without NASA's commitment to innovation , it is hard to believe that such an incredible new capability would be available NASA Earth science programs have played a key role in identification of a series of global-scale changes in environment including ozone biodiversity and climate change activities can provide information that sustain life | The first example is probably well known to you. The ozone "holes" in the Antarctic and Arctic were monitored from space by various NASA satellite systems, including the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS). The diagnosis of the physical and chemical mechanisms responsible for these dangerous changes to our protective ozone shield was made possible by the combination of observations, modeling, and theory supported by NASA. In fact, it was a NASA high-altitude aircraft that made the "smoking gun" measurements that convinced the scientific and policy communities that chlorine compounds produced by various human activities were centrally responsible for the observed ozone loss. Following these observations, international protocols were put in place that are beginning to ameliorate the global-scale ozone loss. The TOMS instrument has provided an ongoing source of data that permits us to track the level of ozone in the stratosphere, the annual opening and closing of the "ozone hole," and how this phenomenon is changing over time. These continuing measurements and analyses and the effective regulatory response have led, among other things, to a reduction in projected deaths from skin cancer worldwide. Last week, President Bush mentioned proposed rules to limit air pollution from coalfired power plants. Air pollution is clearly an important concern. NASA has played a major role in the development of new technologies that can monitor the sources and circulation patterns of air pollution globally. It is another tremendous story of science serving society through innovation. In this case, through an international collaboration, NASA deployed a one-of-a-kind instrument designed to observe global carbon monoxide and its transport from the NASA Terra spacecraft. These animations show the first global observations of air pollution. Sources of carbon monoxide include industrial processes (see, for example, source regions in the Pacific Rim) and fires (for example in Amazonia). These global-scale data from space have helped change our understanding of the relationship between pollution and air quality - we now know that pollution is not solely or even primarily a local or regional problem. California's air quality is influenced by industrial activity in Asia, and Europe's air quality is influenced by activities here in America. From such pioneering work, operational systems can now be designed to observe pollution events, the global distribution of chemicals and particulate matter in the atmosphere, and the ways in which these substances interact and affect the ability of the atmosphere to sustain life - such a system will undoubtedly underpin future efforts to understand, monitor, and manage air quality globally. Without NASA's commitment to innovation in the Earth sciences, it is hard to believe that such an incredible new capability would be available today. The Promise of Earth Observations in the Next Decade The achievements of the last several decades have laid the foundation for an unprecedented era of discovery and innovation in Earth system science. Advances in observing technologies have been accompanied by vast improvements in computing and data processing. When the Earth Observing System satellites were being designed, processing and archiving the data was a central challenge. The Terra satellite produces about 194 gigabytes of raw data per day, which seemed a daunting prospect at the time of its definition. Now laptop memories are measured in gigabytes, students can work with remote sensing datasets on their laptops, and a large data center like NCAR increases our data holdings by about 1000 gigabytes per day. The next generation of high performance computing systems, which will be deployed during the next five years or so, will be petascale systems, meaning that they will be able to process millions of gigabytes of data. The ongoing revolution in information technology has provided us with capabilities we could hardly conceive of when the current generation of Earth observing satellites was being developed. We have just begun to take advantage of the synergies between these technological areas. The U.S., through NASA, is uniquely positioned to take advantage of this technological opportunity. Example 3: Weather Forecasting Weather forecasting in the Southern Hemisphere has been dramatically improved through NASA's contributions, and this experience illustrates the power of remote sensing for further global improvements in weather prediction. The lack of surface- based data in the Southern Hemisphere once meant that predictive skill lagged considerably behind that achieved in the Northern Hemisphere. The improvement in the accuracy of Southern Hemisphere weather forecasting is well documented and almost entirely due to the increased use of remote-sensing data. But improvements in the quality of satellite data were not sufficient. Improvements in data assimilation a family of techniques for integrating observational results into predictive models were also necessary. The combination has resulted in rapid improvement in Southern Hemisphere forecasting, which is now nearly equal to that in northern regions. Data assimilation capabilities continue to advance rapidly. One can now easily conceive of forecast systems that will fuse data from satellites, ground-based systems, databases, and models to provide predictions with unprecedented detail and accuracy - perhaps reaching natural limits of predictability. A new generation of weather forecast models with cloud-resolving spatial resolution is coming on line, and these models show significant promise for improving forecast skills across the board. Use of new NASA remote sensing data from upcoming missions such as Calipso (Cloud- Aerosol and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite) and CloudSat will be essential to fully validate and tune these new capabilities which will serve the nation in providing improved hurricane and severe storm prediction, and in the development of numerous decision support systems reliant on state-of-the-art numerical weather prediction capabilities. Example 4: Earth System Models Data from NASA missions are central to constructing more comprehensive and detailed models that will more realistically represent the complexity of the Earth system. Cloud observations from MODIS (the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) and precipitation measurements from GPM (the Global Precipitation Mission), for example, are critical to improving the representation of clouds and the water cycle in such models. Observations from MODIS and Landsat are fundamental to the development of more sophisticated representation of marine and terrestrial ecosystems and atmosphere-land surface interactions. The inclusion of this detail will help in the creation of true Earth system models that will enable detailed investigation of the interactions of Earth system processes and multiple environmental stresses within physically consistent simulated systems. In general terms, Earth system observations represent the only means of validating Earth system model predictions. Our confidence in short-term, regional-scale weather predictions is based on how closely they match observed regional conditions. Assessing the performance of global-scale, longer-term model predictions likewise depends on comparing model results with observational records. Scientific confidence in the ability of general circulation models to represent Earth's climate has been greatly enhanced by comparing model results for the last century with the observational records from that period. At the same time, the sparse and uneven nature of past observational records is an ongoing source of uncertainty in the evaluation of model results. The existence of much more comprehensive and consistent global measurements from space such as the data from the NASA Terra, Aqua, and Aura satellites is a giant step forward in this regard, and, if maintained, will enable much more rigorous evaluation of model performance in the future. In summary, Earth system models, with increasing temporal and spatial resolutions and validated predictive capabilities, will be used by industry and governmental decision makers across a host of domains into the foreseeable future. This knowledge base will drive new economies and efficiencies within our society. I believe that requirements flowing from the needs and capabilities of sophisticated Earth system models will be very useful for NASA in developing strategic roadmaps for future missions. C. The Importance of Careful Planning The central role of NASA in supporting Earth system science, the demonstrated success and impact of previous and current NASA missions, and the promise of continued advances in scientific understanding and societal benefits all argue for a careful, analytical approach to major modifications in the NASA Earth science program. As noted above, the development of space systems is a time-consuming and difficult process. Today's actions and plans will have long-term consequences for our nation's capabilities in this area. The link between plans and actions is one of the most important points I want to address today. From the outside, the interagency planning process seems to be experiencing substantial difficulties in maintaining this link. The NASA Earth science program is part of two major Presidential initiatives, the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) and the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). With regard to the CCSP, it is not apparent that the strategies and plans developed through the interagency process are having much impact on NASA decision-making. In January 2004, then- Administrator of NASA, Sean O'Keefe, called for acceleration of the NASA Glory mission because of the direct relevance of the mission to understanding the roles of aerosols in the climate system, which is one of the highest-priority science questions defined in the CCSP research strategy. NASA is now proposing cancellation of the mission. As I have emphasized throughout this testimony, the progress of and benefits from Earth system science research are contingent upon close coordination between research, modeling, and observations. The close coordination of program planning among the agencies that support these activities is also a necessity. This coordination currently appears to be fragile. The effect of significant redirections in NASA and reduction in NASA's Earth science effort are equally worrisome in the case of the Administration's GEOSS initiative, which is focused on improving the international coordination of environmental observing systems. Both NASA and NOAA satellite programs are vital to this effort. The science community is very supportive of the GEOSS concept and goals. There are over 100 space-based remote-sensing systems that are either operating or planned by various nations for the next decade. Collaboration among space systems, between space- and ground-based systems, and between suppliers and users of observational data is critical to avoiding duplication of effort and to getting the most out of the investments in observing technology. The tragic example of the Indian Ocean Tsunami demonstrates the need for such coordination. The tsunami was detected and observed before hitting land, but the absence of effective communication links prevented warnings from reaching those who needed them in time. A functioning GEOSS could lead to major improvements in the rapid availability of data and warnings, and the U.S. is right to make development of such a system a priority. But U.S. credibility and leadership of this initiative will be called into question if our nation is unable or unwilling to coordinate and maintain the U.S. programs that make up the core of our proposed contribution. D. Answers to Questions Posed by the Committee My testimony to this point has outlined my views on a series of key issues for the NASA Earth science program. Much of the text found above is relevant to consideration of the specific questions posed by the Committee in its letter of invitation. In this section, I provide more direct answers to these questions to the extent possible and appropriate. How should NASA prioritize currently planned and future missions? What criteria should NASA use in doing so? I believe that NASA should work with the scientific and technical community and its partner agencies to define a NASA Earth science plan that is fully compatible with the overall CCSP and GEOSS science strategies. In my view, the interaction with the scientific and technical community should include both input from and review by the National Research Council (NRC) and direct interaction with the strong national community of Earth science investigators and the aerospace industry who are very familiar with NASA capabilities and developing technological opportunities. Competitive peer review processes should be used appropriately in assessing the merit of competing approaches and in key decision- making. I believe NASA should also find a means of involving users and potential users of NASA-generated data in this process, perhaps through public comment periods or a series of workshops. Sufficient time should be allotted to this process for a careful and deliberative evaluation of options. This science plan should then guide the process of setting mission priorities. Defining criteria to use in comparing and deciding upon potential missions would be an important part of this planning exercise. I would recommend consideration of a set of criteria that include: -- compatibility with science priorities in the CCSP and GEOSS science plans -- potential scientific return from mission -- technological risk -- direct and indirect societal benefits -- cost. I believe that the decadal planning activity underway at the NRC in response to a request from NASA and NOAA is a valuable step in this process. What are the highest priority unaddressed or unanswered questions in Earth science observations from space? I believe this question is most appropriately addressed through the community process suggested above. There are many important Earth science questions, and prioritizing among them is best done in a deliberative and transparent process that involves extensive input from and discussion by the science community. I would personally cite soil moisture, three-dimensional cloud characteristics, global vector tropospheric winds, pollutant characteristics and transport, carbon fluxes, and aerosol distributions as all high priority measurements to make on a global scale. What have been the most important contributions to society that have come from NASA Earth sciences over the last decade (or two)? NASA Earth science programs have played a key role in developing our understanding of the Earth as a coupled system of inter- related parts, and in the identification and documentation of a series of global-scale changes in the Earth's environment, including ozone depletion, land use and land cover change, loss of biodiversity, and climate change. Other examples of societal contributions include improved weather forecasting, improved understanding of the large-scale climate variations, such as the El Nino- Southern Oscillation and the North Atlantic Oscillation that alter seasonal patterns of rainfall, and improved understanding of the status of and changes in marine and terrestrial ecosystems that contributes to more effective management of natural resources. What future benefits to the nation (societal applications) are possible that NASA Earth sciences could provide? What gaps in our knowledge must we fill before those future benefits are possible? In a broad sense, NASA Earth science activities are part of developing a global Earth information system that can provide ongoing and accurate information about the status of and changes in the atmosphere, oceans, and marine and terrestrial ecosystems that sustain life, including the impact of human activities. The continued development of observation systems, sophisticated Earth system models, data assimilation methods, and information technologies holds the promise of much improved predictions of weather and climate variations and much more effective prediction and warning of natural hazards. Much has already been accomplished to lay the groundwork for such a system, but many important questions remain. Some of the most important have to do with the functioning and human alteration of the Earth's carbon, nitrogen, and water cycles, and how these cycles interact; the regional manifestation of global scale climate change; and the reactions of ecosystems to simultaneous multiple stresses. | 16,759 | <h4>Ineffective NASA Earth sciences risk multiple threats of extinction</h4><p><strong>Killeen 5</strong> (Timothy L., Director – National Center for Atmospheric Research, “NASA Earth Science”, CQ Congressional Testimony, 4-28, Lexis)</p><p>The first example is probably well known to you. The <u>ozone "holes"</u> in the Antarctic and Arctic <u>were monitored</u> from space <u>by</u> various N<u>ASA satellite systems</u>, including the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS). The diagnosis of the physical and chemical mechanisms responsible for these dangerous changes to our protective ozone shield was made possible by the combination of observations, modeling, and theory supported by NASA. In fact, it was a <u>NASA</u> high-altitude aircraft that <u>made the "smoking gun" measurements that convinced the scientific and policy communities that</u> chlorine compounds produced by various <u>human activities were</u> centrally <u>responsible for</u> the observed <u>ozone loss</u>. <u>Following</u> these <u>observations, international protocols were put in place that are beginning to ameliorate</u> the <u>global-scale ozone loss</u>. The TOMS instrument has provided an ongoing source of data that permits us to track the level of ozone in the stratosphere, the annual opening and closing of the "ozone hole," and how this phenomenon is changing over time. These <u>continuing measurements</u> and analyses and the effective regulatory response <u>have led</u>, among other things, <u>to a reduction in</u> projected <u>deaths from</u> skin <u>cancer worldwide</u>. Last week, President Bush mentioned proposed rules to limit air pollution from coalfired power plants. <u><mark>Air pollution is</u></mark> clearly <u><mark>a</mark>n important <mark>concern</mark>. <mark>NASA has played a major role</mark> in</u> the <u>development of new technologies that can monitor the sources and circulation patterns of air pollution globally</u>. It is another tremendous story of science serving society through innovation. In this case, through an international collaboration, NASA deployed a one-of-a-kind instrument designed to observe global carbon monoxide and its transport from the NASA Terra spacecraft. These animations show the first global observations of air pollution. Sources of carbon monoxide include industrial processes (see, for example, source regions in the Pacific Rim) and fires (for example in Amazonia). These global-scale data from space have helped change our understanding of the relationship between pollution and air quality - we now know that pollution is not solely or even primarily a local or regional problem. California's air quality is influenced by industrial activity in Asia, and Europe's air quality is influenced by activities here in America. From such pioneering work, <u>operational systems can</u> now <u>be designed to observe</u> pollution events, <u>the</u> <u>global distribution of chemicals</u> and particulate matter <u>in the atmosphere</u>, <u>and the ways</u> in which <u>these substances</u> interact and affect the <u>ability of the atmosphere to sustain life</u> - such a system will undoubtedly underpin future efforts to understand, monitor, and manage air quality globally. <u><mark>Without NASA's commitment to innovation</mark> in the Earth sciences<mark>, it is hard to believe that such an incredible new capability would be available</mark> today</u>. The Promise of Earth Observations in the Next Decade The achievements of the last several decades have laid the foundation for an unprecedented era of discovery and innovation in Earth system science. Advances in observing technologies have been accompanied by vast improvements in computing and data processing. When the Earth Observing System satellites were being designed, processing and archiving the data was a central challenge. The Terra satellite produces about 194 gigabytes of raw data per day, which seemed a daunting prospect at the time of its definition. Now laptop memories are measured in gigabytes, students can work with remote sensing datasets on their laptops, and a large data center like NCAR increases our data holdings by about 1000 gigabytes per day. The next generation of high performance computing systems, which will be deployed during the next five years or so, will be petascale systems, meaning that they will be able to process millions of gigabytes of data. The ongoing revolution in information technology has provided us with capabilities we could hardly conceive of when the current generation of Earth observing satellites was being developed. We have just begun to take advantage of the synergies between these technological areas. The U.S., through NASA, is uniquely positioned to take advantage of this technological opportunity. Example 3: Weather Forecasting Weather forecasting in the Southern Hemisphere has been dramatically improved through NASA's contributions, and this experience illustrates the power of remote sensing for further global improvements in weather prediction. The lack of surface- based data in the Southern Hemisphere once meant that predictive skill lagged considerably behind that achieved in the Northern Hemisphere. The improvement in the accuracy of Southern Hemisphere weather forecasting is well documented and almost entirely due to the increased use of remote-sensing data. But improvements in the quality of satellite data were not sufficient. Improvements in data assimilation a family of techniques for integrating observational results into predictive models were also necessary. The combination has resulted in rapid improvement in Southern Hemisphere forecasting, which is now nearly equal to that in northern regions. Data assimilation capabilities continue to advance rapidly. One can now easily conceive of forecast systems that will fuse data from satellites, ground-based systems, databases, and models to provide predictions with unprecedented detail and accuracy - perhaps reaching natural limits of predictability. A new generation of weather forecast models with cloud-resolving spatial resolution is coming on line, and these models show significant promise for improving forecast skills across the board. Use of new NASA remote sensing data from upcoming missions such as Calipso (Cloud- Aerosol and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite) and CloudSat will be essential to fully validate and tune these new capabilities which will serve the nation in providing improved hurricane and severe storm prediction, and in the development of numerous decision support systems reliant on state-of-the-art numerical weather prediction capabilities. Example 4: Earth System Models Data from NASA missions are central to constructing more comprehensive and detailed models that will more realistically represent the complexity of the Earth system. Cloud observations from MODIS (the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) and precipitation measurements from GPM (the Global Precipitation Mission), for example, are critical to improving the representation of clouds and the water cycle in such models. Observations from MODIS and Landsat are fundamental to the development of more sophisticated representation of marine and terrestrial ecosystems and atmosphere-land surface interactions. The inclusion of this detail will help in the creation of true Earth system models that will enable detailed investigation of the interactions of Earth system processes and multiple environmental stresses within physically consistent simulated systems. In general terms, Earth system observations represent the only means of validating Earth system model predictions. Our confidence in short-term, regional-scale weather predictions is based on how closely they match observed regional conditions. Assessing the performance of global-scale, longer-term model predictions likewise depends on comparing model results with observational records. Scientific confidence in the ability of general circulation models to represent Earth's climate has been greatly enhanced by comparing model results for the last century with the observational records from that period. At the same time, the sparse and uneven nature of past observational records is an ongoing source of uncertainty in the evaluation of model results. The existence of much more comprehensive and consistent global measurements from space such as the data from the NASA Terra, Aqua, and Aura satellites is a giant step forward in this regard, and, if maintained, will enable much more rigorous evaluation of model performance in the future. In summary, Earth system models, with increasing temporal and spatial resolutions and validated predictive capabilities, will be used by industry and governmental decision makers across a host of domains into the foreseeable future. This knowledge base will drive new economies and efficiencies within our society. I believe that requirements flowing from the needs and capabilities of sophisticated Earth system models will be very useful for NASA in developing strategic roadmaps for future missions. C. The Importance of Careful Planning The central role of NASA in supporting Earth system science, the demonstrated success and impact of previous and current NASA missions, and the promise of continued advances in scientific understanding and societal benefits all argue for a careful, analytical approach to major modifications in the NASA Earth science program. As noted above, the development of space systems is a time-consuming and difficult process. Today's actions and plans will have long-term consequences for our nation's capabilities in this area. The link between plans and actions is one of the most important points I want to address today. From the outside, the interagency planning process seems to be experiencing substantial difficulties in maintaining this link. The NASA Earth science program is part of two major Presidential initiatives, the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) and the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). With regard to the CCSP, it is not apparent that the strategies and plans developed through the interagency process are having much impact on NASA decision-making. In January 2004, then- Administrator of NASA, Sean O'Keefe, called for acceleration of the NASA Glory mission because of the direct relevance of the mission to understanding the roles of aerosols in the climate system, which is one of the highest-priority science questions defined in the CCSP research strategy. NASA is now proposing cancellation of the mission. As I have emphasized throughout this testimony, the progress of and benefits from Earth system science research are contingent upon close coordination between research, modeling, and observations. The close coordination of program planning among the agencies that support these activities is also a necessity. This coordination currently appears to be fragile. The effect of significant redirections in NASA and reduction in NASA's Earth science effort are equally worrisome in the case of the Administration's GEOSS initiative, which is focused on improving the international coordination of environmental observing systems. Both NASA and NOAA satellite programs are vital to this effort. The science community is very supportive of the GEOSS concept and goals. There are over 100 space-based remote-sensing systems that are either operating or planned by various nations for the next decade. Collaboration among space systems, between space- and ground-based systems, and between suppliers and users of observational data is critical to avoiding duplication of effort and to getting the most out of the investments in observing technology. The tragic example of the Indian Ocean Tsunami demonstrates the need for such coordination. The tsunami was detected and observed before hitting land, but the absence of effective communication links prevented warnings from reaching those who needed them in time. A functioning GEOSS could lead to major improvements in the rapid availability of data and warnings, and the U.S. is right to make development of such a system a priority. But U.S. credibility and leadership of this initiative will be called into question if our nation is unable or unwilling to coordinate and maintain the U.S. programs that make up the core of our proposed contribution. D. Answers to Questions Posed by the Committee My testimony to this point has outlined my views on a series of key issues for the NASA Earth science program. Much of the text found above is relevant to consideration of the specific questions posed by the Committee in its letter of invitation. In this section, I provide more direct answers to these questions to the extent possible and appropriate. How should NASA prioritize currently planned and future missions? What criteria should NASA use in doing so? I believe that NASA should work with the scientific and technical community and its partner agencies to define a NASA Earth science plan that is fully compatible with the overall CCSP and GEOSS science strategies. In my view, the interaction with the scientific and technical community should include both input from and review by the National Research Council (NRC) and direct interaction with the strong national community of Earth science investigators and the aerospace industry who are very familiar with NASA capabilities and developing technological opportunities. Competitive peer review processes should be used appropriately in assessing the merit of competing approaches and in key decision- making. I believe NASA should also find a means of involving users and potential users of NASA-generated data in this process, perhaps through public comment periods or a series of workshops. Sufficient time should be allotted to this process for a careful and deliberative evaluation of options. This science plan should then guide the process of setting mission priorities. Defining criteria to use in comparing and deciding upon potential missions would be an important part of this planning exercise. I would recommend consideration of a set of criteria that include: -- compatibility with science priorities in the CCSP and GEOSS science plans -- potential scientific return from mission -- technological risk -- direct and indirect societal benefits -- cost. I believe that the decadal planning activity underway at the NRC in response to a request from NASA and NOAA is a valuable step in this process. What are the highest priority unaddressed or unanswered questions in Earth science observations from space? I believe this question is most appropriately addressed through the community process suggested above. There are many important Earth science questions, and prioritizing among them is best done in a deliberative and transparent process that involves extensive input from and discussion by the science community. I would personally cite soil moisture, three-dimensional cloud characteristics, global vector tropospheric winds, pollutant characteristics and transport, carbon fluxes, and aerosol distributions as all high priority measurements to make on a global scale. What have been the most important contributions to society that have come from NASA Earth sciences over the last decade (or two)? <u><strong><mark>NASA Earth science</strong> programs have played a key role in</u></mark> developing our understanding of the Earth as a coupled system of inter- related parts, and in the <u><mark>identification</mark> and documentation <mark>of a series of global-scale changes in</mark> the Earth's <mark>environment</mark>, <mark>including ozone</mark> depletion</u>, land use and land cover change, <u>loss of <mark>biodiversity</mark>, <mark>and climate change</u></mark>. Other examples of societal contributions include improved weather forecasting, improved understanding of the large-scale climate variations, such as the El Nino- Southern Oscillation and the North Atlantic Oscillation that alter seasonal patterns of rainfall, and improved understanding of the status of and changes in marine and terrestrial ecosystems that contributes to more effective management of natural resources. What future benefits to the nation (societal applications) are possible that NASA Earth sciences could provide? What gaps in our knowledge must we fill before those future benefits are possible? In a broad sense, NASA <u>Earth science <mark>activities</u></mark> are part of developing a global Earth information system that <u><mark>can provide</u></mark> ongoing and accurate <u><mark>information</mark> about</u> the status of and <u>changes in the atmosphere, oceans, and</u> marine and terrestrial <u>ecosystems <mark>that sustain life</mark>, including the impact of human activities</u>. <u>The continued development of observation systems</u>, sophisticated Earth system models, data assimilation methods, and information technologies <u>holds the promise of much improved predictions of</u> weather and climate variations and much more effective prediction and warning of natural hazards. Much has already been accomplished to lay the groundwork for such a system, but <u>many important questions remain</u>. Some of the most important have to do <u>with</u> the functioning and <u>human</u> <u>alteration of the Earth's carbon, nitrogen, and water cycles</u>, and how these cycles interact; the regional manifestation of global scale climate change; and the reactions of ecosystems to simultaneous multiple stresses. </p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 2 | 123,115 | 17 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
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3,783,466 | B – this topic is already huge – this argument makes sense on any other topic, but our limits offense proves that you should err negative | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>B – this topic is already huge – this argument makes sense on any other topic, but our limits offense proves that you should err negative </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,835 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
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3,783,467 | Utopian visions of a peaceful global community causes scapegoating and elimination of the other | Stavrakakis, 99 | Stavrakakis, 99 (Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 99-100). | Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ Utopia is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which antagonisms will be resolved utopia is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat The danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence This repressed moment of violence resurfaces in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’ | the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased conflict every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example Every utopian fantasy calls for its elimination the paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted stigmatisation is followed by extermination | In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Let’s start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative...in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 | 3,848 | <h4>Utopian visions of a peaceful global community causes scapegoating and elimination of the other</h4><p><u><strong>Stavrakakis, 99</u></strong> (Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 99-100). </p><p>In this chapter, I will try to show that <u>Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket.</u> Let’s start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions <u>it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking</u>. First of all it seems that <u><mark>the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased</mark> uncertainty, social instability and <mark>conflict</mark>, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality</u>. <u>Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field</u>. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative...in human existence; <u>it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ </u>(Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). <u>Utopia</u> then <u>is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience</u>. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) <u>it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is</u>, however, <u>the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities</u> <u>in which</u> these <u>antagonisms</u> and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) <u>will be</u> forever <u>resolved</u>, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, <u>utopia</u> sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it <u>is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium</u> (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that <u><strong><mark>every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example</u></strong></mark>, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 <u><strong><mark>Every utopian fantasy</mark> produces its reverse and <mark>calls for its elimination</strong></mark>. </u>Put another way, <u><mark>the</mark> beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a <mark>paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat</u></mark>. <u>The </u>naivety—and also the <u>danger—of utopian structures <mark>is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted</mark>. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: <strong><mark>stigmatisation is followed by extermination</strong></mark>. This is</u> not an accident. It is <u>inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work</u>. <u>If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence</u> (this is its beatific side) <u>this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence</u> (this is its horrific side). <u>This repressed moment of violence resurfaces</u>, as Marin points out, <u>in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself </u>(Marin, 1984:110). <u>What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy</u>. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, <u>what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’</u> (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘<u>what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’</u>?—VII:131).5</p> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 85,390 | 139 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
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3,783,468 | proposing solutions and allowing them to be contested is the foundation of a political method by which we can create the possibility for positive change---but voting affirmative will never get us there | Leggett, Birmingham government and society professor, 2013 | Leggett, Birmingham government and society professor, 2013
(Will, “Restoring society to post-structuralist politics: Mouffe, Gramsci and radical democracy”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 39.3, SAGE) | If politics is a hegemonic struggle to articulate political identities, then values are clearly a key mobilizing resource understands values as being transhistorical as entirely contingent they are the mechanism through which individuals are won over politically agents must be motivated to act Despite this, her post-structuralist insistence on discursive contingency means that ‘values’ can only be a provisional and always unsuccessful attempt to stabilize discourses But broad values of the sort consistently invoked by Mouffe (liberty, equality) are more enduring than this, both across generations and in the way they are internalized by individuals over the life-course This is not to essentialize values; how exactly they are interpreted and mobilized will vary But the a priori assumption that liberty and equality are empty of substantive content is not a promising basis from which to build enduring political support The argument here is that Mouffe’s project would benefit from recognizing values as having structural, recursive properties, and that the recovery of a Gramscian (not a rigid Althusserian) sense of ideology would assist in achieving this It is the stable and enduring nature of ideologies – rather than rare moments of rupture – which calls for the most theoretical attention ( A Gramscian approach to ideologies corrects this problem in two key respects. First, where Mouffe’s image of political subjectivity neglects how the agent’s choices over the life-course are framed by material and ideological influences He argued that man [sic] ‘cannot be conceived of except as historically determined man – i.e. man who has developed, and who lives, in certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations’ (1971: 244). However, while being alert to the weight of past and present power relations upon individual subjectivity, Gramsci certainly did not see agents as imprisoned by them, given that ‘the will and initiative of men [sic] themselves cannot be left out of account’ (ibid By contrast, as Brennan Wood argues, ‘Discourse theory ... implies identities so frail that they can be ‘‘won’’ only fleetingly. Such analyses fail to understand meaning as enduring domination; they fail to grasp what makes ideology worth studying in the first place’ Because post-Marxism cannot develop an adequate analysis of ‘‘the social’’ from within its own terms, it needs political sociology as a supplement’ (2002: 111). In what follows, the theoretical dimensions of such a supplement are developed by restoring a Gramscian reading of the social to Mouffe’s analysis of political subjectivities, without returning to Gramsci’s class reductionism This involves, first, understanding social structures as being prior to agents, as shaping but not determining action. Second, a notion of society is necessary for political appeals to resonate with enduring, material social relations and experiences. Armed with an account of institutions – again underplayed in poststructuralism – we can theorize civil society as subject to pressure from ‘above’ in the form of the state, and from ‘below’ in the form of social and economic relations Post-Marxism implies an open-ended political space, with apparently infinite possibilities for constructing subjectivities. The first step in restoring society to Mouffe’s analysis is to recognize that social structures exist, and are prior to political This is best captured by Stuart Hall, who suggests that for Gramsci: ... one must understand the fundamental structure – the objective relations – within society ... for these set the most fundamental limits and conditions for the whole shape of historical development. From here arise some of the major lines of tendency which might be favourable to this or that line of development. The error of reductionism is then to translate these tendencies and constraints immediately into their absolutely determined political and ideological effects. ... In fact, they structure and determine only in the sense that they define the terrain on which historical forces move – they define the horizon of possibilities. (1996c: 421–2) Recognizing that the social is prior to politics has important strategic consequences: political subjectivities need to resonate with actual social forces and lived experiences. This No ideological conception can ever become materially effective unless and until it can be articulated to the field of social and political forces’ (1996a Hegemonic projects are most successful when, on the one hand, they are grounded in deeper social processes, while on the other, they are further developed through state strategy’. Rather than undermining agency [as Mouffe claims], such an approach gives agency a terrain on which to operate’ Thus, the recognition of actual social forces does not diminish the space for politics but, on the contrary, enhances the possibilities for political articulation By reducing identity to a matter of political instantiation, Mouffe bypasses the critical, prior influence of the social-cultural terrain Of course, prior structures and historical forces do not just enable the articulation of political values with experiences – they can also present significant constraints upon what is politically possible (Nash The post-structuralist account of the political lacks an adequate account of such constraints upon progressive political ambitions. Given this, it is surely necessary to theorize the institutional and historical specificity of civil society as the terrain of hegemonic struggle. The issue of structural constraint brings us to the final advantage of a Gramscian supplement to radical democratic theory, and one which returns us to the heart of post-Marxism’s political ambitions. To self-identify as a left project, or to be even tangentially connected with Marxism, requires a political economy that is at least prepared to recognize how economic relations and imperatives can shape politics. Post-Marxism’s refusal of society means it cannot adequately theorize the increasing commodification of social and political institutions and identities. contrast to a discourse-centric conception of the political, with its formally elaborated ‘philosophies’, a Gramscian approach can understand values and ideologies in relation to everyday practices – including organized, systemically produced interests In particular, such an approach can account for the structured, recursive character of ideologies. In addition, a Gramscian approach accepts the existence of society itself, rather than refusing it or subordinating it to the political. Th domination. In particular, Gramsci allows the analytical space for civil society as a set of institutions with complex relations to both state and economy. In recovering Gramsci in this fashion, we need not go all the way back down the road with him to positing, for example, ‘fundamental classes’ as the axis of hegemony. What a Gramscian supplement to Mouffe restores are the resources for thinking about democratic left strategies within an enduring, and intensifying, capitalist environment. | values are the mechanism through which individuals are won over politically the assumption that liberty and equality are empty of substantive content is not a promising basis from which to build enduring political support the stable and enduring nature of ideologies calls for the most theoretical attention ‘Discourse theory ... implies identities so frail that they can be ‘‘won’’ only fleetingly. Such analyses fail to understand meaning as enduring domination a notion of society is necessary for political appeals to resonate with enduring, material social relations Armed with an account of institutions we can theorize civil society as subject to pressure from ‘above’ in the form of the state, No ideological conception can ever be effective unless and until it can be articulated to the field of social and political forces’ projects are most successful when they are developed through state strategy’ Rather than undermining agency such an approach gives agency a terrain on which to operate’ the recognition of actual social forces does not diminish the space for politics but enhances the possibilities for political articulation it is necessary to theorize the institutional specificity of civil society as the terrain of hegemonic struggle | If politics is a hegemonic struggle to articulate political identities, then values are clearly a key mobilizing resource. Whether one understands values as being transhistorical, as the reflection of underlying social structures, or as entirely contingent, they are the mechanism through which individuals are won over politically. Although Mouffe eschews foundationalism of any kind, her arguments suggest that she recognizes that at some level agents must be motivated to act at all. For example, at the close of HSS, Laclau and Mouffe point to the ongoing need for ‘utopia’, because: ... without ‘utopia’ ... there is no possibility at all of the constitution of a radical imaginary – whether democratic or of any other type. The presence of this imaginary ... is absolutely essential for the constitution of all left-wing thought. (HSS: 190) We have seen that Mouffe has pursued this theme in her account of the role of passions in democratic politics. Indeed, in presenting her own arguments, Mouffe consistently invokes the rallying values of the left in the form of tropes such as liberty, equality and anti-capitalism. However, the broader assumptions of radical democratic theory cast doubt on its capacity to mobilize values. Mouffe stresses that a preference for deconstruction does not entail relativism (e.g. RP: ch. 1). Despite this, her post-structuralist insistence on discursive contingency means that ‘values’ can only be a provisional and always unsuccessful attempt to stabilize discourses. But broad values of the sort consistently invoked by Mouffe (liberty, equality) are more enduring than this, both across generations and in the way they are internalized by individuals over the life-course (Trainor, 2008). This is not to essentialize values; how exactly they are interpreted and mobilized will vary depending on the empirical context (discussed as ‘resonance’, below). But the a priori assumption that liberty and equality are empty of substantive content is not a promising basis from which to build enduring political support. From the point of view of the left (itself a problematic term for post-structuralists), it is precisely the malleable treatment of concepts such as ‘equality’ which enabled the rhetorical convolutions of Third Way centrism about which Mouffe is so scathing. Mouffe’s work thus recognizes the political importance of values, but simultaneously undercuts their ontological status. A related problem is that although Mouffe speaks of the need for passions and invokes values, her account of values is surprisingly functionalist. For Mouffe, values are politically useful not because of any intrinsic meaning or representation of something substantive, but because they highlight the social condition of antagonism per se. Thus, writing of the ‘integrative role that conflict plays in modern democracy’, Mouffe suggests that: A well functioning democracy requires confrontation between democratic political positions. Without this there is always a danger that democratic confrontation will be replaced by confrontation between non-negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of identification. (2002:10) On this view, the function of values (‘democratic political positions’) is primarily to make various subject positions available, thus providing an outlet for antagonisms and facilitating what we might see as Mouffe’s own meta-value of democratization (RP: ch. 9). The content of the values at stake seems to be of secondary importance; it is their democratic function which matters. With this treatment of values, Mouffe – contrary to the post-Marxist ethos of expanding the boundaries of politics – offers a surprisingly restricted vision; politics appears in terms of available, rather mainstream, ‘subject positions’. For example, Mouffe tends to cite the familiar schemata of social democracy and neo-liberalism as democratic subject positions par excellence. Although she stresses the need for democracy to provide ‘political forms of collective identification around clearly differentiated democratic positions’ (OP: 31), she further narrows this to the need for ‘a clear divide between the government and opposition’ (ibid.: 120). This is in contrast to the much broader vision of the political field in complex, plural societies that Mouffe’s post-structuralist theoretical assumptions imply. Such a narrow, traditional sense of politics is reinforced by Mouffe’s valorization (via Canetti) of the moment of ‘the vote’ in parliament (ibid.: 21–5). There are further difficulties attached to Mouffe’s foregrounding of formal political subject positions. Mouffe is clear that she does not want pluralism itself to drift into an essentialism ‘of the elements’ (RP: 7). The latter, characteristic of much postmodern theory, presents a political field consisting of an infinite variety of subject positions, potentially undermining coherent, strategic political action. However, Mouffe’s use of overarching positions such as neo-liberalism and social democracy risks the essentialism and voluntarism she wishes to avoid. On the one hand, these traditions are invoked in a reified fashion, rather than as historically contingent and contested articulations. But, at the same time, Mouffe implicitly exaggerates the autonomy of individual citizens to choose between these apparently fully formed yet also contingent political products. The result is an unlikely mix of Althusserian ideology analysis with postmodern, identity politics: the very two things Mouffe has successfully distanced herself from elsewhere. The argument here is that Mouffe’s project would benefit from recognizing values as having structural, recursive properties, and that the recovery of a Gramscian (not a rigid Althusserian) sense of ideology would assist in achieving this. It is the stable and enduring nature of ideologies – rather than rare moments of rupture – which calls for the most theoretical attention (Hunter, 1988; Torfing, 1999). Gramsci stressed the material character of ideologies, in terms of the production of everyday common sense at the level of civil society: indeed, in her earlier work, Mouffe (1979) identified this as his great achievement. Gramsci contrasted this practical, material understanding of ideology with the abstract ‘philosophies’ (e.g. 1971: 201). These are the formalized, public political discourses which Mouffe has since come to see as being essential to democracy (e.g. social democracy, neo-liberalism). Such philosophies are associated with ‘traditional’ intellectuals, rather than the ‘organic’ intellectuals Gramsci identified as bridging ideas and the lived reality of classes (e.g. ibid.: 5–14, 418–19). The effect of prioritizing abstract political positions is, as Richard Johnson argues, to reinforce a mode of theorizing ‘that separated a realm of ‘‘philosophy’’ – here of democratic political discourses – from the combined effects of economic and social pressures on people’s lives’ (2007: 101). A Gramscian approach to ideologies corrects this problem in two key respects. First, where Mouffe’s image of political subjectivity neglects how the agent’s choices over the life-course are framed by material and ideological influences (Hill, 2008), Gramsci had a sociologically richer conception of agency. He argued that man [sic] ‘cannot be conceived of except as historically determined man – i.e. man who has developed, and who lives, in certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations’ (1971: 244). However, while being alert to the weight of past and present power relations upon individual subjectivity, Gramsci certainly did not see agents as imprisoned by them, given that ‘the will and initiative of men [sic] themselves cannot be left out of account’ (ibid.: 244). Thus, Gramsci famously described human personality as ‘strangely composite’ in its mix of ‘Stone Age’ received wisdoms as well as intimations of a better future society (ibid.: 324). Gramsci sought to understand not just the historical origins of consciousness, but also the means for changing it, to fight the battle for hearts and minds so that individuals might be won over to a new conception of themselves and society. By contrast, as Brennan Wood argues, ‘Discourse theory ... implies identities so frail that they can be ‘‘won’’ only fleetingly. Such analyses fail to understand meaning as enduring domination; they fail to grasp what makes ideology worth studying in the first place’ (1998: 409). Seen in this light, Mouffe’s view of political action tends towards being – in the language of political science – preference-accommodating: individuals have their primeval passions, and democratic politics must be sufficiently diverse to reflect them. This underplays the preference-shaping capacity both of social experiences prior to political action and, of course, political action itself. Specifying the content of values – projecting an image of the good society (or even utopia) – is integral to this process of preference-shaping, or winning hearts and minds. Mouffe seems reluctant to engage in such advocacy beyond promoting the benefits of radical democracy itself as a master imaginary. Second, Mouffe’s claim that a spread of available value positions acts as a cooling valve, ensuring peaceful, agonistic relations, ignores potential incommensurability between values. Following Gramsci’s sense of ideologies being grounded in concrete practices and interests, it is clear that certain ideas and practices are not just conceptually in tension or contradictory (e.g. liberty/equality) but empirically so. Furthermore, such positions may necessarily seek to obliterate one another as enemies, in precisely the way Mouffe claims an agonistic, radical democracy would circumvent. To take the two organized value positions that Mouffe repeatedly draws on, the logic of neo-liberalism is to obliterate the regulatory constraints of social democracy which, in its more radical versions, seeks not just to temper or roll back the market but qualitatively to go beyond (and therefore ‘obliterate’) the market form itself. Ironically, the only political position which claims to be able to finally reconcile these tensions is the Third Way, which Mouffe criticizes for precisely this reason (DP; OP). If we recognize that values are grounded in material practices and interests, it follows that for appeals to values to be politically successful, they need to achieve resonance with people’s lived experiences of the social world. However, Mouffe’s post-structuralist refusal of society precludes such resonance. An account of society is necessary for radical democracy to achieve its stated objectives, and we shall see below that Gramsci again provides the resources for such a move. We have in part judged Mouffe against her claim that radical democracy is a left political project. A key assumption of leftist politics has been that society is a verifiable entity, and that consequently political action can intervene in and improve it (McLennan, 2002). Despite this, Mouffe’s work oscillates between extremes with regard to the status of an empirical, social referent. Thus, she praises the ‘marxist tradition as having made an important contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of the capitalist system and its consequences over the ensemble of social relations’ (OP: 53–4). However, alongside this background assumption of a society framed by the effects of capital accumulation, Mouffe continues to reflect the strong anti-realism of HSS: she implies that society as such does not exist, or at least not outside of discourse. In HSS we were left in no doubt about this, with its claim that ‘‘‘Society’’ is not a valid object of discourse’ (111). Even where society is referred to, it is always instantiated by infinite political decisionmaking. Mouffe continues in this vein in her most recent work, summarizing that: Power is constitutive of the social because the social could not exist without the power relations through which it is given shape. What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the common sense which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being. (OP: 18) Given this, Mouffe is scornful of sociology, and in particular the political-sociological theories of those such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens that present ‘supposedly neutral ... sociological evidence’ which is the ‘typical post-political gesture’ (OP: 55). Certainly, highlighting the role of power and political action in generating social arrangements enables proper consideration of agency, avoiding the view of political actors as cultural dupes. However, the ultimate defining of ‘society’ as simply another imaginary, means that necessary sociological analysis of the institutions and processes which permeate political action is shut down. It is precisely this refusal of prior social structures that limits Mouffe’s analysis on its own terms. For Mouffe’s account of the construction of democratic subject positions to work, there need to be actually existing social structures and relations for articulatory practices to resonate with. Addressing this deficit again means restoring to Mouffe’s analysis some of the key insights offered by Gramsci. Kate Nash argues that ‘Because post-Marxism cannot develop an adequate analysis of ‘‘the social’’ from within its own terms, it needs political sociology as a supplement’ (2002: 111). In what follows, the theoretical dimensions of such a supplement are developed by restoring a Gramscian reading of the social to Mouffe’s analysis of political subjectivities, without returning to Gramsci’s class reductionism. This involves, first, understanding social structures as being prior to agents, as shaping but not determining action. Second, a notion of society is necessary for political appeals to resonate with enduring, material social relations and experiences. Third, a conception of social structure enables a theorization of civil society – so integral to the Gramscian analysis – as the concrete space where hegemonic struggles are fought. Armed with an account of institutions – again underplayed in poststructuralism – we can theorize civil society as subject to pressure from ‘above’ in the form of the state, and from ‘below’ in the form of social and economic relations. Such a conception also enables theorization of the effects (but not determinations) of the economic sphere upon political identities. Post-Marxism implies an open-ended political space, with apparently infinite possibilities for constructing subjectivities. The first step in restoring society to Mouffe’s analysis is to recognize that social structures exist, and are prior to political action. Against the more voluntarist and idealist readings of Gramsci, Jonathan Joseph (2008) points to his insistence on both the existence of an objective social reality and, vitally, the constraints this imposes upon social and political possibilities. What Gramsci offers is a reading of the structural pre-conditions of politics which rejects vulgar reductionism, while acknowledging that the political is not an entirely contingent and open-ended field. This is best captured by Stuart Hall, who suggests that for Gramsci: ... one must understand the fundamental structure – the objective relations – within society ... for these set the most fundamental limits and conditions for the whole shape of historical development. From here arise some of the major lines of tendency which might be favourable to this or that line of development. The error of reductionism is then to translate these tendencies and constraints immediately into their absolutely determined political and ideological effects. ... In fact, they structure and determine only in the sense that they define the terrain on which historical forces move – they define the horizon of possibilities. (1996c: 421–2) This approach to structure can be applied to the cultural terrain upon which political subjectivity is formed, and which is critical to Mouffe’s work. Culture consists in the practices, ideas and ways of living which individuals are born into and which shape processes of identity formation (Hill, 2008). By contrast, in Mouffe’s account, identities are only constructed through political acts on the part of agents. Mouffe and other post-Marxists neglect that it is upon the social terrain of culture that subjectivities are constituted prior to their entering the hegemonic game in the political field. Post-Marxism thus lacks a thicker sense of how social and cultural forms of association are a source of identity. An example of a corrective approach is found in Michael Burawoy’s use of Gramsci in calling for a ‘sociological Marxism’. Burawoy points to the importance of specific forms of collective life and community prior to the emergence of the English working class. This class, he suggests, ‘could not be regarded as a blank slate, defenceless against market forces. It was already embodied in community, which gave it the weapons to defend itself and advance active society in its own name’ (2003: 222). Interestingly, drawing on Wittgenstein’s account of the thicker, cultural underpinnings of language games, Mouffe acknowledges that ‘It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life ... that procedures can be accepted and followed’ (DP: 68). This indicates that identity formation cannot be made sense of without reference to prior traditions and practices. Mouffe herself notes that Gramsci was ‘perhaps the only Marxist to have understood the role of tradition’ (RP: 18). However, unlike Mouffe, Gramsci did not see culture and tradition as purely or even predominantly discursive entities, but as complex historical forces with their own materiality and the capacity to shape (but not determine) current political practices. A more sociological understanding of identity formation also throws a different light upon the passions, which Mouffe presents as motivating political action. Gramsci, too, stresses the affective dimensions of politics, but argues that ‘popular feelings’ need to be ‘studied in the way in which they present themselves objectively’ (1971: 419). Thus, the passions themselves are the historically produced, messy and complex outcomes of concrete traditions and practices, not some primeval political force. Recognizing that the social is prior to politics has important strategic consequences: political subjectivities need to resonate with actual social forces and lived experiences. This theme is pursued in Hall’s Gramscian work on the method of articulation. He criticizes Laclau and Mouffe’s collapsing of the social into an open discursive field, as this gives rise to the sense that ‘there is no reason why anything is or isn’t potentially articulatable with anything’ (1996b: 146). By contrast, Hall observes that ‘No ideological conception can ever become materially effective unless and until it can be articulated to the field of social and political forces’ (1996a: 42). On this view, as Joseph more recently explains of Gramsci, ‘Hegemonic projects are most successful when, on the one hand, they are grounded in deeper social processes, while on the other, they are further developed through state strategy’. As such, Joseph continues, ‘Rather than undermining agency [as Mouffe claims], such an approach gives agency a terrain on which to operate’ (2008: 128; emphasis added). Thus, the recognition of actual social forces does not diminish the space for politics but, on the contrary, enhances the possibilities for political articulation. By reducing identity to a matter of political instantiation, Mouffe bypasses the critical, prior influence of the social-cultural terrain. We have already seen that Mouffe presents a rather thin and abstracted conception of political philosophies (e.g. social democracy); we can now add that these are offered up for articulation with an equally thin and abstracted subject. This is no basis for a political project to resonate with people’s experiences. Of course, prior structures and historical forces do not just enable the articulation of political values with experiences – they can also present significant constraints upon what is politically possible (Nash, 2002). The post-structuralist account of the political lacks an adequate account of such constraints upon progressive political ambitions. This is no bad thing from the point of view of promoting the ‘optimism of the will’ famously called for by Gramsci, but fails to maintain his simultaneous call for a ‘pessimism of the intellect’. The latter means confronting the obduracy of the social relations and institutions of capitalist societies. For Gramsci, the struggle over identities is played out in civil society. As Burawoy notes, Gramsci certainly sees civil society as a ‘terrain of struggle’ (as do post-Marxists), but it nevertheless ‘occupies a specific institutional space within capitalism between economy and the state’ (2003: 198), and is subject to structural pressure from both. This is in contrast to the post-Marxist reading in which the social and the political are collapsed into a single discursive field. Mouffe suggests pluralist and complex late-modern societies are particularly conducive to hegemonic politics. Given this, it is surely necessary to theorize the institutional and historical specificity of civil society as the terrain of hegemonic struggle. This is particularly true of liberal democratic capitalist societies, in which a supposedly autonomous civil society continues to confound the left by reproducing dominant (neo-liberal) interests and ideologies. The issue of structural constraint brings us to the final advantage of a Gramscian supplement to radical democratic theory, and one which returns us to the heart of post-Marxism’s political ambitions. To self-identify as a left project, or to be even tangentially connected with Marxism, requires a political economy that is at least prepared to recognize how economic relations and imperatives can shape politics. Post-Marxism’s refusal of society means it cannot adequately theorize the increasing commodification of social and political institutions and identities. We need not claim any necessary relationship between the economy and other domains of social life. However, once we admit the existence of society per se, we can discuss more or less causal influences upon its character and development. This in turn allows recognition that economic logics and relations play a key role in the social and political sphere under capitalist conditions. While Gramsci had already perceived the importance of treating what we today call discourse in combination with economic analysis, in post-Marxism, as Peter Ives notes, ‘in order to expunge the ‘‘essentialist remnant’’ from Gramsci, economic analysis has to be denied altogether as does the Marxist critique of capitalism (or any systematic critique of capitalism)’ (2005: 466). Instead, I have argued that we should see Gramsci as the means to ‘bring society back in’, providing post-Marxist radical democracy with the tools to justify itself as a left project, concerned with understanding and challenging the basic structures of capitalism. The post-Marxist project – and in particular Mouffe’s programme of radical democracy focused on here – has drawn on post-structuralism to offer invaluable theoretical and political insights. Originally acknowledging its debt to Gramsci, it has shown how the left can abandon determinism and develop a hegemonic politics under social conditions of pluralism and indeterminacy. Specifically, Mouffe has suggested how the left can reclaim the mantle of democracy, thus banishing the spectre of authoritarianism. But this article has argued that the ‘postmodernization’ of Gramsci has limited the post-Marxist project in general, and Mouffe’s radical democratic theory in particular. Restoring key elements of the Gramscian heritage could address these limitations, without jettisoning radical democracy’s contemporary insights. In contrast to a discourse-centric conception of the political, with its formally elaborated ‘philosophies’, a Gramscian approach can understand values and ideologies in relation to everyday practices – including organized, systemically produced interests. In particular, such an approach can account for the structured, recursive character of ideologies. In addition, a Gramscian approach accepts the existence of society itself, rather than refusing it or subordinating it to the political. This actually enhances Mouffe’s account of political subjectivity, by allowing for the prior cultural and social terrain upon which identities are articulated and mobilized, as well as again accounting for recursive structures of domination. In particular, Gramsci allows the analytical space for civil society as a set of institutions with complex relations to both state and economy. In recovering Gramsci in this fashion, we need not go all the way back down the road with him to positing, for example, ‘fundamental classes’ as the axis of hegemony. What a Gramscian supplement to Mouffe restores are the resources for thinking about democratic left strategies within an enduring, and intensifying, capitalist environment. | 25,480 | <h4><strong>proposing solutions and allowing them to be contested is the foundation of a political method by which we can create the possibility for positive change---but voting affirmative will never get us there</h4><p>Leggett, Birmingham government and society professor, 2013</p><p><u></strong>(Will, “Restoring society to post-structuralist politics: Mouffe, Gramsci and radical democracy”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 39.3, SAGE)</p><p>If politics is a hegemonic struggle to articulate political identities, then values are clearly a key mobilizing resource</u>. Whether one <u>understands <mark>values</mark> as being transhistorical</u>, as the reflection of underlying social structures, or <u>as entirely contingent</u>, <u><strong>they <mark>are the mechanism through which individuals</mark> <mark>are won over politically</u></strong></mark>. Although Mouffe eschews foundationalism of any kind, her arguments suggest that she recognizes that at some level <u>agents must be motivated to act</u> at all. For example, at the close of HSS, Laclau and Mouffe point to the ongoing need for ‘utopia’, because: ... without ‘utopia’ ... there is no possibility at all of the constitution of a radical imaginary – whether democratic or of any other type. The presence of this imaginary ... is absolutely essential for the constitution of all left-wing thought. (HSS: 190) We have seen that Mouffe has pursued this theme in her account of the role of passions in democratic politics. Indeed, in presenting her own arguments, Mouffe consistently invokes the rallying values of the left in the form of tropes such as liberty, equality and anti-capitalism. However, the broader assumptions of radical democratic theory cast doubt on its capacity to mobilize values. Mouffe stresses that a preference for deconstruction does not entail relativism (e.g. RP: ch. 1). <u>Despite this, her post-structuralist insistence on discursive contingency means that ‘values’ can only be a provisional and always unsuccessful attempt to stabilize discourses</u>. <u>But broad values of the sort consistently invoked by Mouffe (liberty, equality) are more enduring than this, both across generations and in the way they are internalized by individuals over the life-course</u> (Trainor, 2008). <u>This is not to essentialize values; how exactly they are interpreted and mobilized will vary</u> depending on the empirical context (discussed as ‘resonance’, below). <u><strong>But <mark>the</mark> a priori <mark>assumption that liberty and equality are empty of substantive content is not a promising basis from which to build enduring political support</u></strong></mark>. From the point of view of the left (itself a problematic term for post-structuralists), it is precisely the malleable treatment of concepts such as ‘equality’ which enabled the rhetorical convolutions of Third Way centrism about which Mouffe is so scathing. Mouffe’s work thus recognizes the political importance of values, but simultaneously undercuts their ontological status. A related problem is that although Mouffe speaks of the need for passions and invokes values, her account of values is surprisingly functionalist. For Mouffe, values are politically useful not because of any intrinsic meaning or representation of something substantive, but because they highlight the social condition of antagonism per se. Thus, writing of the ‘integrative role that conflict plays in modern democracy’, Mouffe suggests that: A well functioning democracy requires confrontation between democratic political positions. Without this there is always a danger that democratic confrontation will be replaced by confrontation between non-negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of identification. (2002:10) On this view, the function of values (‘democratic political positions’) is primarily to make various subject positions available, thus providing an outlet for antagonisms and facilitating what we might see as Mouffe’s own meta-value of democratization (RP: ch. 9). The content of the values at stake seems to be of secondary importance; it is their democratic function which matters. With this treatment of values, Mouffe – contrary to the post-Marxist ethos of expanding the boundaries of politics – offers a surprisingly restricted vision; politics appears in terms of available, rather mainstream, ‘subject positions’. For example, Mouffe tends to cite the familiar schemata of social democracy and neo-liberalism as democratic subject positions par excellence. Although she stresses the need for democracy to provide ‘political forms of collective identification around clearly differentiated democratic positions’ (OP: 31), she further narrows this to the need for ‘a clear divide between the government and opposition’ (ibid.: 120). This is in contrast to the much broader vision of the political field in complex, plural societies that Mouffe’s post-structuralist theoretical assumptions imply. Such a narrow, traditional sense of politics is reinforced by Mouffe’s valorization (via Canetti) of the moment of ‘the vote’ in parliament (ibid.: 21–5). There are further difficulties attached to Mouffe’s foregrounding of formal political subject positions. Mouffe is clear that she does not want pluralism itself to drift into an essentialism ‘of the elements’ (RP: 7). The latter, characteristic of much postmodern theory, presents a political field consisting of an infinite variety of subject positions, potentially undermining coherent, strategic political action. However, Mouffe’s use of overarching positions such as neo-liberalism and social democracy risks the essentialism and voluntarism she wishes to avoid. On the one hand, these traditions are invoked in a reified fashion, rather than as historically contingent and contested articulations. But, at the same time, Mouffe implicitly exaggerates the autonomy of individual citizens to choose between these apparently fully formed yet also contingent political products. The result is an unlikely mix of Althusserian ideology analysis with postmodern, identity politics: the very two things Mouffe has successfully distanced herself from elsewhere. <u>The argument here is that Mouffe’s project would benefit from recognizing values as having structural, recursive properties, and that the recovery of a Gramscian (not a rigid Althusserian) sense of ideology would assist in achieving this</u>. <u><strong>It is <mark>the stable and enduring nature of ideologies</mark> – rather than rare moments of rupture – which <mark>calls for the most theoretical attention</mark> (</u></strong>Hunter, 1988; Torfing, 1999). Gramsci stressed the material character of ideologies, in terms of the production of everyday common sense at the level of civil society: indeed, in her earlier work, Mouffe (1979) identified this as his great achievement. Gramsci contrasted this practical, material understanding of ideology with the abstract ‘philosophies’ (e.g. 1971: 201). These are the formalized, public political discourses which Mouffe has since come to see as being essential to democracy (e.g. social democracy, neo-liberalism). Such philosophies are associated with ‘traditional’ intellectuals, rather than the ‘organic’ intellectuals Gramsci identified as bridging ideas and the lived reality of classes (e.g. ibid.: 5–14, 418–19). The effect of prioritizing abstract political positions is, as Richard Johnson argues, to reinforce a mode of theorizing ‘that separated a realm of ‘‘philosophy’’ – here of democratic political discourses – from the combined effects of economic and social pressures on people’s lives’ (2007: 101). <u>A Gramscian approach to ideologies corrects this problem in two key respects. First, where Mouffe’s image of political subjectivity neglects how the agent’s choices over the life-course are framed by material and ideological influences</u> (Hill, 2008), Gramsci had a sociologically richer conception of agency. <u>He argued that man [sic] ‘cannot be conceived of except as historically determined man – i.e. man who has developed, and who lives, in certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations’ (1971: 244). However, while being alert to the weight of past and present power relations upon individual subjectivity, Gramsci certainly did not see agents as imprisoned by them, given that ‘the will and initiative of men [sic] themselves cannot be left out of account’ (ibid</u>.: 244). Thus, Gramsci famously described human personality as ‘strangely composite’ in its mix of ‘Stone Age’ received wisdoms as well as intimations of a better future society (ibid.: 324). Gramsci sought to understand not just the historical origins of consciousness, but also the means for changing it, to fight the battle for hearts and minds so that individuals might be won over to a new conception of themselves and society. <u>By contrast, as Brennan Wood argues, <mark>‘Discourse theory ... implies identities so frail that they can be ‘‘won’’ only fleetingly. Such analyses fail to understand meaning as enduring domination</mark>; they fail to grasp what makes ideology worth studying in the first place’</u> (1998: 409). Seen in this light, Mouffe’s view of political action tends towards being – in the language of political science – preference-accommodating: individuals have their primeval passions, and democratic politics must be sufficiently diverse to reflect them. This underplays the preference-shaping capacity both of social experiences prior to political action and, of course, political action itself. Specifying the content of values – projecting an image of the good society (or even utopia) – is integral to this process of preference-shaping, or winning hearts and minds. Mouffe seems reluctant to engage in such advocacy beyond promoting the benefits of radical democracy itself as a master imaginary. Second, Mouffe’s claim that a spread of available value positions acts as a cooling valve, ensuring peaceful, agonistic relations, ignores potential incommensurability between values. Following Gramsci’s sense of ideologies being grounded in concrete practices and interests, it is clear that certain ideas and practices are not just conceptually in tension or contradictory (e.g. liberty/equality) but empirically so. Furthermore, such positions may necessarily seek to obliterate one another as enemies, in precisely the way Mouffe claims an agonistic, radical democracy would circumvent. To take the two organized value positions that Mouffe repeatedly draws on, the logic of neo-liberalism is to obliterate the regulatory constraints of social democracy which, in its more radical versions, seeks not just to temper or roll back the market but qualitatively to go beyond (and therefore ‘obliterate’) the market form itself. Ironically, the only political position which claims to be able to finally reconcile these tensions is the Third Way, which Mouffe criticizes for precisely this reason (DP; OP). If we recognize that values are grounded in material practices and interests, it follows that for appeals to values to be politically successful, they need to achieve resonance with people’s lived experiences of the social world. However, Mouffe’s post-structuralist refusal of society precludes such resonance. An account of society is necessary for radical democracy to achieve its stated objectives, and we shall see below that Gramsci again provides the resources for such a move. We have in part judged Mouffe against her claim that radical democracy is a left political project. A key assumption of leftist politics has been that society is a verifiable entity, and that consequently political action can intervene in and improve it (McLennan, 2002). Despite this, Mouffe’s work oscillates between extremes with regard to the status of an empirical, social referent. Thus, she praises the ‘marxist tradition as having made an important contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of the capitalist system and its consequences over the ensemble of social relations’ (OP: 53–4). However, alongside this background assumption of a society framed by the effects of capital accumulation, Mouffe continues to reflect the strong anti-realism of HSS: she implies that society as such does not exist, or at least not outside of discourse. In HSS we were left in no doubt about this, with its claim that ‘‘‘Society’’ is not a valid object of discourse’ (111). Even where society is referred to, it is always instantiated by infinite political decisionmaking. Mouffe continues in this vein in her most recent work, summarizing that: Power is constitutive of the social because the social could not exist without the power relations through which it is given shape. What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the common sense which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being. (OP: 18) Given this, Mouffe is scornful of sociology, and in particular the political-sociological theories of those such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens that present ‘supposedly neutral ... sociological evidence’ which is the ‘typical post-political gesture’ (OP: 55). Certainly, highlighting the role of power and political action in generating social arrangements enables proper consideration of agency, avoiding the view of political actors as cultural dupes. However, the ultimate defining of ‘society’ as simply another imaginary, means that necessary sociological analysis of the institutions and processes which permeate political action is shut down. It is precisely this refusal of prior social structures that limits Mouffe’s analysis on its own terms. For Mouffe’s account of the construction of democratic subject positions to work, there need to be actually existing social structures and relations for articulatory practices to resonate with. Addressing this deficit again means restoring to Mouffe’s analysis some of the key insights offered by Gramsci. Kate Nash argues that ‘<u>Because post-Marxism cannot develop an adequate analysis of ‘‘the social’’ from within its own terms, it needs political sociology as a supplement’ (2002: 111). In what follows, the theoretical dimensions of such a supplement are developed by restoring a Gramscian reading of the social to Mouffe’s analysis of political subjectivities, without returning to Gramsci’s class reductionism</u>. <u><strong>This involves, first, understanding social structures as being prior to agents, as shaping but not determining action. Second, <mark>a notion of society is necessary for political appeals to resonate with enduring, material social relations</mark> and experiences.</u></strong> Third, a conception of social structure enables a theorization of civil society – so integral to the Gramscian analysis – as the concrete space where hegemonic struggles are fought. <u><strong><mark>Armed with an account of institutions</mark> – again underplayed in poststructuralism – <mark>we can theorize civil society</mark> <mark>as subject to pressure from ‘above’ in the form of the state,</mark> and from ‘below’ in the form of social and economic relations</u></strong>. Such a conception also enables theorization of the effects (but not determinations) of the economic sphere upon political identities. <u>Post-Marxism implies an open-ended political space, with apparently infinite possibilities for constructing subjectivities. The first step in restoring society to Mouffe’s analysis is to recognize that social structures exist, and are prior to political</u> action. Against the more voluntarist and idealist readings of Gramsci, Jonathan Joseph (2008) points to his insistence on both the existence of an objective social reality and, vitally, the constraints this imposes upon social and political possibilities. What Gramsci offers is a reading of the structural pre-conditions of politics which rejects vulgar reductionism, while acknowledging that the political is not an entirely contingent and open-ended field. <u>This is best captured by Stuart Hall, who suggests that for Gramsci: ... one must understand the fundamental structure – the objective relations – within society ... for these set the most fundamental limits and conditions for the whole shape of historical development. From here arise some of the major lines of tendency which might be favourable to this or that line of development. The error of reductionism is then to translate these tendencies and constraints immediately into their absolutely determined political and ideological effects. ... In fact, they structure and determine only in the sense that they define the terrain on which historical forces move – they define the horizon of possibilities. (1996c: 421–2)</u> This approach to structure can be applied to the cultural terrain upon which political subjectivity is formed, and which is critical to Mouffe’s work. Culture consists in the practices, ideas and ways of living which individuals are born into and which shape processes of identity formation (Hill, 2008). By contrast, in Mouffe’s account, identities are only constructed through political acts on the part of agents. Mouffe and other post-Marxists neglect that it is upon the social terrain of culture that subjectivities are constituted prior to their entering the hegemonic game in the political field. Post-Marxism thus lacks a thicker sense of how social and cultural forms of association are a source of identity. An example of a corrective approach is found in Michael Burawoy’s use of Gramsci in calling for a ‘sociological Marxism’. Burawoy points to the importance of specific forms of collective life and community prior to the emergence of the English working class. This class, he suggests, ‘could not be regarded as a blank slate, defenceless against market forces. It was already embodied in community, which gave it the weapons to defend itself and advance active society in its own name’ (2003: 222). Interestingly, drawing on Wittgenstein’s account of the thicker, cultural underpinnings of language games, Mouffe acknowledges that ‘It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life ... that procedures can be accepted and followed’ (DP: 68). This indicates that identity formation cannot be made sense of without reference to prior traditions and practices. Mouffe herself notes that Gramsci was ‘perhaps the only Marxist to have understood the role of tradition’ (RP: 18). However, unlike Mouffe, Gramsci did not see culture and tradition as purely or even predominantly discursive entities, but as complex historical forces with their own materiality and the capacity to shape (but not determine) current political practices. A more sociological understanding of identity formation also throws a different light upon the passions, which Mouffe presents as motivating political action. Gramsci, too, stresses the affective dimensions of politics, but argues that ‘popular feelings’ need to be ‘studied in the way in which they present themselves objectively’ (1971: 419). Thus, the passions themselves are the historically produced, messy and complex outcomes of concrete traditions and practices, not some primeval political force. <u><strong>Recognizing that the social is prior to politics has important strategic consequences: political subjectivities need to resonate with actual social forces and lived experiences. This</u></strong> theme is pursued in Hall’s Gramscian work on the method of articulation. He criticizes Laclau and Mouffe’s collapsing of the social into an open discursive field, as this gives rise to the sense that ‘there is no reason why anything is or isn’t potentially articulatable with anything’ (1996b: 146). By contrast, Hall observes that ‘<u><mark>No ideological conception can ever be</mark>come materially <mark>effective unless and until it can be articulated to the field of social and political forces’</mark> (1996a</u>: 42). On this view, as Joseph more recently explains of Gramsci, ‘<u><strong>Hegemonic <mark>projects are most successful when</mark>, on the one hand, they are grounded in deeper social processes, while on the other, <mark>they are</mark> further <mark>developed through state strategy’</mark>.</u></strong> As such, Joseph continues, ‘<u><mark>Rather than undermining agency</mark> [as Mouffe claims], <mark>such</mark> <mark>an approach gives agency a terrain on which to operate’</u></mark> (2008: 128; emphasis added). <u><strong>Thus, <mark>the recognition of actual social forces does not diminish the space for politics but</mark>, on the contrary, <mark>enhances the possibilities for political articulation</u></strong></mark>. <u>By reducing identity to a matter of political instantiation, Mouffe bypasses the critical, prior influence of the social-cultural terrain</u>. We have already seen that Mouffe presents a rather thin and abstracted conception of political philosophies (e.g. social democracy); we can now add that these are offered up for articulation with an equally thin and abstracted subject. This is no basis for a political project to resonate with people’s experiences. <u>Of course, prior structures and historical forces do not just enable the articulation of political values with experiences – they can also present significant constraints upon what is politically possible (Nash</u>, 2002). <u>The post-structuralist account of the political lacks an adequate account of such constraints upon progressive political ambitions. </u>This is no bad thing from the point of view of promoting the ‘optimism of the will’ famously called for by Gramsci, but fails to maintain his simultaneous call for a ‘pessimism of the intellect’. The latter means confronting the obduracy of the social relations and institutions of capitalist societies. For Gramsci, the struggle over identities is played out in civil society. As Burawoy notes, Gramsci certainly sees civil society as a ‘terrain of struggle’ (as do post-Marxists), but it nevertheless ‘occupies a specific institutional space within capitalism between economy and the state’ (2003: 198), and is subject to structural pressure from both. This is in contrast to the post-Marxist reading in which the social and the political are collapsed into a single discursive field. Mouffe suggests pluralist and complex late-modern societies are particularly conducive to hegemonic politics. <u><strong>Given this, <mark>it is</mark> surely <mark>necessary to theorize the institutional</mark> and historical <mark>specificity of civil society as the terrain of hegemonic struggle</mark>.</u></strong> This is particularly true of liberal democratic capitalist societies, in which a supposedly autonomous civil society continues to confound the left by reproducing dominant (neo-liberal) interests and ideologies. <u>The issue of structural constraint brings us to the final advantage of a Gramscian supplement to radical democratic theory, and one which returns us to the heart of post-Marxism’s political ambitions. To self-identify as a left project, or to be even tangentially connected with Marxism, requires a political economy that is at least prepared to recognize how economic relations and imperatives can shape politics. Post-Marxism’s refusal of society means it cannot adequately theorize the increasing commodification of social and political institutions and identities.</u> We need not claim any necessary relationship between the economy and other domains of social life. However, once we admit the existence of society per se, we can discuss more or less causal influences upon its character and development. This in turn allows recognition that economic logics and relations play a key role in the social and political sphere under capitalist conditions. While Gramsci had already perceived the importance of treating what we today call discourse in combination with economic analysis, in post-Marxism, as Peter Ives notes, ‘in order to expunge the ‘‘essentialist remnant’’ from Gramsci, economic analysis has to be denied altogether as does the Marxist critique of capitalism (or any systematic critique of capitalism)’ (2005: 466). Instead, I have argued that we should see Gramsci as the means to ‘bring society back in’, providing post-Marxist radical democracy with the tools to justify itself as a left project, concerned with understanding and challenging the basic structures of capitalism. The post-Marxist project – and in particular Mouffe’s programme of radical democracy focused on here – has drawn on post-structuralism to offer invaluable theoretical and political insights. Originally acknowledging its debt to Gramsci, it has shown how the left can abandon determinism and develop a hegemonic politics under social conditions of pluralism and indeterminacy. Specifically, Mouffe has suggested how the left can reclaim the mantle of democracy, thus banishing the spectre of authoritarianism. But this article has argued that the ‘postmodernization’ of Gramsci has limited the post-Marxist project in general, and Mouffe’s radical democratic theory in particular. Restoring key elements of the Gramscian heritage could address these limitations, without jettisoning radical democracy’s contemporary insights. In <u>contrast to a discourse-centric conception of the political, with its formally elaborated ‘philosophies’, a Gramscian approach can understand values and ideologies in relation to everyday practices – including organized, systemically produced interests</u>. <u>In particular, such an approach can account for the structured, recursive character of ideologies. In addition, a Gramscian approach accepts the existence of society itself, rather than refusing it or subordinating it to the political. Th</u>is actually enhances Mouffe’s account of political subjectivity, by allowing for the prior cultural and social terrain upon which identities are articulated and mobilized, as well as again accounting for recursive structures of <u><strong>domination. In particular, Gramsci allows the analytical space for civil society as a set of institutions with complex relations to both state and economy</strong>. In recovering Gramsci in this fashion, we need not go all the way back down the road with him to positing, for example, ‘fundamental classes’ as the axis of hegemony. What a Gramscian supplement to Mouffe restores are the resources for thinking about democratic left strategies within an enduring, and intensifying, capitalist environment.</p></u> | 2NC | Case | Topicality | 74,340 | 52 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
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3,783,469 | Chinese economic growth is slowing now – declining investment and structural weaknesses. | Reuters 16 [Reuters, 5-17-2016, "China's April economic activity data disappoints," Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/business/chinas-april-economic-activity-data-disappoints] | Reuters 16 [Reuters, 5-17-2016, "China's April economic activity data disappoints," Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/business/chinas-april-economic-activity-data-disappoints] | China's investment, factory output and retail sales all grew more slowly than expected adding to doubts about whether the world's second-largest economy is stabilising. Growth in factory output cooled to 6 per cent disappointing analysts Fixed investment by private firms continued to slow, indicating private businesses remain sceptical of economic prospects. all the engines suddenly lost momentum, and growth outlook has turned soft China is still struggling Because the total amount of private investment is relatively large, its continued slowdown could restrain stable growth Retail sales growth rose slower than expected. much of the data on April, which included weaker-than-expected exports and imports, plus soft factory activity surveys, continued to underline lingering weakness in the broader economy. China's economic growth has cooled to 25-year lows, weighed down by a combination of weak demand at home and abroad, factory overcapacity and increasing amounts of debt. | China's investment, factory output and retail sales all grew slowly investment by private firms continued to slow China is struggling sales growth rose slower than expected continued to underline lingering weakness in the economy. China's economic growth has cooled to 25-year lows | China's investment, factory output and retail sales all grew more slowly than expected in April, adding to doubts about whether the world's second-largest economy is stabilising. Growth in factory output cooled to 6 per cent in April, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said last Saturday, disappointing analysts who expected it to rise 6.5 per cent on an annual basis after an increase of 6.8 per cent the prior month. China's fixed-asset investment growth eased to 10.5 per cent year-on-year in the January to April period, missing market expectations of 10.9 per cent, and down from the first quarter's 10.7 per cent. Fixed investment by private firms continued to slow, indicating private businesses remain sceptical of economic prospects. Investment by private firms rose 5.2 per cent year-on-year in January-April, down from 5.7 per cent growth in the first quarter. "It appears that all the engines suddenly lost momentum, and growth outlook has turned soft as well," Mr Zhou Hao, an economist at Commerzbank, said in a research note. "At the end of the day, we have to acknowledge that China is still struggling." China's banking regulator had sent an urgent notice to banks on Saturday telling them to clear bottlenecks holding back lending to private firms. In its data announcement, the statistics bureau said: "Because the total amount of private investment is relatively large, its continued slowdown could restrain stable growth, and requires a high degree of attention." Retail sales growth in April, which captures both private and government purchasing, rose 10.1 per cent on an annual basis, slower than expected. Analysts had forecast sales would rise 10.5 per cent on an annual basis, the same percentage increase as reported for March. It was upbeat March data that sparked hopes China's economy was picking up in the wake of a more than year-long blitz of fiscal, monetary and administrative stimulus measures. A recovering property market has also boosted demand for raw materials, giving a boost to long ailing heavy industries such as steel mills. But much of the data on April, which included weaker-than-expected exports and imports, plus soft factory activity surveys, continued to underline lingering weakness in the broader economy. The only bright spot was investment in housing, which grew 9.7 per cent in April from a year earlier. China's economic growth has cooled to 25-year lows, weighed down by a combination of weak demand at home and abroad, factory overcapacity and increasing amounts of debt. | 2,539 | <h4>Chinese economic growth is slowing now – declining investment and structural weaknesses.</h4><p><strong>Reuters 16 <u>[Reuters, 5-17-2016, "China's April economic activity data disappoints," Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/business/chinas-april-economic-activity-data-disappoints]</p><p><mark>China's investment, factory output and retail sales all grew</mark> more <mark>slowly</mark> than expected</u></strong> in April, <u><strong>adding to doubts about whether the world's second-largest economy is stabilising. Growth in factory output cooled to 6 per cent</u></strong> in April, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said last Saturday, <u><strong>disappointing analysts</u></strong> who expected it to rise 6.5 per cent on an annual basis after an increase of 6.8 per cent the prior month. China's fixed-asset investment growth eased to 10.5 per cent year-on-year in the January to April period, missing market expectations of 10.9 per cent, and down from the first quarter's 10.7 per cent. <u><strong>Fixed <mark>investment by private firms continued to slow</mark>, indicating private businesses remain sceptical of economic prospects.</u></strong> Investment by private firms rose 5.2 per cent year-on-year in January-April, down from 5.7 per cent growth in the first quarter. "It appears that <u><strong>all the engines suddenly lost momentum, and growth outlook has turned soft</u></strong> as well," Mr Zhou Hao, an economist at Commerzbank, said in a research note. "At the end of the day, we have to acknowledge that <u><strong><mark>China is</mark> still <mark>struggling</u></strong></mark>." China's banking regulator had sent an urgent notice to banks on Saturday telling them to clear bottlenecks holding back lending to private firms. In its data announcement, the statistics bureau said: "<u><strong>Because the total amount of private investment is relatively large, its continued slowdown could restrain stable growth</u></strong>, and requires a high degree of attention." <u><strong>Retail <mark>sales growth</u></strong></mark> in April, which captures both private and government purchasing, <u><strong><mark>rose</u></strong></mark> 10.1 per cent on an annual basis, <u><strong><mark>slower than expected</mark>.</u></strong> Analysts had forecast sales would rise 10.5 per cent on an annual basis, the same percentage increase as reported for March. It was upbeat March data that sparked hopes China's economy was picking up in the wake of a more than year-long blitz of fiscal, monetary and administrative stimulus measures. A recovering property market has also boosted demand for raw materials, giving a boost to long ailing heavy industries such as steel mills. But <u><strong>much of the data on April, which included weaker-than-expected exports and imports, plus soft factory activity surveys, <mark>continued to underline lingering weakness in the </mark>broader <mark>economy.</mark> </u></strong>The only bright spot was investment in housing, which grew 9.7 per cent in April from a year earlier. <u><strong><mark>China's economic growth has cooled to 25-year lows</mark>, weighed down by a combination of weak demand at home and abroad, factory overcapacity and increasing amounts of debt.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 160,874 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
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3,783,470 | Wolf key to deter cyber attacks | Pentland 11 (William Pentland - Bill began his tenure at the Pace Energy and Climate Center in early 2010. Equipped with an extensive background in energy finance, environmental trading and commercial law, he focuses on the full spectrum of market, regulatory, and policy issues pertaining to distributed generation applications like combined heat-and-power, district heating, and small-scale renewable energy systems. In addition, as the Center’s Senior Energy Systems Analyst, he promotes the adoption of a “systems” perspective across the Center’s diverse portfolio of research projects in an effort to enhance cross-sector collaboration and encourage comprehensive market and policy strategies, “Congress Bans Scientific Collaboration with China, Cites High Espionage Risks”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/05/07/congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks/#7883f0852b86 | Pentland 11 (William Pentland - Bill began his tenure at the Pace Energy and Climate Center in early 2010. Equipped with an extensive background in energy finance, environmental trading and commercial law, he focuses on the full spectrum of market, regulatory, and policy issues pertaining to distributed generation applications like combined heat-and-power, district heating, and small-scale renewable energy systems. In addition, as the Center’s Senior Energy Systems Analyst, he promotes the adoption of a “systems” perspective across the Center’s diverse portfolio of research projects in an effort to enhance cross-sector collaboration and encourage comprehensive market and policy strategies, “Congress Bans Scientific Collaboration with China, Cites High Espionage Risks”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/05/07/congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks/#7883f0852b86, Accessed 8/9/16 – JJ) | A two-sentence clause included in the U.S. spending bill approved by Congress a few weeks ago threatens to reverse more than three decades of constructive U.S. engagement with the People’s Republic of China. The clause prohibits the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ()NASA from coordinating any joint scientific activity with China. Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), a long-time critic of the Chinese government who chairs a House spending committee that oversees several science agencies, inserted the language into the spending legislation to prevent NASA or OSTP from using federal funds “to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” By prohibiting the OSTP from working with China, Wolf claims the ban will bear on “the entire bilateral relationship on science and technology. Wolf will seek to make the prohibition on any scientific collaboration between U.S. research agencies and China permanent. “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” said Wolf. “China is spying against us, and every U.S. government agency has been hit by cyber-attacks. They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have taken technology from NASA, and they have hit the NSF computers . . . . You name the company, and the Chinese are trying to get its secrets.” Wolf’s intense concern about the possible theft of intellectual property and sensitive military technologies resulting from joint U.S.-China research activities explain why the spending bill also prohibits NASA facilities from hosting “official Chinese visitors.” While this draconian prohibition may strike some as borderline paranoid, a growing body of evidence suggests that the risks of espionage are considerably higher than most people would suspect. | A clause approved by Congress ago threatens to reverse decades of constructive U.S. engagement with the P R C prohibits OSTP) and NASA from coordinating any joint scientific activity with China. Wolf inserted from using federal funds “to develop, design, plan implement or execute a bilateral policy in any way with China the ban will bear on “the entire bilateral relationship on science and technology.” “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them “China is spying against us, and cyber-attacks. They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have taken technology from NASA a growing body of evidence suggests that the risks of espionage are considerably higher than most people would suspect. | A two-sentence clause included in the U.S. spending bill approved by Congress a few weeks ago threatens to reverse more than three decades of constructive U.S. engagement with the People’s Republic of China. The clause prohibits the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ()NASA from coordinating any joint scientific activity with China. Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), a long-time critic of the Chinese government who chairs a House spending committee that oversees several science agencies, inserted the language into the spending legislation to prevent NASA or OSTP from using federal funds “to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” By prohibiting the OSTP from working with China, Wolf claims the ban will bear on “the entire bilateral relationship on science and technology.” “It’s the whole ball of wax,” said Wolf in an interview with Science Insider. Although the ban will expire at the end of the current fiscal year in October, Wolf will seek to make the prohibition on any scientific collaboration between U.S. research agencies and China permanent. “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” said Wolf. “China is spying against us, and every U.S. government agency has been hit by cyber-attacks. They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have taken technology from NASA, and they have hit the NSF computers . . . . You name the company, and the Chinese are trying to get its secrets.” Meanwhile, the Obama Administration has taken the position that the ban does not apply to any U.S. scientific interactions with China conducted as part of foreign policy. This interpretation will likely allow the President to continue current activities until the spending bill expires in October. Wolf’s intense concern about the possible theft of intellectual property and sensitive military technologies resulting from joint U.S.-China research activities explain why the spending bill also prohibits NASA facilities from hosting “official Chinese visitors.” While this draconian prohibition may strike some as borderline paranoid, a growing body of evidence suggests that the risks of espionage are considerably higher than most people would suspect. Wolf has learned this lesson the hard way. | 2,571 | <h4><strong>Wolf key to deter cyber attacks</h4><p>Pentland 11 (William Pentland - Bill began his tenure at the Pace Energy and Climate Center in early 2010. Equipped with an extensive background in energy finance, environmental trading and commercial law, he focuses on the full spectrum of market, regulatory, and policy issues pertaining to distributed generation applications like combined heat-and-power, district heating, and small-scale renewable energy systems. In addition, as the Center’s Senior Energy Systems Analyst, he promotes the adoption of a “systems” perspective across the Center’s diverse portfolio of research projects in an effort to enhance cross-sector collaboration and encourage comprehensive market and policy strategies, “Congress Bans Scientific Collaboration with China, Cites High Espionage Risks”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/05/07/congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks/#7883f0852b86</strong>, Accessed 8/9/16 – JJ)</p><p><u><mark>A</mark> two-sentence <mark>clause</mark> included in the U.S. spending bill <mark>approved by Congress</mark> a few weeks <mark>ago threatens to reverse</mark> more than three <mark>decades of constructive U.S. engagement with the P</mark>eople’s <mark>R</mark>epublic of <mark>C</mark>hina. The clause <mark>prohibits </mark>the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (<mark>OSTP) and</mark> the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ()<mark>NASA from coordinating any joint scientific activity with China. </mark>Representative Frank <mark>Wolf</mark> (R-VA), a long-time critic of the Chinese government who chairs a House spending committee that oversees several science agencies, <mark>inserted </mark>the language into the spending legislation to prevent NASA or OSTP <mark>from using federal funds “to develop, design, plan</mark>, promulgate, <mark>implement or execute a bilateral policy</mark>, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally <mark>in any way with China </mark>or any Chinese-owned company.” By prohibiting the OSTP from working with China, Wolf claims <mark>the ban will bear on “the entire bilateral relationship on science and technology.</u>”</mark> “It’s the whole ball of wax,” said Wolf in an interview with Science Insider. Although the ban will expire at the end of the current fiscal year in October, <u>Wolf will seek to make the prohibition on any scientific collaboration between U.S. research agencies and China permanent. <mark>“We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them</mark>,” said Wolf. <mark>“China is spying against us, and </mark>every U.S. government agency has been hit by <mark>cyber-attacks. They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have taken technology from NASA</mark>, and they have hit the NSF computers . . . . You name the company, and the Chinese are trying to get its secrets.”</u> Meanwhile, the Obama Administration has taken the position that the ban does not apply to any U.S. scientific interactions with China conducted as part of foreign policy. This interpretation will likely allow the President to continue current activities until the spending bill expires in October. <u>Wolf’s intense concern about the possible theft of intellectual property and sensitive military technologies resulting from joint U.S.-China research activities explain why the spending bill also prohibits NASA facilities from hosting “official Chinese visitors.” While this draconian prohibition may strike some as borderline paranoid, <strong><mark>a growing body of evidence suggests that the risks of espionage are considerably higher than most people would suspect.</strong></mark> </u>Wolf has learned this lesson the hard way.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 3 | 71,692 | 12 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,471 | Desertification is on the decline – China proves | Associated Press 2007 | Associated Press July 17,2007[Climate Ark News Archive “Official: China's problem with desertification decreasing as area of sanded landshrinks” http://www.climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=80239&keybold=land%20desertification] | China said it was winning the struggle against encroaching deserts Desert coverage has been falling by about 1,200 square kilometers (460 square miles) each year for the past five to six years This has been a trend that has been ongoing," he said. "This is a good thing that we have witnessed. China has planted thousands of hectares (acres) of vegetation to stop the spread of deserts in its north and west, which had been gradually expanding into populated areas and worsening sand storms that strike cities | China was winning the struggle against encroaching deserts Desert coverage has been falling each year for the past five to six years China has planted thousands of vegetation to stop the spread of deserts | China said Tuesday it was winning the struggle against encroaching deserts, with the threat to vulnerable land steadily decreasing over the past half-decade. Desert coverage has been falling by about 1,200 square kilometers (460 square miles) each year for the past five to six years, Zhu Lieke, deputy director of the State Forestry Administration, said at a news conference. "This has been a trend that has been ongoing," he said. "This is a good thing that we have witnessed." Zhu said his data was backed up by satellite imagery and scientists in the field. China has planted thousands of hectares (acres) of vegetation to stop the spread of deserts in its north and west, which had been gradually expanding into populated areas and worsening sand storms that strike cities. Chinese officials said last year that deserts still cover 2.64 million square kilometers (1.05 million square miles), or about 27 percent of the country. Since 1981, China has planted 49.2 billion trees — the equivalent of 219,000 square kilometers (84,500 square miles), said Jia Zhibang, head of the forestry administration, who also spoke at the briefing. | 1,137 | <h4>Desertification is on the decline – China proves</h4><p><strong>Associated Press</strong> July 17,<strong>2007</strong>[Climate Ark News Archive “Official: China's problem with desertification decreasing as area of sanded landshrinks” http://www.climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=80239&keybold=land%20desertification]</p><p><u><mark>China</mark> said</u> Tuesday <u>it <mark>was winning the struggle against encroaching deserts</u></mark>, with the threat to vulnerable land steadily decreasing over the past half-decade. <u><mark>Desert coverage has been falling</mark> by about 1,200 square kilometers (460 square miles) <mark>each year for the past five to six years</u></mark>, Zhu Lieke, deputy director of the State Forestry Administration, said at a news conference. "<u>This has been a trend that has been ongoing," he said. "This is a good thing that we have witnessed.</u>" Zhu said his data was backed up by satellite imagery and scientists in the field. <u><mark>China has planted thousands of</mark> hectares (acres) of <mark>vegetation to stop the spread of deserts</mark> in its north and west, which had been gradually expanding into populated areas and worsening sand storms that strike cities</u>. Chinese officials said last year that deserts still cover 2.64 million square kilometers (1.05 million square miles), or about 27 percent of the country. Since 1981, China has planted 49.2 billion trees — the equivalent of 219,000 square kilometers (84,500 square miles), said Jia Zhibang, head of the forestry administration, who also spoke at the briefing.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Africa | 1,560,836 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,472 | The failure to have a concrete option we can debate against guarantees that oppression continues and efforts for change backfire | Steve, 07 | Steve, 07 (Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation who lives in East Lansing, MI, Date Last Mod. Feb 8, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm) | The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way We were being led around DC by any and everybody We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own the lack of strategy problem is a general problem We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off The strategies that we develop will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy could be priorities In order for the most oppressed people to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans simple solutions to complex questions, only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples People can respond to examples better than unusual theory If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state | The main weakness of the Black Block was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way We were being led by any and everybody . We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed because we had none of our own We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving toward political goals needs to be a priority The strategies that we develop without a plan we will always end up making bad decisions a forum among people to have political discussion could b priorities In order for the oppressed to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of chang We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" We must have plans We need practical examples People can respond to examples better than unusual theory | What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state. | 7,928 | <h4><strong>The failure to have a concrete option we can debate against guarantees that oppression continues and efforts for change backfire</h4><p>Steve, 07 </strong>(Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation who lives in East Lansing, MI, Date Last Mod. Feb 8, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm)</p><p>What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. <u>The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. <mark>The main weakness of the Black Block</mark> in DC <mark>was that clear goals were not</mark> <mark>elaborated in a strategic way</u></mark> and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. <u><mark>We were being led</mark> around DC <mark>by any and everybody</u></mark>. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own<mark>. <u>We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was</mark> <mark>doomed</mark> from the get go, <mark>because we had none of our own</u></mark>. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of <u>the lack of strategy problem is a general problem</u> within the North American anarchist movement. <u><mark>We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state</mark> <mark>and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving</mark> away from strictly tactical thinking <mark>toward political goals</mark> and long term strategy <mark>needs to be a</mark> <mark>priority</u></mark> for the anarchist movement. <u>No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off</u>. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. <u><mark>The strategies</mark> <mark>that we develop</u></mark> in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They <u>will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But <mark>without a</mark> specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we <mark>plan</mark> to get there, <mark>we will always end up making bad decisions</mark>. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical</u>. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided <u><mark>a forum among</mark> a lot of <mark>people to have</mark> a lot of <mark>political discussion</mark> and try to develop strategy</u> in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, <u><mark>could b</mark>e</u> the <u><mark>priorities</u></mark> of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. <u><mark>In order for the</mark> most <mark>oppressed</mark> people</u> here <u><mark>to</mark> <mark>get involved the movement must offer the possibility of chang</mark>ing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk</u> with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. <u><mark>We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse</mark> <mark>that "the people will decide after the revolution"</mark> how this or that will work. <strong><mark>We must have plans</u></strong></mark> and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear <u>simple solutions to complex questions,</u> that <u>only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. <mark>We need</mark> <mark>practical examples</u></mark> of what we are fighting for. <u><mark>People can respond to examples better than unusual theory</u></mark>. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. <u>If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state</u> or a new state.</p> | 2NC | Case | Topicality | 132,617 | 16 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,473 | Calculation – security necessitates dehumanization and instrumentalization of being – outweighs every impact even if threats are real | Burke, 07 | Burke, 07 – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies”, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/07-1.pdf | Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’ it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School | Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, such approaches have their roots in processes colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’ and ‘superfluous’ The existential threat should generate a very different policy logic | Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’: | 1,451 | <h4>Calculation – security necessitates dehumanization and instrumentalization of being – outweighs every impact even if threats are real</h4><p><u><strong>Burke, 07</u></strong> – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies”, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/07-1.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>Even if threats are credible and existential</strong>, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’,</u></mark> which has in our time been <u>more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers</u>. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, <u><mark>such approaches have their roots in processes</mark> (namely <mark>colonialism and the Holocaust) that <strong>systematically dehumanized</strong> their victims producing lives that were <strong>‘bare’</strong></mark>, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ <strong><mark>and ‘superfluous’</u></strong></mark>. If nothing else, <u>it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation</u>. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. <u><mark>The existential threat </mark>of human beings may be real enough, but it <strong><mark>should generate a very different policy logic</strong></mark> than outlined by the Copenhagen School</u>. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:</p> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 93,831 | 13 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,474 | Competing interps is good: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Competing interps is good:</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,837 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,475 | Decline over the long term is inevitable – only economic reforms solve. | Kroeber 16 | Kroeber 16 [Arthur R. Kroeber, Senior Fellow at Brookings, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, and editor of its journal China Economic Quarterly 2-9-2016, "Should we worry about China’s economy? ," Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/02/09-worry-about-chinese-economy-kroeber] | The flattening of its commodity demand shows China has turned its back on an unsustainable growth model based on ever-rising investment The question now is whether it can succeed in building a new growth model based mainly on services and consumer spending growth in services and consumer spending is solid is still not strong enough to carry the whole burden of driving the economy. For that to happen, much more reform is needed. And the pace of those reforms has been disappointing crucial reforms all relate to increasing the role of markets, and decreasing the role of the state the value of state-owned enterprise assets is around 145 percent of GDP, more than double the figure for the next most state-dominated economy, This functioned well for most of the last two decades, since the main tasks were to mobilize as many resources as possible and build infrastructure Now infrastructure is built and the main task is to make the most efficient use of resources, maximize productivity, and satisfy consumer demand markets must take a leading role and the government must wean itself off state-owned firms Beijing does not seem all that willing to let markets have their way concerns stem from recent interventions in equity and currency Last June, when a k market bubble popped, the authorities forced state-controlled firms to buy shares This stabilized the market for a while, but left people wondering what would happen when these agencies started selling down the shares the authorities instituted a “circuit breake Instead of calming the market, this induced panic selling Beijing got into trouble when it announced a new exchange-rate mechanism because it paired this move with a small, unexpected devaluation, many traders assumed the real goal was to devalue the renminbi, and started pushing the currency down. So the People’s Bank of China intervened massivel This stabilized the currency, but brought into question the government’s commitment to a truly market-driven exchange rate in December, PBOC made another change, by starting to manage the renminbi against a trade-weighted basket rather than against the dollar this meant that PBOC was letting the renminbi devalue against the dollar it undermined the credibility of this intention by intervening to prevent the currency from falling against the dollar One could argue that these episodes were merely potholes investors both inside and outside China are not convinced heavy-handed management of the equity and currency markets gives the impression that Beijing is not willing to tolerate market outcomes that conflict with the government’s idea of what prices should be. This runs against the government’s stated commitment decision to let market forces “play a decisive role in resource allocation. Another source of unease is the slow progress on state enterprise reform Momentum seemed strong in 2014 to date only a handful of mixed-ownership deals have been completed, many of them involve the transfer of shares to state-owned investment companies, with no private-sector participation Plans to subject the big centrally controlled state enterprises to greater financial discipline have been discussed, but not put into action number of state firms continues to grow So long as Beijing continues to intervene in markets , and fails to deliver on the key structural reforms markets will continue to be nervous about the sustainability of growth neither private entrepreneurs in China, nor traders on global financial markets, are confident in such a trend | China has turned its back on an unsustainable growth model growth is not strong enough to carry the economy. more reform is needed markets must take a leading role, Beijing does not seem all that willing to let markets have their way. unexpected devaluation brought into question the government’s commitment to a truly market-driven exchange rate investors are not convinced. This runs against the government’s stated commitment to date only a handful of mixed-ownership deals have been complete So long as Beijing continues to intervene in markets and fails to deliver on the key structural reforms markets will continue to be nervous about the sustainability of growth, | There is a silver lining: The flattening of its commodity demand shows China has turned its back on an unsustainable growth model based on ever-rising investment. The question now is whether it can succeed in building a new growth model based mainly on services and consumer spending. As we noted above, growth in services and consumer spending is solid. But it is still not strong enough to carry the whole burden of driving the economy. For that to happen, much more reform is needed. And the pace of those reforms has been disappointing. The crucial reforms all relate to increasing the role of markets, and decreasing the role of the state in economic activity. China has an unusually large state sector: OECD researchers have estimated that the value of state-owned enterprise assets is around 145 percent of GDP, more than double the figure for the next most state-dominated economy, India.[1] This large state sector functioned well for most of the last two decades, since the main tasks were to mobilize as many resources as possible and build the infrastructure of a modern economy—tasks for which state firms, which are not bound by short-term profit constraints, are well suited. Now, however, the infrastructure is mostly built and the main task is to make the most efficient use of resources, maximize productivity, and satisfy ever-shifting consumer demand. For this job, markets must take a leading role, and the government must wean itself off the habit of using state-owned firms to achieve its economic ends. And the big worry is that, despite the promises in the November 2013 Third Plenum reform agenda, Beijing does not seem all that willing to let markets have their way. The concerns stem from the government’s recent interventions in the equity and currency markets. Last June, when a short-lived stock market bubble popped, the authorities forced various state-controlled firms and agencies to buy up shares to stop the rout. This stabilized the market for a while, but left people wondering what would happen when these agencies started selling down the shares they had been forced to buy. To enable these holdings to be sold without disrupting the market, the authorities instituted a “circuit breaker” which automatically suspended stock-exchange trading when prices fell by 5 percent in one day. Instead of calming the market, this induced panic selling, as traders rushed to dump their shares before the circuit breaker shut off trading. The government canceled the circuit breaker, and the market remains haunted by the risk of state-controlled shareholders dumping their shares en masse. Similarly, Beijing got into trouble in August when it announced a new exchange-rate mechanism that would make the value of the renminbi more market determined. But because it paired this move with a small, unexpected devaluation, many traders assumed the real goal was to devalue the renminbi, and started pushing the currency down. So the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) intervened massively in the foreign exchange markets, spending down its foreign-currency reserves to prop up the value of the renminbi. This stabilized the currency, but brought into question the government’s commitment to a truly market-driven exchange rate. Then, in December, PBOC made another change, by starting to manage the renminbi against a trade-weighted basket of 13 currencies, rather than against the dollar as in the past. Because the dollar has been strong lately, this in effect meant that PBOC was letting the renminbi devalue against the dollar. Again, PBOC argued that its intention was not to devalue, but simply to establish a more flexible exchange rate. And again, it undermined the credibility of this intention by intervening to prevent the currency from falling against the dollar. One could argue that these episodes were merely potholes on the road to a greater reliance on markets. This may be so, but investors both inside and outside China are not convinced. The heavy-handed management of the equity and currency markets gives the impression that Beijing is not willing to tolerate market outcomes that conflict with the government’s idea of what prices should be. This runs against the government’s stated commitment in the Third Plenum decision to let market forces “play a decisive role in resource allocation.” Another source of unease is the slow progress on state enterprise reform. Momentum seemed strong in 2014, when provinces were encouraged to publish “mixed ownership” plans to diversify the shareholding of their firms. This raised hopes that private investors would be brought in to improve the management of inefficient state companies. Yet to date only a handful of mixed-ownership deals have been completed, and many of them involve the transfer of shares to state-owned investment companies, with no private-sector participation. Plans to subject the big centrally controlled state enterprises to greater financial discipline by putting them under holding companies modeled on Singapore’s Temasek have been incessantly discussed, but not put into action. Meanwhile the number of state firms continues to grow, rising from a low of 110,000 in 2008 to around 160,000 in 2014. So long as Beijing continues to intervene in markets to guide prices, and fails to deliver on the key structural reforms needed to create a sustainable consumer-led economy, markets both inside and outside China will continue to be nervous about the sustainability of growth, and we will see more “China scares” like the one we endured in January. A clearer sense of direction is required, as is better communication. For three decades, China sustained fast economic growth by steadily increasing the scope of markets, even as it preserved a large role for the state. Because investors were confident in the general trend towards more markets and more space for private firms, they were happy to invest in growth. Today neither private entrepreneurs in China, nor traders on global financial markets, are confident in such a trend. By the end of 2015 growth in investment by non-state firms had slowed to only about two-thirds the rate posted by state-owned firms, ending nearly two decades of private-sector outperformance. | 6,238 | <h4>Decline over the long term is inevitable – only economic reforms solve.</h4><p><strong>Kroeber 16 </strong>[Arthur R. Kroeber, Senior Fellow at Brookings, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, and editor of its journal China Economic Quarterly 2-9-2016, "Should we worry about China’s economy? ," Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/02/09-worry-about-chinese-economy-kroeber]</p><p>There is a silver lining: <u><strong>The flattening of its commodity demand shows <mark>China has turned its back on an unsustainable growth model</mark> based on ever-rising investment</u></strong>. <u><strong>The question now is whether it can succeed in building a new growth model based mainly on services and consumer spending</u></strong>. As we noted above, <u><strong><mark>growth</mark> in services and consumer spending is solid</u></strong>. But it <u><strong><mark>is</mark> still <mark>not strong enough to carry the</mark> whole burden of driving the <mark>economy.</mark> For that to happen, much <mark>more reform is needed</mark>. And the pace of those reforms has been disappointing</u></strong>. The <u><strong>crucial reforms all relate to increasing the role of markets, and decreasing the role of the state</u></strong> in economic activity. China has an unusually large state sector: OECD researchers have estimated that <u><strong>the value of state-owned enterprise assets is around 145 percent of GDP, more than double the figure for the next most state-dominated economy,</u></strong> India.[1] <u><strong>This</u></strong> large state sector <u><strong>functioned well for most of the last two decades,</u></strong> <u><strong>since the main tasks were to mobilize as many resources as possible and build</u></strong> the <u><strong>infrastructure</u></strong> of a modern economy—tasks for which state firms, which are not bound by short-term profit constraints, are well suited. <u><strong>Now</u></strong>, however, the <u><strong>infrastructure is</u></strong> mostly <u><strong>built and the main task is to make the most efficient use of resources, maximize productivity, and satisfy</u></strong> ever-shifting <u><strong>consumer demand</u></strong>. For this job, <u><strong><mark>markets must take a leading role</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong>and the government must wean itself off</u></strong> the habit of using <u><strong>state-owned firms</u></strong> to achieve its economic ends. And the big worry is that, despite the promises in the November 2013 Third Plenum reform agenda, <u><strong><mark>Beijing does not seem all that willing to let markets have their way</u></strong>.</mark> The <u><strong>concerns stem from</u></strong> the government’s <u><strong>recent interventions in</u></strong> the <u><strong>equity and currency </u></strong>markets. <u><strong>Last June, when a</u></strong> short-lived stoc<u><strong>k market bubble popped, the authorities forced </u></strong>various <u><strong>state-controlled firms</u></strong> and agencies <u><strong>to buy</u></strong> up <u><strong>shares</u></strong> to stop the rout. <u><strong>This stabilized the market for a while, but left people wondering what would happen when these agencies started selling down the shares</u></strong> they had been forced to buy. To enable these holdings to be sold without disrupting the market, <u><strong>the authorities instituted a “circuit breake</u></strong>r” which automatically suspended stock-exchange trading when prices fell by 5 percent in one day. <u><strong>Instead of calming the market, this induced panic selling</u></strong>, as traders rushed to dump their shares before the circuit breaker shut off trading. The government canceled the circuit breaker, and the market remains haunted by the risk of state-controlled shareholders dumping their shares en masse. Similarly, <u><strong>Beijing got into trouble</u></strong> in August <u><strong>when it announced a new exchange-rate mechanism</u></strong> that would make the value of the renminbi more market determined. But <u><strong>because it paired this move with a small, <mark>unexpected devaluation</mark>, many traders assumed the real goal was to devalue the renminbi, and started pushing the currency down. So the People’s Bank of China</u></strong> (PBOC) <u><strong>intervened massivel</u></strong>y in the foreign exchange markets, spending down its foreign-currency reserves to prop up the value of the renminbi. <u><strong>This stabilized the currency, but <mark>brought into question the government’s commitment to a truly market-driven exchange rate</u></strong></mark>. Then, <u><strong>in December, PBOC made another change, by starting to manage the renminbi against a trade-weighted basket </u></strong>of 13 currencies, <u><strong>rather than against the dollar </u></strong>as in the past. Because the dollar has been strong lately, <u><strong>this </u></strong>in effect<u><strong> meant that PBOC was letting the renminbi devalue against the dollar</u></strong>. Again, PBOC argued that its intention was not to devalue, but simply to establish a more flexible exchange rate. And again, <u><strong>it undermined the credibility of this intention by intervening to prevent the currency from falling against the dollar</u></strong>. <u><strong>One could argue that these episodes were merely potholes</u></strong> on the road to a greater reliance on markets. This may be so, but <u><strong><mark>investors</mark> both inside and outside China <mark>are not convinced</u></strong>.</mark> The <u><strong>heavy-handed management of the equity and currency markets gives the impression that Beijing is not willing to tolerate market outcomes that conflict with the government’s idea of what prices should be. <mark>This runs against the government’s stated commitment</u></strong></mark> in the Third Plenum <u><strong>decision to let market forces “play a decisive role in resource allocation.</u></strong>” <u><strong>Another source of unease is the slow progress on state enterprise reform</u></strong>. <u><strong>Momentum seemed strong in 2014</u></strong>, when provinces were encouraged to publish “mixed ownership” plans to diversify the shareholding of their firms. This raised hopes that private investors would be brought in to improve the management of inefficient state companies. Yet <u><strong><mark>to date only a handful of mixed-ownership deals have been complete</mark>d, </u></strong>and <u><strong>many of them involve the transfer of shares to state-owned investment companies, with no private-sector participation</u></strong>. <u><strong>Plans to subject the big centrally controlled state enterprises to greater financial discipline</u></strong> by putting them under holding companies modeled on Singapore’s Temasek <u><strong>have been</u></strong> incessantly <u><strong>discussed, but not put into action</u></strong>. Meanwhile the <u><strong>number of state firms continues to grow</u></strong>, rising from a low of 110,000 in 2008 to around 160,000 in 2014. <u><strong><mark>So long as Beijing continues to intervene in markets</u></strong></mark> to guide prices<u><strong>, <mark>and fails to deliver on the key structural reforms</u></strong></mark> needed to create a sustainable consumer-led economy, <u><strong><mark>markets</u></strong></mark> both inside and outside China <u><strong><mark>will continue to be nervous about the sustainability of growth</u></strong>,</mark> and we will see more “China scares” like the one we endured in January. A clearer sense of direction is required, as is better communication. For three decades, China sustained fast economic growth by steadily increasing the scope of markets, even as it preserved a large role for the state. Because investors were confident in the general trend towards more markets and more space for private firms, they were happy to invest in growth. Today <u><strong>neither private entrepreneurs in China, nor traders on global financial markets, are confident in such a trend</u></strong>. By the end of 2015 growth in investment by non-state firms had slowed to only about two-thirds the rate posted by state-owned firms, ending nearly two decades of private-sector outperformance.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 160,877 | 3 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,476 | Extinction—cyber attacks | Visha Thamboo, 2014 | Visha Thamboo, 2014—, citing Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, “Cyber Security: The world’s greatest threat,” 11-25, https://blogs.ubc.ca/vishathamboo/2014/11/25/cyber-security-the-worlds-greatest-threat/ | warfare had entered the fifth domain: cyberspace. Cyberspace is the most dangerous of all warfares because of the amount of damage that can be done, whilst remaining completely immobile and anonymous. Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring down military systems; oil refineries and pipelines explode; air-traffic-control systems collapse; freight and metro trains derail; financial data are scrambled; the electrical grid goes down orbiting satellites spin out of control. Society soon breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out The internet was designed for convenience and reliability, not security. Yet in wiring together the globe, it has merged the garden and the wilderness. No passport is required in cyberspace. And although police are constrained by national borders, criminals roam freely. Enemy states are no longer on the other side of the ocean, but just behind the firewall Deterrence in cyber-warfare is more uncertain than in nuclear strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line between criminality and war is blurred and identifying attacking computers is difficult Retaliation need not be confined to cyberspace Although for now, cyber warfare has not spiralled out of control, it is only a matter of time, before cyber warfare becomes the most prominent type of attack, and the most deadly because of its scope and anonymity. | warfare had entered the fifth domain: cyberspace the most dangerous of all warfares Clarke envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring down military systems; pipelines explode; air-traffic-control systems collapse the grid goes down Deterrence in cyber-war is more uncertain than nuclear strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line is blurred and identifying attacking computers is difficult Although cyber war has not spiralled out of control, it is only a matter of time, before cyber becomes the most prominent type of attack, and the most deadly because of its scope and anonymity | After land, sea, air and space, warfare had entered the fifth domain: cyberspace. Cyberspace is arguably the most dangerous of all warfares because of the amount of damage that can be done, whilst remaining completely immobile and anonymous. In a new book Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring down military e-mail systems; oil refineries and pipelines explode; air-traffic-control systems collapse; freight and metro trains derail; financial data are scrambled; the electrical grid goes down in the eastern United States; orbiting satellites spin out of control. Society soon breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out. Worst of all, the identity of the attacker may remain a mystery. Other dangers are coming: weakly governed swathes of Africa are being connected up to fibre-optic cables, potentially creating new havens for cyber-criminals and the spread of mobile internet will bring new means of attack. The internet was designed for convenience and reliability, not security. Yet in wiring together the globe, it has merged the garden and the wilderness. No passport is required in cyberspace. And although police are constrained by national borders, criminals roam freely. Enemy states are no longer on the other side of the ocean, but just behind the firewall. The ill-intentioned can mask their identity and location, impersonate others and con their way into the buildings that hold the digitised wealth of the electronic age: money, personal data and intellectual property. Deterrence in cyber-warfare is more uncertain than, say, in nuclear strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line between criminality and war is blurred and identifying attacking computers, let alone the fingers on the keyboards, is difficult. Retaliation need not be confined to cyberspace; the one system that is certainly not linked to the public internet is America’s nuclear firing chain. Although for now, cyber warfare has not spiralled out of control, it is only a matter of time, before cyber warfare becomes the most prominent type of attack, and the most deadly because of its scope and anonymity. | 2,261 | <h4>Extinction—cyber attacks</h4><p><strong>Visha Thamboo, 2014</strong>—, citing Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, “Cyber Security: The world’s greatest threat,” 11-25, <u>https://blogs.ubc.ca/vishathamboo/2014/11/25/cyber-security-the-worlds-greatest-threat/</p><p></u>After land, sea, air and space, <u><mark>warfare had entered the fifth domain: cyberspace</mark>. Cyberspace is</u> arguably <u><mark>the most dangerous of all warfares</mark> because of the amount of damage that can be done, whilst remaining completely immobile and anonymous. </u>In a new book <u>Richard <mark>Clarke</mark>, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, <mark>envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring down military</u></mark> e-mail <u><mark>systems;</mark> oil refineries and <mark>pipelines</mark> <mark>explode; air-traffic-control systems collapse</mark>; freight and metro trains derail; financial data are scrambled; <mark>the</mark> electrical <mark>grid goes down</u></mark> in the eastern United States; <u>orbiting satellites spin out of control. Society soon breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out</u>. Worst of all, the identity of the attacker may remain a mystery. Other dangers are coming: weakly governed swathes of Africa are being connected up to fibre-optic cables, potentially creating new havens for cyber-criminals and the spread of mobile internet will bring new means of attack. <u>The internet was designed for convenience and reliability, not security. Yet in wiring together the globe, it has merged the garden and the wilderness. No passport is required in cyberspace. And although police are constrained by national borders, criminals roam freely. Enemy states are no longer on the other side of the ocean, but just behind the firewall</u>. The ill-intentioned can mask their identity and location, impersonate others and con their way into the buildings that hold the digitised wealth of the electronic age: money, personal data and intellectual property. <u><mark>Deterrence in cyber-war</mark>fare <mark>is more uncertain than</u></mark>, say, <u>in <mark>nuclear strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line</mark> between criminality and war <mark>is blurred and identifying attacking computers</u></mark>, let alone the fingers on the keyboards, <u><mark>is difficult</u></mark>. <u>Retaliation need not be confined to cyberspace</u>; the one system that is certainly not linked to the public internet is America’s nuclear firing chain. <u><mark>Although</mark> for now, <mark>cyber war</mark>fare <mark>has not spiralled out of control, it is only a matter of time, before cyber</mark> warfare <mark>becomes the most prominent type of attack, and the most deadly because of its scope and anonymity</mark>.</p></u> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 3 | 166,766 | 32 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,477 | Switch side debate is key to democracy --- external impact | Baird, 55 | Baird, 55 – Professor of Speech at the University of Iowa (C. A., “The college debater and the red china issue,” Central States Speech Journal, 6(2), 5-7) | our justification of free discussion and debate on opposing sides is the best guarantee of sound conclusions. This presentation of both sides—the heart of legislative and all other debating — is the basis of a stable democracy What relation has this to bad propaganda the debater has special responsibilities the need for education in responsible thinking and utterance is especially urgent. Bad propaganda is pouring upon us from every side You are trained to alertness to the typical propagandists devices of glittering generalities, name calling, false analogies, biased authorities, false facts, and the other marks of evil propaganda this technique thunders at us from behind the Iron Curtain you are qualified to detect the genuine and expose the spurious In this long race between education and catastrophe the colleges and universities have their key role. You discussants are typical of these institutions in their pursuit of truth and wisdom. Fulbright recently observed that there is no great merit in ignorance. The sad part about this is that it is indicative of the low estate to which we have fallen where freedom of expression is concerned." | our justification of free debate on opposing sides is the best guarantee of sound conclusions. This presentation of both sides is the basis of a stable democracy the debater has special responsibilities the need for responsible thinking is especially urgent. You are trained to alertness to the typical propagandists devices of generalities you are qualified to detect the genuine and expose the spurious there is no great merit in ignorance. The sad part about this is that it is indicative of the low estate to which we have fallen where freedom of expression is concerned." | Thus our justification of free discussion and debate on opposing sides is the best guarantee of sound conclusions. This presentation of both sides—the heart of legislative and all other debating — is the basis of a stable democracy. What relation has this philosophy of free discussion and persuasion to bad propaganda? Here the debater has special responsibilities. Here the need for education in responsible thinking and utterance is especially urgent. Bad propaganda, as never before, is pouring upon us from every side. As we have been told so often, television and the other agencies have created mass communication and mass thinking. You are trained to alertness to the typical propagandists devices of glittering generalities, name calling, false analogies, biased authorities, false facts, and the other marks of evil propaganda. Sometimes this technique thunders at us from behind the Iron Curtain. At other times it disguises itself in soft phrases and pseudo-objectivity. In either case you are qualified to detect the genuine and expose the spurious. College debate teams are the last groups in this nation where Communistic propaganda has any chance of making headway. In this long race between education and catastrophe the colleges and universities have their key role. You discussants are typical of these institutions in their pursuit of truth and wisdom. Senator Fulbright recently, in commenting on the freedom to discuss controversial issues, observed that "I think there is no great merit in ignorance. The sad part about this (discussion ban) is that it is indicative of the low estate to which we have fallen where freedom of expression is concerned." I do not share the Senator's pessimistic outlook. Men and women, when the future of the state is in doubt, will some forward "to express the aspirations of our people in dignified honest speech." And their words will prevail. | 1,900 | <h4>Switch side debate is key to democracy --- external impact</h4><p><strong>Baird, 55</strong> – Professor of Speech at the University of Iowa (C. A., “The college debater and the red china issue,” Central States Speech Journal, 6(2), 5-7)</p><p>Thus <u><mark>our justification of free</mark> discussion and <mark>debate on opposing sides is the best guarantee of sound conclusions. This presentation of both sides</mark>—the heart of legislative and all other debating — <mark>is the basis of a stable democracy</u></mark>. <u>What relation has this </u>philosophy of free discussion and persuasion <u>to bad propaganda</u>? Here <u><mark>the debater has special responsibilities</u></mark>. Here <u><mark>the need for</mark> education in <mark>responsible thinking</mark> and utterance <mark>is especially urgent. </mark>Bad propaganda</u>, as never before, <u>is pouring upon us from every side</u>. As we have been told so often, television and the other agencies have created mass communication and mass thinking.<mark> <u>You are trained to alertness to the typical propagandists devices of </mark>glittering <mark>generalities</mark>, name calling, false analogies, biased authorities, false facts, and the other marks of evil propaganda</u>. Sometimes <u>this technique thunders at us from behind the Iron Curtain</u>. At other times it disguises itself in soft phrases and pseudo-objectivity. In either case <u><mark>you are qualified to detect the genuine and expose the spurious</u></mark>. College debate teams are the last groups in this nation where Communistic propaganda has any chance of making headway. <u>In this long race between education and catastrophe the colleges and universities have their key role. You discussants are typical of these institutions in their pursuit of truth and wisdom.</u> Senator <u>Fulbright recently</u>, in commenting on the freedom to discuss controversial issues, <u>observed that </u>"I think <u><mark>there is</mark> <mark>no great merit in ignorance. The sad part about this</mark> </u>(discussion ban) <u><mark>is that it is indicative of the low estate to which we have fallen where freedom of expression is concerned."</u></mark> I do not share the Senator's pessimistic outlook. Men and women, when the future of the state is in doubt, will some forward "to express the aspirations of our people in dignified honest speech." And their words will prevail.</p> | 2NC | Case | Topicality | 1,560,838 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,478 | No chance of US-China war | Li, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, et al, 6/29/2015 | Li, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, et al, 6/29/2015 Xue, “South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy” 6/29/2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/ | Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, the U S main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests and a rising China In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South China Sea Obama, the ‘peace president’ is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea. Washington is aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. Washington opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.” China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes. The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize cooperation audiences should be aware that aggressive statements are not representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key | this does not mean the S C S will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a hegemon the U S interest lies in maintaining the order as well as peace the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia the U.S strengthened its military presence while supporting ASEAN countries However there are limiting factors interests at stake are not core national interests Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence the U S is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation Obama is even less likely to fight Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities both sides will not take the risk of confrontation artificial islands help promote the resolution The Chinese side has yet to feel any security threat Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary agenda it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN aggressive statements are not representative of U.S.-China relations statements are made by military rather than political elites | In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing. However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea. As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area. Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China. Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move. As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.” For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy. In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said. Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes. The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize cooperation. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year. But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer. | 8,998 | <h4>No chance of US-China war</h4><p><strong><mark>Li,</mark> Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, <mark>et al, 6/29/2015</strong></mark> Xue, “South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy” 6/29/2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/</p><p>In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” <u>Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor</u>. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing. <u><strong>However, <mark>this does not</mark> necessary <mark>mean the</mark> <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. </strong>As a</mark> global <mark>hegemon</mark>, <mark>the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates’ <u>main <mark>interest lies in maintaining the</mark> current international <mark>order as well as <strong>peace</mark> and stability</strong>.</u> <u>Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones</u>. <u><strong>Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests</u></strong>—<u>and a rising China</u> determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. <u>In response, <mark>the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia</mark>” strategy. In practice, <mark>the U.S</mark>. has on the one hand <strong><mark>strengthened its military presence</strong></mark> in Asia-Pacific, <mark>while</mark> on the other hand <strong><mark>supporting ASEAN countries</strong></mark>, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. </u>This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon <u>Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role</u>” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. <u>In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands</u> and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea. <u><mark>However</mark>, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, <mark>there are</mark> <strong>several <mark>limiting factors</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>interests at stake</mark> in the South China Sea <mark>are <strong>not core national interests</mark> for the United States.</u></strong> Meanwhile, <u>the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. <mark>Given U.S.-China mutual economic</mark> <mark>dependence</mark> and China’s comprehensive national strength,</u> <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation</mark> with China over the South China Sea</u></strong>. Barack <u><mark>Obama</mark>, the ‘peace president’</u> who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, <u><strong><mark>is even less likely to fight</mark> with China for the South China Sea. </u></strong>As for the U.S. interests in the region, <u>Washington is</u> surely <u>aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters</u> so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, <u><mark>Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually <strong>recognize the legality of military activities</mark> in another country’s EEZ</u></strong> (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area. <u>Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China.</u> It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China. <u>Washington</u> has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has <u>opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands.</u> This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move. As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). <u>To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet <mark>both sides <strong>will not take the risk of</mark> military <mark>confrontation</u></strong></mark>. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, <u>our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.” </u>For its part, <u>China is determined to build <mark>artificial islands</mark> and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would <mark>help <strong>promote the resolution</mark> of SCS disputes</u></strong>. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy. In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “<u><mark>The Chinese side has yet to feel any</mark> air <mark>security threat</mark> from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region</u>,” a spokesperson said. <u><mark>Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary</mark> strategic <mark>agenda</mark> for the coming years, <mark>it is crucial for China <strong>to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN</u></strong></mark> on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. <u>As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and <strong>propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes. </strong>The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to <strong>emphasize cooperation</u></strong>. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year. But <u>audiences should be aware that <mark>aggressive statements</u></mark> at the Shangri-La Dialogue <u><mark>are not</u></mark> totally <u><mark>representative of U.S.-China relations</mark>. After all, these <mark>statements are made by military rather than political elites</mark>.</u> <u><strong>Cooperation will be the key</u></strong> when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Africa | 67,854 | 107 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,479 | Framing must come first – determines the outcomes of policy | Calkivik 10 | Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” http://purl.umn.edu/99479) | The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state security. Mutimer points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a problem shapes the constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to particular patterns of foreign policy a core concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through representational practices and linguistic elements. scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective identity the international interventions that took place during the 1990s are legitimated by the West through a moral discourse based on universal values Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of security. They analyze the construction of the non-Western subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World. other scholars expose the gender biases imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and insecurity from the perspective of women. | a particular discursive framing shapes the constitution of identities and interests of actors and gives way to particular patterns of foreign policy national interest is discursively constituted through representational practices and linguistic elements interventions are legitimated through discourse representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security practices and policies | The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to particular patterns of foreign policy. The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129 In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as security problems.131 A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war, scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134 Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic, social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and insecurity from the perspective of women.137 | 4,535 | <h4>Framing must come first – determines the outcomes of policy</h4><p><strong>Calkivik 10</strong> (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” http://purl.umn.edu/99479)</p><p><u>The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state security.</u> For instance, <u>Mutimer</u> examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of proliferation.”128 He <u>points out the way in which <strong><mark>a particular discursive framing</strong></mark> of a problem</u>—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—<u><strong><mark>shapes the constitution of identities and interests</strong> of</mark> the <mark>actors</mark> in question <mark>and <strong>gives way to particular patterns </strong>of foreign policy</u></mark>. The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129 In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how <u>a core concept such as the <mark>national interest is<strong> discursively constituted </strong>through<strong> representational practices and linguistic elements</strong></mark>.</u>130 Other investigations explore the working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as security problems.131 A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war, <u>scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective identity</u>.133 Others focus on <u>the international <mark>interventions</mark> that took place during the 1990s</u> and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments <u><mark>are legitimated </mark>by the West <mark>through</mark> a moral <strong><mark>discourse</strong></mark> based on universal values</u>.134 <u>Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of security.</u> Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic, social, and military relations.135 <u>They analyze the construction of the non-Western subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the ways in which these <strong><mark>representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security practices and policies</strong></mark> such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.</u>136 Introducing feminist perspectives into their analyses, <u>other scholars expose the gender biases imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and insecurity from the perspective of women.</u>137</p> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 114,113 | 3 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,480 | A – portable skills – competing interps is key to foster better decision-making skills and cost-benefit analysis – reasonability disincentivizes robust analysis | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>A – portable skills – competing interps is key to foster better decision-making skills and cost-benefit analysis – reasonability disincentivizes robust analysis</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,839 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,481 | A bilateral investment treaty saves Chinese growth – increases investment and pushes through reforms. | Miner 15 | Miner 15 [Sean Miner, China Program Manager and Research Associate @ Pearson Institute for International Economics, MBA from George Washington University where he focused on international business and finance, 6-18-2015, "Why China Wants A BIT With The United States," PIIE Trade & Investment Policy Watch, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/why-china-wants-bit-united-states] | the United States stands to gain more access and protections for its companies in China’s restricted market there are important reasons why China would want to reach a deal. Domestic Reforms – China uses international agreements to overcome vested interests and push for domestic reforms. Under the cover of accession to the WTO), China pushed through a multitude of economic reforms that were strongly opposed by powerful groups that profited from the status quo. A US-China BIT could help China open up its service sector, a necessity if China wants to extend the fast pace of economic growth Parts of China’s services sector are dominated by many state-owned enterprises, especially in industries like telecommunications, finance, information technology, and health care. The BIT could open these up to domestic and foreign private firms, which are much more efficient and profitable than the state firms. the BIT could provide the impetus to further simplify the complex regulatory environment in China. China has long complained that the US national security review for foreign investments stifles Chinese investment in the United States. the perception and reputation of CFIUS has discouraged some Chinese investors. A US-China BIT might push for more transparency and possibly some clarity of the criteria needed to pass a CFIUS investigation for Chinese enterprises Increased FDI – US investors account for less than 3 percent of FDI in China, and they are now seeing more reasons to invest elsewhere rising production costs, complex regulatory environment, competition policy issues, lack of enforcement of intellectual property, and increased competition. These, divert investments away from China A US-China BIT could improve the attractiveness of investing in China. Recognizing China as a market economy could be part of a side agreement. China believes that the United States should qualify China as a market economy by the end of 2016, per China’s WTO accession protocol. The United States could assure China that it won’t resist in this area if a BIT is agreed. US High-Tech Exports to China China has long complained about US restrictions on the export of many dual-use items related to military use. many of these products are already available for purchase for China from countries like France and Germany, so the United States could relax the restrictions on some of these items China has a lot to gain from a US-China BIT, the most obvious of which is a more dynamic economy. China has ambitions to move up the value chain In order to do this, China must foster a more competitive business environment, which a BIT could facilitate. many obstacles stand in the way of an agreement, most importantly the US Senate, which must approve any BIT by a two-thirds majority. The Senate won’t pass a BIT unless China significantly opens its market to US investors. If China’s negative list is acceptable to its US counterparts, both countries will stand to benefit enormously. the prospects for concluding a BIT before Obama leaves office are very low | the U S stands to gain more access China, uses international agreements to overcome vested interests and push for domestic reforms. Under the cover of (WTO), China pushed through a multitude of economic reforms US-China BIT could help China open up its service sector, a necessity if China wants to extend the fast pace of economic growth the BIT could provide the impetus to further simplify the regulatory environment the perception of CFIUS has discouraged investors. A US-China BIT might push for more transparency and clarity criteria needed to pass a CFIUS US investors account for less than 3 percent of FDI in China, China BIT could improve the attractiveness of investing in China . China has l to gain a more dynamic economy China must foster a more competitive business environment, which a BIT could facilitate obstacles stand in the way most importantly the US Senate The Senate won’t pass a BIT both countries will stand to benefit enormously | Negotiations over a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) have entered a new phase with China’s formal submission (link is external) of its negative list on June 12 and the upcoming September summit between President Xi and President Obama. The BIT will be a focus of the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) between China and the United States in Washington next week. The key to answering “why China wants a BIT” is to understand what China would gain from such a treaty with the United States. While the United States stands to gain more access and protections for its companies in China’s restricted market, China has seemingly less incentive to grant the United States more market access and protection, as it may get relatively little in return from the already more open US investment environment. However, there are still important reasons why China would want to reach a deal. 1. Domestic Reforms – China, like many countries, uses international agreements to overcome vested interests and push for domestic reforms. Under the cover of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China pushed through a multitude of economic reforms that were strongly opposed by powerful groups that profited from the status quo. A US-China BIT could help China open up its service sector, a necessity if China wants to extend the fast pace of economic growth it has seen over the past 25 years. Parts of China’s services sector are dominated by many state-owned or state supported enterprises, especially in industries like telecommunications, finance, information technology, and health care. The BIT could open these up to domestic and foreign private firms, which are much more efficient and profitable than the state firms. Moreover, the BIT could provide the impetus to further simplify the complex regulatory environment in China. Premier Li Keqiang recently stated that some agencies require you to “prove your mother is your mother (link is external),” in an attempt to describe the sometimes outrageous administrative hoops invented by government agencies. 2. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) – China has long complained that the US national security review for foreign investments stifles Chinese investment in the United States. As we’ve shown in our February 2014 report on the US-China BIT, the data doesn’t show that CFIUS has been a huge hurdle. Also, Rhodium Group’s recent report (link is external) shows that Chinese investment in the United States has accelerated rapidly in the past couple of years. However, because of a few high profile cases, the perception and reputation of CFIUS has discouraged some Chinese investors. A US-China BIT is unlikely to make major changes to the CFIUS review process, but it might push for more transparency and possibly some clarity of the criteria needed to pass a CFIUS investigation for not only private Chinese enterprises, but also for state-owned enterprise, which still account for more than half of China’s outbound foreign direct investment (FDI). 3. Increased FDI – US investors account for less than 3 percent of FDI in China, and they are now seeing more reasons to invest elsewhere than China: rising production costs, complex regulatory environment, competition policy issues, lack of enforcement of intellectual property, and increased competition. These, along with the prospect of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will have a strong investment chapter, could divert investments away from China and towards TPP countries. A US-China BIT could improve the attractiveness of investing in China. 4. Market Economy Status – Recognizing China as a market economy is not directly related to the BIT but could be part of a side agreement. China believes that the United States and all other WTO members should qualify China as a market economy by the end of 2016, per China’s WTO accession protocol. But the United States (along with the European Union), has refrained from guaranteeing that the United States will recognize China’s market economy status (and therefore the way it calculates anti-dumping and countervailing duties against some Chinese imports). The United States could assure China that it won’t resist in this area if a BIT is agreed. 5. US High-Tech Exports to China – Also not directly related to a BIT, China has long complained about US restrictions on the export of many dual-use items related to military use. However, many of these products are already available for purchase for China from countries like France and Germany, so the United States could relax the restrictions on some of these items, which may partly satisfy this long-standing complaint China has with the United States. China has a lot to gain from a US-China BIT, the most obvious of which is a more dynamic economy. China has ambitions to move up the value chain, going from assembler of the world’s cheap products to producer of complex, high-tech goods. In order to do this, China must foster a more competitive business environment, which a BIT could facilitate. But many obstacles stand in the way of an agreement, most importantly the US Senate, which must approve any BIT by a two-thirds majority. The Senate won’t pass a BIT unless China significantly opens its market to US investors. China can do so by submitting a very short “negative list” of industries that are off limits to foreign investment. China recently (link is external) submitted its negative list to the US. If China’s negative list is acceptable to its US counterparts, both countries will stand to benefit enormously. To be clear, the prospects for concluding a BIT before Obama leaves office are very low, as it’s not just the negative list keeping an agreement at bay but issues like intellectual property, technology transfer, competition policy, and China’s efforts to strengthen its national security regulations that also stand in the way. However, the S&ED this month and the Xi-Obama summit in September will provide special opportunities to meaningfully advance the BIT negotiations. | 6,081 | <h4>A bilateral investment treaty saves Chinese growth – increases investment and pushes through reforms. </h4><p><strong>Miner 15 </strong>[Sean Miner, China Program Manager and Research Associate @ Pearson Institute for International Economics, MBA from George Washington University where he focused on international business and finance, 6-18-2015, "Why China Wants A BIT With The United States," PIIE Trade & Investment Policy Watch, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/why-china-wants-bit-united-states]</p><p>Negotiations over a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) have entered a new phase with China’s formal submission (link is external) of its negative list on June 12 and the upcoming September summit between President Xi and President Obama. The BIT will be a focus of the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) between China and the United States in Washington next week. The key to answering “why China wants a BIT” is to understand what China would gain from such a treaty with the United States. While <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>stands to gain more access</mark> and protections for its companies in China’s restricted market</u></strong>, China has seemingly less incentive to grant the United States more market access and protection, as it may get relatively little in return from the already more open US investment environment. However, <u><strong>there are</u></strong> still <u><strong>important reasons why China would want to reach a deal. </u></strong>1.<u><strong> Domestic Reforms – <mark>China</u></strong>,</mark> like many countries, <u><strong><mark>uses international agreements to overcome vested interests and push for domestic reforms. Under the cover of</mark> accession to the</u></strong> World Trade Organization <mark>(<u><strong>WTO), China pushed through a multitude of economic reforms</mark> that were strongly opposed by powerful groups that profited from the status quo. A <mark>US-China BIT could help China open up its service sector, a necessity if China wants to extend the fast pace of economic growth</u></strong></mark> it has seen over the past 25 years. <u><strong>Parts of China’s services sector are dominated by many state-owned</u></strong> or state supported <u><strong>enterprises, especially in industries like telecommunications, finance, information technology, and health care. The BIT could open these up to domestic and foreign private firms, which are much more efficient and profitable than the state firms.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>the BIT could provide the impetus to further simplify the</mark> complex <mark>regulatory environment</mark> in China. </u></strong>Premier Li Keqiang recently stated that some agencies require you to “prove your mother is your mother (link is external),” in an attempt to describe the sometimes outrageous administrative hoops invented by government agencies. 2. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) – <u><strong>China has long complained that the US national security review for foreign investments stifles Chinese investment in the United States.</u></strong> As we’ve shown in our February 2014 report on the US-China BIT, the data doesn’t show that CFIUS has been a huge hurdle. Also, Rhodium Group’s recent report (link is external) shows that Chinese investment in the United States has accelerated rapidly in the past couple of years. However, because of a few high profile cases, <u><strong><mark>the perception</mark> and reputation <mark>of CFIUS has discouraged</mark> some Chinese <mark>investors. A US-China BIT</u></strong></mark> is unlikely to make major changes to the CFIUS review process, but it <u><strong><mark>might push for more transparency and</mark> possibly some <mark>clarity</mark> of the <mark>criteria needed to pass a CFIUS</mark> investigation for</u></strong> not only private <u><strong>Chinese enterprises</u></strong>, but also for state-owned enterprise, which still account for more than half of China’s outbound foreign direct investment (FDI). 3. <u><strong>Increased FDI – <mark>US investors account for less than 3 percent of FDI in China,</mark> and they are now seeing more reasons to invest elsewhere</u></strong> than China: <u><strong>rising production costs, complex regulatory environment, competition policy issues, lack of enforcement of intellectual property, and increased competition. These,</u></strong> along with the prospect of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will have a strong investment chapter, could <u><strong>divert investments away from China</u></strong> and towards TPP countries. <u><strong>A US-<mark>China BIT could improve the attractiveness of investing in China</mark>. </u></strong>4. Market Economy Status – <u><strong>Recognizing China as a market economy</u></strong> is not directly related to the BIT but <u><strong>could be part of a side agreement. China believes that the United States</u></strong> and all other WTO members <u><strong>should qualify China as a market economy by the end of 2016, per China’s WTO accession protocol.</u></strong> But the United States (along with the European Union), has refrained from guaranteeing that the United States will recognize China’s market economy status (and therefore the way it calculates anti-dumping and countervailing duties against some Chinese imports). <u><strong>The United States could assure China that it won’t resist in this area if a BIT is agreed. </u></strong>5. <u><strong>US High-Tech Exports to China</u></strong> – Also not directly related to a BIT, <u><strong>China has long complained about US restrictions on the export of many dual-use items related to military use.</u></strong> However, <u><strong>many of these products are already available for purchase for China from countries like France and Germany, so the United States could relax the restrictions on some of these items</u></strong>, which may partly satisfy this long-standing complaint China has with the United States<mark>. <u><strong>China has</mark> a <mark>l</mark>ot<mark> to gain</mark> from a US-China BIT, the most obvious of which is <mark>a more dynamic economy</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>China has ambitions to move up the value chain</u></strong>, going from assembler of the world’s cheap products to producer of complex, high-tech goods. <u><strong>In order to do this, <mark>China must foster a more competitive business environment, which a BIT could facilitate</mark>. </u></strong>But <u><strong>many <mark>obstacles stand in the way</mark> of an agreement, <mark>most importantly the US Senate</mark>, which must approve any BIT by a two-thirds majority. <mark>The Senate won’t pass a BIT</mark> unless China significantly opens its market to US investors.</u></strong> China can do so by submitting a very short “negative list” of industries that are off limits to foreign investment. China recently (link is external) submitted its negative list to the US. <u><strong>If China’s negative list is acceptable to its US counterparts, <mark>both countries will stand to benefit enormously</mark>. </u></strong>To be clear, <u><strong>the prospects for concluding a BIT before Obama leaves office are very low</u></strong>, as it’s not just the negative list keeping an agreement at bay but issues like intellectual property, technology transfer, competition policy, and China’s efforts to strengthen its national security regulations that also stand in the way. However, the S&ED this month and the Xi-Obama summit in September will provide special opportunities to meaningfully advance the BIT negotiations.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 160,878 | 17 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,482 | Engagement is the attempt to influence the behavior of China – it needs to be defined by both means and ends in the context of China to distinguish military strategy from diplomatic engagement | Finamore, 14 | Finamore, 14 – Doctoral Researcher at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and International Relations (Salvatore, The EU, the US and China: Towards a New International Order?, ed: Men and Shen, p. 111-113) | with respect to China Constructing a framework for the study of engagement, most scholars would agree that engagement refers to one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'. if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order' This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized by Resnick argues the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization he proposes a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement. However, overlooking its goals and focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of the analysis of engagement as a foreign policy strategy. strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means ). This is true for military strategy, which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends' but it also holds true for strategy in general. in order to analyze engagement as a foreign policy strategy, one needs to pay attention both to its goals and to the instruments by which they are achieved. | with respect to China. Constructing a framework for engagement scholars would agree engagement refers to attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' Resnick , overlooking goals focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of engagement as a foreign policy strategy true for military strategy, to analyze engagement needs to pay attention to goals and the instruments . | As the previous section illustrated, even a brief sketch of American and European experiences with respect to China's rise is sufficient to draw some key parallels in US and EU China policies, as well as to outline some of their main differences. In order to move beyond this contextual level and take the analysis further, however, it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capturing the main elements of their engagement strategies. To this end, this section proposes a framework based on socialization theory, which will serve to highlight the different policy instruments available to the EU and the US and the way they have been employed in pursuit of their specific engagement goals with respect to China. Constructing a framework for the study of engagement, however, is a harder task than it would initially appear, not least because of the existence of profound disagreements in the academic literature over the meaning and scope of engagement as a foreign policy strategy (Resnick 2(H) 1: Suetlinger 2000. p. 17). Broadly speaking, most scholars would agree that engagement refers to one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000, p. I). In some more specific instances, it can also be understood as an approach through which established powers can deal with the emergence of new actors posing a threat to the international status quo (Schweller 1999). From this perspective, engagement could then be grouped within the same category as other foreign policy strategies, such as balancing, containment or appeasement. In fact, many commentators point in particular to the existence of shared traits between engagement and appeasement, with some even arguing that engagement is essentially nothing but a new and more acceptable term for a policy otherwise fallen into historical disrepute (Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81: George 1993, p. 61). According to Stephen Rock (2000. pp. 22-23), both engagement and appeasement rely on positive inducements to produce a relaxation of tensions and a change in the behavior of the target actor, with a potential scope for socialization and learning. The difference between these two concepts would rest mainly in the fact that engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'. From this point of view, appeasement would essentially constitute 'a subcategory of engagement'. According to other authors, if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order' (Schweller 1999, p. 14; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81), rather than simply aiming for more 'modest' goals such as tension-reduction and the avoidance of war (Resnick 2001, p. 557). This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized by some authors. Evan Resnick in particular argues that, as an ends-based definition, the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization. Instead, he proposes what he regards as a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts ... across multiple issue-areas' (Resnick 2001, p. 559). Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement. However, overlooking its goals and focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of the analysis of engagement as a foreign policy strategy. In fact, at least since the time of Carl von Clausewitz, strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means (see Howard 2002, pp. 16 and 36). This is true for military strategy, which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends' (Betts 2000, p. 5), but it also holds true for strategy in general. It follows that in order to analyze engagement as a foreign policy strategy, one needs to pay attention both to its goals and to the instruments by which they are achieved. | 4,564 | <h4>Engagement is the attempt to influence the behavior of China – it needs to be defined by both means and ends in the context of China to distinguish military strategy from diplomatic engagement</h4><p><strong>Finamore, 14</strong> – Doctoral Researcher at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and International Relations (Salvatore, <u>The EU, the US and China: Towards a New International Order?</u>, ed: Men and Shen, p. 111-113)</p><p>As the previous section illustrated, even a brief sketch of American and European experiences with respect to China's rise is sufficient to draw some key parallels in US and EU China policies, as well as to outline some of their main differences. In order to move beyond this contextual level and take the analysis further, however, it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capturing the main elements of their engagement strategies. To this end, this section proposes a framework based on socialization theory, which will serve to highlight the different policy instruments available to the EU and the US and the way they have been employed in pursuit of their specific engagement goals <u><mark>with respect to China</u>.<u> Constructing a framework for </mark>the study of <mark>engagement</mark>,</u> however, is a harder task than it would initially appear, not least because of the existence of profound disagreements in the academic literature over the meaning and scope of engagement as a foreign policy strategy (Resnick 2(H) 1: Suetlinger 2000. p. 17). Broadly speaking, <u>most <mark>scholars would agree</mark> that <mark>engagement refers to</mark> one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the <mark>attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes'</u></mark> (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000, p. I). In some more specific instances, it can also be understood as an approach through which established powers can deal with the emergence of new actors posing a threat to the international status quo (Schweller 1999). From this perspective, engagement could then be grouped within the same category as other foreign policy strategies, such as balancing, containment or appeasement. In fact, many commentators point in particular to the existence of shared traits between engagement and appeasement, with some even arguing that engagement is essentially nothing but a new and more acceptable term for a policy otherwise fallen into historical disrepute (Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81: George 1993, p. 61). According to Stephen Rock (2000. pp. 22-23), both engagement and appeasement rely on positive inducements to produce a relaxation of tensions and a change in the behavior of the target actor, with a potential scope for socialization and learning. The difference between these two concepts would rest mainly in the fact that <u>engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'.</u> From this point of view, appeasement would essentially constitute 'a subcategory of engagement'. According to other authors, <u>if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order'</u> (Schweller 1999, p. 14; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81), rather than simply aiming for more 'modest' goals such as tension-reduction and the avoidance of war (Resnick 2001, p. 557). <u>This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized</u> <u>by</u> some authors. Evan <u><mark>Resnick</u></mark> in particular <u>argues</u> that, as an ends-based definition, <u>the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization</u>. Instead, <u>he proposes</u> what he regards as <u>a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts</u> ... across multiple issue-areas' (Resnick 2001, p. 559). <u>Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement<strong>. However<mark>, overlooking </mark>its <mark>goals </mark>and <mark>focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of </mark>the analysis of <mark>engagement as a foreign policy strategy</mark>.</u></strong> In fact, at least since the time of Carl von Clausewitz, <u>strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means </u>(see Howard 2002, pp. 16 and 36<u>). This is <mark>true for</u> <u><strong>military strategy</strong>, </mark>which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends'</u> (Betts 2000, p. 5), <u>but it also holds true for strategy in general.</u> It follows that <u><strong>in order <mark>to</mark> <mark>analyze engagement</mark> as a foreign policy strategy, one <mark>needs to pay attention </mark>both <mark>to </mark>its <mark>goals and </mark>to <mark>the instruments </mark>by which they are achieved<mark>.</p></u></strong></mark> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 4 | 1,555,359 | 47 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,483 | Aff can’t solve within the time of their impacts—Afghan will always be unstable | Patel 2007 | Seema Patel, consultant for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS, leading an evaluation study of reconstruction efforts, “Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan” CSIS 2-23-2007 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070223_breakingpoint.pdf) | Even with full international support and sound policies and programs, Afghanistan in 10 years will likely still be a poor and underdeveloped country Sustained growth in the economy and trade will not provide enough jobs and steady income for Afghan families. The central government will struggle to retain legitimacy, to collect revenues Neighbors will meddle in Afghanistan’s domestic economy and politics | Even with full international support and sound policies and programs, Afghanistan in 10 years will still be poor and underdeveloped Sustained growth and trade will not provide enough jobs and steady income for Afghan families. The central government will struggle to retain legitimacy, to collect revenues Neighbors will meddle in Afghanistan’s domestic economy and politics | Even with full international support and sound policies and programs, Afghanistan in 10 years will likely still be a poor and underdeveloped country. Sustained growth in the economy and trade will not provide enough jobs and steady income for Afghan families. The central government will struggle to retain legitimacy, to collect revenues for the sustenance of its military and bureaucracy, to eliminate corruption, to deliver social and judicial services, and to extend its presence to the whole country. Pockets of territory will remain or fall under the influence of local strongmen, and Afghans will rely on local and tribal institutions to fill the vacuums left by the state. Historical social divisions between tribes, ethnicities, and regions will persist, and populations will remain isolated from one another and from the center. Neighbors will meddle in Afghanistan’s domestic economy and politics. | 908 | <h4><strong>Aff can’t solve within the time of their impacts—Afghan will always be unstable</h4><p></strong>Seema <strong><mark>Patel</strong></mark>, consultant for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS, leading an evaluation study of reconstruction efforts, “Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan” CSIS 2-23-<strong><mark>2007</strong></mark> (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070223_breakingpoint.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Even with full international support and sound policies and programs</strong>, Afghanistan in 10 years will</mark> likely <mark>still be</mark> a <mark>poor and</mark> <mark>underdeveloped</mark> country</u>. <u><mark>Sustained growth</mark> in the economy <mark>and trade will not provide enough jobs and steady income for Afghan families. The central government will struggle to retain legitimacy, to collect revenues</u></mark> for the sustenance of its military and bureaucracy, to eliminate corruption, to deliver social and judicial services, and to extend its presence to the whole country. Pockets of territory will remain or fall under the influence of local strongmen, and Afghans will rely on local and tribal institutions to fill the vacuums left by the state. Historical social divisions between tribes, ethnicities, and regions will persist, and populations will remain isolated from one another and from the center. <u><mark>Neighbors will meddle in Afghanistan’s domestic economy and politics</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Indo-Pak | 1,560,840 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,484 | Flight from an anti-black world is activated through macropolitical changes – freedom is metaphysical cognition meaning institutional engagement complements their political strategy, it doesn’t supplant it. Material theories of social position double turn with their theory, which is a reason to prefer framework over the af. | Roberts 15 | Roberts, Associate Professor of Africana Studies @ Williams College, 15 | 118-121)
Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee through non-fleeting acts of reordering of the state of society and constitutionalism It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped by cognition, metaphysics egalitarianism hope and the experiences of masses in political order Condition, not place, is vital marronage operates against the presumption that slaves exist in a state of “social death.” The idea of social death denies the significance of psychology to freedom rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside the actions and intentions of enslaving agents It cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom thereby offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the constitution of the self and drastic alterations of social structures. This would shatter the assumptions of European human sciences the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing Rather than an inert state of social death the zone of nonbeing is As loathsome as life inside this zone might be, it is a zone of hope Flight always exists as a potentiality The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, Fanon detects there how the experience of the black under the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures unfreedom choices and vision of an alter native future The “Look” fixes Fanon, unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racis His point is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization however counterintuitive or nauseating, the zone can induce action The zone of nonbeing harbors the prospect for revolution among the unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing life options. | Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee through non-fleeting acts reordering of the state and constitutionalism by cognition, metaphysics Condition is vital marronage operates against presumption slaves exist in “social death.” social death denies significance of psychology to freedom, rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside actions enslaving agents. It cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the self and alterations of social structures. As loathsome as life inside this zone it is a zone of hope Flight always exists The “Look” fixes Fanon unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language His point is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization however counterintuitive the zone can induce action zone of nonbeing harbors prospect for revolution among unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing options | (Neil, “Freedom as Marronage” pp. 118-121)
Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee slavery through non-fleeting acts of naming, vèvè architectonics, liberation, reordering of the state of society, and constitutionalism. It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped by cognition, metaphysics, egalitarianism, hope for refuge, and the experiences of masses in a social and political order. Condition, not place, is vital to its phenomenology In the beginning of our study, we discerned how marronage operates against the presumption that slaves exist in a state of “social death.” In the language of vodou, social death is the life of a zombie, a being roaming the earth with glazed eyes, lacking the ability to control its actions, an entity neither dead nor alive. Social death is compatible with maintaining that all slave revolts inevitably enter into a maroon dimension and that freedom is the slave’s response to powerlessness, dishonor, and natal alienation under mastery. The idea of social death denies the significance of psychology to freedom, rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside the actions and intentions of enslaving agents. It also cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom, thereby offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the constitution of the self and drastic alterations of social structures. Prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century European thinkers, in cluding Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Alfred Adler, and Jacques Lacan, opposed the bracketing of the psychological in interpreta lions of child, adolescent, and adult behavior and actions. Nietzsche went so far as to categorize psychology as a prima philosophiac and the foremost human science beyond good and evil,” Before the Martinican philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, the fields of psychoanalysis and psychopathology shared a common limiting epistemology inherited from the Enlightenment: the reduction of individual psychological experiences to universal human attributes. In the mid-twentieth century, Fanon reshaped psychological inquiry by placing it alongside the traditions of existential phenomenology and Ca ribbean thought. This would shatter the assumptions of European human sciences and leave, well into the twenty-first century, residual questions for the philosophical conjectures of adherents of the social death trope who have sought to overturn Western bifurcations of negative and positive the orizations of freedom while subordinating the psychological to statistical insignificance. Fanon once wrote of composing ideas that were not to he construed as timeless truths. Hut his revelations turned out to be of tians- historical import, and they can be read for our purposes backward into the Haitian Revolution. Fanon argues in Black Skin, White Masks that the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing” (zone de non-être; see fig. 1). This hellish cartographic space is physical and psychological, and it structures personal expression as well as the state of society. Rather than an inert state of social death, the zone of nonbeing is “an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge.”” As loathsome as life inside this zone of enslavement might be, it is a zone of hope and natality. Flight always exists as a potentiality constrained by circumstance. The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, which Fanon likens in his final treatise, The Wretched of the Earth, to that of the dannes (the damned), foments the trepidations and aspirations of the enslaved. The famous fifth chapter of Black Skin, mistranslated into English for decades as The Fact of Blackness,” is properly translated The Lived Experience of the Black” (L’expérience vécue du Noir). Fanon detects there how the experience of the black Antillean under slavery and the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures her unfreedom, choices, and vision of an alter native future. He laments an experience of a walk in France when, after having departed Martinique for the metropole, a young white child, fearful of Fanon’s presence by virtue of his blackness, points to him and shouts; “Look, a Negro (Nègre)”' The child’s parent replies, “Ssh! You’ll make him angry Don’t pay attention to him, monsieur, he doesn’t realize you’re pust as civilized as we are”3 The “Look” fixes Fanon, the black over-determined externally because of the epidermal racial schema, the black unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language rooted in the political philosophy of white supremacy. Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racism not only in late colonialism, but also in transatlantic slavery. His point, though, is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization. Fanon examines the zone of nonbeing, determining that, however counterintuitive or nauseating, the zone prepares Ithe human to act,” can induce man to be actional,” and is a region ripe for an authentic upheaval.’5 Whether through négritude, Marxism, sources of the self, or another system beyond Fanon’s considerations in Black Skin, the axiom is clear: The zone of nonbeing harbors the prospect for revolution among the unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing life options. | 5,414 | <h4>Flight from an anti-black world is activated through macropolitical changes – freedom is metaphysical cognition meaning institutional engagement complements their political strategy, it doesn’t supplant it. Material theories of social position double turn with their theory, which is a reason to prefer framework over the af. </h4><p><strong>Roberts</strong>, Associate Professor of Africana Studies @ Williams College, <strong>15</strong> </p><p>(Neil, “Freedom as Marronage” pp. <u><strong>118-121)</p><p></strong><mark>Sociogenic marronage denotes <strong>macropolitical flight</u></strong> <u>whereby agents flee</u></mark> slavery <u><strong><mark>through non-fleeting acts</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> naming, vèvè architectonics, liberation, <u><strong><mark>reordering of the state</mark> of society</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>constitutionalism</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped <mark>by <strong>cognition</strong>,</u> <u><strong>metaphysics</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>egalitarianism</u></strong>,<mark> <u><strong></mark>hope</u></strong> for refuge, <u>and the experiences of masses in</u> a social and <u><strong>political order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Condition</mark>, not place, <mark>is vital</u></strong></mark> to its phenomenology In the beginning of our study, we discerned how <u><mark>marronage operates <strong>against </mark>the <mark>presumption</strong> </mark>that <strong><mark>slaves exist in </mark>a state of <mark>“social death.”</mark> </u></strong>In the language of vodou, social death is the life of a zombie, a being roaming the earth with glazed eyes, lacking the ability to control its actions, an entity neither dead nor alive. Social death is compatible with maintaining that all slave revolts inevitably enter into a maroon dimension and that freedom is the slave’s response to powerlessness, dishonor, and natal alienation under mastery. <u>The idea of <mark>social death denies </mark>the <mark>significance of <strong>psychology to freedom</u></strong>, <u>rendering it unable</mark> <mark>to explain how slaves are able to become <strong>free physically outside</u></strong></mark> <u>the <mark>actions </mark>and <strong>intentions of <mark>enslaving agents</u></strong>. <u>It</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>cannot explain</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the metaphysics of freedom</u></mark>, <u>thereby <mark>offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the </mark>constitution of the <mark>self and <strong></mark>drastic <mark>alterations of social structures.</mark> </u></strong>Prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century European thinkers, in cluding Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Alfred Adler, and Jacques Lacan, opposed the bracketing of the psychological in interpreta lions of child, adolescent, and adult behavior and actions. Nietzsche went so far as to categorize psychology as a prima philosophiac and the foremost human science beyond good and evil,” Before the Martinican philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, the fields of psychoanalysis and psychopathology shared a common limiting epistemology inherited from the Enlightenment: the reduction of individual psychological experiences to universal human attributes. In the mid-twentieth century, Fanon reshaped psychological inquiry by placing it alongside the traditions of existential phenomenology and Ca ribbean thought. <u><strong>This would shatter the assumptions</u></strong> <u>of European human sciences</u> and leave, well into the twenty-first century, residual questions for the philosophical conjectures of adherents of the social death trope who have sought to overturn Western bifurcations of negative and positive the orizations of freedom while subordinating the psychological to statistical insignificance. Fanon once wrote of composing ideas that were not to he construed as timeless truths. Hut his revelations turned out to be of tians- historical import, and they can be read for our purposes backward into the Haitian Revolution. Fanon argues in Black Skin, White Masks that <u>the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing</u>” (zone de non-être; see fig. 1). This hellish cartographic space is physical and psychological, and it structures personal expression as well as the state of society. <u>Rather than an inert state of <strong>social death</u></strong>, <u>the zone of nonbeing is </u>“an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge.”” <u><mark>As loathsome as life inside this zone</u></mark> of enslavement <u><strong>might be, <mark>it is a zone of hope</mark> </u></strong>and natality. <u><strong><mark>Flight always exists</u></strong> <u></mark>as a potentiality </u>constrained by circumstance. <u>The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, </u>which Fanon likens in his final treatise, The Wretched of the Earth, to that of the dannes (the damned), foments the trepidations and aspirations of the enslaved. The famous fifth chapter of Black Skin, mistranslated into English for decades as The Fact of Blackness,” is properly translated The Lived Experience of the Black” (L’expérience vécue du Noir). <u>Fanon detects there how the experience of the black</u> Antillean <u>under</u> slavery and <u>the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures</u> her <u>unfreedom</u>, <u>choices</u>, <u>and vision of an alter native future</u>. He laments an experience of a walk in France when, after having departed Martinique for the metropole, a young white child, fearful of Fanon’s presence by virtue of his blackness, points to him and shouts; “Look, a Negro (Nègre)”' The child’s parent replies, “Ssh! You’ll make him angry Don’t pay attention to him, monsieur, he doesn’t realize you’re pust as civilized as we are”3 <u><strong><mark>The “Look” fixes Fanon</mark>,</u></strong> the black over-determined externally because of the epidermal racial schema, the black <u><mark>unable to avoid the effects of <strong>another’s learned language</u></strong></mark> rooted in the political philosophy of white supremacy. <u>Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racis</u>m not only in late colonialism, but also in transatlantic slavery. <u><mark>His point</u></mark>, though, <u><mark>is to exhibit an edict that <strong>transcends periodization</u></strong></mark>. Fanon examines the zone of nonbeing, determining that, <u><mark>however <strong>counterintuitive</strong> </mark>or <strong>nauseating</strong>,</u> <u><strong><mark>the zone</mark> </u></strong>prepares Ithe human to act,” <u><strong><mark>can induce</mark> </u></strong>man to be <u><strong><mark>action</u></strong></mark>al,” and is a region ripe for an authentic upheaval.’5 Whether through négritude, Marxism, sources of the self, or another system beyond Fanon’s considerations in Black Skin, the axiom is clear: <u><strong>The <mark>zone of nonbeing harbors </mark>the <mark>prospect for revolution among </mark>the <mark>unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing </mark>life <mark>options</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NR | Case | Topicality | 40,798 | 26 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,485 | -- Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality (Blue Highlighting) | Jourde 6 – | Jourde 6 – Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal (Cedric, 2006, “1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush,” Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3) | Relations between states are constructed upon representations Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant' they are founded on each actor's cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act that reality as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable , making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable identifying how a state represents another state helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded . the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'. | Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality representations are not objective they are founded on each actor's cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act that reality. representations constrain and enable policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable identifying how a state represents another helps to understand why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other excluded. | Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'. | 2,760 | <h4>-- Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality (Blue Highlighting) </h4><p><strong>Jourde 6 – <u></strong>Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal (Cedric, 2006, “1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush,” Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3)</p><p>Relations between states are</u>, at least in part, <u>constructed upon representations</u>. <u><mark>Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality</u></mark>, <u>through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues</u>.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. <u>It must be clear that <mark>representations are not objective</u></mark> <u>or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'</u>.3 In other words, <u><mark>they are founded on each actor's</u></mark> and group of actors' <u><mark>cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints</u><strong>.</strong></mark> <u>Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world</u>, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. <u><mark>Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act that reality</u>.</mark> In other words, <u>as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, <mark>representations constrain and enable </mark>the</u> <u><mark>policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states</u>; <u>they limit the courses of action that are <strong>politically thinkable</u></strong></mark> and imaginable<u>, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable</u>.4 Accordingly, <u><mark>identifying how a state represents another</mark> state </u>or non-state actor <u><mark>helps to understand</mark> how and <mark>why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other</mark> policies have been <mark>excluded</u>.</mark> To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum<u>. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'. </p></u> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 40,939 | 55 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,486 | B – best vision of the topic – t is an attempt to create the best debate – marginal differences in competitive equity should be reason to reject the team – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>B – best vision of the topic – t is an attempt to create the best debate – marginal differences in competitive equity should be reason to reject the team – </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | Reasonabil | 1,560,841 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,487 | It’s a template for future growth in a consumption-led model – key to economic reforms. | Lehr 15 | Lehr 15 [Deborah Lehr (Senior Fellow at the Paulson Institute, was deputy assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative and Asia director at the National Security Council, London School of Economics and Political Science), 2-13-2015, "Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters," Paulson Institute, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/] | China’s WTO accession provided a ten-year road map for opening and reform of China’s economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition. And both countries benefited from this transparency. Yet that ten-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard bilateral investment treaty can fill the resulting gap. It would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China Chinese actual investment in the United States is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the United States might open the doors to more money coming in US investment in China no doubt would increase Xi has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda China’s large-scale state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The United States has a unique opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth. More engagement with China can lead to positive outcomes for both countries. | WTO provided a ten-year road map b i t can fill the gap. It would bring in investments That would help China transform its economic model away from export led growth to a consumption based model. Such a treaty would clarify regulations transparent re open the doors to more money U S has a opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth | Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. China’s WTO accession provided a ten-year road map for opening and reform of China’s economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition. And both countries benefited from this transparency. Low cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement. And US exports to China rose by 533 percent since China’s accession. Yet that ten-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard bilateral investment treaty can fill the resulting gap. It would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese government’s “going out” initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn, would create jobs and opportunities for American workers. There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China. So far, Chinese actual investment in the United States, less than $4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs. US investment in China, more than $50 billion, no doubt would increase as the playing field becomes more level. President Xi has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda; just as Premier Zhu Rongji had done at the time of China’s WTO accession. China’s large-scale state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The United States has a unique opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth. More engagement with China can lead to positive outcomes for both countries. Indeed, we think it’s crucial. | 2,597 | <h4>It’s a template for future growth in a consumption-led model – key to economic reforms.</h4><p><strong>Lehr 15 </strong>[Deborah Lehr (Senior Fellow at the Paulson Institute, was deputy assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative and Asia director at the National Security Council, London School of Economics and Political Science), 2-13-2015, "Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters," Paulson Institute, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/]</p><p>Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. <u><strong>China’s <mark>WTO</mark> accession <mark>provided a ten-year road map</mark> for opening and reform of China’s economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition. And both countries benefited from this transparency. </u></strong>Low cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement. And US exports to China rose by 533 percent since China’s accession. <u><strong>Yet that ten-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard <mark>b</mark>ilateral <mark>i</mark>nvestment <mark>t</mark>reaty <mark>can fill the</mark> resulting <mark>gap. It would</mark> bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening of the market would <mark>bring in investments</mark>, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>That</mark> in turn <mark>would help China </mark>achieve its ambitious plan to <mark>transform its economic model away from export led growth to a</mark> more <mark>consumption based model. Such a treaty would</mark> also help <mark>clarify regulations</mark> for Chinese companies investing in the United States. </u></strong>And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese government’s “going out” initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn, would create jobs and opportunities for American workers. <u><strong>There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China</u></strong>. So far, <u><strong>Chinese actual investment in the United States</u></strong>, less than $4 billion in 2014, <u><strong>is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, <mark>transparent re</mark>gulations about investment in the United States might <mark>open the doors to more money</mark> coming in</u></strong>, creating new jobs. <u><strong>US investment in China</u></strong>, more than $50 billion, <u><strong>no doubt would increase</u></strong> as the playing field becomes more level. President <u><strong>Xi has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda</u></strong>; just as Premier Zhu Rongji had done at the time of China’s WTO accession. <u><strong>China’s large-scale state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has a</mark> unique <mark>opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth</mark>. More engagement with China can lead to positive outcomes for both countries. </u></strong>Indeed, we think it’s crucial.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 160,882 | 16 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,488 | Diplomatic is categorically distinct from the military | Lee 12 | Lee 12 – Instructor, Department of Military & Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy (Jeongseok, “Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China” Available Online at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_18064.pdf) | Engagement is defined as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the enhancement of contacts with that state Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic contacts e.g. elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings military contacts e.g. military exchange, joint training or exercise, confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng economic contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs | Engagement is the attempt to influence behavior of a state Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings military military exchange confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng), | The Seventh option is to engage with the ascending power. Engagement is defined as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas.” (Resnick 2001: 559) Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic contacts (e.g. extension and elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings, etc.), military contacts (e.g. military exchange, joint training or exercise, confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng), economic contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies), and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs). Through these forms of interactions, minor powers can try to induce its target to more moderate and peaceful path of ascendance. Although secondary states’ influence over shaping perceptions and behaviors of rising power is not as powerful as great powers,’ engagement is a considerable option. If ascending state’s thinking and behavior can be altered to a more favorable direction even to the slightest degree, it is worth to attempt because it does not require significant compensations nor costs, and it does not risk provoking antagonism. | 1,302 | <h4>Diplomatic is categorically distinct from the military</h4><p><strong>Lee 12 </strong>– Instructor, Department of Military & Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy (Jeongseok, “Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China” Available Online at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_18064.pdf)</p><p>The Seventh option is to engage with the ascending power. <u><mark>Engagement is</mark> defined as “<mark>the attempt to <strong>influence</mark> the </strong>political <strong><mark>behavior of a</mark> target <mark>state</strong></mark> through the</u> comprehensive establishment and <u>enhancement of contacts with that state</u> across multiple issue-areas.” (Resnick 2001: 559) <u><mark>Instruments of engagement policy</u></mark> <u><mark>include <strong>diplomatic</strong></mark> contacts</u> (<u>e.g.</u> extension and <u><mark>elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings</u></mark>, etc.), <u><strong><mark>military</strong></mark> contacts</u> (<u>e.g. <mark>military exchange</mark>, joint training or exercise, <mark>confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng</u>), <u><strong></mark>economic</strong> contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies</u>), <u>and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs</u>). Through these forms of interactions, minor powers can try to induce its target to more moderate and peaceful path of ascendance. Although secondary states’ influence over shaping perceptions and behaviors of rising power is not as powerful as great powers,’ engagement is a considerable option. If ascending state’s thinking and behavior can be altered to a more favorable direction even to the slightest degree, it is worth to attempt because it does not require significant compensations nor costs, and it does not risk provoking antagonism. </p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 4 | 174,785 | 65 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,489 | Decline causes Pakistani insability and causes South and Central Asian instability --- makes IP conflict likely | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS | While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a l late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people are still premodern, rural and defined by tribal identities The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of separate national identity the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan’s consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state or a “state” with no centralized government at all The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China , America’s decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus increasing regional instability or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to gain the regional upper hand | Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of national identity, the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained profound antipathy a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan Pakistan could transform into a radical Islamic state Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability America’s decline would increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan increasing regional instability or wider conflict | Pakistan While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a professional late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people— despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban population— are still premodern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain’s departure from India. The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of separate national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy for each other. Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability. And a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan’s consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, or a “state” with no centralized government at all. The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran. The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China. In the above circumstances, America’s decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan. China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus potentially increasing regional instability. Ultimately, an unstable peace or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to exploit Pakistan’s instability in order to gain the regional upper hand. | 1,912 | <h4>Decline causes Pakistani insability and causes South and Central Asian instability --- makes IP conflict likely</h4><p><strong>Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS</p><p></strong>Pakistan <u>While <mark>Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons</mark> and is held together by a </u>professiona<u>l late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people</u>— despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban population— <u>are still premodern, rural</u>, <u>and</u> largely <u>defined by</u> regional and <u>tribal identities</u>. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain’s departure from India. <u>The resulting <mark>conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of</mark> separate <mark>national identity</u>,</mark> while <u><strong><mark>the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained</mark> a shared and <mark>profound antipathy</u></strong></mark> for each other. <u>Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability</u>. And <u><strong><mark>a decline in US power would reduce</mark> <mark>America’s ability to aid Pakistan</mark>’s consolidation and development. <mark>Pakistan could transform into a</mark> state run by the military, or a <mark>radical Islamic state</u></strong></mark>, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, <u>or a “state” with no centralized government at all</u>. <u>The worst-case scenarios are that <mark>Pakistan <strong>devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism</strong></mark> or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran</u>. <u><mark>The latter could in <strong>turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability</mark> of concern both to Russia and to China</u></strong>. In the above circumstances<u><strong>, <mark>America’s decline would</mark> also <mark>increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and</mark> could <mark>intensify Indian temptations to</mark> <mark>undermine Pakistan</u></strong></mark>. <u>China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely,</u> <u>thus</u> potentially <u><mark>increasing regional instability</u></mark>. Ultimately, an unstable peace <u><mark>or</mark> a <mark>wider conflict</mark> in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses</u> to exploit Pakistan’s instability in order <u>to gain the regional upper hand</u>.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Indo-Pak | 424,451 | 10 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,490 | Only resistance to security logic can generate genuine political thought | Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6] | Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6] | The only way out is to eschew the logic of security altogether the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' will make it hard to do. security has become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably , debates that animate political life. it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? maybe there is no hole The task is to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. to keep harping on about insecurity is to blind ourselves to alternatives To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, learning to tolerate the uncertainties, that come with being human; 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."' | The only way out is to eschew the logic of security altogether constant iteration of 'this is an insecure world' will make it hard to do security marginalises all else, most notably debates that animate political life it suppresses all issues and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security' The task is to fight for an alternative political language to keep harping about insecurity is to blind ourselves to alternatives To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good it requires accepting insecurity is part of the human condition learning to tolerate uncertainties 'securitizing' requires us to be brave enough to return the gift | The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."' | 5,274 | <h4>Only resistance to security logic can generate genuine political thought </h4><p><strong>Neocleous 8 – <u>Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></strong><mark>The only way out</mark> </u>of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish,<u> <mark>is</mark> </u>perhaps<u> <strong><mark>to eschew the logic of security altogether</u></strong></mark> - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that<u> the <mark>constant iteration of </mark>the refrain <mark>'this is an insecure world'</u></mark> and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another <u><mark>will</mark> </u>also<u> <mark>make it hard to do</mark>.</u> But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because <u><mark>security </mark>has </u>now<u> become so all-encompassing that it<strong> <mark>marginalises all else, most notably</u></strong></mark> the constructive conflicts<u>, <strong><mark>debates</strong></mark> </u>and discussions<u> <strong><mark>that animate political life</mark>.</strong> </u>The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing <u><mark>it suppresses all issues</mark> of power <mark>and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security'</mark>,</u> despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: <u>if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind?</u> But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: <u><strong>maybe there is no hole</u></strong>."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>real<u> <mark>task is</mark> </u>not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but<u> <mark>to fight for an <strong>alternative political language</strong></mark> which </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u>does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. </u>That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.</u> For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then <u><mark>to keep harping </mark>on <mark>about insecurity</mark> </u>and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) <u><mark>is to <strong>blind ourselves</strong> to</mark> </u>the possibility of building real<u> <mark>alternatives</mark> </u>to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <u><mark>To situate ourselves against security politics would</u></mark> allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a <strong>different conception of the good</mark>.</u></strong> We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; <mark>it requires accepting </mark>that <mark>insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u><mark>learning to tolerate</mark> the <mark>uncertainties</mark>, </u>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u> that come with being human;</u> it requires accepting that <u><mark>'securitizing'</mark> an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but <strong>bracketing it out</strong> and handing it to the state; <strong>it <mark>requires us to be brave enough to return the gift</mark>."'</p></u></strong> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 2,525 | 266 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,491 | Violation – the aff is military engagement, not diplomatic | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Violation – the aff is military engagement, not diplomatic</h4> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 4 | 1,560,842 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,492 | Chinese economic decline increases military aggression – rally around the flag | Addison 9 | Addison 9 [Jennifer Addison, citing Jacqueline Newmyer (president and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group, worked on projects related to East Asia for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, has held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard) “Economic Crisis: Impact on Chinese Military Modernization”, Center for National Policy, April 2009, http://cnponline.org/p/economic-crisis-impact-on-chinese-military-modernization/] | the Center for National Policy hosted a discussion entitled “Economic Crisis: Impact on Chinese Military Modernization”, featuring Dr. Jacqueline Newmyer and Kristen Gunness, a China advisor for the U.S. Department of the Navy Newmyer began by forecasting two potential scenarios that China could face as a result of the recent economic downturn: The first is that the crisis does not ultimately disrupt China’s strong economic growth The second is that the crisis leads both to a dramatic downturn of the Chinese economy and thus a drastic change in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. The point is that in both scenarios China would be likely to increase defense spending and undertake a more assertive stance in its foreign policy, leading to complications for the United States and its regional allies. China has doubled its defense spending in recent years countries such as Japan and India are becoming increasingly worried about the effects of Chinese arms exports on their own national interests. that the economic downturn would have little effect on China’s defense policy. is plausible, given China’s substantial treasury reserves, its insulation from the global economy relative to the United States, and its quick enactment of a government stimulus package. increases in defense spending could be seen as an expedient way for the CCP to stimulate the economy without relinquishing party control. If the second scenario came about, however, the economic crisis would have a severe effect on the Chinese economy. Because the basis of the Chinese government’s legitimacy has been its ability to facilitate rapid economic growth, a sharp and prolonged downturn could trigger widespread social and political unrest. the natural interest of the government would be to look for external enemies to blame the crisis on (be they an interventionalist America, and emerging India, or a historically cantankerous Japan), and embark on a more belligerent foreign policy as a result. Either way there is an increased likelihood that the economic downturn will lead China to adopt a more assertive defense and foreign policy, causing friction with its neighbors and with the major powers in the region. economic crisis appears to have had little effect on the PLA’s funding. China issued an official 17.6 percent increase in its defense budget in 2008, and is announcing an additional 14.9 percent increase in 2009. Much of these increases are going towards a substantial modernization program designed to transform he PLA from a primarily “personnel intensive” force to one that is increasingly “technology intensive.” | crisis leads to a drastic change in Chinese domestic and foreign policies China would be likely to increase defense spending and undertake a more assertive stance in its foreign policy increases in defense spending could be seen as an expedient way for the CCP to stimulate the economy without relinquishing party control. the government would look for enemies to blame America, and India, or Japan mbark on a more belligerent foreign policy economic downturn will lead to adopt a more assertive defense causing friction with major powers | On April 8, 2009, the Center for National Policy hosted a discussion entitled “Economic Crisis: Impact on Chinese Military Modernization”, featuring Dr. Jacqueline Newmyer, president and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group and Kristen Gunness, a China advisor for the U.S. Department of the Navy, as keynote speakers. Before running Long Term Strategy, Dr. Newmyer worked on projects related to East Asia for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, has held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard and has published articles on energy security. Ms. Gunness has spent significant time working in the private sector as a business consultant focusing on China issues, and has spent time studying in China. Jacqueline Newmyer began the discussion by forecasting two potential scenarios that China could face as a result of the recent economic downturn: The first is that the crisis, while difficult, does not ultimately disrupt China’s strong economic growth and thus does not lead to major changes in Chinese policy. The second is that the crisis leads both to a dramatic downturn of the Chinese economy and thus a drastic change in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. The point Newmyer ultimately makes, however, is that in both scenarios China would be likely to increase defense spending and undertake a more assertive stance in its foreign policy, leading to complications for the United States and its regional allies. Observe China’s past actions: Depending on which analysis is used, China has doubled its defense spending in recent years; a feat un-replicated by other industrialized nations for many decades. Although the generally accepted rationale for such increases is to secure it’s position vis-à-vis Taiwan, its investment in hi-tech weaponry and a green-to-blue water navy suggests that its aims are much broader than the simple maintenance of a military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Pursuant to this expanded geopolitical role, China announced plans to develop three aircraft carriers by 2020, and has made significant advances in long-range logistics and air-to-air refueling. China has also upgraded its space-based reconnaissance program, anti-satellite capabilities, anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and new submarines which are capable of launching sea-based ballistic missiles. Even more worrisome is notion that the US presence in Asia is on the relative decline. The current US fleet is half the size it was under Regan, giving China the largest combat fleet by numbers in the region. Although the Chinese fleet is technologically inferior to its American counterpart, this emerging trend is not lost on United States’ allies in the region. Thus, countries such as Japan and India are becoming increasingly worried about the effects of Chinese arms exports on their own national interests. Although Chinese hi-tech arms exports were once almost nonexistent, they are now poised to create a defense conglomerate that could rival British Aerospace by 2017. . Elaborating more on the economic picture and the first scenario, Newmyer explored the possibility that the economic downturn would have little effect on China’s defense policy. This scenario is plausible, given China’s substantial treasury reserves, its insulation from the global economy relative to the United States, and its quick enactment of a government stimulus package. Nevertheless, however, Newmyer raises serious questions about the efficacy of China’s stimulus program, given its focus on short-term infrastructure projects, and prevalent use of state-owned banks with a history of inefficient resource allocation. Although Western analysts argue that China should place more emphasis on domestic consumption over foreign exports, such dramatic political and structural changes are extraordinarily difficult to make. Thus, Newmyer predicts that China would continue to focus on exports, including a further increase in arms sales to buyers in the Middle East. Along the same lines, increases in defense spending could be seen as an expedient way for the CCP to stimulate the economy without relinquishing party control. If the second scenario came about, however, the economic crisis would have a severe effect on the Chinese economy. Because the basis of the Chinese government’s legitimacy has been its ability to facilitate rapid economic growth, a sharp and prolonged downturn could trigger widespread social and political unrest. Indeed, the number of incidents of social unrest have increased five-fold from 2005 to 2006, and doubled for the second time in three years in 2008. Newmyer argues that the natural interest of the government would be to look for external enemies to blame the crisis on (be they an interventionalist America, and emerging India, or a historically cantankerous Japan), and embark on a more belligerent foreign policy as a result. Either way, she concludes, there is an increased likelihood that the economic downturn will lead China to adopt a more assertive defense and foreign policy, causing friction with its neighbors and with the major powers in the region. Kristen Gunness continued the conversation by discussing the impact of the economic crisis on the PLA and the Chinese defense budget. On a superficial level, Gunness notes that the economic crisis appears to have had little effect on the PLA’s funding. China issued an official 17.6 percent increase in its defense budget in 2008, and is announcing an additional 14.9 percent increase in 2009. Although China’s official defense budget stands at $70.3 billion, a 2009 DoD report put the figure somewhere between $105 to $150 billion. Much of these increases are going towards a substantial modernization program designed to transform he PLA from a primarily “personnel intensive” force to one that is increasingly “technology intensive.” This transformation not only requires a complete overhaul of the PLA’s activities, institutions, military doctrines, and officer corps, it also requires that PLA to take-on missions outside of its comfort zone of defending the Chinese mainland. To this end, the PLA has contributed troops to peacekeeping missions, sent ships to the Horn of Africa to combat piracy, and has engaged in disaster relief missions such as those surrounding the Sichuan earthquake in spring 2008. | 6,329 | <h4>Chinese economic decline increases military aggression – rally around the flag </h4><p><strong>Addison 9</strong> [Jennifer Addison, citing Jacqueline Newmyer (president and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group, worked on projects related to East Asia for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, has held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard) “Economic Crisis: Impact on Chinese Military Modernization”, Center for National Policy, April 2009, http://cnponline.org/p/economic-crisis-impact-on-chinese-military-modernization/]</p><p>On April 8, 2009, <u><strong>the Center for National Policy hosted a discussion entitled “Economic Crisis: Impact on Chinese Military Modernization”, featuring Dr. Jacqueline Newmyer</u></strong>, president and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group <u><strong>and Kristen Gunness, a China advisor for the U.S. Department of the Navy</u></strong>, as keynote speakers. Before running Long Term Strategy, Dr. Newmyer worked on projects related to East Asia for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, has held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard and has published articles on energy security. Ms. Gunness has spent significant time working in the private sector as a business consultant focusing on China issues, and has spent time studying in China. Jacqueline <u><strong>Newmyer began</u></strong> the discussion <u><strong>by forecasting two potential scenarios that China could face as a result of the recent economic downturn: The first is that the crisis</u></strong>, while difficult, <u><strong>does not ultimately disrupt China’s strong economic growth</u></strong> and thus does not lead to major changes in Chinese policy. <u><strong>The second is that the <mark>crisis leads</mark> both <mark>to</mark> a dramatic downturn of the Chinese economy and thus <mark>a drastic change in Chinese domestic and foreign policies</mark>. The point</u></strong> Newmyer ultimately makes, however, <u><strong>is that in both scenarios <mark>China would be likely to increase defense spending and undertake a more assertive stance in its foreign policy</mark>, leading to complications for the United States and its regional allies. </u></strong>Observe China’s past actions: Depending on which analysis is used, <u><strong>China has doubled its defense spending in recent years</u></strong>; a feat un-replicated by other industrialized nations for many decades. Although the generally accepted rationale for such increases is to secure it’s position vis-à-vis Taiwan, its investment in hi-tech weaponry and a green-to-blue water navy suggests that its aims are much broader than the simple maintenance of a military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Pursuant to this expanded geopolitical role, China announced plans to develop three aircraft carriers by 2020, and has made significant advances in long-range logistics and air-to-air refueling. China has also upgraded its space-based reconnaissance program, anti-satellite capabilities, anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and new submarines which are capable of launching sea-based ballistic missiles. Even more worrisome is notion that the US presence in Asia is on the relative decline. The current US fleet is half the size it was under Regan, giving China the largest combat fleet by numbers in the region. Although the Chinese fleet is technologically inferior to its American counterpart, this emerging trend is not lost on United States’ allies in the region. Thus, <u><strong>countries such as Japan and India are becoming increasingly worried about the effects of Chinese arms exports on their own national interests.</u></strong> Although Chinese hi-tech arms exports were once almost nonexistent, they are now poised to create a defense conglomerate that could rival British Aerospace by 2017. . Elaborating more on the economic picture and the first scenario, Newmyer explored the possibility <u><strong>that the economic downturn would have little effect on China’s defense policy.</u></strong> This scenario <u><strong>is plausible, given China’s substantial treasury reserves, its insulation from the global economy relative to the United States, and its quick enactment of a government stimulus package.</u></strong> Nevertheless, however, Newmyer raises serious questions about the efficacy of China’s stimulus program, given its focus on short-term infrastructure projects, and prevalent use of state-owned banks with a history of inefficient resource allocation. Although Western analysts argue that China should place more emphasis on domestic consumption over foreign exports, such dramatic political and structural changes are extraordinarily difficult to make. Thus, Newmyer predicts that China would continue to focus on exports, including a further increase in arms sales to buyers in the Middle East. Along the same lines, <u><strong><mark>increases in defense spending could be seen as an expedient way for the CCP to stimulate the economy without relinquishing party control.</mark> If the second scenario came about, however, the economic crisis would have a severe effect on the Chinese economy. Because the basis of the Chinese government’s legitimacy has been its ability to facilitate rapid economic growth, a sharp and prolonged downturn could trigger widespread social and political unrest.</u></strong> Indeed, the number of incidents of social unrest have increased five-fold from 2005 to 2006, and doubled for the second time in three years in 2008. Newmyer argues that <u><strong>the natural interest of <mark>the government would</mark> be to <mark>look for</mark> external <mark>enemies to blame</mark> the crisis on (be they an interventionalist <mark>America, and</mark> emerging <mark>India, or</mark> a historically cantankerous <mark>Japan</mark>), and e<mark>mbark on a more belligerent foreign policy</mark> as a result. Either way</u></strong>, she concludes, <u><strong>there is an increased likelihood that the <mark>economic downturn will lead</mark> China <mark>to</mark> <mark>adopt a more assertive defense</mark> and foreign policy, <mark>causing friction with</mark> its neighbors and with the <mark>major powers </mark>in the region. </u></strong>Kristen Gunness continued the conversation by discussing the impact of the economic crisis on the PLA and the Chinese defense budget. On a superficial level, Gunness notes that the <u><strong>economic crisis appears to have had little effect on the PLA’s funding. China issued an official 17.6 percent increase in its defense budget in 2008, and is announcing an additional 14.9 percent increase in 2009.</u></strong> Although China’s official defense budget stands at $70.3 billion, a 2009 DoD report put the figure somewhere between $105 to $150 billion. <u><strong>Much of these increases are going towards a substantial modernization program designed to transform he PLA from a primarily “personnel intensive” force to one that is increasingly “technology intensive.” </u></strong>This transformation not only requires a complete overhaul of the PLA’s activities, institutions, military doctrines, and officer corps, it also requires that PLA to take-on missions outside of its comfort zone of defending the Chinese mainland. To this end, the PLA has contributed troops to peacekeeping missions, sent ships to the Horn of Africa to combat piracy, and has engaged in disaster relief missions such as those surrounding the Sichuan earthquake in spring 2008.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 128,445 | 5 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,493 | . | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>. </h4> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 1,560,843 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,494 | No nuclear terrorism – no capability nor intent- reject their alarmism | Gavin et. al, 2010 Cold War”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.7 | Gavin et. al, 2010, Francis J. Gavin is Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center¶ for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 2010, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37¶ © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Same As It Ever Was ¶ Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the¶ Cold War”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.7 | The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the¶ United States is widely believed to be a grave, even apocalyptic, threat and a¶ likely possibility, , there are reasons to doubt both the capabilities and even the interest many terrorist groups have in detonating a nuclear device The threat of nuclear¶ terrorism is very remote . According to terrorism expert Robin Frost, the danger of a¶ “nuclear black market” and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated. Even¶ if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it¶ against a U.S. target would present tremendous technical and logistical¶ difficulties the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes¶ may be exaggerated states such as Iran and North Korea are “not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, if any, are small and exceedingly precious, and hence¶ well-guarded there “is no reason to believe that Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of¶ mass destruction] technology to terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53¶ Even if a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device, expert Michael¶ Levi demonstrates that effective planning can prevent catastrophe: for nuclear terrorists, what “can go wrong might go wrong, and when it comes to¶ nuclear terrorism, a broader, integrated defense, just like controls at the source¶ of weapons and materials, can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibilities of terrorist failure, possibly .” Warning of the danger of a terrorist acquiring a nuclear¶ weapon, most analyses are based on the inaccurate image of an “infallible tenfoot-tall enemy.” This type of alarmism, “Worst-case estimates have their place, but the possible failure-averse, conservative, resource-limited five-foot-tall nuclear terrorist, who is subject not only¶ to the laws of physics but also to Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism, needs to¶ become just as central to our evaluations of strategies.”54¶ A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims¶ that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional¶ means is in fact much lower than commonly thought nuclear] weapons do not play a¶ central part in al-Qaida’s strategy In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons¶ primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of¶ terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been¶ various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the¶ nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN¶ capability.... Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain¶ CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an¶ awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that¶ popular wisdom on the topic is significantly fiawed.”59 | The threat of nuclear¶ terrorism is remote , the danger of a loose nukes may be overstated. Even¶ if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it¶ would present tremendous ¶ difficulties states are “not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, ¶ well-guarded there “is no reason to believe Iran would transfer WMD tech to terrorist groups effective planning can prevent catastrophe: broad defense, of weapons , intensify, failure, al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated ¶ looking at activities within al-Qaida nuclear] weapons do not play a¶ part in al-Qaida’s strategy In the 90s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons¶ to deter a U.S. attack This reveals an organization at odds with alarmists Al-Qaida members were divided on the issue there was ¶ awareness that weapons were extremely difficult to obtain popular wisdom on the topic is significantly fiawed | Nuclear Terrorism. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the¶ United States is widely believed to be a grave, even apocalyptic, threat and a¶ likely possibility, a belief supported by numerous statements by public¶ officials. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the inevitability of the spread¶ of nuclear terrorism” and of a “successful terrorist attack” have been taken for¶ granted.48¶ Coherent policies to reduce the risk of a nonstate actor using nuclear weapons clearly need to be developed. In particular, the rise of the Abdul Qadeer¶ Khan nuclear technology network should give pause.49 But again, the news is¶ not as grim as nuclear alarmists would suggest. Much has already been done¶ to secure the supply of nuclear materials, and relatively simple steps can produce further improvements. Moreover, there are reasons to doubt both the capabilities and even the interest many terrorist groups have in detonating a¶ nuclear device on U.S. soil. As Adam Garfinkle writes, “The threat of nuclear¶ terrorism is very remote.”50¶ Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientific, engineering,¶ financial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear¶ bomb from scratch. According to terrorism expert Robin Frost, the danger of a¶ “nuclear black market” and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated. Even¶ if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it¶ against a U.S. target would present tremendous technical and logistical¶ difficulties.51 Finally, the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes¶ may be exaggerated. As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues,¶ states such as Iran and North Korea are “not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, if any, are small and exceedingly precious, and hence¶ well-guarded.”52 Chubin states that there “is no reason to believe that Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of¶ mass destruction] technology to terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53¶ Even if a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device, expert Michael¶ Levi demonstrates that effective planning can prevent catastrophe: for nuclear terrorists, what “can go wrong might go wrong, and when it comes to¶ nuclear terrorism, a broader, integrated defense, just like controls at the source¶ of weapons and materials, can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibilities of terrorist failure, possibly driving terrorist groups to reject nuclear terrorism altogether.” Warning of the danger of a terrorist acquiring a nuclear¶ weapon, most analyses are based on the inaccurate image of an “infallible tenfoot-tall enemy.” This type of alarmism, writes Levi, impedes the development¶ of thoughtful strategies that could deter, prevent, or mitigate a terrorist attack:¶ “Worst-case estimates have their place, but the possible failure-averse, conservative, resource-limited five-foot-tall nuclear terrorist, who is subject not only¶ to the laws of physics but also to Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism, needs to¶ become just as central to our evaluations of strategies.”54¶ A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims¶ that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional¶ means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that¶ “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a¶ central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons¶ primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of¶ terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been¶ various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the¶ nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN¶ capability.... Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain¶ CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an¶ awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.”57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of¶ their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58¶ As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that¶ popular wisdom on the topic is significantly fiawed.”59 | 4,936 | <h4>No nuclear terrorism – no capability nor intent- reject their alarmism </h4><p><strong>Gavin et. al, 2010</strong>, Francis J. Gavin is Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center¶ for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 2010, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37¶ © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Same As It Ever Was ¶ Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the¶<u><strong> Cold War”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.7</p><p></u></strong>Nuclear Terrorism. <u>The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the¶ United States is widely believed to be a grave, even apocalyptic, threat and a¶ likely possibility,</u> a belief supported by numerous statements by public¶ officials. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the inevitability of the spread¶ of nuclear terrorism” and of a “successful terrorist attack” have been taken for¶ granted.48¶ Coherent policies to reduce the risk of a nonstate actor using nuclear weapons clearly need to be developed. In particular, the rise of the Abdul Qadeer¶ Khan nuclear technology network should give pause.49 But again, the news is¶ not as grim as nuclear alarmists would suggest. Much has already been done¶ to secure the supply of nuclear materials, and relatively simple steps can produce further improvements. Moreover<u>, there are reasons to doubt both the capabilities and even the interest many terrorist groups have in detonating a</u><strong>¶</strong> <u>nuclear device</u> on U.S. soil. As Adam Garfinkle writes, “<u><strong><mark>The threat of nuclear</strong>¶<strong> terrorism is </mark>very <mark>remote</u></strong></mark>.”50¶ Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientific, engineering,¶ financial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear¶ bomb from scratch<u>. According to terrorism expert Robin Frost<mark>, the danger of a</mark>¶ “nuclear black market” and <mark>loose nukes </mark>from Russia <strong><mark>may be overstated.</u></strong> <u>Even¶ if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it¶</mark> against a U.S. target <mark>would present tremendous </mark>technical and logistical<mark>¶ difficulties</u></mark>.51 Finally, <u>the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes¶ may be exaggerated</u>. As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues,¶ <u><mark>states </mark>such as Iran and North Korea<mark> are “not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles,</mark> if any, are small and exceedingly precious, and hence<mark>¶ well-guarded</u></mark>.”52 Chubin states that <u><mark>there “<strong>is no reason to believe</strong></mark> that <mark>Iran</mark> today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, <mark>would transfer WMD</mark> [weapons of¶ mass destruction] <mark>tech</mark>nology <mark>to terrorist groups</mark> like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53¶</u> <u><strong>Even if a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device</strong>, expert Michael¶ Levi demonstrates that <mark>effective planning can prevent catastrophe: </mark>for nuclear terrorists, what <strong>“can go wrong might go wrong</strong>, and when it comes to¶ nuclear terrorism, a <mark>broad</mark>er, integrated <mark>defense, </mark>just like controls at the source¶ <mark>of weapons </mark>and materials, <strong>can multiply<mark>, intensify, </mark>and compound the possibilities of terrorist <mark>failure,</strong></mark> possibly </u>driving terrorist groups to reject nuclear terrorism altogether<u>.” Warning of the danger of a terrorist acquiring a nuclear¶</u> <u>weapon, most analyses are based on the <strong>inaccurate image</strong> of an “infallible tenfoot-tall enemy.”</u> <u>This type of alarmism, </u>writes Levi, impedes the development¶ of thoughtful strategies that could deter, prevent, or mitigate a terrorist attack:¶ <u>“Worst-case estimates have their place, but the possible failure-averse, conservative, resource-limited five-foot-tall nuclear terrorist, who is subject not only¶ to the laws of physics but also to Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism, needs to¶ become just as central to our evaluations of strategies.”54¶</u> <u>A recent study contends that <mark>al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons <strong>may be overstated</strong></mark>. </u>Anne <u>Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims<mark>¶</mark> that “<mark>looking at </mark>statements and <mark>activities</mark> at various levels <mark>within</mark> the <mark>al-Qaida </mark>network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional¶ means is in fact <strong>much lower</strong> than commonly thought</u>.”55 She further states that¶ “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and <u><mark>nuclear] weapons do not play a¶</mark> central <mark>part in al-Qaida’s strategy</u></mark>.”56 <u><mark>In the</mark> 19<mark>90s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. <strong>Those in favor sought the weapons</strong>¶<strong> </mark>primarily <mark>to deter a U.S. attack</strong></mark> on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. <mark>This </mark>assessment <mark>reveals <strong>an organization at odds with </mark>that laid out by nuclear <mark>alarmists</strong></mark> of¶ terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences</u>. <u>Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been¶ various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the¶ nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central <strong>have not dedicated a lot of time or effort </strong>to developing a high-end CBRN¶ capability.... <mark>Al-Qaida </mark>central never had a coherent strategy to obtain¶ CBRN: instead, its <mark>members were divided on the issue</mark>, and <mark>there was </mark>an<mark>¶ awareness that </mark>militarily effective <mark>weapons <strong>were extremely difficult to obtain</u></strong></mark>.”57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of¶ their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58¶ As <u>Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is<strong> overstated</strong>, and that¶ <mark>popular wisdom on the topic is <strong>significantly fiawed</strong></mark>.”59</p></u> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Indo-Pak | 254,857 | 30 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,495 | Vote neg to preserve predictable limits – it’s the key internal link to education, clash, and ground – this is the largest topic of the decade and the military could be a separate resolution | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Vote neg to preserve predictable limits – it’s the key internal link to education, clash, and ground – this is the largest topic of the decade and the military could be a separate resolution </h4> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 4 | 1,560,844 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,496 | Specifically, reversing slow growth is key to prevent lash-out against Japan and Taiwan | Deweaver 13 | Deweaver 13 [Mark A. Deweaver (fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, PhD in Economics), 6-17-2013, "The Threat Of A Declining China," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/threat-declining-china-1310023] | China’s decline is likely to be a lot less peaceful than its rise. Slower growth will pose an existential problem for the C C P economic development has been the Party’s primary source of legitimacy. A prolonged slowdown will weaken its hold on power If China is not going to be “number one” after all, some other justification for Party rule will be urgently needed. The Party’s best bet will be to play the nationalist card, making the defense of the “motherland” its primary mission It will be easy to blame China’s economic failures on the machinations of foreign powers It will also be easy to put the Chinese economy on a war footing. China’s central planning institutions are well suited to the mobilization of resources for defense industries. A military buildup would also help to alleviate excess capacity problems in heavy industry. Arms manufacturing is likely to be seen as a good way to put idle plants back online. The implications for China’s neighbors are already evident in Beijing’s increasingly bellicose insistence on irredentist territorial claims. There have been escalating tensions with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, spats in the South China Sea Such incidents are better understood as consequences of the Party’s domestic agenda. Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment is now at fever pitch, with many of China’s netizens expressing strident support for military action against Japan to recover lost territories, right historical wrongs, and avenge past humiliations this type of nationalist sentiment is going to be the Party’s ace in the hole once the economy slows Its objective will be to keep the Chinese public distracted by possible foreign threats to China’s national security Beijing will be unable to give ground in disputes with its neighbors because doing so will weaken the Party domestically. the Party’s survival depends on escalating tensions. Given that dialogue is likely to be ineffective, Japan and Taiwan, which are likely to be the main targets of Chinese military adventurism | null | As the Chinese juggernaut starts to lose momentum, should Americans be breathing a collective sigh of relief? Not really. Unfortunately, China’s decline is likely to be a lot less peaceful than its rise. Slower growth will pose an existential problem for the Chinese Communist Party. Ever since the end of the Maoist era in 1978, economic development has been the Party’s primary source of legitimacy. A prolonged slowdown will weaken its hold on power in much the same way that crop failures during imperial times undermined the emperor’s claim to the “mandate of heaven.” If China is not going to be “number one” after all, some other justification for Party rule will be urgently needed. The Party’s best bet will be to play the nationalist card, making the defense of the “motherland” its primary mission. This will not be difficult. It will be easy to blame China’s economic failures on the machinations of foreign powers, even as Mao Zedong did in his famous speech proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. The fact that China had “fallen behind,” he said, was “due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments.” It will also be easy to put the Chinese economy on a war footing. China’s central planning institutions are well suited to the mobilization of resources for defense industries. A military buildup would also help to alleviate excess capacity problems in heavy industry. Total excess capacity in the steel sector, for example, already exceeds total U.S. capacity. Arms manufacturing is likely to be seen as a good way to put idle plants back online. The implications for China’s neighbors are already evident in Beijing’s increasingly bellicose insistence on irredentist territorial claims. There have been escalating tensions with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, spats in the South China Sea involving areas claimed by Vietnam, and even a Chinese incursion into an Indian-controlled Himalayan region claimed by both Beijing and New Delhi. Such incidents are often described as competitions for the control of natural resources such as the South China Sea’s oil and natural gas. They are, however, better understood as consequences of the Party’s domestic agenda. And as public relations exercises they have been remarkably successful. Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment is now at fever pitch, with many of China’s netizens expressing strident support for military action against Japan to recover lost territories, right historical wrongs, and avenge past humiliations. U.S. policymakers need to realize that this type of nationalist sentiment is going to be the Party’s ace in the hole once the economy slows. Beijing can therefore be expected to prefer that international disputes remain unresolved. Its objective will be to keep the Chinese public distracted by possible foreign threats to China’s national security and economic development. China, not the U.S., is fated to be the “declining power” for the remainder of this decade. This means that Washington’s preferred policy of ‘engagement’ will not work. Beijing will be unable to give ground in disputes with its neighbors because doing so will weaken the Party domestically. Events like the recent summit between President Obama and General Secretary Xi Jinping are not going to improve U.S.-China relations when the Party’s survival depends on escalating tensions. Given that dialogue is likely to be ineffective, the U.S. must focus instead on defending its strategic interests in the Pacific. It must continue to strengthen ties with its regional partners, particularly Japan and Taiwan, which are likely to be the main targets of Chinese military adventurism. Most important, the U.S. must avoid helping the Party stifle demands for political reforms at home by handing it easy victories abroad. | 3,849 | <h4>Specifically, reversing slow growth is key to prevent lash-out against Japan and Taiwan</h4><p><strong>Deweaver 13</strong> [Mark A. Deweaver (fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, PhD in Economics), 6-17-2013, "The Threat Of A Declining China," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/threat-declining-china-1310023]</p><p>As the Chinese juggernaut starts to lose momentum, should Americans be breathing a collective sigh of relief? Not really. Unfortunately, <u><strong>China’s decline is likely to be a lot less peaceful than its rise. Slower growth will pose an existential problem for the</u></strong> <u><strong>C</u></strong>hinese <u><strong>C</u></strong>ommunist <u><strong>P</u></strong>arty. Ever since the end of the Maoist era in 1978, <u><strong>economic development has been the Party’s primary source of legitimacy.</u></strong> <u><strong>A prolonged slowdown will weaken its hold on power</u></strong> in much the same way that crop failures during imperial times undermined the emperor’s claim to the “mandate of heaven.” <u><strong>If China is not going to be “number one” after all, some other justification for Party rule will be urgently needed.</u></strong> <u><strong>The Party’s best bet will be to play the nationalist card, making the defense of the “motherland” its primary mission</u></strong>. This will not be difficult. <u><strong>It will be easy to blame China’s economic failures on the machinations of foreign powers</u></strong>, even as Mao Zedong did in his famous speech proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. The fact that China had “fallen behind,” he said, was “due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments.” <u><strong>It will also be easy to put the Chinese economy on a war footing. China’s central planning institutions are well suited to the mobilization of resources for defense industries. A military buildup would also help to alleviate excess capacity problems in heavy industry. </u></strong>Total excess capacity in the steel sector, for example, already exceeds total U.S. capacity. <u><strong>Arms manufacturing is likely to be seen as a good way to put idle plants back online. The implications for China’s neighbors are already evident in Beijing’s increasingly bellicose insistence on irredentist territorial claims. There have been escalating tensions with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, spats in the South China Sea</u></strong> involving areas claimed by Vietnam, and even a Chinese incursion into an Indian-controlled Himalayan region claimed by both Beijing and New Delhi. <u><strong>Such incidents are</u></strong> often described as competitions for the control of natural resources such as the South China Sea’s oil and natural gas. They are, however, <u><strong>better understood as consequences of the Party’s domestic agenda.</u></strong> And as public relations exercises they have been remarkably successful. <u><strong>Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment is now at fever pitch, with many of China’s netizens expressing strident support for military action against Japan to recover lost territories, right historical wrongs, and avenge past humiliations</u></strong>. U.S. policymakers need to realize that <u><strong>this type of nationalist sentiment is going to be the Party’s ace in the hole once the economy slows</u></strong>. Beijing can therefore be expected to prefer that international disputes remain unresolved. <u><strong>Its objective will be to keep the Chinese public distracted by possible foreign threats to China’s national security</u></strong> and economic development. China, not the U.S., is fated to be the “declining power” for the remainder of this decade. This means that Washington’s preferred policy of ‘engagement’ will not work. <u><strong>Beijing will be unable to give ground in disputes with its neighbors because doing so will weaken the Party domestically.</u></strong> Events like the recent summit between President Obama and General Secretary Xi Jinping are not going to improve U.S.-China relations when <u><strong>the Party’s survival depends on escalating tensions. Given that dialogue is likely to be ineffective, </u></strong>the U.S. must focus instead on defending its strategic interests in the Pacific. It must continue to strengthen ties with its regional partners, particularly <u><strong>Japan and Taiwan, which are likely to be the main targets of Chinese military adventurism</u>. Most important, the U.S. must avoid helping the Party stifle demands for political reforms at home by handing it easy victories abroad. </p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 128,438 | 10 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,497 | The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings | Burke 7 | Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4) | frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches realism sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security the nature of progress or the promises of national identity political debate about insecurity, violent conflict and injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique. | frameworks are interrogated in their implementation in specific policy contexts powerful political concepts all have histories, often complex normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of power reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive approaches, , but to available alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions but their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches realism or centrist Debates about when and how it may be legitimate to use military force with other policy options mask a fundamental discursive consensus about security injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of possibility that systematically wards off critique. | These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique. | 3,047 | <h4>The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings </h4><p><strong>Burke 7<u></strong> – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)</p><p></u>These <u><mark>frameworks are interrogated</mark> at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: <mark>in their </mark>influence and <mark>implementation in specific policy contexts</mark> and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East</u> and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that <u>the meaning of <mark>powerful political concepts</mark> cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they <mark>all have histories, often complex</mark> and conflictual</u>; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. <u>While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their <mark>normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of</mark> political, social and economic <mark>power</mark> and their consequent worldly effects.</u> Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, <u>the <mark>reasons for pursuing a critical analysis <strong>relate not only to the</strong> most destructive</u></mark> or controversial <u><mark>approaches, </mark>such as the war in Iraq<mark>, <strong>but</mark> also <mark>to </mark>their <mark>available</u></strong></mark> (and generally preferable) <u><mark>alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions</mark> such as the Bush doctrine</u>, Indonesian militarism <u>or Israeli expansionism, <strong><mark>but</mark> also <mark>their mainstream critique</strong>s</u> - <u>whether they take the form <strong>of liberal policy approaches</u></strong></mark> in international relations (IR), just war theory, US <u><mark>realism</u></mark>, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of <u>sensitivity to cultural difference, <mark>or centrist</u></mark> Israeli <u>security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively</u> (and often significant) <u>debate masks a deeper agreement <strong>about major concepts</strong>,</u> forms of political identity <u>and the imperative to secure them. <mark>Debates about when and how it may be </mark>effective and <mark>legitimate to use military force</mark> in tandem <mark>with other policy options</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>mask a </mark>more <mark>fundamental discursive consensus about </mark>the meaning of <mark>security</u></mark>, the effectiveness of strategic power, <u>the nature of progress</u>, the value of freedom <u>or the promises of</u> <u>national</u> and cultural <u>identity</u>. As a result, <u>political</u> and intellectual <u>debate about insecurity, violent conflict and</u> global <u><mark>injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of</mark> political and ethical <mark>possibility that systematically <strong>wards off critique.</p></u></strong></mark> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 74,755 | 24 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,498 | Nuclear weapons are stabilizing and prevent escalation of IndoPak conflict | Rajagopalan ‘5 | Rajagopalan ‘5 (Rajesh, Associate Prof. Int’l. Politics – School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru U., India Review, “The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, 4:2, July, Ebsco) | Asia South Asian geography is considered the most critical factor accentuating nuclear danger in the subcontinent The proximity of the South Asian nuclear adversaries are believed to make four dangers of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons even greater the state of civil–military relations and the limitations of safety mechanisms are thought to increase the threat of unintended uses of nuclear weapons How serious are these dangers Many of these claims rest on assumptions about deployment practices, operational imperatives, and crisis behavior these assumptions are questionable, from the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines as well as from actual practices the proliferation pessimists either ignore the doctrinal issue or completely misinterpret the effects of nuclear doctrines on the possibility of unintended nuclear use A factor that has consistently been ignored in these analyses is that both India and Pakistan have built relatively small arsenals Seng has shown, small arsenals have unique advantages, despite the predictions of pessimists that small arsenals will be highly vulnerable, neither India nor Pakistan has behaved as if their arsenals are vulnerable to a surprise attack neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear force is thought to be on high alert, let alone on hair-trigger alert Both assertions about the geographical imperative and the small-size problem predicted high-alert and even hair-trigger alert forces in South Asia. This, clearly, has not happened Both India and Pakistan are clearly far more confident of the ability of their nuclear forces to survive any enemy first-strike than proliferation pessimists predicted India has stuck to its no-first-use pledge, despite initial skepticism from external observers Even Pakistan’s doctrine is generally less dangerous than it is sometimes made out to be. Though Pakistan has a first-use doctrine, it is not a first-strike doctrine despite the geographical imperative and the small force imperative, there is little indication that either of the South Asian adversaries is embarked on particularly dangerous choices in weapons deployment. despite the criticism of the Indian and Pakistani missile programs, missiles might actually have a beneficial effect in reducing the dangers of unintended escalation If both sides only had aircraft, they would be tied down to the couple of dozen air bases that both sides have. This in turn could have led to high alert levels Having mobile missiles in the mix increases the confidence of political leaders in the survivability of their nuclear arsenals, which reduces anxieties and tensions, always a good thing when nuclear weapons are involved If there is one thing that the history of nuclear crises demonstrates, it is that political leaders tend to be very careful in confrontations where nuclear weapons are involved. leaders tend to reassert control over nuclear forces and employment policies, even if normally they tend to delegate more authority over nuclear weapons to military commanders. This happened with both sides in the Cuban missile crisis This has also happened in South Asia, most recently during the Kargil war, In essence, then, political leaders do not let events run away from them. They usually reassert control, especially in crisis time | prolife pessimists ignore the doctrinal issue or misinterpret the effects on nuclear use. small arsenals have unique advantages neither India nor Pakistan has behaved as if their arsenals are vulnerable t neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear force is thought to be on high alert, let alone on hair-trigger alert India and Pakistan are confident of the ability of their nuclear forces to survive first-strike despite the geographical and mall force imperative, there is little indication that either of the South Asian adversaries is embarked on dangerous choices missiles have a beneficial effect in reducing the dangers of unintended escalation. Having mobile missiles increases the confidence of political leaders in the survivability of their nuclear arsenals which reduces anxieties and tensions If there is one thing that the history of nuclear crises demonstrates, it is that political leaders tend to be very careful in confrontations where nuclear weapons are involved leaders reassert control over nuclear forces even if normally they tend to delegate This happened in South Asia during the Kargil war, | Four Factors Accentuating the Nuclear Danger in South Asia South Asian geography is an important issue and is generally considered the most critical factor accentuating nuclear danger in the subcontinent. The proximity of the South Asian nuclear adversaries are believed to make each of the four dangers of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons even greater than is normally the case. In addition to geography, the state of civil–military relations, the nature of command and control systems, and the limitations of safety mechanisms are thought to increase the threat of unintended uses of nuclear weapons. South Asian Geography, or the Proximity Problem One of the main arguments of analysts who adopt arguments from proliferation pessimists to look at the South Asian situation is that the proximity of the South Asian adversaries will create tremendous pressures which will make it difficult to keep these arsenals safe. The geographical constraints faced by the South Asia duo “are by far the most demanding that have been encountered by any nuclear antagonists on a permanent basis since the advent of nuclear weapons,” writes Francois Heisbourg.19 Proximity increases the pressures on the nuclear forces in a number of ways. How so? Proximity would force both countries to tend towards delegative command and control systems – in other words both India and Pakistan might be forced to delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons to military commanders who possess these weapons.20 They will do so because the flight times between the probable missile/air bases and their targets are negligible, which in turn means that neither side will have sufficient time to detect an attack, decide how to respond, and communicate their response to nuclear force commanders. This gives rise to two additional problems: first, the initial attack might be targeted on the National Command Authority (NCA – presumably in the capital city), which could eliminate the political leadership before they can take any decision. Such a “decapitating” strike might prevent retaliation even if the entire nuclear force of the victim survives the initial attack because there is no central political authority left to give the order to retaliate. The second danger is that the initial pre-emptive strike might directly target the nuclear forces and destroy them (which is possible because these forces are quite small) before these forces are launched. In other words, even if the NCA survives and orders a retaliatory strike, there might not be any forces left with which to retaliate. Such dangers would force both countries (particularly Pakistan, because of its lack of strategic depth) to adopt delegative command and control systems with forces that are ready to “launch-on-warning” or “launch-under-attack” during an enemy assault. What if one or both sides adopted more assertive command and control systems? Though assertive command and control systems will reduce some of the dangers associated with nuclear weapons, proximity will compel both sides to face up to another danger: the possibility that in an acute crisis, one or the other might be tempted to conduct a pre-emptive attack on the NCA, if they suspect that the opposing side has an assertive command and control system which can be “taken out” before a retaliatory order is transmitted. The risks of such temptations and its implications have not been adequately addressed in India, which is thought to have an assertive command and control system. 21 But because such a scenario involves a deliberate rather than unintended use of nuclear forces, I do not consider it here. Civil–Military Relations Organization theorists such as Scott Sagan have argued that militaries generally tend to be biased towards offensive operations, to resist civilian interference in professional matters (which could include such matters as military doctrines), and be captives of inflexible routines and standard operating procedures, all of which tend to come in the way of coordinated civil–military responses to international crises, which in turn could lead to crisis instability and inadvertent escalation or war.22 Consequently, writing in the early 1990s, Sagan suggested that the Pakistani military might be tempted to conduct a preventive war against India if Pakistan’s military leaders came to the conclusion that they had a temporary nuclear advantage over India.23 Indeed, Pakistan is the focus of most concerns about the impact of civil–military relations on nuclear operations because of the Pakistani army’s history of frequent military interventions and its well-known refusal to relinquish control over the atomic weapons program to civilians.24 If military organizations are susceptible to the various ills that they are blamed for by organization theorists, then, given the dominance of the military in the Pakistani system, we should expect Pakistan to make choices about nuclear operations that are dangerous and unstable. These include an emphasis on pre-emption, dispersal of nuclear weapons to lower commands and delegative rather than assertive control over nuclear operations. The state of Pakistan’s civil– military relations raises another issue also – who decides when nuclear weapons must be used? And in a crisis who should India and other powers be talking to about reducing the threat of escalation?25 Most analysts concede that the Indian military’s tradition of discipline and strict adherence to the principle of civilian supremacy make dangers arising out of civil–military tensions a less important issue in Indian nuclear operations.26 But there are other worries. As I suggested earlier, very assertive controls might provide unnecessary temptation for a decapitating first-strike. Gregory Giles suggests another possibility: considering the Pakistani army’s constant intervention in politics, “India may not have confidence in the ability of Pakistan’s political leadership to exercise a restraining influence over nuclear decision making. In the midst of another crisis or war with Pakistan, such doubts could compel India to take precipitous actions.”27 In other words, even if Indian civil–military relations are not a cause for concern, India’s perceptions about the consequences of Pakistan’s civil–military relations could lead to dangerous outcomes. Command and Control Issues India and Pakistan, with relatively small nuclear forces, deployed incountry, should face far less command and control problems when compared to the extremely complicated Cold War systems built by the United States and the Soviet Union. There are other dangers, however. Neither India nor Pakistan are thought to have sufficiently robust early warning and threat assessment systems in place to detect and respond to missile attacks. One incident has been repeatedly highlighted by analysts looking at this issue: Pakistan’s complete inability to detect the dozens of American cruise missiles that traversed Pakistan to attack the bases of Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan. Concerned about possible Pakistani misinterpretation and over-reaction, the US sent a senior air force general to be in place in case Pakistan did detect the attack and assume it was an Indian attack.28 India is thought to have in place an “assertive” rather than a delegative command and control system. But India is also expected to deploy mobile missiles. These two do not go well together. Dispersed forces are seen to require more a delegative command and control system because of “connectivity” problems. As forces are dispersed in remote areas, they are likely to be away from secure communications, and thus not easily accessible to the NCA or vice versa.29 Pakistan, which is thought to have a more delegated command and control system, is not thought to face this particular difficulty, though it will suffer from natural disadvantages and dangers associated with a delegated command and control system. Limitations of Safety Mechanisms Very little is known about the safety systems and devices that are used on Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. But the worst is assumed – that neither country has spent much time on such safety measures or systems. Some analysts have argued that this is the consequence of cultural factors. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani analyst and nuclear physicist, argues that for both India and Pakistan “safety has never been an overriding concern in driving cars and buses, in the disposal of toxic wastes, in the construction of buildings, and so forth. Why should we assume that it would be any different when it comes to building bombs?”30 Neither India nor Pakistan is thought to have instituted safety mechanisms such as Permissive Action Links, “One Point Safety,” or “Weak Link–Strong Link” measures.31 On the other hand, it is generally assumed that, at least in India, weapons components are kept separate, which should assure a measure of safety against accidental detonations. But such measures might be possible only with singlestage atomic weapons, not more advanced boosted or hydrogen bombs, which require a “sealed-pit” design.32 All the factors mentioned above, the geographical imperative, command and control choices, civil–military relations and the weakness of safety measures on weapons, are expected to interact in ways that further increase the threat of unintended uses of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In the next section, I examine how these impinge on each of the four threats of unintended uses of nuclear weapons. Examining the Four Threats Inadvertent Escalation Inadvertent escalation refers to the use of nuclear weapons in an unpremeditated manner. In other words, this refers to the possibility of India and Pakistan ending up in a nuclear confrontation and possible use of nuclear weapons without either side intending to do so. This does not refer to one scenario that has caused some discussion in India and elsewhere – the possibility that an Indian offensive deep into Pakistan would force Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons. Such a possibility is well recognized in India and India is thus unlikely to undertake such offensives. Moreover, Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons in such circumstances would be a deliberate act, and in keeping with Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. But there is another scenario for inadvertent escalation.33 This is when nuclear escalation takes place as a consequence of conventional war. Conventional attacks, especially air attacks, could unknowingly target bases or sites that might be used for nuclear or missile storage, or critical command and control facilities. Such attacks, even if they are not intended as such, might threaten to destroy, or even destroy some part of the adversary’s nuclear capability. For example, if Indian aircraft were to attack a particular air base which is also used (unknown to Indian commanders) as a nuclear storage site, Pakistan might assume that the attack is directed at its nuclear weapons.34 Even if the original attack is a conventional attack, Pakistan might assume it is targeted at Pakistan’s strategic assets and might respond with a nuclear retaliation. In an unforeseen manner, then, Indian conventional air attacks might lead Pakistan into the “use-’em-or-lose-’em” dilemma. It is likely that India (or Pakistan, for that matter) might not conduct such attacks if they had foreknowledge that the bases they are attacking contained nuclear weapons. It is this factor which makes such escalation “inadvertent.” Eric Arnett mentions another scenario, which is somewhat less likely.35 This is the possibility of sustained attacks by the Indian Air Force that degrade the Pakistan Air Force so much that it becomes an unviable nuclear delivery instrument. This is less likely for two reasons: one, Indian leaders, as well as the IAF, will be aware of the consequences of such an outcome and, two, Pakistan’s missile forces give Pakistan alternative delivery vehicles, even if its aircraft are no longer available. Some of the accentuating factors mentioned earlier could make matters worse. Two, command and control and civil–military relations, are relevant. Poor threat interpretation and assessment capabilities might prevent Pakistan (or India) from assessing such attacks as isolated acts, and not part of a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear forces. And delegative command systems, especially in Pakistan, might make nuclear escalation easier because the commander of the base under attack could order the launch of a nuclear retaliation. Similarly, civil–military relations could also accentuate the difficulties, especially in Pakistan, if military authorities force the civilian leaders into escalation. Unauthorized Use Unauthorized use refers to the use of nuclear weapons by military commanders without approval from the political leaders. There are two possible scenarios for such use. One is the possibility of nuclear use by commanders who face the “use-’em-or-lose-’em” dilemma. The other is the “Dr. Strangelove” phenomenon – an over-eager (or hate-filled) military commander who decides to take matters into his own hands. In this, all of the four accentuating factors referred to earlier can play a role. Geographical proximity and a delegative command and control can combine to create pressures for use in the first scenario. Local commanders who detect an incoming attack will have little time to react and poor threat interpretation could make them assume the worst. They will certainly not have time to consult the NCA for a decision. If they have the authority to launch nuclear weapons on their own, they would be tempted to use that discretionary power and launch their weapons. Poor civil–military relations, in which civilians are routinely kept out of nuclear decision-making (as in Pakistan), might also make it easier for the local commander to ignore the political leadership. In the second scenario, an Indian or Pakistani commander could decide to use the nuclear weapons without provocation. A delegative command and control system, and poor safety measures, might make it easy for such commanders to carry out such acts. If safety measures are weak, even an assertive command and control system might not stop such a commander. Loss of Possession Loss of possession danger refers to the possibility of theft of nuclear weapons. One oft-cited possibility is of terrorists seizing an atomic explosive device. The second possibility is of a rebellious faction within the military seizing control of nuclear weapons. Such scenarios became popular in the aftermath of the failed military coup against the Soviet government in the dying days of the Soviet Union (and made even more popular by Hollywood in films such as the highly authentic “Crimson Tide”), but analysts also point to earlier instances. In 1961, the French government apparently ordered the hasty detonation of a French nuclear device rather than let it fall into the hands of military rebels who were attempting a coup. Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution in China, the military commander of the Xinjiang province apparently threatened to take over control of the nuclear base there.36 Geographical proximity accentuates some of these difficulties. Proximity and the consequent lack of warning time might lead both India and Pakistan to dispersed peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, the lack of strategic depth would further increase such propensities. The dispersal of nuclear weapons, while an essential measure to ensure survival of small nuclear forces, also increases the vulnerability of these forces to terrorist attacks. A delegative command and control system will also put several dozen military commanders in control of nuclear weapons. Because this is a far lower number than those who had delegated authority over nuclear weapons in superpower nuclear arsenals, the problem facing India and Pakistan is that much more manageable.37 Nevertheless, ensuring the reliability of those put in charge of these weapons would remain an important problem. Lack of adequate safety mechanisms can also increase the risk of theft of these weapons. Terrorists are unlikely to be interested in weapons they know they cannot use. Nuclear Accidents Nuclear accidents as a consequence of the improper handling of weapons, or inadequate safety measures, or even dangerous design flaws are always a possibility. Proliferation pessimists like to narrate the story of the Iraqi bomb design, which called for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into its core as to be highly unstable.38 Clearly, India and Pakistan are not Iraq, and the 1998 tests reveal a certain level of design competence in both countries. Nevertheless these dangers cannot and should not be dismissed. Geography and proximity factors, to the extent that they lead to dispersal of these weapons, do increase the chances for accidents. But the most important factor that accentuates the dangers is the possible lack of nuclear weapon safety devices and measures. It is, of course, not clear that India and Pakistan do not have such devices.39 The US introduced Permissive Action Links into their nuclear arsenals in the early 1960s, and the technique is relatively widely known. In addition,assertive controls, especially in India, should reduce the dangers of accidents somewhat. How serious are these dangers and how valid are the claims of the proliferation pessimists? Many of these claims rest on a couple of assumptions about deployment practices, operational imperatives, and crisis behavior. But these assumptions are questionable, both from the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines as well as from actual practices. Indeed, the proliferation pessimists either ignore the doctrinal issue or completely misinterpret the effects of nuclear doctrines on the possibility of unintended nuclear use.40 A factor that has consistently been ignored in these analyses is that both India and Pakistan have built relatively small arsenals, despite the predictions of some proliferation pessimists that these arsenals would not remain small. As Jordan Seng has shown, small arsenals have unique advantages, and these advantages will benefit India and Pakistan. In addition, despite the predictions of pessimists that small arsenals will be highly vulnerable, neither India nor Pakistan has behaved as if their arsenals are vulnerable to a surprise attack. For example, neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear force is thought to be on high alert, let alone on hair-trigger alert. Both assertions about the geographical imperative and the small-size problem predicted high-alert and even hair-trigger alert forces in South Asia. This, clearly, has not happened. Both India and Pakistan are clearly far more confident of the ability of their nuclear forces to survive any enemy first-strike than proliferation pessimists predicted. Similarly, India has stuck to its no-first-use pledge, despite initial skepticism from external observers (and even several domestic ones). Even Pakistan’s doctrine is generally less dangerous than it is sometimes made out to be. Though Pakistan has a first-use doctrine, it is not a first-strike doctrine, and the difference is considerable. Pakistani doctrine appears to indicate that Pakistan would make a limited strike, on Pakistani territory, against Indian forces that have penetrated deep into Pakistani territory. There is little indication from what we do know about Pakistani doctrine that it will resort to massive attacks at that stage.41 In essence, then, despite the geographical imperative and the small force imperative, there is little indication that either of the South Asian adversaries is embarked on particularly dangerous choices in weapons deployment. Similarly, despite the criticism of the Indian and Pakistani missile programs, missiles might actually have a beneficial effect in reducing the dangers of unintended escalation. If both sides only had aircraft, they would be tied down to the couple of dozen air bases that both sides have. This would have both made nuclear forces vulnerable, and increased the anxiety of leaders about the survival of their nuclear arsenals. This in turn could have led to high alert levels, with all its attendant dangers. Having mobile missiles in the mix increases the confidence of political leaders in the survivability of their nuclear arsenals, which reduces anxieties and tensions, always a good thing when nuclear weapons are involved. A final point also needs to be made, though this has not as much to do with doctrines. If there is one thing that the history of nuclear crises demonstrates, it is that political leaders tend to be very careful in confrontations where nuclear weapons are involved. In fact, leaders tend to reassert control over nuclear forces and employment policies, even if normally they tend to delegate more authority over nuclear weapons to military commanders. This happened with both sides in the Cuban missile crisis.42 Though the evidence is not as clear-cut, such assertion of central authority also appears to have happened to both sides during the Sino-Soviet border war. This has also happened in South Asia, most recently during the Kargil war, when both sides undertook a variety of measures to ensure that the crisis did not escalate. On the Indian side, this included the decision not to strike back at Pakistan, either in Kashmir or elsewhere (i.e., the decision to limit the theater of operations), and the decision to use the IAF strictly within Indian borders. Pakistan, similarly, appears to have decided to accept its loss rather than risk a wider war by sending in more troops. In essence, then, political leaders do not let events run away from them. They usually reassert control, especially in crisis time. | 21,849 | <h4>Nuclear weapons are stabilizing and prevent escalation of IndoPak conflict</h4><p><strong>Rajagopalan ‘5</strong> (Rajesh, Associate Prof. Int’l. Politics – School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru U., India Review, “The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, 4:2, July, Ebsco)</p><p>Four Factors Accentuating the Nuclear Danger in South <u>Asia South Asian geography is </u>an important issue and is generally <u>considered the most critical factor accentuating nuclear danger in the subcontinent</u>. <u>The proximity of the South Asian nuclear adversaries are believed to make</u> each of the <u>four dangers of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons even greater</u> than is normally the case. In addition to geography, <u>the state of civil–military relations</u>, the nature of command and control systems, <u>and the limitations of safety mechanisms are thought to increase the threat of unintended uses of nuclear weapons</u>. South Asian Geography, or the Proximity Problem One of the main arguments of analysts who adopt arguments from proliferation pessimists to look at the South Asian situation is that the proximity of the South Asian adversaries will create tremendous pressures which will make it difficult to keep these arsenals safe. The geographical constraints faced by the South Asia duo “are by far the most demanding that have been encountered by any nuclear antagonists on a permanent basis since the advent of nuclear weapons,” writes Francois Heisbourg.19 Proximity increases the pressures on the nuclear forces in a number of ways. How so? Proximity would force both countries to tend towards delegative command and control systems – in other words both India and Pakistan might be forced to delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons to military commanders who possess these weapons.20 They will do so because the flight times between the probable missile/air bases and their targets are negligible, which in turn means that neither side will have sufficient time to detect an attack, decide how to respond, and communicate their response to nuclear force commanders. This gives rise to two additional problems: first, the initial attack might be targeted on the National Command Authority (NCA – presumably in the capital city), which could eliminate the political leadership before they can take any decision. Such a “decapitating” strike might prevent retaliation even if the entire nuclear force of the victim survives the initial attack because there is no central political authority left to give the order to retaliate. The second danger is that the initial pre-emptive strike might directly target the nuclear forces and destroy them (which is possible because these forces are quite small) before these forces are launched. In other words, even if the NCA survives and orders a retaliatory strike, there might not be any forces left with which to retaliate. Such dangers would force both countries (particularly Pakistan, because of its lack of strategic depth) to adopt delegative command and control systems with forces that are ready to “launch-on-warning” or “launch-under-attack” during an enemy assault. What if one or both sides adopted more assertive command and control systems? Though assertive command and control systems will reduce some of the dangers associated with nuclear weapons, proximity will compel both sides to face up to another danger: the possibility that in an acute crisis, one or the other might be tempted to conduct a pre-emptive attack on the NCA, if they suspect that the opposing side has an assertive command and control system which can be “taken out” before a retaliatory order is transmitted. The risks of such temptations and its implications have not been adequately addressed in India, which is thought to have an assertive command and control system. 21 But because such a scenario involves a deliberate rather than unintended use of nuclear forces, I do not consider it here. Civil–Military Relations Organization theorists such as Scott Sagan have argued that militaries generally tend to be biased towards offensive operations, to resist civilian interference in professional matters (which could include such matters as military doctrines), and be captives of inflexible routines and standard operating procedures, all of which tend to come in the way of coordinated civil–military responses to international crises, which in turn could lead to crisis instability and inadvertent escalation or war.22 Consequently, writing in the early 1990s, Sagan suggested that the Pakistani military might be tempted to conduct a preventive war against India if Pakistan’s military leaders came to the conclusion that they had a temporary nuclear advantage over India.23 Indeed, Pakistan is the focus of most concerns about the impact of civil–military relations on nuclear operations because of the Pakistani army’s history of frequent military interventions and its well-known refusal to relinquish control over the atomic weapons program to civilians.24 If military organizations are susceptible to the various ills that they are blamed for by organization theorists, then, given the dominance of the military in the Pakistani system, we should expect Pakistan to make choices about nuclear operations that are dangerous and unstable. These include an emphasis on pre-emption, dispersal of nuclear weapons to lower commands and delegative rather than assertive control over nuclear operations. The state of Pakistan’s civil– military relations raises another issue also – who decides when nuclear weapons must be used? And in a crisis who should India and other powers be talking to about reducing the threat of escalation?25 Most analysts concede that the Indian military’s tradition of discipline and strict adherence to the principle of civilian supremacy make dangers arising out of civil–military tensions a less important issue in Indian nuclear operations.26 But there are other worries. As I suggested earlier, very assertive controls might provide unnecessary temptation for a decapitating first-strike. Gregory Giles suggests another possibility: considering the Pakistani army’s constant intervention in politics, “India may not have confidence in the ability of Pakistan’s political leadership to exercise a restraining influence over nuclear decision making. In the midst of another crisis or war with Pakistan, such doubts could compel India to take precipitous actions.”27 In other words, even if Indian civil–military relations are not a cause for concern, India’s perceptions about the consequences of Pakistan’s civil–military relations could lead to dangerous outcomes. Command and Control Issues India and Pakistan, with relatively small nuclear forces, deployed incountry, should face far less command and control problems when compared to the extremely complicated Cold War systems built by the United States and the Soviet Union. There are other dangers, however. Neither India nor Pakistan are thought to have sufficiently robust early warning and threat assessment systems in place to detect and respond to missile attacks. One incident has been repeatedly highlighted by analysts looking at this issue: Pakistan’s complete inability to detect the dozens of American cruise missiles that traversed Pakistan to attack the bases of Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan. Concerned about possible Pakistani misinterpretation and over-reaction, the US sent a senior air force general to be in place in case Pakistan did detect the attack and assume it was an Indian attack.28 India is thought to have in place an “assertive” rather than a delegative command and control system. But India is also expected to deploy mobile missiles. These two do not go well together. Dispersed forces are seen to require more a delegative command and control system because of “connectivity” problems. As forces are dispersed in remote areas, they are likely to be away from secure communications, and thus not easily accessible to the NCA or vice versa.29 Pakistan, which is thought to have a more delegated command and control system, is not thought to face this particular difficulty, though it will suffer from natural disadvantages and dangers associated with a delegated command and control system. Limitations of Safety Mechanisms Very little is known about the safety systems and devices that are used on Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. But the worst is assumed – that neither country has spent much time on such safety measures or systems. Some analysts have argued that this is the consequence of cultural factors. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani analyst and nuclear physicist, argues that for both India and Pakistan “safety has never been an overriding concern in driving cars and buses, in the disposal of toxic wastes, in the construction of buildings, and so forth. Why should we assume that it would be any different when it comes to building bombs?”30 Neither India nor Pakistan is thought to have instituted safety mechanisms such as Permissive Action Links, “One Point Safety,” or “Weak Link–Strong Link” measures.31 On the other hand, it is generally assumed that, at least in India, weapons components are kept separate, which should assure a measure of safety against accidental detonations. But such measures might be possible only with singlestage atomic weapons, not more advanced boosted or hydrogen bombs, which require a “sealed-pit” design.32 All the factors mentioned above, the geographical imperative, command and control choices, civil–military relations and the weakness of safety measures on weapons, are expected to interact in ways that further increase the threat of unintended uses of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In the next section, I examine how these impinge on each of the four threats of unintended uses of nuclear weapons. Examining the Four Threats Inadvertent Escalation Inadvertent escalation refers to the use of nuclear weapons in an unpremeditated manner. In other words, this refers to the possibility of India and Pakistan ending up in a nuclear confrontation and possible use of nuclear weapons without either side intending to do so. This does not refer to one scenario that has caused some discussion in India and elsewhere – the possibility that an Indian offensive deep into Pakistan would force Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons. Such a possibility is well recognized in India and India is thus unlikely to undertake such offensives. Moreover, Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons in such circumstances would be a deliberate act, and in keeping with Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. But there is another scenario for inadvertent escalation.33 This is when nuclear escalation takes place as a consequence of conventional war. Conventional attacks, especially air attacks, could unknowingly target bases or sites that might be used for nuclear or missile storage, or critical command and control facilities. Such attacks, even if they are not intended as such, might threaten to destroy, or even destroy some part of the adversary’s nuclear capability. For example, if Indian aircraft were to attack a particular air base which is also used (unknown to Indian commanders) as a nuclear storage site, Pakistan might assume that the attack is directed at its nuclear weapons.34 Even if the original attack is a conventional attack, Pakistan might assume it is targeted at Pakistan’s strategic assets and might respond with a nuclear retaliation. In an unforeseen manner, then, Indian conventional air attacks might lead Pakistan into the “use-’em-or-lose-’em” dilemma. It is likely that India (or Pakistan, for that matter) might not conduct such attacks if they had foreknowledge that the bases they are attacking contained nuclear weapons. It is this factor which makes such escalation “inadvertent.” Eric Arnett mentions another scenario, which is somewhat less likely.35 This is the possibility of sustained attacks by the Indian Air Force that degrade the Pakistan Air Force so much that it becomes an unviable nuclear delivery instrument. This is less likely for two reasons: one, Indian leaders, as well as the IAF, will be aware of the consequences of such an outcome and, two, Pakistan’s missile forces give Pakistan alternative delivery vehicles, even if its aircraft are no longer available. Some of the accentuating factors mentioned earlier could make matters worse. Two, command and control and civil–military relations, are relevant. Poor threat interpretation and assessment capabilities might prevent Pakistan (or India) from assessing such attacks as isolated acts, and not part of a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear forces. And delegative command systems, especially in Pakistan, might make nuclear escalation easier because the commander of the base under attack could order the launch of a nuclear retaliation. Similarly, civil–military relations could also accentuate the difficulties, especially in Pakistan, if military authorities force the civilian leaders into escalation. Unauthorized Use Unauthorized use refers to the use of nuclear weapons by military commanders without approval from the political leaders. There are two possible scenarios for such use. One is the possibility of nuclear use by commanders who face the “use-’em-or-lose-’em” dilemma. The other is the “Dr. Strangelove” phenomenon – an over-eager (or hate-filled) military commander who decides to take matters into his own hands. In this, all of the four accentuating factors referred to earlier can play a role. Geographical proximity and a delegative command and control can combine to create pressures for use in the first scenario. Local commanders who detect an incoming attack will have little time to react and poor threat interpretation could make them assume the worst. They will certainly not have time to consult the NCA for a decision. If they have the authority to launch nuclear weapons on their own, they would be tempted to use that discretionary power and launch their weapons. Poor civil–military relations, in which civilians are routinely kept out of nuclear decision-making (as in Pakistan), might also make it easier for the local commander to ignore the political leadership. In the second scenario, an Indian or Pakistani commander could decide to use the nuclear weapons without provocation. A delegative command and control system, and poor safety measures, might make it easy for such commanders to carry out such acts. If safety measures are weak, even an assertive command and control system might not stop such a commander. Loss of Possession Loss of possession danger refers to the possibility of theft of nuclear weapons. One oft-cited possibility is of terrorists seizing an atomic explosive device. The second possibility is of a rebellious faction within the military seizing control of nuclear weapons. Such scenarios became popular in the aftermath of the failed military coup against the Soviet government in the dying days of the Soviet Union (and made even more popular by Hollywood in films such as the highly authentic “Crimson Tide”), but analysts also point to earlier instances. In 1961, the French government apparently ordered the hasty detonation of a French nuclear device rather than let it fall into the hands of military rebels who were attempting a coup. Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution in China, the military commander of the Xinjiang province apparently threatened to take over control of the nuclear base there.36 Geographical proximity accentuates some of these difficulties. Proximity and the consequent lack of warning time might lead both India and Pakistan to dispersed peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, the lack of strategic depth would further increase such propensities. The dispersal of nuclear weapons, while an essential measure to ensure survival of small nuclear forces, also increases the vulnerability of these forces to terrorist attacks. A delegative command and control system will also put several dozen military commanders in control of nuclear weapons. Because this is a far lower number than those who had delegated authority over nuclear weapons in superpower nuclear arsenals, the problem facing India and Pakistan is that much more manageable.37 Nevertheless, ensuring the reliability of those put in charge of these weapons would remain an important problem. Lack of adequate safety mechanisms can also increase the risk of theft of these weapons. Terrorists are unlikely to be interested in weapons they know they cannot use. Nuclear Accidents Nuclear accidents as a consequence of the improper handling of weapons, or inadequate safety measures, or even dangerous design flaws are always a possibility. Proliferation pessimists like to narrate the story of the Iraqi bomb design, which called for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into its core as to be highly unstable.38 Clearly, India and Pakistan are not Iraq, and the 1998 tests reveal a certain level of design competence in both countries. Nevertheless these dangers cannot and should not be dismissed. Geography and proximity factors, to the extent that they lead to dispersal of these weapons, do increase the chances for accidents. But the most important factor that accentuates the dangers is the possible lack of nuclear weapon safety devices and measures. It is, of course, not clear that India and Pakistan do not have such devices.39 The US introduced Permissive Action Links into their nuclear arsenals in the early 1960s, and the technique is relatively widely known. In addition,assertive controls, especially in India, should reduce the dangers of accidents somewhat. <u>How serious are these dangers</u> and how valid are the claims of the proliferation pessimists? <u>Many of these claims</u> <u>rest on</u> a couple of <u>assumptions about deployment practices, operational imperatives, and crisis behavior</u>. But <u>these assumptions are questionable, </u>both <u>from the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines as well as from actual practices</u>. Indeed, <u><strong>the <mark>prolife</mark>ration <mark>pessimists</mark> either <mark>ignore the doctrinal issue or</mark> completely <mark>misinterpret the effects</mark> of nuclear doctrines <mark>on</mark> the possibility of unintended <mark>nuclear use</u></strong>.</mark>40 <u>A factor that has consistently been ignored in these analyses is that both India and Pakistan have built relatively small arsenals</u>, despite the predictions of some proliferation pessimists that these arsenals would not remain small. As Jordan <u>Seng has shown, <mark>small arsenals have unique advantages</mark>,</u> and these advantages will benefit India and Pakistan. In addition, <u>despite the predictions of pessimists that small arsenals will be highly vulnerable, <mark>neither India nor Pakistan has behaved as if their arsenals are vulnerable t</mark>o a surprise attack</u>. For example, <u><strong><mark>neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear force is thought to be on high alert, let alone on hair-trigger alert</u></strong></mark>. <u>Both assertions about the geographical imperative and the small-size problem predicted high-alert and even hair-trigger alert forces in South Asia. <strong>This, clearly, has not happened</u></strong>. <u>Both <mark>India and Pakistan are</mark> clearly far more <mark>confident of the ability of their nuclear forces to survive</mark> any enemy <mark>first-strike</mark> than proliferation pessimists predicted</u>. Similarly, <u>India has stuck to its no-first-use pledge, despite initial skepticism from external observers</u> (and even several domestic ones). <u>Even Pakistan’s doctrine is generally less dangerous than it is sometimes made out to be.</u> <u>Though Pakistan has a first-use doctrine, it is not a first-strike doctrine</u>, and the difference is considerable. Pakistani doctrine appears to indicate that Pakistan would make a limited strike, on Pakistani territory, against Indian forces that have penetrated deep into Pakistani territory. There is little indication from what we do know about Pakistani doctrine that it will resort to massive attacks at that stage.41 In essence, then, <u><mark>despite the geographical</mark> imperative <mark>and</mark> the s<mark>mall force imperative, there is little indication that either of the South Asian adversaries is embarked on</mark> particularly <mark>dangerous choices</mark> in weapons deployment.</u> Similarly, <u><strong>despite the criticism of the Indian and Pakistani missile programs, <mark>missiles</mark> might actually <mark>have a beneficial effect in reducing the dangers of unintended escalation</u></strong>.</mark> <u>If both sides only had aircraft, they would be tied down to the couple of dozen air bases that both sides have.</u> This would have both made nuclear forces vulnerable, and increased the anxiety of leaders about the survival of their nuclear arsenals. <u>This in turn could have led to high alert levels</u>, with all its attendant dangers. <u><strong><mark>Having mobile missiles </mark>in the mix <mark>increases the confidence of political leaders in the survivability of their nuclear arsenals</mark>, <mark>which reduces anxieties and tensions</mark>, always a good thing when nuclear weapons are involved</u></strong>. A final point also needs to be made, though this has not as much to do with doctrines. <u><mark>If there is one thing that the history of nuclear crises demonstrates, it is that political leaders tend to be very careful in confrontations where nuclear weapons are involved</mark>.</u> In fact, <u><mark>leaders</mark> tend to <mark>reassert control over nuclear forces</mark> and employment policies, <mark>even if normally they tend to delegate</mark> more authority over nuclear weapons to military commanders. This happened with both sides in the Cuban missile crisis</u>.42 Though the evidence is not as clear-cut, such assertion of central authority also appears to have happened to both sides during the Sino-Soviet border war. <u><mark>This</mark> has also <mark>happened in South Asia</mark>, most recently <mark>during the Kargil war,</mark> </u>when both sides undertook a variety of measures to ensure that the crisis did not escalate. On the Indian side, this included the decision not to strike back at Pakistan, either in Kashmir or elsewhere (i.e., the decision to limit the theater of operations), and the decision to use the IAF strictly within Indian borders. Pakistan, similarly, appears to have decided to accept its loss rather than risk a wider war by sending in more troops. <u>In essence, then, political leaders do not let events run away from them. They usually reassert control, especially in crisis time</u>.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Case | Indo-Pak | 1,560,846 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,499 | Scenario One is the South China Sea: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Scenario One is the South China Sea:</h4></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 1,560,845 | 1 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,500 | Text: The United States Federal Government should propose a joint human mission to Mars with the People’s Republic of China | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States Federal Government should propose a joint human mission to Mars with the People’s Republic of China</h4> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 5 | 1,560,847 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,501 | Low timeframe- bill must be passed within the next 200 days. No bipartisanship in Congress makes the process nearly impossible. | Meredith and Fortt 2-28-2017 | Meredith and Fortt 2-28-2017 (Sam Meredith is a digital reporter, Jon Fortt is the co-anchor for “Squawk Alley”, 2-28-2017, "Trump's ambitious tax reforms are unlikely to be implemented by September: PwC Chairman," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/trumps-ambitious-tax-reforms-are-unlikely-to-be-implemented-by-september-pwc-chairman.html) | U.S. President Donald Trump's ambitions to implement "historic" tax reforms would be great for the economy but are too ambitious to be achieved in the short term the ability for the new administration to enact such reform through the necessary legislative process by the fall was questioned The reality of getting something through (by) September… unlikely," Bob Moritz told CNBC at the Mobile World Congress on Wednesday. "We haven't seen a bill yet, so the reality is to try and to get something there in 200 days… I think is very ambitious. the degree of difficulty to get it done is pretty high," | President Trump's ambitions to implement tax reforms are too ambitious to be achieved in the short term the ability for the new administration to enact such reform through the necessary legislative process by the fall was questioned The reality of getting something through (by) September… unlikely We haven't seen a bill yet, so the reality is to try and to get something there in 200 days… I think is very ambitious the degree of difficulty to get it done is pretty high | U.S. President Donald Trump's ambitions to implement "historic" tax reforms would be great for the economy but are too ambitious to be achieved in the short term, according to the Global Chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). Trump said in a speech to Congress on Tuesday that he remained committed to his campaign pledge to provide "massive tax relief" to the middle class and cut corporate tax rates. However, the ability for the new administration to enact such reform through the necessary legislative process by the fall was questioned by the global chairman of U.K. accounting firm PwC. "The reality of getting something through (by) September… unlikely," Bob Moritz told CNBC at the Mobile World Congress on Wednesday. "We haven't seen a bill yet, so the reality is to try and to get something there in 200 days… I think is very ambitious. (It'd be) great if it happens because I think the administration is trying to move with speed but the degree of difficulty to get it done is pretty high," Moritz added. | 1,018 | <h4><strong>Low timeframe- bill must be passed within the next 200 days. No bipartisanship in Congress makes the process nearly impossible.</h4><p>Meredith and Fortt 2-28-2017 </strong>(Sam Meredith is a digital reporter, Jon Fortt is the co-anchor for “Squawk Alley”, 2-28-2017, "Trump's ambitious tax reforms are unlikely to be implemented by September: PwC Chairman," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/trumps-ambitious-tax-reforms-are-unlikely-to-be-implemented-by-september-pwc-chairman.html)</p><p><u><strong>U.S. <mark>President</mark> Donald <mark>Trump's ambitions to implement</mark> "historic" <mark>tax reforms</mark> would be great for the economy but <mark>are too ambitious to be achieved in the short term</u></strong></mark>, according to the Global Chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). Trump said in a speech to Congress on Tuesday that he remained committed to his campaign pledge to provide "massive tax relief" to the middle class and cut corporate tax rates. However, <u><strong><mark>the ability for the new administration to enact such reform through the necessary legislative process by the fall was questioned</u></strong></mark> by the global chairman of U.K. accounting firm PwC. "<u><strong><mark>The reality of getting something through (by) September… unlikely</mark>," Bob Moritz told CNBC at the Mobile World Congress on Wednesday. "<mark>We haven't seen a bill yet, so the reality is to try and to get something there in 200 days… I think is very ambitious</mark>. </u></strong>(It'd be) great if it happens because I think the administration is trying to move with speed but <u><strong><mark>the degree of difficulty to get it done is pretty high</mark>,"</u></strong> Moritz added.</p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 1,560,848 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,502 | Footnoting DA—including the aff makes the K an afterthought | Der Derian 95 | Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374) | A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes | A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes | But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette | 918 | <h4>Footnoting DA—including the aff makes the K an afterthought </h4><p><strong>Der Derian 95</strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><strong><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></strong></mark> definitional <u><strong><mark>gambit with a facile gesture</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The IR theorist</u></strong></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><strong><mark>will note the 'essentially contested'</u></strong> <u><strong>nature of realism</u></strong></mark> - <u><strong>duly <mark>backed up with a footnote</u></strong></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><strong><mark>and then get down to business as usual</u></strong></mark>, that is, <u><strong>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon</u></strong>. <u><strong>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: <mark>in exchange for not contesting</u></strong></mark> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><strong><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong><mark>to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></strong></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette</p> | 2NC | Case | 1 | 224,576 | 30 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,503 | We PIC’ed out of your wolf amendment because the net benefit is wolf amendment disad | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>We PIC’ed out of your wolf amendment because the net benefit is wolf amendment disad</h4> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 5 | 1,560,849 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,504 | Tensions are high now – increased militarism locks in escalation | Heydarian 16 [Richard Javad Heydarian (Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs), Al-Jazeera, “China's aggressive posture in South China Sea”, 2/21/16, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/china-aggressive-posture-south-china-sea-160221074036883.html] | Heydarian 16 [Richard Javad Heydarian (Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs), Al-Jazeera, “China's aggressive posture in South China Sea”, 2/21/16, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/china-aggressive-posture-south-china-sea-160221074036883.html] | The South China Sea disputes are rapidly descending into a quagmire, with potentially explosive ramifications. there "is every evidence, every day that there has been an increase of militarisation [by China] Japan condemned the alleged "unilateral move by China to change the status quo," adding that it "cannot be overlooked there is growing fear that Beijing is determined to fully dominate its adjacent waters at the expense of freedom of navigation and overflight in arguably the world's most important waterway. China's insistence that the US should respect its "core interests" including its territorial claims in adjacent waters was interpreted as a thinly-veiled demand for US non-interference in the South China Sea disputes. China pressed ahead with massive reclamation activities across disputed waters building a sprawling network of dual-purpose facilities and airstrips It made Obama's engagement policy seem like an unequivocal failure. Astounded by the sheer scale and speed of China's "revanchist" activities in disputed waters, the Obama administration switched to a more muscular approach. it began conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied land features in the South China Sea. The US began to deploy destroyers and advanced aircraft to challenge China's sovereignty claims. the commander of the US Pacific Command warned China by stating that "you will see more of them FONOPs and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope in areas of challenge". which prompted China to (once again) deploy the surface-to-air missile platform to the area. Obama has called upon major allies and partners such as Japan, Australia and India to contribute to freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea China will slowly move towards establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone across the whole South China Sea by deploying surface-to-air missiles and advanced military platforms to airstrips and facilities US efforts at constraining China's behaviour has prompted the latter to become even more determined to dominate adjacent waters, Asia seems to be | S C S disputes are potentially explosive ramifications every day that there has been an increase of militarisation Beijing is determined to fully dominate its adjacent waters China pressed ahead with massive reclamation activities US Pacific Command warned China you will see more of them [FONOPs], and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope which prompted China to (once again) deploy the surface-to-air missile platform to the area China will establish an Air Defense Identification Zone Asia seems to be | The South China Sea disputes are rapidly descending into a quagmire, with potentially explosive ramifications. Shortly after United States President Barack Obama concluded a high-profile summit with Southeast Asian leaders, China reportedly deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system to the Paracel chain of islands, which is also claimed by Vietnam. In response, Hanoi immediately lodged a formal complaint at the United Nations, accusing its giant neighbour of "serious infringements of Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels, threatening peace and stability in the region as well as security, safety and freedom of navigation and flight". US Secretary of State John Kerry was emphatic, declaring that there "is every evidence, every day that there has been an increase of militarisation [by China] of one kind or another." He vowed to hold a "very serious conversation" with his Chinese counterparts. The US also accused China of reneging on its earlier promise, delivered by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to the White House last year, to not militarise the disputes. Regional powers such as Japan, which heavily relies on the South China Sea for the shipment of its energy imports, have also pitched in. Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani condemned the alleged "unilateral move by China to change the status quo," adding that it "cannot be overlooked". Chinese officials, however, downplayed the whole affair. Foreign Minister Wang Yi tried to justify the deployment of the advanced military platforms as "limited and necessary self-defence facilities", while the Chinese defence ministry dismissed criticisms over the issue as a Western "hype". Yet, there is growing fear that Beijing is determined to fully dominate its adjacent waters at the expense of freedom of navigation and overflight in arguably the world's most important waterway. Failure of engagement Back in 2013, Obama invited his Chinese counterpart Xi for an intimate, informal summit in Sunnylands resort in California. It was a controversial decision since such "short sleeve" meetings were usually reserved for leaders of the US' dearest allies, such as Japan (as in former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi) and the UK (as in Prime Minister David Cameron). Under his much-touted Pivot to Asia doctrine, the Obama administration was determined to explore a more cooperative relationship with China. In fact, Washington explicitly framed its ties with Beijing as "the most important bilateral relationship in the world," reiterating the necessity for robust engagement with the rising superpower. Xi, however, had other ideas. He interpreted the whole event as an implicit US recognition of China as its new peer in the Asia-Pacific theatre, calling for a "new type of great power relations". In light of China's insistence that the US should respect its "core interests" (PDF), including its territorial claims in adjacent waters, the statement was interpreted as a thinly-veiled demand for US non-interference in the South China Sea disputes. In the following months, China pressed ahead with massive reclamation activities across disputed waters, transforming rocks and atolls into artificial islands and building a sprawling network of dual-purpose facilities and airstrips in both the Paracel and the Spratly island chains. It made Obama's engagement policy seem like an unequivocal failure. Tit-for-tat showdown Astounded by the sheer scale and speed of China's "revanchist" activities in disputed waters, the Obama administration switched to a more muscular approach. On one hand, it began conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied land features in the South China Sea. The US began to deploy destroyers and advanced aircraft to challenge China's sovereignty claims. Admiral Harry B Harris Jr, the commander of the US Pacific Command, effectively warned China by stating that "you will see more of them [FONOPs], and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope in areas of challenge". The latest operation was conducted in the Paracel chain of islands, which most likely prompted China to (once again) deploy the surface-to-air missile platform to the area. The Obama administration, however, is primarily interested in mobilising a multilateral coalition against China. It has called upon major allies and partners such as Japan, Australia and India to contribute to freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea, with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force contemplating the prospects of joint-patrols close to Chinese-occupied land features. To underscore the comprehensive nature of his engagement with Asia, Obama recently also hosted leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at Sunnylands, where he managed to garner the support of regional states, including staunch Chinese allies like Cambodia and Laos, to sign a joint statement that implicitly criticised China's activities in disputed waters. Together with the European Union, the US has also called on China to respect the (likely unfavourable) outcome of the Philippines' arbitration case against China vis-a-vis the maritime disputes. The US and its allies are optimistic that the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague will rule against China's sweeping claims as well as increasingly aggressive posturing in the area. The real fear, however, is that China will slowly move towards establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone across the whole South China Sea by deploying surface-to-air missiles and advanced military platforms to airstrips and facilities in the Paracels and the Spratlys. Ironically, though, US efforts at constraining China's behaviour has prompted the latter to become even more determined to dominate adjacent waters, undermining freedom of overflight and navigation in a waterway that is pivotal to global commerce and energy transport. Asia, the new centre of global economic gravity, seems to be sleepwalking into an all-out conflict. | 6,008 | <h4>Tensions are high now – increased militarism locks in escalation</h4><p><strong>Heydarian 16 <u>[Richard Javad Heydarian (Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs), Al-Jazeera, “China's aggressive posture in South China Sea”, 2/21/16, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/china-aggressive-posture-south-china-sea-160221074036883.html]</p><p>The <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>disputes are</mark> rapidly descending into a quagmire, with <mark>potentially explosive ramifications</mark>. </u></strong>Shortly after United States President Barack Obama concluded a high-profile summit with Southeast Asian leaders, China reportedly deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system to the Paracel chain of islands, which is also claimed by Vietnam. In response, Hanoi immediately lodged a formal complaint at the United Nations, accusing its giant neighbour of "serious infringements of Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels, threatening peace and stability in the region as well as security, safety and freedom of navigation and flight". US Secretary of State John Kerry was emphatic, declaring that <u><strong>there "is every evidence, <mark>every day that there has been an increase of militarisation</mark> [by China] </u></strong>of one kind or another." He vowed to hold a "very serious conversation" with his Chinese counterparts. The US also accused China of reneging on its earlier promise, delivered by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to the White House last year, to not militarise the disputes. Regional powers such as <u><strong>Japan</u></strong>, which heavily relies on the South China Sea for the shipment of its energy imports, have also pitched in. Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani <u><strong>condemned the alleged "unilateral move by China to change the status quo," adding that it "cannot be overlooked</u></strong>". Chinese officials, however, downplayed the whole affair. Foreign Minister Wang Yi tried to justify the deployment of the advanced military platforms as "limited and necessary self-defence facilities", while the Chinese defence ministry dismissed criticisms over the issue as a Western "hype". Yet, <u><strong>there is growing fear that <mark>Beijing is determined to fully dominate its adjacent waters</mark> at the expense of freedom of navigation and overflight in arguably the world's most important waterway. </u></strong>Failure of engagement Back in 2013, Obama invited his Chinese counterpart Xi for an intimate, informal summit in Sunnylands resort in California. It was a controversial decision since such "short sleeve" meetings were usually reserved for leaders of the US' dearest allies, such as Japan (as in former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi) and the UK (as in Prime Minister David Cameron). Under his much-touted Pivot to Asia doctrine, the Obama administration was determined to explore a more cooperative relationship with China. In fact, Washington explicitly framed its ties with Beijing as "the most important bilateral relationship in the world," reiterating the necessity for robust engagement with the rising superpower. Xi, however, had other ideas. He interpreted the whole event as an implicit US recognition of China as its new peer in the Asia-Pacific theatre, calling for a "new type of great power relations". In light of <u><strong>China's insistence that the US should respect its "core interests"</u></strong> (PDF), <u><strong>including its territorial claims in adjacent waters</u></strong>, the statement <u><strong>was interpreted as a thinly-veiled demand for US non-interference in the South China Sea disputes. </u></strong>In the following months, <u><strong><mark>China pressed ahead with massive reclamation activities</mark> across disputed waters</u></strong>, transforming rocks and atolls into artificial islands and <u><strong>building a sprawling network of dual-purpose facilities and airstrips</u></strong> in both the Paracel and the Spratly island chains. <u><strong>It made Obama's engagement policy seem like an unequivocal failure. </u></strong>Tit-for-tat showdown <u><strong>Astounded by the sheer scale and speed of China's "revanchist" activities in disputed waters, the Obama administration switched to a more muscular approach.</u></strong> On one hand, <u><strong>it began conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations </u></strong>(FONOPs) <u><strong>in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied land features in the South China Sea. The US began to deploy destroyers and advanced aircraft to challenge China's sovereignty claims.</u></strong> Admiral Harry B Harris Jr, <u><strong>the commander of the <mark>US Pacific Command</u></strong></mark>, effectively <u><strong><mark>warned China</mark> by stating that "<mark>you will see more of them </u></strong>[<u><strong>FONOPs</u></strong>], <u><strong>and you will see them increasing in complexity and scope</mark> in areas of challenge". </u></strong>The latest operation was conducted in the Paracel chain of islands, <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark> most likely <u><strong><mark>prompted China to (once again) deploy the surface-to-air missile platform to the area</mark>. </u></strong>The <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> administration, however, is primarily interested in mobilising a multilateral coalition against China. It <u><strong>has called upon major allies and partners such as Japan, Australia and India to contribute to freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea</u></strong>, with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force contemplating the prospects of joint-patrols close to Chinese-occupied land features. To underscore the comprehensive nature of his engagement with Asia, Obama recently also hosted leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at Sunnylands, where he managed to garner the support of regional states, including staunch Chinese allies like Cambodia and Laos, to sign a joint statement that implicitly criticised China's activities in disputed waters. Together with the European Union, the US has also called on China to respect the (likely unfavourable) outcome of the Philippines' arbitration case against China vis-a-vis the maritime disputes. The US and its allies are optimistic that the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague will rule against China's sweeping claims as well as increasingly aggressive posturing in the area. The real fear, however, is that <u><strong><mark>China will</mark> slowly move towards <mark>establish</mark>ing <mark>an Air Defense Identification Zone</mark> across the whole South China Sea by deploying surface-to-air missiles and advanced military platforms to airstrips and facilities</u></strong> in the Paracels and the Spratlys. Ironically, though, <u><strong>US efforts at constraining China's behaviour has prompted the latter to become even more determined to dominate adjacent waters,</u></strong> undermining freedom of overflight and navigation in a waterway that is pivotal to global commerce and energy transport. <u><strong><mark>Asia</u></strong></mark>, the new centre of global economic gravity, <u><strong><mark>seems to be </u></mark>sleepwalking into an all-out conflict.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 128,399 | 5 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,505 | Heg is good --- solves a laundry list of impacts (Extra card as external impacts) | Brooks et al. 2013 | Brooks et al. 2013 (Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. “Lean Forward in Defense of American Engagement,” January/February 2013, http://www.stjoe.k12.in.us/ourpages/auto/2013/1/7/40360647/13-0102%20Lean%20Forward.pdf) | In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations | to counter transnational threats terrorism, piracy crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work But cooperation does not come effortlessly U S s' military efforts promote stability and make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives these communication channels are pronounced when it comes to fighting threats that require new cooperation the U S is in a stronger position than it would otherwise to advance cooperatio The U S has the more direct effect of facilitating bargains among governments that get cooperation going used in bargaining situations | What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the TransPacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." | 2,879 | <h4>Heg is good --- solves a laundry list of impacts (Extra card as external impacts)</h4><p><strong>Brooks et al. 2013</strong> (Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. “Lean Forward in Defense of American Engagement,” January/February 2013, http://www.stjoe.k12.in.us/ourpages/auto/2013/1/7/40360647/13-0102%20Lean%20Forward.pdf)</p><p>What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. <u>In order <mark>to counter transnational threats</mark>, such as <mark>terrorism, piracy</mark>, organized <mark>crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work</mark> together and take collective action. <mark>But <strong>cooperation does not come</mark> about <mark>effortlessly</u></strong></mark>, especially when national interests diverge. <u>The <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tate<mark>s'</mark> <mark>military efforts</mark> to <mark>promote stability and</mark> its broader leadership <mark>make it <strong>easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives</u></strong></mark> and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the TransPacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. <u>The benefits of <mark>these communication channels are</mark> especially <mark>pronounced when it comes to fighting</mark> the kinds of <mark>threats that require new</mark> forms of <mark>cooperation</mark>, such as <strong>terrorism and pandemics</u></strong>. With its alliance system in place, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is in a stronger position than it would otherwise</mark> be <mark>to advance cooperatio</mark>n and share burdens. </u>For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates' global role also <mark>has the more direct effect of facilitating</mark> the <mark>bargains among governments that get cooperation going</mark> in the first place</u>. As the scholar Joseph <u>Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies</u>, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, <u>means that the provision of<mark> </mark>protective force can be <mark>used in bargaining situations</u></mark>. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."</p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 42,131 | 332 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,506 | Strict limits enable creativity. Beauty emerges from identifying constraints and working within them. | Flood 10 | Flood 10 (Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692) | thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules Nonsense. it's easier to think outside the box than within its confines outside the box, you don't face rules consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball Unfortunately he can't place those between the foul lines to his fans, he's a loser to limit his hits between the foul poles The most impressive tactic is essentially useless Like the baseball player, we have to operate within limits the greatest artists didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured beauty within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed emotion within ordinary chunks of marble I doubt Beethoven whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a canvas, he didn't agonize over its size Think about Apollo 13 NASA couldn't rewrite physics yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative The next time someone tells you the solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder the best solution may be lurking in a corner of that familiar box | thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules Nonsense consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball Unfortunately he can't place those between the foul lines to his fans, he's a loser Like the baseball player, we have to operate within limits the greatest artists didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured beauty within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed emotion within ordinary chunks of marble I doubt Beethoven whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a canvas he didn't agonize over its size. Think about Apollo 13 NASA couldn't rewrite physics yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative The next time someone tells you the tion involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder the best solution may be lurking in a corner of that familiar box. | It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. Nonsense. Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but it's actually easier to think outside the box than within its confines. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working outside the box, you don't face rules, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball over 450 feet. Unfortunately, he has a wee problem: he can't place those hits between the foul lines, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but to his teammates and the fans, he's a loser who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has to limit his hits to between the foul poles, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. The most dazzling and impressive tactic is essentially useless if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. Like the baseball player, we may not like the realities, but we have to operate within their limits. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet the greatest artists of all time didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured the grace and beauty of France astonishingly well within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed the breathtaking emotion that lurked within ordinary chunks of marble. And I doubt that Beethoven ever whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a blank canvas, it's safe to say that he didn't agonize over its size. He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. Think about the Apollo 13 mission. NASA didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They couldn't rewrite the laws of physics. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative; more important, that was successful. The next time someone tells you that the real solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder. After all, the best solution may very well be lurking in a corner of that familiar box. | 4,700 | <h4>Strict limits enable creativity. Beauty emerges from identifying constraints and working within them. </h4><p><strong>Flood 10</strong> (Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692) </p><p>It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and <u><mark>thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with</mark> <mark>ignoring rules</u></mark> and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. <u><strong><mark>Nonsense</strong></mark>.</u> Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but <u>it's</u> actually <u>easier to think outside the box than within its confines</u>. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working <u>outside the box, you don't face rules</u>, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, <u><mark>consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball</u></mark> over 450 feet. <u><mark>Unfortunately</u></mark>, he has a wee problem: <u><mark>he can't place those</u></mark> hits <u><mark>between the foul lines</u></mark>, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but <u><mark>to his</u></mark> teammates and the <u><mark>fans, he's a loser</u></mark> who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has <u>to limit his hits</u> to <u>between the foul poles</u>, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. <u>The most</u> dazzling and <u>impressive tactic is essentially useless</u> if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. <u><mark>Like the baseball player, we</u></mark> may not like the realities, but we <u><mark>have to operate within</u> </mark>their <u><mark>limits</u></mark>. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet <u><mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>greatest artists</u></strong></mark> of all time <u><mark>didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured</u></mark> the grace and <u><mark>beauty</u></mark> of France astonishingly well <u><mark>within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed</u></mark> the breathtaking <u><mark>emotion</u></mark> that lurked <u><mark>within ordinary</mark> <mark>chunks of marble</u></mark>. And <u><mark>I doubt</u></mark> that <u><mark>Beethoven</u></mark> ever <u><mark>whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano</u></mark>. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. <u><strong><mark>Real creativity</strong> is driven by a <strong>need</strong> to create. When Monet approached a</u></mark> blank <u><mark>canvas</mark>,</u> it's safe to say that <u><mark>he didn't agonize over its size</u>.</mark> He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. <u><mark>Think</mark> <mark>about</u></mark> the <u><mark>Apollo 13</u></mark> mission. <u><mark>NASA</u></mark> didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They <u><mark>couldn't rewrite</u></mark> the laws of <u><mark>physics</u></mark>. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And <u><mark>yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative</u></mark>; more important, that was successful. <u><mark>The next time someone tells you</u></mark> that <u><mark>the</u></mark> real <u>solu<mark>tion involves stepping outside the box, <strong>challenge him or her to think and work harder</u></strong></mark>. After all, <u><mark>the <strong>best solution</strong> may</u></mark> very well <u><mark>be lurking in a corner of that familiar box</u>.</p></mark> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | T | 71,374 | 27 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,507 | Slow growth makes SCS war inevitable – nationalism and miscalculation cause escalation. | Lopez 15 [Linette Lopez (senior finance editor at Business Insider, adjunct professor at the Columbia School of Journalism), 6-2-2015, "China is using one of the most dangerous conflicts on the planet as a distraction," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-using-south-china-sea-conflicts-as-distraction-2015-6] | Lopez 15 [Linette Lopez (senior finance editor at Business Insider, adjunct professor at the Columbia School of Journalism), 6-2-2015, "China is using one of the most dangerous conflicts on the planet as a distraction," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-using-south-china-sea-conflicts-as-distraction-2015-6] | In an effort to stoke nationalism and distract its people from a slowing economy, the Chinese government has been acting aggressively in the South China Sea, engaging in territorial disputes with Japan. This is one of the most dangerous games in the world. China has been diligently building islands in the South China Sea, In April, satellite imagery showed that the Chinese military had built an airstrip big enough for military aircraft. any attempt by the US to stop China from building out parts of the South China Sea would inevitably end in war. The intensity of the conflict will be higher than what people usually think of as 'friction.'" This nationalist stance is no doubt a response to China's slowing economy. Growth and China's rise have always been tied to the modern Chinese identity. as growth slows to maintain nationalistic fervor in the country, China has relied on the South China Sea issue. For several years at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, world leaders have had no trouble pinpointing the greatest threat to global stability. It was the disaster that could result from a conflict between China and Japan over the South China Sea. A conflict that could be sparked by careless action by either party. to save face with its own people in the face of an economic slowdown, the Chinese government is being careless all over the place. politicians are turning the area into an issue of historical pride Beijing and China's (PLA) don't seem to believe the Obama administration will do anything about it, either. white papers put out by the PLA over the past month indicate that while the government may pay lip service to peace, the actions that feed this conflict will continue at a steady clip. | to and distract its people from a slowing economy, the Chinese government has been acting aggressively in the S C S This is the most dangerous games in the world. any attempt by the US to stop China would inevitably end in war h This nationalist stance is no doubt a response to China's slowing economy. Growth and China's rise have always been tied to the modern Chinese identity. as growth slows to maintain nationalistic fervor in the country, China has relied on the South China Sea issue. the greatest threat to global stability A conflict that could be sparked by careless action by either party PLA) don't seem to believe the Obama administration will do anything about it, either | In an effort to stoke nationalism and distract its people from a slowing economy, the Chinese government has been acting particularly aggressively in the South China Sea, engaging in territorial disputes with neighbors including Japan. This is one of the most dangerous games in the world. For over a year China has been diligently building islands on top of reefs in the South China Sea, reclaiming 2,000 acres of land. In April, satellite imagery showed that the Chinese military had built an airstrip big enough for military aircraft. The government has been loud about it, too, declaring its right to reclaim the Spratly Islands, the land around the reefs, on historical grounds. The Global Post, a state tabloid owned by party publication The People's Daily, wrote that any attempt by the US to stop China from building out parts of the South China Sea would inevitably end in war. "If the United States' bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea," the newspaper said. "The intensity of the conflict will be higher than what people usually think of as 'friction.'" This nationalist stance is no doubt a response to China's slowing economy. Growth and China's rise have always been tied to the modern Chinese identity. The government is asking its people to accept a "new normal" as growth slows, debt piles to almost 300% of gross domestic product, construction and property companies default, and credit dries up. But to maintain nationalistic fervor in the country, China has relied on the South China Sea issue. US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently called for an end to reclamation and China's violation of "international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific security architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion." This did not sit well with China at all. "China's construction in the South China Sea is within China's sovereign rights, and its activities are lawful, reasonable, and justified," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told Xinhua News after Carter made those comments at a conference in Singapore. Hua continued: "China's construction activities on the Nansha islands and reefs are entirely within China's sovereignty. They are lawful, justified, and reasonable and do not affect or target any particular country." Of course, particular countries may not feel that way — particularly US ally Japan. For several years at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, world leaders have had no trouble pinpointing the greatest threat to global stability. It wasn't Iraq or Islamic State militants. It wasn't Iran. It was the disaster that could result from a conflict between China and Japan over the South China Sea. A conflict that could be sparked by careless action by either party. Now, to save face with its own people in the face of an economic slowdown, the Chinese government is being careless all over the place. Scholars, journalists, and politicians are all turning the area into an issue of historical pride, regardless of whether historical evidence for China's claim exists. Beijing and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) don't seem to believe the Obama administration will do anything about it, either. "A member of the PLA asked me whether, in 18 months if Hillary Clinton is elected president, will she be much tougher on China than the current administration," Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Bloomberg's Josh Rogin. "I said, 'The premise of your question is that in the next 18 months you have enough running room to do whatever you want.' He just laughed." It seems, according to Rogin, that the PLA equates American caution with weakness. Indeed, white papers put out by the PLA over the past month indicate that while the government may pay lip service to peace, the actions that feed this conflict will continue at a steady clip. "Some offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied," a PLA paper published in May said, according to ChinaDaily. "It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests." It went on to say that the PLA would soon add "'open seas protection" to its traditional mandate of "offshore waters defense." In other words, this is only going to escalate. | 4,461 | <h4><strong>Slow growth makes SCS war inevitable – nationalism and miscalculation cause escalation.</h4><p>Lopez 15 [Linette Lopez (senior finance editor at Business Insider, adjunct professor at the Columbia School of Journalism), 6-2-2015, "China is using one of the most dangerous conflicts on the planet as a distraction," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-using-south-china-sea-conflicts-as-distraction-2015-6]</p><p><u>In an effort <mark>to</mark> stoke nationalism <mark>and distract its people from a slowing economy, the Chinese government has been acting</mark> </u></strong>particularly <u><strong><mark>aggressively in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea, engaging in territorial disputes with</u></strong> neighbors including <u><strong>Japan. <mark>This is </mark>one of <mark>the most dangerous games in the world.</mark> </u></strong>For over a year <u><strong>China has been diligently building islands</u></strong> on top of reefs <u><strong>in the South China Sea,</u></strong> reclaiming 2,000 acres of land. <u><strong>In April, satellite imagery showed that the Chinese military had built an airstrip big enough for military aircraft. </u></strong>The government has been loud about it, too, declaring its right to reclaim the Spratly Islands, the land around the reefs, on historical grounds. The Global Post, a state tabloid owned by party publication The People's Daily, wrote that <u><strong><mark>any attempt by the US to stop China</mark> from building out parts of the South China Sea <mark>would inevitably end in war</mark>.</u></strong> "If the United States' bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea," the newspaper said. "<u><strong>T<mark>h</mark>e intensity of the conflict will be higher than what people usually think of as 'friction.'" <mark>This nationalist stance is no doubt a response to China's slowing economy. Growth and China's rise have always been tied to the modern Chinese identity.</u></strong></mark> The government is asking its people to accept a "new normal" <u><strong><mark>as growth slows</u></strong></mark>, debt piles to almost 300% of gross domestic product, construction and property companies default, and credit dries up. But <u><strong><mark>to maintain nationalistic fervor in the country, China has relied on the South China Sea issue.</u></strong></mark> US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently called for an end to reclamation and China's violation of "international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific security architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion." This did not sit well with China at all. "China's construction in the South China Sea is within China's sovereign rights, and its activities are lawful, reasonable, and justified," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told Xinhua News after Carter made those comments at a conference in Singapore. Hua continued: "China's construction activities on the Nansha islands and reefs are entirely within China's sovereignty. They are lawful, justified, and reasonable and do not affect or target any particular country." Of course, particular countries may not feel that way — particularly US ally Japan. <u><strong>For several years at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, world leaders have had no trouble pinpointing <mark>the greatest threat to global stability</mark>.</u></strong> It wasn't Iraq or Islamic State militants. It wasn't Iran. <u><strong>It was the disaster that could result from a conflict between China and Japan over the South China Sea. <mark>A conflict that could be sparked by careless action by either party</mark>. </u></strong>Now, <u><strong>to save face with its own people in the face of an economic slowdown, the Chinese government is being careless all over the place.</u></strong> Scholars, journalists, and <u><strong>politicians are</u></strong> all <u><strong>turning the area into an issue of historical pride</u></strong>, regardless of whether historical evidence for China's claim exists. <u><strong>Beijing and China's</u></strong> People's Liberation Army <u><strong>(<mark>PLA) don't seem to believe the Obama administration will do anything about it, either</mark>. </u></strong>"A member of the PLA asked me whether, in 18 months if Hillary Clinton is elected president, will she be much tougher on China than the current administration," Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Bloomberg's Josh Rogin. "I said, 'The premise of your question is that in the next 18 months you have enough running room to do whatever you want.' He just laughed." It seems, according to Rogin, that the PLA equates American caution with weakness. Indeed, <u><strong>white papers put out by the PLA over the past month indicate that while the government may pay lip service to peace, the actions that feed this conflict will continue at a steady clip. </u></strong>"Some offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied," a PLA paper published in May said, according to ChinaDaily. "It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests." It went on to say that the PLA would soon add "'open seas protection" to its traditional mandate of "offshore waters defense." In other words, <strong>this is only going to escalate.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 128,391 | 11 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,508 | Space exploration leads neoliberal practices | Gilley, 15 | Gilley, 15 | Soviet Space Program were lumped together , the new Russian Space Agency was created Known as Roscosmos this new institution was from its earliest inception very poorly managed and funded. large degree of decisionmaking and profit seeking was directed by a storied privatized space industry The role played during the Soviet Era by Energia was so great that there is very little practical separation between Energia and the Soviet Space Program. This special relationship between Energia and the Russian Federal Space Program continued once both were moved out of the Soviet system. , the new relationship reflected a much more public-private partnership ). The era of informal privatization of Roscosmos began with the question of continued operation of the Mir space station. Seeing that the station was sound and that there were good financial and scientific reasons to keep it in orbit RSC Energia made the decision to continue operations of Mir well past the 1999 operation window RSC maintained control over the manned space flight aspects of the Russian Space Program, not only handling the launch of Russian astronauts, but also expanding manned launch services to other states and private individuals through a partnership with Space Adventures. Russia suffered from massive cash flow problems related to the wider privatization of Russian industry. The mission parameters of Roscosmos expanded beyond simply operating Russian space missions to become the world’s largest provider of space launches. Russia executes in a single year almost the same number of launches as the rest of the world combined By switching from strictly the government’s route to orbit to becoming the space travel equivalent of UPS Roscosmos counteract declining cash flow from the government Roscosmos has expanded its orbital delivery offerings, becoming one of the primary operators of the Sea Launch initiative This expansion into money-earning activities crucial in keeping Roscosmos afloat and growing during several periods of turmoil since the creation of the Russian Federation. The argument put forth by Mr. Popovkin is that it would take a period of government direction to correct the systemic mismanagement that has characterized Roscosmos up to this point in time. State ownership would also allow the country to restructure the space industry to remove much of the redundant capacity left over from the Soviet Era ( | Space Agency was created Known as inception very poorly managed and funded decisionmaking and profit seeking was directed by a storied privatized space industry the new relationship reflected a much more public-private partnership By switching from strictly the government’s route to orbit to becoming the space travel equivalent of UPS This expansion into money-earning activities crucial in keeping periods of turmoil | [James Luther, Graduate Student at the University of Louisiana “SPACE COPS AND CYBER COWBOYS: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OF THE GOVERNANCE OF SPACE EXPLORATION AND THE INTERNET, Louisiana State University, Page 112-116] KLu
ROSCOSMOS, RSC ENERGIA, and Informal Privatization of Russian Space Activities With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, many of the important state-run activities of the newly reformed Russian Federation found themselves in an institutional lurch. The old Soviet era space industry was not immune to this condition. The activities of the old Soviet Space Program were lumped together and on February 25th, 1992, the new Russian Space Agency was created. Known commonly as Roscosmos, this new institution was from its earliest inception very poorly managed and funded. The first leader of this new institution, Yuri Koptev, was not a bureaucrat with institutional experience, but was instead a designer of Mars landers. The organization itself was not centrally controlled or organized, but instead had various competing design bureaus, all constantly struggling to keep their preferred projects afloat. While Roscosmos was never formally privatized, a large degree of decisionmaking and profit seeking was directed by a storied privatized space industry in Russia, the OAO S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia, or RSC Energia for short. RSC Energia was itself a product of privatization in the same period as Roscosmos, having been previously known as Scientific-Production Association Energia (NPO Energia). During the Soviet era, NPO Energia had been the primary design and construction contractor for the Soviet Space Program. The role played during the Soviet Era by Energia was so great that there is very little practical separation between Energia and the Soviet Space Program. This special relationship between Energia and the Russian Federal Space Program continued once both were moved out of the Soviet system. But instead of this relationship being one between various government entities with similar interests, the new relationship reflected a much more public-private partnership. With decision-making capability at a minimum within Roscosmos proper, RSC Energia began to play a much larger role in deciding the direction of Russian space activities (Harvey, 2007). The era of informal privatization of Roscosmos began with the question of continued operation of the Mir space station. With the station reaching the end of its own predicted usable lifespan, but showing signs that it could survive beyond the “useby date,” a decision had to be made concerning the continued operation of the station by Roscosmos. RKA was at the time in an institutional crisis, with the various competing factions of design bureaus unable to reach any decision on the operation of Mir in the future. It was at this point that the private shareholders board of RSC Energia convened to come to a decision about Mir, as they had been instrumental in the design and construction of the station, as well as its operation. Seeing that the station was sound and that there were good financial and scientific reasons to keep it in orbit, the board of RSC Energia made the decision to continue operations of Mir well past the 1999 operation window. The board of RSC Energia was also instrumental in the Shuttle-Mir program, a program that would lay the groundwork for the creation of the International Space Station, the follow-on project from Mir. RSC Energia also maintained control over the manned space flight aspects of the Russian Space Program, not only handling the launch of Russian astronauts, but also expanding manned launch services to other states and private individuals through a partnership with Space Adventures. Beyond simply the question of continuing to operate the Mir station, RSC Energia also expanded its role in the other operations of Roscosmos. While Roscosmos began to suffer from management issues, larger problems in Russian society also began to affect the Russian Space Program. From the inception of the Russian Federation until well into the early years of the 2000s, Russia suffered from massive cash flow problems related to the wider privatization of Russian industry. This situation saw Roscosmos privatized in a second informal manner. The mission parameters of Roscosmos expanded beyond simply operating Russian space missions to become the world’s largest provider of space launches. On the back of the RSC Energia-designed Soyuz and Proton rockets, Russia executes in a single year almost the same number of launches as the rest of the world combined (SpaceFlightNow, 2015). By switching from strictly the government’s route to orbit to becoming the space travel equivalent of UPS, Roscosmos was able to counteract the problem of declining cash flow from the government. Roscosmos continues to supplement its own governmental budget by acting as the world’s orbital delivery service. Furthermore, Roscosmos has expanded its orbital delivery offerings, becoming one of the primary operators of the Sea Launch initiative. This expansion into money-earning activities, both commercial and tourism-based has been crucial in keeping Roscosmos afloat and growing during several periods of turmoil since the creation of the Russian Federation. Roscosmos has been rather successful during the period of two-pronged privatization, but, as with all things in Russia, the situation is contingent of political activity. With the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term, a push originating from Roscosmos itself has begun to change the status quo of both Roscosmos and the Russian space industry as a whole (Harvey, 2007). In dealing with the various problems of mismanagement that have come from both the institutional structure and poor leadership of Roscosmos, Vladimir Popovkin, the then head of Roscosmos, called for RKA to be made into a wholly state-owned corporation for a period of five-seven years. Following this period of re-nationalization, RKA should then be turned into a joint-stock company. The argument put forth by Mr. Popovkin is that it would take a period of government direction to correct the systemic mismanagement that has characterized Roscosmos up to this point in time. State ownership would also allow the country to restructure the space industry to remove much of the redundant capacity left over from the Soviet Era (Interfax 2012). | 6,506 | <h4><strong>Space exploration leads neoliberal practices</h4><p>Gilley, 15 </p><p></strong>[James Luther, Graduate Student at the University of Louisiana “SPACE COPS AND CYBER COWBOYS: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OF THE GOVERNANCE OF SPACE EXPLORATION AND THE INTERNET, Louisiana State University, Page 112-116] KLu</p><p>ROSCOSMOS, RSC ENERGIA, and Informal Privatization of Russian Space Activities With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, many of the important state-run activities of the newly reformed Russian Federation found themselves in an institutional lurch. The old Soviet era space industry was not immune to this condition. The activities of the old <u>Soviet Space Program were lumped together</u> and on February 25th, 1992<u>, the new Russian <mark>Space Agency was created</u></mark>. <u><mark>Known</u></mark> commonly <u><mark>as</mark> Roscosmos</u>, <u>this new institution was from its earliest <mark>inception very poorly managed and funded</mark>.</u> The first leader of this new institution, Yuri Koptev, was not a bureaucrat with institutional experience, but was instead a designer of Mars landers. The organization itself was not centrally controlled or organized, but instead had various competing design bureaus, all constantly struggling to keep their preferred projects afloat. While Roscosmos was never formally privatized, a <u><strong>large degree of <mark>decisionmaking and profit seeking was directed by a storied privatized space industry</u></strong></mark> in Russia, the OAO S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia, or RSC Energia for short. RSC Energia was itself a product of privatization in the same period as Roscosmos, having been previously known as Scientific-Production Association Energia (NPO Energia). During the Soviet era, NPO Energia had been the primary design and construction contractor for the Soviet Space Program. <u>The role played during the Soviet Era by Energia was so great that there is very little practical separation between Energia and the Soviet Space Program. This special relationship between Energia and the Russian Federal Space Program continued once both were moved out of the Soviet system.</u> But instead of this relationship being one between various government entities with similar interests<u>, <mark>the new relationship reflected a much more public-private partnership</u></mark>. With decision-making capability at a minimum within Roscosmos proper, RSC Energia began to play a much larger role in deciding the direction of Russian space activities (Harvey, 2007<u>). The era of informal privatization of Roscosmos began with the question of continued operation of the Mir space station.</u> With the station reaching the end of its own predicted usable lifespan, but showing signs that it could survive beyond the “useby date,” a decision had to be made concerning the continued operation of the station by Roscosmos. RKA was at the time in an institutional crisis, with the various competing factions of design bureaus unable to reach any decision on the operation of Mir in the future. It was at this point that the private shareholders board of RSC Energia convened to come to a decision about Mir, as they had been instrumental in the design and construction of the station, as well as its operation. <u>Seeing that the station was sound and that there were good financial and scientific reasons to keep it in orbit</u>, the board of <u>RSC</u> <u>Energia</u> <u>made the decision to continue operations of Mir well past the 1999 operation window</u>. The board of RSC Energia was also instrumental in the Shuttle-Mir program, a program that would lay the groundwork for the creation of the International Space Station, the follow-on project from Mir. <u>RSC</u> Energia also <u>maintained control over the manned space flight aspects of the Russian Space Program, not only handling the launch of Russian astronauts, but also expanding manned launch services to other states and private individuals through a partnership with Space Adventures.</u> Beyond simply the question of continuing to operate the Mir station, RSC Energia also expanded its role in the other operations of Roscosmos. While Roscosmos began to suffer from management issues, larger problems in Russian society also began to affect the Russian Space Program. From the inception of the Russian Federation until well into the early years of the 2000s, <u>Russia suffered from massive cash flow problems related to the wider privatization of Russian industry.</u> This situation saw Roscosmos privatized in a second informal manner. <u>The mission parameters of Roscosmos expanded beyond simply operating Russian space missions to become the world’s largest provider of space launches.</u> On the back of the RSC Energia-designed Soyuz and Proton rockets, <u>Russia executes in a single year almost the same number of launches as the rest of the world combined</u> (SpaceFlightNow, 2015). <u><strong><mark>By switching from strictly the government’s route to orbit to becoming the space travel equivalent of UPS</u></strong></mark>, <u>Roscosmos</u> was able to <u>counteract</u> the problem of <u>declining cash flow from the government</u>. Roscosmos continues to supplement its own governmental budget by acting as the world’s orbital delivery service. Furthermore, <u>Roscosmos has expanded its orbital delivery offerings, becoming one of the primary operators of the Sea Launch initiative</u>. <u><mark>This expansion into money-earning activities</u></mark>, both commercial and tourism-based has been <u><mark>crucial in keeping</mark> Roscosmos afloat and growing during several <mark>periods of turmoil</mark> since the creation of the Russian Federation.</u> Roscosmos has been rather successful during the period of two-pronged privatization, but, as with all things in Russia, the situation is contingent of political activity. With the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term, a push originating from Roscosmos itself has begun to change the status quo of both Roscosmos and the Russian space industry as a whole (Harvey, 2007). In dealing with the various problems of mismanagement that have come from both the institutional structure and poor leadership of Roscosmos, Vladimir Popovkin, the then head of Roscosmos, called for RKA to be made into a wholly state-owned corporation for a period of five-seven years. Following this period of re-nationalization, RKA should then be turned into a joint-stock company. <u>The argument put forth by Mr. Popovkin is that it would take a period of government direction to correct the systemic mismanagement that has characterized Roscosmos up to this point in time. State ownership would also allow the country to restructure the space industry to remove much of the redundant capacity left over from the Soviet Era (</u>Interfax 2012).</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 6 | 181,167 | 2 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,509 | Decline destroys Afghani stability --- results in greater central Asian instability and conflict --- also results in international terrorism | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 96-97)//JBS | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 96-97)//JBS | Devastated by nine years of extraordinarily brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union ignored by the West mismanaged by the medieval Taliban rulers and exposed during the Bush presidency to seven years of halfhearted US military operations Afghanistan is a country in shambles It has little economic output Only 15– 20% of Afghans have access to electricity The most likely results of a rapid US disengagement brought on by war fatigue or the early effects of an American decline would be internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan the country would be dominated by rival warlords Pakistan and India would more assertively and openly compete for influence in Afghanistan with Iran also probably involved. the possibility of at least an indirect war between India and Pakistan would increase Iran would likely try to exploit the Pakistani-Indian rivalry India and Iran fear that any increase in Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would severely affect the regional balance of power and in India’s case compound the belligerent stance of Pakistan adjoining central Asian states could become involved in the regional power play as well the more players involved in Afghanistan the more likely it is that a larger regional conflict could break out even if a solid Afghan government is in place at the time of American disengagement a subsequent failure to sustain US-sponsored international involvement in the region’s stability is likely to reignite the embers of ethnic and religious passions The Taliban could reemerge as the major disruptive force in Afghanistan Afghanistan could descend into a state of tribal warlordism Afghanistan could become a larger player in the international drug trade and a haven for international terrorism | The most likely results of a rapid US disengagement or an American decline would be internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan Pakistan and India would openly compete for influence with Iran also involved the possibility of at least an indirect war between India and Pakistan would increase any increase in Pakistani influence would compound the belligerent stance of Pakistan the more players involved a larger regional conflict could break out American disengagement is likely to reignite the embers of ethnic passions The Taliban could reemerge as the major disruptive force in Afghanistan Afghanistan could become a haven for international terrorism | Afghanistan Devastated by nine years of extraordinarily brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union, ignored by the West for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, mismanaged by the medieval Taliban rulers who seized power with Pakistani assistance, and exposed during the Bush presidency to seven years of halfhearted US military operations and sporadic economic assistance, Afghanistan is a country in shambles. It has little economic output outside of its illegal narcotics trade, with 40% unemployment and a global ranking of 219th in GDP per capita. Only 15– 20% of Afghans have access to electricity. The most likely results of a rapid US disengagement brought on by war fatigue or the early effects of an American decline would be internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of an effective and stable government in Kabul, the country would be dominated by rival warlords. Both Pakistan and India would more assertively and openly compete for influence in Afghanistan— with Iran also probably involved. As the result, the possibility of at least an indirect war between India and Pakistan would increase. Iran would likely try to exploit the Pakistani-Indian rivalry in seeking advantage for itself. Both India and Iran fear that any increase in Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would severely affect the regional balance of power, and in India’s case compound the belligerent stance of Pakistan. In addition, adjoining central Asian states— given the presence of significant Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Turkmen communities in Afghanistan— could become involved in the regional power play as well. And the more players involved in Afghanistan, the more likely it is that a larger regional conflict could break out. Second, even if a solid Afghan government is in place at the time of currently planned American disengagement— with some semblance of central control— a subsequent failure to sustain US-sponsored international involvement in the region’s stability is likely to reignite the embers of ethnic and religious passions. The Taliban could reemerge as the major disruptive force in Afghanistan— with help from the Pakistani Taliban— and/or Afghanistan could descend into a state of tribal warlordism. Afghanistan then could become a still larger player in the international drug trade, and even perhaps again a haven for international terrorism. | 2,430 | <h4>Decline destroys Afghani stability --- results in greater central Asian instability and conflict --- also results in international terrorism</h4><p><strong>Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 96-97)//JBS</p><p></strong>Afghanistan <u>Devastated by nine years of extraordinarily brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union</u>, <u>ignored by the West</u> for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, <u>mismanaged by the medieval Taliban rulers</u> who seized power with Pakistani assistance, <u>and exposed during the Bush presidency to seven years of halfhearted US military operations</u> and sporadic economic assistance, <u>Afghanistan is a country in shambles</u>. <u>It has little economic output</u> outside of its illegal narcotics trade, with 40% unemployment and a global ranking of 219th in GDP per capita. <u>Only 15– 20% of Afghans have access to electricity</u>. <u><strong><mark>The most likely results of a rapid US disengagement</mark> brought on by war fatigue <mark>or</mark> the early effects of <mark>an American decline would be internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan</u></strong></mark>. In the absence of an effective and stable government in Kabul, <u>the country would be dominated by rival warlords</u>. Both <u><mark>Pakistan and India would</mark> more assertively and <mark>openly compete for influence</mark> in Afghanistan</u>— <u><mark>with Iran also</mark> probably <mark>involved</mark>.</u> As the result, <u><strong><mark>the possibility of at least an indirect war between India and Pakistan would increase</u></strong></mark>. <u>Iran would likely try to exploit the Pakistani-Indian rivalry</u> in seeking advantage for itself. Both <u>India and Iran fear that <mark>any increase in Pakistani influence</mark> in Afghanistan <mark>would</mark> severely affect the regional balance of power</u>, <u>and in India’s case <strong><mark>compound the belligerent stance of Pakistan</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u>adjoining central Asian states</u>— given the presence of significant Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Turkmen communities in Afghanistan— <u>could become involved in the regional power play as well</u>. And <u><mark>the more players involved</mark> in Afghanistan</u>, <u>the more likely it is that <strong><mark>a larger regional conflict could break out</u></strong></mark>. Second, <u>even if a solid Afghan government is in place at the time of </u>currently<u> </u>planned<u> <mark>American disengagement</u></mark>— with some semblance of central control— <u>a subsequent failure to sustain US-sponsored international involvement in the region’s stability <mark>is likely to reignite the embers of</mark> <mark>ethnic</mark> and religious <mark>passions</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The Taliban could reemerge as the major disruptive force in Afghanistan</u></strong></mark>— with help from the Pakistani Taliban— and/or <u>Afghanistan could descend into a state of tribal warlordism</u>. <u><mark>Afghanistan</u></mark> then <u><mark>could become a</mark> </u>still <u>larger player in the international drug trade</u>, <u>and</u> even perhaps again <u>a <strong><mark>haven for international terrorism</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 424,451 | 10 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,510 | Economic integration stops all conflict in East Asia | Drysdale, East Asia forum editor, 2012 | Drysdale, East Asia forum editor, 2012
(Peter, “Asia’s economic and political interdependence”, 5-28, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/28/asias-economic-and-political-interdependence/, DOA: 10-15-12, ldg) | East Asia’s economy has prospered and economic relationships thrived The positive economic relationships have also come to dominate conflictual political relationships. The open system had other benefits, strengthening bilateral economic relationships and acting as ballast in sensitive bilateral political and strategic relations. Growing regional economic interdependence has reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in the region. The huge economic relationship that has grown between the two countries over the past two decades has changed the tone of their political relationship since China embraced the global trading rules and norms, under which Japan has operated with American support since the Second World War. The ‘scale and depth of the economic relationship is reshaping their political relationship in ways that underline its cooperative more than its conflictual elements’ Tensions will continue to arise from time to time between the two big neighbours — as they did around the maritime incident of 2010 — but what stands out is that stronger economic relationships have reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in East Asia. The relative stability of the region and the lessening of political tensions that has accompanied regional economic integration have importantly been secured within the framework of global economic institutions that made the growing economic interdependence possible. And keeping the global system strong and open will remain the key to both the economic and the political pay-off from Asian integration. | East Asia’s economy has prospered The positive economic relationships have come to dominate conflictual political relationships. The open system had other benefits, strengthening sensitive political and strategic relations. Growing regional interdependence has reinforced a more stable strategic environment in the region. The economic relationship between the two countries has changed the tone of their political relationship since China embraced global norms The ‘scale and depth of the economic relationship is reshaping their political relationship in ways that underline its cooperative more than its conflictual elements’, Tensions will continue to arise from time to time but stronger economic relationships have reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in East Asia | Despite the political and diplomatic tensions, East Asia’s economy has prospered and economic relationships thrived. Only North Korea and Myanmar have remained apart from East Asia’s spectacular economic integration. Up to this point, they have been a major source of regional security anxieties, though it appears Myanmar is about to change course. The positive economic relationships have also come to dominate conflictual political relationships. Asia’s economies were huge beneficiaries of the open trading system that was set in place in the post-war period. In the early stages of their economic transformation, open markets provided them with an outlet for simple manufactures produced by their large pools of relatively unskilled labour. Their growth was initially driven by labour-intensive exports and with rising incomes, higher rates of investment in human and physical capital have allowed progress up the value-add chain. The open system had other benefits, strengthening bilateral economic relationships — built on increasing trade flows and greater levels of integration — and acting as ballast in sensitive bilateral political and strategic relations. Growing regional economic interdependence has reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in the region. In this week’s lead essay Shiro Armstrong underlines the importance of the global trading framework not only in delivering large income gains from trade but also in improving political relations between China and Japan, two countries that have the third-biggest trading relationship in the world. ‘Japan and China are often seen as adversaries’, Armstrong points out, ‘locked into bickering and an historically antagonistic relationship’. They may be neighbouring economic giants but they would appear to have a host of unresolved historical issues to deal with and a natural rivalry for regional and now global influence. ‘But the rivalry and historical baggage no longer dominates the China–Japan relationship today’, Armstrong argues. The huge economic relationship that has grown between the two countries over the past two decades has changed the tone of their political relationship since China embraced the global trading rules and norms, under which Japan has operated with American support since the Second World War. The ‘scale and depth of the economic relationship is reshaping their political relationship in ways that underline its cooperative more than its conflictual elements’, says Armstrong. Nor is the China–Japan relationship a narrowly bilateral relationship. It underpins regional growth and prosperity and plays a major role in the East Asian economic interdependence and the regional production networks that have created it. The bilateral relationship is nestled in a complex set of links led by trade and investment throughout the region. Regional economic partners cannot view their relationships with Japan in isolation of their relationships with China. And Japan’s relationships with them are closely bound up with China. Japanese firms — once manufacturing powerhouses confined largely to Japan— now produce over 45 per cent of their electronics output and 33 per cent of all their manufacturing output offshore, a very large portion of that in China. Like most international brands, Sony, Panasonic and the Japanese big-name brand products are put together in China and elsewhere in Asia, and products made in China frequently come with a Japanese name. Tensions will continue to arise from time to time between the two big neighbours — as they did around the maritime incident of 2010 — but what stands out is that stronger economic relationships have reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in East Asia. The relative stability of the region and the lessening of political tensions that has accompanied regional economic integration have importantly been secured within the framework of global economic institutions that made the growing economic interdependence possible. And keeping the global system strong and open will remain the key to both the economic and the political pay-off from Asian integration. | 4,156 | <h4><strong>Economic integration stops all conflict in East Asia</h4><p>Drysdale, East Asia forum editor, 2012</p><p></strong>(Peter, “Asia’s economic and political interdependence”, 5-28, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/28/asias-economic-and-political-interdependence/, DOA: 10-15-12, ldg)</p><p><u> </p><p></u> Despite the political and diplomatic tensions, <u><mark>East Asia’s economy has prospered</mark> and economic relationships thrived</u>. Only North Korea and Myanmar have remained apart from East Asia’s spectacular economic integration. Up to this point, they have been a major source of regional security anxieties, though it appears Myanmar is about to change course. <u><mark>The positive economic relationships have</mark> also <mark>come to dominate conflictual political relationships.</mark> </u>Asia’s economies were huge beneficiaries of the open trading system that was set in place in the post-war period. In the early stages of their economic transformation, open markets provided them with an outlet for simple manufactures produced by their large pools of relatively unskilled labour. Their growth was initially driven by labour-intensive exports and with rising incomes, higher rates of investment in human and physical capital have allowed progress up the value-add chain. <u><mark>The open system had other benefits, strengthening</mark> bilateral economic relationships</u> — built on increasing trade flows and greater levels of integration — <u>and acting as ballast in <mark>sensitive</mark> bilateral <mark>political and strategic relations. Growing regional</mark> economic <mark>interdependence has reinforced a more stable strategic</mark> and political <mark>environment in the region.</u></mark> In this week’s lead essay Shiro Armstrong underlines the importance of the global trading framework not only in delivering large income gains from trade but also in improving political relations between China and Japan, two countries that have the third-biggest trading relationship in the world. ‘Japan and China are often seen as adversaries’, Armstrong points out, ‘locked into bickering and an historically antagonistic relationship’. They may be neighbouring economic giants but they would appear to have a host of unresolved historical issues to deal with and a natural rivalry for regional and now global influence. ‘But the rivalry and historical baggage no longer dominates the China–Japan relationship today’, Armstrong argues. <u><mark>The</mark> huge <mark>economic relationship</mark> that has grown <mark>between the two countries</mark> over the past two decades <mark>has changed the tone of their political relationship since China embraced</mark> the <mark>global</mark> trading rules and <mark>norms</mark>, under which Japan has operated with American support since the Second World War.</u> <u><strong><mark>The ‘scale and depth of the economic relationship is reshaping their political relationship in ways that underline its cooperative more than its conflictual elements’</u></strong>,</mark> says Armstrong. Nor is the China–Japan relationship a narrowly bilateral relationship. It underpins regional growth and prosperity and plays a major role in the East Asian economic interdependence and the regional production networks that have created it. The bilateral relationship is nestled in a complex set of links led by trade and investment throughout the region. Regional economic partners cannot view their relationships with Japan in isolation of their relationships with China. And Japan’s relationships with them are closely bound up with China. Japanese firms — once manufacturing powerhouses confined largely to Japan— now produce over 45 per cent of their electronics output and 33 per cent of all their manufacturing output offshore, a very large portion of that in China. Like most international brands, Sony, Panasonic and the Japanese big-name brand products are put together in China and elsewhere in Asia, and products made in China frequently come with a Japanese name. <u><mark>Tensions will continue to arise from time to time</mark> between the two big neighbours — as they did around the maritime incident of 2010 — <mark>but</mark> what stands out is that <mark>stronger economic relationships have reinforced a more stable strategic and political environment in East Asia</mark>. The relative stability of the region and the lessening of political tensions that has accompanied regional economic integration have importantly been secured within the framework of global economic institutions that made the growing economic interdependence possible. And keeping the global system strong and open will remain the key to both the economic and the political pay-off from Asian integration. </p></u> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | ECS | 441,455 | 6 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,511 | Goes nuclear rapidly and draws in the U.S. – no checks | Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University & Desmond Ball, Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?” Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014 Survival: Global Politics and Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441] | Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University & Desmond Ball, Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?” Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014 Survival: Global Politics and Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441] | In the strategic relationship between Japan and China, however, there are problems at both the political and military–technical levels. there seems to be minimal political understanding of, or commitment to, avoiding escalation. It is hard to tell whether Japan and China will see it as in their political interests to constrain what begins as a minor conflict. These political obstacles increase the pressure created by military considerations that encourage swift escalation, to the point at which even nuclear options seem attractive. The close military links between Japan and the US would not necessarily encourage restraint. It may be militarily logical for the US to place China in a position in which further escalation seemed tempting, while it could be politically logical for Japan to create conditions in which American action became more likely. An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China might veer out of control before they had a chance to take preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the United States could lead to Asia's first serious war involving nuclear-armed states. And we have no precedent to suggest how dangerous that would become. | China will see it as in their political interests to constrain what begins as a minor conflict which even nuclear options seem attractive. US would not necessarily encourage restraint An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China veer out of control before they had a chance to take preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the United States could lead to Asia war | In the strategic relationship between Japan and China, however, there are problems at both the political and military–technical levels. Firstly, there seems to be minimal political understanding of, or commitment to, avoiding escalation. It is hard to tell whether Japan and China will see it as in their political interests to constrain what begins as a minor conflict. These political obstacles increase the pressure created by military considerations that encourage swift escalation, to the point at which even nuclear options seem attractive. The close military links between Japan and the US would not necessarily encourage restraint. It may be militarily logical for the US to place China in a position in which further escalation seemed tempting, while it could be politically logical for Japan to create conditions in which American action became more likely. An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China over the East China Sea could remain just that: a short, contained exchange of fire and a sobering lesson that encouraged much-needed efforts to improve communication and recognise their common interest in avoiding conflict. But it might also veer out of control before they had a chance to take preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the United States could lead to Asia's first serious war involving nuclear-armed states. And we have no precedent to suggest how dangerous that would become. | 1,433 | <h4><strong>Goes nuclear rapidly and draws in the U.S. – no checks </h4><p>Ayson & Ball 14 <u>[Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University & Desmond Ball, Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?” Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014 Survival: Global Politics and Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441]</p><p>In the strategic relationship between Japan and China, however, there are problems at both the political and military–technical levels.</u></strong> Firstly, <u><strong>there seems to be minimal political understanding of, or commitment to, avoiding escalation. It is hard to tell whether Japan and <mark>China will see it as in their political interests to constrain what begins as a minor conflict</mark>. These political obstacles increase the pressure created by military considerations that encourage swift escalation, to the point at <mark>which even nuclear options seem attractive.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The close military links between Japan and the <mark>US would not necessarily encourage restraint</mark>. It may be militarily logical for the US to place China in a position in which further escalation seemed tempting, while it could be politically logical for Japan to create conditions in which American action became more likely. <mark>An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China</mark> </u></strong>over the East China Sea could remain just that: a short, contained exchange of fire and a sobering lesson that encouraged much-needed efforts to improve communication and recognise their common interest in avoiding conflict. But it <u><strong>might</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>veer out of control</u></strong> <u><strong>before they had a chance to take preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the United States could lead to Asia</mark>'s first serious <mark>war</mark> involving nuclear-armed states. And we have no precedent to suggest how dangerous that would become.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 66,562 | 46 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,512 | Heg solves central Asian nuke war | Kagan 2007 | Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007 [Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10] | the United States insisted on preserving regional predominance in , Central Asia the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus The United States having entered a region are remarkably slow to withdraw The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system Nationalism is back Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars more catastrophic | the U S insisted on preserving regional predominance in Central Asia, and the Caucasus it is engaged in competitions with China in Central Asia and Russia in Central Asia, and the Caucasus Were the U S to diminish its influence in the regions other nations would settle disputes through wars such a multipolar world these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars more catastrophic | Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. | 2,474 | <h4>Heg solves central Asian nuke war</h4><p><strong>Kagan</strong>, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <strong>2007<u></strong> [Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]</p><p></u>Finally, there is <u><mark>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</u> itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have <u><mark>insisted on preserving regional</mark> <mark>predominance in</u></mark> East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly<u>, Central Asia</u>. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, <u>the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, <mark>Central Asia, and the Caucasus</u></mark>. Even <u>as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, <mark>it is</mark> also <mark>engaged in</mark> hegemonic <mark>competitions</mark> in these regions <mark>with China in</mark> East and <mark>Central Asia</mark>, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, <mark>and</mark> with <mark>Russia in</mark> Eastern Europe, <mark>Central Asia, and the Caucasus</u></mark>. <u>The United States</u>, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once <u>having entered a region</u>, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they <u>are remarkably slow to withdraw</u> from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. <u>The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations</u> and would-be nations <u>is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system</u>. <u>Nationalism </u>in all its forms <u>is back</u>, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. <u><mark>Were the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to diminish its influence in the regions</mark> where it is currently the strongest power, the <mark>other nations would settle disputes</mark> </u>as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often<u> <mark>through</mark> confrontation and <mark>wars</mark> of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of <mark>such a multipolar world</mark> is that most of <mark>these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars</mark> </u>between them less likely, or it could simply make them<u> <mark>more catastrophic</u><strong></mark>. </p></strong> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 87,745 | 63 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,513 | The alternative is to break economic rationality and refuse 1AC | Meszaros 8 | Meszaros 8 | The unreality of postulation the solution within the formal framework and constraints of politics arises from the fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule since capital is in control of all aspects of the social metabolism it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies, is necessary to radically challenge capital itself The “social productive powers of labor appear as immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. Capital cannot be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework the only challenge that could affect the power of capital is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process that must be initiated right in our own historical time It means, in the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society | The unreality of postulation the solution within the framework and constraints of politics arises from the misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule capital is in control of all aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies necessary to challenge capital capital’s mode of reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform the only challenge is one which would aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes instead of being hopelessly constrained by institutionally legitimated political action | (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)
The unreality of postulation the sustainable solution of the grave problems of our social order within the formal and legal framework and corresponding constraints of parliamentary politics arises from the fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that since capital is actually in control of all vital aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter, thereby necessarily excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies, now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it is necessary to radically challenge capital itself as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. The “social productive powers of labor, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence appear as something immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. Capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It cannot possibly be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus the only challenge that could affect the power of capital, in a sustainable manner, is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices. The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process that must be initiated right in our own historical time. It means, in plain language, the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise. | 12,373 | <h4>The alternative is to <strong>break economic rationality and refuse 1AC</h4><p>Meszaros 8 </p><p>(Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)</p><p><u><mark>The unreality of postulation</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> sustainable <u><strong><mark>solution</u></strong></mark> of the grave problems of our social order <u><strong><mark>within</mark> <mark>the</mark> formal</u></strong> and legal <u><strong><mark>framework</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> corresponding <u><strong><mark>constraints</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong></mark> parliamentary <u><strong><mark>politics</mark> <mark>arises from the</mark> fundamental <mark>misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule</u></strong></mark>, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that <u><strong>since <mark>capital is</u></strong></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>in control of all</u></strong></mark> vital <u><strong><mark>aspects of the social metabolism</u></strong>, <u><strong>it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter</u></strong></mark>, thereby necessarily <u><strong><mark>excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged</u></strong></mark> in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. <u><strong><mark>TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies</mark>,</u></strong> now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it <u><strong>is <mark>necessary to</mark> radically <mark>challenge capital</mark> itself</u></strong> as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. <u><strong>The “social productive powers of labor</u></strong>, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence <u><strong>appear</u></strong> <u><strong>as</u></strong> something <u><strong>immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is how <mark>capital’s mode of</mark> social metabolic <mark>reproduction</mark> <mark>becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system</u></strong>. <u><strong>Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure</mark>. </u></strong>The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. <u><strong><mark>None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform</mark>. </u></strong>It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. <u><strong>Capital</u></strong> is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It <u><strong>cannot</u></strong> possibly <u><strong>be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power.</u></strong> And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, <u><strong>it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework</u></strong>. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus <u><strong><mark>the only challenge</mark> that could affect the power of capital</u></strong>, in a sustainable manner, <u><strong><mark>is one which would</mark> simultaneously <mark>aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes</mark> in all spheres, <mark>instead of being hopelessly constrained by </mark>the circular confinement of <mark>institutionally legitimated political action</mark> to parliamentary legislation</u></strong>. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, <u><strong>in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices</u></strong>. <u><strong>The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system</u></strong>. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, <u><strong>the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process</strong> <strong>that must be initiated right in our own historical time</u></strong>. <u><strong>It means, in</u></strong> plain language, <u><strong>the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society</u></strong>. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise. </p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 6 | 52,612 | 28 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,514 | No risk of South China Sea conflict – economic interests, lack of US engagement and precedent against conflict checks. | Valencia 4/9/2014 | Valencia, attending the Boao Forum for Asia, is a visiting senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Hainan, Previous Senior Fellow with the East-West Center, M.A. in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D in Oceanography from the University of Hawaii, Fulbright Fellow, an Abe Fellow, a DAAD (German Government) Fellow, an International Institute for Asian Studies ( Leiden University) Visiting Fellow , an Ocean Policy Research Foundation (Japan) Visiting Scholar and a U.S. State Department –sponsored international speaker, 4/9/2014 “South China Sea dispute rolls on with no resolution in sight” http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1468906/south-china-sea-dispute-rolls-no-resolution-sight | Despite rising tension in the South China Sea and alarmists' warnings of conflagration war is still well over the horizon - and is not inevitable But full-scale conventional war is unlikely There are too many negatives the US-China competition seems to fit the "Thucydides trap" - the theory that the dominant power and a rising power will inevitably clash China and the US are already "clashing But a full-blown conflict is hardly written in stone. Both are preoccupied with other significant matters China with its economic development, internal instability and burgeoning conflict with Japan The US on ongoing international conflicts, that with Russia over Crimea being the latest deflating fiasco. neither are "ready" for war China is not yet ready technologically for an all-out conflict the US is two decades ahead militarily war-fatigued US public and military are not ready for war The US is working very hard behind the scenes to discourage its allies from provoking China into the use of force and is thus unlikely to allow smaller countries - allies or not - to draw it into a wide regional conflict. there is no fundamental US security interest at stake those that see weakness in US restraint will not miscalculate The US cites freedom of navigation as a "national interest" but it well knows that China has never threatened freedom of commercial navigation and is highly unlikely to do so The US-China incidents at sea stemmed from purposely provocative US intelligence and reconnaissance probes China justifies its interference it claims through reference to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties Through it, the parties agree "to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate affect peace there are also International Court of Justice precedents that urge rival disputants to refrain from unilateral activities in disputed areas. in what it views as an exercise of self-restraint, China always uses civilian vessels to enforce what it perceives as its rights And the Philippines, presumably under considerable pressure from the US, is demonstrating considerable restraint the US will bluster and bluff And it may well deploy more assets to the region and verbally and technologically back up its ally. There may be a rise in tension, and even a chill in Sino-US relations that involves a downturn in economic relations But an incident - even a series of incidents - is not a war. | Despite tension full-scale war is unlikely Both are preoccupied with other matters - China with its economic development, internal instability and burgeoning conflict with Japan The US on ongoing international conflicts neither are "ready" for war not technologically the US is two decades ahead militarily war-fatigued US public and military are not ready for war The US is working behind the scenes to discourage allies from provoking China and is unlikely to allow allies or not - to draw it into a wide regional conflict there is no security interest at stake those that see weakness in US restraint will not miscalculate China has never threatened freedom of commercial navigation The US-China incidents at sea stemmed from US intelligence probes through the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties parties agree "to exercise self-restraint there are also I C J precedents that urge disputants to refrain from unilateral activities in self-restraint, China uses civilian vessels to enforce rights And the Philippines, under pressure from the US, is demonstrating restraint the US will bluster and bluff There may be a rise in tension, and even a chill in relations But an incident is not a war. | Despite rising tension between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea and alarmists' warnings of conflagration, war is still well over the horizon - and is not inevitable. There may indeed be potential for miscalculation and violent incidents. But full-scale conventional war is unlikely. There are just too many negatives and too much to lose for all concerned. It is true that the US-China competition seems to fit the "Thucydides trap" - the international relations theory that the dominant power and a rising power will inevitably clash. Make no mistake, China and the US are already "clashing" - over regional dominance and political influence as well as interpretations or reinterpretations of the world order and international law. But a full-blown conflict is hardly written in stone. Both protagonists are preoccupied with other significant matters - China with its economic development, internal instability and burgeoning conflict with Japan in the East China Sea. The US is focused on its multiple ongoing international conflicts, that with Russia over Crimea being the latest deflating fiasco. Moreover, neither are "ready" for war. China is not yet ready technologically for an all-out conflict; the US is at least two decades ahead militarily, although China is quickly catching up. The war-fatigued US public and military are not ready for war, either. The US is working very hard behind the scenes to discourage its allies from provoking China into the use of force and is thus unlikely to allow smaller countries - allies or not - to draw it into a wide regional conflict. Further, there is really no fundamental US security interest at stake - other than pride of place and precedent. In this context, those that see weakness in recent US restraint should not and hopefully will not miscalculate. The US often cites freedom of navigation as a "national interest" in the South China Sea but it well knows that China has never threatened freedom of commercial navigation and is highly unlikely to do so. The US-China incidents at sea and over the sea have stemmed from purposely provocative US intelligence and reconnaissance probes that China feels threaten its security. China probably justifies its interference with petroleum exploration and fishing by other countries in areas it claims through reference to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that it has signed with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through it, the parties agree "to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability". This provision could, of course, be interpreted for and against China. But there are also International Court of Justice precedents that urge rival disputants to refrain from unilateral activities in disputed areas. Moreover, in what it views as an exercise of self-restraint, China almost always uses civilian vessels to enforce what it perceives as its rights. And the Philippines, presumably under considerable pressure from the US, is demonstrating considerable restraint as well. However, without an effective military, it really does not have much choice if it wants to physically hold on to its claimed features. The Philippines hopes its actions vis-à-vis China will be backed by the US. Last week, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel told the Senate's foreign relations committee that he noted China's "intimidating steps" towards the Philippines and said "there should be no doubt about the resolve of the United States". Yes, the US will bluster and bluff. And it may well deploy more assets to the region and verbally and technologically back up its ally. Yes, the situation is becoming politically dangerous. There may be a rise in tension, and even a chill in Sino-US relations that involves a downturn in economic relations. But an incident - even a series of incidents - is not a war. | 3,981 | <h4>No risk of South China Sea conflict – economic interests, lack of US engagement and precedent against conflict checks. </h4><p><strong>Valencia</strong>, attending the Boao Forum for Asia, is a visiting senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Hainan, Previous Senior Fellow with the East-West Center, M.A. in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D in Oceanography from the University of Hawaii, Fulbright Fellow, an Abe Fellow, a DAAD (German Government) Fellow, an International Institute for Asian Studies ( Leiden University) Visiting Fellow , an Ocean Policy Research Foundation (Japan) Visiting Scholar and a U.S. State Department –sponsored international speaker, <strong>4/9/2014 </strong>“South China Sea dispute rolls on with no resolution in sight” http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1468906/south-china-sea-dispute-rolls-no-resolution-sight</p><p><u><mark>Despite</mark> rising <mark>tension</u></mark> between China and the Philippines <u>in the South China Sea and alarmists' warnings of conflagration</u>, <u><strong>war is still well over the horizon - and is not inevitable</u></strong>. There may indeed be potential for miscalculation and violent incidents. <u><strong>But <mark>full-scale</mark> conventional <mark>war is unlikely</u></strong></mark>. <u>There are</u> just <u>too many negatives</u> and too much to lose for all concerned. It is true that <u>the US-China competition seems to fit the "Thucydides trap" - the</u> international relations <u>theory that the dominant power and a rising power will inevitably clash</u>. Make no mistake, <u>China and the US are already "clashing</u>" - over regional dominance and political influence as well as interpretations or reinterpretations of the world order and international law. <u><strong>But a full-blown conflict is hardly written in stone. </strong><mark>Both</u></mark> protagonists <u><mark>are preoccupied with other</mark> significant <mark>matters</u> - <u>China with its</u> <u><strong>economic development,</mark> <mark>internal instability and burgeoning conflict with Japan</u></strong></mark> in the East China Sea. <u><mark>The US</mark> </u>is focused <u><mark>on</u></mark> its multiple <u><strong><mark>ongoing international conflicts</strong></mark>, that with Russia over Crimea being the latest deflating fiasco. </u>Moreover, <u><mark>neither <strong>are "ready" for war</u></strong></mark>. <u>China is <strong><mark>not</mark> yet ready <mark>technologically</strong></mark> for an all-out conflict</u>; <u><mark>the US is</u></mark> at least <u><strong><mark>two decades ahead militarily</u></strong></mark>, although China is quickly catching up. The <u><mark>war-<strong>fatigued US public and military are not ready for war</u></strong></mark>, either. <u><mark>The US is working</mark> very hard <strong><mark>behind the scenes</strong> to discourage</mark> its <mark>allies</mark> <mark>from provoking China</mark> into the use of force <mark>and is</mark> thus</u> <u><strong><mark>unlikely to allow</mark> smaller countries - <mark>allies or not - to draw it into a wide regional conflict</mark>. </u></strong>Further, <u><mark>there is</mark> </u>really <u><strong><mark>no</mark> fundamental US <mark>security interest</mark> <mark>at stake</u></strong></mark> - other than pride of place and precedent. In this context, <u><mark>those that see weakness in</mark> </u>recent <u><mark>US restraint</u></mark> should not and hopefully <u><strong><mark>will not miscalculate</u></strong></mark>. <u>The US</u> often <u>cites freedom of navigation as a "national interest"</u> in the South China Sea <u>but it well knows that <strong><mark>China has never threatened freedom of commercial navigation</mark> and is highly unlikely to do so</u></strong>. <u><mark>The US-China incidents at sea</u></mark> and over the sea have <u><mark>stemmed from</mark> purposely provocative <mark>US intelligence</mark> and reconnaissance <mark>probes</u></mark> that China feels threaten its security. <u>China</u> probably <u>justifies its interference</u> with petroleum exploration and fishing by other countries in areas <u>it claims <mark>through</mark> reference to <mark>the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties</u></mark> in the South China Sea that it has signed with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. <u>Through it, the <mark>parties agree "to <strong>exercise self-restraint</strong></mark> in the conduct of activities that would complicate</u> or escalate disputes and <u>affect peace</u> and stability". This provision could, of course, be interpreted for and against China. But <u><mark>there are also</u> <u><strong>I</mark>nternational <mark>C</mark>ourt of <mark>J</mark>ustice <mark>precedents that urge</mark> rival <mark>disputants to refrain from unilateral activities</mark> in disputed areas. </u></strong>Moreover, <u><mark>in</mark> what it views as an exercise of <mark>self-restraint, China</u></mark> almost <u><strong>always <mark>uses civilian vessels to enforce</mark> what it perceives as its <mark>rights</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>And the Philippines,</mark> presumably <mark>under</mark> considerable <mark>pressure from the US, is demonstrating</mark> considerable <mark>restraint</u></mark> as well. However, without an effective military, it really does not have much choice if it wants to physically hold on to its claimed features. The Philippines hopes its actions vis-à-vis China will be backed by the US. Last week, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel told the Senate's foreign relations committee that he noted China's "intimidating steps" towards the Philippines and said "there should be no doubt about the resolve of the United States". Yes, <u><mark>the US will <strong>bluster and bluff</u></strong></mark>. <u>And it may well deploy more assets to the region and verbally and technologically back up its ally.</u> Yes, the situation is becoming politically dangerous. <u><mark>There may be a rise in tension, and even a chill in</mark> Sino-US <mark>relations</mark> that involves a downturn in economic relations</u>. <u><strong><mark>But an incident</mark> - even a series of incidents - <mark>is not a war.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | SCS | 184,173 | 21 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,515 | US-China war causes extinction. | Wittner 11 ) | Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446) | The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased military presence and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region need this lead to nuclear war Not necessarily yet there are signs that it could. both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations But the Kargil War between India and Pakistan should convince us that such wars can occur in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack Obviously NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars Why are these vastly expensive military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. | need this lead to nuclear war it could U S and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons such wars can occur don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred A nuclear attack by China would slaughter 10 million Americans Both nations would be reduced to wastelands. debris would blot out the sun destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. | While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. | 4,132 | <h4>US-China war causes extinction.</h4><p><strong>Wittner 11</strong> (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. <u><strong>The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear </u></strong>enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, <u><strong>the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased</u></strong> the U.S. <u><strong>military presence</u></strong> in Australia, <u><strong>and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region</u></strong>. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But <u><strong><mark>need this lead to nuclear war</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong>Not necessarily</u></strong>. And <u><strong>yet</u></strong>, <u><strong>there are signs that <mark>it could</mark>. </u></strong>After all, <u><strong>both the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons</mark>. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu</u></strong>. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. <u><strong>Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations</u></strong>; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. <u><strong>But the Kargil War</u></strong> of 1999, <u><strong>between</u></strong> nuclear-armed <u><strong>India and</u></strong> nuclear-armed <u><strong>Pakistan</u></strong>, <u><strong>should convince us that <mark>such wars can occur</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong>in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war.</u></strong> Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, <u><strong><mark>don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack</u></strong></mark>? Do they? <u><strong><mark>Obviously</u></strong>, <u><strong>NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred</u></strong></mark>, for, <u><strong>throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong>if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars</u></strong>” and its modern variant, national missile defense. <u><strong>Why are these vastly expensive</u></strong>—and probably unworkable—<u><strong>military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might</u></strong>? Of course, <u><strong>the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart.</u></strong> Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. <u><strong>Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail?</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>A nuclear attack by China would</mark> immediately <mark>slaughter</mark> at least <mark>10 million Americans</mark> </u></strong>in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. <u><strong>The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Both nations would be reduced to</mark> smoldering, radioactive <mark>wastelands</u></strong>.</mark> Also, <u><strong>radioactive <mark>debris</mark> sent aloft by the nuclear explosions <mark>would blot out the sun</mark> and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—<mark>destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.</mark> </p></u></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – China Economy | null | 9,638 | 1,488 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,516 | Mars colonalization is impossible- money, technology, cosmic rays, and gravity | Sutter 15 | Sutter 15 | In an airless world, no matter how hard you throw the object, it will reach the ground in the same amount of time Gravity keeps on tugging at the object, but it frustratingly keeps missing the ground. orbit There is, after all, an actual atmosphere to deal with You can certainly go slower and still visit space make sure you packed a heat shield, because you're coming back down And that's the fundamental challenge engineers tell me these "rockets" are actually quite complicated Humans are heavy. Humans need to carry little bubbles of the Earth ecosystem with them everywhere they go Humans need room to stretch. Humans want to bring human-centric niceties, like hammers and toothpaste and lima beans. Oh, yeah, and we need to bring them back home, I suppose. So pack the spare rockets and extra fuel we don't have the capacity to send humans beyond Low Earth Orbit, the very edge of space, let alone Mars Getting to Mars requires a lot of new technology colonies on Earth have a few advantages, namely, a) breathable air, b) liquid water, c) dirt and d) proximity to other Earth-based cities cosmic rays are high-energy protons zipping through the universe The universe is swimming in them, and they cut through DNA like a hot knife through butter On Earth the atmosphere makes for nice insulation, catching most of the deadliest cosmic rays | Gravity keeps on tugging at the object, but it frustratingly keeps missing the ground an actual atmosphere to deal with Just make sure you packed a heat shield, because you're coming back down Humans are heavy. Humans need to carry little bubbles of the Earth ecosystem we don't have the capacity to send humans beyond Low Earth Orbit requires a lot of new technology namely, a) breathable air, b) liquid water, c) dirt and d) proximity cosmic rays are high-energy protons cut through DNA | Paul is a research fellow at the Astronomical Observatory of Trieste and visiting scholar at the Ohio State University's Center for Cosmology and Astro-Particle Physics (CCAPP), September 28, “Will We Ever Colonize Mars? (Op-Ed)”, Space.com, http://www.space.com/30679-will-humans-ever-colonize-mars.html
What's the problem? Pick up the nearest object and throw it. I don't care if there are people around you. Do it. This is an experiment. This is science. Note how far the object goes before it hits the ground. Now pick it up and throw it harder. It went further, didn't it? Part of the reason you didn't throw it as far as your ego thought you would was air resistance. Plowing through the atmosphere like a bull in a molecular china shop, the object quickly loses speed. But the actual "hitting the ground” part is due to gravity. If you took away all the air, your thrown object would still eventually hit the ground. In an airless world, no matter how hard you throw the object, it will reach the ground in the same amount of time. That's because gravity only works in the "down" direction, not the "over" direction, so for all gravity cares, you might as well have just lazily dropped it. But the harder you throw it, the more speed it will have, and the farther it will go before inevitably hitting the ground. Or maybe not so inevitably. Imagine throwing something so hard that in the few seconds before it hits the ground, it reached the other side of a house. Or maybe a street. Throw it harder and you could get it across town. Across the country. Even faster: across an ocean. Imagine throwing it so fast that by the time gravity gets around to doing its thing, the Earth has curved away from it. Gravity keeps on tugging at the object, but it frustratingly keeps missing the ground. Ta-da: orbit! How fast is orbital fast? Around 18,000 miles per hour (or 11 kilometers per second), give or take. There is, after all, an actual atmosphere to deal with. You can certainly go slower and still visit space. Just make sure you packed a heat shield, because you're coming back down. You can also go even faster than orbital speed and escape the jealous clutches of Earth's gravity altogether, which is what it takes to get to Mars. And that's the fundamental challenge. There just aren't many ways of pushing stuff that fast. Our best method so far involves blowing up stuff in a tube, and making sure to leave a hole in one side. Newton's laws do the rest. It seems primitive, but the engineers tell me these "rockets" are actually quite complicated. We can easily send robots to Mars, because their feelings don't get hurt if you forget to pack the oxygen and food. But people are a different … well, animal, altogether. Humans are heavy. Humans need to carry little bubbles of the Earth ecosystem with them everywhere they go. Humans need room to stretch. Humans want to bring human-centric niceties, like hammers and toothpaste and lima beans. Oh, yeah, and we need to bring them back home, I suppose. So pack the spare rockets and extra fuel. Let this sink in: at the time of this writing, we don't have the capacity to send humans beyond Low Earth Orbit, the very edge of space, let alone Mars. Getting to Mars is hard, folks, and it requires a lot of new technology. And that's just enough stuff for a handful of hominids to poke around the place for a bit. A colony? Look around the city you're in, and marvel at all the junk it takes to get you through the day. Think of all the layers of civilization and organization (spontaneous or otherwise) it takes to get you dinner. Made of food. Cooked. On a plate. That you will clean up with water … eventually. In a house. On a street. And on and on. A city is a massively complicated thing. Sure, we've built them from the ground up before, but colonies on Earth have a few advantages, namely, a) breathable air, b) liquid water, c) dirt and d) proximity to other Earth-based cities. Even the U.S. National Science Foundation's Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station — the closest to a Mars colony you can get while keeping two feet on the Earth — enjoys most of these advantages, and is still a nightmare to keep alive. And did I mention the cosmic rays? No? Well, now's a good time — cosmic rays are high-energy protons (and some heavier nuclei) zipping through the universe, generated in…well, we're not exactly sure, but probably supernovae and other cataclysmic events. The universe is swimming in them, and they cut through DNA like a hot knife through butter. The butter is you in this metaphor, just to be clear. On Earth the atmosphere makes for nice insulation, catching most of the deadliest cosmic rays, but some still make it through, possibly giving everyone — especially airline crews — a slightly elevated risk of cancer. [Radiation Fears Shouldn't Hold Back Mars Colonization (Op-Ed )] But a two-year journey to Mars? Exposure on the surface? Better make sure your transports and habitats are well-shielded or buried underground — or at least make sure you have some talented oncologists on staff. Despite these challenges and more, it's not impossible to get people to Mars and start a viable colony. It's not like there's any physics-based reason preventing the escapades. It's just a question of engineering. And money. Lots and lots of money. | 5,323 | <h4><strong>Mars colonalization is impossible- money, technology, cosmic rays, and gravity</h4><p>Sutter 15</p><p></strong>Paul is a research fellow at the Astronomical Observatory of Trieste and visiting scholar at the Ohio State University's Center for Cosmology and Astro-Particle Physics (CCAPP), September 28, “Will We Ever Colonize Mars? (Op-Ed)”, Space.com, http://www.space.com/30679-will-humans-ever-colonize-mars.html</p><p>What's the problem? Pick up the nearest object and throw it. I don't care if there are people around you. Do it. This is an experiment. This is science. Note how far the object goes before it hits the ground. Now pick it up and throw it harder. It went further, didn't it? Part of the reason you didn't throw it as far as your ego thought you would was air resistance. Plowing through the atmosphere like a bull in a molecular china shop, the object quickly loses speed. But the actual "hitting the ground” part is due to gravity. If you took away all the air, your thrown object would still eventually hit the ground. <u>In an airless world, no matter how hard you throw the object, it will reach the ground in the same amount of time</u>. That's because gravity only works in the "down" direction, not the "over" direction, so for all gravity cares, you might as well have just lazily dropped it. But the harder you throw it, the more speed it will have, and the farther it will go before inevitably hitting the ground. Or maybe not so inevitably. Imagine throwing something so hard that in the few seconds before it hits the ground, it reached the other side of a house. Or maybe a street. Throw it harder and you could get it across town. Across the country. Even faster: across an ocean. Imagine throwing it so fast that by the time gravity gets around to doing its thing, the Earth has curved away from it. <u><mark>Gravity keeps on tugging at the object, but it frustratingly keeps missing the ground</mark>.</u> Ta-da: <u>orbit</u>! How fast is orbital fast? Around 18,000 miles per hour (or 11 kilometers per second), give or take. <u><strong>There is, after all, <mark>an actual atmosphere to deal with</u></strong></mark>. <u>You can certainly go slower and still visit space</u>. <mark>Just <u><strong>make sure you packed a heat shield, because you're coming back down</u></strong></mark>. You can also go even faster than orbital speed and escape the jealous clutches of Earth's gravity altogether, which is what it takes to get to Mars. <u>And that's the fundamental challenge</u>. There just aren't many ways of pushing stuff that fast. Our best method so far involves blowing up stuff in a tube, and making sure to leave a hole in one side. Newton's laws do the rest. It seems primitive, but the <u>engineers tell me these "rockets" are actually quite complicated</u>. We can easily send robots to Mars, because their feelings don't get hurt if you forget to pack the oxygen and food. But people are a different … well, animal, altogether. <u><strong><mark>Humans are heavy. Humans need to carry little bubbles of the Earth ecosystem</mark> with them everywhere they go</u></strong>. <u>Humans need room to stretch. Humans want to bring human-centric niceties, like hammers and toothpaste and lima beans. Oh, yeah, and we need to bring them back home, I suppose. So pack the spare rockets and extra fuel</u>. Let this sink in: at the time of this writing, <u><strong><mark>we don't have the capacity to send humans beyond Low Earth Orbit</mark>, the very edge of space, let alone Mars</u></strong>. <u>Getting to Mars</u> is hard, folks, and it <u><mark>requires a lot of new technology</u></mark>. And that's just enough stuff for a handful of hominids to poke around the place for a bit. A colony? Look around the city you're in, and marvel at all the junk it takes to get you through the day. Think of all the layers of civilization and organization (spontaneous or otherwise) it takes to get you dinner. Made of food. Cooked. On a plate. That you will clean up with water … eventually. In a house. On a street. And on and on. A city is a massively complicated thing. Sure, we've built them from the ground up before, but <u>colonies on Earth have a few advantages, <mark>namely, a) <strong>breathable air,</strong> b) <strong>liquid water</strong>, c) <strong>dirt</strong> and d) <strong>proximity</strong></mark> to other Earth-based cities</u>. Even the U.S. National Science Foundation's Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station — the closest to a Mars colony you can get while keeping two feet on the Earth — enjoys most of these advantages, and is still a nightmare to keep alive. And did I mention the cosmic rays? No? Well, now's a good time — <u><strong><mark>cosmic rays are high-energy protons</u></strong></mark> (and some heavier nuclei) <u>zipping through the universe</u>, generated in…well, we're not exactly sure, but probably supernovae and other cataclysmic events. <u>The universe is swimming in them, and they <mark>cut through DNA</mark> like a hot knife through butter</u>. The butter is you in this metaphor, just to be clear. <u>On Earth the atmosphere makes for nice insulation, catching most of the deadliest cosmic rays</u>, but some still make it through, possibly giving everyone — especially airline crews — a slightly elevated risk of cancer. [Radiation Fears Shouldn't Hold Back Mars Colonization (Op-Ed )] But a two-year journey to Mars? Exposure on the surface? Better make sure your transports and habitats are well-shielded or buried underground — or at least make sure you have some talented oncologists on staff. Despite these challenges and more, it's not impossible to get people to Mars and start a viable colony. It's not like there's any physics-based reason preventing the escapades. It's just a question of engineering. And money. Lots and lots of money.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 1 | 1,560,850 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
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3,783,517 | Decline causes Pakistani insability and causes South and Central Asian instability --- makes IP conflict likely | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS | While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a l late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people are still premodern, rural and defined by tribal identities The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of separate national identity the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan’s consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state or a “state” with no centralized government at all The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China , America’s decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus increasing regional instability or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to gain the regional upper hand. | Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of national identity, the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained profound antipathy a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan Pakistan could transform into a radical Islamic state Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability America’s decline would increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan increasing regional instability or wider conflict | Pakistan While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a professional late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people— despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban population— are still premodern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain’s departure from India. The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of separate national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy for each other. Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability. And a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan’s consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, or a “state” with no centralized government at all. The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran. The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China. In the above circumstances, America’s decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan. China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus potentially increasing regional instability. Ultimately, an unstable peace or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to exploit Pakistan’s instability in order to gain the regional upper hand. | 1,912 | <h4>Decline causes Pakistani insability and causes South and Central Asian instability --- makes IP conflict likely</h4><p><strong>Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pgs. 97-98)//JBS</p><p></strong>Pakistan <u>While <mark>Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons</mark> and is held together by a </u>professiona<u>l late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people</u>— despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban population— <u>are still premodern, rural</u>, <u>and</u> largely <u>defined by</u> regional and <u>tribal identities</u>. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain’s departure from India. <u>The resulting <mark>conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of</mark> separate <mark>national identity</u>,</mark> while <u><strong><mark>the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained</mark> a shared and <mark>profound antipathy</u></strong></mark> for each other. <u>Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability</u>. And <u><strong><mark>a decline in US power would reduce</mark> <mark>America’s ability to aid Pakistan</mark>’s consolidation and development. <mark>Pakistan could transform into a</mark> state run by the military, or a <mark>radical Islamic state</u></strong></mark>, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, <u>or a “state” with no centralized government at all</u>. <u>The worst-case scenarios are that <mark>Pakistan <strong>devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism</strong></mark> or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran</u>. <u><mark>The latter could in <strong>turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability</mark> of concern both to Russia and to China</u></strong>. In the above circumstances<u><strong>, <mark>America’s decline would</mark> also <mark>increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and</mark> could <mark>intensify Indian temptations to</mark> <mark>undermine Pakistan</u></strong></mark>. <u>China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely,</u> <u>thus</u> potentially <u><mark>increasing regional instability</u></mark>. Ultimately, an unstable peace <u><mark>or</mark> a <mark>wider conflict</mark> in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses</u> to exploit Pakistan’s instability in order <u>to gain the regional upper hand.</p></u> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 424,451 | 10 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
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3,783,518 | No risk of war – it’s not a flashpoint and all of your author’s are hacks who ignore empirics and misunderstand the region. | Taylor 2014 | Taylor, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, 2014 Brendan, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint” http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/south-china-sea-not-flashpoint | the S C S has become one of East Asia’s most talked-about security flashpoints Kaplan characterized this body of water as “the future of conflict. IISS) describes the South China Sea as a “crucible for the unfolding geopolitics of Southeast Asia Pitsuwan dubbed the disputes “Asia’s Palestine while Rudd refers to the South China Sea as a “tinderbox on water outlining a hypothetical scenario where a naval skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels draws in the U S and ultimately escalates into “the biggest war for many decades, and quite possibly the biggest since the Second World War.” The term “flashpoint” is one of the most frequently used terms China’s interests in the S C S are often overstated and Beijing will continue to favor options short of military force to advance what interests it does have the balance of military power is not shifting against the U S at the rate many pundits suggest, rendering overblown the prospects for Washington being drawn into war with China to defend the credibility History suggests that the S C S is not a flashpoint. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints The nationalist foundations of these disputes are fundamentally different from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat The strategic geography of the S C S militates against it being a genuine flashpoint. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war when clashes at sea do occur history suggests that these afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions “neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation The antagonists in the S C S disputes are less proximate than in the case of the Korean Peninsula The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint New Delhi’s interests in the South China Sea remain economic even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake it is accepted that India’s armed forces will lack the capacity to credibly defend these , while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan dwarf those which it has at stake in the more distant South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests of China and the U S continues to be overstated. a New York Times article fuelled speculation claiming that Chinese officials had referred to the South China Sea as a “core interest Hillary Clinton alleged that Chinese officials had again applied this terminology to the South China Sea But doubts remain over whether Beijing truly regards the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC ‘core interest Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan Explicit threats and promises are absent in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region continue to be confined the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels Beijing’s approach has been one of conflict de- escalation Beijing’s preference has been to manage such tensions bilaterally Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for settling maritime disputes in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents Beijing shown willingness to take the multilateral route China signed a non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea the official position remains to establish a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management commentators contend that energy security will eventually render the South China Sea a true “core interest Of greatest concern seems to be the prospect that the United States would seek to strangle China of such supplies in a future conflict over Taiwan. the U.S. Navy it would be to the potentially irreparable damage of the United States’ international standing and reputation as a provider of global public goods. Nothing in the United States’ foreign policy tradition indicates that the country would abuse its maritime power for its own narrow interests In the unlikely event the United States were ever to take this path Beijing would still retain the option of diverting its ships through alternative routes, opening of a new oil and gas pipeline through Myanmar has further alleviated Beijing’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma such considerations cast doubt over speculation that the South China Sea will inevitably emerge as a Chinese “core interest Some suggest that the South China Sea constitutes a vital U.S. interest because it is a litmus test for China’s challenge to U.S. primacy it is important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of China’s military modernization, conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy China does not possess the capability to project substantial power and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another two decades questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy crews Other commentators have argued that the South China Sea is a vital U.S. interest because it symbolizes the United States’ commitment According to this any wavering to come to the defense of one of its Southeast Asian allies in the face of Chinese coercion would lead other regional partners to question the reliability of their own strategic relationship Yet, despite the fact that Washington ultimately refused to side with the Philippines during 2012 there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America’s closest Asia–Pacific allies Canberra characterizes Australia’s alliance with the United States as being “our most important defence relationship The U S was swift to demonstrate the credibility of its alliance commitment to Seoul following the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan Likewise in 2013, Washington sent a strong signal of support for Tokyo by flying two B-52 bombers through China’s Air Defense Identification Zone Hagel backed up this show of defiance with unequivocal confirmation that Article V of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands These examples call into question the connection that some commentators draw between the S C S and the continued viability of alliances. What they instead appear to demonstrate is that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply in a different category the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint Over the past two or more decades, the United States and China have gone to great lengths to manage bilateral tensions and prevent them from spiraling out of control. In the S C S major, modern Sino–U.S. crises have been successfully managed in 2001 those most intimately involved in the
crisis have
written subsequently how top U.S. officials “made
every effort to exercise prudence and restraint .” They acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made a series of grudging concessions that ultimately resulted in success after they decided that it was important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident Again in 2009 good sense prevailed as officials issued statements maintaining that such incidents would not become the norm and pledging deeper cooperation | China’s interests in the S C S are overstated, and Beijing will continue to favor options short of military force the balance o power is not shifting at the rate pundits suggest, rendering overblown the prospects for Washington being drawn into war History suggests that the S C S is not a flashpoint The strategic geography militates against it when clashes at sea these afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions Tension can be slower to develop, allowing time to avoid unnecessary escalation antagonists are less proximate New Delhi’s interests remain economic even if India’s armed forces lack capacity while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan dwarf those which it has at stake in the S C S The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests continues to be overstated the investigation of Chinese official sources “failed to unearth a single example of a PRC source that identifies the S C S as a core interest Explicit threats are absent although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region continue to be confined to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels Beijing’s approach has been conflict de- escalation to take the multilateral route signed a legally binding code of conduct for avoiding incidents the prospect that the U S would seek to strangle China of supplies would be to the potentially irreparable damage of the U S international standing Nothing in the U S foreign policy tradition indicates that the country would abuse its maritime power for its own narrow interests In the event the U S were to take this path Beijing would still retain the option of diverting its ships through alternative routes, a new oil and gas pipeline through Myanmar further alleviated Beijing’s Dilemma China does not possess the capability to project substantial power and will remain unable to do s commentators argued that the S C S is a vital U.S. interest because it symbolizes commitment Yet, despite the fact that Washington ultimately refused to side with the Philippines during 2012 there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America’s closest Asia–Pacific allies examples call into question the connection that commentators draw they appear to demonstrate that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply in a different category Over the past two or more decades, the U S and China have gone to great lengths to manage b tensions in 2001 those most intimately involved in the
crisis written how top officials “made
every effort to exercise prudence and restraint They acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made grudging concessions after they decided that it was important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident | More than at any time in the history of these disputes, the South China Sea has today become one of East Asia’s most talked-about security flashpoints. Most famously, the strategic commentator Robert Kaplan has characterized this body of water as “the future of conflict.”1 A recent study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) describes the South China Sea as a “crucible for the unfolding geopolitics of Southeast Asia,” which has the potential to “influence the evolving balance of power in the region, and perhaps even the prospects for peace in the Asia–Pacific in the twenty-first century.”2 Southeast Asia’s top diplomat, Surin Pitsuwan, has dubbed the disputes “Asia’s Palestine,”3 while former Australian Prime Minister and China savant Kevin Rudd refers to the South China Sea as a “tinderbox on water” and a “maritime Balkans of the 21st century.”4 In a controversial new book, Rudd’s compatriot Hugh White goes even further, outlining a hypothetical scenario where a naval skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels draws in the United States and ultimately escalates into “the biggest war for many decades, and quite possibly the biggest since the Second World War.”5 The term “flashpoint” is one of the most frequently used and yet underdefined terms in the security lexicon. Its origins lie in the physical sciences, where “flashpoint” refers to the temperature at which vapors emitted by a liquid will ignite when exposed to a flame. Applied to global affairs, flashpoints are geographic areas that have the ongoing potential to erupt into sudden and violent conflict. In one of the few attempts to formally define the term, U.S. Naval War College Professor Timothy Hoyt suggests that flashpoints properly consist of three elements: First, they exhibit a political dimension, meaning that they “must be at the forefront of a significant and long-standing political dispute.” Second, proximity is key— flashpoints “tend to become greater concerns if they are proximate to both adversaries.” And third, flashpoints also “threaten to involve or engage more powerful actors in the international community, raising the possibility of escalation to a broader war.”6 This article challenges the popular assumption that the South China Sea is an increasingly perilous Asian security flashpoint. First, East Asia’s traditional flashpoints—Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the East China Sea—stand a significantly higher prospect of combusting into broader, region-wide conflict. Second, China’s interests in the South China Sea are often overstated, and Beijing will continue to favor options short of military force to advance what interests it does have in this region. Third, the balance of military power in the South China Sea is not shifting against the United States at the rate many pundits suggest, rendering overblown the prospects for Washington being drawn into war with China to defend the credibility of its Asian alliances. While the South China Sea is not a flashpoint, however, there are dangers in continuing to refer to it as one. Pale by Comparison History initially suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. For instance, in the unresolved Korean War (1950–53), which remains at the heart of continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an estimated two million military personnel were either killed or unaccounted for.7 A comparable number of casualties occurred in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which left today’s Taiwan flashpoint as a direct product.8 Further, at a time when some analysts are talking up the prospects of war between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is worth recalling that an estimated 15–35 million perished during the course of the second Sino–Japanese War (1937–45).9 While history is not destiny, more recent estimates suggest that the combustion of any one of these flashpoints today could prove equally devastating. Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, for example, predict that a conflict over Taiwan could spark a nuclear war involving 1.5 billion people and produce a fundamental change in the international order.10 Similar estimates produced at the time of the 1993–94 North
Korean nuclear crisis suggested that war on the
Korean Peninsula could cost half a million lives
and up to US$1 trillion in its first ninety days.11
Conflict between Asia’s two most powerful navies
in the East China Sea could prove equally devastating, particularly given that China and Japan are also the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively. Total trade between these two historical great powers of East Asia currently stands at U.S. $345 billion.12 It is hard to envisage a credible scenario where a skirmish in the South China Sea could erupt into a conflict of similar proportions. The nationalist foundations of these disputes are fundamentally different from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. By way of example, recent polling suggests that 87 percent of the Chinese public view Japan negatively, whilst 50 percent anticipate a military dispute with Japan.13 Reflecting this sentiment, when Tokyo announced its decision to purchase contested Islands in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, this sparked widespread anti-Japanese protests across China that spread to more than 100 cities.14 Such public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat. Subsequently, a mere 150 protesters gathered in the city center.15 Crowds of comparable size have attended anti-Chinese protests in the Philippines. For instance, a March 2012 protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila that organizers expected to draw 1,000 protesters attracted barely half that number.16 The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18 Ross’ observation, in turn, dovetails elegantly with the issue of proximity, which Hoyt regards as a defining feature of a flashpoint. The antagonists in the South China Sea disputes are less proximate than in the case of the Korean Peninsula—where the two Koreas share a land border that remains the most militarized on earth. The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint. Indeed, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland affords Beijing credible strategic options— and arguably even incentives—involving the use of force that are not available to it in the South China Sea.19 Finally, and related to the third of Hoyt’s criteria, the South China Sea cannot be said to engage the vital interests of Asia’s great powers. To be sure, much has been made of India’s growing interests in this part of the world— particularly following reports of a July 2011 face-off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters.20 However, New Delhi’s interests in the South China Sea remain overwhelmingly economic, not strategic, driven as they are by the search for oil. Moreover, even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake in the geographically distant South China Sea, it is widely accepted that India’s armed forces will for some time lack the capacity to credibly defend these.21 Similarly, while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila with improving its maritime surveillance capabilities,22 for reasons of history and geography, Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and even the Taiwan flashpoint dwarf those which it has at stake in the more distant South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests of China and the United States continues to be overstated. Chinese Core Interest? Nevertheless, an April 2010 New York Times article fuelled speculation to the contrary, claiming that Chinese officials had referred to the South China Sea as a “core interest” during a meeting with two senior U.S. counterparts.23 In a November 2010 interview with veteran Australian journalist Greg Sheridan, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alleged that Chinese officials had again applied this terminology to the South China Sea during the May 2010 gathering of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.24 Beijing’s use of the term “core interest” in relation to any issue is significant given that Chinese officials have traditionally maintained that military force will be used in defending these. Since the term “core interest” first appeared in the Chinese foreign policy lexicon during the early 2000s, it has generally only been applied—officially at least—in relation to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. For this reason, use of the term with reference to the South China Sea would strengthen the justification for referring to this issue as a genuine flashpoint. But doubts remain over whether Beijing truly regards the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Michael Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC ‘core interest.’”25 By contrast, Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27 Explicit threats and promises of this nature are absent in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region continue to be confined, by and large, to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels.29 This stands in contrast to the East China Sea, where exchanges between Beijing and Tokyo have quickly escalated to involve the use of military ships and aircraft. In early 2013, for instance, Tokyo accused Chinese warships of locking weapons-guiding radar onto a Japanese helicopter and a destroyer in two separate incidents.30 In November 2013, Beijing went on to announce a controversial new “Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and initially threatened to take defensive action against aircraft that did not disclose their flight plans prior to entering the zone and identifying themselves when operating within it.31 Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijing’s approach toward the South China Sea disputes has traditionally been one of conflict de- escalation. Beijing’s clear preference has been to manage such tensions bilaterally. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for settling maritime disputes. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.32 Beijing has also shown some willingness to take the multilateral route. Most famously, China signed a non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues, the official position of both China and ASEAN remains to establish a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence building measures, and joint development.33 Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off limits in Asia’s multilateral forums. Some commentators contend that rising China’s deepening energy security imperative will eventually render the South China Sea a true “core interest” to Beijing. Chinese demand for oil is projected to increase by 40 percent—to in excess of 1.1 million barrels per day—within only a few years.34 With unproven oil reserves of an estimated 11 billion barrels, the South China Sea offers Beijing a potential solution to this conundrum.35 In the immediate term, however, many analysts also suggest that the South China Sea presents a different, yet no less significant “Malacca Dilemma” for China’s leaders. According to this line of argument, approximately 80 percent of China’s oil imports (sourced from Africa and the Middle East) are vulnerable to interdiction, particularly in narrow chokepoints that connect the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, such as the Malacca Strait.36 The same argument applies to Chinese imports of gas and other raw materials that also pass through these waters. Of greatest concern seems to be the prospect that the United States would seek to strangle China of such supplies in a future conflict over Taiwan. While it is true that the U.S. Navy remains second-to-none in its capacity to enforce a blockade of Chinese shipping coming through the Malacca Strait, history suggests that it would only exercise this capability under the most dire circumstances—and even then, it would be to the potentially irreparable damage of the United States’ international standing and reputation as a provider of global public goods. As Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal have argued, “The United States has a very long tradition of promoting and protecting the free flow of trade over the world’s seas. When Washington has used its naval dominance to blockade shipping, it has done so judiciously...Nothing in the United States’ foreign policy tradition indicates that the country would abuse its maritime power for its own narrow interests.”37 In the unlikely event the United States were ever to take this path— conceivably only in the context of all-out war with China—it is important to remember that Beijing would still retain the option of diverting its ships through alternative routes, such as the Lombok or Sunda Straits, or potentially even south of Australia. U.S.-based China-watchers Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins estimate that such alternative routes could add as little as US$1-2 per barrel—a relatively small price to pay during warfare.38 Added to this, the October 2013 opening of a new oil and gas pipeline through Myanmar has further alleviated Beijing’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma.”39 Taken together, such considerations cast doubt over speculation that the South China Sea will inevitably emerge as a Chinese “core interest” on energy security grounds. U.S. Vital Interest? Some commentators suggest that the South China Sea constitutes a vital U.S. interest because it is a litmus test for China’s challenge to U.S. primacy in the Western Pacific. Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan observe that “the South China Sea will be the strategic bellwether for determining the future of U.S. leadership in the Asia–Pacific region.” In their view, it is in this body of water “where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging U.S. naval preeminence—a trend that, if left on its present trajectory, could upset the balance of power that has existed since the end of World War II.”40 To be sure, the balance of military power between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in Beijing’s favor. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have recently embarked upon their own military modernization programs—and while Southeast Asian claimant states have geographical advantages over China given their proximity to the disputed waters of the South China Sea—Beijing’s military modernization commenced during the mid- 1990s, giving China a substantial head start over its southern neighbors. Moreover, Beijing has not had to deal with the fiscal constraints which periods of economic downturn and political unrest have created for a number of Southeast Asian governments over the past two decades.41 That said, it is equally important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of China’s military modernization, conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy in the broader Western Pacific. China currently does not possess the capability to project substantial power into the South China Sea, and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another two decades, its ongoing experimentation with aircraft carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has observed, “the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability associated with asserting full control over the area, including sufficient at-sea replenishment and aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional bases to support logistical requirements.”42 Added to this, questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy crews to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of high-intensity conflict.43 Other commentators have argued that the South China Sea is a vital U.S. interest because it symbolizes the United States’ commitment to its Asia–Pacific alliance partners. According to this line of reasoning, any wavering or unwillingness on the part of Washington to come to the defense of one of its Southeast Asian allies in the face of Chinese coercion would lead other regional partners to question the reliability of their own strategic relationship with the United States. Yet, despite the fact that Washington ultimately refused to side with the Philippines during the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America’s closest Asia–Pacific allies. In its May 2013 Defense White Paper, for example, Canberra characterizes Australia’s alliance with the United States as being “our most important defence relationship” and “a pillar of Australia’s strategic and security arrangements.”44 The United States was certainly swift to demonstrate the credibility of its alliance commitment to Seoul following the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, undertaking a series of high-profile military exercises with South Korea in waters proximate to China and in the face of strong opposition from Beijing.45 Likewise in November 2013, Washington sent a strong signal of support for Tokyo by flying two B-52 bombers through China’s newly announced “Air Defense Identification Zone” without informing Beijing in advance.46 U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel backed up this show of defiance with unequivocal confirmation that Article V of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands.47 These examples call into question the connection that some commentators draw between U.S. strategy toward the South China Sea and the continued viability of the United States’ Asian alliances. What they instead appear to demonstrate is that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply in a different category than those it has with the Philippines and Thailand. Finally, the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. Over the past two or more decades, the United States and China have gone to great lengths to manage bilateral tensions and prevent them from spiraling out of control. A recent example occurred in May 2012, when the two arrived at a mutually acceptable solution after the blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.48 In the South China Sea, two major, modern Sino–U.S. crises have been successfully managed. The first occurred in April 2001, when a U.S. EP-3 conducting routine surveillance in airspace above the South China Sea collided with a Chinese J-8 jet fighter and was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. To
be sure, efforts to address this crisis did not
initially proceed particularly smoothly, as
Chinese officials refused to answer incoming
calls from the U.S. Embassy. Ultimately,
however, those most intimately involved in the
crisis—such as then-Commander of the U.S.
Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair—have
written subsequently how top U.S. officials “made
every effort to exercise prudence and restraint
while they collected more information about the nature of the incident.” They have also acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made a series of grudging concessions that ultimately resulted in success...after they decided that it was important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident.”49 Again in March 2009, while diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington heightened in the immediate aftermath of an incident involving the harassment of the USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels, good sense also prevailed as senior U.S. and Chinese officials issued statements maintaining that such incidents would not become the norm and pledging deeper cooperation to ensure so.50 Added to these examples of effective crisis management, it is also worth noting that Washington reportedly facilitated a compromise to the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff.51 | 23,320 | <h4>No risk of war – it’s not a flashpoint and all of your author’s are hacks who ignore empirics and misunderstand the region. </h4><p><strong>Taylor</strong>, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, <strong>2014</strong> Brendan, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint” http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/south-china-sea-not-flashpoint</p><p>More than at any time in the history of these disputes, <u>the</u> <u><strong>S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea <u>has</u> today <u>become one of East Asia’s most talked-about security flashpoints</u>. Most famously, the strategic commentator Robert <u>Kaplan</u> has <u>characterized this body of water as “the future of conflict.</u>”1 A recent study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (<u>IISS) describes the <strong>S</strong>outh <strong>C</strong>hina <strong>S</strong>ea as a “crucible for the unfolding geopolitics of Southeast Asia</u>,” which has the potential to “influence the evolving balance of power in the region, and perhaps even the prospects for peace in the Asia–Pacific in the twenty-first century.”2 Southeast Asia’s top diplomat, Surin <u>Pitsuwan</u>, has <u>dubbed the disputes “Asia’s Palestine</u>,”3 <u>while</u> former Australian Prime Minister and China savant Kevin <u>Rudd refers to the South China Sea as a “tinderbox on water</u>” and a “maritime Balkans of the 21st century.”4 In a controversial new book, Rudd’s compatriot Hugh White goes even further, <u>outlining a hypothetical scenario where a naval skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels draws in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and ultimately escalates into “the biggest war for many decades, and quite possibly the biggest since the Second World War.”</u>5 <u>The term “flashpoint” is one of the most frequently used</u> and yet underdefined <u>terms</u> in the security lexicon. Its origins lie in the physical sciences, where “flashpoint” refers to the temperature at which vapors emitted by a liquid will ignite when exposed to a flame. Applied to global affairs, flashpoints are geographic areas that have the ongoing potential to erupt into sudden and violent conflict. In one of the few attempts to formally define the term, U.S. Naval War College Professor Timothy Hoyt suggests that flashpoints properly consist of three elements: First, they exhibit a political dimension, meaning that they “must be at the forefront of a significant and long-standing political dispute.” Second, proximity is key— flashpoints “tend to become greater concerns if they are proximate to both adversaries.” And third, flashpoints also “threaten to involve or engage more powerful actors in the international community, raising the possibility of escalation to a broader war.”6 This article challenges the popular assumption that the South China Sea is an increasingly perilous Asian security flashpoint. First, East Asia’s traditional flashpoints—Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the East China Sea—stand a significantly higher prospect of combusting into broader, region-wide conflict. Second, <u><mark>China’s interests in the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>outh <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>hina <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ea <u><strong><mark>are</mark> often <mark>overstated</u></strong>, <u>and Beijing will <strong>continue to favor options short of military force</mark> to advance what interests it does have</u></strong> in this region. Third, <u><mark>the balance o</mark>f military <mark>power</u></mark> in the South China Sea <u><strong><mark>is not shifting</mark> against</u></strong> <u>the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><mark>at the rate</mark> many <mark>pundits suggest, <strong>rendering overblown</strong> the prospects for Washington being drawn into war</mark> with China to defend the credibility </u>of its Asian alliances. While the South China Sea is not a flashpoint, however, there are dangers in continuing to refer to it as one. Pale by Comparison <u><mark>History</u></mark> initially <u><mark>suggests that the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>outh <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>hina <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ea <u><strong><mark>is not a flashpoint</strong></mark>. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints</u>. For instance, in the unresolved Korean War (1950–53), which remains at the heart of continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an estimated two million military personnel were either killed or unaccounted for.7 A comparable number of casualties occurred in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which left today’s Taiwan flashpoint as a direct product.8 Further, at a time when some analysts are talking up the prospects of war between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is worth recalling that an estimated 15–35 million perished during the course of the second Sino–Japanese War (1937–45).9 While history is not destiny, more recent estimates suggest that the combustion of any one of these flashpoints today could prove equally devastating. Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, for example, predict that a conflict over Taiwan could spark a nuclear war involving 1.5 billion people and produce a fundamental change in the international order.10 Similar estimates produced at the time of the 1993–94 North
Korean nuclear crisis suggested that war on the
Korean Peninsula could cost half a million lives
and up to US$1 trillion in its first ninety days.11
Conflict between Asia’s two most powerful navies
in the East China Sea could prove equally devastating, particularly given that China and Japan are also the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively. Total trade between these two historical great powers of East Asia currently stands at U.S. $345 billion.12 It is hard to envisage a credible scenario where a skirmish in the South China Sea could erupt into a conflict of similar proportions. <u>The nationalist foundations of these disputes are <strong>fundamentally different</strong> from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints</u>. By way of example, recent polling suggests that 87 percent of the Chinese public view Japan negatively, whilst 50 percent anticipate a military dispute with Japan.13 Reflecting this sentiment, when Tokyo announced its decision to purchase contested Islands in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, this sparked widespread anti-Japanese protests across China that spread to more than 100 cities.14 Such <u>public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat</u>. Subsequently, a mere 150 protesters gathered in the city center.15 Crowds of comparable size have attended anti-Chinese protests in the Philippines. For instance, a March 2012 protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila that organizers expected to draw 1,000 protesters attracted barely half that number.16 <u><mark>The strategic geography</mark> of the</u> <u><strong>S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea also <u><strong><mark>militates against it</mark> being a genuine flashpoint.</u></strong> <u>Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war</u>. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even <u><mark>when clashes at sea</mark> do occur</u>, <u>history suggests that <mark>these</mark> </u>generally<u> <strong><mark>afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions</u></strong></mark>. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases <u>“neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate</u> to heightened military readiness. <u><mark>Tension can be slower to develop, <strong>allowing</mark> the protagonists <mark>time to</mark> manage and <mark>avoid unnecessary escalation</u></strong></mark>.”18 Ross’ observation, in turn, dovetails elegantly with the issue of proximity, which Hoyt regards as a defining feature of a flashpoint. <u>The <mark>antagonists</mark> in the</u> <u><strong>S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea <u>disputes <mark>are <strong>less proximate</strong></mark> than in the case of the Korean Peninsula</u>—where the two Koreas share a land border that remains the most militarized on earth. <u>The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint</u>. Indeed, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland affords Beijing credible strategic options— and arguably even incentives—involving the use of force that are not available to it in the South China Sea.19 Finally, and related to the third of Hoyt’s criteria, the South China Sea cannot be said to engage the vital interests of Asia’s great powers. To be sure, much has been made of India’s growing interests in this part of the world— particularly following reports of a July 2011 face-off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters.20 However, <u><mark>New Delhi’s interests</mark> in the South China Sea <mark>remain</u></mark> overwhelmingly <u><strong><mark>economic</u></strong></mark>, not strategic, driven as they are by the search for oil. Moreover, <u><mark>even if</mark> New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake</u> in the geographically distant South China Sea, <u>it is</u> widely <u>accepted that <mark>India’s armed forces</mark> will</u> for some time <u><strong><mark>lack</mark> the <mark>capacity</mark> to credibly defend these</u></strong>.21 Similarly<u>, <mark>while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila</u></mark> with improving its maritime surveillance capabilities,22 for reasons of history and geography, <u><mark>Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and</mark> </u>even the <u><mark>Taiwan</u></mark> flashpoint <u><strong><mark>dwarf those which it has at stake in the</mark> more distant <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea.</u></strong> <u><mark>The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests</mark> of China and the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u> <mark>continues to be <strong>overstated</strong></mark>. </u>Chinese Core Interest? Nevertheless, <u>a</u>n April 2010 <u>New York Times article fuelled speculation</u> to the contrary, <u>claiming that Chinese officials had referred to the South China Sea as a “core interest</u>” during a meeting with two senior U.S. counterparts.23 In a November 2010 interview with veteran Australian journalist Greg Sheridan, then-Secretary of State <u>Hillary Clinton alleged that Chinese officials had again applied this terminology to the South China Sea</u> during the May 2010 gathering of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.24 Beijing’s use of the term “core interest” in relation to any issue is significant given that Chinese officials have traditionally maintained that military force will be used in defending these. Since the term “core interest” first appeared in the Chinese foreign policy lexicon during the early 2000s, it has generally only been applied—officially at least—in relation to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. For this reason, use of the term with reference to the South China Sea would strengthen the justification for referring to this issue as a genuine flashpoint. <u>But doubts remain over whether Beijing truly regards <mark>the</mark> South China Sea as a “core interest.”</u> Michael <u>Swaine reports that his <mark>investigation of Chinese official sources “<strong>failed to unearth a single example of a PRC </mark>official or an official PRC document or media <mark>source that</mark> publicly and explicitly <mark>identifies the</mark> <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>as a</mark> PRC ‘<mark>core interest</u></strong></mark>.’”25 By contrast, <u>Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan</u> or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27 <u><mark>Explicit threats</mark> and promises</u> of this nature <u><mark>are absent</mark> in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea</u> even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, <u><mark>although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities</u></mark> by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—<u><strong><mark>it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region continue to be confined</u></strong></mark>, by and large, <mark>to <u><strong>the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels</u></strong></mark>.29 This stands in contrast to the East China Sea, where exchanges between Beijing and Tokyo have quickly escalated to involve the use of military ships and aircraft. In early 2013, for instance, Tokyo accused Chinese warships of locking weapons-guiding radar onto a Japanese helicopter and a destroyer in two separate incidents.30 In November 2013, Beijing went on to announce a controversial new “Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and initially threatened to take defensive action against aircraft that did not disclose their flight plans prior to entering the zone and identifying themselves when operating within it.31 Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, <u><mark>Beijing’s approach</u></mark> toward the South China Sea disputes <u><mark>has</u></mark> traditionally <u><mark>been</mark> one of</u> <u><strong><mark>conflict de- escalation</u></strong></mark>. <u>Beijing’s</u> clear <u>preference has been to manage such tensions bilaterally</u>. <u>Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes</u> with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, <u>Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for settling maritime disputes</u>. Likewise <u>in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents</u> at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.32 <u>Beijing</u> has also <u>shown</u> some <u><strong>willingness <mark>to take the multilateral route</u></strong></mark>. Most famously, <u>China <mark>signed a </mark>non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</u>” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues, <u>the official position</u> of both China and ASEAN <u>remains to establish a <strong><mark>legally binding code of conduct</u></strong></mark> <u>in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms <mark>for <strong>avoiding incidents</strong></mark> at sea, <strong>crisis management</u></strong>, confidence building measures, and joint development.33 Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off limits in Asia’s multilateral forums. Some <u>commentators contend that</u> rising China’s deepening <u>energy security</u> imperative <u>will eventually render the South China Sea a true “core interest</u>” to Beijing. Chinese demand for oil is projected to increase by 40 percent—to in excess of 1.1 million barrels per day—within only a few years.34 With unproven oil reserves of an estimated 11 billion barrels, the South China Sea offers Beijing a potential solution to this conundrum.35 In the immediate term, however, many analysts also suggest that the South China Sea presents a different, yet no less significant “Malacca Dilemma” for China’s leaders. According to this line of argument, approximately 80 percent of China’s oil imports (sourced from Africa and the Middle East) are vulnerable to interdiction, particularly in narrow chokepoints that connect the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, such as the Malacca Strait.36 The same argument applies to Chinese imports of gas and other raw materials that also pass through these waters. <u>Of greatest concern seems to be <mark>the prospect that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>would seek to strangle China of</mark> such <mark>supplies</mark> in a future conflict over Taiwan. </u>While it is true that <u>the U.S. Navy </u>remains second-to-none in its capacity to enforce a blockade of Chinese shipping coming through the Malacca Strait, history suggests that it would only exercise this capability under the most dire circumstances—and even then, <u><strong>it <mark>would be to the potentially irreparable damage of the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ <mark>international standing</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and reputation as a provider of global public goods.</u></strong> As Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal have argued, “The United States has a very long tradition of promoting and protecting the free flow of trade over the world’s seas. When Washington has used its naval dominance to blockade shipping, it has done so judiciously...<u><strong><mark>Nothing in the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates’ <mark>foreign</mark> <mark>policy tradition indicates that the country would abuse its maritime power for its own narrow interests</u></strong></mark>.”37 <u><mark>In the</mark> unlikely <mark>event the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>were</mark> ever <mark>to take this path</u></mark>— conceivably only in the context of all-out war with China—it is important to remember that <u><strong><mark>Beijing would still retain the option of diverting its ships through alternative routes,</u></strong></mark> such as the Lombok or Sunda Straits, or potentially even south of Australia. U.S.-based China-watchers Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins estimate that such alternative routes could add as little as US$1-2 per barrel—a relatively small price to pay during warfare.38 Added to this, the October 2013 <u>opening of <mark>a <strong>new oil and gas pipeline</strong> through Myanmar</mark> has <mark>further <strong>alleviated</strong> Beijing’s</mark> so-called “Malacca <mark>Dilemma</u></mark>.”39 Taken together, <u>such considerations cast <strong>doubt over speculation</strong> that the South China Sea will inevitably emerge as a Chinese “core interest</u>” on energy security grounds. U.S. Vital Interest? <u>Some</u> commentators <u>suggest that the South China Sea constitutes a vital U.S. interest because it is a litmus test for China’s challenge to U.S. primacy</u> in the Western Pacific. Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan observe that “the South China Sea will be the strategic bellwether for determining the future of U.S. leadership in the Asia–Pacific region.” In their view, it is in this body of water “where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging U.S. naval preeminence—a trend that, if left on its present trajectory, could upset the balance of power that has existed since the end of World War II.”40 To be sure, the balance of military power between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in Beijing’s favor. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have recently embarked upon their own military modernization programs—and while Southeast Asian claimant states have geographical advantages over China given their proximity to the disputed waters of the South China Sea—Beijing’s military modernization commenced during the mid- 1990s, giving China a substantial head start over its southern neighbors. Moreover, Beijing has not had to deal with the fiscal constraints which periods of economic downturn and political unrest have created for a number of Southeast Asian governments over the past two decades.41 That said, <u>it is</u> equally <u>important <strong>not to exaggerate the pace and scope of China’s military modernization,</u></strong> <u>conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy</u> in the broader Western Pacific. <u><mark>China</u></mark> currently <u><mark>does <strong>not possess the capability to project substantial power</u></strong></mark> into the South China Sea, <u><mark>and will</mark> likely <mark>remain unable to do s</mark>o for at least another two decades</u>, its ongoing experimentation with aircraft carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has observed, “the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability associated with asserting full control over the area, including sufficient at-sea replenishment and aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional bases to support logistical requirements.”42 Added to this, <u>questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy crews</u> to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of high-intensity conflict.43 <u>Other <mark>commentators</mark> have <mark>argued that the</mark> <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>is a vital U.S. interest because it symbolizes</mark> the United States’ <mark>commitment</u></mark> to its Asia–Pacific alliance partners. <u>According to this</u> line of reasoning, <u>any wavering</u> or unwillingness on the part of Washington <u>to come to the defense of one of its Southeast Asian allies in the face of Chinese coercion would lead other regional partners to question the reliability of their own strategic relationship</u> with the United States. <u><mark>Yet, despite the fact that Washington <strong>ultimately refused to side with the Philippines</u></strong> <u>during</u></mark> the April <u><mark>2012</u> </mark>Scarborough Shoal standoff, <u><strong><mark>there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America’s closest Asia–Pacific allies</u></strong></mark>. In its May 2013 Defense White Paper, for example, <u>Canberra characterizes Australia’s alliance with the United States as being “our most important defence relationship</u>” and “a pillar of Australia’s strategic and security arrangements.”44 <u>The</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>was</u> certainly <u>swift to demonstrate the credibility of its alliance commitment to Seoul following the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan</u>, undertaking a series of high-profile military exercises with South Korea in waters proximate to China and in the face of strong opposition from Beijing.45 <u>Likewise in</u> November <u>2013, Washington sent a strong signal of support for Tokyo by flying two B-52 bombers through China’s</u> newly announced “<u>Air Defense Identification Zone</u>” without informing Beijing in advance.46 U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck <u>Hagel backed up this show of defiance with unequivocal confirmation that Article V of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands</u>.47 <u>These <mark>examples <strong>call into question the connection that</mark> some <mark>commentators draw</u></strong></mark> <u>between</u> U.S. strategy toward <u>the</u> <u><strong>S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea <u>and the continued viability of</u> the United States’ Asian <u>alliances. What <mark>they</mark> instead <mark>appear to demonstrate</mark> is <mark>that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply <strong>in a different category</mark> </u></strong>than those it has with the Philippines and Thailand. Finally, <u>the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further suggests that the South China Sea <strong>is not a flashpoint</u></strong>. <u><mark>Over the past two or more decades, the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China have gone to great lengths to manage b</mark>ilateral <mark>tensions</mark> and <strong>prevent them from spiraling out of control.</u></strong> A recent example occurred in May 2012, when the two arrived at a mutually acceptable solution after the blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.48 <u>In the</u> <u><strong>S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea, two <u>major, modern Sino–U.S. crises have been successfully managed</u>. The first occurred <u><mark>in</u></mark> April <u><mark>2001</u></mark>, when a U.S. EP-3 conducting routine surveillance in airspace above the South China Sea collided with a Chinese J-8 jet fighter and was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. To
be sure, efforts to address this crisis did not
initially proceed particularly smoothly, as
Chinese officials refused to answer incoming
calls from the U.S. Embassy. Ultimately,
however, <u><mark>those most intimately involved in the
crisis</u></mark>—such as then-Commander of the U.S.
Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair—<u>have
<mark>written</mark> subsequently <mark>how <strong>top</mark> U.S. <mark>officials “made
every effort to exercise prudence and restraint</mark>
</u></strong>while they collected more information about the nature of the incident<u>.”</u> <u><mark>They</u></mark> have also <u><mark>acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made</mark> a series of <strong><mark>grudging concessions</strong></mark> that ultimately resulted in success</u>...<u><mark>after they decided that it was <strong>important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident</u></strong></mark>.”49 <u>Again in</u> March <u>2009</u>, while diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington heightened in the immediate aftermath of an incident involving the harassment of the USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels, <u>good sense</u> also <u><strong>prevailed</u></strong> <u>as</u> senior U.S. and Chinese <u>officials issued statements maintaining that such incidents would not become the norm and <strong>pledging deeper cooperation</strong> </u>to ensure so.50 Added to these examples of effective crisis management, it is also worth noting that Washington reportedly facilitated a compromise to the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff.51</p> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | SCS | 9,831 | 50 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
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3,783,519 | No consistent regulatory framework for international investment now – current “patchwork” creates contradictions and inefficiencies that undermine investment. | Stephenson & Dadush 13 | Stephenson & Dadush 13 [Sherry Stephenson (Senior Fellow with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Senior Advisor for Services Trade in the Executive Secretariat for Integral Development of the Organization of American States in Washington DC, has done consulting work for many organizations including The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and Uri Dadush (senior associate and the director of the "International Economics Program" at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and director of economic policy, PhD in Business Economics, Harvard University), “The Current (Fragmented) Governance of FDI”, in “Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, 2013, www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf] | Despite its importance, the disciplines governing FDI lie in the shadow of those governing global trade. There is no single, comprehensive multilateral treaty or institution to oversee investment activity. attempts to bring FDI under multilateral purview in the past have been unsuccessful. The result is a complex and confusing overlay of bilateral, regional and, in very limited areas, plurilateral disciplines. The negotiation of mega-regionals (e.g. TPP may result in just another layer of complexity. repeated failures to consolidate a multilateral investment regime have left in place an irregular, overlapping and complex “patchwork quilt” of over 3,000 agreements in the IIA universe, This incoherent and often contradictory picture of FDI governance, with its associated costs and inefficiencies, undermines the tremendous value that investment brings as a source of world economic growth and employment, generator of world trade flows and driver of innovation and technological change. The Uruguay Round resulted in a patchwork of partial investment rules within the WTO. There are three agreements currently in effect that cover aspects of FDI, but they are not related in any way; nor are they comprehensive. These three existing WTO agreements are insufficient to provide a coherent and effective regulatory framework for FDI at the multilateral level. Agreements at the plurilateral, regional and bilateral levels have attempted to remedy inadequacies at the multilateral level in dealing with FDI, though in doing so, they have created their own network of overlapping – and sometimes contradictory and incoherent – disciplines, adding to the “patchwork quilt” on FDI. | There is no single multilateral treaty or institution to oversee investment activity The result is a complex and confusing overlay TPP may result in just another layer of complexity. 6 repeated failures left in place a patchwork quilt” of over 3,000 agreemen sociated costs and inefficiencies, undermines value that investment brings as a generator of world trade There are three agreements currently in effect that cover aspects of FDI they are not related in any way; existing agreements are insufficient to provide a regulatory framework for FDI they have created their own network of contradictory and incoherent – disciplines | Despite its importance, the disciplines governing FDI lie in the shadow of those governing global trade. There is no single, comprehensive multilateral treaty or institution to oversee investment activity. Various attempts to bring FDI under multilateral purview in the past have been unsuccessful. The result is a complex and confusing overlay of bilateral, regional and, in very limited areas, plurilateral disciplines. The negotiation of mega-regionals (e.g. TPP and TTIP), if successful, may improve this situation in some instances, or may result in just another layer of complexity. 6.1 Efforts at the Multilateral Level There have been several attempts to govern investment at the multilateral level. In addition to the efforts to address the topic in the Havana Charter of 1948 – which ultimately failed for other reasons,48 a second attempt was made by the OECD through its four-year effort (1995–1998) to craft an MAI. The effort involved OECD Members and a few key developing countries. When made public in 1997, the draft agreement drew widespread criticism from civil society groups and developing countries, and the ensuing public pressure and opposition led to the withdrawal of first France and then other countries from the agreement. The effort was suspended at the end of December 1998.49 A third attempt to bring investment under multilateral rules took place within the WTO itself, in the context of the Doha Development Agenda, when investment and three other “Singapore issues” (competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation) were originally included within the Doha negotiating mandate. However, dissension within the WTO ranks made it impossible to reach a decision by consensus on the modalities for negotiating these issues, and therefore negotiations could not be launched as planned at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference. While the EU, Japan and Korea were supportive of negotiating all four issues, most developing WTO Members were generally opposed, and the United States preferred to focus on market access rather than on generalized disciplines.50 In August 2004 three of the four “Singapore issues” (including investment) were dropped from the Doha Agenda, and negotiations were subsequently launched on only one subject: trade facilitation.51 These repeated failures to consolidate a multilateral investment regime have left in place an irregular, overlapping and complex “patchwork quilt” of over 3,000 agreements in the IIA universe, consisting of 2,833 BITs and 331 “other IIAs, primarily FTAs with investment provisions, economic partnership agreements and regional agreements” (see the table in the Annex).52 This incoherent and often contradictory picture of FDI governance, with its associated costs and inefficiencies, undermines the tremendous value that investment brings as a source of world economic growth and employment, generator of world trade flows and driver of innovation and technological change. 6.2 Partial Investment Rules at the Multilateral Level The Uruguay Round resulted in a patchwork of partial investment rules within the WTO. There are three agreements currently in effect that cover aspects of FDI, but they are not related in any way; nor are they comprehensive. The first of these is the TRIMS Agreement covering trade in goods with a few disciplines but no investor protections.53 The second is the GATS, which covers FDI in services, defining FDI as one of the four ways of trading services (mode 3 or “commercial presence”). Certain generalized disciplines within the GATS on MFN, transparency and notification, and domestic regulation apply to FDI in services, but there are no comprehensive disciplines that address investment guarantees and protections.54 The third is the Agreement on SCM, which abolishes export subsidies for most products and regulates the response to them, as discussed by Dadush in the previous section. These three existing WTO agreements are insufficient to provide a coherent and effective regulatory framework for FDI at the multilateral level. Agreements at the plurilateral, regional and bilateral levels have attempted to remedy inadequacies at the multilateral level in dealing with FDI, though in doing so, they have created their own network of overlapping – and sometimes contradictory and incoherent – disciplines, adding to the “patchwork quilt” on FDI. The table in the Annex summarizes the types of agreements that have been negotiated at various levels on FDI and their membership. | 4,519 | <h4><strong>No consistent regulatory framework for international investment now – current “patchwork” creates contradictions and inefficiencies that undermine investment.</h4><p>Stephenson & Dadush 13</strong> [Sherry Stephenson (Senior Fellow with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Senior Advisor for Services Trade in the Executive Secretariat for Integral Development of the Organization of American States in Washington DC, has done consulting work for many organizations including The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and Uri Dadush (senior associate and the director of the "International Economics Program" at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and director of economic policy, PhD in Business Economics, Harvard University), “The Current (Fragmented) Governance of FDI”, in “Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, 2013, www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf]</p><p><u><strong>Despite its importance, the disciplines governing FDI lie in the shadow of those governing global trade. <mark>There is no single</mark>, comprehensive <mark>multilateral treaty or institution to oversee investment activity</mark>. </u></strong>Various <u><strong>attempts to bring FDI under multilateral purview in the past have been unsuccessful. <mark>The result is a complex and confusing overlay</mark> of bilateral, regional and, in very limited areas, plurilateral disciplines. The negotiation of mega-regionals (e.g. <mark>TPP</u></strong></mark> and TTIP), if successful, may improve this situation in some instances, or <u><strong><mark>may result in just another layer of complexity. </u></strong>6</mark>.1 Efforts at the Multilateral Level There have been several attempts to govern investment at the multilateral level. In addition to the efforts to address the topic in the Havana Charter of 1948 – which ultimately failed for other reasons,48 a second attempt was made by the OECD through its four-year effort (1995–1998) to craft an MAI. The effort involved OECD Members and a few key developing countries. When made public in 1997, the draft agreement drew widespread criticism from civil society groups and developing countries, and the ensuing public pressure and opposition led to the withdrawal of first France and then other countries from the agreement. The effort was suspended at the end of December 1998.49 A third attempt to bring investment under multilateral rules took place within the WTO itself, in the context of the Doha Development Agenda, when investment and three other “Singapore issues” (competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation) were originally included within the Doha negotiating mandate. However, dissension within the WTO ranks made it impossible to reach a decision by consensus on the modalities for negotiating these issues, and therefore negotiations could not be launched as planned at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference. While the EU, Japan and Korea were supportive of negotiating all four issues, most developing WTO Members were generally opposed, and the United States preferred to focus on market access rather than on generalized disciplines.50 In August 2004 three of the four “Singapore issues” (including investment) were dropped from the Doha Agenda, and negotiations were subsequently launched on only one subject: trade facilitation.51 These <u><strong><mark>repeated failures</mark> to consolidate a multilateral investment regime have <mark>left in place a</mark>n irregular, overlapping and complex “<mark>patchwork quilt” of over 3,000 agreemen</mark>ts in the IIA universe, </u></strong>consisting of 2,833 BITs and 331 “other IIAs, primarily FTAs with investment provisions, economic partnership agreements and regional agreements” (see the table in the Annex).52 <u><strong>This incoherent and often contradictory picture of FDI governance, with its as<mark>sociated costs and inefficiencies, undermines</mark> the tremendous <mark>value that investment brings as a</mark> source of world economic growth and employment, <mark>generator of world trade</mark> flows and driver of innovation and technological change. </u></strong>6.2 Partial Investment Rules at the Multilateral Level <u><strong>The Uruguay Round resulted in a patchwork of partial investment rules within the WTO. <mark>There are three agreements currently in effect that cover aspects of FDI</mark>, but <mark>they are not related in any way;</mark> nor are they comprehensive. </u></strong>The first of these is the TRIMS Agreement covering trade in goods with a few disciplines but no investor protections.53 The second is the GATS, which covers FDI in services, defining FDI as one of the four ways of trading services (mode 3 or “commercial presence”). Certain generalized disciplines within the GATS on MFN, transparency and notification, and domestic regulation apply to FDI in services, but there are no comprehensive disciplines that address investment guarantees and protections.54 The third is the Agreement on SCM, which abolishes export subsidies for most products and regulates the response to them, as discussed by Dadush in the previous section. <u><strong>These three <mark>existing</mark> WTO <mark>agreements are insufficient to provide a</mark> coherent and effective <mark>regulatory framework for FDI</mark> at the multilateral level. Agreements at the plurilateral, regional and bilateral levels have attempted to remedy inadequacies at the multilateral level in dealing with FDI, though in doing so, <mark>they have created their own network of</mark> overlapping – and sometimes <mark>contradictory and incoherent – disciplines</mark>, adding to the “patchwork quilt” on FDI. </u>The table in the Annex summarizes the types of agreements that have been negotiated at various levels on FDI and their membership.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,914 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
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3,783,520 | Violence and extinction are not inevitable – human ingenuity | Peiser, 2007 | Peiser, 2007 (Benny, Ph.D. and Social Anthropologist at Liverpool John Moores University, “Existential Risks and Democratic Peace”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm) | In recent years leading scientists have advanced the Doomsday Argument that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or unavoidable. all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and technologies that comprise boundless solutions to existential risks. technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of democratic liberalism is directly correlated with a steep reduction of armed conflicts. the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War while the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically the prophets of doom are wrong. societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history. | there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined all existential risks can be tackled technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically | In recent years, leading scientists in the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, have advanced the so-called Doomsday Argument, a cosmological theory in which global catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or unavoidable. According to a more optimistic view of the future, all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted by the constraints of human biology. Instead, it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and information-crunching technologies that potentially comprise boundless technological solutions to existential risks. Current advances in developing an effective planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk from the list of contemporary concerns. A technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global democracy as a solution But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-cut solutions are available for the inherent potential threats posed by super-technologies. After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes. Here, the solution can only be political and cultural. Fortunately, there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of democratic liberalism is directly correlated with a steep reduction of armed conflicts. A recent UN report found that the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War, while the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically, from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems. As Rudolph J Rummel, one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: "In democracy we have a cure for war and a way of minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history. | 3,459 | <h4>Violence and extinction are not inevitable – human ingenuity </h4><p><strong>Peiser, 2007<u></strong> (Benny, Ph.D. and Social Anthropologist at Liverpool John Moores University, “Existential Risks and Democratic Peace”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm)</p><p><strong>In recent years</u></strong>, <u><strong>leading scientists </u></strong>in the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, <u><strong>have advanced the </u></strong>so-called <u><strong>Doomsday Argument</u></strong>, a cosmological theory in which global catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing <u><strong>that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. Nevertheless, <mark>there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined</mark> or unavoidable. </u></strong>According to a more optimistic view of the future, <u><strong><mark>all existential risks can be tackled</mark>, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. </u></strong>From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, <u><strong>the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted </u></strong>by the constraints of human biology. Instead, <u><strong>it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and </u></strong>information-crunching <u><strong>technologies that </u></strong>potentially <u><strong>comprise boundless </u></strong>technological <u><strong>solutions to existential risks. </u></strong>Current advances in developing an effective planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how <u><strong><mark>technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk</mark> </u></strong>from the list of contemporary concerns. A technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global democracy as a solution But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-cut solutions are available for the inherent potential threats posed by super-technologies. After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes. Here, the solution can only be political and cultural. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of democratic liberalism is directly correlated with a steep reduction of armed conflicts. </u></strong>A recent UN report found that <u><strong>the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War</u></strong>, <u><strong>while <mark>the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically</u></strong></mark>, from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems. As Rudolph J Rummel, one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: "In democracy we have a cure for war and a way of minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that <u><strong>the prophets of doom</u></strong>, including those predicting climate doom, <u><strong>are wrong. </u></strong>Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, <u><strong>societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history.</p></u></strong> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 1 | 63,113 | 28 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
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1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,521 | Heg deters china war | Lieber 05 | Lieber 05 (Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, (p. 158)) | the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing Far from being a source of this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons As a even China acquiesces in America's regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor
The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional capacity American engagement remains crucial given its weight on the international stage, the potential threats to its own security, and it has leverage in the regions the Caucasus and Central Asian states have been receptive to the United States Regional countries need American support to maintain U.S. leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems | the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia this presence reduce competition among powers and deter conflict. Disengagement would lead to more dangerous competition and spread of nuclear weapons. even China acquiesces in America's regional role
The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional capacity engagement remains crucial given its weight on the international stage, the Caucasus and Central Asian states have been receptive to the United States Regional countries need American support U.S. leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems | Parallels between America's role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia's geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region's security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing. Far from being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, even China acquiesces in America's regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor
casus and Central Asian states, combined with brutal regional wars, makes them extremely vulnerable to outside pressure—especially from Russia. Although Russia itself is weak, it is far stronger than all the states combined, and while its direct influence over their affairs has declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remains the dominant economic, political, and military force. The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional capacity and in promoting cooperation among them. American engagement remains crucial given its weight on the international stage, the potential threats to its own security, and the fact that it has leverage in the regions. In spite of a few glitches, the Caucasus and Central Asian states have been receptive to the United States and are among its few potential allies in a zone where other states are not so amenable to U.S. activity. Regional countries need American moral and material support to maintain independence in the face of increasing pressures, and its guidance in dealing with presidential transition crises and addressing human rights abuses. Even with limited political and financial resources, U.S. leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems. | 2,483 | <h4><strong>Heg deters china war </h4><p>Lieber 05 <u></strong>(Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, (p. 158))</p><p></u>Parallels between America's role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia's geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region's security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, <u><strong><mark>the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia </mark>that no other country or organization is capable of playing</u></strong>. <u><strong>Far from being a source of</u></strong> tension or instability, <u><strong><mark>this presence </mark>tends to <mark>reduce competition among</mark> regional <mark>powers and </mark>to <mark>deter </mark>armed <mark>conflict. Disengagement</mark>,</u></strong> as urged by some critics of American primacy, <u><strong><mark>would</mark> probably <mark>lead to more dangerous competition</mark> or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment <mark>and </mark>the <mark>spread of nuclear weapons</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>As a </u></strong>consequence, <u><mark>even<strong> China acquiesces in America's regional role</strong></mark> despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor</p><p></u>casus and Central Asian states, combined with brutal regional wars, makes them extremely vulnerable to outside pressure—especially from Russia. Although Russia itself is weak, it is far stronger than all the states combined, and while its direct influence over their affairs has declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remains the dominant economic, political, and military force.<u> <mark>The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional capacity</u></mark> and in promoting cooperation among them. <u>American <mark>engagement remains crucial given its weight on the international stage,</mark> the potential threats to its own security, and </u>the fact that<u> it has leverage in the regions</u>. In spite of a few glitches, <u><mark>the Caucasus and Central Asian states</u> <u>have been receptive to the United States</u></mark> and are among its few potential allies in a zone where other states are not so amenable to U.S. activity. <u><mark>Regional countries need American</mark> </u>moral and<u> </u>material <u><mark>support</mark> to maintain </u>independence in the face of increasing pressures, and its guidance in dealing with presidential transition crises and addressing human rights abuses. Even with limited political and financial resources, <u><mark>U.S. leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 143,007 | 16 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,522 | Nuclear weapons and geography check miscalc | Keck, Diplomat associate editor, 2013 | Keck, Diplomat associate editor, 2013 | a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is more frightening than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society measured means of retaliation would be available and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China wa First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power in historical cases each state had to worry that the other side could threaten the other side’s survival Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their security dilemma China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them the difficulty of projecting power across large distances reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances with Beijing’s neighbors At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system i throughout the Cold War Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least | a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of nuclear weapons and geography war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed nce no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for miscalculation to occur. these can be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. holding regularly senior level dialogues it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange at each stage of the crisis leaders know nuclear war could ensue measured means of retaliation would be available and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process both the U S and China are large countries They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific the difficulty of projecting power across large distances reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten survival the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system throughout the Cold War Even with the U.S. presence in Asia the fact that the homelands are separated is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide . | (Zachary, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War”, 7-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/, ldg)
But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures. Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival. Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast, when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: the difficulty of projecting power across large distances—particularly bodies of waters— reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least. | 5,814 | <h4><strong>Nuclear weapons and geography check miscalc</h4><p>Keck, Diplomat associate editor, 2013</p><p></strong>(Zachary, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War”, 7-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/, ldg)</p><p>But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, <u><mark>a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of</mark> two other factors: <mark>nuclear weapons and geography</u></mark>. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and <u>nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics</u>. <u>Put differently, <mark>war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states</u></mark>. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. <u>With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and <mark>since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed</mark> in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Si<mark>nce no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for</mark> a <mark>miscalculation</mark> of some sort <mark>to occur. <strong></mark>Most of <mark>these can </mark>and should <mark>be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. </mark>leaders <mark>holding regularly senior level dialogues</u></strong></mark> like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, <u><mark>it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange</mark> between China and the United</u> States. <u>After all, <mark>at each stage of the crisis leaders know</mark> that if it is not properly contained, a <mark>nuclear war could ensue</u></mark>, <u>and the complete destruction of a leader’s country</u> <u>is</u> a <u>more frightening</u> possibility <u>than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society</u>. In any case, <u><strong><mark>measured means of retaliation would be available</u></strong></mark> to the party wronged, <u><strong><mark>and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process</u></strong></mark> of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures. <u>Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China wa</u>r, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. <u>First, <mark>both the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China are</mark> immensely <mark>large countries</u></mark>—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. <u><mark>They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable</mark> by another power</u>. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, <u>in</u> Europe where many of the <u>historical cases</u> derive from, <u>each state</u> genuinely <u>had to worry that the other side</u> could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they <u>could</u> credibly <u>threaten the other side’s</u> national <u>survival</u>. <u>Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their</u> insecurity and therefore the <u>security dilemma</u> they operate within. Besides being immensely large countries, <u><mark>China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific</mark> Ocean,</u> which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast, <u>when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them</u>, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: <u><mark>the difficulty of projecting power across large distances</u></mark>—particularly bodies of waters— <u><mark>reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten</mark> its national <mark>survival</mark> and most important strategic interests. True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances</u> and partnerships <u>with Beijing’s neighbors</u>. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. <u>At the same time, <mark>the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere</u></mark>, most notably in Canada, <u><mark>and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system</mark> i</u>n Western Europe <u><mark>throughout the Cold War</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even with the U.S. presence in Asia</mark>, then, <mark>the fact that the</mark> Chinese and American <mark>homelands are separated</mark> by the largest body of water in the world <mark>is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide </mark>at least</u></strong><mark>.</p></mark> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | US China War | 36,146 | 306 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,523 | US-China BIT spurs a multilateral investment framework – key to sustainable FDI. | Sauvant 16 | Sauvant 16 [Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division), “The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, January 2016, The policy options paper is the result of a collective process involving all members of the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy. It draws on the active engagement of these eminent experts in discussions over multiple meetings as well as an overview paper and think pieces commissioned by the E15Initiative and authored by group members and external contributors, www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Investment_Law_Policy_regime_report_2015_1401.pdf] | The discussion so far has focused on individual aspects of the international investment regime But one could also take a holistic approach to the governance of international investment, namely to negotiate a comprehensive universal framework on international investment, a multilateral framework on investment Such a framework would have to start from the need to promote sustainable FDI for sustainable development. The convergence of policy interests that has been underway between home and host countries with the growth of outward FDI from emerging markets could facilitate reaching such an objective. it is significant that governments continue to show a great willingness to make rules on international investment This is particularly reflected in the negotiation of BITs between key countries these negotiations represent significant opportunities to shape the investment regime by narrowing the substantive and procedural investment law differences between and among the principal FDI host and home countries. these negotiations could become important stepping stones towards a subsequent universal investment instrument. it would be desirable to begin a process of exploring the possibility of negotiating an international framework on investment, ideally of a multilateral nature. a permanent multilateral system for investment disputes could become the nucleus around which a universal framework could be built. a plurilateral framework on international investment could serve as a first step in that direction. it could be an agreement negotiated by interested parties that would be open for future accessions by other states. The situation may be favourable for such an initiative, in particular if the China-United States BIT should be concluded expeditiously. If that should occur, the most important home and host countries among developed and developing countries would have negotiated an agreement that could serve as a template that could be taken forward. | one could also take a holistic approach to the governance of international investment Such a framework would promote sustainable FDI . This is particularly reflected in the negotiation of BIT these represent significant opportunities to shape the investment regime by narrowing the substantive and procedural investment law differences and become important stepping stones towards a universal investment instrument a permanent multilateral system could become the nucleus around which a universal framework could be built situation may be favourable if the China-United States BIT should be concluded expeditiously. an agreement that could serve as a template that could be taken forward. | The discussion so far has focused on individual—but key—aspects of the international investment regime and how they could be improved. But one could also take a holistic approach to the governance of international investment, namely to negotiate a comprehensive universal framework on international investment, preferably a multilateral framework on investment (MFI), possibly starting with a plurilateral framework on investment (PFI) that would be open for future accessions by other states. Such a framework would have to start from the need to promote sustainable FDI for sustainable development. The convergence of policy interests that has been underway between home and host countries with the growth of outward FDI from emerging markets could facilitate reaching such an objective. Moreover, it is significant that governments continue to show a great willingness to make rules on international investment, as revealed in the proliferation of IIAs. This is particularly reflected in the negotiation of BITs between key countries, as well as in the negotiation of mega-regional agreements with investment chapters. Together, these negotiations represent significant opportunities to shape the investment regime by narrowing the substantive and procedural investment law differences between and among the principal FDI host and home countries. If this should occur, the result of these negotiations could become important stepping stones towards a subsequent universal investment instrument. Still, the negotiation of such an instrument, especially a high-standards one, would face significant challenges, in light of the unsuccessful efforts of the past and the wide range of views and the considerable passion surrounding IIAs. Given these and other challenges, it would be desirable to begin a process of exploring the possibility of negotiating an international framework on investment, ideally of a multilateral nature. This may be particular pertinent in light of the July 2015 decision by the Third International Conference on Financing for Development to mandate UNCTAD to work with member states to improve IIAs, and the experience of that organization in this area, not least in its comprehensive recent effort to facilitate the formulation of a new generation of investment policies through its Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. On the other hand, the WTO offers the best platform for the trade and investment regimes to be combined and consolidated, as a unified system providing systematic legal and institutional support for the future growth of global value chains, turning that organization into a World Investment and Trade Organization. If this course were to be pursued, the WTO’s Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment could be reactivated in due course, or a new working group could be established. Another alternative is to build on existing agreements, especially the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, to cover other types of investment and obligations. There might also be the possibility that the international investment court and appellate mechanism sought by the European Commission could become a stepping stone towards a permanent multilateral system for investment disputes, which, in turn, could become the nucleus around which a universal framework could be built. If a truly universal and comprehensive strong investment framework is out of reach at this time, a plurilateral framework on international investment could serve as a first step in that direction. Following the example of the Trade in Services Agreement, it could be an agreement negotiated by interested parties that would be open for future accessions by other states. The situation may be favourable for such an initiative, in particular if the China-United States BIT should be concluded expeditiously. If that should occur, the most important home and host countries among developed and developing countries would have negotiated an agreement that could serve as a template that could be taken forward. The 2016 G20 summit in China could initiate such a process. | 4,130 | <h4>US-China BIT spurs a multilateral investment framework – key to sustainable FDI.</h4><p><strong>Sauvant 16 </strong>[Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division), “The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, January 2016, The policy options paper is the result of a collective process involving all members of the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy. It draws on the active engagement of these eminent experts in discussions over multiple meetings as well as an overview paper and think pieces commissioned by the E15Initiative and authored by group members and external contributors, www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Investment_Law_Policy_regime_report_2015_1401.pdf]</p><p><u><strong>The discussion so far has focused on individual</u></strong>—but key—<u><strong>aspects of the international investment regime</u></strong> and how they could be improved. <u><strong>But <mark>one could also take a holistic approach to the governance of international investment</mark>, namely to negotiate a comprehensive universal framework on international investment, </u></strong>preferably<u><strong> a multilateral framework on investment</u></strong> (MFI), possibly starting with a plurilateral framework on investment (PFI) that would be open for future accessions by other states. <u><strong><mark>Such a framework would</mark> have to start from the need to <mark>promote sustainable FDI</mark> for sustainable development. The convergence of policy interests that has been underway between home and host countries with the growth of outward FDI from emerging markets could facilitate reaching such an objective.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>it is significant that governments continue to show a great willingness to make rules on international investment</u></strong>, as revealed in the proliferation of IIAs<mark>. <u><strong>This is particularly reflected in the negotiation of BIT</mark>s between key countries</u></strong>, as well as in the negotiation of mega-regional agreements with investment chapters. Together, <u><strong><mark>these</mark> negotiations <mark>represent significant opportunities to shape the investment regime by narrowing the substantive and procedural investment law differences</mark> between and among the principal FDI host <mark>and</mark> home countries.</u></strong> If this should occur, the result of<u><strong> these negotiations could <mark>become important stepping stones towards a</mark> subsequent <mark>universal investment instrument</mark>.</u></strong> Still, the negotiation of such an instrument, especially a high-standards one, would face significant challenges, in light of the unsuccessful efforts of the past and the wide range of views and the considerable passion surrounding IIAs. Given these and other challenges, <u><strong>it would be desirable to begin a process of exploring the possibility of negotiating an international framework on investment, ideally of a multilateral nature.</u></strong> This may be particular pertinent in light of the July 2015 decision by the Third International Conference on Financing for Development to mandate UNCTAD to work with member states to improve IIAs, and the experience of that organization in this area, not least in its comprehensive recent effort to facilitate the formulation of a new generation of investment policies through its Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. On the other hand, the WTO offers the best platform for the trade and investment regimes to be combined and consolidated, as a unified system providing systematic legal and institutional support for the future growth of global value chains, turning that organization into a World Investment and Trade Organization. If this course were to be pursued, the WTO’s Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment could be reactivated in due course, or a new working group could be established. Another alternative is to build on existing agreements, especially the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, to cover other types of investment and obligations. There might also be the possibility that the international investment court and appellate mechanism sought by the European Commission could become a stepping stone towards <u><strong><mark>a permanent multilateral system</mark> for investment disputes</u></strong>, which, in turn, <u><strong><mark>could become the nucleus around which a universal framework could be built</mark>.</u></strong> If a truly universal and comprehensive strong investment framework is out of reach at this time, <u><strong>a plurilateral framework on international investment could serve as a first step in that direction.</u></strong> Following the example of the Trade in Services Agreement, <u><strong>it could be an agreement negotiated by interested parties that would be open for future accessions by other states. The <mark>situation may be favourable</mark> for such an initiative, in particular <mark>if the China-United States BIT should be concluded expeditiously.</mark> If that should occur, the most important home and host countries among developed and developing countries would have negotiated <mark>an agreement that could serve as a template that could be taken forward.</mark> </u></strong>The 2016 G20 summit in China could initiate such a process.</p> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,919 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,524 | Space exploration will lead to alien encounter | Daily Galaxy 5/29 | Daily Galaxy 5/29/2011 [‘Weekend Feature: 'Endeavour' Astronauts on Extraterrestrial Life -- "We'll find something out there."’, May 29th, 2011, http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2011/05/-weekend-feature-endeavour-astronauts-on-extraterrestrial-life-well-find-something-out-there.html] | The human race will find life elsewhere in the Universe as it pushes ahead with space exploration, reported astronauts of the space shuttle Endeavour. The US space shuttle Endeavour prepares today to undock from the International Space Station and jet back to Earth, wrapping up its final journey before entering retirement, NASA said. "If we push back boundaries far enough, I'm sure eventually we'll find something out there," said Mike Foreman, a mission specialist on the Endeavour, "Maybe not as evolved as we are, but it's hard to believe that there is not life somewhere else in this great Universe," he added. “I personally believe that we are going to find something that we can't explain," said another astronaut, Gregory Johnson. "There is probably something out there but I've never seen it," he said. Dominic Gorie, the crew commander and veteran of four space flights, points out that explorers in past eras did not know what they would find before setting off across the ocean. "As we travel in the space, we don't know what we'll find. That's the beauty of what we do. I hope that someday we'll find what we don't understand." Takao Doi, a Japanese astronaut on past Endeavour missions, agreed "life like us must exist" elsewhere in the Universe. The comments come after a surprisingly high-level debate in Japan about UFOs. Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura said in 2007 that he personally believed aliens existed, in an unusual rebuttal to a government statement that Japan had no knowledge of UFOs. Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba went as far as to say that he was studying the legal ramifications of responding to an alien attack in light of Japan's post-World War II pacifist constitution. At the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of NASA, Stephen Hawking, Newton's heir as the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge, answered the question, “Are we alone?” His answer is short and simple; probably not! | If we push back boundaries far enough we'll find something out there it's hard to believe that there is not life somewhere else in this great Universe added Stephen Hawking | The human race will find life elsewhere in the Universe as it pushes ahead with space exploration, reported astronauts of the space shuttle Endeavour. The US space shuttle Endeavour prepares today to undock from the International Space Station and jet back to Earth, wrapping up its final journey before entering retirement, NASA said. "If we push back boundaries far enough, I'm sure eventually we'll find something out there," said Mike Foreman, a mission specialist on the Endeavour, "Maybe not as evolved as we are, but it's hard to believe that there is not life somewhere else in this great Universe," he added. “I personally believe that we are going to find something that we can't explain," said another astronaut, Gregory Johnson. "There is probably something out there but I've never seen it," he said. Dominic Gorie, the crew commander and veteran of four space flights, points out that explorers in past eras did not know what they would find before setting off across the ocean. "As we travel in the space, we don't know what we'll find. That's the beauty of what we do. I hope that someday we'll find what we don't understand." Takao Doi, a Japanese astronaut on past Endeavour missions, agreed "life like us must exist" elsewhere in the Universe. The comments come after a surprisingly high-level debate in Japan about UFOs. Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura said in 2007 that he personally believed aliens existed, in an unusual rebuttal to a government statement that Japan had no knowledge of UFOs. Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba went as far as to say that he was studying the legal ramifications of responding to an alien attack in light of Japan's post-World War II pacifist constitution. At the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of NASA, Stephen Hawking, Newton's heir as the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge, answered the question, “Are we alone?” His answer is short and simple; probably not! | 1,967 | <h4><u>Space exploration will lead to alien encounter</h4><p><strong><mark>Daily Galaxy</mark> 5/29</strong>/20<mark>11</mark> [‘Weekend Feature: 'Endeavour' Astronauts on Extraterrestrial Life -- "We'll find something out there."’, May 29th, 2011, http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2011/05/-weekend-feature-endeavour-astronauts-on-extraterrestrial-life-well-find-something-out-there.html]</p><p> <strong>The human race will find life elsewhere in the Universe as it pushes ahead with space exploration, reported astronauts of the space shuttle Endeavour.</strong> The US space shuttle Endeavour prepares today to undock from the International Space Station and jet back to Earth, wrapping up its final journey before entering retirement, NASA said. "<mark>If we push back boundaries far enough</mark>, I'm sure eventually <mark>we'll find something out there</mark>," said Mike Foreman, a mission specialist on the Endeavour, "Maybe not as evolved as we are, but <mark>it's hard to believe that there is not life somewhere else in this great Universe</mark>," he <mark>added</mark>. “I personally believe that we are going to find something that we can't explain," said another astronaut, Gregory Johnson. "There is probably something out there but I've never seen it," he said. Dominic Gorie, the crew commander and veteran of four space flights, points out that explorers in past eras did not know what they would find before setting off across the ocean. "As we travel in the space, we don't know what we'll find. That's the beauty of what we do. I hope that someday we'll find what we don't understand." Takao Doi, a Japanese astronaut on past Endeavour missions, agreed "life like us must exist" elsewhere in the Universe. The comments come after a surprisingly high-level debate in Japan about UFOs. Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura said in 2007 that he personally believed aliens existed, in an unusual rebuttal to a government statement that Japan had no knowledge of UFOs. Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba went as far as to say that he was studying the legal ramifications of responding to an alien attack in light of Japan's post-World War II pacifist constitution. At the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of NASA, <mark>Stephen Hawking</mark>, Newton's heir as the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge, answered the question, “Are we alone?” His answer is short and simple; probably not!</p></u> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 1 | 13,314 | 3 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,525 | Decline results in the intensification of resource wars --- specifically water wars are likely to escalate absent US hegemony | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pg. 115-116)//JBS | Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pg. 115-116)//JBS | this century the world will face a series of novel geopolitical challenges brought about by significant changes in the physical environment The management of those changing environmental commons will require global consensus and mutual sacrifice a decline in American influence would reduce the likelihood of achieving cooperative agreements on environmental and resource management America’s retirement from its role of global policeman could create greater opportunities for emerging powers to further exploit the environmental commons for their own economic gain, increasing the chances of resource-driven conflict, particularly in Asia The latter is likely to be the case especially in regard to increasingly scarce water resources by 2025 more than 2.8 billion people will be living in either water-scarce or waterstressed regions global demand for water will double every twenty years interstate conflicts the geopolitical consequences of cross-border water scarcity are most likely to occur in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and northeastern Africa The combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination. The threat of water conflicts is likely to intensify as the economic growth and increasing demand for water in emerging powers like Turkey and India collides with instability and resource scarcity in rival countries like Iraq and Pakistan In South Asia, the never-ending political tension between India and Pakistan combined with overcrowding may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk especially because the river basin originates in Kashmir The lingering dispute between India and China over the status of Northeast India remains a serious concern. As American hegemony disappears and regional competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts | a decline in American influence would reduce the likelihood of achieving cooperative agreements on resource management increasing the chances of resource-driven conflict, particularly in Asia especially in regard to water global demand for water will double interstate conflicts the consequences of water scarcity are likely The combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination The threat of water conflicts is likely to intensify the tension between India and Pakistan combined with overcrowding may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk because the river basin originates in Kashmir As American hegemony disappears and competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts. | In addition to the foregoing, in the course of this century the world will face a series of novel geopolitical challenges brought about by significant changes in the physical environment. The management of those changing environmental commons— the growing scarcity of fresh water, the opening of the Arctic, and global warming— will require global consensus and mutual sacrifice. American leadership alone is not enough to secure cooperation on all these issues, but a decline in American influence would reduce the likelihood of achieving cooperative agreements on environmental and resource management. America’s retirement from its role of global policeman could create greater opportunities for emerging powers to further exploit the environmental commons for their own economic gain, increasing the chances of resource-driven conflict, particularly in Asia. The latter is likely to be the case especially in regard to the increasingly scarce water resources in many countries. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), by 2025 more than 2.8 billion people will be living in either water-scarce or waterstressed regions, as global demand for water will double every twenty years. 9 While much of the Southern Hemisphere is threatened by potential water scarcity, interstate conflicts— the geopolitical consequences of cross-border water scarcity— are most likely to occur in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and northeastern Africa, regions where limited water resources are shared across borders and political stability is transient. The combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination. The threat of water conflicts is likely to intensify as the economic growth and increasing demand for water in emerging powers like Turkey and India collides with instability and resource scarcity in rival countries like Iraq and Pakistan. Water scarcity will also test China’s internal stability as its burgeoning population and growing industrial complex combine to increase demand for and decrease supply of usable water. In South Asia, the never-ending political tension between India and Pakistan combined with overcrowding and Pakistan’s heightening internal crises may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk, especially because the river basin originates in the long-disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, an area of ever-increasing political and military volatility. The lingering dispute between India and China over the status of Northeast India, an area through which the vital Brahmaputra River flows, also remains a serious concern. As American hegemony disappears and regional competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts. | 2,797 | <h4>Decline results in the intensification of resource wars --- specifically water wars are likely to escalate absent US hegemony</h4><p><strong>Brzezinski, 2012 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power, Pg. 115-116)//JBS</p><p></strong>In addition to the foregoing, in the course of <u>this century the world will face a series of novel geopolitical challenges brought about by significant changes in the physical environment</u>. <u>The management of those changing environmental commons</u>— the growing scarcity of fresh water, the opening of the Arctic, and global warming— <u>will require global consensus and mutual sacrifice</u>. American leadership alone is not enough to secure cooperation on all these issues, but <u><strong><mark>a decline in American influence would reduce the likelihood of achieving cooperative agreements on</mark> environmental and <mark>resource management</u></strong></mark>. <u>America’s retirement from its role of global policeman</u> <u>could create greater opportunities for emerging powers to further exploit the environmental commons for their own economic gain<strong>, <mark>increasing the chances of resource-driven conflict, particularly in Asia</u></strong></mark>. <u>The latter is likely to be the case <mark>especially in regard to</u></mark> the <u>increasingly scarce <mark>water</mark> resources</u> in many countries. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), <u>by 2025 more than 2.8 billion people will be living in either water-scarce or waterstressed regions</u>, as <u><mark>global demand for water will double</mark> every twenty years</u>. 9 While much of the Southern Hemisphere is threatened by potential water scarcity, <u><mark>interstate conflicts</u></mark>— <u><mark>the</mark> geopolitical <mark>consequences</mark> <mark>of</mark> cross-border <mark>water scarcity</u></mark>— <u><mark>are</mark> most <mark>likely</mark> to occur in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and northeastern Africa</u>, regions where limited water resources are shared across borders and political stability is transient. <u><strong><mark>The combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination</strong></mark>. <mark>The threat of water conflicts is likely to intensify</mark> as the economic growth and increasing demand for water in emerging powers like Turkey and India collides with instability and resource scarcity in rival countries like Iraq and Pakistan</u>. Water scarcity will also test China’s internal stability as its burgeoning population and growing industrial complex combine to increase demand for and decrease supply of usable water. <u>In South Asia, <mark>the</mark> never-ending political <mark>tension between India and Pakistan combined with overcrowding</u></mark> and Pakistan’s heightening internal crises <u><mark>may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk</u></mark>, <u>especially <mark>because the river basin</mark> <mark>originates in</u></mark> the long-disputed territory of Jammu and <u><mark>Kashmir</u></mark>, an area of ever-increasing political and military volatility. <u>The lingering dispute between India and China over the status of Northeast India</u>, an area through which the vital Brahmaputra River flows, also <u>remains a serious concern<strong>. <mark>As American hegemony disappears and</mark> regional <mark>competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts</u></strong>.</p></mark> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 137,858 | 28 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,526 | Even if war happens no one has an incentive to escalate to nuclear use | Colby, CNA principal analyst, 2013 | Colby, CNA principal analyst, 2013 | even in the event of a major war, both the United States and China would have the weightiest possible reasons not to escalate to a nuclear exchange. For the United States a war would almost certainly be fought remote from questions of national survival The United States might seek to constrain the war through a number of avenues, such as by bounding its attacks on the Chinese mainland within a territory close to the war zone or by avoiding highly valued or emotional targets any sensible nuclear use by the United States would have to be limited, discriminate and designed to promote deescalation. The brute fact, which Beijing is well aware of, is that the United States enjoys a massive advantage both in the size and in the flexibility of its nuclear forces while the United States would desperately want to avoid a nuclear conflict China’s leadership would want to avoid it even more as that is a war that China would most certainly not win don’t take my word for it. Listen and look at the Chinese one thing, they repeatedly claim that they would never use nuclear weapons first China’s nuclear force does not provide a rational basis for major first use it is small, extremely destructive, and stands no chance of preventing a devastating U.S. response | even in the event of a major war the U S and China would have the weightiest possible reasons not to escalate to a nuclear exchange a war would almost certainly be fought remote from questions of national survival The U S might seek to constrain the war by bounding its attacks within a territory close to the war zone or by avoiding highly valued targets any sensible nuclear use would have to be limited, discriminate and designed to promote deescalation. Beijing is aware that the U S enjoys a massive advantage of its nuclear forces China’s leadership would want to avoid it even more, as that is a war that China would not win Listen and look at the Chinese they repeatedly claim that they would never use nuclear weapons | (Elbridge, “Don't Sweat AirSea Battle”, 7-31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=4, ldg)
The basic reason why this is so is that, even in the event of a major war, both the United States and China would have the weightiest possible reasons not to escalate to a nuclear exchange. For the United States, the rationale for limiting such a war is abundantly clear. Such a war would almost certainly be fought about issues in the Western Pacific remote from questions of national survival, and would be fought under the shadow of a Chinese nuclear-weapons capability that, while far smaller than that of the United States, would have to be reckoned by any president as presenting a very probable second-strike capability—a combination that would be sure to make the limitation of the war of the highest priority for Washington. The United States might seek to constrain the war through a number of avenues, such as by bounding its attacks on the Chinese mainland within a territory close to the war zone or by avoiding highly valued or emotional targets (like leadership facilities). U.S. nuclear use in such a conflict could only reasonably be contemplated in extreme circumstances in which the Chinese struck first or in which U.S. conventional power had failed to arrest Chinese assaults against U.S. forces or territory or against U.S. allies in the region—the latter being precisely the eventuality AirSea Battle tries to avoid. Even in such circumstances, any sensible nuclear use by the United States would have to be limited, discriminate and designed to promote deescalation. Of course Hammes and Co.’s worry is more that China would be the one to escalate. But this is to drastically underestimate China’s own incentives to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. The brute fact, which Beijing is well aware of, is that the United States enjoys a massive advantage both in the size and in the flexibility of its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders are well aware that any Chinese nuclear attack—and certainly one against the population centers of the United States or one of its allies—would invite a U.S. nuclear response. And, while the United States would desperately want to avoid a nuclear conflict with China, China’s leadership would want to avoid it even more, as that is a war that China would most certainly not win. Indeed, undertaking a nuclear war with the United States would be tantamount to destroying the very objectives that China’s leadership would be keen to defend in any conflict with the United States—such as the leadership of the Communist Party, the further growth and strengthening of the Chinese nation, and the like. China would therefore have exceedingly powerful incentives to avoid starting a nuclear war with the United States. But don’t take my word for it. Listen and look at the Chinese. For one thing, they repeatedly claim that they would never use nuclear weapons first. Now, people reasonably question the how sincere and enforceable that pledge is, but the simple fact is that China’s nuclear force does not provide a rational basis for major first use against the United States—it is small, extremely destructive, and stands no chance of preventing a devastating U.S. response. China might also look to a more purely military use of its nuclear weapons—but here too it would be entering the ring as a welterweight challenging the heavyweight. Barring major changes to the respective characters of Chinese and U.S. nuclear forces—something the United States should seek to prevent from happening—China could only really look to use its nuclear weapons first out of desperation or pique. | 3,666 | <h4><strong>Even if war happens no one has an incentive to escalate to nuclear use</h4><p>Colby, CNA principal analyst, 2013</p><p></strong>(Elbridge, “Don't Sweat AirSea Battle”, 7-31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=4, ldg)</p><p>The basic reason why this is so is that, <u><strong><mark>even in the event of a major war</strong></mark>, both <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China would have the weightiest possible reasons not to escalate to a nuclear exchange</mark>. For the United States</u>, the rationale for limiting such a war is abundantly clear. Such <u><mark>a war would almost certainly be fought</u></mark> about issues in the Western Pacific <u><strong><mark>remote from questions of national survival</u></strong></mark>, and would be fought under the shadow of a Chinese nuclear-weapons capability that, while far smaller than that of the United States, would have to be reckoned by any president as presenting a very probable second-strike capability—a combination that would be sure to make the limitation of the war of the highest priority for Washington. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>might seek to constrain the war </mark>through a number of avenues, such as <mark>by bounding its attacks</mark> on the Chinese mainland <mark>within a territory close to the war zone or by avoiding highly valued</mark> or emotional <mark>targets</u></mark> (like leadership facilities). U.S. nuclear use in such a conflict could only reasonably be contemplated in extreme circumstances in which the Chinese struck first or in which U.S. conventional power had failed to arrest Chinese assaults against U.S. forces or territory or against U.S. allies in the region—the latter being precisely the eventuality AirSea Battle tries to avoid. Even in such circumstances, <u><mark>any sensible nuclear use</mark> by the United States <mark>would have to be limited, discriminate and <strong>designed to promote deescalation.</strong></mark> </u>Of course Hammes and Co.’s worry is more that China would be the one to escalate. But this is to drastically underestimate China’s own incentives to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. <u>The brute fact, which <mark>Beijing is</mark> well <mark>aware</mark> of, is <mark>that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>enjoys a massive advantage</mark> both in the size and in the flexibility <mark>of its nuclear forces</u></mark>. Chinese leaders are well aware that any Chinese nuclear attack—and certainly one against the population centers of the United States or one of its allies—would invite a U.S. nuclear response. And, <u>while the United States would desperately want to avoid a nuclear conflict</u> with China, <u><mark>China’s leadership would want to avoid it even more</u>, <u>as that is a war that China would </mark>most certainly <mark>not win</u></mark>. Indeed, undertaking a nuclear war with the United States would be tantamount to destroying the very objectives that China’s leadership would be keen to defend in any conflict with the United States—such as the leadership of the Communist Party, the further growth and strengthening of the Chinese nation, and the like. China would therefore have exceedingly powerful incentives to avoid starting a nuclear war with the United States. But <u>don’t take my word for it. <mark>Listen and look at the Chinese</u></mark>. For <u>one thing, <mark>they repeatedly claim that they would never use nuclear weapons</mark> first</u>. Now, people reasonably question the how sincere and enforceable that pledge is, but the simple fact is that <u>China’s nuclear force does not provide a rational basis for major first use</u> against the United States—<u>it is small, extremely destructive, and stands no chance of preventing a devastating U.S. response</u>. China might also look to a more purely military use of its nuclear weapons—but here too it would be entering the ring as a welterweight challenging the heavyweight. Barring major changes to the respective characters of Chinese and U.S. nuclear forces—something the United States should seek to prevent from happening—China could only really look to use its nuclear weapons first out of desperation or pique.</p> | 1NR Card Round 5 v WW KK | Case | US China War | 464,140 | 36 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,527 | Contention One is Space Cooperation. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Contention One is Space Cooperation</u>.</h4> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Relations Advantage | 1,560,851 | 1 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,528 | The plan is a template for multilateralism – sets a precedent for balancing conflicting interests. | Sauvant & Chen 12 [Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division) & Huiping Chen (Professor of International Law at Xiamen University Law School), “A China – US bilateral investment treaty: A template for a multilateral framework for investment?”, Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 85 December 17, 2012, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_85.pdf] | Sauvant & Chen 12 [Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division) & Huiping Chen (Professor of International Law at Xiamen University Law School), “A China – US bilateral investment treaty: A template for a multilateral framework for investment?”, Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 85 December 17, 2012, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_85.pdf] | China is the largest foreign direct investment host and home country among emerging markets, the United States among developed countries. As host countries, both seek to maintain policy space to pursue their own legitimate public policy objectives; as home countries, both seek to protect their investors’ outward FDI. The development of their (BITs) over the past decade reflects this: Chinese BITs have become more protective of investors, US ones more respectful of host country interests. If agreement is reached between both, it would provide a template for future investment agreements. countries should be interested in concluding their BIT negotiations, to put their bilateral investment relationship on a predictable footing. a BIT would increase the protection that investors from both countries would receive in each other’s territory, provide a mechanism for dispute resolution and improve market access. a China-US BIT would provide a solution to the challenge of balancing the interests of a given country in its capacity as a (capital-importing) host country with its interests in its capacity of a (capital-exporting) home country. Meeting this challenge would represent a historic compromise between the traditionally quite diverging host and home country positions and might well become a platform on which a multilateral framework could be built. These negotiations are therefore of crucial importance for the evolution of the international investment law regime. | BITs) have become more protective of investors If agreement is reached between both, it would provide a template for future investment agreements BIT would increase the protection that investors from both countries China-US BIT would provide a solution to the challenge of balancing the interests Meeting this challenge would represent a historic compromise might well become a platform on which a multilateral framework could be built. These negotiations are therefore of crucial importance for the evolution of the international investment law regime. | China is the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) host and home country among emerging markets, the United States among developed countries. As host countries, both seek to maintain policy space to pursue their own legitimate public policy objectives; as home countries, both seek to protect their investors’ outward FDI. The development of their bilateral investment treaties (BITs) over the past decade reflects this: Chinese BITs have become more protective of investors, US ones more respectful of host country interests. If agreement is reached between both, it would provide a template for future investment agreements. The two governments began negotiating a BIT in June 2008. With the new US Model BIT released in April 2012 and a May 2012 cabinet-level agreement between the two governments to intensify negotiations, discussions resumed in October 2012. So far, it appears likely (based on publicly available documents) that agreement can be reached that all investors (including state-controlled entities) are covered; the MFN clause applies to substantive provisions only; fair and equitable treatment corresponds to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment; the indirect expropriation clause is circumscribed; and treaty benefits can be denied under certain circumstances. Differences are more pronounced regarding performance requirements (the US seeks to expand the TRIMs list, China not; reaffirming China’s WTO accession commitments to leave the use of certain requirements to the parties to a given investment might solve this matter); labor and environment standards (the US desires strong language; side agreements of the China-New Zealand free trade agreement reaffirming commitments already made in other fora and providing for purposeful cooperation between the parties in these areas suggest a compromise); and investor-state dispute settlement (where one could build, in the framework of general agreement, on the September 2012 Canada-China BIT regarding transparency). Not surprisingly, the most difficult issue concerns the phase of investment to which national treatment (NT) applies: host countries typically want to maintain flexibility relating to when and where they allow FDI into their economies (including given industrial policy considerations), while the US business community seeks strong market access commitments. Accordingly, the US government seeks pre-establishment national treatment (PENT) with a “negative list” approach (which lists sectors to which NT does not apply), while China has limited its agreements to date to post-establishment NT with carve-outs for existing non-conforming measures. This key architectural question has profound implications for market access. Perhaps a compromise could be a negative list approach for NT regarding post establishment and a positive list approach (which lists sectors to which NT applies) regarding pre-establishment (China’s Guidance Catalogue and the US exceptions in BITs may constitute starting points as they identify sectors). In a hybrid approach, the two governments would (1) list the broad sectors to which NT applies pre-establishment (positive list) and (2), within each broad sector, list all sub-sectors to which NT does not apply pre-establishment (negative list). Either approach would be a major concession by the parties and would require a political decision. This could be facilitated (and hence limit the concession) by grandfathering existing non-conforming measures (including a narrowly defined national security review); agreeing a standstill on new restrictions (to provide transparency, predictability and stability, but perhaps with the flexibility that new restrictions for future investments need to be offset by negotiated new openings) and a commitment to remove nonconforming measures progressively. One could also carve out particularly important sectors and agree on a tailored approach for them. Or one could grant pre-establishment MFN but not PENT (as per the Canada-China BIT). There are many approaches to protect the essential interests of both sides. US concerns as a host country seem to become more pronounced, reflected in the more active screening of certain incoming investments (see e.g. President Obama’s September 2012 veto, on national security grounds, of a Chinese investment, the first such veto in 22 years), while China has introduced its own FDI national security review (which includes economic security and conceivably also industrial policy) -- making investment entry less predictable. Moreover, China’s outward FDI is rising rapidly and, with it, the desire to protect it. Hence, both countries should be interested in concluding their BIT negotiations, to put their bilateral investment relationship on a predictable footing. In particular, a BIT would increase the protection that investors from both countries would receive in each other’s territory, provide a mechanism for dispute resolution and likely improve market access. More generally, a China-US BIT would provide a solution to the challenge of balancing the interests of a given country in its capacity as a (capital-importing) host country with its interests in its capacity of a (capital-exporting) home country. Meeting this challenge would represent a historic compromise between the traditionally quite diverging host and home country positions and (together with other important negotiations, e.g. involving the European Union, Japan, India, and a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) might well become a platform on which, sooner or later, a multilateral framework could be built. These negotiations are therefore of crucial importance not only for the economic relations of the world’s two largest economies, but also for the evolution of the international investment law regime. | 5,830 | <h4>The plan is a template for multilateralism – sets a precedent for balancing conflicting interests.</h4><p><strong>Sauvant & Chen 12 <u>[Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division) & Huiping Chen (Professor of International Law at Xiamen University Law School), “A China – US bilateral investment treaty: A template for a multilateral framework for investment?”, Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 85 December 17, 2012, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_85.pdf]</p><p>China is the largest foreign direct investment</u></strong> (FDI) <u><strong>host and home country among emerging markets, the United States among developed countries. As host countries, both seek to maintain policy space to pursue their own legitimate public policy objectives; as home countries, both seek to protect their investors’ outward FDI. The development of their</u></strong> bilateral investment treaties <u><strong>(<mark>BITs)</mark> over the past decade reflects this: Chinese BITs <mark>have become more protective of investors</mark>, US ones more respectful of host country interests. <mark>If agreement is reached between both, it would provide a template for future investment agreements</mark>.</u></strong> The two governments began negotiating a BIT in June 2008. With the new US Model BIT released in April 2012 and a May 2012 cabinet-level agreement between the two governments to intensify negotiations, discussions resumed in October 2012. So far, it appears likely (based on publicly available documents) that agreement can be reached that all investors (including state-controlled entities) are covered; the MFN clause applies to substantive provisions only; fair and equitable treatment corresponds to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment; the indirect expropriation clause is circumscribed; and treaty benefits can be denied under certain circumstances. Differences are more pronounced regarding performance requirements (the US seeks to expand the TRIMs list, China not; reaffirming China’s WTO accession commitments to leave the use of certain requirements to the parties to a given investment might solve this matter); labor and environment standards (the US desires strong language; side agreements of the China-New Zealand free trade agreement reaffirming commitments already made in other fora and providing for purposeful cooperation between the parties in these areas suggest a compromise); and investor-state dispute settlement (where one could build, in the framework of general agreement, on the September 2012 Canada-China BIT regarding transparency). Not surprisingly, the most difficult issue concerns the phase of investment to which national treatment (NT) applies: host countries typically want to maintain flexibility relating to when and where they allow FDI into their economies (including given industrial policy considerations), while the US business community seeks strong market access commitments. Accordingly, the US government seeks pre-establishment national treatment (PENT) with a “negative list” approach (which lists sectors to which NT does not apply), while China has limited its agreements to date to post-establishment NT with carve-outs for existing non-conforming measures. This key architectural question has profound implications for market access. Perhaps a compromise could be a negative list approach for NT regarding post establishment and a positive list approach (which lists sectors to which NT applies) regarding pre-establishment (China’s Guidance Catalogue and the US exceptions in BITs may constitute starting points as they identify sectors). In a hybrid approach, the two governments would (1) list the broad sectors to which NT applies pre-establishment (positive list) and (2), within each broad sector, list all sub-sectors to which NT does not apply pre-establishment (negative list). Either approach would be a major concession by the parties and would require a political decision. This could be facilitated (and hence limit the concession) by grandfathering existing non-conforming measures (including a narrowly defined national security review); agreeing a standstill on new restrictions (to provide transparency, predictability and stability, but perhaps with the flexibility that new restrictions for future investments need to be offset by negotiated new openings) and a commitment to remove nonconforming measures progressively. One could also carve out particularly important sectors and agree on a tailored approach for them. Or one could grant pre-establishment MFN but not PENT (as per the Canada-China BIT). There are many approaches to protect the essential interests of both sides. US concerns as a host country seem to become more pronounced, reflected in the more active screening of certain incoming investments (see e.g. President Obama’s September 2012 veto, on national security grounds, of a Chinese investment, the first such veto in 22 years), while China has introduced its own FDI national security review (which includes economic security and conceivably also industrial policy) -- making investment entry less predictable. Moreover, China’s outward FDI is rising rapidly and, with it, the desire to protect it. Hence, both <u><strong>countries should be interested in concluding their BIT negotiations, to put their bilateral investment relationship on a predictable footing.</u></strong> In particular, <u><strong>a <mark>BIT would increase the protection that investors from both countries</mark> would receive in each other’s territory, provide a mechanism for dispute resolution and </u></strong>likely<u><strong> improve market access. </u></strong>More generally, <u><strong>a <mark>China-US BIT would provide a solution to the challenge of balancing the interests</mark> of a given country in its capacity as a (capital-importing) host country with its interests in its capacity of a (capital-exporting) home country. <mark>Meeting this challenge would represent a historic compromise</mark> between the traditionally quite diverging host and home country positions and</u></strong> (together with other important negotiations, e.g. involving the European Union, Japan, India, and a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) <u><strong><mark>might well become a platform on which</u></strong></mark>, sooner or later, <u><strong><mark>a multilateral framework could be built. These negotiations are therefore of crucial importance</u></strong></mark> not only for the economic relations of the world’s two largest economies, but also <u><strong><mark>for the evolution of the international investment law regime.</u></mark> </p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,924 | 5 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,529 | Aliens will pillage earth for resources and kill the humans that remain | Leake, 2010 | Jonathan Leake, journalist, 4/25/2010 [ “Don’t talk to aliens, warns Stephen Hawking”, April 25th, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article7107207.ece] | THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out Stephen Hawking has suggested that extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact Alien life, he will suggest, is almost certain to exist in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space.
Hawking believes that contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.” | THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out Hawking suggested that extraterrestrials is almost certain to exist
contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity contact is “a little too risky | THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out, at least according to Stephen Hawking. He has suggested that extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact. The suggestions come in a new documentary series in which Hawking, one of the world’s leading scientists, will set out his latest thinking on some of the universe’s greatest mysteries. Alien life, he will suggest, is almost certain to exist in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space. Hawking’s logic on aliens is, for him, unusually simple. The universe, he points out, has 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of millions of stars. In such a big place, Earth is unlikely to be the only planet where life has evolved. Top of Form
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
“To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said. “The real challenge is to work out what aliens might actually be like.” The answer, he suggests, is that most of it will be the equivalent of microbes or simple animals — the sort of life that has dominated Earth for most of its history. One scene in his documentary for the Discovery Channel shows herds of two-legged herbivores browsing on an alien cliff-face where they are picked off by flying, yellow lizard-like predators. Another shows glowing fluorescent aquatic animals forming vast shoals in the oceans thought to underlie the thick ice coating Europa, one of the moons of Jupiter. Such scenes are speculative, but Hawking uses them to lead on to a serious point: that a few life forms could be intelligent and pose a threat. Hawking believes that contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity. He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.” He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky”. He said: “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.” The completion of the documentary marks a triumph for Hawking, now 68, who is paralysed by motor neurone disease and has very limited powers of communication. The project took him and his producers three years, during which he insisted on rewriting large chunks of the script and checking the filming. | 2,835 | <h4>Aliens will pillage earth for resources and kill the humans that remain</h4><p><u>Jonathan<strong> <mark>Leake</mark>, </strong>journalist, 4/25/<strong>20<mark>10</mark> </strong>[ “</u>Don’t talk to aliens, warns Stephen Hawking”, April 25th, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article7107207.ece]</p><p><u><mark>THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out</u></mark>, at least according to <u><strong>Stephen <mark>Hawking</u></strong></mark>. He<u> has <mark>suggested that extraterrestrials</mark> are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact</u>. The suggestions come in a new documentary series in which Hawking, one of the world’s leading scientists, will set out his latest thinking on some of the universe’s greatest mysteries. <u>Alien life, he will suggest, <mark>is almost certain to exist</mark> in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space. </u>Hawking’s logic on aliens is, for him, unusually simple. The universe, he points out, has 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of millions of stars. In such a big place, Earth is unlikely to be the only planet where life has evolved. Top of Form</p><p>Top of Form</p><p>Bottom of Form</p><p>“To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said. “The real challenge is to work out what aliens might actually be like.” The answer, he suggests, is that most of it will be the equivalent of microbes or simple animals — the sort of life that has dominated Earth for most of its history. One scene in his documentary for the Discovery Channel shows herds of two-legged herbivores browsing on an alien cliff-face where they are picked off by flying, yellow lizard-like predators. Another shows glowing fluorescent aquatic animals forming vast shoals in the oceans thought to underlie the thick ice coating Europa, one of the moons of Jupiter. Such scenes are speculative, but Hawking uses them to lead on to a serious point: that a few life forms could be intelligent and pose a threat. <u>Hawking believes that <mark>contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity</u></mark>. <u>He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on:</u> “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.” <u>He concludes that trying to make <mark>contact</mark> with alien races <mark>is “a little too risky</u></mark>”. He said: <u>“If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.”</u> The completion of the documentary marks a triumph for Hawking, now 68, who is paralysed by motor neurone disease and has very limited powers of communication. The project took him and his producers three years, during which he insisted on rewriting large chunks of the script and checking the filming.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 1 | 251,079 | 5 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,530 | Heg solves terrorism - deterrence | Thayer, 07 | Thayer, 07 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16) | the benefits of American military power are considerable the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States. Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. | the benefits of American military power are considerable people are protected from invasion the U.S. military do an outstanding job deterring aggression American interests abroad are protected the U S has made the decision to attack terrorists and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the U S Its military power gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. | Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” the benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States. Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos-sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21 | 1,530 | <h4>Heg solves terrorism - deterrence</h4><p><strong>Thayer, 07</strong> – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16)</p><p>Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” <u><mark>the benefits of American military power are considerable</u></mark>, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, <u>the American <mark>people are protected from invasion</mark> and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of <mark>the U.S. military</mark> and intelligence community <mark>do an outstanding job deterring aggression</mark> against the United States. Second, <mark>American interests abroad are protected</mark>. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has made the decision to attack terrorists</mark> far from America’s shores, <mark>and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates itself. <mark>Its military power</mark> also <mark>gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents.</u></mark> In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos-sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21 </p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 143,022 | 10 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,531 | Contention One: Growth | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Contention One: Growth </h4></u> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 1,560,852 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,532 | First, the Wolf Amendment created a statutory ban on civil space cooperation with China. | Jie 16 | Jie 16 — staff for Global Times (Kou, “Experts say Sino-US space collaboration is likely to stay sci-fi” Global Times, 5/26, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/985361.shtml | the US government currently bans NASA from cooperating with Chinese scientists
the current distrust is not going anywhere soon
According to a law passed by the Congress in 2011, NASA is prohibited from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China, hosting Chinese visitors or working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity
even some ordinary academic conferences can be restrained [by the law],
US law bans Chinese scientists from cooperating with NASA, but NASA personnel are also not allowed to enter Beijing's aerospace town
As space technologies become more sophisticated and expensive in the future, international collaboration is needed to share the load | null | In the 2015 sci-fi box office smash The Martian, China and the US, supposedly space rivals, have buried the hatchet and jointly pushed mankind deeper into outer space than ever before, a scenario which experts say is highly unlikely in the short term.
At an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute on Washington DC's Capitol Hill on Monday, Administrator Charles Bolden of NASA said he hopes the US can someday cooperate with China in manned space exploration, though he himself admitted that this dream may not be realized during his tenure, as the US government currently bans NASA from cooperating with Chinese scientists, according to Voice of America (VOA).
"We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz (a US-Soviet joint space project)……I think we will get there [with China] and I think it is necessary," Bolden was quoted as saying by the VOA.
Though the remarks do suggest the possibility of a future thaw in tensions between the two nations in space cooperation, experts believe that the current distrust is not going anywhere soon.
"Space technologies can be used for military purposes, while astronautic and aeronautics weapons will play a great role in future wars. Due to the countries' national interests, the US and China still face difficulties in space cooperation," Huang Jun, a professor at the School of Aeronautic Science and Engineering at Beihang University, told the Global Times.
Cooperation stonewalled
According to a law passed by the US Congress in 2011, NASA is prohibited from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China, hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities or working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise.
"China and the US had some space cooperation in the 1980s, but there was no substantial progress afterwards. Nowadays, even some ordinary academic conferences can be restrained [by the law]," Huang said.
The law has frustrated not only Chinese scientists, but also their US counterparts. In 2013, NASA faced fierce backlash from US researchers after it cited the law and rejected applications from Chinese nationals who wanted to attend a conference at the agency's Ames Research Center in California on the grounds of national security.
"Space cooperation between the US and China is still a sensitive topic. US law bans Chinese scientists from cooperating with NASA, but NASA personnel are also not allowed to enter Beijing's aerospace town while their European counterparts can," an insider told the Global Times.
Aerospace City, one of the world's top aerospace centers, is in Beijing's northwestern outskirts.
Tensions between the US and China have pushed the latter to find other partners, which has led to the development of relatively close relations with Russia and Europe on space cooperation in recent years.
"China and Europe have been working together towards deeper space exploration cooperation as highlighted by joint projects such as Double Star, a satellite-based space mission conducted by the China National Space Administration and the European Space Agency, which has had a great deal of scientific achievements," Pang Zhihao, a Beijing-based aerospace expert, told the Global Times, adding that the two organizations have also cooperated in data exchange.
China and Russia have also cooperated, mainly focusing on manned space flight including spacesuit technologies, Pang said,
"From the perspective of science, mutual communication and cooperation on space technologies can help the two countries learn from each other and push mankind deeper in the space," Huang said, adding that ideology shouldn't hinder Sino-US cooperation.
Possible approaches
"One of the main reasons for US reluctance cooperate with China is because of the latter's relatively low technological level. The US fears that China may study its technologies to close their gap," Hung said.
Frank Wolf, a former US legislator who was instrumental in passing the law to hinder the two countries' space cooperation, was quoted as saying by Science Magazine that "the US doesn't want to give China the opportunity to take advantage of US technology, and the US has nothing to gain from dealing with them."
"Though China has achieved a lot in space technology in recent years, it still has a long way to catch up with the US," Huang said, adding that China should improve its own technological level first.
"The US and Russia's space cooperation can serve as an example, as both countries have advanced space station technologies," Huang said.
"As space technologies become more sophisticated and expensive in the future, international collaboration is needed to share the load, which can also improve the utilization of the scientific achievements," Huang added. | 4,791 | <h4><u>First</u>, the Wolf Amendment created a <u>statutory ban</u> on civil space cooperation with China.</h4><p><strong>Jie 16 </strong>— staff for Global Times (Kou, “Experts say Sino-US space collaboration is likely to stay sci-fi” Global Times, 5/26, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/985361.shtml</p><p>In the 2015 sci-fi box office smash The Martian, China and the US, supposedly space rivals, have buried the hatchet and jointly pushed mankind deeper into outer space than ever before, a scenario which experts say is highly unlikely in the short term.</p><p>At an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute on Washington DC's Capitol Hill on Monday, Administrator Charles Bolden of NASA said he hopes the US can someday cooperate with China in manned space exploration, though he himself admitted that this dream may not be realized during his tenure, as <u>the US government currently bans NASA from cooperating with Chinese scientists</u>, according to Voice of America (VOA).</p><p>"We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz (a US-Soviet joint space project)……I think we will get there [with China] and I think it is necessary," Bolden was quoted as saying by the VOA. </p><p>Though the remarks do suggest the possibility of a future thaw in tensions between the two nations in space cooperation, experts believe that <u>the current distrust is not going anywhere soon</u>.</p><p>"Space technologies can be used for military purposes, while astronautic and aeronautics weapons will play a great role in future wars. Due to the countries' national interests, the US and China still face difficulties in space cooperation," Huang Jun, a professor at the School of Aeronautic Science and Engineering at Beihang University, told the Global Times.</p><p>Cooperation stonewalled</p><p><u>According to a law passed by the</u> US <u>Congress in 2011, NASA is prohibited from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China, hosting Chinese visitors</u> at its facilities <u>or working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity</u> or enterprise.</p><p>"China and the US had some space cooperation in the 1980s, but there was no substantial progress afterwards. Nowadays, <u>even some ordinary academic conferences can be restrained [by the law],</u>" Huang said.</p><p>The law has frustrated not only Chinese scientists, but also their US counterparts. In 2013, NASA faced fierce backlash from US researchers after it cited the law and rejected applications from Chinese nationals who wanted to attend a conference at the agency's Ames Research Center in California on the grounds of national security.</p><p>"Space cooperation between the US and China is still a sensitive topic. <u>US law bans Chinese scientists from cooperating with NASA, but NASA personnel are also not allowed to enter Beijing's aerospace town </u>while their European counterparts can," an insider told the Global Times.</p><p>Aerospace City, one of the world's top aerospace centers, is in Beijing's northwestern outskirts.</p><p>Tensions between the US and China have pushed the latter to find other partners, which has led to the development of relatively close relations with Russia and Europe on space cooperation in recent years.</p><p>"China and Europe have been working together towards deeper space exploration cooperation as highlighted by joint projects such as Double Star, a satellite-based space mission conducted by the China National Space Administration and the European Space Agency, which has had a great deal of scientific achievements," Pang Zhihao, a Beijing-based aerospace expert, told the Global Times, adding that the two organizations have also cooperated in data exchange.</p><p>China and Russia have also cooperated, mainly focusing on manned space flight including spacesuit technologies, Pang said,</p><p>"From the perspective of science, mutual communication and cooperation on space technologies can help the two countries learn from each other and push mankind deeper in the space," Huang said, adding that ideology shouldn't hinder Sino-US cooperation.</p><p>Possible approaches</p><p>"One of the main reasons for US reluctance cooperate with China is because of the latter's relatively low technological level. The US fears that China may study its technologies to close their gap," Hung said.</p><p>Frank Wolf, a former US legislator who was instrumental in passing the law to hinder the two countries' space cooperation, was quoted as saying by Science Magazine that "the US doesn't want to give China the opportunity to take advantage of US technology, and the US has nothing to gain from dealing with them."</p><p>"Though China has achieved a lot in space technology in recent years, it still has a long way to catch up with the US," Huang said, adding that China should improve its own technological level first.</p><p>"The US and Russia's space cooperation can serve as an example, as both countries have advanced space station technologies," Huang said.</p><p>"<u>As space technologies become more sophisticated and expensive in the future, international collaboration is needed to share the load</u>, which can also improve the utilization of the scientific achievements," Huang added.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Relations Advantage | 183,704 | 11 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,533 | China doesn’t want to cooperate with the US — primacy would be threatened. | Daniels 16 | Daniels 16 — Laura Daniels, 2016 ("Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space," National Interest, February 18th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248, Accessed 7-13-2016) | That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead. China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite (ASAT) and intelligence technology his has strong implications | That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead China has advanced its anti-satellite (ASAT and intelligence technology This has strong implications | That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above. Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead. If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements. Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite (ASAT), command and control, and intelligence technology, in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. This has strong implications for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield. | 2,238 | <h4>China doesn’t want to cooperate with the US — primacy would be threatened. </h4><p><strong>Daniels 16</strong> — Laura Daniels, 2016 ("Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space," National Interest, February 18th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248, Accessed 7-13-2016)</p><p><u><mark>That China is <strong>pushing back against the U.S.-led international order</strong></mark> is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues:</u> duplicating the architecture of the international order, <u>bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons.</u> While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, <u><mark>Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars</mark> above</u>. <u>Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station</u>. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, <u>China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station.</u> <u><mark>Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead</mark>.</u> If this sounds familiar, it’s because <u>China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth.</u> The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. <u>Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage</u>, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements. <u>Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability</u>, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. <u>This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where <mark>China has advanced its anti-satellite (<strong>ASAT</strong></mark>)</u>, command and control, <u><mark>and intelligence technology</u></mark>, in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. <mark>T<u>his has <strong>strong implications</strong></mark> </u>for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 2 | 161,834 | 83 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,534 | Multilateralism is key – international investment fails without regulatory consistency and a predictable dispute resolution mechanism. | Leal-Arcas 9 | Leal-Arcas 9 [Rafael Leal-Arcas (Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law and European Union Law, and Deputy Director of Graduate Studies, Resident Fellow at the American Society of International Law, Visiting Scholar at Georgetown University Law Center, Visiting Fellow at its Institute of International Economic Law), “The Multilateralization of International Investment Law”, North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, September 1, 2009] | The need for harmonization of international rules on investment and the creation of a homogeneous framework for investment is recognized both by economists and legal scholars There is a strong case to be made for a comprehensive approach to investment within a broader context of good governance and consideration of the legitimate interests of developed countries, developing countries, and investors alike. foreign investors are keen to reduce political risks in host States and therefore prefer to have their investments covered by international law where possible. The relevant international legal framework has changed quite dramatically over the past decade. there are several reasons for having a MFI: The increased importance of foreign-owned production and distribution facilities in most countries is cited as tangible evidence of globalization the creation of an MFI is a way to increase efficiency failure to reach a multilateral agreement will result in a slowdown of FDI flows trade and FDI are increasingly complementary and interlinked, ways of servicing foreign markets a future multilateral framework for investment could clarify the relationship among the GATS, TRIMs Agreements, and BITs. The need for an MFI can be perceived in the dramatic proliferation of international investment agreements in recent years. With approximately 2,700 BITs, 200 regional cooperation arrangements, and 500 multilateral conventions governing cross-border investment flows, it is no wonder that investors are facing difficulties in choosing which regulatory regime suits them best. Separate negotiations increase the danger of inconsistent rules being established in different agreements. This leads to confusion, legal conflict, and uncertainty. the current fragmented international investment regime may encourage regulatory competition among the various models of international investment agreements. the dispute settlement mechanism does not rely on a uniform dispute settlement body or institutional mechanisms that ensure consistency and predictability Rather, it rests on ad hoc arbitration panels with limited State oversight. forum shopping and inconsistency of arbitral awards in dispute resolution seem to be the primary reasons why the creation of an MFI is necessary. The future of international investment needs this coherent legal structure. an international framework that codifies existing rules Would serve to provide coherence, predictability, and legal security One of the difficulties is the high number of mostly nonbinding provisions already in existence at the bilateral, regional, and even multilateral level. a coherent and unified multilateral framework for investment would not contradict but rather reinforce the current fragmented system. It would create a synergy from the existing bilateral, regional, and multilateral rules. the system would become more predictable, more secure, and would encourage FDI and all its positive effects. As long as investors feel more secure, FDI flows will benefit from it. The benefits from a coherent legal framework are not only visible with respect to the volume of FDI but also | foreign investors are keen to reduce political risks in host States and therefore prefer to have their investments covered by international law an MFI is a way to increase efficiency failure to reach a multilateral agreement will result in a slowdown of FDI flows trade and FDI are but increasingly complementary and interlinked future multilateral framework could clarify the relationship among the GATS, TRIMs Agreements, and BITs need for an MFI can be perceived in the dramatic proliferation of international investment agreements investors are facing difficulties inconsistent rules leads to confusion, legal conflict, and uncertainty. The future of international investment needs this coherent legal structur to provide coherence, predictability, and legal security It would create a synergy the system would become more predictable, more secure, and would encourage FDI As long as investors feel more secure, FDI flows will benefit | The need for harmonization of international rules on investment and the creation of a homogeneous framework for investment is recognized both by economists and legal scholars.""^ The attempts to create multilateral rules (from the Havana Charter in 1948 to the failure of the MAI negotiated at the OECD between 1995 and 1998) show that there is an ongoing process of creation and thinking in this direction. In order to achieve a multilateral framework for investment, we have to be aware of the various ways in which we can model it. Since the Havana Charter, different approaches to investment liberalization have been envisioned. The MAI"**^ is a good example of one of these approaches,''"^ even though it never entered into force and, currently, there are no plans to re-initiate negotiations. Another example is the gap between the EU's and NAFTA's approach to this issue, although the economic objectives are identical. A. Practical and Structural Reasons for an MFI There is a strong case to be made for a comprehensive approach to investment within a broader context of good governance and consideration of the legitimate interests of developed countries, developing countries, and investors alike. Such an approach would require a shift from the current primary focus of international investment rules and investor protection, to considerations of the environment, labor standards, and sustainable development. It is a fact that foreign investors are keen to reduce political risks in host States and therefore prefer to have their investments covered by international law where possible. The relevant international legal framework has changed quite dramatically over the past decade. With this context in mind, there are several reasons for having a MFI: 1) The increased importance of foreign-owned production and distribution facilities in most countries is cited as tangible evidence of globalization;""* 2) the role of FDI in the development of less-developed countries;""^ 3) the creation of an MFI is a way to increase efficiency;""^ 4) the fear that, failure to reach a multilateral agreement will result in a slowdown of FDI flows;""' and 5) the perception that trade and FDI are simply two alternative, but increasingly complementary and interlinked, ways of servicing foreign markets."'" Of course, there are concerns over possible negative effects of FDI. Home countries are concerned that FDI may decrease jobs and lower wages. Host countries worry about the effect FDI may have on their government's ability to control the economy. In addition, some critics are wary of a multilateral agreement that binds signatories to national FDI rules, viewing it as "pre-empting a country's right to manage inflows of FDI. " Various questions arise: Should a multilateral investment treaty be a stand-alone agreement as was the case of the MAI or should it be institutionalized somewhere, such as in the WTO framework? If the former, other issues come to mind, such as the need for secretariat support, a dispute settlement mechanism, enforceability of awards, and possible retaliatory measures. If the latter, how can a multilateral investment treaty be created in the WTO framework? Whatever the option, the MAI can certainly help as a point of departure for establishing guidelines for a future multilateral investment treaty. Another source of inspiration may be the recent proposal for a Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (USD Model Agreement)"'^ presented by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. As noted by the Canadian Mission to the WTO, it is worth investigating how possible elements of a prospective international investment agreement would interact with each other as well as with other provisions within the WTO system that deal with international investment."*'^ In Canada's view, balance-ofpayments is an important element when discussing possible exceptions to a prospective WTO investment agreement.'*'"' For example, exceptions facilitating temporary balance-of-payments safeguards exist in many trade and investment agreements. In Canada's view, exceptions, whether for balance-of-payments or for any other purpose, are an integral component of intemational investment agreements. Generally, the scope of any given agreement is determined by an overarching Article, definitions of agreement terms, and any limitations on the "reach" of the provisions."'^ "Exceptions effectively serve to limit the scope of the agreement by accommodating sectors, issue areas, or circumstances where provisions of the agreement would not apply. '""* According to the Canadian Mission to the WTO, [reservations] usually refer to individual country measures to which certain negotiated provisions of the agreement do not apply. Importantly, in sensitive sectors where it may be difficult to define precisely the measures that may be necessary to effectively limit the scope of the agreement, reservations may also be negotiated with respect to future measures."" Therefore, exceptions and reservations could provide much of the necessary flexibility in any investment agreement in the WTO framework."'^ To sum up, a future multilateral framework for investment in the WTO context could clarify the relationship among the GATS, TRIMs Agreements, and BITs. The future MAI could also add substantive rules on environmental and labor standards to the current system of international investment law B. Need for Coherence The need for an MFI can be perceived in the dramatic proliferation of international investment agreements in recent years. Many of these agreements have been concluded bilaterally, regionally, or even multilaterally. With approximately 2,700 BITs, 200 regional cooperation arrangements, and 500 multilateral conventions governing cross-border investment flows, it is no wonder that investors are facing difficulties in choosing which regulatory regime suits them best. Different agreements often have different coverage of issues and may apply different rules. Separate negotiations increase the danger of inconsistent rules being established in different agreements. This leads to confusion, legal conflict, and uncertainty.""' Furthermore, the current fragmented international investment regime may encourage regulatory competition among the various models of international investment agreements. Moreover, the dispute settlement mechanism does not rely on a uniform dispute settlement body or institutional mechanisms that ensure consistency and predictability in the decision-making process of arbitral tribunals. Rather, it rests on ad hoc arbitration panels with limited State oversight. Therefore, forum shopping and inconsistency of arbitral awards in dispute resolution seem to be the primary reasons why the creation of an MFI is necessary. The future of international investment thus arguably needs this coherent legal structure. If we agree that there are customary international law rules conceming investment, why not create an international framework that codifies existing rules? Would this framework not serve to provide coherence, predictability, and legal security? One of the difficulties in designing and establishing a common and unique framework for investments is the high number of mostly nonbinding provisions already in existence at the bilateral, regional, and even multilateral level. Their number also reflects their differences. In order to find common ground, the question arises: In what way would a single provision represent the different standards and levels of development of the regulation? The situation was completely different concerning trade in services and intellectual property rights, as before the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the GATS, when there were no preexisting rules that the drafters had to take into account. Three more issues complicate the creation of an MFI. First, due to the many diverse interests of States and corporations, there may not be any consensus over an MFI. States do not necessarily agree on what constitutes investment stability. This is because of differing views on the impact of macroeconomic implications. Second, even if the international community ends up having a treaty similar to GATT, GATS, or the TRIMs Agreement, there will always be contentious concepts such as expropriation, protectionism,''^° essential security, or the principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. States may still end up with bilateral side letters to clarify certain terms relating to specific industries. Third, in relation to conflicting arbitral awards and forum shopping, investments comprise many forms and stretch over many industries. The facts of each case may be different making it difficult to glean specific rules from different arbitral decisions. Consensus would only be possible when dealing with broad rules. For example, the notion of "public order" as applied in one specific case may be different for another case. Ideally, a coherent and unified multilateral framework for investment would not contradict but rather reinforce the current fragmented system. It would create a synergy from the existing bilateral, regional, and multilateral rules. This means that the system would become more predictable, more secure, and would encourage FDI and all its positive effects. As long as investors feel more secure, FDI flows will benefit from it. The benefits from a coherent legal framework are not only visible with respect to the volume of FDI but also, and perhaps more importantly, with respect to the nature and structure of FDI. | 9,690 | <h4><strong>Multilateralism is key – international investment fails without regulatory consistency and a predictable dispute resolution mechanism.</h4><p>Leal-Arcas 9 </strong>[Rafael Leal-Arcas (Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law and European Union Law, and Deputy Director of Graduate Studies, Resident Fellow at the American Society of International Law, Visiting Scholar at Georgetown University Law Center, Visiting Fellow at its Institute of International Economic Law), “The Multilateralization of International Investment Law”, North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, September 1, 2009]</p><p><u><strong>The need for harmonization of international rules on investment and the creation of a homogeneous framework for investment is recognized both by economists and legal scholars</u></strong>.""^ The attempts to create multilateral rules (from the Havana Charter in 1948 to the failure of the MAI negotiated at the OECD between 1995 and 1998) show that there is an ongoing process of creation and thinking in this direction. In order to achieve a multilateral framework for investment, we have to be aware of the various ways in which we can model it. Since the Havana Charter, different approaches to investment liberalization have been envisioned. The MAI"**^ is a good example of one of these approaches,''"^ even though it never entered into force and, currently, there are no plans to re-initiate negotiations. Another example is the gap between the EU's and NAFTA's approach to this issue, although the economic objectives are identical. A. Practical and Structural Reasons for an MFI <u><strong>There is a strong case to be made for a comprehensive approach to investment within a broader context of good governance and consideration of the legitimate interests of developed countries, developing countries, and investors alike. </u></strong>Such an approach would require a shift from the current primary focus of international investment rules and investor protection, to considerations of the environment, labor standards, and sustainable development. It is a fact that <u><strong><mark>foreign investors are keen to reduce political risks in host States and therefore prefer to have their investments covered by international law</mark> where possible. The relevant international legal framework has changed quite dramatically over the past decade.</u></strong> With this context in mind, <u><strong>there are several reasons for having a MFI:</u></strong> 1) <u><strong>The increased importance of foreign-owned production and distribution facilities in most countries is cited as tangible evidence of globalization</u></strong>;""* 2) the role of FDI in the development of less-developed countries;""^ 3) <u><strong>the creation of <mark>an MFI is a way to increase efficiency</u></strong></mark>;""^ 4) the fear that, <u><strong><mark>failure to reach a multilateral agreement will result in a slowdown of FDI flows</u></strong></mark>;""' and 5) the perception that <u><strong><mark>trade and FDI are</mark> </u></strong>simply two alternative, <mark>but <u><strong>increasingly complementary and interlinked</mark>, ways of servicing foreign markets</u></strong>."'" Of course, there are concerns over possible negative effects of FDI. Home countries are concerned that FDI may decrease jobs and lower wages. Host countries worry about the effect FDI may have on their government's ability to control the economy. In addition, some critics are wary of a multilateral agreement that binds signatories to national FDI rules, viewing it as "pre-empting a country's right to manage inflows of FDI. " Various questions arise: Should a multilateral investment treaty be a stand-alone agreement as was the case of the MAI or should it be institutionalized somewhere, such as in the WTO framework? If the former, other issues come to mind, such as the need for secretariat support, a dispute settlement mechanism, enforceability of awards, and possible retaliatory measures. If the latter, how can a multilateral investment treaty be created in the WTO framework? Whatever the option, the MAI can certainly help as a point of departure for establishing guidelines for a future multilateral investment treaty. Another source of inspiration may be the recent proposal for a Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (USD Model Agreement)"'^ presented by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. As noted by the Canadian Mission to the WTO, it is worth investigating how possible elements of a prospective international investment agreement would interact with each other as well as with other provisions within the WTO system that deal with international investment."*'^ In Canada's view, balance-ofpayments is an important element when discussing possible exceptions to a prospective WTO investment agreement.'*'"' For example, exceptions facilitating temporary balance-of-payments safeguards exist in many trade and investment agreements. In Canada's view, exceptions, whether for balance-of-payments or for any other purpose, are an integral component of intemational investment agreements. Generally, the scope of any given agreement is determined by an overarching Article, definitions of agreement terms, and any limitations on the "reach" of the provisions."'^ "Exceptions effectively serve to limit the scope of the agreement by accommodating sectors, issue areas, or circumstances where provisions of the agreement would not apply. '""* According to the Canadian Mission to the WTO, [reservations] usually refer to individual country measures to which certain negotiated provisions of the agreement do not apply. Importantly, in sensitive sectors where it may be difficult to define precisely the measures that may be necessary to effectively limit the scope of the agreement, reservations may also be negotiated with respect to future measures."" Therefore, exceptions and reservations could provide much of the necessary flexibility in any investment agreement in the WTO framework."'^ To sum up, <u><strong>a <mark>future multilateral framework</mark> for investment</u></strong> in the WTO context <u><strong><mark>could clarify the relationship among the GATS, TRIMs Agreements, and BITs</mark>. </u></strong>The future MAI could also add substantive rules on environmental and labor standards to the current system of international investment law B. Need for Coherence <u><strong>The <mark>need for an MFI can be perceived in the dramatic proliferation of international investment agreements</mark> in recent years.</u></strong> Many of these agreements have been concluded bilaterally, regionally, or even multilaterally. <u><strong>With approximately 2,700 BITs, 200 regional cooperation arrangements, and 500 multilateral conventions governing cross-border investment flows, it is no wonder that <mark>investors are facing difficulties</mark> in choosing which regulatory regime suits them best.</u></strong> Different agreements often have different coverage of issues and may apply different rules. <u><strong>Separate negotiations increase the danger of <mark>inconsistent rules </mark>being established in different agreements. This <mark>leads to confusion, legal conflict, and uncertainty.</u></strong></mark>""' Furthermore, <u><strong>the current fragmented international investment regime may encourage regulatory competition among the various models of international investment agreements.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>the dispute settlement mechanism does not rely on a uniform dispute settlement body or institutional mechanisms that ensure consistency and predictability</u></strong> in the decision-making process of arbitral tribunals. <u><strong>Rather, it rests on ad hoc arbitration panels with limited State oversight.</u></strong> Therefore, <u><strong>forum shopping and inconsistency of arbitral awards in dispute resolution seem to be the primary reasons why the creation of an MFI is necessary. <mark>The future of international investment</mark> </u></strong>thus arguably <u><strong><mark>needs this coherent legal structur</mark>e.</u></strong> If we agree that there are customary international law rules conceming investment, why not create <u><strong>an international framework that codifies existing rules</u></strong>? <u><strong>Would</u></strong> this framework not <u><strong>serve <mark>to provide coherence, predictability, and legal security</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong>One of the difficulties</u></strong> in designing and establishing a common and unique framework for investments <u><strong>is the high number of mostly nonbinding provisions already in existence at the bilateral, regional, and even multilateral level.</u></strong> Their number also reflects their differences. In order to find common ground, the question arises: In what way would a single provision represent the different standards and levels of development of the regulation? The situation was completely different concerning trade in services and intellectual property rights, as before the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the GATS, when there were no preexisting rules that the drafters had to take into account. Three more issues complicate the creation of an MFI. First, due to the many diverse interests of States and corporations, there may not be any consensus over an MFI. States do not necessarily agree on what constitutes investment stability. This is because of differing views on the impact of macroeconomic implications. Second, even if the international community ends up having a treaty similar to GATT, GATS, or the TRIMs Agreement, there will always be contentious concepts such as expropriation, protectionism,''^° essential security, or the principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. States may still end up with bilateral side letters to clarify certain terms relating to specific industries. Third, in relation to conflicting arbitral awards and forum shopping, investments comprise many forms and stretch over many industries. The facts of each case may be different making it difficult to glean specific rules from different arbitral decisions. Consensus would only be possible when dealing with broad rules. For example, the notion of "public order" as applied in one specific case may be different for another case. Ideally, <u><strong>a coherent and unified multilateral framework for investment would not contradict but rather reinforce the current fragmented system. <mark>It would create a synergy</mark> from the existing bilateral, regional, and multilateral rules. </u></strong>This means that <u><strong><mark>the system would become more predictable, more secure, and would encourage FDI</mark> and all its positive effects. <mark>As long as investors feel more secure, FDI flows will benefit</mark> from it. The benefits from a coherent legal framework are not only visible with respect to the volume of FDI but also</u></strong>, and perhaps more importantly, with respect to <strong>the nature and structure of FDI.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,927 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,535 | Most recent evidence goes aff | Topychkanov 1/25/14 ) | Topychkanov 1/25/14 (Pyotr PhD in History, Associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, “Nuclear Terrorism: Bogeyman or Real Threat?”, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3045&active_id_11=39#top) | Nuclear terrorism involves using fissile weapons-grade materials Uranium Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists Enriching uranium or producing the necessary quantity of plutonium requires scientific and technological facilities that no terrorist organisation has. Acquiring the necessary quantities of fissile weapons-grade materials on the black market would require the relevant supply, which is not currently there most incidents are unrelated to weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and, secondly, in all reported incidents the fissile materials are returned under proper control any active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection Queries regarding nuclear weapons development made using internet browsers can be traced by intelligence services nuclear devices built under such conditions can hardly be expected to be reliable since given the lack of specialists, high-precision equipment, and testing capabilities, it would be difficult to avoid errors during the development or assembly of any such device handling major amounts of cash or sourcing fissile weapons-grade materials in the required quantities would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of the intelligence services of a number of countries As a result, having risked substantial amounts of money and possible detection, an organisation planning to commit an act of nuclear terrorism would have to accept that the outcome is uncertain, at best. | Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists Enriching uranium or plutonium requires facilities that no terrorist organisation has Acquiring the necessary qua on the black market supply is not currently there active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection nuclear devices built under such conditions can hardly be expected to be reliable it would be difficult to avoid errors cash would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of intelligence services | Nuclear terrorism involves using fissile weapons-grade materials: Uranium-235 enriched to over 90% and plutonium-239 with an isotopic purity of at least 94%. According to current estimates, in the five countries that have nuclear weapons, building a nuclear device requires 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU); although some specialists suggest 4kg to 5kg of plutonium or 16kg of HEU would be sufficient. With 20% enriched uranium, it would take 800kg of material to reach the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion, which is believed to be technically implausible [3]. Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists, chiefly for the following reasons. Enriching uranium or producing the necessary quantity of plutonium requires scientific and technological facilities that no terrorist organisation has. Acquiring the necessary quantities of fissile weapons-grade materials on the black market would require the relevant supply, which is not currently there (the IAEA receives about 150-200 reports from Member States each year of fissile materials that are lost, stolen or otherwise out of their control, but, first, most incidents are unrelated to weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and, secondly, in all reported incidents the fissile materials are returned under proper control). Should terrorists nevertheless succeed in obtaining the requisite quantity of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, as a study commissioned in 1977 by US Congress showed, a small group of people who had never had any access to classified information could develop and build a primitive nuclear explosive device [4]. To do so, according to estimates at that time, they would need up to US$ 1 million, a medium-size workshop, at least one specialist who is conversant with the relevant literature, and an engineer. Today, some solutions are within an easier reach for terrorists compared to the 1970s, largely thanks to information technologies. However, any active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection. Queries regarding nuclear weapons development made using internet browsers can be traced by intelligence services [5]. Importantly, nuclear devices built under such conditions can hardly be expected to be reliable, since given the lack of specialists, high-precision equipment, and testing capabilities, it would be difficult to avoid errors during the development or assembly of any such device. In addition, handling major amounts of cash or sourcing fissile weapons-grade materials in the required quantities would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of the intelligence services of a number of countries. As a result, having risked substantial amounts of money and possible detection, an organisation planning to commit an act of nuclear terrorism would have to accept that the outcome is uncertain, at best. | 2,895 | <h4>Most recent evidence goes aff</h4><p><strong>Topychkanov 1/25/14</strong> (Pyotr PhD in History, Associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, “Nuclear Terrorism: Bogeyman or Real Threat?”, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3045&active_id_11=39#top<u><strong>)</p><p></strong>Nuclear terrorism involves using fissile weapons-grade materials</u>: <u>Uranium</u>-235 enriched to over 90% and plutonium-239 with an isotopic purity of at least 94%. According to current estimates, in the five countries that have nuclear weapons, building a nuclear device requires 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU); although some specialists suggest 4kg to 5kg of plutonium or 16kg of HEU would be sufficient. With 20% enriched uranium, it would take 800kg of material to reach the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion, which is believed to be technically implausible [3]. <u><strong><mark>Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists</u></strong></mark>, chiefly for the following reasons. <u><mark>Enriching uranium or</mark> producing the necessary quantity of <mark>plutonium requires</mark> scientific and technological <mark>facilities</u> <u><strong>that no terrorist organisation has</mark>. </strong><mark>Acquiring the necessary qua</mark>ntities of fissile weapons-grade materials</u> <u><mark>on the black market</mark> <strong>would require the relevant <mark>supply</mark>, which <mark>is not currently there</mark> </u></strong>(the IAEA receives about 150-200 reports from Member States each year of fissile materials that are lost, stolen or otherwise out of their control, but, first, <u>most incidents are unrelated to weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and, secondly, in all reported incidents the fissile materials are returned under proper control</u>). Should terrorists nevertheless succeed in obtaining the requisite quantity of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, as a study commissioned in 1977 by US Congress showed, a small group of people who had never had any access to classified information could develop and build a primitive nuclear explosive device [4]. To do so, according to estimates at that time, they would need up to US$ 1 million, a medium-size workshop, at least one specialist who is conversant with the relevant literature, and an engineer. Today, some solutions are within an easier reach for terrorists compared to the 1970s, largely thanks to information technologies. However, <u><strong>any <mark>active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection</u></strong></mark>. <u>Queries regarding nuclear weapons development made using internet browsers can be traced by intelligence services</u> [5]. Importantly, <u><mark>nuclear devices built under such conditions <strong>can hardly be expected to be reliable</u></strong></mark>, <u>since given the lack of specialists, high-precision equipment, and testing capabilities,</u> <u><strong><mark>it would be difficult to avoid errors</mark> during the development or assembly of any such device</u></strong>. In addition, <u>handling major amounts of <mark>cash</mark> or sourcing fissile weapons-grade materials in the required <strong>quantities <mark>would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of </mark>the <mark>intelligence services</mark> of a number of countries</u></strong>. <u>As a result, having risked substantial amounts of money and possible detection, <strong>an organisation planning to commit an act of nuclear terrorism would have to accept that the outcome is uncertain, at best.</p></u></strong> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 140,475 | 62 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,536 | Contention 1: Restraint | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Contention 1: Restraint</h4> | null | null | null | 1,560,853 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,537 | Interp: American-style engagement is positive incentives. | Capie and Evans 2002 | David Capie and Paul Evans Prof, Canada-Asia Policy Studies. The Asia-Pacific security lexicon (p.108-114) / 2002 David Capie is completing his Ph.D. at York University in Toronto, Canada. In autumn 2001, he took up a post-doctoral appointment at the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies and cross-appointed at the Institute of Asian Research and the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Google books 109 | null | null | They conclude there is "virtually nothing in the policy that approaches an articulated 'theory'
AND
.S. extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country". | 179 | <h4><u>Interp</u>: American-style engagement is positive incentives.</h4><p>David <strong>Capie and</strong> Paul <strong>Evans</strong> Prof, Canada-Asia Policy Studies. The Asia-Pacific security lexicon (p.108-114) / <strong>2002</strong> David Capie is completing his Ph.D. at York University in Toronto, Canada. In autumn 2001, he took up a post-doctoral appointment at the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies and cross-appointed at the Institute of Asian Research and the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Google books 109</p><p>They conclude there is "virtually nothing in the policy that approaches an articulated 'theory' </p><p>AND</p><p>.S. extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country".</p> | 1NC | T | null | 1,560,854 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,538 | IPR protected industries contribute to 34.8% of US GDP growth – lack of effective enforcement in China undermines those businesses and undermines US competitiveness. | Morrison, 2015 | Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance at the Congressional Research Service, 2015 | U.S. business voiced growing concern over economic losses suffered by U.S. firms as a result of IPR infringement in China U.S. innovation and the intellectual property that is generated by such have been cited by various economists as a critical source of U.S. economic growth and global competitiveness U.S. IP-intensive industries supported at least 40 million jobs and contributed $5.1 trillion or 34.8%) to U.S. GDP workers in IP-intensive production earned 60% more than workers at similar levels in non-IP industries Apple's innovation in developing and engineering the iPod and its ability to source most of its production to low-cost countries have helped enable it to become a highly competitive and profitable firm as well as a creator of high-paying jobs Lack of effective and consistent protection of IPR has been cited as one of the most significant problems they face in doing business in China Other U.S. firms have expressed concern over pressures they often face from Chinese government entities to share technology and IPR with a Chinese partner. Although China has significantly improved its IPR protection regime , U.S. IP industries complain that piracy rates in China continue to remain unacceptably high and economic losses are significant an effective IPR enforcement regime in China that was comparable to U.S. levels could increase employment by IP-intensive firms in the United States by 923,000 jobs. | U.S. business voiced concern over losses suffered by firms as a result of IPR infringement in China innovation generated have been cited as a critical source of growth and competitiveness IP-intensive industries supported 34.8%) U.S GDP IP helped enable it to become a highly competitive firm as well as a creator of high-paying jobs Lack of effective protection has been cited as the most significant problems Although China has significantly its protection industries complain piracy rates continue to remain unacceptably high | Wayne, “China-U.S. Trade Issues” 12/15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf
U.S. business and government representatives have voiced growing concern over economic losses suffered by U.S. firms as a result of IPR infringement in China (and elsewhere), including those that have resulted from cyberattacks. U.S. innovation and the intellectual property that is generated by such activities have been cited by various economists as a critical source of U.S. economic growth and global competitiveness.136 For example, according to the Department of Commerce, in 2010, U.S. IP-intensive industries supported at least 40 million jobs and contributed $5.1 trillion (or 34.8%) to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).137 A study by NDP Consulting estimated that in 2008, workers in IP-intensive production earned 60% more than workers at similar levels in non-IP industries.138 A study on the Apple iPod concluded that Apple's innovation in developing and engineering the iPod and its ability to source most of its production to low-cost countries, such as China, have helped enable it to become a highly competitive and profitable firm as well as a creator of high-paying jobs (such as engineers engaged in the design of Apple products) in the United States.139 Lack of effective and consistent protection of IPR has been cited by U.S. firms as one of the most significant problems they face in doing business in China. Other U.S. firms have expressed concern over pressures they often face from Chinese government entities to share technology and IPR with a Chinese partner. Although China has significantly improved its IPR protection regime over the past few years, U.S. IP industries complain that piracy rates in China continue to remain unacceptably high and economic losses are significant, as illustrated by studies and estimates made by several stakeholders: A May 2013 study by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated the annual cost to the U.S. economy of global IPR theft at $300 billion, of which China accounted for 50% ($150 billion) to 80% ($240 billion) of those losses.140 A 2013 AmCham China survey found that 72% of respondents said that China’s IPR enforcement was either ineffective or totally ineffective.141 The USITC estimated that U.S. intellectual property-intensive firms that conducted business in China lost $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, and license fees in 2009 because of IPR violations there. It also estimated that an effective IPR enforcement regime in China that was comparable to U.S. levels could increase employment by IP-intensive firms in the United States by 923,000 jobs. | 2,654 | <h4>IPR protected industries contribute to 34.8% of US GDP growth – lack of effective enforcement in China undermines those businesses and undermines US competitiveness. </h4><p><u><strong>Morrison,</u></strong> Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance at the Congressional Research Service, <u><strong>2015</u></strong> </p><p>Wayne, “China-U.S. Trade Issues” 12/15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. business</u></strong></mark> and government representatives have <u><strong><mark>voiced</mark> growing <mark>concern over</mark> economic <mark>losses suffered by</mark> U.S. <mark>firms as a result of IPR infringement in China</u></strong></mark> (and elsewhere), including those that have resulted from cyberattacks. <u><strong>U.S. <mark>innovation</mark> and the intellectual property that is <mark>generated</mark> by such</u></strong> activities <u><strong><mark>have been cited</mark> by various economists</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>as a critical source of</mark> U.S. economic <mark>growth and</mark> global <mark>competitiveness</u></strong></mark>.136 For example, according to the Department of Commerce, in 2010, <u><strong>U.S. <mark>IP-intensive industries supported</mark> at least 40 million jobs and contributed $5.1 trillion</u></strong> (<u><strong>or <mark>34.8%)</mark> to <mark>U.S</mark>.</u></strong> gross domestic product (<u><strong><mark>GDP</u></strong></mark>).137 A study by NDP Consulting estimated that in 2008, <u><strong>workers in <mark>IP</mark>-intensive production earned 60% more than workers at similar levels in non-IP industries</u></strong>.138 A study on the Apple iPod concluded that <u><strong>Apple's innovation in developing and engineering the iPod and its ability to source most of its production to low-cost countries</u></strong>, such as China, <u><strong>have <mark>helped enable it to become a</mark> <mark>highly competitive</mark> and profitable <mark>firm as well as a creator of high-paying jobs</u></strong></mark> (such as engineers engaged in the design of Apple products) in the United States.139 <u><strong><mark>Lack of effective</mark> and consistent <mark>protection</mark> of IPR <mark>has been cited</u></strong></mark> by U.S. firms <u><strong><mark>as</mark> one of <mark>the most significant problems</mark> they face in doing business in China</u></strong>. <u><strong>Other U.S. firms have expressed concern over pressures they often face from Chinese government entities to share technology and IPR with a Chinese partner. <mark>Although China has significantly</mark> improved <mark>its</mark> IPR <mark>protection</mark> regime</u></strong> over the past few years<u><strong>, U.S. IP <mark>industries complain</mark> that <mark>piracy rates</mark> in China <mark>continue to remain unacceptably high</mark> and economic losses are significant</u></strong>, as illustrated by studies and estimates made by several stakeholders: A May 2013 study by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated the annual cost to the U.S. economy of global IPR theft at $300 billion, of which China accounted for 50% ($150 billion) to 80% ($240 billion) of those losses.140 A 2013 AmCham China survey found that 72% of respondents said that China’s IPR enforcement was either ineffective or totally ineffective.141 The USITC estimated that U.S. intellectual property-intensive firms that conducted business in China lost $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, and license fees in 2009 because of IPR violations there. It also estimated that <u><strong>an effective IPR enforcement regime in China that was comparable to U.S. levels could increase employment by IP-intensive firms in the United States by 923,000 jobs.</u></strong> </p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 1AC | Growth – 1AC | 1,559,382 | 11 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,539 | Second, isolating China in space is counterproductive: it drives China to challenge the international order through space militarization. | Daniels 16 — | Daniels 16 — Laura Daniels works at a leading Washington, D.C., think tank where she specializes in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. She holds a Master of Public Administration in International Security Policy from Columbia University (“Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space” The National Interest, 2/18, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248 | China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons
Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage
Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite command and control, and intelligence technology This has strong implications for the U S as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield
In the expansive global commons of outer space, China’s ASAT technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets critical to the global economy
The prescription for dealing with Chinese pressure on the international order is much the same in space as on land: build on the order’s strengths, and adjust it for an increasingly multipolar environment The U S should pursue cooperation with China on benign space research to better integrate China as a partner in the established order and to afford U.S. security strategists a window into Chinese decision making and intentions reviving the political will to maintain U.S. leadership in space will be a boon to national security. All this will help ensure that destabilization of the international order doesn’t fly over our heads | null | That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above.
Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead. If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements.
Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite (ASAT), command and control, and intelligence technology, in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. This has strong implications for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield.
With growing military capacity comes the ability to contest freedom of movement in the global commons. In the expansive global commons of outer space, China’s ASAT technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets critical to the global economy. While these same developments unfolding in the South and East China Seas are of more immediate concern, free movement of satellites within space is vital, contributing to approximately $1.6 trillion of U.S. commercial revenue.
The prescription for dealing with Chinese pressure on the international order is much the same in space as on land: build on the order’s strengths, and adjust it for an increasingly multipolar environment. The United States should pursue cooperation with China on benign space research to better integrate China as a partner in the established order and to afford U.S. security strategists a window into Chinese decision making and intentions. The State Department’s recent cooperation initiative is a step in the right direction. Simultaneously, the United States should promote deterrence by improving on an array of resilience and counterspace abilities, but without growing alarmism—after all, often cited as the greatest threat to national security in space is floating junk. Finally, reviving the political will to maintain U.S. leadership in space and abroad will be a boon to national security. All this will help ensure that destabilization of the international order doesn’t fly over our heads. | 3,744 | <h4><u>Second</u>, isolating China in space is <u>counterproductive</u>: it drives China to <u>challenge the international </u>order through <u>space militarization</u>.</h4><p><strong>Daniels 16 — </strong>Laura Daniels works at a leading Washington, D.C., think tank where she specializes in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. She holds a Master of Public Administration in International Security Policy from Columbia University (“Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space” The National Interest, 2/18, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248</p><p>That <u>China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order</u> is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of the international order, <u>bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons</u>. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above.</p><p>Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. <u>Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station</u>. <u>Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead</u>. If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe <u>Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage</u>, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements.</p><p><u>Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order</u>. <u>This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite</u> (ASAT), <u>command and control, and intelligence technology</u>, in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. <u>This has strong implications for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and the international order it undergirds, <u>as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield</u>.</p><p>With growing military capacity comes the ability to contest freedom of movement in the global commons. <u>In the expansive global commons of outer space, China’s ASAT technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets critical to the global economy</u>. While these same developments unfolding in the South and East China Seas are of more immediate concern, free movement of satellites within space is vital, contributing to approximately $1.6 trillion of U.S. commercial revenue.</p><p><u>The prescription for dealing with Chinese pressure on the international order is much the same in space as on land: build on the order’s strengths, and adjust it for an increasingly multipolar environment</u>. <u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong>should pursue cooperation with China</u></strong> <u>on benign space research to better integrate China as a partner in the established order and to afford U.S. security strategists a window into Chinese decision making and intentions</u>. The State Department’s recent cooperation initiative is a step in the right direction. Simultaneously, the United States should promote deterrence by improving on an array of resilience and counterspace abilities, but without growing alarmism—after all, often cited as the greatest threat to national security in space is floating junk. Finally, <u>reviving the political will to maintain U.S. leadership in space</u> and abroad <u>will be a boon to national security. All this will help ensure that destabilization of the international order doesn’t fly over our heads</u>.</p> | 1AC — China Space Affirmative | 1AC — Space | 1AC — Relations Advantage | 161,834 | 83 | 125,814 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | 655,782 | A | null | 1 | Who Knows | Someone | null | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/DeSt/Chattahoochee-Deng-Stepka-Aff-NA-Round1.docx | null | 55,565 | DeSt | Chattahoochee DeSt | null | Ta..... | De..... | Pe..... | St..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,540 | No deep coop – Russia/China alliance directly challenges—even if Wolf was repealed | Palmer 6/26 | Palmer 6/26 (Coburn Palmer, Reporter at The Inquisitr News, 6/26/16, “Russia and China Sign Space Alliance to Threaten US Supremacy, Target Military Satellites,” http://www.inquisitr.com/3247550/russia-and-china-sign-space-alliance-to-threaten-u-s-supremacy-targets-military-satellites/ // MH) | Russia and China signed a space alliance this week to protect their interstellar interests as the Roscosmos space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed by the American space agency, so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites This political stance helped push China and Russia into a space alliance designed to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in peaceful space exploration, and further the development of interstellar vehicles “The Russian and Chinese governments have signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in connection to cooperation on peaceful space exploration and usage as well as creation and exploitation of launch vehicles and land-based space infrastructure.” | Russia and China signed a space alliance as the space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites This helped push China and Russia into a space alliance to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in space , and further the development of interstellar vehicles | Russia and China signed a space alliance this week to protect their interstellar interests as the Roscosmos space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites. Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed by the American space agency, so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites, reports SpaceDaily. “The US wants to preserve its monopoly in regulating space traffic. Moreover, the US military doesn’t want make data on its objects public.” The upcoming Russian catalog of near-Earth objects would include a number of asteroids and space debris, but also the location of secret U.S. military satellites. The Pentagon published the location of Russian military satellites a long time ago, but it keeps information on its own space-going vessels and those of its allies a secret. This political stance helped push China and Russia into a space alliance designed to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in peaceful space exploration, and further the development of interstellar vehicles, according to Sputnik News. “The Russian and Chinese governments have signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in connection to cooperation on peaceful space exploration and usage as well as creation and exploitation of launch vehicles and land-based space infrastructure.” | 1,443 | <h4><strong>No deep coop – Russia/China alliance directly challenges—even if Wolf was repealed</h4><p>Palmer 6/26</strong> (Coburn Palmer, Reporter at The Inquisitr News, 6/26/16, “Russia and China Sign Space Alliance to Threaten US Supremacy, Target Military Satellites,” http://www.inquisitr.com/3247550/russia-and-china-sign-space-alliance-to-threaten-u-s-supremacy-targets-military-satellites/ // MH)<strong> </p><p><u></strong><mark>Russia and China signed a space alliance</mark> this week to protect their interstellar interests <mark>as the </mark>Roscosmos <mark>space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites</u></mark>. <u><mark>Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed</mark> by the American space agency, <mark>so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites</u></mark>, reports SpaceDaily. “The US wants to preserve its monopoly in regulating space traffic. Moreover, the US military doesn’t want make data on its objects public.” The upcoming Russian catalog of near-Earth objects would include a number of asteroids and space debris, but also the location of secret U.S. military satellites. The Pentagon published the location of Russian military satellites a long time ago, but it keeps information on its own space-going vessels and those of its allies a secret. <u><mark>This</mark> political stance <mark>helped push China and Russia into a space alliance </mark>designed <mark>to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in </mark>peaceful <mark>space </mark>exploration<mark>, and further the development of interstellar vehicles</u></mark>, according to Sputnik News. <u>“The Russian and Chinese governments have signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in connection to cooperation on peaceful space exploration and usage as well as creation and exploitation of launch vehicles and land-based space infrastructure.”</u> </p> | Neg Mount vernon | Case | Advantage 2 | 183,739 | 16 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,541 | Increased FDI requires a consistent international framework – otherwise global investment and trade are unsustainable. | Sauvant 16 | Sauvant 16 [Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division), “The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, January 2016, The policy options paper is the result of a collective process involving all members of the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy. It draws on the active engagement of these eminent experts in discussions over multiple meetings as well as an overview paper and think pieces commissioned by the E15Initiative and authored by group members and external contributors, www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Investment_Law_Policy_regime_report_2015_1401.pdf] | the international investment regime covers what has become the single most important form of international economic transactions and the most powerful vector of integration among economies: FDI and non-equity forms of control by MNEs over foreign production facilities. These have become more important than trade in delivering goods and services to foreign markets, and they interlock national economies through their production networks The presence and commercial links of MNEs across different international markets has led to a substantial and rising share of international trade taking place within global value chains and as intra-company transactions, thus tightly intertwining investment and trade. developing countries have emerged as both major recipients of FDI FDI integrate not just national markets through trade but also national production systems through investment. despite the economic importance of international investment, there is no overarching and unified set of rules governing this subject matter. Instead, the investment regime consists in the main of over 3,000 international investment agreements In the face of prospects that the world economy may face a decade or more of slow growth, it is unfortunate that world FDI inflows almost halved Flows need not only to recover, but surpass this earlier record. In 2014, FDI inflows as a percentage of world gross domestic capital formation stood at 6.5%, There is no economic reason why this share could not be double or triple more FDI helps to put the world on a sustainable development path. The world is awash in capital, and the world’s investment needs are tremendous. Mobilizing such investment requires, that the economic, regulatory and investment promotion determinants in individual countries are favourable. But the international framework dealing with the relations of governments and international investors needs to be enabling as well: it needs to provide clear rules of the game and a suitable mechanism for resolving disputes between these two main actors the framework needs to provide international support to help emerging markets become more attractive for international investors. Given the importance of international investment for economic growth and development, the patchwork nature of the regime governing it and, the operation of the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism, it is not surprising that public attention focuses on the regime’s weaknesses priority needs to be given to special efforts to promote substantially higher flows of sustainable FDI for sustainable development, within an encouraging and generally accepted international investment framework. The policy recommendations as regards an enhanced investment regime focus on the need to expand the regime’s purpose beyond the protection of international investment and the facilitation of efficient investor operations to encompass also the promotion of sustainable development and further to institutionalize the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism Negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement could provide an overall framework for international investment | FDI have become more important than trade in delivering goods and services to foreign markets, and they interlock national economies FDI integrate not just national markets through trade but also national production systems through investment there is no overarching and unified set of rules governing this subject matter. Flows need not only to recover, but surpass this earlier record. more FDI helps to put the world on a sustainable development path the international framework dealing with the relations needs to be enabling priority needs to be given to FDI within an accepted international investment framework. Negotiations could provide an overall framework for international investment | Such growing policy attention is justified. As will be documented briefly below, the international investment regime covers what has become the single most important form of international economic transactions and the most powerful vector of integration among economies: FDI and non-equity forms of control by MNEs over foreign production facilities. These have become more important than trade in delivering goods and services to foreign markets, and they interlock national economies through their production networks: the sales of foreign affiliates alone amounted to US$36 trillion in 2014, compared to world exports that year of US$23 trillion.3 The presence and commercial links of MNEs across different international markets has led to a substantial and rising share of international trade taking place within global value chains and as intra-company transactions, thus tightly intertwining investment and trade. Furthermore, developing countries have emerged as both major recipients of FDI and major outward investors, through their own MNEs. As a result, FDI and non-equity forms of control integrate not just national markets through trade but also national production systems through investment. Yet, despite the economic importance of international investment, there is no overarching and unified set of rules governing this subject matter. Instead, the investment regime consists in the main of over 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs). The great majority of these agreements are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but virtually all recent bilateral and regional free trade agreements also feature comprehensive investment chapters. Both types of instruments deal primarily with the treatment of international investors by host countries. These agreements, furthermore, are supplemented by contracts between states and individual investors, as well as a number of voluntary, soft law, instruments that address primarily various aspects relating to international investors, such as corporate social responsibility and anti-competitive conduct. Having the right international investment framework in place is not an objective in itself. In the face of prospects that the world economy may face a decade or more of slow growth, it is unfortunate that world FDI inflows almost halved from a high of some US$2 trillion in 2007 to US$1.2 trillion in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. Flows need not only to recover, but surpass this earlier record. In 2014, FDI inflows as a percentage of world gross domestic capital formation stood at 6.5%, although it was much higher in a number of developed and developing countries. There is no economic reason why this share could not be double or triple, although the issue is not only more FDI, but more FDI that helps to put the world on a sustainable development path. The world is awash in capital, and the world’s investment needs are tremendous. Mobilizing such investment requires, first of all, that the economic, regulatory and investment promotion determinants in individual countries are favourable. But the international framework dealing with the relations of governments and international investors needs to be enabling as well: it needs to provide clear rules of the game and a suitable mechanism for resolving disputes between these two main actors, should such disputes arise. And the framework needs to provide international support to help emerging markets become more attractive for international investors. Given the importance of international investment for economic growth and development, the patchwork nature of the regime governing it and, in particular, the operation of the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism, it is not surprising that public attention focuses on the regime’s strengths and weaknesses. In light of this, the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy examined a number of key policy challenges related to the governance of international investment and, in particular, the evolving interaction between international investors and governments, with a view towards identifying policy recommendations. The discussions were future-oriented, looking ahead five to ten years—a daunting challenge in a fast-moving field in which some ideas that would have been cast aside as pipedreams only a few years ago are now on the international policy agenda, such as a world investment court. In reforming the investment regime, priority needs to be given to special efforts to promote substantially higher flows of sustainable FDI for sustainable development, particularly to developing and least developed countries, within an encouraging and generally accepted international investment framework. The policy recommendations as regards an enhanced investment regime focus on the need to expand the regime’s purpose beyond the protection of international investment and the facilitation of efficient investor operations to encompass also the promotion of sustainable development (and allow for the pursuit of other legitimate public policy objectives such as public welfare and human rights) and further to institutionalize the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism, complemented by an Advisory Centre on International Investment Law. Negotiations of a multilateral/plurilateral investment agreement could provide an overall framework for international investment, preceded (or accompanied) by an informal consensus-building process. | 5,433 | <h4><strong>Increased FDI requires a consistent international framework – otherwise global investment and trade are unsustainable.</h4><p>Sauvant 16 </strong>[Karl P. Sauvant (Resident Senior Fellow at the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia Law School, Founding Executive Director and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division), “The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Ways Forward”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, January 2016, The policy options paper is the result of a collective process involving all members of the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy. It draws on the active engagement of these eminent experts in discussions over multiple meetings as well as an overview paper and think pieces commissioned by the E15Initiative and authored by group members and external contributors, www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Investment_Law_Policy_regime_report_2015_1401.pdf]</p><p>Such growing policy attention is justified. As will be documented briefly below, <u><strong>the international investment regime covers what has become the single most important form of international economic transactions and the most powerful vector of integration among economies:<mark> FDI</mark> and non-equity forms of control by MNEs over foreign production facilities. These <mark>have become more important than trade in delivering goods and services to foreign markets, and they interlock national economies</mark> through their production networks</u></strong>: the sales of foreign affiliates alone amounted to US$36 trillion in 2014, compared to world exports that year of US$23 trillion.3 <u><strong>The presence and commercial links of MNEs across different international markets has led to a substantial and rising share of international trade taking place within global value chains and as intra-company transactions, thus tightly intertwining investment and trade.</u></strong> Furthermore, <u><strong>developing countries have emerged as both major recipients of FDI</u></strong> and major outward investors, through their own MNEs. As a result, <u><strong><mark>FDI</u></strong></mark> and non-equity forms of control <u><strong><mark>integrate not just national markets through trade but also national production systems through investment</mark>. </u></strong>Yet, <u><strong>despite the economic importance of international investment, <mark>there is no overarching and unified set of rules governing this subject matter.</mark> Instead, the investment regime consists in the main of over 3,000 international investment agreements</u></strong> (IIAs). The great majority of these agreements are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but virtually all recent bilateral and regional free trade agreements also feature comprehensive investment chapters. Both types of instruments deal primarily with the treatment of international investors by host countries. These agreements, furthermore, are supplemented by contracts between states and individual investors, as well as a number of voluntary, soft law, instruments that address primarily various aspects relating to international investors, such as corporate social responsibility and anti-competitive conduct. Having the right international investment framework in place is not an objective in itself. <u><strong>In the face of prospects that the world economy may face a decade or more of slow growth, it is unfortunate that world FDI inflows almost halved</u></strong> from a high of some US$2 trillion in 2007 to US$1.2 trillion in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. <u><strong><mark>Flows need not only to recover, but surpass this earlier record.</mark> In 2014, FDI inflows as a percentage of world gross domestic capital formation stood at 6.5%,</u></strong> although it was much higher in a number of developed and developing countries. <u><strong>There is no economic reason why this share could not be double or triple</u></strong>, although the issue is not only more FDI, but <u><strong><mark>more FDI</mark> </u></strong>that <u><strong><mark>helps to put the world on a sustainable development path</mark>. The world is awash in capital, and the world’s investment needs are tremendous. Mobilizing such investment requires, </u></strong>first of all, <u><strong>that the economic, regulatory and investment promotion determinants in individual countries are favourable. But <mark>the international framework dealing with the relations</mark> of governments and international investors <mark>needs to be enabling</mark> as well: it needs to provide clear rules of the game and a suitable mechanism for resolving disputes between these two main actors</u></strong>, should such disputes arise. And <u><strong>the framework needs to provide international support to help emerging markets become more attractive for international investors. Given the importance of international investment for economic growth and development, the patchwork nature of the regime governing it and,</u></strong> in particular, <u><strong>the operation of the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism, it is not surprising that public attention focuses on the regime’s </u></strong>strengths and <u><strong>weaknesses</u></strong>. In light of this, the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy examined a number of key policy challenges related to the governance of international investment and, in particular, the evolving interaction between international investors and governments, with a view towards identifying policy recommendations. The discussions were future-oriented, looking ahead five to ten years—a daunting challenge in a fast-moving field in which some ideas that would have been cast aside as pipedreams only a few years ago are now on the international policy agenda, such as a world investment court. In reforming the investment regime, <u><strong><mark>priority needs to be given to</mark> special efforts to promote substantially higher flows of sustainable <mark>FDI</mark> for sustainable development, </u></strong>particularly to developing and least developed countries, <u><strong><mark>within an</mark> encouraging and generally <mark>accepted international investment framework.</mark> The policy recommendations as regards an enhanced investment regime focus on the need to expand the regime’s purpose beyond the protection of international investment and the facilitation of efficient investor operations to encompass also the promotion of sustainable development</u></strong> (and allow for the pursuit of other legitimate public policy objectives such as public welfare and human rights) <u><strong>and further to institutionalize the regime’s dispute-settlement mechanism</u></strong>, complemented by an Advisory Centre on International Investment Law. <u><strong><mark>Negotiations</mark> of a multilateral</u></strong>/plurilateral <u><strong>investment agreement <mark>could provide an overall framework for international investment</u></mark>, preceded (or accompanied) by an informal consensus-building process.</p></strong> | null | 1AC Adv – Investment Law | null | 160,935 | 2 | 125,810 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | 655,808 | A | Creek Classic | 2 | Kent Denver KK | Steven Larue | 1AC- BIT
1NC- Disclosure theory T QPQ NoKo conditions CP CCP leadership DA Appeasement DA
2NC- T Appeasement
1NR- CCP leadership DA
2NR- appeasment | hspolicy16/CherryCreek/HeRa/Cherry%20Creek-Herbst-Ramesh-Aff-Creek%20Classic-Round2.docx | null | 55,572 | HeRa | Cherry Creek HeRa | null | Wi..... | He..... | Ra..... | Ra..... | 20,069 | CherryCreek | Cherry Creek | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,542 | Too many obstacles | Mearsheimer 14 | John J. Mearsheimer 14, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show | Am I overlooking terrorism? No Sure, the U S has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat September 11 did not cripple the U S in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a bomb on American soil Terrorism was a much bigger problem during the 1970s What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that Political turmoil could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose weapon, but the U S already has detailed plans to deal with that unlikely contingency Terrorists might try to acquire material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and delivering it. every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat | he U S terrorism problem is a minor threat an attack is highly unlikely the possibility that a terrorist might obtain a nuclear weapon are nil. No state is going to supply because it would have no control turmoil could allow terrorists to grab a loose weapon, but the U S already has detailed plans to deal with that Terrorists might try to acquire material and build their own But there are significant obstacles to getting material and even bigger obstacles to building and delivering | Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody. | 2,041 | <h4>Too many obstacles</h4><p>John J. <strong>Mearsheimer 14</strong>, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show</p><p><u>Am I overlooking </u>the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is <u>terrorism? No</u>t at all. <u>Sure, t<mark>he U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has a <mark>terrorism problem<strong></mark>. But it <mark>is a minor threat</u></strong></mark>. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on <u>September 11</u>, but it <u>did not cripple the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>in any meaningful way and <mark>an</mark>other <mark>attack</mark> of that magnitude <mark>is <strong>highly unlikely</u></strong></mark> in the foreseeable future. Indeed, <u>there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a</u> primitive <u>bomb on American soil</u>, much less striking a major blow. <u>Terrorism</u>—most of it arising from domestic groups—<u>was a much bigger problem</u> in the United States <u>during the 1970s</u> than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ <u>What about <mark>the possibility that a terrorist</mark> group <mark>might obtain a nuclear weapon</mark>?</u> Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but <u><strong>the chances of that happening <mark>are</mark> virtually <mark>nil</strong>. No</mark> nuclear-armed <mark>state is going to supply</mark> terrorists</u> with a nuclear weapon <u><mark>because it would have no control</mark> over how the recipients might use that</u> weapon. <u>Political <mark>turmoil</u></mark> in a nuclear-armed state <u><mark>could</mark> in theory <mark>allow terrorists to grab a loose</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>weapon, but the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>already has detailed plans to deal with that</u></mark> highly <u>unlikely contingency</u>.¶ <u><mark>Terrorists might</u></mark> also <u><mark>try to acquire</u></mark> fissile <u><mark>material and build their own</mark> bomb. <mark>But</mark> that scenario is extremely unlikely as well<strong>: <mark>there are significant obstacles to getting</mark> enough <mark>material and even bigger obstacles to building</mark> a bomb <mark>and</u></strong></mark> then <u><strong><mark>delivering</mark> it.</u></strong> More generally, virtually <u>every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a</u> nuclear <u>weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target</u> of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. <u><strong>Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat</u></strong>. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.</p> | 2nc | Case | Indo-Pak | 21,456 | 411 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,543 | Restraint agreement between the US and China were made in Mara-La-Go, but recent North Korean tensions put it on the brink – China wants continued restraint | Mullany et al 4/14 | Mullany et al 4/14
(Gerry Mullany reported from Hong Kong, Chris Buckley from Beijing, and David E. Sanger from Washington. Choe Sang-Hun contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea all from the New York Times, "China Warns of ‘Storm Clouds Gathering’ in U.S.-North Korea Standoff," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear.html) | China has been trying to steer between the Trump administration’s demands for it to do more to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its longstanding reluctance to risk a rupture with the North In a telephone conversation with Mr. Trump on Wednesday, China’s president, Xi Jinping, also called for restraint. But behind the scenes, officials said, Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi had reached some preliminary understandings, during their meeting at the president’s Mar-a-Lago resort a week ago, about what the Chinese might do to change the behavior of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. According to officials who have seen notes of the conversations, the Chinese have agreed to crack down on their second-tier banks that have helped finance the North’s trade. | China has been trying to steer between the Trump administration’s and the North In a conversation with Trump Xi called for restraint But behind the scenes Trump and Xi reached preliminary understandings about what the Chinese might do to change the behavior of Kim Jong-un the Chinese agreed to crack down on banks that help finance the North’s trade | “The United States and South Korea and North Korea are engaging in tit for tat, with swords drawn and bows bent, and there have been storm clouds gathering,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said in Beijing, according to Xinhua, the state news agency. “If they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoulder that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this,” Mr. Wang said. The comments were unusually blunt from China, which has been trying to steer between the Trump administration’s demands for it to do more to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its longstanding reluctance to risk a rupture with the North. The remarks also reflected, American experts said, an effort by the Chinese to throw responsibility for what happens back on Washington, after Mr. Trump declared, in several Twitter messages, that it was up to the Chinese to contain their neighbor and sometime partner. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Trump on Wednesday, China’s president, Xi Jinping, also called for restraint. But behind the scenes, officials said, Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi had reached some preliminary understandings, during their meeting at the president’s Mar-a-Lago resort a week ago, about what the Chinese might do to change the behavior of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. According to officials who have seen notes of the conversations, the Chinese have agreed to crack down on their second-tier banks that have helped finance the North’s trade. But it is unclear what that crackdown would look like: While much has been made by Mr. Trump about North Korean “boats” of coal that have been turned away by China, the most recent statistics show a significant increase in overall trade between the two countries. American officials contend that the two countries have also agreed to share some intelligence — a highly unusual step — about suspected North Korean shipments of arms and other illicit goods. That would improve the chances that those shipments can be intercepted, perhaps when they make port calls. The Bush administration began such a program, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, more than a decade ago, but attention to it has waxed and waned. The North Korean military issued a statement on Friday threatening to attack major American military bases in South Korea, as well as the presidential Blue House, warning that it could annihilate those targets “within minutes.” Administration officials flatly denied a report on NBC News that the United States was planning for a pre-emptive strike ahead of any nuclear test. It was unclear what American forces would strike, and the nuclear test site where the North has conducted its five previous tests would make a hard-to-hit target. Moreover, they noted, Vice President Mike Pence is scheduled to visit Seoul this weekend, and it is almost impossible to imagine a strike occurring while he was consulting with the South’s acting president about how to respond to the crisis. | 2,979 | <h4><strong>Restraint agreement between the US and China were made in Mara-La-Go, but recent North Korean tensions put it on the brink – China wants continued restraint</h4><p>Mullany et al 4/14</p><p></strong>(Gerry Mullany reported from Hong Kong, Chris Buckley from Beijing, and David E. Sanger from Washington. Choe Sang-Hun contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea all from the New York Times, "China Warns of ‘Storm Clouds Gathering’ in U.S.-North Korea Standoff," https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear.html)</p><p> “The United States and South Korea and North Korea are engaging in tit for tat, with swords drawn and bows bent, and there have been storm clouds gathering,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said in Beijing, according to Xinhua, the state news agency. “If they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoulder that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this,” Mr. Wang said. The comments were unusually blunt from <u><mark>China</u></mark>, which <u><mark>has been trying to steer between the Trump administration’s</mark> demands for it to do more to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program <mark>and</mark> its longstanding reluctance to risk a rupture with <mark>the North</u></mark>. The remarks also reflected, American experts said, an effort by the Chinese to throw responsibility for what happens back on Washington, after Mr. Trump declared, in several Twitter messages, that it was up to the Chinese to contain their neighbor and sometime partner. <u><mark>In a</mark> telephone <mark>conversation with</mark> Mr. <mark>Trump</mark> on Wednesday, China’s president, <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping, also <strong><mark>called for restraint</strong></mark>. <mark>But <strong>behind the scenes</strong></mark>, officials said, <strong>Mr. <mark>Trump and</mark> Mr. <mark>Xi</mark> had <mark>reached</mark> some <mark>preliminary understandings</strong></mark>, during their meeting at the president’s Mar-a-Lago resort a week ago, <mark>about what the Chinese might</mark> <mark>do to change the behavior of</mark> the North’s leader, <mark>Kim Jong-un</mark>. According to officials who have seen notes of the conversations, <mark>the Chinese</mark> have <mark>agreed to crack down on</mark> their second-tier <mark>banks that</mark> have <mark>help</mark>ed <mark>finance the North’s trade</mark>.</u> But it is unclear what that crackdown would look like: While much has been made by Mr. Trump about North Korean “boats” of coal that have been turned away by China, the most recent statistics show a significant increase in overall trade between the two countries. American officials contend that the two countries have also agreed to share some intelligence — a highly unusual step — about suspected North Korean shipments of arms and other illicit goods. That would improve the chances that those shipments can be intercepted, perhaps when they make port calls. The Bush administration began such a program, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, more than a decade ago, but attention to it has waxed and waned. The North Korean military issued a statement on Friday threatening to attack major American military bases in South Korea, as well as the presidential Blue House, warning that it could annihilate those targets “within minutes.” Administration officials flatly denied a report on NBC News that the United States was planning for a pre-emptive strike ahead of any nuclear test. It was unclear what American forces would strike, and the nuclear test site where the North has conducted its five previous tests would make a hard-to-hit target. Moreover, they noted, Vice President Mike Pence is scheduled to visit Seoul this weekend, and it is almost impossible to imagine a strike occurring while he was consulting with the South’s acting president about how to respond to the crisis.</p> | null | null | null | 1,560,855 | 1 | 125,797 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | 655,494 | A | St Marks Novice Round Up | 1 | Any | Any | 1AC - Mutually Assured Restraint | hspolicy16/Casady/LiHo/Casady-Lindstrom-Horton-Aff-St%20Marks%20Novice%20Round%20Up-Round1.docx | null | 55,539 | LiHo | Casady LiHo | null | Co..... | Li..... | El..... | Ho..... | 20,062 | Casady | Casady | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,544 | Violation: Economic and diplomatic engagement are parts of broad relations – quid pro quos are too specific | Martin 2011 | Curtis Martin, Professor of Political Science @ Merrimack College, A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2011 “Gauging Engagement: Obama’s “Open Hand” to North Korea and Iran”, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/9/9/5/8/pages499587/p499587-1.php | null | null | There is no commonly agreed definition of “engagement”, and indeed the term is
AND
will principally concern its efforts at narrow engagement with Iran and the DPRK. | 164 | <h4><u>Violation</u>: Economic and diplomatic engagement are parts of broad relations – quid pro quos are too specific</h4><p>Curtis <strong>Martin</strong>, Professor of Political Science @ Merrimack College, A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, <strong>2011</strong> “Gauging Engagement: Obama’s “Open Hand” to North Korea and Iran”, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/9/9/5/8/pages499587/p499587-1.php</p><p>There is no commonly agreed definition of “engagement”, and indeed the term is </p><p>AND</p><p>will principally concern its efforts at narrow engagement with Iran and the DPRK.</p> | 1NC | T | null | 1,560,856 | 1 | 126,087 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | 660,573 | N | Grapevine | 4 | Edina RW | John Mast | 1AC-Taiwan
1NC-TPoliticsJapanIndian Ocean Track 2 CP
2NC-Japan Indian Ocean
1NR-Politics
2NR-Indian Ocean | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-Grapevine-Round4.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
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