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3,783,645 | We don’t disagree that Clean technology can solve warming—but companies won’t innovate because of trade theft. The aff is key to dissiminate those technologies the counterplan produces—justifies perm do the counterplan—we will defend it | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>We don’t disagree that Clean technology can solve warming—but companies won’t innovate because of trade theft. The aff is key to dissiminate those technologies the counterplan produces—justifies perm do the counterplan—we will defend it</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,895 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,646 | Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its diplomatic and/or economic engagement with the People's Republic of China regarding implementation of a risk-based anti-money laundering regime in the People’s Republic of China. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its diplomatic and/or economic engagement with the People's Republic of China regarding implementation of a risk-based anti-money laundering regime in the People’s Republic of China. </h4> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Plan | 1,560,896 | 1 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,647 | Threatening and pressures fail to induce compliance in the context of Chinese IPR – division of domestic interest overwhelms the threat and it causes a trade war – err aff – empirics prove this is how China perceives sanction threats. | Wang 2012 | Wang, Doctor of Philosophy, 2012 | Zeng’s book Trade Threats, Trade Wars focuses on the result of American aggressive trade diplomacy during the 1980s and early 1990s she examines the effectiveness of the use of trade threats in soliciting foreign concessions The most important contribution comes from her argument that states that the trade structure between two countries affects the effectiveness of coercive trade diplomacy she argues that when the United States has complementary trade relations with its trading partners, for example, the kind of trade structure between the U.S. and China where the United States mainly export high-tech, capital-intensive products and China exports low-tech, labor-intensive products, the use of threats generally becomes ineffective because of higher levels of division of domestic interest the threat to revoke China’s MFN status encountered opposition from industries making use of cheap imports from China such as textiles, toys, and furniture. The U.S. exporting industries such as airplanes, high-tech electrical equipments, and computer processors might also oppose unilateral sanctions for the fear of losing market due to Chinese retaliation threats to impose sanctions on Chinese imports failed to extract desired Chinese concessions for better protections of U.S. intellectual property. Although U.S. copyright and patent industries were pleased to see a strong punitive action those who benefit from trade with China voiced their deep concerns that threatened sanctions might incur seriously adverse effects on their business interest For instance, China would retaliate by suspending investment projects by big U.S. businesses Therefore, the complementary trade structure which is the key source of the division of domestic interest, eroded the credibility of imposing sanctions In actuality, the administration has a strong incentive to avoid confrontation with China because it could jeopardize broader U.S. strategic and commercial The patterns for several rounds of IPR negotiations were similar that the U.S. negotiators had to back up from tough positions and accept compromised deals from China that the newly instituted WTO dispute settlement mechanism will not eliminate aggressive unilateral trade policies the WTO will change little of the nature of trade structures in determining the degree of unity for policy preferences by domestic interest groups, which in the end affect trade negotiations | The most important contribution comes from her argument the trade structure affects the effectiveness of coercive trade diplomacy when the U S has complementary trade relations for example the U.S. and China, use of threats becomes ineffective because of domestic interest the threat to revoke China’s MFN status encountered opposition from industries for fear of losing market due to retaliation threats failed to extract desired concessions for better protections of U.S. in p China would retaliate by suspending investment projects Therefore, the trade structure eroded the credibility of imposing sanctions because it could jeopardize broader U.S. strategic and commercial. patterns for several rounds were similar that the U.S. had to back up from tough positions and accept compromised deals | YInan, “HANDLING THE U.S.-CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE – THE ROLE OF WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM” https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/document/get/miami1336224534/inline
Inspired by Bayard and Elliott, Ka Zeng’s book Trade Threats, Trade Wars focuses on the result of American aggressive trade diplomacy during the 1980s and early 1990s (pre-WTO period).21 In particular, she examines the effectiveness of the use of trade threats in soliciting foreign concessions on trade agreements. The most important contribution of Zeng’s study comes from her argument that states that the trade structure (either complementary or competitive) between two countries affects the effectiveness of coercive trade diplomacy. Specifically, she argues that when the United States has complementary trade relations with its trading partners, for example, the kind of trade structure between the U.S. and China, where the United States mainly export high-tech, capital-intensive products, and China exports low-tech, labor-intensive products, the use of threats generally becomes ineffective because of higher levels of division of domestic interest. However, when the trade structure is competitive, for example, trade between most industrialized democracies, the U.S. coercive trade diplomacy is more likely to gain concessions from its trade partners because of the unity of domestic support from both import-competing and export-seeking groups. In the former situation, for instance, the threat to revoke China’s MFN status encountered opposition from industries making use of cheap imports from China such as textiles, toys, and furniture. The U.S. exporting industries such as airplanes, high-tech electrical equipments, and computer processors might also oppose unilateral sanctions for the fear of losing market due to Chinese retaliation. In the U.S.-Japan semiconductor case, the sanction threat on Japan-made computers and some consumer electronic products was largely successful because domestic interests were unified as both importcompeting consumer electronic industry and export-seeking semiconductor industry supported sanctions. In one of her case analyses related to current study, Zeng has demonstrated that threats to impose sanctions on Chinese imports failed to extract desired Chinese concessions for better protections of U.S. intellectual property. Although U.S. copyright and patent industries were pleased to see a strong punitive government action to stop piracy in China, those who benefit from trade with China voiced their deep concerns that threatened sanctions might incur seriously adverse effects on their business interest. For instance, China would retaliate by suspending investment projects by big U.S. businesses. Therefore, the complementary trade structure, which is the key source of the division of domestic interest, eroded the credibility of imposing sanctions. In actuality, the administration has a strong incentive to avoid confrontation with China because it could jeopardize broader U.S. strategic and commercial. The patterns for several rounds of IPR negotiations were similar that the U.S. negotiators had to back up from tough positions and accept compromised deals from China. Since Zeng’s study deals exclusively with pre-WTO cases, in the concluding chapter she suggests—though without detailed empirical evidence—that the newly instituted WTO dispute settlement mechanism will not eliminate aggressive unilateral trade policies, although it does discourage unilateral retaliations between member countries. For example, she mentions that the frequency of the pursuit of aggressive unilateral trade policies by the USTR under Section 301 is even higher than that in the GATT period. In the meantime, the WTO will change little of the nature of trade structures in determining the degree of unity for policy preferences by domestic interest groups, which in the end affect trade negotiations. As such, Zeng leaves the question open that how the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has fundamentally changed the way the United States and China settle their trade disputes. | 4,122 | <h4>Threatening and pressures fail to induce compliance in the context of Chinese IPR – division of domestic interest overwhelms the threat and it causes a trade war – err aff – empirics prove this is how China perceives sanction threats. </h4><p><u><strong>Wang</u></strong>, Doctor of Philosophy, <u><strong>2012</u></strong> </p><p>YInan, “HANDLING THE U.S.-CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE – THE ROLE OF WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM” https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/document/get/miami1336224534/inline</p><p>Inspired by Bayard and Elliott, Ka <u><strong>Zeng’s book Trade Threats, Trade Wars focuses on the result of American aggressive trade diplomacy during the 1980s and early 1990s</u></strong> (pre-WTO period).21 In particular, <u><strong>she examines the effectiveness of the use of trade threats in soliciting foreign concessions</u></strong> on trade agreements. <u><strong><mark>The most important contribution</u></strong></mark> of Zeng’s study <u><strong><mark>comes from her argument</mark> that states that <mark>the trade structure</u></strong></mark> (either complementary or competitive) <u><strong>between two countries <mark>affects the effectiveness of coercive trade</mark> <mark>diplomacy</u></strong></mark>. Specifically, <u><strong>she argues that <mark>when the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has complementary trade relations</mark> with its trading partners, <mark>for example</mark>, the kind of trade structure between <mark>the U.S. and China</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong>where the United States mainly export high-tech, capital-intensive products</u></strong>, <u><strong>and China exports low-tech, labor-intensive products, the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>use of threats</mark> generally <mark>becomes ineffective because of</mark> higher levels of division of <mark>domestic interest</u></strong></mark>. However, when the trade structure is competitive, for example, trade between most industrialized democracies, the U.S. coercive trade diplomacy is more likely to gain concessions from its trade partners because of the unity of domestic support from both import-competing and export-seeking groups. In the former situation, for instance, <u><strong><mark>the threat to revoke China’s MFN status encountered opposition from industries</mark> making use of cheap imports from China such as textiles, toys, and furniture. The U.S. exporting industries such as airplanes,</u></strong> <u><strong>high-tech electrical equipments, and computer processors might also oppose unilateral sanctions <mark>for</mark> the <mark>fear of losing market due to</mark> Chinese <mark>retaliation</u></strong></mark>. In the U.S.-Japan semiconductor case, the sanction threat on Japan-made computers and some consumer electronic products was largely successful because domestic interests were unified as both importcompeting consumer electronic industry and export-seeking semiconductor industry supported sanctions. In one of her case analyses related to current study, Zeng has demonstrated that <u><strong><mark>threats</mark> to impose sanctions on Chinese imports <mark>failed to extract desired</mark> Chinese <mark>concessions for better protections of U.S. in</mark>tellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty.</u></strong> <u><strong>Although U.S. copyright and patent industries were pleased to see a strong punitive</u></strong> government <u><strong>action</u></strong> to stop piracy in China, <u><strong>those who benefit from trade with China voiced their deep concerns that threatened sanctions might incur seriously adverse effects on their business interest</u></strong>. <u><strong>For instance, <mark>China would retaliate by suspending investment projects</mark> by big U.S. businesses</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Therefore, the</mark> complementary <mark>trade structure</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which is the key source of the division of domestic interest, <mark>eroded the credibility of imposing sanctions</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>In actuality, the administration has a strong incentive to avoid confrontation with China <mark>because it could jeopardize broader U.S. strategic and commercial</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>The <mark>patterns for several rounds</mark> of IPR negotiations <mark>were similar that the U.S. </mark>negotiators <mark>had to back up from tough positions and</mark> <mark>accept compromised deals</mark> from China</u></strong>. Since Zeng’s study deals exclusively with pre-WTO cases, in the concluding chapter she suggests—though without detailed empirical evidence—<u><strong>that the newly instituted WTO dispute settlement mechanism will not eliminate aggressive unilateral trade policies</u></strong>, although it does discourage unilateral retaliations between member countries. For example, she mentions that the frequency of the pursuit of aggressive unilateral trade policies by the USTR under Section 301 is even higher than that in the GATT period. In the meantime, <u><strong>the WTO will change little of the nature of trade structures in determining the degree of unity for policy preferences by domestic interest groups, which in the end affect trade negotiations</u></strong>. As such, Zeng leaves the question open that how the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has fundamentally changed the way the United States and China settle their trade disputes.</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,559,792 | 3 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,648 | China is currently the world leader for money laundering – China realizes that they need to have a better anti-money laundering regime that is only possible with cooperation from foreign countries | WB 16 | WB 3/13/16 (The Whistleblowers – Forum for publishing articles to inform the public and uncover large scale, organized, transnational money laundering from certain global banks – “DIRTY MONEY: China + International Money Laundering” – The Whistleblowers – Mar 13, 2016 – http://thewhistleblowers.info/dirty-money-china-international-money-laundering/) | In the midst of turmoil in the Chinese stock markets, one serious problem that may appear is increased currency outflows created by current and potential investors who would rather move their assets to foreign countries viewed as safer havens. Money laundering should be under close surveillance. Chinese involvement in money laundering has been growing. “China leads the world in illicit capital flows,” that China is a leading source of illegal money transfers it consistently fails to cooperate with other countries in resolving cross-border money laundering. Chinese authorities have identified “the adoption of new money laundering methods, including illegal fundraising activity, cross-border communications fraud, and corruption in the banking, securities and transportation services.” “Chinese authorities have also observed that money laundering schemes continue to spread from the developed coastal areas…to underdeveloped inland regions As China’s international economic relations continue to expand, China must be willing to cooperate to detect and punish cross-border crimes that are multiplying. China realizes that it needs international cooperation from foreign countries | one problem is increased currency outflows investors move their assets to foreign countries Chinese involvement in money laundering has been growing. China is a leading source of illegal money transfers authorities identified new money laundering methods money laundering schemes spread from the developed coastal areas…to underdeveloped inland regions China realizes that it needs international cooperation from foreign countries | In the midst of turmoil in the Chinese stock markets, one serious problem that may appear is increased currency outflows created by current and potential investors who would rather move their assets to foreign countries viewed as safer havens. Money laundering should be under close surveillance. Chinese involvement in money laundering has been growing. “China leads the world in illicit capital flows,” according to the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. State Department, which monitors international money laundering. The report not only states that China is a leading source of illegal money transfers, but that it consistently fails to cooperate with other countries in resolving cross-border money laundering. In addition to enumerating conventional methods of illegally transferring cash, the Report also notes that Chinese authorities have identified “the adoption of new money laundering methods, including illegal fundraising activity, cross-border communications fraud, and corruption in the banking, securities and transportation services.” It goes on to report that “Chinese authorities have also observed that money laundering schemes continue to spread from the developed coastal areas…to underdeveloped inland regions.” Against this background, some recent developments are grounds for concern: Italian prosecutors are seeking to indict the Bank of China (BOC) for laundering billions of euros via a branch of the Bank in Italy. The Bank and government officials have refused to cooperate. As China’s international economic relations continue to expand, China must be willing to cooperate to detect and punish cross-border crimes that are multiplying. At the same time, China realizes that it needs international cooperation from foreign countries as it attempts to locate and extradite Chinese officials who have fled abroad to escape punishment for corruption. | 1,986 | <h4>China is currently the world leader for money laundering – China realizes that they need to have a better anti-money laundering regime that is only possible with cooperation from foreign countries</h4><p><strong>WB </strong>3/13/<strong>16</strong> <u>(The Whistleblowers – Forum for publishing articles to inform the public and uncover large scale, organized, transnational money laundering from certain global banks – “DIRTY MONEY: China + International Money Laundering” – The Whistleblowers – Mar 13, 2016 – http://thewhistleblowers.info/dirty-money-china-international-money-laundering/)</p><p>In the midst of turmoil in the Chinese stock markets, <mark>one</mark> serious <mark>problem</mark> that may appear <mark>is increased currency outflows</mark> created by current and potential <mark>investors</mark> who would rather <mark>move their assets to foreign countries </mark>viewed as safer havens. Money laundering should be under close surveillance. <strong><mark>Chinese involvement in money laundering has been growing.</mark> “China leads the world in illicit capital flows,”</u></strong> according to the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. State Department, which monitors international money laundering. The report not only states <u><strong>that <mark>China is a leading source of illegal money transfers</u></strong></mark>, but that <u>it consistently fails to cooperate with other countries in resolving cross-border money laundering.</u> In addition to enumerating conventional methods of illegally transferring cash, the Report also notes that <u>Chinese <mark>authorities</mark> have <mark>identified</mark> “the adoption of <mark>new money laundering methods</mark>, including illegal fundraising activity, cross-border communications fraud, and corruption in the banking, securities and transportation services.”</u> It goes on to report that <u>“Chinese authorities have also observed that <mark>money laundering schemes</mark> continue to <mark>spread from the developed coastal areas…to underdeveloped inland regions</u></mark>.” Against this background, some recent developments are grounds for concern: Italian prosecutors are seeking to indict the Bank of China (BOC) for laundering billions of euros via a branch of the Bank in Italy. The Bank and government officials have refused to cooperate. <u>As China’s international economic relations continue to expand, <strong>China must be willing to cooperate to detect and punish cross-border crimes that are multiplying</strong>.</u> At the same time, <u><strong><mark>China realizes that it needs international cooperation from foreign countries</u></mark> as it attempts to locate and extradite Chinese officials who have fled abroad to escape punishment for corruption.</p></strong> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 1,559,320 | 11 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,649 | Permutation do the counterplan—The US already sanctions China by placing them on the IPR watch list | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Permutation do the counterplan—The US already sanctions China by placing them on the IPR watch list </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,897 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,650 | Links to the net benefits if it imposes sanctions | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Links to the net benefits if it imposes sanctions</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,898 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,651 | The anti-money laundering regime in China has caused mass capital flight – billions of dollars are rapidly pouring out of the country in recent years – only the plan can reverse this by creating a stronger AML regime in China | Kochan 16 | Kochan 16(Nick Kochan, Nick Kochan has extensive experience as an author and journalist in the fields of banking, management and forensic studies. His books on corruption, white collar crime and British politics have won acclaim, 07-20-2016, "Global concern at AML standards of Chinese banks abroad," Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, https://www.wolterskluwerfs.com/article/global-concern-at-aml-standards-of-chinese-banks-abroad.aspx) | Regulators are becoming increasingly concerned about Chinese anti-money laundering (AML) procedures, . First is the number of recent cases, (outlined below) where the operations of subsidiaries and branches of Chinese banks operating abroad are shown to be laundering vehicles. Second, is the amount of capital flight, being facilitated by fraud and money laundering through offshore and less-regulated centres. Evidence is growing that the country’s state-owned financial institutions are involved in large-scale money laundering for the expatriate Chinese community around Europe and in the US. Dirty money is flowing both into China from the Chinese expatriot community, and out of China, through deliberate fraud designed to evade export controls. . Each involves one of the largest five state-owned Chinese banks, the alleged transfer of funds from an overseas subsidiary back to China, and participation by an overseas subsidiary working with a very extensive local Chinese community. A number also involve the bank working with allegedly illegal activities Chinese local banks pay lip service to regulation but their implementation is deficient . When they do the funds transfer, they don’t check the source of funds, which is very important in KYC. They don’t check, they just do the transaction.’ The local Chinese banks will bypass compliance to win business and banks are taking time ‘to close the gap between local and international standards’ but he says the regulators fail to apply it. Chinese regulators are ‘not half as effective as the Chinese government would like them to be. That is why they still have the problem.’ Banks’ role in facilitating capital flight from China is a key government concern, he says. ‘You cannot have capital flight on this kind of scale without proper respected and respectable financial institutions being used as vehicles senior executives turn a blind eye a huge amount of money involved. That money will have to be sent through normal channels, so some of the major financial institutions will have been involved Chinese regulation is impeded by low level of fines says that the fines may be large in the context of salaries for state bank officials. ‘If you gave the bank or the management a serious fine or penalty, no one would want to work in the bank. Salaries are not high The illegal exporting of cash is typically performed using the creation of bogus trade documentation, often with the assistance of a third jurisdiction. People are able to use the financial system creatively to get a lot of money out of China in spite of tight regulations. Many are believed to use false invoicing whereby the wealthy individual sets up a company in a convenient overseas jurisdiction that makes a purchase from a Chinese supplier creating an obligation The jurisdiction that provides the safest route out of China for laundered funds is Hong Kong, with its sophisticated financial centre, where many Chinese companies operate schemes continue to result in huge movements of funds both into and out of China, There is also more incentive for certain people in China to get their money out . The economy is slowing down Three recent cases of alleged money laundering by overseas branches or subsidiaries of Chinese state banks ICBC had been used to transfer money made in the import scheme from Spain to China. Some €40m of undeclared money had been found. The alleged smuggling of more than €4.5 billion ($5 billion) out of Italy to China, through a money transfer service part-owned by Chinese immigrants was investigated by Italian police in 2015. The funds went through Bank of China’s (BOC) Milan branch, which handled more than half of the €5 billion CCB Question marks have been raised about the quality of AML compliance at China Construction Bank (CCB) following the announcement last year that the Office of the Controller of the Currency in New York had brought enforcement action against the bank. The details of the infringements have not been disclosed but an OCC spokesman has said that the lender’s US division had agreed to rectify policies and systems for finding and reporting suspicious behaviour among its customers, | Regulators are concerned about Chinese AML procedures cases of Chinese banks operating to launder vehicles. Second, is the amount of capital flight institutions are involved in money laundering for the Chinese community . Dirty money is flowing both in and out of China, through deliberate fraud Chinese banks implementation is deficient they don’t check the source of funds they just do the transaction The banks will bypass compliance to win business and banks are taking time ‘to close the gap between local and international standards’ Chinese regulators are ‘not effective ‘You cannot have capital flight without proper respected financial institutions People are able to use the financial system to get a lot of money out of China in spite of regulations There is also more incentive for certain people in China to get their money out The economy is slowing down | Regulators are becoming increasingly concerned about Chinese anti-money laundering (AML) procedures, as the strength of Chinese trade with the outside world grows, and the economy experiences rapid growth. Two factors underpin the regulators’ concerns. First is the number of recent cases, (outlined below) where the operations of subsidiaries and branches of Chinese banks operating abroad are shown to be laundering vehicles. Second, is the amount of capital flight, being facilitated by fraud and money laundering through offshore and less-regulated centres. Evidence is growing that the country’s state-owned financial institutions are involved in large-scale money laundering for the expatriate Chinese community around Europe and in the US. Dirty money is flowing both into China from the Chinese expatriot community, and out of China, through deliberate fraud designed to evade export controls. The issue has triggered alarm in the United States and Europe where local law enforcement and regulators have been involved. In the UK, it has been reported by the CAIXIN news agency, that the Financial Conduct Authority has plans to strengthen inspections of the largest branches of subsidiaries of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and on China Construction Bank Corp (CCB). The cases involving Chinese subsidiaries abroad listed below have a number of common features. Each involves one of the largest five state-owned Chinese banks, the alleged transfer of funds from an overseas subsidiary back to China, and participation by an overseas subsidiary working with a very extensive local Chinese community. A number also involve the bank working with allegedly illegal activities in the overseas market. These include counterfeiting and prostitution. Chinese local banks pay lip service to regulation, says Henry Rui, a partner for EY in China, but their implementation is deficient. ‘They will claim that their paperwork, their procedures follow the local country’s policy but the implementation is questionable’, he says. ‘Their standard may be lower than the EU standard. When they do the funds transfer, they don’t check the source of funds, which is very important in KYC. They don’t check, they just do the transaction.’ The local Chinese banks will bypass compliance to win business, says Rui. ‘When they have a bigger customer or piece of business to win, there will be a question mark over their implementation standards.’ Rui has been employed by a number of foreign banks including Citibank operating in China. He says that foreign banks apply the highest international standards. The history of AML in China is relatively recent and banks are taking time ‘to close the gap between local and international standards’, says Rui. In fact, the first AML rules were introduced in 1997, almost two decades ago, with a criminal law that included the banning of money laundering. Administrative rules for the submission of suspicious activity reports were introduced in 2003, and the Chinese financial intelligence unit, called the Chinese Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring Analysis Centre (CAMLMAC), was set up in 2004. The country joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2007. The country’s legal code applies international standards to know your customer (KYC) due diligence and disclosure of beneficial ownership says Steve Tsang, professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies and Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham in the UK, but he says the regulators fail to apply it. Chinese regulators are ‘not half as effective as the Chinese government would like them to be. That is why they still have the problem.’ Banks’ role in facilitating capital flight from China is a key government concern, he says. ‘You cannot have capital flight on this kind of scale without proper respected and respectable financial institutions being used as vehicles. Whether their senior executives turn a blind eye or not, I don’t know. You are not talking about a million pound here or there that can be smuggled out in a suitcase. You are talking about a huge amount of money involved. That money will have to be sent through normal channels, so some of the major financial institutions will have been involved. ‘They have tight regulations in terms of the amounts going out without going through an authorisation process. Technically you can’t take a lot of money out of China but everybody gets their money out of China. How do people manage to buy expensive properties in central London?’ Chinese regulation is impeded by low level of fines says a report by Temenos, a banking consultancy operating in China. The report says that regulators can impose fines amounting to no more than $70,000 on an institution for misconduct. Directors, senior managers and other persons directly responsible for the misconduct can also receive a fine of between $1,500 and $7,300. If non-compliance leads to actual money laundering, the fines are about ten times higher. Rui says that the fines may be large in the context of salaries for state bank officials. ‘If you gave the bank or the management a serious fine or penalty, no one would want to work in the bank. Salaries are not high.’ The Temenos report refers to the central bank’s (the People’s Bank of China or PBOC) ‘light handed stance on the enforcement of AML violations.... in order to create a genuine incentive for banks to reduce money laundering, the regulator must be willing to legislate and execute serious punishment to improve credibility. Otherwise banks will not make the effort to sustainably reduce money laundering.’ Overseas subsidiaries and branches of Chinese state banks need to hire local AML experts to introduce and monitor AML compliance, says Rui. A number have followed this advice, only to find that foreigners clash with the bank’s culture and quit. Rui says, ‘Local experts don’t like to work in a Chinese bank because the culture is different. The Chinese subsidiary needs to change its mindset in line with the local country’s way of doing business, which says you need to comply with every regulation, every policy of the European country. They need to implement the local policy and regulations of the local country.’ Drawing hope that government is putting greater emphasis on the importance of the implementation of AML rules in Chinese banks, Rui notes that the Chinese government has just set up a committee to assist banks introducing financial technology. He says, ‘The introduction of AML compliance as a membership qualification is very important. You need to pass the AML evaluation. The committee is operating under the auspices of government bodies including the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission.’ The illegal exporting of cash is typically performed using the creation of bogus trade documentation, often with the assistance of a third jurisdiction. People are able to use the financial system creatively to get a lot of money out of China in spite of tight regulations. China is believed to operate a control of no more than £50,000, yet this is bypassed by some relatively basic laundering schemes. Many are believed to use false invoicing whereby the wealthy individual sets up a company in a convenient overseas jurisdiction that makes a purchase from a Chinese supplier creating an obligation. The Chinese supplier makes the payment to a company in a third jurisdiction outside the Chinese mainland and the reach of Chinese controls. Tsang describes this as follows: ‘You buy a small amount of something from China and you invoice for a much larger quantity. You pay for that, and you release the money outside the country. If you want to get Chinese currency into the UK, a UK company makes a large purchase of something from a British company. The British company invoices for more than what it sold. You have to pay the invoice, and that gives you a legitimate need for foreign exchange and you are allowed to release the money out of the country. Your actual purchase is actually quite small.’ The jurisdiction that provides the safest route out of China for laundered funds is Hong Kong, with its sophisticated financial centre, where many Chinese companies operate. Tsang describes this structure as ‘horizontal integration’. He says, ‘It is a network and you have someone set up for a fee a company in the country where you need the foreign cash. A lot of those companies are managed by business partners of those who want to get their money out. They want to be safe, they want to deal with people they know and a lot of it is based on trust. They work with their own network so if your partner steals your money and disappears, are you really going to take your partner to court in London and admit that you were committing a crime?’ He says that companies are set up specifically to implement such a fraudulent arrangement. While the schemes continue to result in huge movements of funds both into and out of China, deliberate evasion of Chinese controls is undoubtedly under pressure as Chinese government moves against corruption. Tsang says, ‘They are now aggressively pursuing people who took their money out of China. Previously it was more a matter of turning a blind eye. We are learning more about the problems for the Chinese government because we are receiving more information and we have tighter controls in the West. There is also more incentive for certain people in China to get their money out and therefore there is more incentive for Chinese government to make sure it doesn’t happen. China needs the investment now inside the country. The economy is slowing down, they want domestic consumption, they want the money in the system.’ One management consultant with a long history of working in China, believes some macro-financial issues are driving today’s capital flight. Key to these is the convertibility of the Renminbi – the Chinese currency – which he says ‘is at a half-way house stage’. For this consultant, the issue is how Chinese people go through the optimal process to get their money into a hard currency, given loosening controls to buy dollars. ‘With so much international trade, where they are manufacturing and needing to buy materials, they need hard currency. The opportunity to abuse the system is facilitated by the volumes of trade’. He cites the case of a company that orders and pays for a thousand printers from the US but only receives 800, the overpayment remaining in the US. ‘When your customer moves to the US, he can use the unspent funds. You do the paperwork and it looks fine. You play this cat and mouse game, appearing to be transparent to the authorities with your money, while at the same time doing everything you can, in as complex a process as possible, to hide some of it. False invoicing is rife.’ Three recent cases of alleged money laundering by overseas branches or subsidiaries of Chinese state banks ICBC The five directors of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in Madrid were arrested and charged with money laundering and tax evasion in February 2016. The Guardia Civil, in ‘Operation Shadow’, said that ICBC had been used to transfer money made in the import scheme from Spain to China. Some €40m of undeclared money had been found. In addition to the five directors’ arrests, another 47 were charged with money laundering, tax fraud, and other criminal activities. The criminal group allegedly helped businesses launder money, charging commissions in the process. Illegal workshops were found where contraband goods were made by Chinese nationals, a number of whose identities could not be verified. Spain has a Chinese population of some 180,000. Tne former law enforcement official who wished to remain anonymous, noted that lapses found at ICBC in Spain are shared across the board with other Chinese banks. ‘ICBC’s [AML] lapses were not unique to it. The same could be said of the other four Chinese banks as they have created presences for themselves, first in Hong Kong, and then in Europe and the U.S. It appears that the bank was using the latest systems, but they still had lapses in their KYC. That’s why there needs to be more hands on, personalised scrutiny for people and monies from certain countries. Risk-based screening needs to be ratcheted up.’ Spanish regulators need to share some of the responsibility for poor compliance by local Chinese banks, said a Madrid-based private sector investigator who wished to remain anonymous. ‘Spain and Portugal are one of the worst countries in Europe from the standpoint of criminal activity such as money laundering, smuggling and sanctions violations. This is as much a failing of ICBC as it is of regulators in Spain. Having said that, when you’re an enterprise as large as ICBC, one of the largest banks on earth, there are bound to be violations. The question is, do they learn from them and is there a feedback loop that makes their compliance evolve and improve.’ BOC The alleged smuggling of more than €4.5 billion ($5 billion) out of Italy to China, through a money transfer service part-owned by Chinese immigrants was investigated by Italian police in 2015. The funds went through Bank of China’s (BOC) Milan branch, which handled more than half of the €5 billion. It earned over €758,000 in commissions on the transactions. Investigations of these cases are undermined by the absence of effective legal and judicial cooperation between China and the West. BOC has global assets of about $2.5 trillion and is on the Financial Stability Board’s list of systemically important institutions. CCB Question marks have been raised about the quality of AML compliance at China Construction Bank (CCB) following the announcement last year that the Office of the Controller of the Currency in New York had brought enforcement action against the bank. The details of the infringements have not been disclosed but an OCC spokesman has said that the lender’s US division had agreed to rectify policies and systems for finding and reporting suspicious behaviour among its customers, keep better track of currency transactions and limit its vulnerability to financial crimes. China Construction Bank has also faced an enforcement action from the Federal Reserve similar to Bank of China’s OCC action. The Federal Reserve ordered the lender to tighten the money-laundering controls in its New York branch. | 14,492 | <h4><strong>The anti-money laundering regime in China has caused mass capital flight – billions of dollars are rapidly pouring out of the country in recent years – only the plan can reverse this by creating a stronger AML regime in China</h4><p>Kochan 16</strong>(Nick Kochan, Nick Kochan has extensive experience as an author and journalist in the fields of banking, management and forensic studies. His books on corruption, white collar crime and British politics have won acclaim, 07-20-2016, "Global concern at AML standards of Chinese banks abroad," Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, https://www.wolterskluwerfs.com/article/global-concern-at-aml-standards-of-chinese-banks-abroad.aspx)</p><p><u><mark>Regulators are</mark> becoming increasingly <mark>concerned about Chinese</mark> anti-money laundering (<mark>AML</mark>) <mark>procedures</mark>,</u> as the strength of Chinese trade with the outside world grows, and the economy experiences rapid growth. Two factors underpin the regulators’ concerns<u><strong>. First is the number of recent <mark>cases</mark>, (outlined below) where the operations <mark>of </mark>subsidiaries and branches of <mark>Chinese banks operating</mark> abroad are shown <mark>to</mark> be <mark>launder</mark>ing <mark>vehicles. Second, is the amount of capital flight</mark>, being facilitated by fraud and money laundering through offshore and less-regulated centres</strong>. Evidence is growing that the country’s state-owned financial <mark>institutions are involved in</mark> large-scale <mark>money laundering for the </mark>expatriate <mark>Chinese community </mark>around Europe and in the US<mark>. Dirty money is flowing both in</mark>to China from the Chinese expatriot community, <mark>and out of China, through deliberate fraud</mark> designed to evade export controls.</u> The issue has triggered alarm in the United States and Europe where local law enforcement and regulators have been involved. In the UK, it has been reported by the CAIXIN news agency, that the Financial Conduct Authority has plans to strengthen inspections of the largest branches of subsidiaries of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and on China Construction Bank Corp (CCB). The cases involving Chinese subsidiaries abroad listed below have a number of common features<u>. Each involves one of the largest five state-owned Chinese banks, the alleged transfer of funds from an overseas subsidiary back to China, and participation by an overseas subsidiary working with a very extensive local Chinese community. A number also involve the bank working with allegedly illegal activities</u> in the overseas market. These include counterfeiting and prostitution. <u><mark>Chinese </mark>local <mark>banks</mark> pay lip service to regulation</u>, says Henry Rui, a partner for EY in China, <u><strong>but their <mark>implementation is deficient</u></strong></mark>. ‘They will claim that their paperwork, their procedures follow the local country’s policy but the implementation is questionable’, he says. ‘Their standard may be lower than the EU standard<u>. When they do the funds transfer, <mark>they don’t check the source of funds</mark>, which is very important in KYC. They don’t check, <mark>they just do the transaction</mark>.’ <mark>The </mark>local Chinese <mark>banks will bypass compliance to win business</u></mark>, says Rui. ‘When they have a bigger customer or piece of business to win, there will be a question mark over their implementation standards.’ Rui has been employed by a number of foreign banks including Citibank operating in China. He says that foreign banks apply the highest international standards. The history of AML in China is relatively recent <u><mark>and banks are taking time ‘to close the gap between local and international standards’</u></mark>, says Rui. In fact, the first AML rules were introduced in 1997, almost two decades ago, with a criminal law that included the banning of money laundering. Administrative rules for the submission of suspicious activity reports were introduced in 2003, and the Chinese financial intelligence unit, called the Chinese Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring Analysis Centre (CAMLMAC), was set up in 2004. The country joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2007. The country’s legal code applies international standards to know your customer (KYC) due diligence and disclosure of beneficial ownership says Steve Tsang, professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies and Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham in the UK, <u>but he says the regulators fail to apply it. <mark>Chinese regulators are ‘not</mark> half as <mark>effective </mark>as the Chinese government would like them to be. That is why they still have the problem.’ Banks’ role in facilitating capital flight from China is a key government concern, he says. <mark>‘You cannot have capital flight</mark> on this kind of scale <mark>without proper respected </mark>and respectable <mark>financial institutions</mark> being used as vehicles</u>. Whether their <u>senior executives turn a blind eye</u> or not, I don’t know. You are not talking about a million pound here or there that can be smuggled out in a suitcase. You are talking about <u>a huge amount of money involved. That money will have to be sent through normal channels, so some of the major financial institutions will have been involved</u>. ‘They have tight regulations in terms of the amounts going out without going through an authorisation process. Technically you can’t take a lot of money out of China but everybody gets their money out of China. How do people manage to buy expensive properties in central London?’ <u>Chinese regulation is impeded by low level of fines</u> says a report by Temenos, a banking consultancy operating in China. The report says that regulators can impose fines amounting to no more than $70,000 on an institution for misconduct. Directors, senior managers and other persons directly responsible for the misconduct can also receive a fine of between $1,500 and $7,300. If non-compliance leads to actual money laundering, the fines are about ten times higher. Rui <u>says that the fines may be large in the context of salaries for state bank officials. ‘If you gave the bank or the management a serious fine or penalty, no one would want to work in the bank. Salaries are not high</u>.’ The Temenos report refers to the central bank’s (the People’s Bank of China or PBOC) ‘light handed stance on the enforcement of AML violations.... in order to create a genuine incentive for banks to reduce money laundering, the regulator must be willing to legislate and execute serious punishment to improve credibility. Otherwise banks will not make the effort to sustainably reduce money laundering.’ Overseas subsidiaries and branches of Chinese state banks need to hire local AML experts to introduce and monitor AML compliance, says Rui. A number have followed this advice, only to find that foreigners clash with the bank’s culture and quit. Rui says, ‘Local experts don’t like to work in a Chinese bank because the culture is different. The Chinese subsidiary needs to change its mindset in line with the local country’s way of doing business, which says you need to comply with every regulation, every policy of the European country. They need to implement the local policy and regulations of the local country.’ Drawing hope that government is putting greater emphasis on the importance of the implementation of AML rules in Chinese banks, Rui notes that the Chinese government has just set up a committee to assist banks introducing financial technology. He says, ‘The introduction of AML compliance as a membership qualification is very important. You need to pass the AML evaluation. The committee is operating under the auspices of government bodies including the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission.’ <u>The illegal exporting of cash is typically performed using the creation of bogus trade documentation, often with the assistance of a third jurisdiction. <mark>People are able to use the financial system </mark>creatively <mark>to get a lot of money out of China in spite of </mark>tight <mark>regulations</mark>.</u> China is believed to operate a control of no more than £50,000, yet this is bypassed by some relatively basic laundering schemes. <u>Many are believed to use false invoicing whereby the wealthy individual sets up a company in a convenient overseas jurisdiction that makes a purchase from a Chinese supplier creating an obligation</u>. The Chinese supplier makes the payment to a company in a third jurisdiction outside the Chinese mainland and the reach of Chinese controls. Tsang describes this as follows: ‘You buy a small amount of something from China and you invoice for a much larger quantity. You pay for that, and you release the money outside the country. If you want to get Chinese currency into the UK, a UK company makes a large purchase of something from a British company. The British company invoices for more than what it sold. You have to pay the invoice, and that gives you a legitimate need for foreign exchange and you are allowed to release the money out of the country. Your actual purchase is actually quite small.’ <u>The jurisdiction that provides the safest route out of China for laundered funds is Hong Kong, with its sophisticated financial centre, where many Chinese companies operate</u>. Tsang describes this structure as ‘horizontal integration’. He says, ‘It is a network and you have someone set up for a fee a company in the country where you need the foreign cash. A lot of those companies are managed by business partners of those who want to get their money out. They want to be safe, they want to deal with people they know and a lot of it is based on trust. They work with their own network so if your partner steals your money and disappears, are you really going to take your partner to court in London and admit that you were committing a crime?’ He says that companies are set up specifically to implement such a fraudulent arrangement. While the <u>schemes continue to result in huge movements of funds both into and out of China,</u> deliberate evasion of Chinese controls is undoubtedly under pressure as Chinese government moves against corruption. Tsang says, ‘They are now aggressively pursuing people who took their money out of China. Previously it was more a matter of turning a blind eye. We are learning more about the problems for the Chinese government because we are receiving more information and we have tighter controls in the West. <u><mark>There is also more incentive for certain people in China to get their money out</u></mark> and therefore there is more incentive for Chinese government to make sure it doesn’t happen. China needs the investment now inside the country<u>. <mark>The economy is slowing down</u></mark>, they want domestic consumption, they want the money in the system.’ One management consultant with a long history of working in China, believes some macro-financial issues are driving today’s capital flight. Key to these is the convertibility of the Renminbi – the Chinese currency – which he says ‘is at a half-way house stage’. For this consultant, the issue is how Chinese people go through the optimal process to get their money into a hard currency, given loosening controls to buy dollars. ‘With so much international trade, where they are manufacturing and needing to buy materials, they need hard currency. The opportunity to abuse the system is facilitated by the volumes of trade’. He cites the case of a company that orders and pays for a thousand printers from the US but only receives 800, the overpayment remaining in the US. ‘When your customer moves to the US, he can use the unspent funds. You do the paperwork and it looks fine. You play this cat and mouse game, appearing to be transparent to the authorities with your money, while at the same time doing everything you can, in as complex a process as possible, to hide some of it. False invoicing is rife.’ <u>Three recent cases of alleged money laundering by overseas branches or subsidiaries of Chinese state banks</u> ICBC The five directors of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in Madrid were arrested and charged with money laundering and tax evasion in February 2016. The Guardia Civil, in ‘Operation Shadow’, said that <u>ICBC had been used to transfer money made in the import scheme from Spain to China. Some €40m of undeclared money had been found.</u> In addition to the five directors’ arrests, another 47 were charged with money laundering, tax fraud, and other criminal activities. The criminal group allegedly helped businesses launder money, charging commissions in the process. Illegal workshops were found where contraband goods were made by Chinese nationals, a number of whose identities could not be verified. Spain has a Chinese population of some 180,000. Tne former law enforcement official who wished to remain anonymous, noted that lapses found at ICBC in Spain are shared across the board with other Chinese banks. ‘ICBC’s [AML] lapses were not unique to it. The same could be said of the other four Chinese banks as they have created presences for themselves, first in Hong Kong, and then in Europe and the U.S. It appears that the bank was using the latest systems, but they still had lapses in their KYC. That’s why there needs to be more hands on, personalised scrutiny for people and monies from certain countries. Risk-based screening needs to be ratcheted up.’ Spanish regulators need to share some of the responsibility for poor compliance by local Chinese banks, said a Madrid-based private sector investigator who wished to remain anonymous. ‘Spain and Portugal are one of the worst countries in Europe from the standpoint of criminal activity such as money laundering, smuggling and sanctions violations. This is as much a failing of ICBC as it is of regulators in Spain. Having said that, when you’re an enterprise as large as ICBC, one of the largest banks on earth, there are bound to be violations. The question is, do they learn from them and is there a feedback loop that makes their compliance evolve and improve.’ BOC <u>The alleged smuggling of more than €4.5 billion ($5 billion) out of Italy to China, through a money transfer service part-owned by Chinese immigrants was investigated by Italian police in 2015. The funds went through Bank of China’s (BOC) Milan branch, which handled more than half of the €5 billion</u>. It earned over €758,000 in commissions on the transactions. Investigations of these cases are undermined by the absence of effective legal and judicial cooperation between China and the West. BOC has global assets of about $2.5 trillion and is on the Financial Stability Board’s list of systemically important institutions. <u>CCB Question marks have been raised about the quality of AML compliance at China Construction Bank (CCB) following the announcement last year that the Office of the Controller of the Currency in New York had brought enforcement action against the bank. The details of the infringements have not been disclosed but an OCC spokesman has said that the lender’s US division had agreed to rectify policies and systems for finding and reporting suspicious behaviour among its customers,</u> keep better track of currency transactions and limit its vulnerability to financial crimes. China Construction Bank has also faced an enforcement action from the Federal Reserve similar to Bank of China’s OCC action. The Federal Reserve ordered the lender to tighten the money-laundering controls in its New York branch.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 1,559,321 | 11 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,652 | Multiplank counterplans are a voter—allows them to kick out of one and go for the rest or can only go for one. Shifts advocacy skills and moots predictability because we don’t know which one they go for | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Multiplank counterplans are a voter—allows them to kick out of one and go for the rest or can only go for one. Shifts advocacy skills and moots predictability because we don’t know which one they go for </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Counterplan | 1,560,899 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,653 | No link to the aff – we discuss all the time IPR and economic issues but still have military presence in Okinawa which should check any residual risk of a link – no evidence in the specific context of the aff means you reject any contrived spin. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>No link to the aff – we discuss all the time IPR and economic issues but still have military presence in Okinawa which should check any residual risk of a link – no evidence in the specific context of the aff means you reject any contrived spin. </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 1,560,900 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,654 | Capital Flight destroys the economy by allowing billions of dollars to flow out of the country – effectively mitigating China’s economy | Poljak 16 | Poljak 16 (Vesna Poljak, Senior markets writer, 02-07-2016, "Capital flight, not debt, could shock China's economy," Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/capital-flight-not-debt-could-shock-chinas-economy-btims-gor-warns-20160207-gmnl0z.html) | Capital outflows leading to the exhaustion of China's foreign exchange reserves are a bigger trigger for a hard landing in the Chinese economy than its enormous pile of debt China reported a lower-than-expected $US100 billion drop in the value of its foreign exchange reserves on Sunday, reducing its stockpile to $US3.23 trillion last month, the lowest level since May 2012, according to central bank figures the Fed has completed a 180-degree turn trying to assert control over money fleeing an economy's borders can be a bit like preventing a run on a bank. "The market sees capital outflows and devaluation more akin to what a failing bank looks like in its final days – a bank run precipitating a falling stock price, which encourages further doubt and so on," the fund manager says in his widely followed investor newsletter "The capital outflows are the depositor withdrawals and the exchange rate is the stock price its capital controls have proved incredibly porous and money is still leaving the country despite restrictions imposed by financial institutions. The depreciation of the yuan, which began in earnest in August 2015, has not deterred wealthy Chinese from trying to move their cash abroad FX reserve depletion could well be the actual trigger for a hard landing in China, rather than a collapse of the banking system, which is still clearly under the party's control. that the wealthiest members of China's population maintain a deep distrust of policymakers, and Beijing needs a new strategy. "This is driving the capital outflow, which has resulted in devaluation, but the real risk will be if it eventuates that a 20 [-plus per cent] devaluation doesn't stop the flow of capital out of the country | Capital outflows of foreign exchange reserves are a bigger trigger in the Chinese economy than its debt China reported a $ 100 billion drop in the value of its foreign exchange reserves trying to assert control over money can be like preventing a run on a bank capital controls have proved porous and money is leaving the country despite restrictions by financial institutions. reserve depletion could well be the actual trigger for a hard landing in China, Beijing needs a new strategy the real risk will be if it eventuates that a 20 per cent] devaluation doesn't stop the flow of capital out of the country | Capital outflows leading to the exhaustion of China's foreign exchange reserves are a bigger trigger for a hard landing in the Chinese economy than its enormous pile of debt, warns one of Australia's most prominent fund managers. China reported a lower-than-expected $US100 billion drop in the value of its foreign exchange reserves on Sunday, reducing its stockpile to $US3.23 trillion last month, the lowest level since May 2012, according to central bank figures. Vimal Gor says the Fed has completed a 180-degree turn. Vimal Gor says the Fed has completed a 180-degree turn. Photo: Christopher Pearce That rate of depletion is slower than it was in December, when China spent a record $US108 billion defending its currency. Even though Beijing is seeking a weaker yuan, it has been forced to prop up the currency by selling US dollars to avert a sharper collapse. Vimal Gor, head of income and fixed interest at BT Investment Management, argued that trying to assert control over money fleeing an economy's borders can be a bit like preventing a run on a bank. "The market sees capital outflows and devaluation more akin to what a failing bank looks like in its final days – a bank run precipitating a falling stock price, which encourages further doubt and so on," the fund manager says in his widely followed investor newsletter. "The capital outflows are the depositor withdrawals and the exchange rate is the stock price. This is because similar issues around opacity affect banks as well. When a bank run is occurring, as Mervyn King, ex-governor of the [Bank of England] once said, it is rational to participate in it." Part of China's problem is that its capital controls have proved incredibly porous and money is still leaving the country despite restrictions imposed by financial institutions. The depreciation of the yuan, which began in earnest in August 2015, has not deterred wealthy Chinese from trying to move their cash abroad. "For those in power, moving this money overseas is the rational thing to do, and should be independent of whatever the exchange rate is," Mr Gor said. "This means that FX reserve depletion could well be the actual trigger for a hard landing in China, rather than a collapse of the banking system, which is still clearly under the party's control. "We aren't sure how any form of reform could stop this risk, opening up much more downside in the exchange rate. This might be what separates the Japanese experience from the future Chinese experience." The Japanese experience Mr Gor is referring to is the collapse of Japan's economy in the late 1980s, which "didn't actually result in a large depreciation of the yen". Mr Gor argues that the wealthiest members of China's population maintain a deep distrust of policymakers, and Beijing needs a new strategy. "This is driving the capital outflow, which has resulted in devaluation, but the real risk will be if it eventuates that a 20 [-plus per cent] devaluation doesn't stop the flow of capital out of the country." | 3,015 | <h4>Capital Flight destroys the economy by allowing billions of dollars to flow out of the country – effectively mitigating China’s economy</h4><p><strong>Poljak 16 </strong>(Vesna Poljak, Senior markets writer, 02-07-2016, "Capital flight, not debt, could shock China's economy," Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/capital-flight-not-debt-could-shock-chinas-economy-btims-gor-warns-20160207-gmnl0z.html)</p><p><u><mark>Capital outflows</mark> leading to the exhaustion <mark>of </mark>China's <mark>foreign exchange reserves are a bigger trigger</mark> for a hard landing <mark>in the Chinese economy than its</mark> enormous pile of <mark>debt</u></mark>, warns one of Australia's most prominent fund managers. <u><mark>China reported a</mark> lower-than-expected <mark>$</mark>US<mark>100 billion drop in the value of its foreign exchange reserves</mark> on Sunday, reducing its stockpile to $US3.23 trillion last month, the lowest level since May 2012, according to central bank figures</u>. Vimal Gor says <u>the Fed has completed a 180-degree turn</u>. Vimal Gor says the Fed has completed a 180-degree turn. Photo: Christopher Pearce That rate of depletion is slower than it was in December, when China spent a record $US108 billion defending its currency. Even though Beijing is seeking a weaker yuan, it has been forced to prop up the currency by selling US dollars to avert a sharper collapse. Vimal Gor, head of income and fixed interest at BT Investment Management, argued that <u><mark>trying to assert control over money </mark>fleeing an economy's borders <mark>can be</mark> a bit <mark>like preventing a run on a bank</mark>. "The market sees capital outflows and devaluation more akin to what a failing bank looks like in its final days – a bank run precipitating a falling stock price, which encourages further doubt and so on," the fund manager says in his widely followed investor newsletter</u>. <u>"The capital outflows are the depositor withdrawals and the exchange rate is the stock price</u>. This is because similar issues around opacity affect banks as well. When a bank run is occurring, as Mervyn King, ex-governor of the [Bank of England] once said, it is rational to participate in it." Part of China's problem is that <u>its <mark>capital controls have proved </mark>incredibly <mark>porous and money is </mark>still <mark>leaving the country despite restrictions </mark>imposed <mark>by financial institutions.</mark> The depreciation of the yuan, which began in earnest in August 2015, has not deterred wealthy Chinese from trying to move their cash abroad</u>. "For those in power, moving this money overseas is the rational thing to do, and should be independent of whatever the exchange rate is," Mr Gor said. "This means that <u><strong>FX <mark>reserve depletion could well be the actual trigger for a hard landing in China, </mark>rather than a collapse of the banking system, which is still clearly under the party's control.</u></strong> "We aren't sure how any form of reform could stop this risk, opening up much more downside in the exchange rate. This might be what separates the Japanese experience from the future Chinese experience." The Japanese experience Mr Gor is referring to is the collapse of Japan's economy in the late 1980s, which "didn't actually result in a large depreciation of the yen". Mr Gor argues <u>that the wealthiest members of China's population maintain a deep distrust of policymakers, and <mark>Beijing needs a new strategy</mark>. "This is driving the capital outflow, which has resulted in devaluation, but <mark>the real risk will be if it eventuates that a 20 </mark>[-plus <mark>per cent] devaluation doesn't stop the flow of capital out of the country</u></mark>." </p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 1,559,323 | 14 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,655 | And the case is an internal link turn – strong economic growth is key to military superiority visa vi China – only the aff can contain them. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>And the case is an internal link turn – strong economic growth is key to military superiority visa vi China – only the aff can contain them. </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 1,560,901 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,656 | China is key to the global economy – china’s economy tanking kills the global economy – 6 reasons why | Koesterich -15 | Russ Koesterich, Cfa, 1-23-15, "Why China Is Important to The Global Economy," No Publication, http://marketrealist.com/2015/01/china-important-world/, Accessed: 6-25-2016, /Bingham-JS | 1. China has quickly become the second-largest economy in the world. 2. China contributed almost half of the global growth in 2013, much more than the United States. China is important to the world because it makes up 50% of the world’s GDP growth. . 3. Resource-hungry China has an outsized influence on most commodities markets. China affects the commodities markets, including crude oil and gold. The graph above shows the top five oil consuming economies in the world , China is the most populated country in the world. Besides oil, China consumes a whole lot of other commodities as well. China is the world’s largest consumer of steel, iron ore, and coal. China is also the second-highest consumer of gold (GLD), a tad behind India, which consumes most of the yellow metal. . 4. China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries. Market Realist – Implications of China being the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries The graph above shows some of the largest foreign holders of US Treasuries (TLT)(IEF) of all maturities. 5. Per capita GDP in China jumped more than 20-fold in the 30-year period ended in 2010. Per capita GDP in China is galloping away. The per capita GDP in China (FXI) has grown by 129% in the last ten years. A rise in per capita GDP usually signals growth in the economy. let’s assume China grows at around 7%, unlike the higher growth rates it’s seen in the recent past. If its population grows by 1.4%, then the 50-year average, per capita GDP growth will be much lower than in the past. 6. China is now the largest market in the world for cars, computers, mobile phones and countless other products. Wine sales in China, for instance, have more than tripled in just five years. China has quickly become the largest market in the world for cars and electronics, among other things. The good news for the global recovery is that I believe China will most likely achieve a soft landing in the near term. China grew at 7.4% in 2014, it still is of the world’s fastest growing economies. And as inflation in China continues to slow, looser monetary policy from the country’s central bank should further support the local economy. | 1. China has quickly become the second-largest economy in the world. 2. China contributed almost half of the global growth in 2013, much more than the United States China is important to the world because it makes up 50% of the world’s GDP growth. 3. Resource-hungry China has an outsized influence on most commodities markets China affects the commodities markets, including crude oil and gold. 4. China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries. Market Realist – Implications of China being the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries 5. Per capita GDP in China jumped more than 20-fold in the 30-year period ended in 2010. The per capita GDP in has grown by 129% in the last ten years. If its population grows by 1.4%, per capita GDP growth will be much lower than in the past 6. China is now the largest market in the world for cars, computers, mobile phones and countless other products. China will achieve a soft landing in the near term. China grew at 7.4% in 2014, it still is of the world’s fastest growing economies. | A new paper, “Braking China. . . Without Breaking the World,” from the BlackRock Investment Institute offers a nice list of six reasons why this is the case. Here are the reasons in no particular order. 1. China has quickly become the second-largest economy in the world. 2. China contributed almost half of the global growth in 2013, much more than the United States. Market Realist – China is important to the world because it makes up 50% of the world’s GDP growth. The pie chart above shows the contribution of some major economies to global GDP (gross domestic product) in 2013. The final data for 2014 aren’t available for most countries. As you can see, China (FXI) made up almost 50% of the world’s GDP growth in 2013. That’s because China is the second-biggest economy in the world. Also, it’s growing at a much faster rate than the US, the biggest economy in the world. The US made up about 29% of the change in global GDP in 2013. The US is a huge economy, with a GDP of around $16,800 billion. Even if it grows by 1%, it contributes a lot to global growth in terms of the bottom line. Russia (RSX), Brazil (EWZ), and India (EPI) combined made up 4.5% of the world’s GDP growth in 2013. This just goes to show the gulf between China and other emerging markets (EEM). A slowdown in China will negatively impact the economies exporting to China. Europe (EZU), Southeast Asia, Japan (EWJ), and South Korea (EWY) are some of China’s biggest import partners. In the next part of this series, we’ll look at the effect of a Chinese slowdown on commodity markets. 3. Resource-hungry China has an outsized influence on most commodities markets. Market Realist – China affects the commodities markets, including crude oil and gold. The graph above shows the top five oil consuming economies in the world. The US is at the top of the list, followed by China (FXI), Japan (EWJ), India (EPI), and Saudi Arabia. China consumes 10.3 million barrels of crude oil (USO) per day. The US consumes 18.5 million barrels a day. The US still consumes almost twice as much crude oil as China. Yet Chinese demand for oil is pivotal. As the number of vehicles have skyrocketed in China, so has the demand for oil in the country. With a population of close to 1.35 billion, China is the most populated country in the world. Besides oil, China consumes a whole lot of other commodities as well. China is the world’s largest consumer of steel, iron ore, and coal. China is also the second-highest consumer of gold (GLD), a tad behind India, which consumes most of the yellow metal. As you can see, China has a pretty big hand in the commodities markets. A slowdown in China is bad news for commodity-driven countries like Brazil (EWZ), Russia (RSX), South Africa (EZA), and so on. Read on to the next part of the series to find out how China can influence US Treasury yields. 4. China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries. Market Realist – Implications of China being the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries The graph above shows some of the largest foreign holders of US Treasuries (TLT)(IEF) of all maturities. As of November 2014, China (FXI) held Treasuries worth $1.25 trillion, the most of any other foreign holder. It’s closely followed by Japan (EWJ), which holds Treasuries worth $1.24 trillion. Other countries—Belgium, Brazil (EWZ), Switzerland, and the United Kingdom— hold much smaller quantities of US Treasuries, comparatively speaking. China’s central bank is a major purchaser of US Treasuries, mainly because of its exchange-rate policy. The Chinese renminbi was pegged to the US dollar to protect the currency from appreciation, which would make Chinese exports unattractive. Remember, China is primarily an export-driven economy. Since the US runs a budget deficit, it needs a way to finance it. It does this by issuing lots of Treasury bonds. All else being equal, buying US Treasuries increases the demand for them, which reduces their yields. This results in a general decrease in interest rates in the US. So if China were to stop buying, or start selling these bonds, it would result in higher Treasury yields. For example, if China decided to inject a monetary stimulus to its slowing economy, it could sell some of the US Treasuries it holds to finance the stimulus. If China decides to sell the Treasuries all at once, Treasury yields could spike due to sudden, excessive supply. The increase to interest rates in the US could cause volatility all over the world (QWLD). Keep reading, as the next part of this series explains why China’s burgeoning per capita GDP (gross domestic product) is important. 5. Per capita GDP in China jumped more than 20-fold in the 30-year period ended in 2010. Market Realist – Per capita GDP in China is galloping away. The graph above shows the per capita GDP (gross domestic product) of China. Per capita GDP is the total GDP of an economy, divided by its population. The number is a national average. The per capita GDP in China (FXI) has grown by 129% in the last ten years. The per capita GDP is useful for comparing one economy to another, because it shows the relative performance of countries. Unlike the GDP, which shows just the total amount, per capita GDP shows the same, adjusted by the number of citizens. A rise in per capita GDP usually signals growth in the economy. It could also be construed as an increase in productivity. As well, it’s a measure of the standard of living. The higher the number, the higher the standard of living. The per capita GDP of China increases every year, even when adjusted for inflation. Still, it’s much lower than the per capita GDP of developed markets (EFA) like Japan (EWJ), Europe (EZU), and the US (SPY), where the numbers are all well over $30,000. Meanwhile, China could catch up within a few decades, if it continues to grow at this rate. But let’s assume China grows at around 7%, unlike the higher growth rates it’s seen in the recent past. If its population grows by 1.4%, then the 50-year average, per capita GDP growth will be much lower than in the past. In the next part of this series, you’ll find out why China has become a market leader in car production. 6. China is now the largest market in the world for cars, computers, mobile phones and countless other products. Wine sales in China, for instance, have more than tripled in just five years. Market Realist – China has quickly become the largest market in the world for cars and electronics, among other things. The graph above shows the major car producers in the world. China (FXI) has quickly jumped to number one in the world. It produced nearly 14.5 million cars in 2011. In other words, one out of every four cars made that year came from China. China was the world’s third-largest car market in 2006, behind Japan (EWJ) and Germany (EWG). But, it made up that deficit in just the next five years. Major car producing firms such as Toyota (TM) have set up many plants in China. To some extent, these companies are dependent on the well-being of China. And, China isn’t just a major car market. It’s also a leader in computers and mobile phones, as well as other electronics. Tech companies (QQQ) in the US rely on steady growth in China. Apple (AAPL), for example, sells many of its iPhones in China. Many other multinational companies from different parts of the world are partly dependent on stable growth in China. All the points cited above prove that most major economies in the world are highly intertwined with the goings-on in China, which is why a soft landing of the Chinese economy is needed. In the last part of this series, you’ll learn about at least one tailwind that’s moving the Chinese economy in the right direction. The good news for the global recovery is that I believe China will most likely achieve a soft landing in the near term. China grew at 7.4% in 2014, slightly lower than the Government’s estimate of 7.5%. However, it still is of the world’s fastest growing economies. And as inflation in China continues to slow, looser monetary policy from the country’s central bank should further support the local economy. As such, I continue to hold a neutral view of Chinese equities, which I prefer to access through the iShares MSCI China Index Fund (MCHI), the iShares FTSE China 25 Index Fund (FXI) and the iShares MSCI China Small Cap Index Fund (ECNS). Market Realist – Lower inflation in China could be good news for its consumers. The graph above shows the year-over-year inflation in China, based on the CPI (consumer price index) for 2014. Inflation slipped from 2.5% in January to 1.5% in December. In fact, inflation was up at around 6.5% in 2011, when the Chinese economy was growing at over 9%. A dip in inflation is usually a good thing for emerging markets (EEM) (VWO). Having said that, the dip in China’s inflation rate could be partly attributed to a cooling off in its GDP (gross domestic product) growth rates, which would be bad news. The recent dip, though, can also be attributed to the slump in crude oil (USO) prices. This could be good news for China (FXI) (MCHI), as the decline in oil prices is akin to a tax break for an economy that consumes as much oil as China does. Some of the savings from this could lead to higher consumption, which would support growth. All economies that are net importers of oil should see a similar benefit. | 9,373 | <h4>China is key to the global economy – china’s economy tanking kills the global economy – 6 reasons why</h4><p>Russ <strong>Koesterich</strong>, Cfa, 1-23<strong>-15</strong>, "Why China Is Important to The Global Economy," No Publication, http://marketrealist.com/2015/01/china-important-world/, Accessed: 6-25-2016, /Bingham-JS</p><p>A new paper, “Braking China. . . Without Breaking the World,” from the BlackRock Investment Institute offers a nice list of six reasons why this is the case. Here are the reasons in no particular order.<u><strong> <mark>1. China has quickly become the second-largest economy in the world. 2. China contributed almost half of the global growth in 2013, much more than the United States</strong></mark>. </u>Market Realist –<u> <strong><mark>China is important to the world because it makes up 50% of the world’s GDP growth.</strong></mark> </u>The pie chart above shows the contribution of some major economies to global GDP (gross domestic product) in 2013. The final data for 2014 aren’t available for most countries. As you can see, China (FXI) made up almost 50% of the world’s GDP growth in 2013. That’s because China is the second-biggest economy in the world. Also, it’s growing at a much faster rate than the US, the biggest economy in the world. The US made up about 29% of the change in global GDP in 2013. The US is a huge economy, with a GDP of around $16,800 billion. Even if it grows by 1%, it contributes a lot to global growth in terms of the bottom line. Russia (RSX), Brazil (EWZ), and India (EPI) combined made up 4.5% of the world’s GDP growth in 2013. This just goes to show the gulf between China and other emerging markets (EEM). A slowdown in China will negatively impact the economies exporting to China. Europe (EZU), Southeast Asia, Japan (EWJ), and South Korea (EWY) are some of China’s biggest import partners. In the next part of this series, we’ll look at the effect of a Chinese slowdown on commodity markets<u><strong>. <mark>3. Resource-hungry China has an outsized influence on most commodities markets</mark>.</strong> </u>Market Realist – <u><strong><mark>China affects the commodities markets, including crude oil and gold.</mark> The graph above shows the top five oil consuming economies in the world</u></strong>. The US is at the top of the list, followed by China (FXI), Japan (EWJ), India (EPI), and Saudi Arabia. China consumes 10.3 million barrels of crude oil (USO) per day. The US consumes 18.5 million barrels a day. The US still consumes almost twice as much crude oil as China. Yet Chinese demand for oil is pivotal. As the number of vehicles have skyrocketed in China, so has the demand for oil in the country. With a population of close to 1.35 billion<u>, China is the most populated country in the world. Besides oil, China consumes a whole lot of other commodities as well. China is the world’s largest consumer of steel, iron ore, and coal. China is also the second-highest consumer of gold (GLD), a tad behind India, which consumes most of the yellow metal. </u>As you can see, China has a pretty big hand in the commodities markets. A slowdown in China is bad news for commodity-driven countries like Brazil (EWZ), Russia (RSX), South Africa (EZA), and so on. Read on to the next part of the series to find out how China can influence US Treasury yields<u><strong>. <mark>4. China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries. Market Realist – Implications of China being the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries</mark> The graph above shows some of the largest foreign holders of US Treasuries (TLT)(IEF) of all maturities</strong>.</u> As of November 2014, China (FXI) held Treasuries worth $1.25 trillion, the most of any other foreign holder. It’s closely followed by Japan (EWJ), which holds Treasuries worth $1.24 trillion. Other countries—Belgium, Brazil (EWZ), Switzerland, and the United Kingdom— hold much smaller quantities of US Treasuries, comparatively speaking. China’s central bank is a major purchaser of US Treasuries, mainly because of its exchange-rate policy. The Chinese renminbi was pegged to the US dollar to protect the currency from appreciation, which would make Chinese exports unattractive. Remember, China is primarily an export-driven economy. Since the US runs a budget deficit, it needs a way to finance it. It does this by issuing lots of Treasury bonds. All else being equal, buying US Treasuries increases the demand for them, which reduces their yields. This results in a general decrease in interest rates in the US. So if China were to stop buying, or start selling these bonds, it would result in higher Treasury yields. For example, if China decided to inject a monetary stimulus to its slowing economy, it could sell some of the US Treasuries it holds to finance the stimulus. If China decides to sell the Treasuries all at once, Treasury yields could spike due to sudden, excessive supply. The increase to interest rates in the US could cause volatility all over the world (QWLD). Keep reading, as the next part of this series explains why China’s burgeoning per capita GDP (gross domestic product) is important. <u><strong><mark>5. Per capita GDP in China jumped more than 20-fold in the 30-year period ended in 2010.</strong></mark> </u>Market Realist – <u>Per capita GDP in China is galloping away. </u>The graph above shows the per capita GDP (gross domestic product) of China. Per capita GDP is the total GDP of an economy, divided by its population. The number is a national average. <u><mark>The per capita GDP in </mark>China (FXI) <mark>has grown by 129% in the last ten years.</mark> </u>The per capita GDP is useful for comparing one economy to another, because it shows the relative performance of countries. Unlike the GDP, which shows just the total amount, per capita GDP shows the same, adjusted by the number of citizens. <u>A rise in per capita GDP usually signals growth in the economy. </u>It could also be construed as an increase in productivity. As well, it’s a measure of the standard of living. The higher the number, the higher the standard of living. The per capita GDP of China increases every year, even when adjusted for inflation. Still, it’s much lower than the per capita GDP of developed markets (EFA) like Japan (EWJ), Europe (EZU), and the US (SPY), where the numbers are all well over $30,000. Meanwhile, China could catch up within a few decades, if it continues to grow at this rate. But <u>let’s assume China grows at around 7%, unlike the higher growth rates it’s seen in the recent past. <mark>If its population grows by 1.4%, </mark>then the 50-year average, <mark>per capita GDP growth will be much lower than in the past</mark>. </u>In the next part of this series, you’ll find out why China has become a market leader in car production. <u><strong><mark>6. China is now the largest market in the world for cars, computers, mobile phones and countless other products. </mark>Wine sales in China, for instance, have more than tripled in just five years</strong>. </u>Market Realist – <u>China has quickly become the largest market in the world for cars and electronics, among other things.</u> The graph above shows the major car producers in the world. China (FXI) has quickly jumped to number one in the world. It produced nearly 14.5 million cars in 2011. In other words, one out of every four cars made that year came from China. China was the world’s third-largest car market in 2006, behind Japan (EWJ) and Germany (EWG). But, it made up that deficit in just the next five years. Major car producing firms such as Toyota (TM) have set up many plants in China. To some extent, these companies are dependent on the well-being of China. And, China isn’t just a major car market. It’s also a leader in computers and mobile phones, as well as other electronics. Tech companies (QQQ) in the US rely on steady growth in China. Apple (AAPL), for example, sells many of its iPhones in China. Many other multinational companies from different parts of the world are partly dependent on stable growth in China. All the points cited above prove that most major economies in the world are highly intertwined with the goings-on in China, which is why a soft landing of the Chinese economy is needed. In the last part of this series, you’ll learn about at least one tailwind that’s moving the Chinese economy in the right direction. <u>The good news for the global recovery is that I believe <mark>China will</mark> most likely <mark>achieve a soft landing in the near term. China grew at 7.4% in 2014,</u></mark> slightly lower than the Government’s estimate of 7.5%. However, <u><mark>it still is of the world’s fastest growing economies.</mark> And as inflation in China continues to slow, looser monetary policy from the country’s central bank should further support the local economy. </u>As such, I continue to hold a neutral view of Chinese equities, which I prefer to access through the iShares MSCI China Index Fund (MCHI), the iShares FTSE China 25 Index Fund (FXI) and the iShares MSCI China Small Cap Index Fund (ECNS). Market Realist – Lower inflation in China could be good news for its consumers. The graph above shows the year-over-year inflation in China, based on the CPI (consumer price index) for 2014. Inflation slipped from 2.5% in January to 1.5% in December. In fact, inflation was up at around 6.5% in 2011, when the Chinese economy was growing at over 9%. A dip in inflation is usually a good thing for emerging markets (EEM) (VWO). Having said that, the dip in China’s inflation rate could be partly attributed to a cooling off in its GDP (gross domestic product) growth rates, which would be bad news. The recent dip, though, can also be attributed to the slump in crude oil (USO) prices. This could be good news for China (FXI) (MCHI), as the decline in oil prices is akin to a tax break for an economy that consumes as much oil as China does. Some of the savings from this could lead to higher consumption, which would support growth. All economies that are net importers of oil should see a similar benefit.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 161,570 | 6 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,657 | Read the link evidence—doesn’t say why economic policies trade off specifically with security issues. Its also a link turn says “trade agreements that exclude China allow China to obtain military capabilities | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Read the link evidence—doesn’t say why economic policies trade off specifically with security issues. Its also a link turn says “trade agreements that exclude China allow China to obtain military capabilities</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 1,560,902 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,658 | Economic decline causes global nuclear war | Tønnesson 15 | Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311 | recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war | understanding of how and what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict If leaders begin to fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon Deterrence could lose its credibility | Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.¶ Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene. | 3,362 | <h4>Economic decline causes global nuclear war </h4><p>Stein <strong>Tønnesson 15</strong>, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311</p><p>Several <u>recent works</u> on China and Sino–US relations <u>have made</u> substantial <u>contributions to the current <mark>understanding of how and</mark> under <mark>what circumstances</u></mark> a combination of <u><mark>nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers</u></mark>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u><mark>interdependence may <strong>both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong></mark> are right. <u><mark>Interdependence raises the cost of</mark> conflict</u> for all sides <u>but</u> <u>asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and <strong><mark>negative trade expectations</u></strong></mark> may <u><mark>generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>increase the risk of military conflict</u></mark> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u>decisions for war</u> and peace <u>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u><mark>If leaders</u></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u><mark>begin to</mark> seriously <strong><mark>fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline</u></strong></mark> then <u><mark>they may blame</u></mark> this on <u><mark>external</mark> <mark>dependence,</mark> appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain</u> respect or <u>credibility, adopt protectionist policies, <mark>and</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred by</u></strong></mark> either <u><strong><mark>nuclear arms</strong> or prospects of socioeconomic calamities</mark>. Such a dangerous shift could happen <strong>abruptly</u></strong>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.¶ Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u>in East Asia</u> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u><mark>The greatest risk is <strong>not</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>a territorial dispute</u></strong></mark> leads to war under present circumstances <u><mark>but that <strong>changes in the world economy</strong> alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious</u></mark>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u><mark>This could have unforeseen consequences</mark> in the field of security, <mark>with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to <strong>protect the world from Armageddon</strong></mark>, and <strong>unreliably so</u></strong>. <u><mark>Deterrence could <strong>lose its credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u>great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional</u> limited <u>war</u>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 142 | 3,586 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,659 | No trade off between security issues make them read evidence about why economic policies cause less security—that’s not their 1nc card | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>No trade off between security issues make them read evidence about why economic policies cause less security—that’s not their 1nc card</h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 1,560,903 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,660 | Chinese economic decline completely destroys CCP stability – leads to over assertive foreign policy risking conflict with Japan and the US | Friedberg and Schoenfeld 15 | Friedberg and Schoenfeld 15 (Professor of Politics, Princeton University AND Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute (Aaron and Gabriel, September 14, “China, a Wounded Tiger, Could Lash out,” http://www.hudson.org/research/11640-china-a-wounded-tiger-could-lash-out) | The C C P has long rested on four pillars: economic growth, nationalism, repression and communist ideology. the first pillar is unstable All eyes are on the gyrating Chinese stock market. Its precipitous decline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi have been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies this summer’s upheaval may accelerate developments that threaten the peace of Asia and pose a strategic challenge to the West. The Chinese people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government, with its reputation for sound economic stewardship declining Xi has been searching for ways to reinvigorate China’s economy. One measure he embraced was to talk up the stock market, which he promised the Chinese people would create both personal and national wealth. As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi’s colleagues in the Politburo as a stroke of genius It now must appear to them as a monumental act of maladministration the party is left, at least for the time being, with repression and nationalism he’s intensified a campaign to bolster internal support by riling China’s neighbors, particularly the Japanese These actions have created alarm in capitals across Asia, provoked military buildups and even encouraged regional cooperation in an effort to contain the increasingly menacing tiger Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources. observers perceive a silver lining in China’s difficulties, believing that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is wishful thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China’s domestic political dynamics Prospects for conflict around China’s periphery and beyond are likely to rise commensurately with the scope of the Communist Party’s internal crisis the United States was ill-prepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in the Pacific. Now the danger we face is growing steadily. The anxieties plaguing China’s leaders are fueling the belligerence of a rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the heels of an economic slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene. | The C C P has long rested on economic growth, the first pillar is unstable the stock market ecline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi have been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government Xi has been searching for ways to reinvigorate China’s economy. One measure he embraced was to talk up the stock market, which would create both personal and national wealth It now must appear to them as a monumental act of maladministration he’s intensified a campaign to bolster internal support by riling China’s neighbors, observers believ that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is wishful thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China’s domestic political dynamics conflict around China’s periphery are likely to rise commensurately with the scope of the Communist Party’s internal crisis Now the danger we face is growing | The Chinese Communist Party’s power has long rested on four pillars: economic growth, nationalism, repression and communist ideology. The last of these withered away almost entirely as China liberalized its economy, with slogans such as “Long live the invincible Marxism-Leninism theory” replaced by “To get rich is glorious.” Now the first pillar is unstable too.∂ All eyes are on the gyrating Chinese stock market. Its precipitous decline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi have been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies. Given that only about 1% of our gross domestic product comes from trade with China, the U.S. economy is hardly at risk. Yet this summer’s upheaval may accelerate developments that threaten the peace of Asia and pose a strategic challenge to the West.∂ China’s economy has been slowing for a while. In this century’s first decade, 10%-plus returns were the norm; lately the growth rate has hovered around 7% — if official figures are to be trusted, which they are not. The Chinese people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government, with its reputation for sound economic stewardship declining in parallel with the downward-sloping GDP growth charts.∂ Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 determined to burnish the leadership’s credentials in this all-critical area. His efforts have taken two forms. The first has been an anti-corruption campaign that plays to popular sentiments but has doubled as a vehicle for a purge of political opponents. Three years into the campaign, China’s president has a large number of very bitter and well-placed enemies, whose family fortunes and lives are on the line.∂ At the same time, Xi has been searching for ways to reinvigorate China’s economy. One measure he embraced was to talk up the stock market, which he promised the Chinese people would create both personal and national wealth. Almost right up to the initial tremors heralding this summer’s crash, state-run news outlets were urging the population to buy stocks. As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi’s colleagues in the Politburo as a stroke of genius; millions of people were getting rich on paper, and the Communist Party was getting the credit for it. It now must appear to them — and to an entire class of unhappy investors — as a monumental act of maladministration.∂ Having lost ideological purity and economic stewardship as claims to power, the party is left, at least for the time being, with repression and nationalism.∂ Accordingly, Xi has cracked down on dissent with renewed vigor, sweeping up democracy advocates, environmentalists, lawyers, champions of minority group rights and anyone else who gets out of line. Simultaneously, he’s intensified a campaign to bolster internal support by riling China’s neighbors, particularly the hated Japanese. In the last three years, China has unilaterally declared an air-defense-identification zone over islands also claimed by Japan, deployed oil rigs off the coast of Vietnam and built an assortment of fortified artificial islands at strategic locations around the South China Sea.∂ These actions have created alarm in capitals across Asia, provoked military buildups and even encouraged regional cooperation in an effort to contain the increasingly menacing tiger.∂ China’s bellicosity may ultimately prove self-defeating as a national security strategy. Indeed, Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources. The costs of antagonism are evidently offset by the internal benefits for Xi and the party’s grip on power.∂ Some observers perceive a silver lining in China’s difficulties, believing that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is wishful thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China’s domestic political dynamics.∂ Prospects for conflict around China’s periphery and beyond are likely to rise commensurately with the scope of the Communist Party’s internal crisis. It is not an accident that this month China dared to send its navy into U.S. territorial waters next to Alaska, something it had never before attempted.∂ Even with the much-vaunted but underresourced “pivot” to Asia, the United States was ill-prepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in the Pacific. Now the danger we face is growing steadily. The anxieties plaguing China’s leaders, in place for decades, are fueling the belligerence of a rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the heels of an economic slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene. | 4,682 | <h4>Chinese economic decline completely destroys CCP stability – leads to over assertive foreign policy risking conflict with Japan and the US</h4><p><strong>Friedberg and Schoenfeld 15 <u></strong>(Professor of Politics, Princeton University AND Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute (Aaron and Gabriel, September 14, “China, a Wounded Tiger, Could Lash out,” http://www.hudson.org/research/11640-china-a-wounded-tiger-could-lash-out)</p><p><mark>The C</u></mark>hinese <u><mark>C</u></mark>ommunist <u><mark>P</u></mark>arty’s power <u><mark>has long rested on</mark> four pillars:<mark> <strong>economic growth</strong>, </mark>nationalism, repression and communist ideology. </u>The last of these withered away almost entirely as China liberalized its economy, with slogans such as “Long live the invincible Marxism-Leninism theory” replaced by “To get rich is glorious.” Now <u><strong><mark>the first pillar is unstable</u></strong></mark> too.∂ <u>All eyes are on <mark>the</mark> gyrating Chinese <mark>stock market</mark>.</u> <u>Its precipitous d<mark>ecline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi have been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars</mark> and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies</u>. Given that only about 1% of our gross domestic product comes from trade with China, the U.S. economy is hardly at risk. Yet <u>this summer’s upheaval may accelerate developments that threaten the peace of Asia and pose a strategic challenge to the West.</u>∂ China’s economy has been slowing for a while. In this century’s first decade, 10%-plus returns were the norm; lately the growth rate has hovered around 7% — if official figures are to be trusted, which they are not. <u>The Chinese <mark>people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government</mark>, with its reputation for sound economic stewardship declining</u> in parallel with the downward-sloping GDP growth charts.∂ Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 determined to burnish the leadership’s credentials in this all-critical area. His efforts have taken two forms. The first has been an anti-corruption campaign that plays to popular sentiments but has doubled as a vehicle for a purge of political opponents. Three years into the campaign, China’s president has a large number of very bitter and well-placed enemies, whose family fortunes and lives are on the line.∂ At the same time, <u><mark>Xi has been searching for ways to reinvigorate China’s economy.</u> <u>One measure he embraced was to talk up the stock market, which</mark> he promised the Chinese people <mark>would create both personal and national wealth</mark>.</u> Almost right up to the initial tremors heralding this summer’s crash, state-run news outlets were urging the population to buy stocks. <u>As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi’s colleagues in the Politburo as a stroke of genius</u>; millions of people were getting rich on paper, and the Communist Party was getting the credit for it. <u><strong><mark>It now must appear to them</u></strong></mark> — and to an entire class of unhappy investors — <u><strong><mark>as a monumental act of maladministration</u></strong></mark>.∂ Having lost ideological purity and economic stewardship as claims to power, <u>the party is left, at least for the time being, with repression and nationalism</u>.∂ Accordingly, Xi has cracked down on dissent with renewed vigor, sweeping up democracy advocates, environmentalists, lawyers, champions of minority group rights and anyone else who gets out of line. Simultaneously, <u><mark>he’s intensified a <strong>campaign to bolster internal support by riling China’s neighbors</strong>,</u></mark> <u>particularly</u> <u>the</u> hated <u>Japanese</u>. In the last three years, China has unilaterally declared an air-defense-identification zone over islands also claimed by Japan, deployed oil rigs off the coast of Vietnam and built an assortment of fortified artificial islands at strategic locations around the South China Sea.∂ <u>These actions have created alarm in capitals across Asia, provoked military buildups and even encouraged regional cooperation in an effort to contain the increasingly menacing tiger</u>.∂ China’s bellicosity may ultimately prove self-defeating as a national security strategy. Indeed, <u>Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources. </u>The costs of antagonism are evidently offset by the internal benefits for Xi and the party’s grip on power.∂ Some <u><mark>observers</mark> perceive a silver lining in China’s difficulties, <mark>believ</mark>ing <mark>that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check.</u> <u><strong>That is wishful thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China’s domestic political dynamics</u></strong></mark>.∂ <u><strong>Prospects for <mark>conflict around China’s periphery </mark>and beyond <mark>are likely to rise commensurately with the scope of the Communist Party’s internal crisis</u></strong></mark>. It is not an accident that this month China dared to send its navy into U.S. territorial waters next to Alaska, something it had never before attempted.∂ Even with the much-vaunted but underresourced “pivot” to Asia, <u>the United States was ill-prepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in the Pacific. <mark>Now the danger we face is growing</mark> steadily. The anxieties plaguing China’s leaders</u>, in place for decades, <u>are fueling the belligerence of a rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the heels of an economic slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene.</p></u> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Adv 1 | 76,719 | 9 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,661 | And no deterrent effect now – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>And no deterrent effect now – </h4> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 1,560,904 | 1 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,662 | North Korean current money laundering in China through companies and intermediaries is key to fund military excersices and nuclear weapons—funding prevents effective sanctions and deterrence | Kim et. al 2-21 | Kim et. al 2-21 | A trail of money stretching to a Chinese bank provides a window on why U.S. efforts to tighten sanctions on North Korea may be harder to achieve North Korea has built networks of front companies and foreign intermediaries to channel currency in and out circumventing attempts to isolate it over its nuclear-weapons program the cornerstone of those networks is China. Its geographic proximity, the huge trade volume, having the contacts, and having the historic relationship all contribute to making China the center point for any North Korean initiative to evade international financial sanctions China is a very important piece in making sure that blockages work North Korea relies on China China has criticized North Korea for provocative actions but historically opposed harsh sanctions Kim Jong Un needs foreign currency to pay for equipment from abroad 80 percent of North Korea’s foreign earnings have in the past come via China there are more people in China who are willing to cooperate with the regime they actually really do care about trying to prevent some of these bad acts A tightening of control in China would make North Korea more dependent on the connections it has built up to do business further afield, where it risks having funds frozen in overseas accounts | money to a Chinese bank provides why U.S. efforts to tighten sanctions on North Korea may be harder North Korea has built networks of companies and intermediaries to channel currency to isolate its nuclear-weapons program the cornerstone of those networks is China Its geographic proximity, the huge trade volume contacts and relationship all contribute to making China the center point Kim needs foreign currency to pay for equipment from abroad 80 percent of North Korea’s foreign earnings have in the past come via China, there are more people in China who are willing to cooperate with the regime A tightening of control in China would make North Korea more dependent on to do business further afield where it risks having funds frozen | Sam is a writer and editor for Bloomberg news and covers South and North Korea, as well as the Southeast Asia region. Other authors are Sangwoon Yoon and Andrea Tan, 2016, “How North Korea Funnels Cash Into the Country”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-21/china-at-the-heart-of-north-korea-s-illicit-cash-flow-funnel, Accessed 10-16
A trail of money stretching from a Panamanian shipping agent to an octogenarian Singaporean to a Chinese bank provides a window on why U.S. efforts to tighten sanctions on North Korea may be harder to achieve than in the case of Iran. For decades North Korea has built networks of front companies and foreign intermediaries to channel currency in and out, circumventing attempts to isolate it over its nuclear-weapons program. Court documents and interviews with investigators, banks and prosecutors show the cornerstone of those networks is China. "Its geographic proximity, the huge trade volume, having the contacts, and having the historic relationship all contribute to making China the center point for any North Korean initiative to evade international financial sanctions," said William Newcomb, a former member of a panel of experts assisting the United Nations’ North Korea sanctions committee. "China is a very important piece in making sure that blockages work." Sanctions applied by the U.S. and other countries to pressure Iran to stop its nuclear weapons program included the freezing of about $32 billion of oil revenue held at banks overseas. Those accounts were unlocked after last year’s nuclear accord, negotiated with world powers including the U.S. and European Union. But Iran’s much larger overseas revenue and its dependence for funding on oil exports made its international finances easier to track. Its economy is about 15 times the estimated size of North Korea’s, and that country’s decades of isolation mean its economy is more self-contained. “The primary playbook for upping sanctions effectively is Iran -- although that may not make practical sense here,” said Adam M. Smith, former senior adviser to the Director of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and now a Washington-based lawyer with Gibson Dunn. “Such implementation would call for the U.S. -- and perhaps others -- to begin threatening sanctions on North Korea’s supporters and protectors.” North Korea relies on China, its biggest trading partner, for food, arms and energy. The countries describe their ties as "friendship forged by blood" during the 1950-1953 Korean War where the U.S. was a common foe. China has criticized North Korea for provocative actions but historically opposed harsh sanctions that might precipitate a regime collapse and a flood of refugees across its 870-mile (1,400 kilometer) shared border. To inject life into an economy made moribund by the fall of the Iron Curtain, failed centralized policies and sanctions, Kim Jong Un needs foreign currency to pay for equipment from abroad, such as the recent purchase of Russian jets to upgrade the national airline. About 70 percent to 80 percent of North Korea’s foreign earnings have in the past come via China, said Kim Kwang Jin, who ran the Singapore branch of North Korea’s North East Asia Bank before defecting in 2003. “That huge trade volume means there are more people in China who are willing to cooperate with the regime," Kim said by phone from Seoul. But China is no longer turning a blind eye to illicit North Korean activities, according to Richard Nephew, a former principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the State Department until last year. “In the last 10-15 years, they actually really do care about trying to prevent some of these bad acts.” China’s Foreign Ministry and central bank didn’t respond to faxes seeking comment on what measures China is taking to stop the flow of illegal money to and from North Korea using banks and intermediaries in China. A tightening of control in China would make North Korea more dependent on the connections it has built up to do business further afield, where it risks having funds frozen in overseas accounts. To avert this, the regime uses a mix of bank accounts in the names of intermediaries who wire money at its request. | 4,256 | <h4><strong>North Korean current money laundering in China through companies and intermediaries is key to fund military excersices and nuclear weapons—funding prevents effective sanctions and deterrence</h4><p>Kim et. al 2-21</p><p></strong>Sam is a writer and editor for Bloomberg news and covers South and North Korea, as well as the Southeast Asia region. Other authors are Sangwoon Yoon and Andrea Tan, 2016, “How North Korea Funnels Cash Into the Country”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-21/china-at-the-heart-of-north-korea-s-illicit-cash-flow-funnel, Accessed 10-16</p><p><u>A trail of <mark>money</mark> stretching </u>from a Panamanian shipping agent to an octogenarian Singaporean <u><mark>to a Chinese bank</mark> <mark>provides</mark> a window on <mark>why U.S. efforts to tighten sanctions on North Korea <strong>may be harder</mark> to achieve</u></strong> than in the case of Iran. For decades <u><strong><mark>North Korea has built networks of</mark> front <mark>companies</mark> <mark>and</mark> foreign <mark>intermediaries to channel currency</mark> in and out</u></strong>, <u>circumventing attempts <mark>to isolate</mark> it over <mark>its <strong>nuclear-weapons program</u></strong></mark>. Court documents and interviews with investigators, banks and prosecutors show <u><mark>the cornerstone of those networks is China</mark>.</u> "<u><strong><mark>Its geographic proximity, the huge trade volume</mark>, having the <mark>contacts</mark>, <mark>and</mark> having the historic <mark>relationship all contribute to making China the center point</mark> for any North Korean initiative to evade international financial sanctions</u></strong>," said William Newcomb, a former member of a panel of experts assisting the United Nations’ North Korea sanctions committee. "<u>China is a very important piece in making sure that blockages work</u>." Sanctions applied by the U.S. and other countries to pressure Iran to stop its nuclear weapons program included the freezing of about $32 billion of oil revenue held at banks overseas. Those accounts were unlocked after last year’s nuclear accord, negotiated with world powers including the U.S. and European Union. But Iran’s much larger overseas revenue and its dependence for funding on oil exports made its international finances easier to track. Its economy is about 15 times the estimated size of North Korea’s, and that country’s decades of isolation mean its economy is more self-contained. “The primary playbook for upping sanctions effectively is Iran -- although that may not make practical sense here,” said Adam M. Smith, former senior adviser to the Director of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and now a Washington-based lawyer with Gibson Dunn. “Such implementation would call for the U.S. -- and perhaps others -- to begin threatening sanctions on North Korea’s supporters and protectors.” <u>North Korea relies on China</u>, its biggest trading partner, for food, arms and energy. The countries describe their ties as "friendship forged by blood" during the 1950-1953 Korean War where the U.S. was a common foe. <u>China has criticized North Korea for provocative actions but historically opposed harsh sanctions</u> that might precipitate a regime collapse and a flood of refugees across its 870-mile (1,400 kilometer) shared border. To inject life into an economy made moribund by the fall of the Iron Curtain, failed centralized policies and sanctions, <u><mark>Kim</mark> Jong Un <mark>needs foreign currency to pay for equipment from abroad</u></mark>, such as the recent purchase of Russian jets to upgrade the national airline. About 70 percent to <u><mark>80 percent of North Korea’s foreign earnings have in the past come via China</u>,</mark> said Kim Kwang Jin, who ran the Singapore branch of North Korea’s North East Asia Bank before defecting in 2003. “That huge trade volume means <u><strong><mark>there are more people in China who are</mark> <mark>willing to cooperate with the regime</u></strong></mark>," Kim said by phone from Seoul. But China is no longer turning a blind eye to illicit North Korean activities, according to Richard Nephew, a former principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the State Department until last year. “In the last 10-15 years, <u>they actually really do care about trying to prevent some of these bad acts</u>.” China’s Foreign Ministry and central bank didn’t respond to faxes seeking comment on what measures China is taking to stop the flow of illegal money to and from North Korea using banks and intermediaries in China. <u><strong><mark>A tightening of control in China would make North Korea more dependent on</mark> the connections it has built up <mark>to do business</mark> <mark>further afield</mark>, <mark>where it risks having funds frozen</mark> in overseas accounts</u></strong>. To avert this, the regime uses a mix of bank accounts in the names of intermediaries who wire money at its request. </p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 414,821 | 9 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,663 | The U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic should offer China full member status in the Arctic Council if China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research, environmental monitoring, and environmental policy issues. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic should offer China full member status in the Arctic Council if China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research, environmental monitoring, and environmental policy issues.</h4> | null | null | Plan | 1,560,905 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,664 | The lack of anti money laundering effectiveness is causing these issues—so yes it is reverse causal and the US regulations are not enough to prevent capital flight | Kim et. al 2-21 | Kim et. al 2-21 | The difficulty for North Korea was avoiding the attention of U.S. regulators Bank of China has denied it knew the payments were linked to Pyongyang it was just really a lack of internal anti-money laundering procedures within the bank Bank of China was the only lender that processed Chinpo’s North Korean transactions the money coming in was payments from clients who used North Korea’s ships to carry cargo Those payments were sometimes as much as $500,000 cash to pay crew wages on some North Korean ships that were in China. But who knows if that’s where the money actually went North Korea’s money largely stays abroad Funds from sales of North Korean goods and services are held in the same offshore accounts in cash | Bank of China has denied it knew the payments were linked to Pyongyang it was just really a lack of internal anti-money laundering procedures within the bank Bank of China was the only lender that processed North Korean transactions Those payments were sometimes as much as $500,000 North Korea’s money largely stays abroad Funds from sales of North Korean goods and services are held in the same offshore accounts | Sam is a writer and editor for Bloomberg news and covers South and North Korea, as well as the Southeast Asia region. Other authors are Sangwoon Yoon and Andrea Tan, 2016, “How North Korea Funnels Cash Into the Country”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-21/china-at-the-heart-of-north-korea-s-illicit-cash-flow-funnel, Accessed 10-16
The difficulty for North Korea was avoiding the attention of U.S. regulators, who can go after foreign banks conducting dollar transactions, because almost all are routed through clearing networks in the U.S. Tan minimized scrutiny by leaving ships’ names off wire transfer forms, testifying in court that Bank of China had advised Chinpo to do so. Bank of China has denied it knew the payments were linked to Pyongyang. Bank of China officials did not respond to e-mailed requests for comment on the payments or its vetting system for suspicious payments, said Unice Liu, a consultant at Baldwin Boyle Group in Singapore which provides public relations for the bank. Chinpo’s Bank of China accounts were closed in December 2013. “I think it was just really a lack of internal anti-money laundering procedures within the bank,” said Baggett, now a consultant for Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in New York. Court papers show Bank of China was the only lender that processed Chinpo’s North Korean transactions. Other banks including Singapore’s United Overseas Bank Ltd.shut down Chinpo accounts in 2005 for attempting to carry out suspicious wire transfers. Chinpo was told the money coming in was payments from clients who used North Korea’s ships to carry cargo, according to testimonies. Those payments were sometimes as much as $500,000, an unusually large amount for a shipping-related fee, said Baggett. Baggett said that, once a year, a woman with diplomatic status would show up and ask Chinpo to withdraw as much as half a million dollars in mint banknotes. “She was stopped once leaving Singapore for China with undeclared currency,” said Baggett. “Her explanation was that she needed the cash to pay crew wages on some North Korean ships that were in China. But who knows if that’s where the money actually went?” Newcomb, the former UN sanctions investigator, said North Korea’s money largely stays abroad. Funds from sales of North Korean goods and services are held in the same offshore accounts, ready to be used to pay salaries for diplomats and officials operating overseas and to buy equipment or supplies. Money returned to North Korea is taken across the border in cash. | 2,554 | <h4><strong>The lack of anti money laundering effectiveness is causing these issues—so yes it is reverse causal and the US regulations are not enough to prevent capital flight</h4><p>Kim et. al 2-21</p><p></strong>Sam is a writer and editor for Bloomberg news and covers South and North Korea, as well as the Southeast Asia region. Other authors are Sangwoon Yoon and Andrea Tan, 2016, “How North Korea Funnels Cash Into the Country”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-21/china-at-the-heart-of-north-korea-s-illicit-cash-flow-funnel, Accessed 10-16</p><p><u>The difficulty for North Korea was avoiding the attention of U.S. regulators</u>, who can go after foreign banks conducting dollar transactions, because almost all are routed through clearing networks in the U.S. Tan minimized scrutiny by leaving ships’ names off wire transfer forms, testifying in court that Bank of China had advised Chinpo to do so. <u><mark>Bank of China has denied it knew the payments were linked to Pyongyang</u></mark>. Bank of China officials did not respond to e-mailed requests for comment on the payments or its vetting system for suspicious payments, said Unice Liu, a consultant at Baldwin Boyle Group in Singapore which provides public relations for the bank. Chinpo’s Bank of China accounts were closed in December 2013. “I think <u><strong><mark>it was just really a lack of internal anti-money laundering procedures within the bank</u></strong></mark>,” said Baggett, now a consultant for Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in New York. Court papers show <u><mark>Bank of China was the only lender that processed</mark> Chinpo’s <mark>North Korean transactions</u></mark>. Other banks including Singapore’s United Overseas Bank Ltd.shut down Chinpo accounts in 2005 for attempting to carry out suspicious wire transfers. Chinpo was told <u>the money coming in was payments from clients who used North Korea’s ships to carry cargo</u>, according to testimonies. <u><strong><mark>Those payments were sometimes as much as $500,000</u></strong></mark>, an unusually large amount for a shipping-related fee, said Baggett. Baggett said that, once a year, a woman with diplomatic status would show up and ask Chinpo to withdraw as much as half a million dollars in mint banknotes. “She was stopped once leaving Singapore for China with undeclared currency,” said Baggett. “Her explanation was that she needed the <u>cash to pay crew wages on some North Korean ships that were in China. But who knows if that’s where the money actually went</u>?” Newcomb, the former UN sanctions investigator, said <u><strong><mark>North Korea’s money largely stays abroad</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Funds from sales of North Korean goods and services are held in the same offshore accounts</u></mark>, ready to be used to pay salaries for diplomats and officials operating overseas and to buy equipment or supplies. Money returned to North Korea is taken across the border <u><strong>in cash</u></strong>. </p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 1,559,389 | 3 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,665 | zero hope US wins an ECS or Taiwan war now | Montgomery 14 | Montgomery, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 14 | war could occur if Beijing attempted to overturn the s quo seizing territory in the E C S military bases in East Asia could be a new “Maginot line” development of advanced aerospace capabilities has highlighted the vulnerability of large fixed facilities and limitations of short-range platforms that depend on access to them. it has only two Futenma and Kadena Many of these missiles are highly accurate and have a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 50 meters The Second Artillery Corps has sufficient range to target bases on Okinawa Beijing has made considerable progress in modernizing its air forces aircraft can be armed with precision munitions radiation homing missiles to destroy air and missile defense radars air-launched cruise missiles to strike point targets laser- and satellite-guided gravity bombs for air-to-ground attacks this represents a significant threat to any bases physical attacks would commence with a salvo of missiles equipped with a variety of tailored warheads concrete-penetrating to crater runways and taxiways Ballistic missile attacks could be followed by higher accuracy higher volume cruise missile With combat aircraft along with a growing arsenal the PLA could re-attack bases after they had been repaired to impede flight operations As these threats to bases grow the U S might be increasingly dependent on Guam China has fielded a layered integrated air defense network that extends well into the Taiwan Strait U.S. aircraft operating from Japan therefore need to penetrate heavily defended airspace to protect local allies | war could occur if Beijing attempted to seiz the E C S bases in East Asia could be a new “Maginot line” advanced aerospace capabilities highlight the vulnerability of large, fixed facilities missiles are highly accurate, The Second Artillery Corps has sufficient range to target bases on Okinawa aircraft can be armed with precision munitions radiation homing missiles to destroy air and missile defense laser- and satellite-guided gravity bombs this represents a significant threat tailored warheads concrete-penetrating to crater runways combat aircraft the PLA could re-attack bases after they had been repaired China has air defense that extends into the Taiwan Strait aircraft operating from Japan need to penetrate heavily defended airspace | (Braden, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific,” International Security 38(4), p. muse)
Conflict between the United States and China is unlikely given the heavy costs both sides would suffer and the significant risks they would run, not least of which include the disruption of trade and the danger of nuclear escalation, respectively. Nevertheless, a limited conventional war could occur if Beijing attempted to overturn the status quo—for instance, by invading or attacking Taiwan, seizing disputed territory in the East China Sea, or impeding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. If so, one of the United States’ principal instruments of force projection would be its land-based tactical aircraft. A decade and a half ago, however, Paul Bracken warned that U.S. military bases in East Asia could soon become a new “Maginot line” as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction proliferated across the region.45 Although this prediction might have been premature, the PLA’s development of advanced aerospace capabilities has highlighted the vulnerability of large, fixed facilities and the limitations of short-range platforms that depend on access to them. The United States has a number of air bases across the Western Pacific, but it has only two in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, which remains one of the most likely flash points for a regional conflict: Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and Kadena Air Base, both on the southern Japanese island of Okinawa. Kadena, in particular, would be the hub of any U.S. military operations within or near the strait; not only does it host the largest combat air wing in the U.S. Air Force, but it also has parallel runways for simultaneous aircraft launch and recovery as well as a large munitions storage facility.46 In the past, [End Page 131] Kadena’s location—it is situated approximately 450 nautical miles (nm) from the center of the strait and 350 nm from the nearest point on the Chinese mainland—was a virtue. All else being equal, the closer a base is to an area of operations, the more combat sorties it can generate. Today, however, Kadena’s proximity to the PRC means that U.S. aircraft could find it difficult to even get off the ground. As one U.S. government report explains, “China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world.”47 Since it began to field conventionally armed ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan in the early 1990s, the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps has amassed more than 1,100 solid-fuel, road-mobile, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Although the majority (700–750) of these SRBMs are DF-11s (CSS-7s) that cannot reach targets beyond Taiwan, many (350–400) are longer-range DF-15s (CSS-6s)—and newer DF-15s can strike targets on Okinawa. Many of these missiles are also highly accurate, and have a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 50 meters (and in some cases as little as 5 to 10 meters). Although it is not clear how many of China’s DF-15s are upgraded variants, the PLA continues to replace older SRBMs with longer-range and more accurate models. The Second Artillery Corps also has upwards of 100 DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its arsenal, all of which have sufficient range to target bases on Okinawa (and many are reported to have CEPs of 50 meters or less).48 In addition to its ballistic missiles, the Second Artillery Corps has been accumulating a large inventory of ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which are less expensive and more accurate, hard to detect given their small size and low flight prolife, and capable of approaching targets from multiple axes. In fact, it has already fielded 200–500 CJ-10 LACMs, which have an estimated range of 800–1,000 nm and a 10-meter CEP.49 Meanwhile, [End Page 132] Beijing has also made considerable progress in modernizing its air forces. Roughly 500 of its 2,000 fighters are fourth-generation aircraft comparable to U.S. legacy platforms such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18, and it recently revealed two different fifth-generation prototypes. Many of these aircraft can also be armed with precision munitions such as beyond-visual-range missiles for air-to-air combat, radiation homing missiles to destroy air and missile defense radars, air-launched cruise missiles to strike point targets at long distances, and both laser- and satellite-guided gravity bombs for more proximate air-to-ground attacks.50 Collectively, this set of capabilities represents a significant threat to any air bases that fall within their range. Consistent with the PLA’s concept of a “joint anti-air raid campaign,” physical attacks on U.S. air bases would likely commence with a salvo of SRBMs and MRBMs. These missiles could be equipped with a variety of tailored warheads, including unitary warheads to destroy point targets such as command and control facilities, concrete-penetrating submunition warheads to crater runways and taxiways, and blast or fragmentation submunition warheads to destroy aircraft parked in the open. Ballistic missile attacks could be followed by higher accuracy, higher volume air and cruise missile strikes against surviving aircraft, air defenses, munitions depots, and fuel storage areas.51 With a large and increasingly modern inventory of combat aircraft, along with a growing arsenal of LACMs, the PLA could also re-attack bases after they had been repaired to impede flight operations over an extended period of time (although its ability to do so would depend on a number of factors, including how much ordnance it depleted during its initial attack, the amount of attrition it sustained during any counterattacks, its ability to perform accurate battle damage assessments, and the effectiveness of any remaining defenses). Of course, a well-coordinated air and missile campaign would be difficult to execute. Nevertheless, China appears to be making progress in this area. According to the Department of Defense, “The PLA has [End Page 133] developed and fielded a robust and increasingly modern C4ISR architecture.” As a result, its air force and Second Artillery Corps have already achieved “a moderate level of capability to conduct pre-planned joint fires against fixed targets in the Pacific Theater.”52 As these threats to U.S. theater bases continue to grow, the United States might become increasingly dependent on less vulnerable facilities such as Andersen Air Force Base on the island of Guam, which is currently beyond the reach of most Chinese conventional precision-strike systems. Yet this would present a number of problems. Because it is located approximately 1,500 nm from the Taiwan Strait, relying on Andersen to conduct operations with tactical aircraft would significantly reduce the amount of combat power that the U.S. Air Force could project into East Asia. The PLA is also developing additional means to hold Andersen at risk, including surface warships, submarines, and bombers armed with extended-range cruise missiles, as well as conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles.53 Finally, the threat to theater bases is not the only challenge to U.S. airpower. In addition to its offensive capabilities, China has fielded a layered, overlapping, integrated air defense network that extends well into the Taiwan Strait (and could expand even farther over time through the acquisition of more advanced surface-to-air missile systems and additional aerial refueling platforms).54 U.S. aircraft operating from Japan, Guam, or carriers at sea would therefore need to penetrate heavily defended airspace to protect local allies and counter many of China’s A2/AD systems.55 | 7,681 | <h4>zero hope US wins an ECS or Taiwan war now</h4><p><u><strong>Montgomery</u></strong>, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, <u><strong>14</p><p></u></strong>(Braden, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific,” International Security 38(4), p. muse) </p><p>Conflict between the United States and China is unlikely given the heavy costs both sides would suffer and the significant risks they would run, not least of which include the disruption of trade and the danger of nuclear escalation, respectively. Nevertheless, a limited conventional <u><strong><mark>war could occur if Beijing attempted to</mark> overturn the s</u></strong>tatus <u><strong>quo</u></strong>—for instance, by invading or attacking Taiwan, <u><strong><mark>seiz</mark>ing</u></strong> disputed <u><strong>territory in <mark>the E</u></strong></mark>ast <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>hina <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ea, or impeding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. If so, one of the United States’ principal instruments of force projection would be its land-based tactical aircraft. A decade and a half ago, however, Paul Bracken warned that U.S. <u><strong>military <mark>bases in East Asia could</u></strong></mark> soon <u><strong><mark>be</u></strong></mark>come <u><strong><mark>a new “Maginot line”</u></strong></mark> as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction proliferated across the region.45 Although this prediction might have been premature, the PLA’s <u><strong>development of</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>advanced aerospace capabilities</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>has <mark>highlight</mark>ed <mark>the</mark> <mark>vulnerability of large</u></strong>, <u><strong>fixed facilities</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> the <u><strong>limitations of</u></strong> <u><strong>short-range platforms that depend on access to them.</u></strong> The United States has a number of air bases across the Western Pacific, but <u><strong>it has only two</u></strong> in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, which remains one of the most likely flash points for a regional conflict: Marine Corps Air Station <u><strong>Futenma and Kadena</u></strong> Air Base, both on the southern Japanese island of Okinawa. Kadena, in particular, would be the hub of any U.S. military operations within or near the strait; not only does it host the largest combat air wing in the U.S. Air Force, but it also has parallel runways for simultaneous aircraft launch and recovery as well as a large munitions storage facility.46 In the past, [End Page 131] Kadena’s location—it is situated approximately 450 nautical miles (nm) from the center of the strait and 350 nm from the nearest point on the Chinese mainland—was a virtue. All else being equal, the closer a base is to an area of operations, the more combat sorties it can generate. Today, however, Kadena’s proximity to the PRC means that U.S. aircraft could find it difficult to even get off the ground. As one U.S. government report explains, “China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world.”47 Since it began to field conventionally armed ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan in the early 1990s, the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps has amassed more than 1,100 solid-fuel, road-mobile, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Although the majority (700–750) of these SRBMs are DF-11s (CSS-7s) that cannot reach targets beyond Taiwan, many (350–400) are longer-range DF-15s (CSS-6s)—and newer DF-15s can strike targets on Okinawa. <u><strong>Many of these <mark>missiles are</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>highly</mark> <mark>accurate</u></strong>, <u><strong></mark>and have a circular error probable</u></strong> <u><strong>(CEP)</u></strong> <u><strong>of less than 50 meters</u></strong> (and in some cases as little as 5 to 10 meters). Although it is not clear how many of China’s DF-15s are upgraded variants, the PLA continues to replace older SRBMs with longer-range and more accurate models. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong> <u><strong>Second Artillery</mark> <mark>Corps</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has</u></strong></mark> upwards of 100 DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its arsenal, all of which have <u><strong><mark>sufficient range to target bases on Okinawa</u></strong></mark> (and many are reported to have CEPs of 50 meters or less).48 In addition to its ballistic missiles, the Second Artillery Corps has been accumulating a large inventory of ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which are less expensive and more accurate, hard to detect given their small size and low flight prolife, and capable of approaching targets from multiple axes. In fact, it has already fielded 200–500 CJ-10 LACMs, which have an estimated range of 800–1,000 nm and a 10-meter CEP.49 Meanwhile, [End Page 132] <u><strong>Beijing has</u></strong> also <u><strong>made</u></strong> <u><strong>considerable progress in modernizing its air forces</u></strong>. Roughly 500 of its 2,000 fighters are fourth-generation aircraft comparable to U.S. legacy platforms such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18, and it recently revealed two different fifth-generation prototypes. Many of these <u><strong><mark>aircraft can</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be</mark> <mark>armed</u></strong> <u><strong>with precision munitions</u></strong></mark> such as beyond-visual-range missiles for air-to-air combat, <u><strong><mark>radiation homing missiles</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>destroy air and missile defense</mark> radars</u></strong>, <u><strong>air-launched cruise missiles</u></strong> <u><strong>to strike point targets </u></strong>at long distances, and both <u><strong><mark>laser- and satellite-guided gravity bombs</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>for</u></strong> more proximate <u><strong>air-to-ground attacks</u></strong>.50 Collectively, <u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> set of capabilities <u><strong><mark>represents a significant threat</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>any</u></strong> air <u><strong>bases</u></strong> that fall within their range. Consistent with the PLA’s concept of a “joint anti-air raid campaign,” <u><strong>physical attacks</u></strong> on U.S. air bases <u><strong>would</u></strong> likely <u><strong>commence with a salvo</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong> SRBMs and MRBMs. These <u><strong>missiles</u></strong> could be <u><strong>equipped with a variety of <mark>tailored</u></strong> <u><strong>warheads</u></strong></mark>, including unitary warheads to destroy point targets such as command and control facilities, <u><strong><mark>concrete-penetrating</u></strong></mark> submunition warheads <u><strong><mark>to crater runways</mark> and taxiways</u></strong>, and blast or fragmentation submunition warheads to destroy aircraft parked in the open. <u><strong>Ballistic missile attacks could be followed by higher accuracy</u></strong>, <u><strong>higher volume</u></strong> air and <u><strong>cruise missile</u></strong> strikes against surviving aircraft, air defenses, munitions depots, and fuel storage areas.51 <u><strong>With</u></strong> a large and increasingly modern inventory of <u><strong><mark>combat aircraft</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>along with a growing arsenal</u></strong> of LACMs, <u><strong><mark>the PLA could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>re-attack bases</u></strong> <u><strong>after</mark> <mark>they had been repaired</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to impede flight operations</u></strong> over an extended period of time (although its ability to do so would depend on a number of factors, including how much ordnance it depleted during its initial attack, the amount of attrition it sustained during any counterattacks, its ability to perform accurate battle damage assessments, and the effectiveness of any remaining defenses). Of course, a well-coordinated air and missile campaign would be difficult to execute. Nevertheless, China appears to be making progress in this area. According to the Department of Defense, “The PLA has [End Page 133] developed and fielded a robust and increasingly modern C4ISR architecture.” As a result, its air force and Second Artillery Corps have already achieved “a moderate level of capability to conduct pre-planned joint fires against fixed targets in the Pacific Theater.”52 <u><strong>As these threats to</u></strong> U.S. theater <u><strong>bases</u></strong> continue to <u><strong>grow</u></strong>, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>might</u></strong> <u><strong>be</u></strong>come <u><strong>increasingly dependent</u></strong> <u><strong>on</u></strong> less vulnerable facilities such as Andersen Air Force Base on the island of <u><strong>Guam</u></strong>, which is currently beyond the reach of most Chinese conventional precision-strike systems. Yet this would present a number of problems. Because it is located approximately 1,500 nm from the Taiwan Strait, relying on Andersen to conduct operations with tactical aircraft would significantly reduce the amount of combat power that the U.S. Air Force could project into East Asia. The PLA is also developing additional means to hold Andersen at risk, including surface warships, submarines, and bombers armed with extended-range cruise missiles, as well as conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles.53 Finally, the threat to theater bases is not the only challenge to U.S. airpower. In addition to its offensive capabilities, <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong> <u><strong>has </mark>fielded a layered</u></strong>, overlapping, <u><strong>integrated<mark> air defense </mark>network <mark>that extends </mark>well <mark>into the Taiwan Strait</u></strong></mark> (and could expand even farther over time through the acquisition of more advanced surface-to-air missile systems and additional aerial refueling platforms).54 <u><strong>U.S.<mark> aircraft operating from Japan</u></strong></mark>, Guam, or carriers at sea would <u><strong>therefore</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>need to penetrate heavily</mark> <mark>defended airspace</mark> to protect local allies</u></strong> and counter many of China’s A2/AD systems.55</p> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 176,778 | 10 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,666 | Protectionism is increasing – upcoming Trump presidency will cause a decline in global trade | Hannon 11/25 (Paul, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 11/25/16, Global Trade Rebound Threatened by Protectionism After Trump Victory, | Hannon 11/25 (Paul, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 11/25/16, Global Trade Rebound Threatened by Protectionism After Trump Victory, http://www.wsj.com/articles/global-trade-rebound-threatened-by-protectionism-after-trump-victory-1480084737?tesla=y) MAM | World trade flows staged a partial rebound in the three months through September, even as concerns mounted over a possible increase in protectionism driven by voter resentment against job losses and weak earnings growth President-elect Donald Trump pledged to introduce higher tariffs on imports from China and Mexico, and reassess other trade relationships the volume of world exports and imports in September was 0.4% lower than in August. But for the third quarter as a whole, trade flows were up 0.5% from the three months through June, having fallen by 0.7% during that period. if U.S. President-elect Donald Trump pressed ahead with higher tariffs against some trading partners, retaliation would likely follow. “That’s very risky in a situation where world trade is already very weak,” he said. “World trade and growth will suffer. The World Trade Organization has cut its forecast for world trade growth in 2016, saying it will be the slowest expansion since the global financial crisis, and warning that could weaken longer-term economic growth. “Matters for trade are made far worse by political developments, Antitrade rhetoric by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump during the election campaign make matters even worse. we focused more on telling the story of the winners and neglected the story of the losers. And this omission has come to haunt us.” | President-elect Trump pledged to introduce higher tariffs on imports from China if Trump pressed ahead with higher tariffs against some trading partners, retaliation would follow That’s very risky in a situation where world trade is already very weak,” World trade and growth will suffer it will be the slowest expansion , that could weaken economic growth. Matters for trade are made far worse by political developments, Antitrade rhetoric make matters even worse. | World trade flows staged a partial rebound in the three months through September, even as concerns mounted over a possible increase in protectionism driven by voter resentment against job losses and weak earnings growth that many blame on three decades of accelerated globalization. During his campaign, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump pledged to introduce higher tariffs on imports from China and Mexico, and reassess other trade relationships that he said placed U.S. workers at a disadvantage. The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis on Friday said the volume of world exports and imports in September was 0.4% lower than in August. But for the third quarter as a whole, trade flows were up 0.5% from the three months through June, having fallen by 0.7% during that period. The third-quarter increase means trade flows may rise over the year as a whole, but any increase is likely to be modest, maintaining the weak pace of expansion seen since 2011. But economic policy makers world-wide worry that a more dramatic swing toward protectionism could lead to even slower growth in coming years. European Central Bank Vice President Vítor Constâncio said on Thursday that if U.S. President-elect Donald Trump pressed ahead with higher tariffs against some trading partners, retaliation would likely follow. “That’s very risky in a situation where world trade is already very weak,” he said. “World trade and growth will suffer. The World Trade Organization has cut its forecast for world trade growth in 2016, saying it will be the slowest expansion since the global financial crisis, and warning that could weaken longer-term economic growth. The Geneva-based institution said government measures that restrict trade continue to rise around the world, and urged its members to remove barriers to imports. Businesses that facilitate trade are preparing for difficult times. “Matters for trade are made far worse by political developments,” said John Lorié , chief economist at Atradius, a firm that provides trade credit insurance. “These are flatly trade-unfriendly, as signaled not only by the Brexit vote in the U.K., but also by the stalling of the regional trade liberalization efforts. Antitrade rhetoric by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump during the election campaign make matters even worse. The climate has changed; we will see that in future trade data.” In the face of mounting hostility toward globalization in developed economies, free-trade advocates have acknowledged that the liberalization of trade and investment since the 1980s has been mishandled. “We knew, from the outset, very well that trade created winners and losers,” said Joakim Reiter , deputy secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “But—if we are honest—we focused more on telling the story of the winners and neglected the story of the losers. And this omission has come to haunt us.” | 2,923 | <h4>Protectionism is increasing – upcoming Trump presidency will cause a decline in global trade</h4><p><strong>Hannon 11/25 (Paul, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 11/25/16, Global Trade Rebound Threatened by Protectionism After Trump Victory, </strong>http://www.wsj.com/articles/global-trade-rebound-threatened-by-protectionism-after-trump-victory-1480084737?tesla=y<u>) MAM</p><p>World trade flows staged a partial rebound in the three months through September, even as concerns mounted over a possible increase in protectionism driven by voter resentment against job losses and weak earnings growth </u>that many blame on three decades of accelerated globalization. During his campaign, U.S. <u><mark>President-elect </mark>Donald<mark> Trump pledged to introduce higher tariffs on imports from China </mark>and Mexico, and reassess other trade relationships</u> that he said placed U.S. workers at a disadvantage. The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis on Friday said <u>the volume of world exports and imports in September was 0.4% lower than in August. But for the third quarter as a whole, trade flows were up 0.5% from the three months through June, having fallen by 0.7% during that period. </u>The third-quarter increase means trade flows may rise over the year as a whole, but any increase is likely to be modest, maintaining the weak pace of expansion seen since 2011. But economic policy makers world-wide worry that a more dramatic swing toward protectionism could lead to even slower growth in coming years. European Central Bank Vice President Vítor Constâncio said on Thursday that <u><mark>if </mark>U.S. President-elect Donald <mark>Trump pressed ahead with higher tariffs against some trading partners, retaliation would</mark> likely <mark>follow</mark>. “<mark>That’s very risky in a situation where world trade is already very weak,”</mark> he said. “<mark>World trade and growth will suffer</mark>. The World Trade Organization has cut its forecast for world trade growth in 2016, saying <mark>it will be the slowest expansion </mark>since the global financial crisis<mark>,</mark> and warning <mark>that could weaken </mark>longer-term <mark>economic growth.</mark> </u>The Geneva-based institution said government measures that restrict trade continue to rise around the world, and urged its members to remove barriers to imports. Businesses that facilitate trade are preparing for difficult times. <u>“<mark>Matters for trade are made far worse by political developments,</u></mark>” said John Lorié , chief economist at Atradius, a firm that provides trade credit insurance. “These are flatly trade-unfriendly, as signaled not only by the Brexit vote in the U.K., but also by the stalling of the regional trade liberalization efforts. <u><mark>Antitrade rhetoric</mark> by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump during the election campaign <mark>make matters even worse.</u> </mark>The climate has changed; we will see that in future trade data.” In the face of mounting hostility toward globalization in developed economies, free-trade advocates have acknowledged that the liberalization of trade and investment since the 1980s has been mishandled. “We knew, from the outset, very well that trade created winners and losers,” said Joakim Reiter , deputy secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “But—if we are honest—<u>we focused more on telling the story of the winners and neglected the story of the losers. And this omission has come to haunt us.”</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 1,560,906 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,667 | China says YES – and ALL DA links are not unique – China seeks Arctic influence now | Fengshi, 16 – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Professor | Fengshi, 16 – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Professor | null | null | Wu, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, specialized in environmental politics, Chinese politics and global governance, Assistant and associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2005-2013), Visiting fellow at the Harvard-Yenching Institute (2008-09). “CHINA’S ASCENT IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ARCTIC”, June, 2016, Vestnik of St Petersburg University, Series 6, Political science, International relations; Issue 2, https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/2771/1/Fengshi%20Wu.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott
The fourth pathway, including … LNG 3 projects in the Gydan Peninsula [25]. | 605 | <h4><strong>China says YES – and ALL DA links are not unique – China seeks Arctic influence now</h4><p><mark>Fengshi, 16</mark> – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Professor </p><p></strong>Wu, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, specialized in environmental politics, Chinese politics and global governance, Assistant and associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2005-2013), Visiting fellow at the Harvard-Yenching Institute (2008-09). “CHINA’S ASCENT IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ARCTIC”, June, 2016, Vestnik of St Petersburg University, Series 6, Political science, International relations; Issue 2, https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/2771/1/Fengshi%20Wu.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott</p><p>The fourth pathway, including … LNG 3 projects in the Gydan Peninsula [25]. </p> | null | null | Contention 1: Governance | 1,560,907 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,668 | Risk based anti money laundering key to stop funding to WMDs in North Korea | Dukic and Peters 6-16 | Dukic and Peters 6-16
Aleksander is has long been providing practical, industry-specific advice on how to navigate complex U.S. regulations to ensure compliance with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions, U.S. export controls, immigration, and USA Patriot Act anti-money laundering obligations., Beth is advises clients on the full range of international trade laws, including export control, cyber, national security, sanctions, customs, anti-boycott, and anti-money laundering/USA Patriot Act regulations, “FinCEN Designates North Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern, Triggering Additional Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions”, Hogan Lovells, https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/blogs/focus-on-regulation/fincen-designates-north-korea-as-a-jurisdiction-of-primary-money-laundering-concern, Accessed 10-18 | Korea Corporation conduct financial transactions in support of North Korea’s proliferation of WMD and from processing transactions involving North Korean financial institutions Financial institutions can satisfy these by notifying, and documenting the notification of, foreign correspondent account holders that the institution has reason to believe provide services to North Korea taking steps to identify any use of foreign correspondent accounts by North Korean financial institutions using a risk-based approach when determining what, if any, other due diligence measures must be adopted to guard against the use of its foreign correspondent accounts to process transactions involving North Korea when aware of potential North Korean access, taking all appropriate steps to further investigate and prevent that access where necessary | Korea Corporation conduct financial transactions in support of North Korea’s proliferation institutions can satisfy these by: notifying, and documenting the notification of, foreign correspondent account that identify any use of foreign correspondent using a risk-based approach when determining what, if any, other due diligence measures must be adopted to guard against transactions involving North Korea | United States and United Nations determinations that Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, Tanchon Commercial Bank, Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation, and Daedong Credit Bank conduct financial transactions in support of North Korea’s proliferation of WMD or ballistic missiles also factored into this finding. As a result, on June 3, 2016, FinCEN published a notice of proposed rulemaking imposing special measure five under Section 311, which prohibits covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account in the United States for, or on behalf of, North Korean banking institutions and from processing transactions involving North Korean financial institutions through a United States correspondent account. Covered institutions will also be required to apply special due diligence to their foreign correspondent accounts to prevent processing of transactions on behalf of North Korean financial institutions, including though indirect correspondent accounts. Violation of these requirements could result in the imposition of civil monetary or criminal penalties. Financial institutions can satisfy these special due diligence requirements by: notifying, and documenting the notification of, foreign correspondent account holders that the institution has reason to believe provide services to North Korean financial institutions; taking steps to identify any use of foreign correspondent accounts by North Korean financial institutions, to the extent that such use can be determined from records maintained in the normal course of business; using a risk-based approach when determining what, if any, other due diligence measures must be adopted to guard against the use of its foreign correspondent accounts to process transactions involving North Korean financial institutions; and, when aware of potential North Korean access, taking all appropriate steps to further investigate and prevent that access, including the notification of its correspondent account holder and, where necessary, termination of the correspondent account. | 2,073 | <h4><strong>Risk based anti money laundering key to stop funding to WMDs in North Korea</h4><p>Dukic and Peters 6-16</p><p></strong>Aleksander is has long been providing practical, industry-specific advice on how to navigate complex U.S. regulations to ensure compliance with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions, U.S. export controls, immigration, and USA Patriot Act anti-money laundering obligations., Beth is advises clients on the full range of international trade laws, including export control, cyber, national security, sanctions, customs, anti-boycott, and anti-money laundering/USA Patriot Act regulations, “FinCEN Designates North Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern, Triggering Additional Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions”, Hogan Lovells, https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/blogs/focus-on-regulation/fincen-designates-north-korea-as-a-jurisdiction-of-primary-money-laundering-concern, Accessed 10-18</p><p>United States and United Nations determinations that Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, Tanchon Commercial Bank, <u><mark>Korea</u></mark> Kwangson Banking <u><mark>Corporation</u></mark>, and Daedong Credit Bank <u><strong><mark>conduct financial transactions in support of North Korea’s proliferation</mark> of WMD </u></strong>or ballistic missiles also factored into this finding. As a result, on June 3, 2016, FinCEN published a notice of proposed rulemaking imposing special measure five under Section 311, which prohibits covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account in the United States for, or on behalf of, North Korean banking institutions <u>and from processing transactions involving North Korean financial institutions</u> through a United States correspondent account. Covered institutions will also be required to apply special due diligence to their foreign correspondent accounts to prevent processing of transactions on behalf of North Korean financial institutions, including though indirect correspondent accounts. Violation of these requirements could result in the imposition of civil monetary or criminal penalties. <u>Financial <mark>institutions can satisfy these</u></mark> special due diligence requirements <u><mark>by</u>: <u>notifying, and documenting the notification of, foreign correspondent account</mark> holders <mark>that</mark> the institution has reason to believe provide services to North Korea</u>n financial institutions; <u>taking steps to <mark>identify any use of foreign correspondent</mark> accounts by North Korean financial institutions</u>, to the extent that such use can be determined from records maintained in the normal course of business; <u><strong><mark>using a risk-based approach when determining what, if any, other due diligence measures must be adopted</mark> <mark>to guard against</mark> the use of its foreign correspondent accounts to process <mark>transactions involving North Korea</u></strong></mark>n financial institutions; and, <u>when aware of potential North Korean access, taking all appropriate steps to further investigate and prevent that access</u>, including the notification of its correspondent account holder and, <u>where necessary</u>, termination of the correspondent account.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 1,560,908 | 1 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,669 | Perception links are empirically denied---Marines leave Okinawa all the time | Vine-prof anthropology, American-15 | Vine-prof anthropology, American-15 | Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World p.272-3
a growing number of military analysts have started to question the U.S. base presence in Okinawa Initially, it was said that the bases helped contain and deter Soviet expansionist ; desires. Since the end of the Cold War, many have simply substituted China and North Korea for the USSR in the containment/deterrence framework. But North Korea is a small, impoverished nation, possibly on the verge of collapse. And China oesn't approach that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What's more, placing bases and troops on another country's door- step can be seen as an aggression in its own right, triggering exactly the kind of military response the strategy is supposedly designed to prevent Even within the context of containment and deterrence, the U.S. presence in Okinawa hardly looks like an optimal setup Many now agree, that the Marines' presence in Okinawa likely has little deterrent effect. Posen, who was a Pentagon official in the Bush administration, has said that with the large Air Force and Navy forces at Kadena Air Base the withdrawal of the marines would see "no change in deterrence Posen added that he "cannot see what role the Marine Corps might play in military actions" that conceivably might take place in the region Barney Frank agreed, saying, "15,000 Marines aren't going to land on the Chinese mainland and confront mil- lions of Chinese soldiers. We don't need Marines in Okinawa And there often haven't even been fifteen thousand marines in Okinawa, the number frequently cited by proponents of the status quo. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, thousands of them deployed from Okinawa, If Okinawa-based Marines are so critical to deterrence, how could the military afford to let them leave? Marines in Okinawa also don't have the transportation necessary to get involved in significant numbers during an emergency To deploy, marines rely on Navy transportation vessels harbored in Sasebo During a drill simulating a response to China seizing Senkaku islands, marines relied on a vessel based in San Diego to transport The Marines' controversial Osprey doesn't have the range to trans- port troops to the Senkaku/Diaoyus without in-air refueling; and with just twenty-four Ospreys in Okinawa, the Marines can send fewer than six hundred troops at most in a single deployment If the Marines can't operate independently and speedily from Okinawa, what land of regional deterrent force are they? | placing bases on another country's door- step can be seen as an aggression triggering the response the strategy is designed to prevent with the large Air Force and Navy forces at Kadena the withdrawal of the marines would see "no change in deterrence there often haven't even been fifteen thousand marines in Okinawa During Afghanistan and Iraq, thousands deployed from Okinawa If Okinawa Marines are so critical to deterrence, how could the military afford to let them leave? Marines don't have the transportation to get involved during an emergency During a drill marines relied on a vessel based in San Diego Osprey doesn't have the range the Marines can send fewer than six hundred in a single deployment | Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World p.272-3
Gradually, a growing number of military analysts have started to question the U.S. base presence in Okinawa—not on political or social grounds, but on purely military ones. .58 More profoundly, analysts across the political spectrum are increas- ingly beginning to question the underlying justifications and rationale for the bases. As long as the United States has had bases in Okinawa and Japan, the primary justification tor their existence has been that they ensure security for the United States, Japan, and the region. Initially, it was said that the bases helped contain and deter Soviet expansionist ; desires. Since the end of the Cold War, many have simply substituted China and North Korea for the USSR in the containment/deterrence framework. But North Korea is a small, impoverished nation, possibly on the verge of collapse. And while China's military power has grown in recent years, it doesn't approach that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What's more, placing bases and troops on another country's door- step can be seen as an aggression in its own right, triggering exactly the kind of military response the strategy is supposedly designed to prevent. Even within the context of containment and deterrence, the U.S. presence in Okinawa hardly looks like an optimal setup. Many now agree, for example, that the Marines' presence in Okinawa—including the controversial Futenma base and its debated replacement—likely has little deterrent effect. Barry Posen, who was a Pentagon official in the Bush administration, has said that with the large Air Force and Navy forces at Okinawa's Kadena Air Base and on mainland Japan, the withdrawal of the marines would see "no change in deterrence." Posen added that he "cannot see what role the Marine Corps might play in military actions" that conceivably might take place in the region.39 Former Democratic House representative Barney Frank agreed, saying, "15,000 Marines aren't going to land on the Chinese mainland and confront mil- lions of Chinese soldiers. We don't need Marines in Okinawa. "They're a hangover from a war that ended 65 years ago "60 And there often haven't even been fifteen thousand marines in Okinawa, the number frequently cited by proponents of the status quo. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, thousands of them deployed from Okinawa, decreasing troop levels by one quarter to one third from pre- war averages.61 If Okinawa-based Marines are so critical to deterrence, how could the military afford to let them leave? Marines in Okinawa also don't have the transportation necessary to get involved in significant numbers during an emergency. To deploy, marines rely on Navy transportation vessels harbored in Sasebo, Japan. During a 2013 drill simulating a response to China's seizing contested territory, such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, marines relied on a vessel based in San Diego to transport troops and weaponry.62 The Marines' controversial Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft doesn't have the range to trans- port troops to the Senkaku/Diaoyus without in-air refueling; and with just twenty-four Ospreys in Okinawa, the Marines can send fewer than six hundred troops at most in a single deployment.63 If the Marines can't operate independently and speedily from Okinawa, what land of regional deterrent force are they? | 3,401 | <h4><u><strong>Perception links are empirically denied---Marines leave Okinawa all the time </h4><p>Vine-prof anthropology, American-15</p><p>Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World p.272-3</p><p></u></strong>Gradually, <u><strong>a growing number of military analysts have started to question the U.S. base presence in Okinawa</u></strong>—not on political or social grounds, but on purely military ones. .58 More profoundly, analysts across the political spectrum are increas- ingly beginning to question the underlying justifications and rationale for the bases. As long as the United States has had bases in Okinawa and Japan, the primary justification tor their existence has been that they ensure security for the United States, Japan, and the region. <u><strong>Initially, it was said that the bases helped contain and deter Soviet expansionist ; desires.</u></strong> <u><strong>Since the end of the Cold War, many have simply substituted China and North Korea for the USSR in the containment/deterrence framework.</u></strong> <u><strong>But North Korea is a small, impoverished nation, possibly on the verge of collapse. And</u></strong> while <u><strong>China</u></strong>'s military power has grown in recent years, it d<u><strong>oesn't approach that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.</u></strong> <u><strong>What's more, <mark>placing bases </mark>and troops <mark>on another country's door- step can be seen as an aggression </mark>in its own right, <mark>triggering </mark>exactly <mark>the </mark>kind of military <mark>response the strategy is </mark>supposedly <mark>designed to prevent</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Even within the context of containment and deterrence, the U.S. presence in Okinawa hardly looks like an optimal setup</u></strong>. <u><strong>Many now agree,</u></strong> for example, <u><strong>that the Marines' presence in Okinawa</u></strong>—including the controversial Futenma base and its debated replacement—<u><strong>likely has little deterrent effect.</u></strong> Barry <u><strong>Posen, who was a Pentagon official in the Bush administration, has said that <mark>with the large Air Force and Navy forces at</u></strong></mark> Okinawa's <u><strong><mark>Kadena</mark> Air Base</u></strong> and on mainland Japan, <u><strong><mark>the withdrawal of the marines would see "no change in deterrence</u></strong></mark>." <u><strong>Posen added that he "cannot see what role the Marine Corps might play in military actions" that conceivably might take place in the region</u></strong>.39 Former Democratic House representative <u><strong>Barney Frank agreed, saying, "15,000 Marines aren't going to land on the Chinese mainland and confront mil- lions of Chinese soldiers. We don't need Marines in Okinawa</u></strong>. "They're a hangover from a war that ended 65 years ago "60 <u><strong>And <mark>there often haven't even been fifteen thousand marines in Okinawa</mark>, the number frequently cited by proponents of the status quo. <mark>During </mark>the wars in <mark>Afghanistan and Iraq, thousands </mark>of them <mark>deployed from Okinawa</mark>, </u></strong>decreasing troop levels by one quarter to one third from pre- war averages.61 <u><strong><mark>If Okinawa</mark>-based <mark>Marines are so critical to deterrence, how could the military afford to let them leave?</u></strong> <u><strong>Marines</mark> in Okinawa also <mark>don't have the transportation</mark> necessary <mark>to get involved</mark> in significant numbers <mark>during an emergency</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>To deploy, marines rely on Navy transportation vessels harbored in Sasebo</u></strong>, Japan. <u><strong><mark>During a</u></strong></mark> 2013 <u><strong><mark>drill</mark> simulating a response to China</u></strong>'s <u><strong>seizing</u></strong> contested territory, such as the <u><strong>Senkaku</u></strong>/Diaoyu <u><strong>islands, <mark>marines relied on a vessel based in San Diego</mark> to transport</u></strong> troops and weaponry.62 <u><strong>The Marines' controversial <mark>Osprey</mark> </u></strong>tilt-rotor aircraft <u><strong><mark>doesn't have the range</mark> to trans- port troops to the Senkaku/Diaoyus without in-air refueling; and with just twenty-four Ospreys in Okinawa, <mark>the Marines can send fewer than six hundred</mark> troops at most <mark>in a single deployment</u></strong></mark>.63 <u><strong>If the Marines can't operate independently and speedily from Okinawa, what land of regional deterrent force are they?</p></u></strong> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 454,548 | 36 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,670 | Chinese inclusion strengthens Arctic Council’s Legitimacy and Effectiveness – China in Arctic Council key to Arctic governance | Chaturvedi, 12 – Panjab University Political Science Professor | Chaturvedi, 12 – Panjab University Political Science Professor
Dr. Sanjay, Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Department of Political Science & Honorary Director of the Centre for the Study of MidWest and Central Asia, Panjab University, Chandigarh. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of geopolitics; with special reference to Polar Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. He is currently focusing on the geopolitics of climate change. “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the future of the Arctic Council”, The Arctic Council: Its place in the future of Arctic governance, January 17-18, 2012, http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Arctic%20Council_FULL.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott | including confidence building measures | including confidence building measures | The vital task of sustaining the … including confidence building measures. | 75 | <h4>Chinese inclusion <u>strengthens Arctic Council’s Legitimacy</u> and Effectiveness – <u>China in Arctic Council key to Arctic governance</u><strong> </h4><p><mark>Chaturvedi, 12</mark> – Panjab University Political Science Professor</p><p></strong>Dr. Sanjay, Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Department of Political Science & Honorary Director of the Centre for the Study of MidWest and Central Asia, Panjab University, Chandigarh. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of geopolitics; with special reference to Polar Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. He is currently focusing on the geopolitics of climate change. “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the future of the Arctic Council”, The Arctic Council: Its place in the future of Arctic governance, January 17-18, 2012, http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Arctic%20Council_FULL.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott</p><p>The vital task of sustaining the … <u><mark> including confidence building measures</u></mark>.</p> | null | null | Contention 1: Governance | 1,560,909 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,671 | Protectionism causes war -- escalates low-level conflicts | Panzner 8 2008 | Michael J. Panzner 8, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, 2008, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138 | calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire protectionist legislation like Smoot-Hawley it triggered tit-for-tat economic responses, which helped turn downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more dangerous confrontations over oil, gas, and other key commodities Whether involving raw materials or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, economic conditions will serve as a pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration toward other countries terrorist groups will boost the frequency and scale of attacks aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok China will assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors Israel may look to draw allies from around the world into conflicts Long-simmering resentments could degenerate quickly triggering genocidal acts. the beginnings of a new world war | protectionist legislation helped turn downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster The rise in protectionism will bring dangerous confrontations over key commodities tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters economic conditions serve as a pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences nations look to divert attention from domestic problems Long-simmering resentments could degenerate triggering genocidal acts the beginnings of a new world war. | Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war. | 4,553 | <h4>Protectionism causes war -- escalates low-level conflicts </h4><p>Michael J. <u><strong>Panzner 8</u></strong>, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, <u><strong>2008</u></strong>, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138</p><p>Continuing <u>calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire</u> the United States and other nations to spew forth <u><mark>protectionist legislation</mark> like</u> the notorious <u>Smoot-Hawley</u> bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, <u>it triggered</u> a series of <u>tit-for-tat economic responses, which</u> many commentators believe <u><mark>helped turn</u></mark> a serious economic <u><mark>downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster</u></mark>, But if history is any guide, <u>those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse</u>. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. <u><mark>The rise in </mark>isolationism and <mark>protectionism will bring</mark> about ever more</u> heated arguments and <u><mark>dangerous confrontations over</u> </mark>shared sources of <u>oil, gas, and other <mark>key commodities</u> </mark>as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. <u>Whether involving raw materials</u> used in strategic industries <u>or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence</u> in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. <u>Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace</u>. Around the world, <u>such <mark>tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters<strong></mark>,</u></strong> often with minimal provocation. In some instances, <u><mark>economic conditions</mark> will <mark>serve as a</u></mark> convenient <u><mark>pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences</u></mark>. Alternatively, <u><mark>nations</mark> may <mark>look to divert attention</mark> away <mark>from domestic problems</mark> by channeling frustration</u> and populist sentiment <u>toward other countries</u> and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, <u>terrorist groups will</u> likely <u>boost the frequency and scale of</u> their horrifying <u>attacks</u>, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage <u>aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok</u>. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. <u>China will</u> likely <u>assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan</u>, while <u>Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors</u> in the Mideast. <u>Israel</u>, for its part, <u>may look to draw</u> a dwindling list of <u>allies from around the world into</u> a growing number of <u>conflicts</u>. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. <u><mark>Long-simmering resentments could</u></mark> also <u><mark>degenerate</mark> quickly</u>, spurring the basest of human instincts and <u><mark>triggering genocidal acts</mark>. </u>Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as <u><mark>the beginnings of a new world war</u>.</p></mark> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 39,217 | 627 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,672 | North Korean missile tests are getting larger and more advanced that is escalating tensions in East Asia | Sang-hun 9-8 | Sang-hun 9-8 | North Korea conducted its fifth underground nuclear test despite threats the explosive power and other characteristics of a “nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted on” its ballistic missiles its nuclear devices have steadily improved the North has launched a series of ballistic missiles with growing ranges that it said were intended to carry nuclear warheads, though doubts persisted that the country had mastered the technology The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the D.P.R.K. to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power This has definitely put on a higher level the D.P.R.K.’s technology The nuclear test sets the stage for a new round of tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula and heightens anxieties elsewhere in Asia a growing number of experts and officials say that the North may be committed to assembling a nuclear arsenal that would include smaller weapons | North Korea conducted its fifth test the power of a “nuclear warhead has been standardized its devices have improved with growing ranges The standardization will enable the D.P.R.K. to produce at will and as many as it wants This has definitely put on a higher level technology The nuclear test sets the stage for a new round of tensions on the divided Peninsula and heightens anxieties in Asia the North may be committed to assembling a nuclear arsenal that would include smaller weapons | Choe is a Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist who writes for the New York Time regarding Asia policy, 2016, “North Korea Tests a Mightier Nuclear Bomb, Raising Tension”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test.html?_r=0, Accessed 10-16
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea conducted its fifth underground nuclear test on Friday, its government said, despite threats of more sanctions from the United States and the United Nations. The latest test, according to South Korean officials, produced a more powerful explosive yield than the North’s previous detonations, indicating that the country was making progress in its efforts to build a functional nuclear warhead. The test confirmed the explosive power and other characteristics of a “nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted on” its ballistic missiles, the North’s nuclear weapons institute said in a statement on Friday. A statement from the South Korean military also said that an artificial tremor, registered as magnitude 5, had originated from Punggye-ri in northeastern North Korea, where the North has conducted its four previous underground nuclear tests. A senior official at the Defense Ministry later told reporters that it had concluded that a nuclear detonation had caused the tremor. The ministry estimated the explosive yield was equivalent to 10 kilotons of TNT, the most powerful detonation unleashed in a North Korean nuclear test so far, according to the official, who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity. The South’s government estimated the North’s last nuclear test, conducted in January, at 4.8 magnitude with an explosive yield of six to nine kilotons. (By comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 exploded with 15 kilotons of energy.) North Korea’s first nuclear detonation, conducted in 2006, was largely dismissed as a fizzle, registering only as a 3.9 magnitude tremor with about one kiloton of energy. But its nuclear devices have steadily improved, producing bigger explosions with stronger seismic tremors in subsequent tests. At the same time, the North has launched a series of ballistic missiles with growing ranges that it said were intended to carry nuclear warheads, though doubts persisted that the country had mastered the technology needed to produce a nuclear warhead small and sturdy enough to travel a long distance through Earth’s atmosphere. On Friday, North Korea reported a major advance in its efforts. “The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the D.P.R.K. to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power,” it said in a statement on Friday, using the initials of the country’s official name, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “This has definitely put on a higher level the D.P.R.K.’s technology of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.” Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn of South Korea called an emergency meeting of top security officials, while his boss, President Park Geun-hye, cut short a visit to Laos, the president’s office said. The episode unfolded less than a day after President Obama concluded the final Asian tour of his presidency and highlighted the conundrums that the North Korean threat presents to the United States and China, which have often been at odds over how to respond to the bellicose acts of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. In Washington, Ned Price, a National Security Council spokesman, said: “We are aware of seismic activity on the Korean Peninsula in the vicinity of a known North Korean nuclear test site. We are monitoring and continuing to assess the situation in close coordination with our regional partners.” The nuclear test sets the stage for a new round of tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula and heightens anxieties elsewhere in Asia and beyond. For the past two decades, Washington has been struggling in vain to stop North Korea’s aggressive, anti-American leaders from arming the country with nuclear weapons. Although it was long thought that North Korean nuclear and missile tests were intended as muscle flexing for both internal and external consumption, and as a way to exact concessions from the great powers, a growing number of experts and officials say that the North may be committed to assembling a nuclear arsenal that would include smaller weapons that could be mounted on short-range missiles. | 4,478 | <h4><strong>North Korean missile tests are getting larger and more advanced that is escalating tensions in East Asia</h4><p>Sang-hun 9-8</p><p></strong>Choe is a Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist who writes for the New York Time regarding Asia policy, 2016, “North Korea Tests a Mightier Nuclear Bomb, Raising Tension”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test.html?_r=0, Accessed 10-16</p><p>SEOUL, South Korea — <u><mark>North Korea conducted its fifth</mark> underground nuclear <mark>test</u></mark> on Friday, its government said, <u>despite threats</u> of more sanctions from the United States and the United Nations. The latest test, according to South Korean officials, produced a more powerful explosive yield than the North’s previous detonations, indicating that the country was making progress in its efforts to build a functional nuclear warhead. The test confirmed <u><mark>the</mark> explosive <mark>power</mark> and other characteristics <mark>of a “nuclear warhead</mark> that <mark>has been standardized</mark> to be able to be mounted on” its ballistic missiles</u>, the North’s nuclear weapons institute said in a statement on Friday. A statement from the South Korean military also said that an artificial tremor, registered as magnitude 5, had originated from Punggye-ri in northeastern North Korea, where the North has conducted its four previous underground nuclear tests. A senior official at the Defense Ministry later told reporters that it had concluded that a nuclear detonation had caused the tremor. The ministry estimated the explosive yield was equivalent to 10 kilotons of TNT, the most powerful detonation unleashed in a North Korean nuclear test so far, according to the official, who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity. The South’s government estimated the North’s last nuclear test, conducted in January, at 4.8 magnitude with an explosive yield of six to nine kilotons. (By comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 exploded with 15 kilotons of energy.) North Korea’s first nuclear detonation, conducted in 2006, was largely dismissed as a fizzle, registering only as a 3.9 magnitude tremor with about one kiloton of energy. But <u><mark>its</mark> nuclear <mark>devices</mark> <mark>have</mark> steadily <mark>improved</u></mark>, producing bigger explosions with stronger seismic tremors in subsequent tests. At the same time, <u>the North has launched a series of ballistic missiles <mark>with growing ranges</mark> that it said were intended to carry nuclear warheads, though doubts persisted that the country had mastered the technology</u> needed to produce a nuclear warhead small and sturdy enough to travel a long distance through Earth’s atmosphere. On Friday, North Korea reported a major advance in its efforts. “<u><mark>The standardization</mark> of the nuclear warhead <mark>will enable the D.P.R.K. to produce at will and as many as it wants</mark> a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power</u>,” it said in a statement on Friday, using the initials of the country’s official name, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “<u><mark>This has definitely put on <strong>a higher level</mark> the D.P.R.K.’s <mark>technology</u></strong></mark> of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.” Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn of South Korea called an emergency meeting of top security officials, while his boss, President Park Geun-hye, cut short a visit to Laos, the president’s office said. The episode unfolded less than a day after President Obama concluded the final Asian tour of his presidency and highlighted the conundrums that the North Korean threat presents to the United States and China, which have often been at odds over how to respond to the bellicose acts of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. In Washington, Ned Price, a National Security Council spokesman, said: “We are aware of seismic activity on the Korean Peninsula in the vicinity of a known North Korean nuclear test site. We are monitoring and continuing to assess the situation in close coordination with our regional partners.” <u><strong><mark>The nuclear test sets the stage for a new round of tensions on the divided</mark> Korean <mark>Peninsula and heightens anxieties</mark> elsewhere <mark>in Asia</u></strong></mark> and beyond. For the past two decades, Washington has been struggling in vain to stop North Korea’s aggressive, anti-American leaders from arming the country with nuclear weapons. Although it was long thought that North Korean nuclear and missile tests were intended as muscle flexing for both internal and external consumption, and as a way to exact concessions from the great powers, <u>a growing number of experts and officials say that <mark>the North may be committed to assembling a nuclear arsenal that would include smaller weapons</u></mark> that could be mounted on short-range missiles.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 1,559,395 | 3 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,673 | Russia won’t start a war—deterrence checks | Girnius 14, IIRPS lecturer, associate professor, November 19, 2014, "Opinion: Are Baltic states in danger?", DELFI, en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-are-baltic-states-in-danger.d?id=66440692 | Kęstutis Girnius 14, IIRPS lecturer, associate professor, November 19, 2014, "Opinion: Are Baltic states in danger?", DELFI, en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-are-baltic-states-in-danger.d?id=66440692 | The situation is Ukraine has gotten more ominous Putin ignored Western moods It is yet unclear weather the movement of troops is an indication that Moscow wants to capture even more land in Ukraine. Russia and the separatists could use the airport and the Black Sea to supply resources But the question begs why this was not done in August, when the Ukrainian government forces were on the brink of collapse Putin has been cautious up to this point Crimea was not taken before it had become clear that no one there would resist the "little green men". Much effort was put into disguising Russian troops' involvement in Ukraine. They acted openly only once there was a real risk that Ukraine's armed forces could win Cohen is worried that "if Ukraine is lost, America's promise to its NATO Allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe is not going to be viewed as credible I cannot agree with Cohen. The decoupling of American and European defence will happen if someone actually decouples it. Who is going to do it? it will definitely not be the EU, because it is more directly threatened by Russian aggression and has defence capabilities well below those of the US. If NATO went down, EU countries would be forced to massively expand their defence spending. If the EU had wanted to see the US defending Ukraine - and Washington had been reluctant - then Europe might have felt abandoned and would have sought other security guarantees. But the American position is actually stronger on Russia, so there is no basis for disillusionment. It is the US that has reasons to be disappointed with some EU countries that have shamefully neglected their defence forces. But even these under-achievers do make their contributions: they guard the Baltic air space, monitor the Baltic Sea, etc. So neither side is eager to decouple American-European defence, while Russia's opportunism brings additional incentives to move closer together Ukraine is not a NATO member, while the Baltic states are - and that is a crucial difference. The US and Russia know that aggression against one NATO member constitutes aggression against all Putin is well aware of that, enough not to risk triggering NATO actions that Russia would not be able to counter and would be forced to accept humiliation. The concern is that inadequate reaction to Russia's aggression would undermine NATO's credibility, turn the alliance into a paper tiger and push scared European nations into sucking up to the Kremlin But Putin was so brave in Georgia and Ukraine precisely because he knew that neither represented vital interests of the US, while NATO was aware of the importance of these countries to Russia. He could therefore safely bet on NATO backing down in case of a serious confrontation. Whereas the Baltic nations, members of NATO, do represent vital interests of the alliance, but not the Kremlin so Putin knows that NATO will not back down Even if Putin found himself in an adventurous mood, there are facts that he and his environment cannot ignore. In terms of military capacity, the US and NATO clearly holds an upper hand, have more experienced soldiers, are better equipped, particularly in aviation. the US is not a pacifist country shying away from military confrontatio under Obama, the US has been at war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and now with Islamic State in Syria Either the West resists Russia's invasion and Moscow is forced to back down, suffering humiliation in front of the world; or, if neither side steps back, a war breaks out that Russia cannot possibly win. There is no basis to assume that Putin and his circle are irrational fanatics they have shown great aptitude to calculate what they can and cannot do. Putin might risk attacking the Baltic states, providing there were realistic chance that the US and NATO could be intimidated into backing down. But in the face of a clear American military advantage, Putin is free to pose, threaten, use shirtless photo-ops, but he will not take the plunge into actual war. | The situation is Ukraine has gotten more ominous Putin has been cautious The decoupling of American and European defence will happen if someone actually decouples it. Who is going to do it? it will not be the EU, because it is more directly threatened by Russian aggression If NATO went down, EU countries would expand spending the American position is stronger on Russia . neither side is eager to decouple defence, while Russia's opportunism brings incentives to move closer Ukraine is not a NATO member, while the Baltic states are - and that is a difference Putin is well aware of that, enough not to risk triggering NATO actions that Russia would not be able to counter Putin was so brave in Georgia and Ukraine because he knew neither represented vital interests of the US Whereas the Baltic nations, members of NATO, do represent vital interests of the alliance, but not the Kremlin Even if Putin found himself in an adventurous mood, there are facts he cannot ignore. In terms of military capacity, the US and NATO holds an upper hand There is no basis to assume that Putin and his circle are irrational fanatics in the face of a clear American military advantage Putin is free to threaten but he will not take the plunge into actual war. | The situation is Ukraine has gotten more ominous. Additional armed Russian troops have entered the country's territory a week ago, accompanied by heavy weaponry and tanks. This mobilization of Russia's armed forces is not the first such occurrence, but the significance lies in its timing on the eve of several high-profile international meetings. Previously, Putin would use similar occasions to tone down Russia's military actions and showcase his good will, hoping to get the West refrain from introducing new sanctions or ease the existing ones. This time, however, he conspicuously ignored Western moods, despite his own and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's previous statements indicating that the sanctions had had negative effects on Russia and were of great concern to the Kremlin. It is yet unclear weather the movement of troops is an indication that Moscow wants to capture even more land in Ukraine. Russia and the separatists could use the airport at Donetsk and, even more importantly, the Black Sea coast that would open up routes to easily supply military equipment and other resources to Crimea and separatist-held territories in eastern Ukraine. But then the question that begs itself is why this was not done in August, when the Ukrainian government forces were on the brink of collapse and demoralization. Moreover, Putin has been cautious up to this point. Crimea was not taken before it had become clear that no one there would resist the "little green men". Much effort was put into disguising Russian troops' involvement in Ukraine. They acted openly only once there was a real risk that Ukraine's armed forces could win and bring Donetsk and Luhansk back under Kiev's control. We do not know what Putin wants, but it won't be good, that much is clear. Everyone is understandably concerned - and not just the professional cassandras who see every action Russia makes as the first step towards attacking one more Eastern European country. Roger Cohen, an influential columnist at The New York Times, is worried that "if Ukraine is lost, America's promise to its NATO Allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe is not going to be viewed as credible. A core Russian strategic objective since 1945 — the decoupling of American and European defense — will be on its way to realization." I cannot agree with Cohen. The decoupling of American and European defence will happen if someone actually decouples it. Who is going to do it? Under current circumstances, it will definitely not be the EU, because it is more directly threatened by Russian aggression and has defence capabilities well below those of the US. If NATO went down, EU countries would be forced to massively expand their defence spending. If the EU had wanted to see the US defending Ukraine - and Washington had been reluctant - then Europe might have felt abandoned and would have sought other security guarantees. But the American position is actually stronger on Russia, so there is no basis for disillusionment. It is the US that has reasons to be disappointed with some EU countries that have shamefully neglected their defence forces. But even these under-achievers do make their contributions: they guard the Baltic air space, monitor the Baltic Sea, etc. So neither side is eager to decouple American-European defence, while Russia's opportunism brings additional incentives to move closer together. Ukraine is not a NATO member, while the Baltic states are - and that is a crucial difference. Neither the US, nor the EU had been committed to defend Ukraine and have been clear since the beginning of the crisis that they will not take up arms. The Baltic states are a different matter altogether. The US and Russia know that aggression against one NATO member constitutes aggression against all - or at least those that have a stake in keeping NATO alive and effective. An attack against Lithuania or Latvia would also be an attack on NATO as a credible and self-defending alliance. The reliability of NATO is a vital interest of the EU countries in particular, therefore Russia's aggression would be met with proper response. Putin is well aware of that, enough not to risk triggering NATO actions that Russia would not be able to counter and would be forced to accept humiliation. The concern of Cohen et al. is that inadequate reaction to Russia's aggression would undermine NATO's credibility, turn the alliance into a paper tiger and push scared European nations into sucking up to the Kremlin. Therefore, the Baltic states could be next in line after Georgia and Ukraine. But Putin was so brave in Georgia and Ukraine precisely because he knew that neither represented vital interests of the US, while NATO was aware of the importance of these countries to Russia. He could therefore safely bet on NATO backing down in case of a serious confrontation. Whereas the Baltic nations, members of NATO, do represent vital interests of the alliance, but not the Kremlin (Russia has been getting by well enough without them in its sphere of interests for a quarter of a century now), so Putin knows that NATO will not back down. Even if Putin found himself in an adventurous mood, there are facts that he and his environment cannot ignore. In terms of military capacity, the US and NATO clearly holds an upper hand, have more experienced soldiers, are better equipped, particularly in aviation. Moreover, the US is not a pacifist country shying away from military confrontation. Quite the opposite, since World War Two, the US has been involved in wars or military operations almost uninterruptedly. Even under the less bellicose President Barack Obama, the US has been at war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and now with Islamic State in Syria. Confrontation with NATO holds little promise to Russia, as only one out of three likely outcomes is any good. There is a chance, albeit a small one, that the West would not resist intervention in the Baltics and let NATO collapse. All other scenarios are not in Russia's interest. Either the West resists Russia's invasion and Moscow is forced to back down, suffering humiliation in front of the world; or, if neither side steps back, a war breaks out that Russia cannot possibly win. The deterrence theory is based on the assumption that both parties of a confrontation are rational and capable of calculating outcomes of different actions - and that they are at least marginally concerned with the welfare of their countries and peoples. One cannot deter suicide bombers because there is nothing that can threaten someone willing to die. There is no basis to assume that Putin and his circle are irrational fanatics. Up to this point, they have shown great aptitude to calculate what they can and cannot do. Putin might risk attacking the Baltic states, providing there were realistic chance that the US and NATO could be intimidated into backing down. But in the face of a clear American military advantage, Putin is free to pose, threaten, use shirtless photo-ops, but he will not take the plunge into actual war. | 7,066 | <h4>Russia won’t start a war—deterrence checks</h4><p>Kęstutis <u><strong>Girnius 14, IIRPS lecturer, associate professor, November 19, 2014, "Opinion: Are Baltic states in danger?", DELFI, en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-are-baltic-states-in-danger.d?id=66440692</p><p><mark>The situation is Ukraine has gotten more ominous</u></strong></mark>. Additional armed Russian troops have entered the country's territory a week ago, accompanied by heavy weaponry and tanks. This mobilization of Russia's armed forces is not the first such occurrence, but the significance lies in its timing on the eve of several high-profile international meetings. Previously, <u><strong>Putin</u></strong> would use similar occasions to tone down Russia's military actions and showcase his good will, hoping to get the West refrain from introducing new sanctions or ease the existing ones. This time, however, he conspicuously <u><strong>ignored Western moods</u></strong>, despite his own and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's previous statements indicating that the sanctions had had negative effects on Russia and were of great concern to the Kremlin. <u><strong>It is yet unclear weather the movement of troops is an indication that Moscow wants to capture even more land in Ukraine. Russia and the separatists could use the airport</u></strong> at Donetsk <u><strong>and</u></strong>, even more importantly, <u><strong>the Black Sea</u></strong> coast that would open up routes <u><strong>to</u></strong> easily <u><strong>supply</u></strong> military equipment and other <u><strong>resources</u></strong> to Crimea and separatist-held territories in eastern Ukraine. <u><strong>But</u></strong> then <u><strong>the question</u></strong> that <u><strong>begs</u></strong> itself is <u><strong>why this was not done in August, when the Ukrainian government forces were on the brink of collapse</u></strong> and demoralization. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>Putin has been cautious</mark> up to this point</u></strong>. <u><strong>Crimea was not taken before it had become clear that no one there would resist the "little green men". Much effort was put into disguising Russian troops' involvement in Ukraine.</u></strong> <u><strong>They acted openly only once there was a real risk that Ukraine's armed forces could win</u></strong> and bring Donetsk and Luhansk back under Kiev's control. We do not know what Putin wants, but it won't be good, that much is clear. Everyone is understandably concerned - and not just the professional cassandras who see every action Russia makes as the first step towards attacking one more Eastern European country. Roger <u><strong>Cohen</u></strong>, an influential columnist at The New York Times, <u><strong>is worried that "if Ukraine is lost, America's promise to its NATO Allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe is not going to be viewed as credible</u></strong>. A core Russian strategic objective since 1945 — the decoupling of American and European defense — will be on its way to realization." <u><strong>I cannot agree with Cohen. <mark>The decoupling of American and European defence will happen if someone actually decouples it.</mark> <mark>Who is going to do it?</mark> </u></strong>Under current circumstances, <u><strong><mark>it will</mark> definitely <mark>not be the EU, because it is more directly threatened by Russian aggression</mark> and has defence capabilities well below those of the US. <mark>If NATO went down, EU countries would</mark> be forced to massively <mark>expand</mark> their defence <mark>spending</mark>. If the EU had wanted to see the US defending Ukraine - and Washington had been reluctant - then Europe might have felt abandoned and would have sought other security guarantees. But <mark>the American position is</mark> actually <mark>stronger on Russia</mark>, so there is no basis for disillusionment<mark>.</mark> It is the US that has reasons to be disappointed with some EU countries that have shamefully neglected their defence forces. But even these under-achievers do make their contributions: they guard the Baltic air space, monitor the Baltic Sea, etc. So <mark>neither side is eager to decouple</mark> American-European <mark>defence, while Russia's opportunism brings</mark> additional <mark>incentives to move closer</mark> together</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Ukraine is not a NATO member, while the Baltic states are - and that is a</mark> crucial <mark>difference</mark>.</u></strong> Neither the US, nor the EU had been committed to defend Ukraine and have been clear since the beginning of the crisis that they will not take up arms. The Baltic states are a different matter altogether. <u><strong>The US and Russia know that aggression against one NATO member constitutes aggression against all </u></strong>- or at least those that have a stake in keeping NATO alive and effective. An attack against Lithuania or Latvia would also be an attack on NATO as a credible and self-defending alliance. The reliability of NATO is a vital interest of the EU countries in particular, therefore Russia's aggression would be met with proper response. <u><strong><mark>Putin is well aware of that, enough not to risk triggering NATO actions that Russia would not be able to counter</mark> and would be forced to accept humiliation. The concern</u></strong> of Cohen et al. <u><strong>is that inadequate reaction to Russia's aggression would undermine NATO's credibility, turn the alliance into a paper tiger and push scared European nations into sucking up to the Kremlin</u></strong>. Therefore, the Baltic states could be next in line after Georgia and Ukraine. <u><strong>But <mark>Putin was so brave in Georgia and Ukraine</mark> precisely <mark>because he knew</mark> that <mark>neither represented vital interests of the US</mark>, while NATO was aware of the importance of these countries to Russia. He could therefore safely bet on NATO backing down in case of a serious confrontation. <mark>Whereas the Baltic nations, members of NATO, do represent vital interests of the alliance, but not the Kremlin</u></strong></mark> (Russia has been getting by well enough without them in its sphere of interests for a quarter of a century now), <u><strong>so Putin knows that NATO will not back down</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Even if Putin found himself in an adventurous mood, there are</mark> <mark>facts</mark> that <mark>he</mark> and his environment <mark>cannot ignore. In terms of military capacity, the US and NATO</mark> clearly <mark>holds an upper hand</mark>, have more experienced soldiers, are better equipped, particularly in aviation. </u></strong>Moreover, <u><strong>the US is not a pacifist country shying away from military confrontatio</u></strong>n. Quite the opposite, since World War Two, the US has been involved in wars or military operations almost uninterruptedly. Even <u><strong>under</u></strong> the less bellicose President Barack <u><strong>Obama, the US has been at war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and now with Islamic State in Syria</u></strong>. Confrontation with NATO holds little promise to Russia, as only one out of three likely outcomes is any good. There is a chance, albeit a small one, that the West would not resist intervention in the Baltics and let NATO collapse. All other scenarios are not in Russia's interest. <u><strong>Either the West resists Russia's invasion and Moscow is forced to back down, suffering humiliation in front of the world; or, if neither side steps back, a war breaks out that Russia cannot possibly win.</u></strong> The deterrence theory is based on the assumption that both parties of a confrontation are rational and capable of calculating outcomes of different actions - and that they are at least marginally concerned with the welfare of their countries and peoples. One cannot deter suicide bombers because there is nothing that can threaten someone willing to die. <u><strong><mark>There is no basis to assume that Putin and his circle are irrational fanatics</u></strong></mark>. Up to this point, <u><strong>they have shown great aptitude to calculate what they can and cannot do. Putin might risk attacking the Baltic states, providing there were realistic chance that the US and NATO could be intimidated into backing down. But <mark>in</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>face of a clear American military advantage</mark>, <mark>Putin is free to</mark> pose, <mark>threaten</mark>, use shirtless photo-ops, <mark>but he will not take the plunge into actual war.</p></u></strong></mark> | Round 2 Aff v MBA KR Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Disad | 462,684 | 7 | 125,811 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | 655,666 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 2 | MBA KR not kaplan | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth and warming
1NC-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2NR-- Balancing Domestic Innovation CP
2AR-- Warming Growth | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round2.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,674 | OBOR expands global trade – develops most profitable trade routes | Ma Zecha et al 16 (Cecilia, an editor with McKinsey Publishing, based in Singapore. This card is the transcript from an interview with Kevin Sneadar, McKinsey’s chairman in Asia and Joe Ngai, managing partner of McKinsey’s Hong Kong location, July 2016, ) MAM | Ma Zecha et al 16 (Cecilia, an editor with McKinsey Publishing, based in Singapore. This card is the transcript from an interview with Kevin Sneadar, McKinsey’s chairman in Asia and Joe Ngai, managing partner of McKinsey’s Hong Kong location, July 2016, http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/china/chinas-one-belt-one-road-will-it-reshape-global-trade) MAM | The future of trade in Asia could depend heavily on what becomes of China’s expansive One Belt, One Road initiative, which calls for massive investment in and development of trade routes in the region arguably its most ambitious economic and diplomatic program One Belt, One Road has the potential to be perhaps the world’s largest platform for regional collaboration. the road is actually the maritime Silk Road, in other words, shipping lanes, essentially from here to Venice. —potentially ambitious—covering about 65 percent of the world’s population, about one-third of the world’s GDP and about a quarter of all the goods and services the world moves The belt, the physical road, and the maritime Silk Road would re-create the shipping routes that made China one of the world’s foremost powers many, many years ago. that’s part of the next growth wave of Chinese exports, which is that it’s going to have its influence and its infrastructure build-out in many of these countries, most of them emerging markets, in lots of things that frankly have fueled the very high growth in China over the past decad The ambition is enormous, and the sums of money are equally enormous. | The future of trade in Asia could depend on O B O R initiative, its most ambitious economic and diplomatic program O B O R has the potential to be the world’s largest platform for regional collaboration part of the next growth wave of Chinese exports The ambition is enormous, and the sums of money are equally enormous. | The future of trade in Asia could depend heavily on what becomes of China’s expansive One Belt, One Road initiative, which calls for massive investment in and development of trade routes in the region. In this episode of the McKinsey Podcast, recorded in May, McKinsey senior partners Joe Ngai and Kevin Sneader talk with Cecilia Ma Zecha about One Belt, One Road—what it really means, what it needs to become a reality, and why people should take it seriously. Podcast transcript Cecilia Ma Zecha: Hello, and welcome to this edition of the McKinsey Podcast. I’m Cecilia Ma Zecha, an editor with McKinsey Publishing, based in Singapore. Today we’re going to be talking about one of the biggest stories in Asian business, China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, arguably its most ambitious economic and diplomatic program since the founding of the People’s Republic. To explain One Belt, One Road and what it means to business, I’m joined today by Kevin Sneader, McKinsey’s chairman in Asia, and Joe Ngai, managing partner of McKinsey’s Hong Kong location. Kevin, let’s start from the very beginning, particularly for anyone listening outside of Asia. But frankly, for many of us who live and work in the region, behind the diplomatic language and the policy speak, what exactly is One Belt, One Road? Kevin Sneader: At one level, One Belt, One Road has the potential to be perhaps the world’s largest platform for regional collaboration. What does that actually mean? There are two parts to this, the belt and the road, and it’s a little confusing. The belt is the physical road, which takes one from here all the way through Europe to somewhere up north in Scandinavia. That is the physical road. What they call the road is actually the maritime Silk Road, in other words, shipping lanes, essentially from here to Venice. Therefore it’s very ambitious—potentially ambitious—covering about 65 percent of the world’s population, about one-third of the world’s GDP, and about a quarter of all the goods and services the world moves. That is what’s at the core of this—at least a potential trading route. The belt, the physical road, and the maritime Silk Road would re-create the shipping routes that made China one of the world’s foremost powers many, many years ago. Cecilia Ma Zecha: Joe, why is this important now? Joe Ngai: China is seeing a bit of a slowing down in its growth. A lot of people are saying that that’s part of the next growth wave of Chinese exports, which is that it’s going to have its influence and its infrastructure build-out in many of these countries, most of them emerging markets, in lots of things that frankly have fueled the very high growth in China over the past decade. The question is going to be how these are financed: whether there is going to be long-term planning that’s required, and whether the local governments and the state governments are able to take the Chinese model and the Chinese infrastructure and figure out how they can have their own version. Kevin Sneader: Some people have talked about this being the second Marshall Plan. It’s worth recalling that the Marshall Plan, which obviously was at the heart of the regeneration of Europe after the Second World War, was one-twelfth the size of what is being contemplated in the One Belt, One Road initiative. So the question is the scale. The ambition is enormous, and the sums of money are equally enormous. That is why I think whether this initiative is successful will have two parts to it. One will be that the funds are indeed available and that governments are willing to deploy the | 3,588 | <h4>OBOR expands global trade – develops most profitable trade routes</h4><p><strong>Ma Zecha et al 16 (Cecilia, an editor with McKinsey Publishing, based in Singapore. This card is the transcript from an interview with Kevin Sneadar, McKinsey’s chairman in Asia and Joe Ngai, managing partner of McKinsey’s Hong Kong location, July 2016, </strong>http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/china/chinas-one-belt-one-road-will-it-reshape-global-trade<strong>) MAM</p><p><u></strong><mark>The future of trade in Asia could depend </mark>heavily<mark> on </mark>what becomes of China’s expansive <mark>O</mark>ne <mark>B</mark>elt, <mark>O</mark>ne <mark>R</mark>oad<mark> initiative,</mark> which calls for massive investment in and development of trade routes in the region</u>. In this episode of the McKinsey Podcast, recorded in May, McKinsey senior partners Joe Ngai and Kevin Sneader talk with Cecilia Ma Zecha about One Belt, One Road—what it really means, what it needs to become a reality, and why people should take it seriously. Podcast transcript Cecilia Ma Zecha: Hello, and welcome to this edition of the McKinsey Podcast. I’m Cecilia Ma Zecha, an editor with McKinsey Publishing, based in Singapore. Today we’re going to be talking about one of the biggest stories in Asian business, China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, <u>arguably <mark>its most ambitious economic and diplomatic program</u></mark> since the founding of the People’s Republic. To explain One Belt, One Road and what it means to business, I’m joined today by Kevin Sneader, McKinsey’s chairman in Asia, and Joe Ngai, managing partner of McKinsey’s Hong Kong location. Kevin, let’s start from the very beginning, particularly for anyone listening outside of Asia. But frankly, for many of us who live and work in the region, behind the diplomatic language and the policy speak, what exactly is One Belt, One Road? Kevin Sneader: At one level, <u><mark>O</mark>ne<mark> B</mark>elt, <mark>O</mark>ne<mark> R</mark>oad<mark> has the potential to be </mark>perhaps<mark> the world’s largest platform for</mark> <mark>regional collaboration</mark>.</u> What does that actually mean? There are two parts to this, the belt and the road, and it’s a little confusing. The belt is the physical road, which takes one from here all the way through Europe to somewhere up north in Scandinavia. That is the physical road. What they call <u>the road is actually the maritime Silk Road, in other words, shipping lanes, essentially from here to Venice. </u>Therefore it’s very ambitious<u>—potentially ambitious—covering about 65 percent of the world’s population, about one-third of the world’s GDP</u>, <u>and about a quarter of all the goods and services the world moves</u>. That is what’s at the core of this—at least a potential trading route. <u>The belt, the physical road, and the maritime Silk Road would re-create the shipping routes that made China one of the world’s foremost powers many, many years ago. </u>Cecilia Ma Zecha: Joe, why is this important now? Joe Ngai: China is seeing a bit of a slowing down in its growth. A lot of people are saying that <u>that’s <mark>part of the next growth wave of Chinese exports</mark>, which is that it’s going to have its influence and its infrastructure build-out in many of these countries, most of them emerging markets, in lots of things that frankly have fueled the very high growth in China over the past decad</u>e. The question is going to be how these are financed: whether there is going to be long-term planning that’s required, and whether the local governments and the state governments are able to take the Chinese model and the Chinese infrastructure and figure out how they can have their own version. Kevin Sneader: Some people have talked about this being the second Marshall Plan. It’s worth recalling that the Marshall Plan, which obviously was at the heart of the regeneration of Europe after the Second World War, was one-twelfth the size of what is being contemplated in the One Belt, One Road initiative. So the question is the scale. <u><mark>The ambition is enormous, and the sums of money are equally enormous.</u></mark> That is why I think whether this initiative is successful will have two parts to it. One will be that the funds are indeed available and that governments are willing to deploy the </p> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 1,560,910 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,675 | Excluding Asian Actors like China causes two Scenarios: 1) Destroys Arctic Council’s Legitimacy, Authority, and Efficacy 2) Precludes Arctic Governance | Chaturvedi, 12 – Panjab University Political Science Professor | Chaturvedi, 12 – Panjab University Political Science Professor
Dr. Sanjay, Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Department of Political Science & Honorary Director of the Centre for the Study of MidWest and Central Asia, Panjab University, Chandigarh. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of geopolitics; with special reference to Polar Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. He is currently focusing on the geopolitics of climate change. “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the future of the Arctic Council”, The Arctic Council: Its place in the future of Arctic governance, January 17-18, 2012, http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Arctic%20Council_FULL.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott | With China, India, South Korea and …. debated and shaped at present | With China shaped | With China, India, South Korea and …. debated and shaped at present. | 69 | <h4>Excluding Asian Actors like China causes two Scenarios: 1) <u>Destroys Arctic Council’s Legitimacy</u>, Authority, and Efficacy 2) <strong>Precludes Arctic Governance</h4><p><mark>Chaturvedi, 12</mark> – Panjab University Political Science Professor</p><p></strong>Dr. Sanjay, Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Department of Political Science & Honorary Director of the Centre for the Study of MidWest and Central Asia, Panjab University, Chandigarh. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of geopolitics; with special reference to Polar Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. He is currently focusing on the geopolitics of climate change. “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the future of the Arctic Council”, The Arctic Council: Its place in the future of Arctic governance, January 17-18, 2012, http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Arctic%20Council_FULL.pdf, Accessed 9/29/16, Scott</p><p><u><mark>With China</mark>, India, South Korea and …. debated and <mark>shaped</mark> at present</u>.</p> | null | null | Contention 1: Governance | 1,560,911 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,676 | Northern nuclear development and capability to attack the US causes South Korea and Asia to freak out and nuclearize—current deterrence doesn’t solve | Yung-Woo, Former National Security Advisor to the President of the ROK and senior advisor at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 5/23/2015 | Yung-Woo, Former National Security Advisor to the President of the ROK and senior advisor at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 5/23/2015 Chun, chairman and founder of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, “REASSURANCE: WHAT DO ALLIES WANT?” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/04-230315carnegieREASSURANCEpanel.pdf | it’s time to be prepared for the failure of diplomacy and deterrence There is a credibility gap between the US and ROK to the extent that there is a danger of deterrence failure and threat and a deficit, security deficit exists the credibility gap comes from the way that US deals with One North Korea. Another China Pyongyang is moving full speed ahead unimpeded toward building its operational nuclear arsenal the South Korean people are getting increasingly anxious about North Korea reaching the stage of mounting it’s nuclear devices on missiles, and once Pyongyang gets there, if not already ther it will be a game changer in that it will no longer allow the Republic of Korea a margin of error in deterrence and defenses against North Korea. At the heart of the mounting anxiety and insecurity lies the persistent doubt about whether nuclear and North Korea can be effectively deterred even with the extended US nuclear deterrence. There have been several instances of failing to deter North Korea when it came to provocations and nuclear tests if his dynasty is about to collapse how we can be sure that such an erratic and unpredictable leader will never resort to nuclear attack there is a high likelihood of miscalculation these are the questions uppermost in the minds of national security planners in the R o K The probability of deterrence failure even though it may be minimal, it’s too high to live with for those of us South Koreans who live in range of only minutes the consequences of deterrence failure are too awesome to be left to chances | There is a credibility gap between the US and ROK that there is a danger of deterrence failure a security deficit exists Pyongyang is moving full speed ahead unimpeded building its nuclear arsenal the South Korean people are getting increasingly anxious about mounting nuclear devices it will be a game changer in that it will no longer allow the R o K a margin of error in deterrence mounting insecurity lies the persistent doubt about whether North Korea can be deterred even with extended US deterrence these questions in the minds of national security planners | Well, I spent more than two years in the six-party talks to denuclearize North Korea, but since I have failed, miserably failed I don’t know if I’m entitled to say anything about that. But I don’t think we should give up efforts to denucleariz North Korea through peaceful means, but I think it’s time to be prepared for the failure of diplomacy and also failure of deterrence. There is a credibility gap, you know, between the US and ROK to the extent that there is a danger of deterrence failure and threat and a deficit, security deficit exists. I think the credibility gap comes from the way that US deals with two sources of security challenges to our risk. One is as we mentioned North Korea. Another is the rise of China. I don’t think I’ll have time to talk about China very much, but let me focus on North Korea. We all know that Pyongyang is moving full speed ahead unimpeded toward building its operational nuclear arsenal. Although the South Korean people are used to all kinds of threats from North Korea and invectives from Pyongyang, they are getting increasingly anxious about North Korea reaching the stage of mounting it’s nuclear devices on missiles, and once Pyongyang gets there, if not already there, it will be a game changer in that it will no longer allow the Republic of Korea a margin of error in deterrence and defenses against North Korea. At the heart of the mounting anxiety and sense of insecurity lies the persistent doubt about whether nuclear and North Korea can be effectively deterred even with the extended US nuclear deterrence. There have been several instances of failing to deter North Korea when it came to North Korea’s provocations their attack on our navy, our corvette, shelling of island and even nuclear explosion tests and long range missile tests. Kim Jong-Un may not casually resort to a nuclear attack. He is fully aware that such an attack means the end of North Korea as it is. However, the story is different if his dynasty is about to collapse anyway and if he sees the only and the last chance of fending off such a collapse in a nuclear attack and I wonder how we can be sure that such an erratic and unpredictable leader as Kim Yong-on with a track record of reckless provocations can, will never resort to nuclear attack under any circumstances, and what options are there if and when he miscalculates? I think there is a high likelihood of miscalculation judging from his track record and there are questions, these are the questions uppermost in the minds of national security planners in the Republic of Korea. The probability of deterrence failure, even though it may be minimal, it’s too high to live with for those of us South Koreans who live in range of only minutes from North Korea missiles, and the consequences of deterrence failure are too awesome to be left to chances. So what we need for more credible reassurance is to making up for deterrence deficit and re-enforce defenses just in case deterrence fails. I think to this end what we need more than anything is forward deployment of sufficient offensive and defensive assets to Korea in order to render North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal harmless before they actually use them. | 3,213 | <h4>Northern nuclear development and capability to attack the US causes South Korea and Asia to freak out and nuclearize—current deterrence doesn’t solve</h4><p><strong><mark>Yung-Woo,</mark> Former National Security Advisor to the President of the ROK and senior advisor at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, <mark>5/23/2015</strong></mark> Chun, chairman and founder of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, “REASSURANCE: WHAT DO ALLIES WANT?” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/04-230315carnegieREASSURANCEpanel.pdf</p><p>Well, I spent more than two years in the six-party talks to denuclearize North Korea, but since I have failed, miserably failed I don’t know if I’m entitled to say anything about that. But I don’t think we should give up efforts to denucleariz North Korea through peaceful means, but I think <u>it’s time to be prepared for the failure of diplomacy and</u> also failure of <u>deterrence</u>. <u><strong><mark>There is a credibility gap</u></strong></mark>, you know, <u><mark>between the US and ROK</mark> to the extent <mark>that there is a danger of deterrence failure</mark> and threat and <mark>a</mark> deficit,</u> <u><strong><mark>security deficit exists</u></strong></mark>. I think <u>the credibility gap comes from the way that US deals with</u> two sources of security challenges to our risk. <u>One</u> is as we mentioned <u>North Korea. Another</u> is the rise of <u>China</u>. I don’t think I’ll have time to talk about China very much, but let me focus on North Korea. We all know that <u><strong><mark>Pyongyang is moving full speed ahead unimpeded</mark> toward <mark>building its</mark> operational <mark>nuclear arsenal</u></strong></mark>. Although <u><mark>the South Korean people</u></mark> are used to all kinds of threats from North Korea and invectives from Pyongyang, they <u><strong><mark>are getting increasingly anxious</u></strong> <u>about</mark> North Korea reaching the stage of <mark>mounting</mark> it’s <mark>nuclear devices</mark> on missiles, and once Pyongyang gets there, if not already ther</u>e,<u><strong> <mark>it will be a game changer in that it will no longer allow the R</mark>epublic <mark>o</mark>f <mark>K</mark>orea <mark>a margin of error in deterrence</mark> and defenses against North Korea. </strong>At the heart of the <strong><mark>mounting </mark>anxiety</u></strong> <u>and</u> sense of <u><strong><mark>insecurity</u></strong> <u>lies the</u> <u><strong>persistent doubt</u></strong> <u>about whether</mark> nuclear and <mark>North Korea can be</mark> effectively <mark>deterred even with</mark> the <mark>extended US</mark> nuclear <mark>deterrence</mark>. There have been several instances of failing to deter North Korea when it came to</u> North Korea’s <u>provocations</u> their attack on our navy, our corvette, shelling of island <u>and</u> even <u>nuclear</u> explosion <u>tests</u> and long range missile tests. Kim Jong-Un may not casually resort to a nuclear attack. He is fully aware that such an attack means the end of North Korea as it is. However, the story is different <u>if his dynasty is about to collapse</u> anyway and if he sees the only and the last chance of fending off such a collapse in a nuclear attack and I wonder <u>how we can be sure that such an erratic and unpredictable leader</u> as Kim Yong-on with a track record of reckless provocations can, <u>will never resort to nuclear attack</u> under any circumstances, and what options are there if and when he miscalculates? I think <u>there is a high likelihood of miscalculation</u> judging from his track record and there are questions, <u><mark>these</mark> are the <mark>questions</mark> uppermost <mark>in the minds of national security planners</mark> in the</u> <u><strong>R</u></strong>epublic <u><strong>o</u></strong>f <u><strong>K</u></strong>orea. <u>The probability of deterrence failure</u>, <u><strong>even though it may be minimal, it’s too high to live with for those of us South Koreans</u></strong> <u>who live in range of only minutes</u> from North Korea missiles, and <u>the consequences of deterrence failure are <strong>too awesome to be left to chances</u></strong>. So what we need for more credible reassurance is to making up for deterrence deficit and re-enforce defenses just in case deterrence fails. I think to this end what we need more than anything is forward deployment of sufficient offensive and defensive assets to Korea in order to render North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal harmless before they actually use them.</p> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 461,438 | 20 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,677 | Arctic Governance creates Global Conflict De-escalation – Cooperation causes Paradigmatic Governance Shift | Heinenen, 16 – University of Lapland Arctic Politics Professor | Heinenen, 16 – University of Lapland Arctic Politics Professor
Lassi, author of more than 200 scientific publications and is the editor of The Arctic Yearbook. “High Arctic Stability as an Asset for Storms of International Politics,” Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-8, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lassi_Heininen/publication/303442996_High_Arctic_Stability_as_an_Asset_for_Storms_of_International_Politics_-_an_Introduction/links/57443e7608aea45ee84dee8b.pdf?origin=publication_detail, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott | null | null | All this sounds like an academic dialogue or … sovereignty and nationalistic security thinking. | 96 | <h4><strong>Arctic Governance creates Global Conflict De-escalation – Cooperation causes Paradigmatic Governance Shift</h4><p><mark>Heinenen, 16</mark> – University of Lapland Arctic Politics Professor</p><p></strong>Lassi, author of more than 200 scientific publications and is the editor of The Arctic Yearbook. “High Arctic Stability as an Asset for Storms of International Politics,” Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-8, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lassi_Heininen/publication/303442996_High_Arctic_Stability_as_an_Asset_for_Storms_of_International_Politics_-_an_Introduction/links/57443e7608aea45ee84dee8b.pdf?origin=publication_detail, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott</p><p>All this sounds like an academic dialogue or … sovereignty and nationalistic security thinking.</p> | null | null | Contention 1: Governance | 1,560,912 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,678 | Trade is key to maintaining global peace – empirics prove that trade creates disincentives for conflict | Griswold 11 | Griswold 11 [Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf] | Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. after World War I unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war. trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free trading nations cooperate more and fight less. trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found | Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” The number of wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. As national economies become intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. Trade helped keep peace in Europe for 60 years it has reduced the spoils of war Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through exchange rather than conquest least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. trading nations cooperate more and fight less trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, | Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, AfghanistaOn and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. | 7,316 | <h4>Trade is key to maintaining global peace – empirics prove that trade creates disincentives for conflict</h4><p><strong>Griswold 11</strong> [Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.”</u></mark> It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, AfghanistaOn and Libya, but <u>our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world</u>. <u><mark>The number of </mark>civil and international<mark> wars</mark> <mark>has dropped sharply in the past 15 years</mark>,</u> along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again <u>the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role</u>. <u><mark>Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries.</u> </mark>In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution <u>after World War I</u>. Hull believed that “<u>unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.</u>” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, <u>trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other</u>. A second and even more potent way that <u>trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war</u>. <u><mark>As national economies become </mark>more <mark>intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out</u>.</mark> War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. <u><mark>Trade</mark> and economic integration has <mark>helped </mark>to<mark> keep</mark> the <mark>peace in Europe for </mark>more than <mark>60 years</mark>.</u> More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because <u><mark>it has reduced the spoils of war</mark>. <mark>Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through</mark> production and <mark>exchange rather than conquest </mark>of territory and resources.</u> <u>As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital</u>. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, <u>only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another.</u> Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the <mark>least <u>free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free</u>.</mark> A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “<u><mark>trading nations cooperate more and fight less</mark>.</u>” In fact, a doubling of <u><mark>trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent</u>. <u>Trade was the most important channel for peace,</mark> they found</u>, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West.</p> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 160,945 | 135 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,679 | Action now is crucial and the plan is key––trying to live with a nuclear DPRK is not an option––absent the plan it shreds US resolve, decks the NPT, and freaks out East Asian allies | Revere 10/4 | Evans J.R. Revere 10/4, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea”, 10/4/16, https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-a-nuclear-armed-north-korea/ | Living with a nuclear North Korea the United States could decide to “live with” a nuclear North Korea and rely on containment and deterrence to defend itself and its allies, manage the continuing nuclear threat, and prevent nuclear proliferation. Taking this path would reverse years of U.S. policy by accepting the permanence of the North’s nuclear arsenal. It would damage fatally, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime It would shake the confidence of America’s South Korean and Japanese allies, who have adamantly refused to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status Calls would escalate in both South Korea and Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability. North Korea would have no practical restraints on its ability to enhance its nuclear and missile arsenals. The temptation to engage in proliferation would be strong, especially since the fabric of the NPT had been damaged and American resolve was now questionable. Pyongyang could be tempted to use its nuclear weapons capability to threaten Accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state would make things worse, not better. | he United States could decide to “live with” a nuclear North Korea Taking this path would reverse years of U.S. policy by accepting the permanence of the North’s nuclear arsenal. It would damage fatally, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime It would shake the confidence of America’s South Korean and Japanese allies, who have adamantly refused to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear status Calls would escalate in both South Korea and Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability. The temptation to engage in proliferation would be strong, especially since the fabric of the NPT had been damaged and American resolve was now questionable Accepting North Korea would make things worse | Living with a nuclear North Korea. Some argue that the United States and the international community are already living with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and that we should now accept the fact of a permanently nuclear-armed DPRK. While the DPRK cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States could decide to “live with” a nuclear North Korea and rely on containment and deterrence to defend itself and its allies, manage the continuing nuclear threat, and prevent nuclear proliferation. Taking this path would reverse years of U.S. policy by accepting the permanence of the North’s nuclear arsenal. It would damage, perhaps fatally, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime by signaling that the Pyongyang regime has now achieved its nuclear goals and is a de facto member of the “nuclear club.” It would shake the confidence of America’s South Korean and Japanese allies, who have adamantly refused to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status. Seoul and Tokyo would require further extended deterrent assurances from the United States, well above the robust steps that the Obama administration has already taken. Calls would escalate in both South Korea and Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability. Meanwhile, North Korea would have no practical restraints on its ability to enhance its nuclear and missile arsenals. The temptation to engage in proliferation would be strong, especially since the fabric of the NPT had been damaged and American resolve was now questionable. Pyongyang could be tempted to use its nuclear weapons capability to threaten, intimidate, or blackmail, especially since the United States would be seen as having capitulated in its efforts to end the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. Accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state would make things worse, not better. | 1,886 | <h4>Action now is crucial and the plan is key––trying to live with a nuclear DPRK is not an option––absent the plan it shreds US resolve, decks the NPT, and freaks out East Asian allies</h4><p>Evans J.R. <strong>Revere 10/4<u></strong>, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea”, 10/4/16, https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-a-nuclear-armed-north-korea/</p><p><strong>Living with a nuclear North Korea</u></strong>. Some argue that the United States and the international community are already living with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and that we should now accept the fact of a permanently nuclear-armed DPRK. While the DPRK cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), <u>t<mark>he United States could decide to “live with” a nuclear North Korea</mark> and rely on containment and deterrence to defend itself and its allies, manage the continuing nuclear threat, and prevent nuclear proliferation. <strong><mark>Taking this path would reverse years of U.S. policy by accepting the permanence of the North’s nuclear arsenal. It would damage</u></strong></mark>, perhaps <u><strong><mark>fatally, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime</mark> </u></strong>by signaling that the Pyongyang regime has now achieved its nuclear goals and is a de facto member of the “nuclear club.” <u><strong><mark>It would shake the confidence of America’s</strong> South Korean and Japanese <strong>allies</strong>, who have adamantly refused to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear</mark> weapons <mark>status</u></mark>. Seoul and Tokyo would require further extended deterrent assurances from the United States, well above the robust steps that the Obama administration has already taken. <u><mark>Calls would escalate in both South Korea and Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability.</u></mark> Meanwhile, <u>North Korea would have no practical restraints on its ability to enhance its nuclear and missile arsenals. <mark>The temptation to engage in proliferation would be strong, especially since the <strong>fabric of the NPT had been damaged and American resolve was now questionable</mark>. </strong>Pyongyang could be tempted to use its nuclear weapons capability to threaten</u>, intimidate, or blackmail, especially since the United States would be seen as having capitulated in its efforts to end the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. <u><mark>Accepting North Korea</mark> as a de facto nuclear weapons state <mark>would make things worse</mark>, not better.</p></u> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 1,559,397 | 3 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,680 | Global Governance is in FLUX – effective transition solves ALL conflicts | Bremmer, 9/30 – NYU Global Research Professor, Eurasia Group President | Bremmer, 9/30 – NYU Global Research Professor, Eurasia Group President
Ian, president and founder of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm, “After the G-Zero: Overcoming fragmentation”, FALL 2016, http://www.eurasiagroup.net/siteFiles/Issues/After_The_G_Zero_.pdf, Accessed 10/3/16, Scott | null | null | The G-Zero will not last forever… whether they actually want to. | 65 | <h4><strong>Global Governance is in FLUX – effective transition solves ALL conflicts</h4><p><mark>Bremmer, 9/30</mark> – NYU Global Research Professor, Eurasia Group President</p><p></strong>Ian, president and founder of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm, “After the G-Zero: Overcoming fragmentation”, FALL 2016, http://www.eurasiagroup.net/siteFiles/Issues/After_The_G_Zero_.pdf, Accessed 10/3/16, Scott</p><p>The G-Zero will not last forever… whether they actually want to.</p> | null | null | Contention 1: Governance | 1,560,913 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,681 | OBOR is key to preventing a global economic collapse – allows U.S. investors and spills over – encourages global investments | Luft 16 ( | Luft 16 (Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play) MAM | The B&R will guide China’s economic and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. resisting China’s regional economic initiatives puts Washington in an uncomfortable position with some of its closest partners, many of which see the B&R as a useful tool for pulling the global economy out of the doldrums. Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks that they require to achieve their development goals. The investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent of that need—and even if the AIIB and China’s other funding outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. The United States should not allow its concerns about great-power rivalry to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity. .S. officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the potential benefits it offers, provided that Beijing leads the effort trans¬parently and ensures that it works largely in the service of inter¬national development rather than China’s own gain. By cautiously embracing the B&R, the U S could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by the biggest economic development project in history. Washington’ could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth by becoming a more active participant in the B&R’s various related institutions, the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. ogether, China and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s economic growth. At a time when the world economy is facing a potentially prolonged stagnation, Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing development agendas than stepping on each other’s toes. | The B&R will guide China’s economic and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. the B&R as a useful tool for pulling the global economy out of the doldrums. Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent The U S should not allow its concerns to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the benefits , the U S could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by the biggest economic development project in history. the U S would be positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing development agendas | The B&R will guide China’s economic and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Yet many China watchers in the United States have downplayed the initiative’s importance, suggesting that it is a pub¬lic¬ity stunt meant to portray China as a benevolent power, a vanity project intended to secure Xi’s legacy, or an unwieldy boondoggle that China, which has struggled with some development initiatives in the past, will fail to execute.Nowhere is this underappreciation more apparent than in Washington. Congress has not held a single hearing dedicated to the B&R; neither has the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body that Congress created in 2000 to monitor bilateral trade and security issues. At both the 2015 and the 2016 meetings of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the highest-level annual summit held between the two countries, U.S. and Chinese officials detailed more than 100 areas of potential cooperation without mention¬ing the B&R once, and in their public statements, U.S. officials tend to refer to the initiative in vague terms. Washington has not only refused to acknowledge the importance of the B&R; in some cases, the Americans have attempted to undermine it, as when the United States futilely opposed the creation of the AIIB. This passive-aggressive approach is misguided: it allows China to shape Eurasia’s economic and political future without U.S. input; it denies American investors opportunities to profit from major infra¬structure projects; and, insofar as it seeks to weaken the initiative, it could stifle a source of much-needed growth for Asia’s developing economies and Europe’s stagnating ones. As the failed U.S. attempt to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB shows, resisting China’s regional economic initiatives puts Washington in an uncomfortable position with some of its closest partners, many of which see the B&R as a useful tool for pulling the global economy out of the doldrums. U.S. officials should also be mindful of history: transnational infrastructure projects have often bred hostility among great powers when not managed collaboratively, as the grandiose rail projects of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom did in the years leading up to World War I. The United States’ failure to properly respond to the B&R is especially striking given that Washington inadvertently helped precipitate Beijing’s interest in the project. The “rebalance,” or “pivot,” to Asia that U.S. President Barack Obama initiated in 2011 has proved hollow, but it has nevertheless reinforced China’s sense of encirclement by the United States and its allies, as has the Obama administration’s de facto exclusion of China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Those actions killed many of China’s ambitions in the Pacific, leading Beijing to seek strategic opportunities to its west. In addition, by opposing China’s calls for a larger voting share at the International Monetary Fund in the first decade of this century, the United States pushed Beijing to establish a multilateral lender of its own. And by backing restrictions on projects that violated American environmental standards at the World Bank—where, in 2013, the United States supported a ban on funding for most new coal-fired power plants—the United States made room for Beijing to develop alternative institutions with the knowledge that it could find customers among its less scrupulous neighbors. Even the United States’ unsustainable federal debt played a role in the creation of the B&R: as it ballooned in the years after the 2008 financial crisis, the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds plummeted, pushing China, the world’s largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, to direct more of its massive savings to infrastructure instead. BACKING THE BIG DIG Over the course of the next four years, Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks that they require to achieve their development goals. The investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent of that need—and even if the AIIB and China’s other funding outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. The United States should not allow its concerns about great-power rivalry to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity. Above all, Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships with the Asian countries where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such a course would grant countries such as Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka inordinate power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington. Instead, Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind. U.S. officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the potential benefits it offers, provided that Beijing leads the effort trans¬parently and ensures that it works largely in the service of inter¬national development rather than China’s own gain. The two countries should then find a bilateral forum—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is just one option—in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the United States that plays to its strengths. American defense contractors, for example, could provide physical security and cybersecurity services to B&R projects, and the U.S. military could help secure some of the more volatile regions where Washington already has military assets, such as the Horn of Africa. That would spare China the need to increase its overseas military presence and bolster the legitimacy of the U.S. forces working in those areas. The United States should reassure some of its allies, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where anxiety about China’s ascendance runs deep, that the B&R is largely a force for economic development rather than Chinese expansionism. And U.S. officials should seek a role for Washington in the AIIB, either as a member of the bank or as an observer. Such a course would have a number of benefits. By cautiously embracing the B&R, the United States could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by what might become the biggest economic development project in history. Washington’s engagement could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth and, by extension, on the U.S. economy. And by becoming a more active participant in the B&R’s various related institutions, the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. Together, China and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s economic growth. At a time when the world economy is facing a potentially prolonged stagnation, Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing their development agendas than stepping on each other’s toes. | 7,087 | <h4>OBOR is key to preventing a global economic collapse – allows U.S. investors and spills over – encourages global investments</h4><p><strong>Luft 16 (</strong>Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play<u>) MAM</p><p><mark>The B&R will guide China’s economic and foreign policy for the foreseeable future.</u></mark> Yet many China watchers in the United States have downplayed the initiative’s importance, suggesting that it is a pub¬lic¬ity stunt meant to portray China as a benevolent power, a vanity project intended to secure Xi’s legacy, or an unwieldy boondoggle that China, which has struggled with some development initiatives in the past, will fail to execute.Nowhere is this underappreciation more apparent than in Washington. Congress has not held a single hearing dedicated to the B&R; neither has the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body that Congress created in 2000 to monitor bilateral trade and security issues. At both the 2015 and the 2016 meetings of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the highest-level annual summit held between the two countries, U.S. and Chinese officials detailed more than 100 areas of potential cooperation without mention¬ing the B&R once, and in their public statements, U.S. officials tend to refer to the initiative in vague terms. Washington has not only refused to acknowledge the importance of the B&R; in some cases, the Americans have attempted to undermine it, as when the United States futilely opposed the creation of the AIIB. This passive-aggressive approach is misguided: it allows China to shape Eurasia’s economic and political future without U.S. input; it denies American investors opportunities to profit from major infra¬structure projects; and, insofar as it seeks to weaken the initiative, it could stifle a source of much-needed growth for Asia’s developing economies and Europe’s stagnating ones. As the failed U.S. attempt to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB shows, <u>resisting China’s regional economic initiatives puts Washington in an uncomfortable position with some of its closest partners, many of which see <mark>the B&R as a useful tool for pulling the global economy out of the doldrums.</u></mark> U.S. officials should also be mindful of history: transnational infrastructure projects have often bred hostility among great powers when not managed collaboratively, as the grandiose rail projects of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom did in the years leading up to World War I. The United States’ failure to properly respond to the B&R is especially striking given that Washington inadvertently helped precipitate Beijing’s interest in the project. The “rebalance,” or “pivot,” to Asia that U.S. President Barack Obama initiated in 2011 has proved hollow, but it has nevertheless reinforced China’s sense of encirclement by the United States and its allies, as has the Obama administration’s de facto exclusion of China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Those actions killed many of China’s ambitions in the Pacific, leading Beijing to seek strategic opportunities to its west. In addition, by opposing China’s calls for a larger voting share at the International Monetary Fund in the first decade of this century, the United States pushed Beijing to establish a multilateral lender of its own. And by backing restrictions on projects that violated American environmental standards at the World Bank—where, in 2013, the United States supported a ban on funding for most new coal-fired power plants—the United States made room for Beijing to develop alternative institutions with the knowledge that it could find customers among its less scrupulous neighbors. Even the United States’ unsustainable federal debt played a role in the creation of the B&R: as it ballooned in the years after the 2008 financial crisis, the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds plummeted, pushing China, the world’s largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, to direct more of its massive savings to infrastructure instead. BACKING THE BIG DIG Over the course of the next four years, <u><mark>Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks</mark> that they require to achieve their development goals. The <mark>investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent</mark> of that need—and even if the AIIB and China’s other funding outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. <mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should not allow its concerns</mark> about great-power rivalry <mark>to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity</mark>. </u>Above all, Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships with the Asian countries where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such a course would grant countries such as Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka inordinate power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington. Instead, Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind. U<u>.S. <mark>officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the </mark>potential <mark>benefits </mark>it offers<mark>,</mark> provided that Beijing leads the effort trans¬parently and ensures that it works largely in the service of inter¬national development rather than China’s own gain. </u>The two countries should then find a bilateral forum—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is just one option—in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the United States that plays to its strengths. American defense contractors, for example, could provide physical security and cybersecurity services to B&R projects, and the U.S. military could help secure some of the more volatile regions where Washington already has military assets, such as the Horn of Africa. That would spare China the need to increase its overseas military presence and bolster the legitimacy of the U.S. forces working in those areas. The United States should reassure some of its allies, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where anxiety about China’s ascendance runs deep, that the B&R is largely a force for economic development rather than Chinese expansionism. And U.S. officials should seek a role for Washington in the AIIB, either as a member of the bank or as an observer. Such a course would have a number of benefits. <u>By cautiously embracing the B&R, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited<u><mark> S</u></mark>tates<u><mark> could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by </u></mark>what might become<u><mark> the biggest economic development project in history.</u> <u></mark>Washington’</u>s engagement<u> could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth </u>and, by extension, on the U.S. economy. And <u>by becoming a more active participant in the B&R’s various related institutions, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>would be</mark> better <mark>positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. </u></mark>T<u>ogether, China and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s economic growth. At a time when the world economy is facing a potentially prolonged stagnation, <mark>Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing </u></mark>their <u><mark>development agendas</mark> than stepping on each other’s toes.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 1,560,914 | 2 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,682 | South Korean nuclearization spills over – undermines the entirety of the US alliance structure, collapses the NPT, causes an Asian proliferation race, and causes Russia and Chinese aggression. | Kuzminski, Strategic Planner on the Army Staff, 3/1/2016 http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html | Kuzminski, Strategic Planner on the Army Staff, 3/1/2016 Frank, graduate of West Point and Harvard University, Major Kuzminski served as an infantry officer for 10 years, including two years with the U.S. Army’s Second Infantry Division in South Korea. “No Nukes in South Korea” http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html | Major Lee argues that the United States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal, This is a false dichotomy and fails to consider the global and strategic consequences of such an outcome. the United States does not dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea is party to the NPT and remains committed , a nuclear ROK) will make the region less secure, and threaten to turn the South into a pariah state Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and lead to a collapse of the delicate nonproliferation regime. encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South North Korea’s long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening Jong-Un does not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The real purpose behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is to ensure the regime’s long-term survival These effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, but also other agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Iran’s capacity to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief and is predicated on the enduring strength of the NPT Controlling the world’s most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international community’s commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal the growing perception that America’s global leadership on important matters is waning towards irrelevance. the most dangerous impact of the United States allowing South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is the erosion of confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella which underwrites its seven military alliances, including NATO Such would represent a striking policy reversal by the United States, and violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. The United States has led the global security order since the end of World War II, largely on the premise of a credible, extended deterren NATO’s clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a “core element of the Alliance’s overall strategy.” Any indication that Washington’s nuclear umbrella is somehow “imprecise would raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment to its allies Given Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine and on NATO’s flank in Eastern Europe as well as China’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea such doubts will surely invite further aggressive behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States. If South Korea withdraws from the NPT, it would likely draw stiff opposition from China and the rest of the world Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a vocal minority, led by Mong-joon, Korean nukes are neither in South Korea’s, nor in the United States’ strategic interests. South Korea risks undoing years of economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a nuclear arms race in North East Asia, if not around the world The United States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must oppose any such unilateral effort . For its sake, Seoul must resist letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle and deal with North Korea in innovative ways. Anything else would play right into Kim Jong-Un’s hands. | South Korea is party to the NPT a nuclear ROK) will make the region less secure, and turn the South into a pariah state going nuclear would undermine the N p T and lead to a collapse of the regime the U S risks eroding the credibility of its deterrent, and the strength of its alliances effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where potential for proliferation exists. If countries perceive the U S is ceding its leadership in favor of the interests of a regional power like South Korea other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw and develop their own weapons a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is other agreements, such as the J C P A which limits Iran’s capacity d is predicated on the enduring strength of the NPT. finger-pointing and accusations will seal the perception that America’s leadership is waning the most dangerous impact is the erosion of America’s nuclear umbrella which underwrites alliances, including NATO Any indication that Washington’s umbrella is imprecise would raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment Given Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine as well as China’s coercive behavior in the S C S such doubts will surely invite further aggressive behavior lead to a dangerous world South Korea risks undoing economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a arms race in N E A if not around the world. T | In a recent article, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee argues that the United States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal, stating that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering his nuclear and ballistic missile program. This argument is a false dichotomy and fails to consider, or at least properly weigh, the global and strategic consequences of such an outcome. First of all, the United States does not dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains committed to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Republic of Korea (ROK) will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten to turn the South into a pariah state like its errant, northern neighbor. Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South with little or no warning; North Korea’s long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening as, if not more destructive than, North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The real purpose behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is to ensure the regime’s long-term survival, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously. According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, North Korea’s ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is South Korea’s top trading partner by far – South Korea can only lose in a strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. These effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept the total number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Iran’s capacity to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on the enduring strength of the NPT. Controlling the world’s most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international community’s commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal the growing perception that America’s global leadership on important matters is waning towards irrelevance. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of the United States allowing South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is the erosion of confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrent, which underwrites its seven military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such a move would represent a striking policy reversal by the United States, as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009, and violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. At the 47th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd, 2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter affirmed the “continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.” The United States has led the global security order since the end of World War II, largely on the premise of a credible, extended deterrent afforded by its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted in November of 2010, clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a “core element of the Alliance’s overall strategy.” Any indication that Washington’s nuclear umbrella is somehow “imprecise,” as Major Lee suggests, would raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment to its allies. Given Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine and on NATO’s flank in Eastern Europe, as well as China’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea, such doubts will surely invite further aggressive behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States. Major Lee does correctly point out, however, that the international community is not doing enough to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Although the recently announced dialogue on basing a U.S. Army THAAD battery on the Korea peninsula is a positive step, this capability is aimed at defending both South Korea and the U.S. homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles, and it doesn’t really prevent North Korea from developing more nukes. It’s no secret that China, Pyongyang’s sole benefactor, has grown weary of Kim Jong-Un’s belligerence. The U.S. and ROK must work together to convince Beijing that a unified Korea run from Seoul is a better alternative to the status quo. This will require a lot of effort to address the potential for millions of North Korean refugees fleeing north into China in the event of regime collapse, not to mention U.S. troops’ presence in Korea post unification, and the disposition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. China clearly values its relationship with South Korea, and vice versa, and President Park and her government should work with China on resolving the North Korean issue, rather than isolating themselves with nuclear arms. If South Korea withdraws from the NPT, it would likely draw stiff opposition from China and the rest of the world, much like North Korea did in the wake of its own withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The only way South Korea can affect North Korea’s nuclear program, short of military action, is to undermine the Kim regime and precipitate a collapse by penetrating the hermit kingdom with information. Consider North Korea’s panicked reaction when South Korea used loudspeaker broadcasts last summer to blast news and K-Pop music across the Demilitarized Zone. Kim Jong-Un fears being exposed for the fraud that he is. South Korea should do everything it can to unravel North Korea’s isolation from the outside world. There’s no question that North Korea’s nuclear program is a danger to the entire world, and a more direct approach, which includes China, is needed to counter this threat. Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a vocal minority, led by Mr. Chong Mong-joon, a South Korean businessman and erstwhile political operative, South Korean nukes are neither in South Korea’s, nor in the United States’ strategic interests. South Korea risks undoing years of economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a nuclear arms race in North East Asia, if not around the world. The United States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must oppose any such unilateral effort by Seoul. South Korea’s greatest advantage over North Korea is its extensive integration in the global economy as one of the world’s top trading power. For its sake, Seoul must resist letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle and deal with North Korea in innovative ways. Anything else would play right into Kim Jong-Un’s hands. | 8,989 | <h4>South Korean nuclearization spills over – undermines the entirety of the US alliance structure, collapses the NPT, causes an Asian proliferation race, and causes Russia and Chinese aggression. </h4><p><strong>Kuzminski, Strategic Planner on the Army Staff, 3/1/2016 </strong>Frank, graduate of West Point and Harvard University, Major Kuzminski served as an infantry officer for 10 years, including two years with the U.S. Army’s Second Infantry Division in South Korea. “No Nukes in South Korea” <u><strong>http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html</p><p></u></strong>In a recent article, U.S. Army <u>Major</u> Christopher <u>Lee argues that the United States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal,</u> stating that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering his nuclear and ballistic missile program. <u>This</u> argument <u><strong>is a false dichotomy</u></strong> <u>and fails to consider</u>, or at least properly weigh, <u><strong>the global and strategic consequences of such an outcome. </u></strong>First of all, <u>the United States does not dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; <mark>South Korea is party to the</u></mark> Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (<u><strong><mark>NPT</u></strong></mark>) <u>and remains committed</u> to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover<u>, <mark>a nuclear</u></mark>-armed Republic of Korea (<u><mark>ROK) will</u></mark>, in fact, <u><strong><mark>make the</mark> <mark>region less secure</strong>, and</mark> threaten to <mark>turn the South into a <strong>pariah state</u></strong> </mark>like its errant, northern neighbor. Additionally, <u>Seoul <mark>going nuclear would <strong>undermine the N</mark>uclear Non<mark>p</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty</u></strong> (NPT), <u><mark>and <strong>lead to a collapse of the</mark> delicate nonproliferation <mark>regime</mark>. </u></strong>By <u>encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>risks</mark> <strong>seriously <mark>eroding the credibility of its</mark> extended <mark>deterrent, and the strength of its alliances</mark>. </u></strong>South Korea acquiring its own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. <u>While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South</u> with little or no warning; <u>North Korea’s long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and <strong>biological weapons are just as threatening</strong> </u>as, if not more destructive than, North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim <u>Jong-Un does not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The real purpose behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is to ensure the<strong> regime’s long-term survival</u></strong>, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously. According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, North Korea’s ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is South Korea’s top trading partner by far – South Korea can only lose in a strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. <u>These <mark>effects may <strong>spill over into other regions, such as the</mark> <mark>Middle East, where</mark> the <mark>potential for</mark> nuclear <mark>proliferation </strong>exists. If countries perceive the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is <strong>ceding its leadership</mark> in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons</strong>, <mark>in favor of the</mark> parochial <mark>interests of a regional power like South Korea</mark>, one can easily envision that <mark>other countries, <strong>such as</mark> <mark>Saudi Arabia, will withdraw</mark> from the NPT <mark>and develop their own</mark> nuclear <mark>weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u>The potential for <mark>a <strong>nuclear arms race</strong> among</u> <u>second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is</mark> not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime,</u> which has kept the total number of nuclear-armed states to nine, <u>but also <mark>other agreements, <strong>such as the J</mark>oint <mark>C</mark>omprehensive <mark>P</mark>lan of <mark>A</mark>ction, <mark>which limits Iran’s capacity</mark> to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief</u></strong>, <u>an<mark>d is predicated on the <strong>enduring strength of the NPT</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Controlling the world’s most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international community’s commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high.</u> <u><strong>If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing.</u></strong> <u>The subsequent <mark>finger-pointing and accusations</mark> by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea <mark>will</mark> <strong>also <mark>seal the</mark> growing <mark>perception that America’s</mark> global <mark>leadership</mark> on important matters <mark>is waning</mark> towards irrelevance. </u></strong>Perhaps <u><mark>the most dangerous impact</mark> of the United States allowing South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons <mark>is the <strong>erosion of</mark> confidence in <mark>America’s nuclear umbrella</u></strong></mark>, or extended deterrent, <u><mark>which</mark> <mark>underwrites</mark> its seven military <mark>alliances, including</u></mark> the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (<u><strong><mark>NATO</u></strong></mark>). <u>Such</u> a move <u>would represent a <strong>striking policy reversal by the United States,</u></strong> as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009, <u>and violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies.</u> At the 47th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd, 2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter affirmed the “continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.” <u>The United States has led <strong>the global security order</strong> since the end of World War II, largely on the premise of a <strong>credible, extended deterren</u></strong>t afforded by its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, <u>NATO’s</u> Strategic Concept, adopted in November of 2010, <u>clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a “core element of the Alliance’s overall strategy.” <mark>Any indication that Washington’s</mark> nuclear <mark>umbrella is</mark> somehow “<mark>imprecise</u></mark>,” as Major Lee suggests, <u><strong><mark>would raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment</mark> to its allies</u></strong>. <u><mark>Given</mark> <strong><mark>Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine</mark> and on NATO’s flank in Eastern Europe</u></strong>, <u><mark>as well as China’s <strong>coercive</mark> <mark>behavior in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea</u></strong>, <u><mark>such doubts will surely <strong>invite further aggressive behavior</mark> by these countries, <mark>lead to a</mark> more <mark>dangerous world</mark>, and reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States. </u></strong>Major Lee does correctly point out, however, that the international community is not doing enough to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Although the recently announced dialogue on basing a U.S. Army THAAD battery on the Korea peninsula is a positive step, this capability is aimed at defending both South Korea and the U.S. homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles, and it doesn’t really prevent North Korea from developing more nukes. It’s no secret that China, Pyongyang’s sole benefactor, has grown weary of Kim Jong-Un’s belligerence. The U.S. and ROK must work together to convince Beijing that a unified Korea run from Seoul is a better alternative to the status quo. This will require a lot of effort to address the potential for millions of North Korean refugees fleeing north into China in the event of regime collapse, not to mention U.S. troops’ presence in Korea post unification, and the disposition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. China clearly values its relationship with South Korea, and vice versa, and President Park and her government should work with China on resolving the North Korean issue, rather than isolating themselves with nuclear arms. <u>If South Korea withdraws from the NPT, it would likely <strong>draw stiff opposition from China</u></strong> <u>and the rest of the world</u>, much like North Korea did in the wake of its own withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The only way South Korea can affect North Korea’s nuclear program, short of military action, is to undermine the Kim regime and precipitate a collapse by penetrating the hermit kingdom with information. Consider North Korea’s panicked reaction when South Korea used loudspeaker broadcasts last summer to blast news and K-Pop music across the Demilitarized Zone. Kim Jong-Un fears being exposed for the fraud that he is. South Korea should do everything it can to unravel North Korea’s isolation from the outside world. There’s no question that North Korea’s nuclear program is a danger to the entire world, and a more direct approach, which includes China, is needed to counter this threat. <u>Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a vocal minority, led by</u> Mr. Chong <u>Mong-joon,</u> a South Korean businessman and erstwhile political operative, South <u>Korean nukes are neither in South Korea’s, nor in the United States’ strategic interests. <mark>South Korea</mark> <mark>risks undoing</mark> years <strong>of <mark>economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a</mark> nuclear <mark>arms race</mark> <mark>in N</mark>orth <mark>E</mark>ast <mark>A</mark>sia, <mark>if not around the world</u></strong>. <u>T</mark>he United States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must oppose any such unilateral effort </u>by Seoul. South Korea’s greatest advantage over North Korea is its extensive integration in the global economy as one of the world’s top trading power<u>. For its sake, Seoul must resist letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle and deal with North Korea in innovative ways. <strong>Anything else would play right into Kim Jong-Un’s hands. </p></u></strong> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Advantage 2 | 21,397 | 74 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,683 | Real, anthropogenic, and threatens extinction | Griffin, 15 – Claremont Graduate University Philosophy of Religion Emeritus Professor | Griffin, 15 – Claremont Graduate University Philosophy of Religion Emeritus Professor | , Accessed 9/30/16, Scott
energy with clean as soon as possible. | null | David Ray, “The climate is ruined. So can civilization even survive?”, Updated 2:59 PM ET, Tue April 14, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/opinion/co2-crisis-griffin/, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott
Although most of us worry about other … energy with clean as soon as possible. | 272 | <h4><strong>Real, anthropogenic, and threatens extinction </h4><p><mark>Griffin, 15</mark> – Claremont Graduate University Philosophy of Religion Emeritus Professor</p><p></strong>David Ray, “The climate is ruined. So can civilization even survive?”, Updated 2:59 PM ET, Tue April 14, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/opinion/co2-crisis-griffin/<u><strong>, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott</p><p></u></strong>Although most of us worry about other … <u><strong>energy with clean as soon as possible.</p></u></strong> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,915 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,684 | Economic decline causes war and miscalculation | Royal 10 | Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215) | economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact and defence behaviour of interdependent states. rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power increasing the risk of miscalculation 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. if the expectations of future trade decline the likelihood for conflict increases Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict “Diversionary theory" suggests tha+t, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views. | economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition increasing the risk of miscalculation if the expectations of future trade decline the likelihood for conflict increases Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict Diversionary theory" suggests when facing unpopularity governments fabricate external conflicts | Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. ¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. ¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) ¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests tha+t, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. ¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. ¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views. | 4,964 | <h4>Economic decline causes war and miscalculation </h4><p><strong>Royal 10</strong> — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)</p><p>Less intuitive is how periods of <u><mark>economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict</u></mark>. Political science <u>literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact</u> of economic decline and the security <u>and defence behaviour of interdependent states.</u> Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. ¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that <u><mark>rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition</u></mark> from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as <u>economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power</u> (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, <u><mark>increasing the risk of miscalculation</u></mark> (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. ¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that <u>'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable</u> in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that <u>interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations.</u> However, <u><mark>if the expectations of future trade decline</u></mark>, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, <u><mark>the likelihood for conflict increases</u></mark>, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. <u><mark>Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict</u></mark>, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) ¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. <u>“<mark>Diversionary theory" suggests</mark> tha+t, <mark>when facing unpopularity</mark> arising from economic decline, sitting <mark>governments</mark> have increased incentives to <mark>fabricate external</mark> military <mark>conflicts</u></mark> to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. ¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. ¶<u> This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 1 is Trade | null | 26,749 | 968 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,685 | US expertise can move China from rule-based to risk-based anti-money laundering | Xue Zhang 16 | Yao-Wen Xue and Yan-Hua Zhang 16, Xue is a professor of financial economics at Shanxi Normal University, and Zhang is a professor at Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, 2016, “Research on money laundering risk assessment of customers – based on the empirical research of China”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 19 Iss: 3, pp.249 - 26 | China established its “rule-based” regulatory approach of (AML) in 2003 a lot of manpower, finances and resources were consumed to monitor money laundering activities however, the regulatory effectiveness is low a lot of money laundering activities were not detected and there was much capital flight from China this paper considers adjusting the regulatory approach based on strategy the UK and the USA are gradually moving toward implementing the “risk-based” AML regulatory approach. it is necessary to analyze the execution effects of the USA and draw lessons from their effective methods and strategies the annual average number of suspicious transaction reports submitted by the financial institutions of China exceeds 45 million copies per year, with the USA submitting about 1.4 million copies Regarding the status quo for tens of millions of copies of the suspicious transaction reports and the low actual regulatory effectiveness, Tang Xu of People’s Bank of China AML bureau thinks it is mainly caused by the mechanical submission of the “rule-based” regulatory approach This article considers learning from the foreign AML advanced experience to evaluate money laundering risk of customers and then gradually make the transition to the “risk-based” regulatory approach. | China established its “rule-based” regulatory approach of (AML) in 2003 however the effectiveness is low: a lot of money laundering activities were not detected and there was much capital flight from China it is necessary to analyze the execution effects of the US and draw lessons from their effective strategies the annual average number of suspicious reports submitted by the financial institutions of China exceeds 45 million per year, with the USA submitting about 1.4 million copies it is mainly caused by the mechanical submission of the “rule-based” regulatory approach This considers learning from the foreign AML advanced experience to | China established its “rule-based” regulatory approach of anti-money laundering (AML) in 2003, with numerous institutions and scholars studying and practicing the approach concerning AML activities. Implemented over 10 years, on the one hand, a lot of manpower, finances and resources were consumed to monitor money laundering activities; however, on the other hand, the regulatory effectiveness is relatively low: a lot of money laundering activities were not detected and there was much capital flight from China. Thus, this paper considers adjusting the regulatory approach based on strategy. Currently, the world’s AML regulatory approach is conducted in two ways: “rule-based” and “risk-based”. As pioneers in the field of AML, the UK and the USA are gradually moving toward implementing the “risk-based” AML regulatory approach. AML work started late in China, so it is necessary to analyze the execution effects of China, the USA and the UK’s AML systems and draw lessons from their effective methods and strategies. Because China began to carry out new AML standards in 2007 and released the first version’s report in 2008, this article selects China, the USA and the UK’s anti-laundering data from 2008 to 2013 and presents comparisons of the execution effects of AML systems in these three countries. Additionally, as seen from the following three tables, the annual average number of suspicious transaction reports submitted by the financial institutions of China exceeds 45 million copies per year, with the USA submitting about 1.4 million copies and the UK submitting only more than 200,000 copies. (Tables I-III) Comparing nearly six years of AML regulatory effectiveness of China, the USA and the UK, this paper found suspicious transaction reports submitted annually: on average, China having 187 times that of the UK and 32 times the USA; however, as to the money laundering cases found according to the suspicious transaction reports, the UK has about five times that of China and ten times the USA. Regarding the status quo for tens of millions of copies of the suspicious transaction reports and the low actual regulatory effectiveness, Tang Xu of People’s Bank of China AML bureau thinks it is mainly caused by the mechanical submission of the “rule-based” regulatory approach (Tang et al., 2009a, pp. 6-7). The mainstream view is that China’s current “rule-based” regulatory approach no longer adapts to the objective reality and needs to adjust to the regulatory approach in time. This article considers learning from the foreign AML advanced experience to evaluate money laundering risk of customers and then gradually make the transition to the “risk-based” regulatory approach. | 2,704 | <h4>US expertise can move China from rule-based to risk-based anti-money laundering</h4><p>Yao-Wen <strong>Xue </strong>and Yan-Hua <strong>Zhang 16<u></strong>, Xue is a professor of financial economics at Shanxi Normal University, and Zhang is a professor at Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, 2016, “Research on money laundering risk assessment of customers – based on the empirical research of China”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 19 Iss: 3, pp.249 - 26</p><p><mark>China established its “rule-based” regulatory approach of</u></mark> anti-money laundering <u><mark>(AML) in 2003</u></mark>, with numerous institutions and scholars studying and practicing the approach concerning AML activities. Implemented over 10 years, on the one hand, <u>a lot of manpower, finances and resources were consumed to monitor money laundering activities</u>; <u><mark>however</mark>,</u> on the other hand, <u><mark>the </mark>regulatory <mark>effectiveness is</u></mark> relatively <u><mark>low</u>: <u><strong>a lot of money laundering activities were not detected and there was much capital flight from China</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u>this paper considers adjusting the regulatory approach based on strategy</u>. Currently, the world’s AML regulatory approach is conducted in two ways: “rule-based” and “risk-based”. As pioneers in the field of AML, <u>the UK and the USA are gradually moving toward implementing the “risk-based” AML regulatory approach.</u> AML work started late in China, so <u><mark>it is necessary to analyze the execution effects of</u></mark> China, <u><mark>the US</mark>A</u> and the UK’s AML systems <u><mark>and draw lessons from their effective </mark>methods and <mark>strategies</u></mark>. Because China began to carry out new AML standards in 2007 and released the first version’s report in 2008, this article selects China, the USA and the UK’s anti-laundering data from 2008 to 2013 and presents comparisons of the execution effects of AML systems in these three countries. Additionally, as seen from the following three tables, <u><mark>the annual average number of suspicious </mark>transaction <mark>reports submitted by the financial institutions of China exceeds 45 million </mark>copies <mark>per year, with the USA submitting about 1.4 million copies</u></mark> and the UK submitting only more than 200,000 copies. (Tables I-III) Comparing nearly six years of AML regulatory effectiveness of China, the USA and the UK, this paper found suspicious transaction reports submitted annually: on average, China having 187 times that of the UK and 32 times the USA; however, as to the money laundering cases found according to the suspicious transaction reports, the UK has about five times that of China and ten times the USA. <u>Regarding the status quo for tens of millions of copies of the suspicious transaction reports and the low actual regulatory effectiveness, Tang Xu of People’s Bank of China AML bureau thinks <mark>it is mainly caused by the mechanical submission of the “rule-based” regulatory approach</u></mark> (Tang et al., 2009a, pp. 6-7). The mainstream view is that China’s current “rule-based” regulatory approach no longer adapts to the objective reality and needs to adjust to the regulatory approach in time. <u><mark>This </mark>article <mark>considers learning from the foreign AML advanced experience to</mark> evaluate money laundering risk of customers and then gradually make the transition to the “risk-based” regulatory approach.</p></u> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Solvency | 1,559,351 | 12 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,686 | Action stops warming’s devastating impacts – not too late | UN 15 | UN 15 (United Nations, “Failure to Constrain Climate Change Will Create ‘Climate Chaos’, Secretary-General Says at High-Level General Assembly Event Aimed at Inspiring Ambitious Accord,” 6-29-15, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11658.doc.htm) | global in nature, which required global action | null | Sam Kutesa (Uganda), Assembly President… global in nature, which required global action. | 89 | <h4>Action stops warming’s devastating impacts – not too late</h4><p><strong>UN 15</strong> (United Nations, “Failure to Constrain Climate Change Will Create ‘Climate Chaos’, Secretary-General Says at High-Level General Assembly Event Aimed at Inspiring Ambitious Accord,” 6-29-15, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11658.doc.htm) </p><p>Sam Kutesa (Uganda), Assembly President… <u> global in nature, which required global action</u>.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,916 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,687 | Trump’s recent actions severely dent relations – cooperation is pivotal | Gosset 12/19 | Gosset 12/19 (David, Director, Academia Sinica Europaea at China Europe International Business School, 12/19/16, China-U.S. Relations In The Trump Era, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/chinaus-relations-in-the-_b_13701180.html) MAM | Through a series of unwise if not reckless moves, Donald Trump has already harmed the world’s most significant bilateral relationship and, by doing so, is taking our global village on a dangerous path since there can’t be global prosperity and peace without strong China-U.S. synergies they misread the intentions of a man obsessed by hard power, who seems to be exclusively concerned with American leadership and who has no real understanding of the Chinese world and certainly no appreciation for the richness of its civilization. Donald Trump is creating an environment in which mistrust between China and the U.S. is growing and it looks like the era dominated by the Kissingerian approach toward China could come to an end. December 2 phone conversation with Taiwan’s leader Tsai Ing-wen - first contact of this kind between the U.S. and China since 1979 - signaled that Trump intends to take the U.S.-Taiwan relations at another level. This is not only a “pivot” but this is an obvious provocation which indicates that Washington will sell more weapons to Taiwan and, by doing so, will be willing to risk having serious tensions with Beijing The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. a genuine change of perspective would presuppose the realization that, in an increasingly interdependent world, what has really to come first are not the immediate interests of one single country but the long-term equilibrium of the entire system. one can’t expect to unilaterally win at the expense of the world’s most populous country and, soon, of what will be the world’s largest economy. | Trump has already harmed the world’s most significant bilateral relationship and is taking a dangerous path there can’t be global prosperity and peace without strong China-U.S. synergies mistrust between China and the U.S. is growing December 2 phone conversation with Taiwan’s leader signaled n obvious provocation which indicates that Washington will sell more weapons will be willing to risk having serious tensions with Beijing The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist a genuine change of perspective would presuppose the realization tha what has really to come first are the long-term equilibrium of the entire system. N one can’t expect to unilaterally win at the expense of the world’s most populous country and, soon, of what will be the world’s largest economy. | Through a series of unwise if not reckless moves, Donald Trump has already harmed the world’s most significant bilateral relationship and, by doing so, is taking our global village on a dangerous path since there can’t be global prosperity and peace without strong China-U.S. synergies. Some analysts - many of them Chinese observers - wrongly believed that Trump’s anti-Chinese rhetoric during the campaign would gradually disappear in the event of a Republican victory. Unfortunately, they misread the intentions of a man obsessed by hard power, who seems to be exclusively concerned with American leadership and who has no real understanding of the Chinese world and certainly no appreciation for the richness of its civilization. Since his election on November 8, Donald Trump is creating an environment in which mistrust between China and the U.S. is growing and it looks like the era dominated by the Kissingerian approach toward China could come to an end. In a sense, without understanding of history, without attention to cultural sensitivities, without real interest for the nuances of diplomacy, Trump is the anti-Kissinger. The meeting the President-elect had with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on November 17 in New-York’s Trump Tower was not a necessity but it was an occasion to send an unambiguous message: in the Far East, Japan is the U.S.’ strategic ally. With the promise of SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son to invest $50 billion in the U.S., Washington and Tokyo have been moving fast to stress the solidity of their alliance. The December 2 phone conversation with Taiwan’s leader Tsai Ing-wen - first contact of this kind between the U.S. and China since 1979 - signaled that Trump intends to take the U.S.-Taiwan relations at another level. This is not only a “pivot” but this is an obvious provocation which indicates that Washington will sell more weapons to Taiwan and, by doing so, will be willing to risk having serious tensions with Beijing. Trump appears to be especially receptive to the lobbying of the U.S. defense industry. One would hope he remembers Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous warning on the “industrial-military complex”. In 1961, Eisenhower, one of the greatest American Presidents, wisely affirmed: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” Trump surrounded himself with advisors explicitly calling for tougher actions against the PRC, Michael Pillsbury, Peter Navarro or Randy Forbes, but the choice of retired lieutenant general Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor is especially worrisome. In his book “The Field of Fight”, Flynn, who served also as the director of defense intelligence agency, put China in the group of America’s enemies. Will Donald Trump modify this confrontational trajectory? Complex realities - North Korea, fight against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, long-term economic and financial issues - might force him to “deal” with China in a less antagonistic manner but a genuine change of perspective would presuppose the realization that, in an increasingly interdependent world, what has really to come first are not the immediate interests of one single country but the long-term equilibrium of the entire system. Nationalism and economic protectionism (the TPP might be dead but trade has to be stimulated) can’t be the solutions of our time’s interconnected problems. Moreover, in a century marked by complex and unprecedented interconnectedness, one can’t expect to unilaterally win at the expense of the world’s most populous country and, soon, of what will be the world’s largest economy. True world’s Statesmen should be on a quest to find ways to create more global value - tangible and intangible - in an inclusive process which ought to be beneficial for all of us. A series of tweets will never make the wise diplomacy of a truly great nation, a constructive foreign policy can’t be the addition of opportunistic moves inspired or imposed by adventurous military people but it should be a long-term strategy carefully designed by thinkers and discerning diplomats. Confronted with Washington’s provocation, Beijing needs to adopt a posture characterized by strategic patience and to reaffirm her responsible and proactive internationalism through new initiatives for trade, the fight against climate change, a renewed support for the United Nations and the acceleration of the “One Belt, One Road” transnational development project. President Xi Jinping’s key messages at the Peru’s APEC meeting will have to be reaffirmed across the continents: China’s reemergence is peaceful and its opening up to the world is a global opportunity. Should Donald Trump gradually develop a form of neo-Caesarism in a combination of nationalistic populism and militarism, China, Europe and others but also the vast majority of the American people would certainly find the ways to oppose and stop what would be for our world a highly dangerous development | 5,124 | <h4>Trump’s recent actions severely dent relations – cooperation is pivotal </h4><p><strong>Gosset 12/19 </strong>(David,<strong> </strong>Director, Academia Sinica Europaea at China Europe International Business School, 12/19/16, China-U.S. Relations In The Trump Era, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/chinaus-relations-in-the-_b_13701180.html) MAM</p><p><u>Through a series of unwise if not reckless moves, Donald <mark>Trump has already harmed the world’s most significant bilateral relationship and</mark>, by doing so, <mark>is taking </mark>our global village on<mark> a dangerous path </mark>since<mark> there can’t be global prosperity and peace without strong China-U.S. synergies</u></mark>. Some analysts - many of them Chinese observers - wrongly believed that Trump’s anti-Chinese rhetoric during the campaign would gradually disappear in the event of a Republican victory. Unfortunately, <u>they misread the intentions of a man obsessed by hard power, who seems to be exclusively concerned with American leadership and who has no real understanding of the Chinese world and certainly no appreciation for the richness of its civilization. </u>Since his election on November 8, <u>Donald Trump is creating an environment in which <mark>mistrust between China and the U.S. is growing</mark> and it looks like the era dominated by the Kissingerian approach toward China could come to an end. </u>In a sense, without understanding of history, without attention to cultural sensitivities, without real interest for the nuances of diplomacy, Trump is the anti-Kissinger. The meeting the President-elect had with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on November 17 in New-York’s Trump Tower was not a necessity but it was an occasion to send an unambiguous message: in the Far East, Japan is the U.S.’ strategic ally. With the promise of SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son to invest $50 billion in the U.S., Washington and Tokyo have been moving fast to stress the solidity of their alliance. The <u><mark>December 2 phone conversation with Taiwan’s leader</mark> Tsai Ing-wen - first contact of this kind between the U.S. and China since 1979 - <mark>signaled</mark> that Trump intends to take the U.S.-Taiwan relations at another level. This is not only a “pivot” but this is a<mark>n obvious provocation which indicates that Washington will sell more weapons </mark>to Taiwan and, by doing so, <mark>will be willing to risk having serious tensions with Beijing</u></mark>. Trump appears to be especially receptive to the lobbying of the U.S. defense industry. One would hope he remembers Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous warning on the “industrial-military complex”. In 1961, Eisenhower, one of the greatest American Presidents, wisely affirmed: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. <u><mark>The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist</mark>.</u>” Trump surrounded himself with advisors explicitly calling for tougher actions against the PRC, Michael Pillsbury, Peter Navarro or Randy Forbes, but the choice of retired lieutenant general Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor is especially worrisome. In his book “The Field of Fight”, Flynn, who served also as the director of defense intelligence agency, put China in the group of America’s enemies. Will Donald Trump modify this confrontational trajectory? Complex realities - North Korea, fight against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, long-term economic and financial issues - might force him to “deal” with China in a less antagonistic manner but <u><mark>a genuine change of perspective would presuppose the realization tha</mark>t, in an increasingly interdependent world,</u> <u><mark>what has really to come first</mark> <mark>are</mark> not the immediate interests of one single country but <mark>the long-term equilibrium of the entire system. </u>N</mark>ationalism and economic protectionism (the TPP might be dead but trade has to be stimulated) can’t be the solutions of our time’s interconnected problems. Moreover, in a century marked by complex and unprecedented interconnectedness, <u><mark>one can’t expect to unilaterally win at the expense of the world’s most populous country and, soon, of what will be the world’s largest economy.</u></mark> True world’s Statesmen should be on a quest to find ways to create more global value - tangible and intangible - in an inclusive process which ought to be beneficial for all of us. A series of tweets will never make the wise diplomacy of a truly great nation, a constructive foreign policy can’t be the addition of opportunistic moves inspired or imposed by adventurous military people but it should be a long-term strategy carefully designed by thinkers and discerning diplomats. Confronted with Washington’s provocation, Beijing needs to adopt a posture characterized by strategic patience and to reaffirm her responsible and proactive internationalism through new initiatives for trade, the fight against climate change, a renewed support for the United Nations and the acceleration of the “One Belt, One Road” transnational development project. President Xi Jinping’s key messages at the Peru’s APEC meeting will have to be reaffirmed across the continents: China’s reemergence is peaceful and its opening up to the world is a global opportunity. Should Donald Trump gradually develop a form of neo-Caesarism in a combination of nationalistic populism and militarism, China, Europe and others but also the vast majority of the American people would certainly find the ways to oppose and stop what would be for our world a highly dangerous development</p> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 1,560,917 | 2 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,688 | US action is key – they are the global leaders of the AML regime | Schroeder 1 | William R. Schroeder 1, Schroeder is an expert in money laundering and asset forfeiture, and is the founder of Madison Associates, Inc., a forensic accounting firm that provides intelligence for law enforcement bodies, May 2001, “A Global Threat and the International Community’s Response”, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 2001, pp. 1 – 7. | The United States commenced one of the earliest responses to money laundering The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury establish regulatory measures and served as a foundation for further measures to combat laundering Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986 which made aundering of proceeds derived from any offense a crime The act also criminalized structuring certain transactions to avoid filing currency reports the United States has become a party to multilateral treaties and agreements, as well as numerous bilateral efforts, that support enhanced international cooperation. The United States participates in and promotes the efforts on international organizations that have developed universal standards and monitor current trends to address the laundering threat to the global community the United Sates transfers funds to foreign jurisdiction that have assisted in efforts that resulted in the forfeiture of property | The U S commenced one of the earliest responses to money laundering Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986, which made laundering of proceeds derived from any offenses a crime the U S has become a party to multilateral treaties and agreement that support international cooperation. The U S participates in and promotes the efforts on international organizations that have developed universal standards to address the laundering threat to the global community | The United States commenced one of the earliest responses to money laundering. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury establish regulatory measures requiring the filing of currency transaction reports and served as a foundation for further measures to combat laundering.21 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986,22 which made the laundering23 of proceeds derived from any one of the long list of offenses (known as Aspecified unlawful activities@) a crime.24 This list now includes over 100 federal offenses, and certain violations of foreign laws.25 The act also criminalized structuring certain transactions to avoid filing currency reports.26 Congress made civil and criminal procedures available to forfeit property involved in a laundering offense. Subsequent legislation has added further enhancements.27 Most recently, the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998 called for the development of a national strategy to combat money laundering and related financial crimes.28 In response, the Department of Justice and the Treasury developed a 5-year strategy that calls for designating high-risk money laundering zones to direct coordinated enforcement effort, providing for greater scrutiny of suspicious transactions, creating new legislation, and intensifying pressure on nations that lack adequate counter-money laundering controls. In addition to its domestic efforts, the United States has become a party to multilateral treaties and agreements, as well as numerous bilateral efforts, that support enhanced international cooperation. The United States participates in and promotes the efforts on international organizations that have developed universal standards and monitor current trends to address the laundering threat to the global community. In furtherance of international cooperation, the United Sates transfers funds to foreign jurisdiction (known as@international sharing@) that have assisted in efforts that resulted in the forfeiture of property | 2,074 | <h4><strong>US action is key – they are the global leaders of the AML regime</h4><p></strong>William R.<strong> Schroeder 1<u></strong>, Schroeder is an expert in money laundering and asset forfeiture, and is the founder of Madison Associates, Inc., a forensic accounting firm that provides intelligence for law enforcement bodies, May 2001, “A Global Threat and the International Community’s Response”, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 2001, pp. 1 – 7.</p><p><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>commenced one of the earliest responses to money laundering</u></mark>. <u>The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury establish regulatory measures</u> requiring the filing of currency transaction reports <u>and served as a foundation for further measures to combat laundering</u>.21 Subsequently, <u><mark>Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986</u>,</mark>22 <u><mark>which made</u></mark> the <mark>l<u>aundering</u></mark>23 <u><mark>of proceeds derived from any</u></mark> one of the long list of <u><mark>offense</u>s</mark> (known as Aspecified unlawful activities@) <u><strong><mark>a crime</u></strong></mark>.24 This list now includes over 100 federal offenses, and certain violations of foreign laws.25 <u>The act also criminalized structuring certain transactions to avoid filing currency reports</u>.26 Congress made civil and criminal procedures available to forfeit property involved in a laundering offense. Subsequent legislation has added further enhancements.27 Most recently, the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998 called for the development of a national strategy to combat money laundering and related financial crimes.28 In response, the Department of Justice and the Treasury developed a 5-year strategy that calls for designating high-risk money laundering zones to direct coordinated enforcement effort, providing for greater scrutiny of suspicious transactions, creating new legislation, and intensifying pressure on nations that lack adequate counter-money laundering controls. In addition to its domestic efforts, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has become a party to multilateral treaties and agreement</mark>s, as well as numerous bilateral efforts, <mark>that support </mark>enhanced <mark>international cooperation. The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>participates in and promotes the efforts on international organizations that have developed universal standards </mark>and monitor current trends <mark>to address the laundering threat to the global community</u></mark>. In furtherance of international cooperation, <u>the United Sates transfers funds to foreign jurisdiction</u> (known as@international sharing@) <u>that have assisted in efforts that resulted in the forfeiture of property</p></u> | 1AC—Carrollton | null | Solvency | 1,559,875 | 3 | 125,809 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | 655,737 | A | Carrolton | 2 | Woodward AP | Tommy Jordan | 1AC - AML w Cap Flight and NoKo
1NC - Orientalism and Uighurs DA
2NR - Orietalism
2AR - Cap Flight | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/SaAd/Chattahoochee-Sama-Adam-Aff-Carrolton-Round2.docx | null | 55,555 | SaAd | Chattahoochee SaAd | null | Su..... | Sa..... | Za..... | Ad..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,689 | Cooperation is on the brink – China’s assessing U.S. | Davenport, 16 | Davenport, 16—Coral, covers energy and climate change policy at The New York Times, previously a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting and covered energy and the environment for National Journal, Politico, and Congressional Quarterly. “Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord,” New York Times (NYT), Feb 10, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html --br | The Supreme Court’s surprise decision meaningful global climate change agreements. | The decision meaningful global agreements. | The Supreme Court’s surprise decision … meaningful global climate change agreements. | 85 | <h4>Cooperation is on the <u>brink</u> – China’s assessing U.S. </h4><p><strong>Davenport, 16</strong>—Coral, covers energy and climate change policy at The New York Times, previously a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting and covered energy and the environment for National Journal, Politico, and Congressional Quarterly. “Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord,” New York Times (NYT), Feb 10, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html<u> --br</p><p><mark>The</mark> Supreme Court’s surprise <mark>decision</u></mark> … <u><mark> meaningful global</mark> climate change <mark>agreements.</mark> </p></u> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,918 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,690 | Relations collapse goes nuclear. | Goldstein ‘13 | Goldstein ‘13 – Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, Muse) | For at least the next decade the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict. the danger of instability in a crisis involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible, near-term concern. potentially catastrophic consequences of this scenario provide good reason to fully consider its implications. events since 2010 especially disputes in the East and South China Seas—suggest that the danger of a military confrontation that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise. a serious U.S.-China crisis may be more likely than is currently recognized. An assessment considering the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility. the capabilities that the two countries possess raise concerns that escalation pressures will exist and that they may be highest early in a crisis, compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict. | , the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is military conflict the danger of instability in a crisis is a tangible, near-term concern potentially catastrophic consequences of this scenario provide good reason disputes in the China Seas—suggest that the danger of a military confrontation that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise. escalation from c instability remains a devastating possibility | Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post-Cold War era. The first is the potentially deadly mix of nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and international terrorists, a worry that became dominant after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.1 The second concern, one whose prominence has waxed and waned since the mid-1990s, is the potentially disruptive impact that China will have if it emerges as a peer competitor of the United States, challenging an international order established during the era of U.S. preponderance.2 Reflecting this second concern, some analysts have expressed reservations about the dominant post-September 11 security agenda, arguing that China could challenge U.S. global interests in ways that terrorists and rogue states cannot. In this article, I raise a more pressing issue, one to which not enough attention has been paid. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak, the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict. In contrast to the long-term prospect of a new great power rivalry between the United States and China, which ultimately rests on debatable claims about the intentions of the two countries and uncertain forecasts about big shifts in their national capabilities, the danger of instability in a crisis involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible, near-term concern.3 Even if the probability of such a war-threatening crisis and its escalation to the use of significant military force is low, the potentially catastrophic consequences of this scenario provide good reason for analysts to better understand its dynamics and for policymakers to fully consider its implications. Moreover, events since 2010—especially those relevant to disputes in the East and South China Seas—suggest that the danger of a military confrontation in the Western Pacific that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise. In what follows, I identify not just pressures to use force preemptively that pose the most serious risk should a Sino-American confrontation unfold, but also related, if slightly less dramatic, incentives to initiate the limited use of force to gain bargaining leverage—a second trigger for potentially devastating instability during a crisis.4 My discussion proceeds in three sections. The first section explains why, during the next decade or two, a serious U.S.-China crisis may be more likely than is currently recognized. The second section examines the features of plausible Sino-American crises that may make them so dangerous. The third section considers general features of crisis stability in asymmetric dyads such as the one in which a U.S. superpower would confront an increasingly capable but still thoroughly overmatched China—the asymmetry that will prevail for at least the next decade. This more stylized discussion clarifies the inadequacy of focusing one-sidedly on conventional forces, as has much of the current commentary about the modernization of China's military and the implications this has for potential conflicts with the United States in the Western Pacific,5 or of focusing one-sidedly on China's nuclear forces, as a smaller slice of the commentary has.6 An assessment considering the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility. Before proceeding, however, I would like to clarify my use of the terms "crisis" and "instability." For the purposes of this article, I define a crisis as a confrontation between states involving a serious threat to vital national interests for both sides, in which there is the expectation of a short time for resolution, and in which there is understood to be a sharply increased risk of war.7 This definition distinguishes crises from many situations to which the label is sometimes applied, such as more protracted confrontations; sharp disagreements over important matters that are not vital interests and in which military force seems irrelevant; and political disputes involving vital interests, even those with military components, that present little immediate risk of war.8 I define instability as the temptation to resort to force in a crisis.9 Crisis stability is greatest when both sides strongly prefer to continue bargaining; instability is greatest when they are strongly tempted to resort to the use of military force. Stability, then, describes a spectrum—from one extreme in which neither side sees much advantage to using force, through a range of situations in which the balance of costs and benefits of using force varies for each side, to the other extreme in which the benefits of using force so greatly exceed the costs that striking first looks nearly irresistible to both sides. Although the incentives to initiate the use of force may not reach this extreme level in a U.S. China crisis, the capabilities that the two countries possess raise concerns that escalation pressures will exist and that they may be highest early in a crisis, compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict. | 5,270 | <h4>Relations collapse goes nuclear.</h4><p><strong>Goldstein ‘13 <u></strong>– Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, Muse)</p><p></u>Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post-Cold War era. The first is the potentially deadly mix of nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and international terrorists, a worry that became dominant after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.1 The second concern, one whose prominence has waxed and waned since the mid-1990s, is the potentially disruptive impact that China will have if it emerges as a peer competitor of the United States, challenging an international order established during the era of U.S. preponderance.2 Reflecting this second concern, some analysts have expressed reservations about the dominant post-September 11 security agenda, arguing that China could challenge U.S. global interests in ways that terrorists and rogue states cannot. In this article, I raise a more pressing issue, one to which not enough attention has been paid. <u>For at least the next decade</u>, while China remains relatively weak<mark>, <u>the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is</mark> the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open<strong> <mark>military conflict</mark>.</u> </strong>In contrast to the long-term prospect of a new great power rivalry between the United States and China, which ultimately rests on debatable claims about the intentions of the two countries and uncertain forecasts about big shifts in their national capabilities, <u><mark>the danger of instability in a crisis </mark>involving these two nuclear-armed states <mark>is a tangible, near-term concern</mark>.</u>3 Even if the probability of such a war-threatening crisis and its escalation to the use of significant military force is low, the <u><strong><mark>potentially catastrophic consequences</strong> of this scenario provide good reason</u></mark> for analysts to better understand its dynamics and for policymakers <u>to fully consider its implications.</u> Moreover, <u>events since 2010</u>—<u>especially</u> those relevant to <u><mark>disputes in the </mark>East and South <mark>China Seas—suggest that <strong>the </strong>danger of<strong> a military confrontation</u></strong></mark> in the Western Pacific <u><strong><mark>that could lead to </strong>a U.S.-China standoff<strong> may be on the rise.</mark> </u></strong>In what follows, I identify not just pressures to use force preemptively that pose the most serious risk should a Sino-American confrontation unfold, but also related, if slightly less dramatic, incentives to initiate the limited use of force to gain bargaining leverage—a second trigger for potentially devastating instability during a crisis.4 My discussion proceeds in three sections. The first section explains why, during the next decade or two, <u>a serious U.S.-China crisis may be more likely than is currently recognized.</u> The second section examines the features of plausible Sino-American crises that may make them so dangerous. The third section considers general features of crisis stability in asymmetric dyads such as the one in which a U.S. superpower would confront an increasingly capable but still thoroughly overmatched China—the asymmetry that will prevail for at least the next decade. This more stylized discussion clarifies the inadequacy of focusing one-sidedly on conventional forces, as has much of the current commentary about the modernization of China's military and the implications this has for potential conflicts with the United States in the Western Pacific,5 or of focusing one-sidedly on China's nuclear forces, as a smaller slice of the commentary has.6 <u>An assessment considering the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces indicates why <strong><mark>escalation </mark>resulting <mark>from c</mark>risis <mark>instability remains a devastating possibility</mark>. </u></strong>Before proceeding, however, I would like to clarify my use of the terms "crisis" and "instability." For the purposes of this article, I define a crisis as a confrontation between states involving a serious threat to vital national interests for both sides, in which there is the expectation of a short time for resolution, and in which there is understood to be a sharply increased risk of war.7 This definition distinguishes crises from many situations to which the label is sometimes applied, such as more protracted confrontations; sharp disagreements over important matters that are not vital interests and in which military force seems irrelevant; and political disputes involving vital interests, even those with military components, that present little immediate risk of war.8 I define instability as the temptation to resort to force in a crisis.9 Crisis stability is greatest when both sides strongly prefer to continue bargaining; instability is greatest when they are strongly tempted to resort to the use of military force. Stability, then, describes a spectrum—from one extreme in which neither side sees much advantage to using force, through a range of situations in which the balance of costs and benefits of using force varies for each side, to the other extreme in which the benefits of using force so greatly exceed the costs that striking first looks nearly irresistible to both sides. Although the incentives to initiate the use of force may not reach this extreme level in a U.S. China crisis, <u>the capabilities that the two countries possess raise concerns that escalation pressures will exist and that they may be highest early in a crisis, compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 83,643 | 105 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,691 | China’s not backing Arctic warming initiatives now, decking broader US-China warming cooperation – supporting Beijing’s Arctic status is key | Tiezzi, 15 – The Diplomat Editor, U.S.-China Policy Foundation Research Associate | Tiezzi, 15 – The Diplomat Editor, U.S.-China Policy Foundation Research Associate | , Accessed 9/30/16, Scott
foreign … for U.S.-China cooperation in general. | for U.S.-China cooperation in general. | Shannon, Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “Why Did China Opt Out of the Arctic Climate Change Statement?” The Diplomat, September 01, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/why-did-china-opt-out-of-the-arctic-climate-change-statement/, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott
On Sunday and Monday, foreign … for U.S.-China cooperation in general. | 702 | <h4>China’s not backing Arctic warming initiatives now, <u>decking broader US-China warming cooperation</u> – <u>supporting Beijing’s Arctic status</u><strong> is key </h4><p><mark>Tiezzi, 15</mark> – The Diplomat Editor, U.S.-China Policy Foundation Research Associate</p><p></strong>Shannon, Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “Why Did China Opt Out of the Arctic Climate Change Statement?” The Diplomat, September 01, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/why-did-china-opt-out-of-the-arctic-climate-change-statement/<u>, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott</p><p></u>On Sunday and Monday, <u>foreign … </u> <u><mark>for U.S.-China cooperation in general.</p></u></mark> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,919 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,692 | OBOR is a golden opportunity – it’s the first step to improving relations overall and overcoming other issues | Liang 15 (Xu, a research fellow at the China Academy of "One Belt, One Road" Strategy of Beijing International Studies University, 6/4/15, Rejecting China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ comes at US’s own cost, | Liang 15 (Xu, a research fellow at the China Academy of "One Belt, One Road" Strategy of Beijing International Studies University, 6/4/15, Rejecting China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ comes at US’s own cost, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/925468.shtml) MAM | the "One Belt, One Road" initiative of China is not a challenge to the US but offers opportunities because of its open, peaceful and win-win approach. Sino-US cooperation can bring peace and development opportunities . China's ideas of "common interests" and its strategic transparency can help eliminate US worries and build a foundation of US involvement. The US can take the following approach to participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. First, the US can create an international mechanism of "creative participation." As economy and trade is the focus of "One Belt, One Road," China and the US can provide the world with diverse choices. In the era of globalization, economic complementarity is more important than competitiveness. The new type of major power relations between China and the US can make a significant breakthrough by the international mechanism for the Silk Road. In this mechanism, the two countries can share a workforce and complement each other through bilateral or multilateral negotiations he US can participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative on a small scale at first and gradually establish mutual trust with China through experimentation the US can take the economic and trade fields as a starting point for participating in China's plan we can let Sino-US joint ventures act as the vanguard and pioneers of the experimental cooperation. Such cooperation is a way to establish initial relationships. Third, the US can participate in China's plan by "going with the trend." US decision-makers should be aware that even if the US doubts . If the US insists on not participating in the program, it will miss a great opportunity. | O B O R offers opportunities because of its win-win approach Sino-US cooperation can bring peace and development opportunities the US can create an international mechanism of "creative participation. the two countries can complement each other through bilateral negotiations . Such cooperation is a way to establish initial relationships | The world is large enough to accommodate not only the US but also China. There has never been a full-scale confrontation between the two countries in history. When Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, US leaders have proposed the "New Silk Road" program. In many people's opinion, competition and conflict is inevitable between the two powers. But the Cold War has ended, and politicians should keep pace with the times. In the era of interdependence, the "One Belt, One Road" initiative of China is not a challenge to the US but offers opportunities because of its open, peaceful and win-win approach. Meanwhile, the mainstream of both the governments and the private sectors are opposed to confrontation and conflict. In the 21st century, cooperation brings benefits and strife will harm each other. The countries along the "One Belt, One Road" all hope Sino-US cooperation can bring peace and development opportunities to them. It shows that civilized competition and rational cooperation is welcomed in this region. So the "One Belt, One Road" initiative of China does not exclude the US, and the US is expected to be actively involved. China's ideas of "common interests" and its strategic transparency can help eliminate US worries and build a foundation of US involvement. The US can take the following approach to participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. First, the US can create an international mechanism of "creative participation." As economy and trade is the focus of "One Belt, One Road," China and the US can provide the world with diverse choices. In the era of globalization, economic complementarity is more important than competitiveness. The new type of major power relations between China and the US can make a significant breakthrough by the international mechanism for the Silk Road. In this mechanism, the two countries can share a workforce and complement each other through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Second, the US can participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative on a small scale at first and gradually establish mutual trust with China through experimentation. Generally speaking, the possibility of win-win relations in the economic sphere is greater than in the military field, so the US can take the economic and trade fields as a starting point for participating in China's plan. For example, we can let Sino-US joint ventures act as the vanguard and pioneers of the experimental cooperation. Such cooperation is a way to establish initial relationships. The US should note that regions covered by the Silk Road program are not under US dominance and have fewer regional mechanisms of cooperation, such as Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and other regions. China has avoided US-dominated areas and the US should respond positively to China's intentions. Third, the US can participate in China's plan by "going with the trend." US decision-makers should be aware that even if the US doubts China's plan, China will continue to promote it. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has proved this. If the US insists on not participating in the program, it will miss a great opportunity. | 3,195 | <h4>OBOR is a <u>golden opportunity</u> – it’s the first step to <u>improving relations</u> overall and overcoming other issues</h4><p><strong>Liang 15 (Xu, a research fellow at the China Academy of "One Belt, One Road" Strategy of Beijing International Studies University, 6/4/15, Rejecting China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ comes at US’s own cost, </strong>http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/925468.shtml<u>) MAM</p><p></u>The world is large enough to accommodate not only the US but also China. There has never been a full-scale confrontation between the two countries in history. When Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, US leaders have proposed the "New Silk Road" program. In many people's opinion, competition and conflict is inevitable between the two powers. But the Cold War has ended, and politicians should keep pace with the times. In the era of interdependence, <u>the "<mark>O</mark>ne <mark>B</mark>elt, <mark>O</mark>ne <mark>R</mark>oad" initiative of China is not a challenge to the US but <mark>offers opportunities because of its </mark>open, peaceful and <mark>win-win approach</mark>.</u> Meanwhile, the mainstream of both the governments and the private sectors are opposed to confrontation and conflict. In the 21st century, cooperation brings benefits and strife will harm each other. The countries along the "One Belt, One Road" all hope<u> <mark>Sino-US cooperation can bring peace and development opportunities</mark> </u>to them. It shows that civilized competition and rational cooperation is welcomed in this region<u>.</u> So the "One Belt, One Road" initiative of China does not exclude the US, and the US is expected to be actively involved. <u>China's ideas of "common interests" and its strategic transparency can help eliminate US worries and build a foundation of US involvement. </u> <u>The US can take the following approach to participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. First, <mark>the US can create an international mechanism of "creative participation.</mark>" As economy and trade is the focus of "One Belt, One Road," China and the US can provide the world with diverse choices. In the era of globalization, economic complementarity is more important than competitiveness.</u> <u>The new type of major power relations between China and the US can make a significant breakthrough by the international mechanism for the Silk Road. In this mechanism, <mark>the two countries can </mark>share a workforce and <mark>complement each other through bilateral </mark>or multilateral <mark>negotiations</u></mark>. Second, t<u>he US can participate in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative on a small scale at first and gradually establish mutual trust with China through experimentation</u>. Generally speaking, the possibility of win-win relations in the economic sphere is greater than in the military field, so <u>the US can take the economic and trade fields as a starting point for participating in China's plan</u>. For example, <u>we can let Sino-US joint ventures act as the vanguard and pioneers of the experimental cooperation<mark>. Such cooperation is a way to establish initial relationships</mark>.</u> The US should note that regions covered by the Silk Road program are not under US dominance and have fewer regional mechanisms of cooperation, such as Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and other regions. China has avoided US-dominated areas and the US should respond positively to China's intentions. <u>Third, the US can participate in China's plan by "going with the trend." US decision-makers should be aware that even if the US doubts</u> China's plan, China will continue to promote it. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has proved this<u>. If the US insists on not participating in the program, it will miss a great opportunity. </p></u> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 1,560,920 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,693 | The Hyperinfo era of semiocapitalist exploitation has created absolute chaos, a panic which attacks the mind of the individual to the point where their body, the material in the world, cease to exist and rationality isn't possible. | Bifo 2009 | Bifo 2009 ~Franco Berardi, aka "Bifo," founder of the famous "Radio Alice" in Bologna and an important figure of the Italian Autonomia Movement, is a writer, media theorist, and media activist. He currently teaches Social History of the Media at the Accademia di Brera, Milan Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of Post-Alpha Generation pg. 43-46~ *We do not endorse gendered or ableist language | Globalization stands reframed in the dark light of the global war. This means we need to reconceptualize the change that is taking place in the social, economic and anthropological form of globalization. During the past two centuries, global control was the general techno-utopia of capitalist society and modern culture. Now, the time of global control is over. We are completely out of this framework today. The new governing framework of capitalism is global panic If we want to understand what panic means we have to talk about the attention economy and about ‘digital labor.’ This is where the source of contemporary panic lies: in the organization of time in the digital sphere Once, panic used to be a nice word, and this is the sense in which the Swiss-American psychoanalyst James Hillman remembers it in his book on Pan. Pan used to be the god of nature, the god of totality. In Greek mythology, Pan was the symbol of the relationship between man and nature. Nature is the overwhelming flow of reality, things and information that we are surrounded by. Modern culture is based on the idea of human domination, of the domestication of nature. So the original panic feeling, which was something good for the ancient world, is becoming increasingly terrifying and destructive. Today, panic has become a form of psychopathology. We can speak of panic when we see a conscious organism (individual or social) being overwhelmed by the speed of processes he, she is involved in, and has no time to process the information input. The accelerated creation of surplus value depends on the acceleration of the info-sphere. The digitalization of the info-sphere opens the road to this kind of acceleration. Signs are produced and circulated at a growing speed but the human terminal of the system is put under growing pressure, and finally it cracks. I think that the current economic crisis has something to do with this imbalance in the field of semio-production and in the field of semio-demand Consequently, info-production is able to create an infinite supply of mental and intellectual goods. But while cyberspace is conceptually infinite, cybertime is not infinite at all. This ability cannot be indefinitely expanded, because it has limits that are physical, emotional, affective. Deleuze and Guattari talk about chaos in What is Philosophy?. They say that chaos occurs when the world goes too fast for your brain. This is chaos. We could recall that Karl Marx had once expressed the concept of an overproduction crisis. You have an overproduction crisis when machinery and the labor of workers produce an amount of goods that the market cannot absorb. destroy human lives, in order to overcome this kind of economic crises. Semio-capital is in a crisis of overproduction, but the form of this crisis is not only economic, but also psychopathic. Semio-capital, in fact, is not about the production of material goods, but about the production of psychic stimulation. leads the individual mind as well as the collective mind to a state of collapse. In the intersection of information and urban space we see the proliferation of a chaotic sprawl following no rule, no plan, dictated by the sole logic of economic interest. The social organism is unable to process the overwhelmingly complex experience of metropolitan chaos. The proliferation of lines of communication has created a new kind of chaotic perception. In their book Attention Economy, Davenport and Bleick say that the central problem of the cognitive worker, and generally of people who are living in hypersaturated informational environments, is this: we have no more time for attention, we are no more able to understand and process information input because our time is saturated by a flow of hyper-information. we have no time for affection, for communication, for erotic relationships. We have no more time for that spatial kind of attention that means attention to the body – to our body, to the body of the other. The world is rushing into a global war whose reasons are not clear, whose limits are not known. Some are speaking of a long-lasting war, possibly an infinite war. Nonsense? Yes, nonsense. But this nonsensical war is the most alarming symptom of the panic syndrome. Colin Powell, some days after 9/11, spoke about the rumors that the intelligence services had received some information about bombings and hijackings of airplanes before September 11th. “Yes, it’s true”, he said, “Yes, it’s true, we have received information about something like this, we have received information about bombings and so on. But we always receive lots of information we are not able to process or even to see. We had too much of it, this is the problem. We have too much information.” They do not understand what is happening because the reality has become too complex and too aggressive. So they react in a primary way. The world’s ruling class is overwhelmed by the very complexity of the world they have built for themselves. | , panic has become a form of psychopathology We can speak of panic when we see a conscious organism (individual or social) being overwhelmed by the speed of processes he, she is involved in, and has no time to process the information input In these cases the organism, all of a sudden, is no more able to process the sheer amount of information coming into its cognitive field or even that which is being generated by the organism itself. Technological transformations have displaced the focus from the sphere of the production of material goods towards the sphere of semiotic goods: the info-sphere. With this, semio-capital becomes the general form of the economy The accelerated creation of surplus value depends on the acceleration of the info-sphere. The digitalization of the info-sphere opens the road to this kind of acceleration. Signs are produced and circulated at a growing speed but the human terminal of the system (the embodied mind) is put under growing pressure, and finally it cracks. I think that the current economic crisis has something to do with this imbalance in the field of semio-production and in the field of semio-demand This imbalance in the relationship between the supply of semiotic goods and the socially available time of attention is the core of the economic crisis as well as the core of the intellectual and the political crises that we are living through now. . I call cybertime the ability of the conscious organism to actually process (cyber-spatial) information. This ability cannot be indefinitely expanded, because it has limits that are physical, emotional, affective. The contradiction between infinite expansion of cyberspace and limited capability of processing of cybertime is the origin of contemporary chaos. Deleuze and Guattari talk about chaos in What is Philosophy?. They say that chaos occurs when the world goes too fast for your brain. This is chaos. Semio-capital, in fact, is not about the production of material goods, but about the production of psychic stimulation. The mental environment is saturated by signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a permanent electrocution, which leads the individual mind as well as the collective mind to a state of collapse. The problem of panic is generally connected with the management of time This collapse in the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime may also be seen as the special feature of the current political situation. The world is rushing into a global war whose reasons are not clear, whose limits are not known. Some are speaking of a long-lasting war, possibly an infinite war. this nonsensical war is the most alarming symptom of the panic syndrome. Colin Powell, some days after 9/11, spoke about the rumors that the intelligence services had received some information about bombings and hijackings of airplanes before September 11th. “Yes, it’s true”, he said, “Yes, it’s true, we have received information about something like this, we have received information about bombings and so on. But we always receive lots of information we are not able to process or even to see. We had too much of it, this is the problem. We have too much information.” This is precisely the effect of info-saturation, which is the consequence of the unbounded expansion of cyberspace. On the one hand, war is a way by which capital deals with the economic problems of overproduction, investments in weapons and tools for security, security and security. On the other hand, war is made inevitable by the mental confusion of the ruling class. They do not understand what is happening because the reality has become too complex and too aggressive. So they react in a primary way. The world’s ruling class is overwhelmed by the very complexity of the world they have built for themselves. | Globalization stands reframed in the dark light of the global war. This means we need to reconceptualize the change that is taking place in the social, economic and anthropological form of globalization. During the past two centuries, global control was the general techno-utopia of capitalist society and modern culture. Now, the time of global control is over. We are completely out of this framework today. The new governing framework of capitalism is global panic. If we want to understand what panic means we have to talk about the attention economy and about ‘digital labor.’ This is where the source of contemporary panic lies: in the organization of time in the digital sphere, in the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime. What is panic? We are told that psychiatrists have recently discovered and named a new kind of disorder – they call it Panic Syndrome. It seems that it’s something quite recent in the psychological self-perception of human beings. But what does panic mean? Once, panic used to be a nice word, and this is the sense in which the Swiss-American psychoanalyst James Hillman remembers it in his 43 // Info-labor book on Pan. Pan used to be the god of nature, the god of totality. In Greek mythology, Pan was the symbol of the relationship between man and nature. Nature is the overwhelming flow of reality, things and information that we are surrounded by. Modern culture is based on the idea of human domination, of the domestication of nature. So the original panic feeling, which was something good for the ancient world, is becoming increasingly terrifying and destructive. Today, panic has become a form of psychopathology. We can speak of panic when we see a conscious organism (individual or social) being overwhelmed by the speed of processes he, she is involved in, and has no time to process the information input. In these cases the organism, all of a sudden, is no more able to process the sheer amount of information coming into its cognitive field or even that which is being generated by the organism itself. Technological transformations have displaced the focus from the sphere of the production of material goods towards the sphere of semiotic goods: the info-sphere. With this, semio-capital becomes the general form of the economy. The accelerated creation of surplus value depends on the acceleration of the info-sphere. The digitalization of the info-sphere opens the road to this kind of acceleration. Signs are produced and circulated at a growing speed but the human terminal of the system (the embodied mind) is put under growing pressure, and finally it cracks. I think that the current economic crisis has something to do with this imbalance in the field of semio-production and in the field of semio-demand. This imbalance in the relationship between the supply of semiotic goods and the socially available time of attention is the core of the economic crisis as well as the core of the intellectual and the political crises that we are living through now. We can describe this situation in terms of the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime. Cyberspace is the infinite productivity of collective intelligence in a networked dimension. The potency of the General Intellect is enormously enhanced when a huge number of points enter into connections with each other thanks to the telematic network. Consequently, info-production is able to create an infinite supply of mental and intellectual goods. But while cyberspace is conceptually infinite, cybertime is not infinite at all. I call cybertime the ability of the conscious organism to actually process (cyber-spatial) information. This ability cannot be indefinitely expanded, because it has limits that are physical, emotional, affective. The contradiction between infinite expansion of cyberspace and limited capability of processing of cybertime is the origin Precarious Rhapsody / 44 of contemporary chaos. Deleuze and Guattari talk about chaos in What is Philosophy?. They say that chaos occurs when the world goes too fast for your brain. This is chaos. We could recall that Karl Marx had once expressed the concept of an overproduction crisis. You have an overproduction crisis when machinery and the labor of workers produce an amount of goods that the market cannot absorb. During the history of the industrial system, the overproduction crisis was recurrent, and capitalism was pushed to destroy goods, destroy productive capacity, and also destroy human lives, in order to overcome this kind of economic crises. What is going to happen now? Should we see a relationship between this big imbalance and the war that is raging and obscuring the horizon of the world? Let’s go back to the concept of panic. Semio-capital is in a crisis of overproduction, but the form of this crisis is not only economic, but also psychopathic. Semio-capital, in fact, is not about the production of material goods, but about the production of psychic stimulation. The mental environment is saturated by signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a permanent electrocution, which leads the individual mind as well as the collective mind to a state of collapse. The problem of panic is generally connected with the management of time. But we can also see a spatial side to panic. During the past centuries, the building of the modern urban environment used to be dependent on the rationalist plan of the political city. The economic dictatorship of the last few decades has accelerated urban expansion. The interaction between cyber-spatial sprawl and urban physical environment has destroyed the rationalist organization of space. In the intersection of information and urban space we see the proliferation of a chaotic sprawl following no rule, no plan, dictated by the sole logic of economic interest. Urban panic is caused by the perception of this sprawl and this proliferation of metropolitan experience; the proliferation of spatial lines of flight. The metropolis is a surface of complexity in the territorial domain. The social organism is unable to process the overwhelmingly complex experience of metropolitan chaos. The proliferation of lines of communication has created a new kind of chaotic perception. In their book Attention Economy, Davenport and Bleick say that the central problem of the cognitive worker, and generally of people who are living in hypersaturated informational environments, is this: we have no 45 // Info-labor more time for attention, we are no more able to understand and process information input because our time is saturated by a flow of hyper-information. We don’t have time for attention in the workplace. We are forced to process far too large amounts of information and our bodymind is completely taken by this. And further, we have no time for affection, for communication, for erotic relationships. We have no more time for that spatial kind of attention that means attention to the body – to our body, to the body of the other. So, more and more, we feel that we have run out of time; that we must accelerate. And we feel simultaneously that acceleration leads to a loss of life, of pleasure and of understanding. This collapse in the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime may also be seen as the special feature of the current political situation. The world is rushing into a global war whose reasons are not clear, whose limits are not known. Some are speaking of a long-lasting war, possibly an infinite war. Nonsense? Yes, nonsense. But this nonsensical war is the most alarming symptom of the panic syndrome. Colin Powell, some days after 9/11, spoke about the rumors that the intelligence services had received some information about bombings and hijackings of airplanes before September 11th. “Yes, it’s true”, he said, “Yes, it’s true, we have received information about something like this, we have received information about bombings and so on. But we always receive lots of information we are not able to process or even to see. We had too much of it, this is the problem. We have too much information.” This is precisely the effect of info-saturation, which is the consequence of the unbounded expansion of cyberspace. On the one hand, war is a way by which capital deals with the economic problems of overproduction, investments in weapons and tools for security, security and security. On the other hand, war is made inevitable by the mental confusion of the ruling class. They do not understand what is happening because the reality has become too complex and too aggressive. So they react in a primary way. The world’s ruling class is overwhelmed by the very complexity of the world they have built for themselves. | 8,709 | <h4>The Hyperinfo era of semiocapitalist exploitation has created absolute chaos, a panic which attacks the mind of the individual to the point where their body, the material in the world, cease to exist and rationality isn't possible.</h4><p><strong>Bifo 2009<u></strong> ~Franco Berardi, aka "Bifo," founder of the famous "Radio Alice" in Bologna and an important figure of the Italian Autonomia Movement, is a writer, media theorist, and media activist. He currently teaches Social History of the Media at the Accademia di Brera, Milan Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of Post-Alpha Generation pg. 43-46~ *We do not endorse gendered or ableist language</p><p>Globalization stands reframed in the dark light of the global war. This means we need to reconceptualize the change that is taking place in the social, economic and anthropological form of globalization. During the past two centuries, global control was the general techno-utopia of capitalist society and modern culture. Now, the time of global control is over. We are completely out of this framework today. The new governing framework of capitalism is global panic</u>. <u>If we want to understand what panic means we have to talk about the attention economy and about ‘digital labor.’ This is where the source of contemporary panic lies: in the organization of time in the digital sphere</u>, in the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime. What is panic? We are told that psychiatrists have recently discovered and named a new kind of disorder – they call it Panic Syndrome. It seems that it’s something quite recent in the psychological self-perception of human beings. But what does panic mean? <u>Once, panic used to be a nice word, and this is the sense in which the Swiss-American psychoanalyst James Hillman remembers it in his</u> 43 // Info-labor <u>book on Pan. Pan used to be the god of nature, the god of totality. In Greek mythology, Pan was the symbol of the relationship between man and nature. Nature is the overwhelming flow of reality, things and information that we are surrounded by. Modern culture is based on the idea of human domination, of the domestication of nature. So the original panic feeling, which was something good for the ancient world, is becoming increasingly terrifying and destructive. Today<mark>, panic has become a form of psychopathology</mark>. <mark>We can speak of panic when we see a conscious organism (individual or social) being overwhelmed by the speed of processes he, she is involved in, and has no time to process the information input</mark>.</u> <mark>In these cases the organism, all of a sudden, is no more able to process the sheer amount of information coming into its cognitive field or even that which is being generated by the organism itself.</mark> <mark>Technological transformations have displaced the focus from the sphere of the production of material goods towards the sphere of semiotic goods: the info-sphere. With this, semio-capital becomes the general form of the economy</mark>. <u><mark>The accelerated creation of surplus value depends on the acceleration of the info-sphere. The digitalization of the info-sphere opens the road to this kind of acceleration. Signs are produced and circulated at a growing speed but the human terminal of the system</u> (the embodied mind) <u>is put under growing pressure, and finally it cracks.</u> <u>I think that the current economic crisis has something to do with this imbalance in the field of semio-production and in the field of semio-demand</u></mark>. <mark>This imbalance in the relationship between the supply of semiotic goods and the socially available time of attention is the core of the economic crisis as well as the core of the intellectual and the political crises that we are living through now.</mark> We can describe this situation in terms of the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime. Cyberspace is the infinite productivity of collective intelligence in a networked dimension. The potency of the General Intellect is enormously enhanced when a huge number of points enter into connections with each other thanks to the telematic network. <u>Consequently, info-production is able to create an infinite supply of mental and intellectual goods. But while cyberspace is conceptually infinite, cybertime is not infinite at all<mark>.</u> I call cybertime the ability of the conscious organism to actually process (cyber-spatial) information. <u>This ability cannot be indefinitely expanded, because it has limits that are physical, emotional, affective.</u> The contradiction between infinite expansion of cyberspace and limited capability of processing of cybertime is the origin</mark> Precarious Rhapsody / 44 <mark>of contemporary chaos. <u>Deleuze and Guattari talk about chaos in What is Philosophy?. They say that chaos occurs when the world goes too fast for your brain. This is chaos.</mark> We could recall that Karl Marx had once expressed the concept of an overproduction crisis. You have an overproduction crisis when machinery and the labor of workers produce an amount of goods that the market cannot absorb.</u> During the history of the industrial system, the overproduction crisis was recurrent, and capitalism was pushed to destroy goods, destroy productive capacity, and also <u>destroy human lives, in order to overcome this kind of economic crises.</u> What is going to happen now? Should we see a relationship between this big imbalance and the war that is raging and obscuring the horizon of the world? Let’s go back to the concept of panic. <u>Semio-capital is in a crisis of overproduction, but the form of this crisis is not only economic, but also psychopathic. <mark>Semio-capital, in fact, is not about the production of material goods, but about the production of psychic stimulation.</u> The mental environment is saturated by signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a permanent electrocution, which <u>leads the individual mind as well as the collective mind to a state of collapse.</u> The problem of panic is generally connected with the management of time</mark>. But we can also see a spatial side to panic. During the past centuries, the building of the modern urban environment used to be dependent on the rationalist plan of the political city. The economic dictatorship of the last few decades has accelerated urban expansion. The interaction between cyber-spatial sprawl and urban physical environment has destroyed the rationalist organization of space. <u>In the intersection of information and urban space we see the proliferation of a chaotic sprawl following no rule, no plan, dictated by the sole logic of economic interest. </u>Urban panic is caused by the perception of this sprawl and this proliferation of metropolitan experience; the proliferation of spatial lines of flight. The metropolis is a surface of complexity in the territorial domain. <u>The social organism is unable to process the overwhelmingly complex experience of metropolitan chaos. The proliferation of lines of communication has created a new kind of chaotic perception. In their book Attention Economy, Davenport and Bleick say that the central problem of the cognitive worker, and generally of people who are living in hypersaturated informational environments, is this: we have no</u> 45 // Info-labor <u>more time for attention, we are no more able to understand and process information input because our time is saturated by a flow of hyper-information.</u> We don’t have time for attention in the workplace. We are forced to process far too large amounts of information and our bodymind is completely taken by this. And further, <u>we have no time for affection, for communication, for erotic relationships. We have no more time for that spatial kind of attention that means attention to the body – to our body, to the body of the other.</u> So, more and more, we feel that we have run out of time; that we must accelerate. And we feel simultaneously that acceleration leads to a loss of life, of pleasure and of understanding. <mark>This collapse in the relationship between cyberspace and cybertime may also be seen as the special feature of the current political situation.</mark> <u><mark>The world is rushing into a global war whose reasons are not clear, whose limits are not known. Some are speaking of a long-lasting war, possibly an infinite war.</mark> Nonsense? Yes, nonsense. But <mark>this nonsensical war is the most alarming symptom of the panic syndrome.</u></mark> <u><mark>Colin Powell, some days after 9/11, spoke about the rumors that the intelligence services had received some information about bombings and hijackings of airplanes before September 11th. “Yes, it’s true”, he said, “Yes, it’s true, we have received information about something like this, we have received information about bombings and so on. But we always receive lots of information we are not able to process or even to see. We had too much of it, this is the problem. We have too much information.”</u></mark> <mark>This is precisely the effect of info-saturation, which is the consequence of the unbounded expansion of cyberspace. On the one hand, war is a way by which capital deals with the economic problems of overproduction, investments in weapons and tools for security, security and security. On the other hand, war is made inevitable by the mental confusion of the ruling class. <u>They do not understand what is happening because the reality has become too complex and too aggressive. So they react in a primary way. The world’s ruling class is overwhelmed by the very complexity of the world they have built for themselves.</p></u></mark> | null | null | Polytechnic – 1AC: Debt | 904,257 | 17 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,694 | Refusal to embrace OBOR is selfish and counterproductive – US involvement is key to hotspot deescalation and enforcing environmental and labor standards | Luft 16 ( | Luft 16 (Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play, AKL) | The United States should not allow its concerns about great-power rivalry to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity. Above all, Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships with the Asian countries where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such a course would grant countries such as Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka inordinate power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington. Instead, Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind. The two countries should then find a bilateral forum in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the United States that plays to its strengths. The United States should reassure some of its allies, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where anxiety about China’s ascendance runs deep, that the B&R is largely a force for economic development rather than Chinese expansionism. By cautiously embracing the B&R, the United States could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by what might become the biggest economic development project in history. Washington’s engagement could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth and, by extension, on the U.S. economy. the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing their development agendas than stepping on each other’s toes. | Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such a course would grant countries power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind The two countries should find a bilateral forum in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the U S that plays to its strengths. By cautiously embracing the B&R, the United States could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered Washington’s engagement could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth and, by extension, on the U.S. economy the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing their agendas | Over the course of the next four years, Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks that they require to achieve their development goals. The investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent of that need—and even if the AIIB and China’s other funding outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. The United States should not allow its concerns about great-power rivalry to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity. Above all, Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships with the Asian countries where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such a course would grant countries such as Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka inordinate power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington. Instead, Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind. U.S. officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the potential benefits it offers, provided that Beijing leads the effort transparently and ensures that it works largely in the service of international development rather than China’s own gain. The two countries should then find a bilateral forum—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is just one option—in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the United States that plays to its strengths. American defense contractors, for example, could provide physical security and cybersecurity services to B&R projects, and the U.S. military could help secure some of the more volatile regions where Washington already has military assets, such as the Horn of Africa. That would spare China the need to increase its overseas military presence and bolster the legitimacy of the U.S. forces working in those areas. The United States should reassure some of its allies, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where anxiety about China’s ascendance runs deep, that the B&R is largely a force for economic development rather than Chinese expansionism. And U.S. officials should seek a role for Washington in the AIIB, either as a member of the bank or as an observer. Such a course would have a number of benefits. By cautiously embracing the B&R, the United States could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered by what might become the biggest economic development project in history. Washington’s engagement could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth and, by extension, on the U.S. economy. And by becoming a more active participant in the B&R’s various related institutions, the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards. Together, China and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s economic growth. At a time when the world economy is facing a potentially prolonged stagnation, Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing their development agendas than stepping on each other’s toes. | 3,300 | <h4><u>Refusal to embrace OBOR is selfish and counterproductive – US involvement is key to hotspot deescalation and enforcing environmental and labor standards</h4><p></u><strong>Luft 16 (</strong>Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play<u>, AKL)</p><p></u>Over the course of the next four years, Asian countries will need around $800 billion annually to build the transport, energy, and communications networks that they require to achieve their development goals. The investment provided by today’s development banks meets less than ten percent of that need—and even if the AIIB and China’s other funding outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. <u>The United States should not allow its concerns about great-power rivalry to distract it from the challenges this deficit poses to global prosperity. Above all, <mark>Washington should not attempt to leverage its relationships </mark>with the Asian countries <mark>where China plans to back infrastructure projects to stymie the initiative’s progress. Such</mark> <mark>a course would grant countries </mark>such as Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka inordinate <mark>power, creating new flash points between Beijing and Washington</mark>. Instead, <mark>Washington should approach the B&R with an open mind</mark>.</u> U.S. officials should publicly acknowledge China’s initiative and the potential benefits it offers, provided that Beijing leads the effort transparently and ensures that it works largely in the service of international development rather than China’s own gain. <u><mark>The two countries should </mark>then <mark>find a bilateral forum</u></mark>—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is just one option—<u><mark>in which to discuss a joint economic development agenda and come up with a role for the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> that plays to its strengths.</u></mark> American defense contractors, for example, could provide physical security and cybersecurity services to B&R projects, and the U.S. military could help secure some of the more volatile regions where Washington already has military assets, such as the Horn of Africa. That would spare China the need to increase its overseas military presence and bolster the legitimacy of the U.S. forces working in those areas. <u>The United States should reassure some of its allies, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where anxiety about China’s ascendance runs deep, that the B&R is largely a force for economic development rather than Chinese expansionism.</u> And U.S. officials should seek a role for Washington in the AIIB, either as a member of the bank or as an observer. Such a course would have a number of benefits. <u><mark>By cautiously embracing the B&R, the United States could ensure that American firms and investors are not excluded from the opportunities offered </mark>by what might become the biggest economic development project in history. <mark>Washington’s engagement could also encourage some of the European, Japanese, and South Korean investors who have been reluctant to fund Chinese-led infrastructure projects to change their tune—which would have a broadly positive impact on global growth and, by extension, on the U.S. economy</mark>.</u> And by becoming a more active participant in the B&R’s various related institutions, <u><mark>the United States would be better positioned to ensure that China’s projects adhere to international labor and environmental standards.</mark> </u>Together, China and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s economic growth. At a time when the world economy is facing a potentially prolonged stagnation, <u><mark>Beijing and Washington would be better off harmonizing their </mark>development <mark>agendas </mark>than stepping on each other’s toes.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 1,560,914 | 2 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,695 | PLAN revives US-China cooperation, spurs highly-visible, lasting changes | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director
David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott | joint Arctic marine research … organizations including the Arctic Council. | joint Arctic marine research … organizations including the Arctic Council | Fifth, joint Arctic marine research … organizations including the Arctic Council. | 82 | <h4>PLAN revives US-China cooperation, spurs <u>highly-visible</u>, <u>lasting</u><strong> changes </h4><p><mark>Slayton et al, 15</mark> – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director</p><p></strong>David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott<u> </p><p></u>Fifth, <u><mark>joint Arctic marine research … organizations including the Arctic Council</mark>.</p></u> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,922 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,696 | First is the theory … | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>First is the theory …</h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,921 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,697 | U.S. cooperation in OBOR solves for relations conflicts and avoids a great power war – sitting on the sidelines allows hostility between nations to occur | Luft, 2015. | Luft, 2015.(Luft, Gal. Co-Director. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. Co-Chairman. Global Forum on Energy Security. Senior Advisor. United States Energy Security Council. July 1, 2015. "U.S. Petulance Toward Belt, Road Self-Defeating." Global Times. Date Accessed: October 20, 2016. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/929909.shtml.) MAM | Since the 2013 unveiling of the Silk Road economic belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, traversing the Eurasian landmass and the surrounding waterways, China has put meat on the bones of the project, announcing major energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, including a recent $46 billion pledge to Pakistan, and it plans to do the same in the Persian Gulf, Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. To fund OBOR projects it has created dedicated financial institutions like the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It even announced a stock index to track the performance of shares of companies which have business related to the initiative.To all of this Washington responded with roaring silence. US officials refrain from commenting on the initiative in public or even mentioning it by name. Instead, Washington exercises soft power tactics intended to disrupt China's plan, like the futile opposition to the AIIB and the efforts within the IMF to block the yuan from attaining the status of reserve currency. The excuse is always the same: China is not responsible enough, not transparent enough and not accountable enough to lead the international development agenda. But the antagonism seems to be driven more by a not-made-here sentiment than by a logical and constructive geopolitical rationale. Further, snubbing what could be the largest and most comprehensive development project in history, with the potential of enabling hundreds of millions of people to lift themselves from poverty at a time when Asia faces a shortfall of hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure investment, is morally objectionable. It is also self-defeating as it denies American investors the benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure. But the bigger problem is that US frosty attitude toward the OBOR initiative raises the risk of great power confrontation down the road. Historically, game-changing transnational infrastructure projects have typically evoked suspicion and hostility among powers. In the late 19th century Britain's Cape Town-to-Cairo Railway project conflicted with the French-planned East-West Railway, almost leading to an Anglo-French war in Africa. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 was precipitated, in part, by the Japanese determination to strike before the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which would considerably strengthen Russia's hold in East Asia, could be completed. Imperial Germany's scheme to build the Berlin-Baghdad Railway to solidify its leverage over the crumbling Ottoman Empire contributed to the outbreak of WWI. Today, it is no longer railways that shape relations among nations, but oil and gas pipelines, LNG terminals, high voltage power lines, and fiber optics lines. Without active US participation in OBOR projects, China's pocket book diplomacy will draw the contour lines of the geopolitical map and history might repeat itself. To reclaim its vital role in shaping Eurasia's regional development and to avoid sinking into great power rivalry the US should seek ways to actively participate in it. But what role can it play? First, it should seek to inject its own comparative advantages to the plan. With superior force projection, homeland security and cyber defense capabilities, the US can play a role in protecting critical infrastructure along the OBOR corridors - many of them traverse tumultuous zones. China may build it; the US will protect it. Additionally, US technology, engineering and construction companies participating in OBOR can offer best practices and high quality and safety standards. Finally, the US should use its participation in OBOR as a way to promote from within China's adherence to international labor, environmental and corporate standards. But for all of this to happen, Washington should first decide to play a more constructive role in the OBOR architecture. The OBOR initiative is China's first real attempt to reshape the international order and it has become the hallmark of the Xi era. To be sure, it may greatly benefit China. But what strengthens China does not necessarily weaken the US. Sulking on the sidelines while China places steel on the ground certainly does. | Washington exercises soft power tactics intended to disrupt China's plan snubbing most comprehensive development project in history, morally objectionable is also self-defeating as it denies American investors the benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure Historically, game-changing transnational infrastructure projects have typically evoked suspicion and hostility among power Without active US participation in OBOR projects history might repeat itself To reclaim its vital role in shaping Eurasia's regional development and to avoid sinking into great power rivalry the US should seek ways to actively participate in it the US can play a role in protecting critical infrastructure along the OBOR corridors - m Washington should first decide to play a more constructive role in the OBOR architectur | Since the 2013 unveiling of the Silk Road economic belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, traversing the Eurasian landmass and the surrounding waterways, China has put meat on the bones of the project, announcing major energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, including a recent $46 billion pledge to Pakistan, and it plans to do the same in the Persian Gulf, Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. To fund OBOR projects it has created dedicated financial institutions like the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It even announced a stock index to track the performance of shares of companies which have business related to the initiative.To all of this Washington responded with roaring silence. US officials refrain from commenting on the initiative in public or even mentioning it by name. Instead, Washington exercises soft power tactics intended to disrupt China's plan, like the futile opposition to the AIIB and the efforts within the IMF to block the yuan from attaining the status of reserve currency. The excuse is always the same: China is not responsible enough, not transparent enough and not accountable enough to lead the international development agenda. But the antagonism seems to be driven more by a not-made-here sentiment than by a logical and constructive geopolitical rationale. Further, snubbing what could be the largest and most comprehensive development project in history, with the potential of enabling hundreds of millions of people to lift themselves from poverty at a time when Asia faces a shortfall of hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure investment, is morally objectionable. It is also self-defeating as it denies American investors the benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure. But the bigger problem is that US frosty attitude toward the OBOR initiative raises the risk of great power confrontation down the road. Historically, game-changing transnational infrastructure projects have typically evoked suspicion and hostility among powers. In the late 19th century Britain's Cape Town-to-Cairo Railway project conflicted with the French-planned East-West Railway, almost leading to an Anglo-French war in Africa. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 was precipitated, in part, by the Japanese determination to strike before the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which would considerably strengthen Russia's hold in East Asia, could be completed. Imperial Germany's scheme to build the Berlin-Baghdad Railway to solidify its leverage over the crumbling Ottoman Empire contributed to the outbreak of WWI. Today, it is no longer railways that shape relations among nations, but oil and gas pipelines, LNG terminals, high voltage power lines, and fiber optics lines. Without active US participation in OBOR projects, China's pocket book diplomacy will draw the contour lines of the geopolitical map and history might repeat itself. To reclaim its vital role in shaping Eurasia's regional development and to avoid sinking into great power rivalry the US should seek ways to actively participate in it. But what role can it play? First, it should seek to inject its own comparative advantages to the plan. With superior force projection, homeland security and cyber defense capabilities, the US can play a role in protecting critical infrastructure along the OBOR corridors - many of them traverse tumultuous zones. China may build it; the US will protect it. Additionally, US technology, engineering and construction companies participating in OBOR can offer best practices and high quality and safety standards. Finally, the US should use its participation in OBOR as a way to promote from within China's adherence to international labor, environmental and corporate standards. But for all of this to happen, Washington should first decide to play a more constructive role in the OBOR architecture. The OBOR initiative is China's first real attempt to reshape the international order and it has become the hallmark of the Xi era. To be sure, it may greatly benefit China. But what strengthens China does not necessarily weaken the US. Sulking on the sidelines while China places steel on the ground certainly does. | 4,270 | <h4><u>U.S. cooperation in OBOR solves for relations conflicts and avoids a great power war – sitting on the sidelines allows hostility between nations to occur </h4><p></u><strong>Luft, 2015.</strong>(Luft, Gal. Co-Director. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. Co-Chairman. Global Forum on Energy Security. Senior Advisor. United States Energy Security Council. July 1, 2015. "U.S. Petulance Toward Belt, Road Self-Defeating." Global Times. Date Accessed: October 20, 2016. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/929909.shtml.)<u> MAM</p><p>Since the 2013 unveiling of the Silk Road economic belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, traversing the Eurasian landmass and the surrounding waterways, China has put meat on the bones of the project, announcing major energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, including a recent $46 billion pledge to Pakistan, and it plans to do the same in the Persian Gulf, Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. To fund OBOR projects it has created dedicated financial institutions like the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It even announced a stock index to track the performance of shares of companies which have business related to the initiative.To all of this Washington responded with roaring silence. US officials refrain from commenting on the initiative in public or even mentioning it by name. Instead, <mark>Washington exercises soft power tactics intended to disrupt China's plan</mark>, like the futile opposition to the AIIB and the efforts within the IMF to block the yuan from attaining the status of reserve currency. The excuse is always the same: China is not responsible enough, not transparent enough and not accountable enough to lead the international development agenda. But the antagonism seems to be driven more by a not-made-here sentiment than by a logical and constructive geopolitical rationale. Further, <mark>snubbing </mark>what could be the largest and<mark> most comprehensive development project in history, </mark>with the potential of enabling hundreds of millions of people to lift themselves from poverty at a time when Asia faces a shortfall of hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure investment, is <mark>morally objectionable</mark>. It <mark>is also self-defeating as it denies American investors the benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure</mark>. But the bigger problem is that US frosty attitude toward the OBOR initiative raises the risk of great power confrontation down the road. <mark>Historically, game-changing transnational infrastructure projects have typically evoked suspicion and hostility among power</mark>s. In the late 19th century Britain's Cape Town-to-Cairo Railway project conflicted with the French-planned East-West Railway, almost leading to an Anglo-French war in Africa. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 was precipitated, in part, by the Japanese determination to strike before the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which would considerably strengthen Russia's hold in East Asia, could be completed. Imperial Germany's scheme to build the Berlin-Baghdad Railway to solidify its leverage over the crumbling Ottoman Empire contributed to the outbreak of WWI. Today, it is no longer railways that shape relations among nations, but oil and gas pipelines, LNG terminals, high voltage power lines, and fiber optics lines. <mark>Without active US participation in OBOR projects</mark>, China's pocket book diplomacy will draw the contour lines of the geopolitical map and <mark>history might repeat itself</mark>. <mark>To reclaim its vital role in shaping Eurasia's regional development and to avoid sinking into great power rivalry the US should seek ways to actively participate in it</mark>. But what role can it play? First, it should seek to inject its own comparative advantages to the plan. With superior force projection, homeland security and cyber defense capabilities, <mark>the US can play a role in protecting critical infrastructure along the OBOR corridors - m</mark>any of them traverse tumultuous zones. China may build it; the US will protect it. Additionally, US technology, engineering and construction companies participating in OBOR can offer best practices and high quality and safety standards. Finally, the US should use its participation in OBOR as a way to promote from within China's adherence to international labor, environmental and corporate standards. But for all of this to happen, <mark>Washington should first decide to play a more constructive role in the OBOR architectur</mark>e. The OBOR initiative is China's first real attempt to reshape the international order and it has become the hallmark of the Xi era. To be sure, it may greatly benefit China. But what strengthens China does not necessarily weaken the US. Sulking on the sidelines while China places steel on the ground certainly does.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 795,748 | 2 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,698 | US-China cooperation is key – two largest emitters and drive multilateral action | Hongzhou, 15 – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Research Fellow | Hongzhou, 15 – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Research Fellow
Zhang, Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). “China-US Climate Change Cooperation: Beyond Energy,” The Diplomat, Oct 13, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-us-climate-change-cooperation-beyond-energy/, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott | null | null | The Paris Summit in December 2015 … emissions in favor of stabilizing economic growth. | 87 | <h4><u>US-China cooperation</u> is key – <u>two largest emitters</u> and <u>drive multilateral action</u><strong> </h4><p><mark>Hongzhou, 15</mark> – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Associate Research Fellow</p><p></strong>Zhang, Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). “China-US Climate Change Cooperation: Beyond Energy,” The Diplomat, Oct 13, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-us-climate-change-cooperation-beyond-energy/, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott</p><p>The Paris Summit in December 2015 … emissions in favor of stabilizing economic growth.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,923 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,699 | The resolution was created to ensure that ground could be clearly distinguished between the affirmative and negative sides of the topic, while allowing for enough arguments to engage in in-depth clash. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The resolution was created to ensure that ground could be clearly distinguished between the affirmative and negative sides of the topic, while allowing for enough arguments to engage in in-depth clash. </h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,924 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,700 | Acting now is key to reviving US-China Arctic cooperation – it’s try or die | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director
David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott | The China-U.S. relationship is a … Hydrographic Organization, among other institutions. | The China-U.S. relationship is a among institutions | The China-U.S. relationship is a … Hydrographic Organization, among other institutions. | 88 | <h4><strong>Acting now is key to reviving US-China Arctic cooperation – it’s try or die </h4><p><mark>Slayton et al, 15</mark> – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director</p><p></strong>David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott<u> </p><p><mark>The China-U.S. relationship is a </mark>… Hydrographic Organization, <mark>among</mark> other <mark>institutions</mark>.</p></u> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,925 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,701 | Narrow-minded foreign policy strategies are a mistake – sustained cooperation between the US and China is key to resolving all global crises and not acting risks catastrophic collapse | Fingar et al 13 | Fingar et al 13 (Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January to December 2009 and holds a Ph.D in political science from Stanford; Banning Garrett is the director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States and also directs the Strategic Foresight Initiative, which works with the National Intelligence Council on their quadrennial long-term assessments, he holds a PhD from Brandeis University and has previously directed the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change at the Asia Society's Center for US-China relations, and was the founding executive director of the Institute for Sino-American International Dialogue at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; also includes input by Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush). Barry Hughes (Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver), Li Zhaoxing (China Public Diplomacy Association), Qu Xing (China Institute of International Studies), Wang Jisi (Peking University), and Ruan Zongze (CIIS); Published by the China Institute of International Studies, whose staff consists of nearly one hundred researchers and other professionals. Among them are senior diplomats, leading area-study specialists, and preeminent experts in major fields of foreign affairs. September 2013, "China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future," http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf, AKL) | The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and interdependence, but past achievements—and further progress—are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or winlose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one. climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. | the most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation the ability to work together on critical global challenges will determine the global future because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries. failure to deal megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the U S , and the world. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges is certain to increase as interdependence deepens. | The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and interdependence, but past achievements—and further progress—are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the USChina relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries. The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. While their individual and combined shares of global population will decline, the USChinese combined share of the global economy will rise further with Chinese growth, staying near or above 35 percent. Note: GDP measured at purchasing power parity; historical values taken from the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank. Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver, version 6.70. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time. How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled Global Trends to 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).1 The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings. This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or winlose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to loselose outcomes. The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, 1 See http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends. and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus. China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort. The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report. The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one. Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list includes consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy.. It also includes demographic change and effects of climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children. Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all. 0 10 20 30 40 50 United States China 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Percent of Global Energy Demand Figure 3. The China-US combined share of global energy demand will remain near 40 percent, with that of China rising to two-thirds of their total share. Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver, version 6.70. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together. 6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States—and the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. | 13,997 | <h4><u>Narrow-minded foreign policy strategies are a mistake – sustained cooperation between the US and China is key to resolving all global crises and not acting risks catastrophic collapse</h4><p></u><strong>Fingar et al 13</strong> (Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January to December 2009 and holds a Ph.D in political science from Stanford; Banning Garrett is the director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States and also directs the Strategic Foresight Initiative, which works with the National Intelligence Council on their quadrennial long-term assessments, he holds a PhD from Brandeis University and has previously directed the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change at the Asia Society's Center for US-China relations, and was the founding executive director of the Institute for Sino-American International Dialogue at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; also includes input by Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush). Barry Hughes (Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver), Li Zhaoxing (China Public Diplomacy Association), Qu Xing (China Institute of International Studies), Wang Jisi (Peking University), and Ruan Zongze (CIIS); Published by the China Institute of International Studies, whose staff consists of nearly one hundred researchers and other professionals. Among them are senior diplomats, leading area-study specialists, and preeminent experts in major fields of foreign affairs. September 2013, "China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future," http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf<u>, AKL)</p><p>The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and interdependence, but past achievements—and further progress—are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities</u>. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. <u>The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, <mark>the most</mark> difficult and most <mark>consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation </mark>between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, <mark>the ability </mark>of China and the United States <mark>to work together on critical global challenges will determine </mark>whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to <mark>the global future </mark>and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China</u>. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the USChina relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that <u>China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. <strong>We must do it <mark>because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries.</u></strong></mark> The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. While their individual and combined shares of global population will decline, the USChinese combined share of the global economy will rise further with Chinese growth, staying near or above 35 percent. Note: GDP measured at purchasing power parity; historical values taken from the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank. Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver, version 6.70. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time. How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled Global Trends to 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).1 The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings. This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. <u>When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or winlose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose.</u> Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to loselose outcomes. The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, 1 See http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends. and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus. China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort. The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report. <u>The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that <mark>failure to deal </mark>effectively with consequential<mark> megatrends will have <strong>deleterious consequences for China, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates<mark>, and the world</strong>. </mark>It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one.</u> Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list includes consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy.. It also includes demographic change and effects of <u>climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively.<mark> <strong>All have profound implications for governance and global stability.</strong></mark> How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children.</u> Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all. 0 10 20 30 40 50 United States China 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Percent of Global Energy Demand Figure 3. The China-US combined share of global energy demand will remain near 40 percent, with that of China rising to two-thirds of their total share. Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver, version 6.70. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. <u>No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune</u>. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together. 6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. <u>Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership.</u> Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States—and <u><strong><mark>the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical</u></strong></mark>. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. <u><mark>The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges</mark> and threats <mark>is certain to increase as</mark> globalization continues and <mark>interdependence deepens.</p></u></mark> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 10,205 | 185 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,702 | The other team chose to not affirm the resolution, which requires government-to-government diplomatic and/or economic engagement. This changed the starting point of the round to something that is undebatable and unpredictable. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The other team chose to not affirm the resolution, which requires government-to-government diplomatic and/or economic engagement. This changed the starting point of the round to something that is undebatable and unpredictable. </h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,926 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,703 | Arctic cooperation is vital – epicenter of climate change | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director | Slayton et al, 15 – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director
David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott | areas of cooperation can enhance … change is another fruitful course ahead. | is fruitful | Five key areas of cooperation can enhance … change is another fruitful course ahead. | 85 | <h4><u>Arctic cooperation</u> is <u>vital</u> – <u>epicenter</u> of <u>climate change</u><strong> </h4><p><mark>Slayton et al, 15</mark> – Stanford University Arctic Security Initiative Executive Director</p><p></strong>David Slayton, research fellow, co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a member of Hoover’s Arctic Security Initiative. “Strengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and China,” Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN), http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china, Accessed 9/30/16. Scott<u> </p><p></u>Five key <u>areas of cooperation can enhance … change <mark>is</mark> another <strong><mark>fruitful</mark> course</strong> ahead.</p></u> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,927 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,704 | OBOR is a perfect start to the Trump administration – it’s a positive item on his foreign policy agenda | Grossman 11/15 | Grossman 11/15 (Mark Grossman, Ambassador Marc Grossman is a Vice Chairman of The Cohen Group. A US Foreign Service Officer for 29 years, he retired in 2005 as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The ambassador was the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2011-2012 and a Kissinger Senior Fellow at Yale in 2013, 11/15/16, Yale Global Online, “China and the US: Two Visions, One Collaboration?”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-and-us-two-visions-one-collaboration, AKL) | With Donald Trump’s election, China and the United States could be on a collision course. Trump may find it useful to look for areas where the two countries could work together. One opportunity ready to be explored is OBOR The US and Chinese projects are currently on separate trajectories there benefits to additional US-China cooperation highlighted Afghanistan as an “area of cooperation.” Another area of potential cooperation is in Pakistan, where China and the United States want Pakistan to support regional stability, grow their economy and undermine extremism. collaborative efforts can bring benefits to US companies The possibilities present the incoming administration with a strategic opportunity to improve US-China ties, advance common security interests, and create economic opportunities for American business. Success would bring tangible benefits to a region where further state failure would surely fuel extremism, a threat to both the United States and China. there would be something positive on President Trump’s agenda with China when he takes office in January | Trump may find it useful to look for areas where the two countries could work together. One opportunity ready to be explored is OBOR The US and Chinese projects are currently on separate trajectories there benefits to additional US-China cooperation highlighted Afghanistan as an “area of cooperation.” Another area of cooperation is in Pakistan, where China and the United States want Pakistan to support regional stability, grow their economy and undermine extremism. collaborative efforts can bring benefits to US companies The possibilities present the incoming administration with opportunity to improve US-China ties, advance common security interests, and create economic opportunities for American business. there would be something positive on President Trump’s agenda with China when he takes office in January | With Donald Trump’s election, China and the United States could be on a collision course. The US president-elect promised during the campaign to label China a currency manipulator, instruct the US trade representative to bring trade cases against China in the World Trade Organization, and threaten 45 percent tariffs if China does not renegotiate trade agreements with the US. Meanwhile, China pursues a military buildup in the South China Sea designed to diminish US influence in Asia. As Trump addresses trade and the other issues on the US-China agenda as president and not candidate, he may find it useful to look for areas where the two countries could work together. One opportunity ready to be explored is the vision promoted by both Beijing and Washington of the need for more economic and infrastructure connections between East Asia, South and Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Two concepts are in play: China’s One Belt One Road, or OBOR initiative, a multibillion dollar program to build ports, railways, roads, power plants in and around 60 countries and the more modest, but still important, the American New Silk Road initiative, or NSR. In July 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke in India about the benefits of linking Central Asian economies with those in South Asia, with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the center. Increased regional economic connectivity, she argued, would promote sustainable economic growth, a crucial part of the effort to defeat extremism. In September, the United States convened a New Silk Road ministerial meeting in New York and China expressed enthusiasm for the project. Turkey hosted the “Heart of Asia Conference” in November 2011, and supported by the United States and China, the concept became a touchstone for regional cooperation. Obstacles then emerged. The Chinese said the name New Silk Road “belonged to China” and “Historic Trade Routes” would be a better name for the US initiative. In 2013, Chinese leaders responded with a Silk Road initiative of their own: One Belt One Road consists of two main components – a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based Maritime Silk Road– which Chinese leaders believe will together change the geostrategic and geo-economic face of the region. In August 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that more than 100 countries and international organizations had committed to participate in OBOR. According to Chinese press reports, OBOR is supported by $40 billion from China’s Silk Road infrastructure fund, $100 billion in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank pledges, and an initial $50 billion commitment from the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – with a promise to increase that to $100 billion. The US and Chinese projects are currently on separate trajectories. American officials maintain that they support OBOR, though the United States is rightly wary of projects that enhance China’s military capacity. And the United States cannot match the dollars or yuan pledged or spent. That said, there are several strategic, regional and commercial benefits to additional US-China cooperation around the OBOR and NSR initiatives. For example, the September 2016 US-China Summit in Hangzhou highlighted Afghanistan as an “area of cooperation.” the two countries share an interest in an Afghan state in which Al Qaeda and the Islamic State find no havens, drug exports shrink, and private sector–based economic activity increases. A coordinated OBOR-NSR effort to create what Afghan officials once called an “Asian Roundabout” to encourage a sustainable Afghan economy would promote these shared goals. The recent opening of a rail line from the eastern coast of China to the northern Afghan city of Hairatan, offers Afghan exporters an alternative route to Asia with dramatically reduced transit times. Another area of potential cooperation is in Pakistan, where China and the United States want Pakistan to support regional stability, grow their economy and undermine extremism. China’s $51 billion commitment to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is designed to build highways, railways and energy generation in Pakistan, including a proposed rail and highway between Pakistan’s port at Gwadar and China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, which would also connect the OBOR to China’s Maritime Silk Road project. Pakistanis hope the corridor will create 700,000 jobs between by 2030, which should provide alternatives to extremism for some of Pakistan’s 190 million people, a majority of whom are under the age of 22. Washington and Beijing are already working together in Pakistan on the clean-energy project Sapphire Wind. The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation has provided $128 million in financing for this 50-MW wind project, which uses General Electric turbines. Under the umbrella of the US-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership, the United States will invest $70 million on transmission lines to connect a 680-MW wind project in Sindh to the national grid. China is also an investor. Such a collaborative NSR-OBOR efforts between the United States and China can bring benefits to US companies. The Wall Street Journal reported in October that General Electric, Honeywell and Caterpillar are already focused on the possibilities. According to the Journal, GE’s orders in Pakistan are more than $1 billion today, compared with less than $100 million five years ago. Connecting US firms to OBOR and keeping them aware of NSR opportunities requires a concerted effort by many parts of the US government, including the Departments of State and Commerce, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export Import Bank. Despite the obvious benefits, there are many challenges to creating an NSR-OBOR nexus. China may be pursuing OBOR to control rising wage rates at home by exporting employment and soaking up overproduction in industries like steel. The Chinese might decide to go it alone, especially when comparing the enormous resources they have promised with a small US investment in NSR. The number of American firms interested in OBOR may be too small to reach critical mass, and those that seek engagement may stand no real chance to work with Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises. In September, representatives of 10 Chinese state-owned enterprises visited Washington and New York to promote US commercial interest in OBOR opportunities, but more needs to be done by Beijing to welcome US private-sector participation and protect US commercial interests. Another challenge is managing Indian anxieties about OBOR. Many security specialists and analysts in Delhi perceive OBOR not as a development initiative, but as a strategic effort by Beijing to surround India with naval facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo in Sri Lanka and Kyaukpyu in Burma. The possibilities of joint efforts inspired by OBOR and NSR present the incoming administration with a strategic opportunity to improve US-China ties, advance common security interests, and create economic opportunities for American business. Success would bring tangible benefits to a region where further state failure would surely fuel extremism, a threat to both the United States and China. And, not least, there would be something positive on President Trump’s already contentious agenda with China when he takes office in January. | 7,428 | <h4>OBOR is a perfect start to the Trump administration – it’s a positive item on his foreign policy agenda</h4><p><strong>Grossman 11/15 </strong>(Mark Grossman, Ambassador Marc Grossman is a Vice Chairman of The Cohen Group. A US Foreign Service Officer for 29 years, he retired in 2005 as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The ambassador was the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2011-2012 and a Kissinger Senior Fellow at Yale in 2013, 11/15/16, Yale Global Online, “China and the US: Two Visions, One Collaboration?”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-and-us-two-visions-one-collaboration, AKL)</p><p><u>With Donald Trump’s election, China and the United States could be on a collision course.</u> The US president-elect promised during the campaign to label China a currency manipulator, instruct the US trade representative to bring trade cases against China in the World Trade Organization, and threaten 45 percent tariffs if China does not renegotiate trade agreements with the US. Meanwhile, China pursues a military buildup in the South China Sea designed to diminish US influence in Asia. As <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> addresses trade and the other issues on the US-China agenda as president and not candidate, he <u><mark>may find it useful to look for areas where the two countries could work together. One opportunity ready to be explored is</u></mark> the vision promoted by both Beijing and Washington of the need for more economic and infrastructure connections between East Asia, South and Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Two concepts are in play: China’s One Belt One Road, or <u><mark>OBOR</u></mark> initiative, a multibillion dollar program to build ports, railways, roads, power plants in and around 60 countries and the more modest, but still important, the American New Silk Road initiative, or NSR. In July 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke in India about the benefits of linking Central Asian economies with those in South Asia, with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the center. Increased regional economic connectivity, she argued, would promote sustainable economic growth, a crucial part of the effort to defeat extremism. In September, the United States convened a New Silk Road ministerial meeting in New York and China expressed enthusiasm for the project. Turkey hosted the “Heart of Asia Conference” in November 2011, and supported by the United States and China, the concept became a touchstone for regional cooperation. Obstacles then emerged. The Chinese said the name New Silk Road “belonged to China” and “Historic Trade Routes” would be a better name for the US initiative. In 2013, Chinese leaders responded with a Silk Road initiative of their own: One Belt One Road consists of two main components – a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based Maritime Silk Road– which Chinese leaders believe will together change the geostrategic and geo-economic face of the region. In August 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that more than 100 countries and international organizations had committed to participate in OBOR. According to Chinese press reports, OBOR is supported by $40 billion from China’s Silk Road infrastructure fund, $100 billion in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank pledges, and an initial $50 billion commitment from the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – with a promise to increase that to $100 billion. <u><mark>The US and Chinese projects are currently on separate trajectories</u></mark>. American officials maintain that they support OBOR, though the United States is rightly wary of projects that enhance China’s military capacity. And the United States cannot match the dollars or yuan pledged or spent. That said, <u><mark>there</u></mark> are several strategic, regional and commercial <u><mark>benefits to additional US-China cooperation</u></mark> around the OBOR and NSR initiatives. For example, the September 2016 US-China Summit in Hangzhou <u><mark>highlighted Afghanistan as an “area of cooperation.”</u></mark> the two countries share an interest in an Afghan state in which Al Qaeda and the Islamic State find no havens, drug exports shrink, and private sector–based economic activity increases. A coordinated OBOR-NSR effort to create what Afghan officials once called an “Asian Roundabout” to encourage a sustainable Afghan economy would promote these shared goals. The recent opening of a rail line from the eastern coast of China to the northern Afghan city of Hairatan, offers Afghan exporters an alternative route to Asia with dramatically reduced transit times. <u><mark>Another area of </mark>potential <mark>cooperation is in Pakistan, where China and the United States want Pakistan to support regional stability, grow their economy and undermine extremism.</u></mark> China’s $51 billion commitment to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is designed to build highways, railways and energy generation in Pakistan, including a proposed rail and highway between Pakistan’s port at Gwadar and China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, which would also connect the OBOR to China’s Maritime Silk Road project. Pakistanis hope the corridor will create 700,000 jobs between by 2030, which should provide alternatives to extremism for some of Pakistan’s 190 million people, a majority of whom are under the age of 22. Washington and Beijing are already working together in Pakistan on the clean-energy project Sapphire Wind. The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation has provided $128 million in financing for this 50-MW wind project, which uses General Electric turbines. Under the umbrella of the US-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership, the United States will invest $70 million on transmission lines to connect a 680-MW wind project in Sindh to the national grid. China is also an investor. Such a <u><mark>collaborative</u></mark> NSR-OBOR <u><mark>efforts</u></mark> between the United States and China <u><mark>can bring benefits to US companies</u></mark>. The Wall Street Journal reported in October that General Electric, Honeywell and Caterpillar are already focused on the possibilities. According to the Journal, GE’s orders in Pakistan are more than $1 billion today, compared with less than $100 million five years ago. Connecting US firms to OBOR and keeping them aware of NSR opportunities requires a concerted effort by many parts of the US government, including the Departments of State and Commerce, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export Import Bank. Despite the obvious benefits, there are many challenges to creating an NSR-OBOR nexus. China may be pursuing OBOR to control rising wage rates at home by exporting employment and soaking up overproduction in industries like steel. The Chinese might decide to go it alone, especially when comparing the enormous resources they have promised with a small US investment in NSR. The number of American firms interested in OBOR may be too small to reach critical mass, and those that seek engagement may stand no real chance to work with Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises. In September, representatives of 10 Chinese state-owned enterprises visited Washington and New York to promote US commercial interest in OBOR opportunities, but more needs to be done by Beijing to welcome US private-sector participation and protect US commercial interests. Another challenge is managing Indian anxieties about OBOR. Many security specialists and analysts in Delhi perceive OBOR not as a development initiative, but as a strategic effort by Beijing to surround India with naval facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo in Sri Lanka and Kyaukpyu in Burma. <u><mark>The possibilities</u></mark> of joint efforts inspired by OBOR and NSR <u><mark>present the incoming administration with </mark>a strategic <mark>opportunity to improve US-China ties, advance common security interests, and create economic opportunities for American business. </mark>Success would bring tangible benefits to a region where further state failure would surely fuel extremism, a threat to both the United States and China.</u> And, not least, <u><mark>there would be something positive on President Trump’s</mark> </u>already contentious <u><mark>agenda with China when he takes office in January</u></mark>.</p><p><u> </p></u> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 1,560,928 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,705 | Substantial increase is at least 30% | Bryson, 2001, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals Federal Circuit | Bryson, 2001, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals Federal Circuit | The specification defines "substantially increased" as an increase of at least about 30%, the term "to increase substantially" requires an increase of at least about 30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst | The specification defines "substantially increased at least about 30% to increase substantially" requires an increase of at least about 30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst | 265 F.3d 1371; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20590; 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, 9/19, lexis
The term "to increase substantially" in claim 1 of the '705 patent refers to the claimed increase achieved by the invention in the relative productivity of the catalyst used in the Fischer-Tropsch process. The specification defines "substantially increased" catalyst activity or productivity as an increase of at least about 30%, more preferably an increase of about 50%, and still more preferably an increase of about 75%. '705 patent, col. 1, ll. 59-63. Based on that language from the specification, the trial court found, and the parties agree, that the term "to increase substantially" requires an increase of at least about 30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst. Notwithstanding that numerical boundary, the trial court found the phrase "to increase substantially" to be indefinite because the court concluded that there were two possible ways to calculate the increase in productivity, the subtraction method and the division method, and the patent did not make clear which of those ways was used in the claim. | 1,109 | <h4><strong>Substantial increase is at least 30%</h4><p>Bryson, 2001, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals Federal Circuit</p><p></strong>265 F.3d 1371; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20590; 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, 9/19, lexis</p><p>The term "to increase substantially" in claim 1 of the '705 patent refers to the claimed increase achieved by the invention in the relative productivity of the catalyst used in the Fischer-Tropsch process. <u><strong><mark>The specification defines "substantially increased</mark>" </u></strong>catalyst activity or productivity <u><strong>as an increase of <mark>at least about 30%</mark>,</u></strong> more preferably an increase of about 50%, and still more preferably an increase of about 75%. '705 patent, col. 1, ll. 59-63. Based on that language from the specification, the trial court found, and the parties agree, that <u><strong>the term "<mark>to increase substantially" requires an increase of at least about 30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst</u></strong></mark>. Notwithstanding that numerical boundary, the trial court found the phrase "to increase substantially" to be indefinite because the court concluded that there were two possible ways to calculate the increase in productivity, the subtraction method and the division method, and the patent did not make clear which of those ways was used in the claim.</p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 51,536 | 29 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,706 | We agree their advocacy has value; however, because they chose a starting point of discussion that wasn’t outlined by the resolution, we should no longer be held to the burden of rejoinder. We should not have to say, “No” to their “Yes”. We should be able to agree with their, “Yes” and then focus the debate on what is the best methodology. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>We agree their advocacy has value; however, because they chose a starting point of discussion that wasn’t outlined by the resolution, we should no longer be held to the burden of rejoinder. We should not have to say, “No” to their “Yes”. We should be able to agree with their, “Yes” and then focus the debate on what is the best methodology. </h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,929 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,707 | Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by selectively engaging in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by selectively engaging in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. </h4> | 1AC | Contention 2 is Relations | null | 1,560,930 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,708 | US-China climate cooperation facilitates mitigation and adaptation strategies globally – solves extinction | China-US Joint Working Group, 13 –Atlantic Council of US & CIIS | China-US Joint Working Group, 13 –Atlantic Council of US & CIIS | widely disseminate clean energy technologies | widely disseminate technologies | Drafted by Thomas Fingar (inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) and Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council), based on discussions of the joint China-US Working Group and draft input from the Chinese working group, with additional input from Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush). The report was vetted and approved by the Chinese side with minor modifications, with particular contributions from Li Zhaoxing (China Public Diplomacy Association), Qu Xing (China Institute of International Studies), Wang Jisi (Peking University), and Ruan Zongze (CIIS). “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,” China Institute of International Studies, September 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169907/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future.pdf, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott
• Cooperation on climate change mitigation, … widely disseminate clean energy technologies. | 998 | <h4>US-China climate cooperation facilitates <u>mitigation and adaptation</u><strong> strategies globally – solves extinction</h4><p><mark>China-US Joint Working Group, 13</mark> –Atlantic Council of US & CIIS</p><p></strong>Drafted by Thomas Fingar (inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) and Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council), based on discussions of the joint China-US Working Group and draft input from the Chinese working group, with additional input from Stephen J. Hadley (former US national security advisor to President George W. Bush). The report was vetted and approved by the Chinese side with minor modifications, with particular contributions from Li Zhaoxing (China Public Diplomacy Association), Qu Xing (China Institute of International Studies), Wang Jisi (Peking University), and Ruan Zongze (CIIS). “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,” China Institute of International Studies, September 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169907/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future.pdf, Accessed 9/30/16, Scott</p><p>• Cooperation on climate change mitigation, … <u><strong><mark> widely disseminate</strong></mark> clean energy <strong><mark>technologies</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,932 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,709 | Forcing us to maintain the burden of rejoinder against non-topical affirmatives that make Capital T Truth claims would put us in the position of making morally reprehensible arguments, which is bad for education, promotes poor discussion and results in a hostile environment. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Forcing us to maintain the burden of rejoinder against non-topical affirmatives that make Capital T Truth claims would put us in the position of making morally reprehensible arguments, which is bad for education, promotes poor discussion and results in a hostile environment. </h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,931 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,710 | Violation: There is already a lot of US-China healthcare cooperation over Africa now—joint infrastructure projects, massive funding, Ebola, and intelligence sharing | NHFPC 2016 | NHFPC 2016 | China and the United States will increase their cooperation in health assistance to Africa, including helping to build the first disease control and prevention center Public health is one area in which China, the United States and Africa can reach cooperation agreements most easily China, the US and other international parties worked well together, with excellent results, on Ebola prevention and control in West Africa in the past two years including Egypt, Kenya and Zambia China will help mostly with building the infrastructure. It will also cooperate with the US in establishing the infectious diseases report system for the CDC China will send public health experts to the center to work and help ensure its normal operation. China has provided $2 million and the US $10 million in assistance China and the US are also cooperating on some other African projects, for example on Ebola prevention and control in Sierra Leone Other African projects involving Chinese and US cooperation are being discussed China and the United States, as large countries, have responsibilities to provide health assistance to poorer countries China has rich experience in infectious disease control and prevention, and Africa, as a continent with a large number of developing countries, resembles China | China and the United States will increase their cooperation in health assistance to Africa Public health is one area in which China, the United States and Africa can reach cooperation agreements China will help mostly with building the infrastructure. China has provided $2 million and the US $10 million cooperating on some other African projects, for example on Ebola Other African projects are being discussed China has rich experience in infectious disease control and prevention | National Health and Family Planning Comission of the PRC, “China, US help boost African healthcare”, NHFPC, 6-8, http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2016-06/08/c_69972.htm, Accessed 2-10
China and the United States will increase their cooperation in health assistance to Africa, including helping to build the first disease control and prevention center on the continent, according to a top Chinese public health official. "Public health is one area in which China, the United States and Africa can reach cooperation agreements most easily, because it is in everyone's interest," said Liang Xiaofeng, deputy director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. China, the US and other international parties worked well together, with excellent results, on Ebola prevention and control in West Africa in the past two years, paving the way for future cooperation, Liang said. An African CDC headquarters will be built in Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia, he said. Five additional national CDCs will be built in other countries, including Egypt, Kenya and Zambia, to help the continent to fight infectious diseases, he said. The Ebola epidemic began in early 2014 and ended late last year, striking mostly West Africa, but cases were found as far as the US and Europe. More than 10,000 people died in Africa. Liang said China will help mostly with building the infrastructure. It will also cooperate with the US in establishing the infectious diseases report system for the CDC, he said. China will send public health experts to the center to work and help ensure its normal operation. China has provided $2 million and the US $10 million in assistance to the CDC, he said. The timetable for building an African CDC has not yet been established, Liang said, and many obstacles still must be worked out. China and the US are also cooperating on some other African projects, for example on Ebola prevention and control in Sierra Leone, he said. The project involves testing the blood and body fluids of Ebola survivors, he said. Other African projects involving Chinese and US cooperation are being discussed, such as one promoting hepatitis B vaccination of newborns in Sierra Leone, he said. "China and the United States, as large countries, have responsibilities to provide health assistance to poorer countries," he said. "Ebola has proved no countries can be exempt from the threats of infectious diseases, and international cooperation is necessary for their control and prevention." "China is lagging behind the US in public health," he said. "Through cooperation we can also borrow good experiences from the US." China has rich experience in infectious disease control and prevention, and Africa, as a continent with a large number of developing countries, resembles China much more than the US, and China's experiences and assistance may be more useful to Africa in fighting infectious diseases, Liang said. | 2,912 | <h4><strong>Violation: There is already a lot of US-China healthcare cooperation over Africa now—joint infrastructure projects, massive funding, Ebola, and intelligence sharing</h4><p>NHFPC 2016</p><p></strong>National Health and Family Planning Comission of the PRC, “China, US help boost African healthcare”, NHFPC, 6-8, http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2016-06/08/c_69972.htm, Accessed 2-10</p><p><u><strong><mark>China and the United States will increase their cooperation in health assistance to Africa</strong></mark>, including helping to build the first disease control and prevention center</u> on the continent, according to a top Chinese public health official. "<u><mark>Public health is one area in which China, the United States and Africa can reach cooperation agreements</mark> most easily</u>, because it is in everyone's interest," said Liang Xiaofeng, deputy director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. <u>China, the US and other international parties worked well together, with excellent results, on <strong>Ebola prevention</strong> and control in West Africa in the past two years</u>, paving the way for future cooperation, Liang said. An African CDC headquarters will be built in Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia, he said. Five additional national CDCs will be built in other countries, <u>including Egypt, Kenya and Zambia</u>, to help the continent to fight infectious diseases, he said. The Ebola epidemic began in early 2014 and ended late last year, striking mostly West Africa, but cases were found as far as the US and Europe. More than 10,000 people died in Africa. Liang said <u><strong><mark>China will help mostly with building the infrastructure.</mark> It will also cooperate with the US in establishing the infectious diseases report system for the CDC</u></strong>, he said. <u>China will send public health experts to the center to work and help ensure its normal operation<strong>. <mark>China has provided $2 million and the US $10 million</mark> in assistance</u></strong> to the CDC, he said. The timetable for building an African CDC has not yet been established, Liang said, and many obstacles still must be worked out. <u>China and the US are also <mark>cooperating on some other African projects, for example on Ebola</mark> prevention and control in Sierra Leone</u>, he said. The project involves testing the blood and body fluids of Ebola survivors, he said. <u><mark>Other African projects</mark> involving Chinese and US cooperation <mark>are being discussed</u></mark>, such as one promoting hepatitis B vaccination of newborns in Sierra Leone, he said. "<u><strong>China and the United States, as large countries, have responsibilities to provide health assistance to poorer countries</u></strong>," he said. "Ebola has proved no countries can be exempt from the threats of infectious diseases, and international cooperation is necessary for their control and prevention." "China is lagging behind the US in public health," he said. "Through cooperation we can also borrow good experiences from the US." <u><mark>China has rich experience in infectious disease control and prevention</mark>, and Africa, as a continent with a large number of developing countries, resembles China</u> much more than the US, and China's experiences and assistance may be more useful to Africa in fighting infectious diseases, Liang said. </p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 175,062 | 8 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,711 | Prioritize solutions to warming- the slow violence of its impacts are underrepresented in decision calculus | Nixon 11 | Nixon 11 (Rob Nixon is the Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, NY Times Contributor and former is an affiliate of the Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies the Harvard University Press 2011 “Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor” Pg 2-3 http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/nixon-rob--slow-violence-and-the-environmentalism-of-the-poor.pdf) | null | null | Underlying his plan is an overlooked … casualties are postponed, often for generations. | 88 | <h4>Prioritize solutions to warming- the slow violence of its impacts are underrepresented in decision calculus</h4><p><strong>Nixon 11</strong> <u>(Rob Nixon is the Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, NY Times Contributor and former is an affiliate of the Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies the Harvard University Press 2011 “Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor” Pg 2-3 http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/nixon-rob--slow-violence-and-the-environmentalism-of-the-poor.pdf) </p><p></u>Underlying his plan is an overlooked … casualties are postponed, often for generations.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,933 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,712 | Selective engagement by the US is key to avoiding backlash on multiple fronts and creating international spillover | Luft 16 ( | Luft 16 (Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play, AKL) | The United States, however, should not give the B&R its blanket support, since doing so would pose serious risks. First, it would feed Russia’s fears of U.S.-Chinese collusion, triggering paranoia in the Kremlin, where there is already concern about China’s push into former Soviet states, and Moscow could lash out in response. India poses a similar challenge. New Delhi is troubled by the commitments Beijing has made to Pakistan and by China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and the neighboring countries of Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Washington should tread carefully, Chinese officials should still welcome American cooperation. Infrastructure projects tend to carry a high risk and produce only modest returns on investment; the B&R is too vast and expensive to rest on one country’s shoulders. American engagement would clear the way for co-investments by U.S.-, European-, and Japanese-led institutions, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; it would attract private capital to China’s projects, as well. | The U S should not give the B&R its blanket support, since doing so would pose serious risks it would feed Russia’s fears of U.S.-Chinese collusion and Moscow could lash out in response. New Delhi is troubled by the commitments Beijing has made to Pakistan and by China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and neighboring countries Washington should tread carefully Chinese officials should still welcome American cooperation. the B&R is too vast and expensive to rest on one country’s shoulders. American engagement would clear the way for co-investments | The United States, however, should not give the B&R its blanket support, since doing so would pose serious risks. First, it would feed Russia’s fears of U.S.-Chinese collusion, triggering paranoia in the Kremlin, where there is already concern about China’s push into former Soviet states, and Moscow could lash out in response. India poses a similar challenge. It recognizes the B&R’s economic promise, but like Russia, it is wary of China’s motives; specifically, New Delhi is troubled by the commitments Beijing has made to Pakistan and by China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and the neighboring countries of Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Any perception that China and the United States are attempting to change the status quo in the region might feed New Delhi’s anxiety and accelerate an arms race between China and India. In both cases, Washington should tread carefully, doing everything it can to avoid creating the appearance of unwanted collaboration between China and the United States. As for the Middle East, the Gulf states will chafe at the prominent role the B&R could give Iran as a land bridge between Central Asia and Europe. So Washington should make clear that its support for China’s infrastructure push will depend on Beijing’s commitment to preserving the delicate balance of power in the Persian Gulf, and it should try to ensure that projects that provide economic boons for Iran are balanced by investments of similar benefit to the Gulf states. And to ensure that it is seen as a leader on global infrastructure itself, Washington should launch and promote its own infrastructure projects, such as the New Silk Road initiative proposed in 2011 by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to connect Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India with roads and pipelines. The greatest risk that the United States would face by supporting the B&R wholesale is that China could use American goodwill to advance its own ascendance to the United States’ detriment—above all, by attempting to change the delicate status quo in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. If China is indeed pursuing a long-term strategy to supplant the United States as the world’s dominant power, as some China watchers contend, then giving it the chance to take such a course would be a grave mistake. In response to the recent rejection of China’s historical claims to most of the South China Sea by an international tribunal, for example, Beijing might try to build dual-use infrastructure that would further militarize the region and intimidate its rivals there. That is something the United States should not tolerate, as no degree of economic integration can justify compromising the United States’ Pacific alliances. Chinese officials would likely recognize that U.S. involvement in the B&R would place some limits on Beijing’s ability to redraw the lines of the Eurasian economy. But for reasons of self-interest, they should still welcome American cooperation. Infrastructure projects tend to carry a high risk and produce only modest returns on investment; the B&R is too vast and expensive to rest on one country’s shoulders. American engagement would clear the way for co-investments by U.S.-, European-, and Japanese-led institutions, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; it would attract private capital to China’s projects, as well. | 3,442 | <h4><u>Selective engagement by the US is key to avoiding backlash on multiple fronts and creating international spillover</h4><p></u><strong>Luft 16 (</strong>Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, a cabinet level exta governmental advisory committee. He is also co-chairman of the Global Forum on Energy Security. He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, energy security and natural resources, Sept/Oct 2016, Foreign Affairs Volume 95 Number 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/china-s-infrastructure-play<u>, AKL)</p><p><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, however, <mark>should not give the B&R its blanket support, since doing so would pose serious risks</mark>. First, <mark>it would feed Russia’s fears of U.S.-Chinese collusion</mark>, triggering paranoia in the Kremlin, where there is already concern about China’s push into former Soviet states, <mark>and Moscow could lash out in response.</mark> India poses a similar challenge.</u> It recognizes the B&R’s economic promise, but like Russia, it is wary of China’s motives; specifically, <u><mark>New Delhi is troubled by the commitments Beijing has made to Pakistan and by China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and </mark>the <mark>neighboring countries</mark> of Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. </u>Any perception that China and the United States are attempting to change the status quo in the region might feed New Delhi’s anxiety and accelerate an arms race between China and India. In both cases, <u><strong><mark>Washington should tread carefully</strong></mark>, </u>doing everything it can to avoid creating the appearance of unwanted collaboration between China and the United States. As for the Middle East, the Gulf states will chafe at the prominent role the B&R could give Iran as a land bridge between Central Asia and Europe. So Washington should make clear that its support for China’s infrastructure push will depend on Beijing’s commitment to preserving the delicate balance of power in the Persian Gulf, and it should try to ensure that projects that provide economic boons for Iran are balanced by investments of similar benefit to the Gulf states. And to ensure that it is seen as a leader on global infrastructure itself, Washington should launch and promote its own infrastructure projects, such as the New Silk Road initiative proposed in 2011 by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to connect Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India with roads and pipelines. The greatest risk that the United States would face by supporting the B&R wholesale is that China could use American goodwill to advance its own ascendance to the United States’ detriment—above all, by attempting to change the delicate status quo in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. If China is indeed pursuing a long-term strategy to supplant the United States as the world’s dominant power, as some China watchers contend, then giving it the chance to take such a course would be a grave mistake. In response to the recent rejection of China’s historical claims to most of the South China Sea by an international tribunal, for example, Beijing might try to build dual-use infrastructure that would further militarize the region and intimidate its rivals there. That is something the United States should not tolerate, as no degree of economic integration can justify compromising the United States’ Pacific alliances. <u><mark>Chinese officials</u></mark> would likely recognize that U.S. involvement in the B&R would place some limits on Beijing’s ability to redraw the lines of the Eurasian economy. But for reasons of self-interest, they <u><mark>should still welcome American cooperation.</mark> Infrastructure projects tend to carry a high risk and produce only modest returns on investment; <strong><mark>the B&R is too vast and expensive to rest on one country’s shoulders.</strong> American engagement would clear the way for co-investments </mark>by U.S.-, European-, and Japanese-led institutions, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; it would attract private capital to China’s projects, as well.</p></u> | 1AC | Contention 3 – Solvency | null | 1,560,936 | 2 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,713 | Standards— | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Standards—</h4> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,934 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,714 | Second is the internal link turn … | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Second is the internal link turn …</h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,935 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,715 | China says yes – it wants U.S. cooperation for OBOR | Jisi December 20 16 | Jisi December 20 16 (Wang, president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2055973/what-china-and-us-must-do-2017-improve-relations) | Trump emphasised the need to improve infrastructure in the United States, in which Chinese companies could invest China, is seeking financial and technological cooperation from industrialised countries in building its “One Belt, One Road” initiative and would certainly welcome American support for this endeavour. | Trump emphasised the need to improve infrastructure China, is seeking financial and technological cooperation from industrialised countries in building its “One Belt, One Road” initiative and would certainly welcome American support for this endeavour. | To allow economic cooperation to be a continued “ballast stone” and “booster” in the bilateral relationship, the two sides also need to find practical ways to cope with problem areas such as currency exchange rates, business environments, trade regimes and legal disputes. There are also numerous opportunities for economic cooperation. For example, Trump emphasised the need to improve infrastructure in the United States, in which Chinese companies could invest. China, for its part, is seeking financial and technological cooperation from industrialised countries in building its “One Belt, One Road” initiative and would certainly welcome American support for this endeavour. | 679 | <h4>China says yes – it wants U.S. cooperation for OBOR</h4><p><strong>Jisi December 20 16</strong> (Wang, <u>president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2055973/what-china-and-us-must-do-2017-improve-relations)</p><p></u>To allow economic cooperation to be a continued “ballast stone” and “booster” in the bilateral relationship, the two sides also need to find practical ways to cope with problem areas such as currency exchange rates, business environments, trade regimes and legal disputes. There are also numerous opportunities for economic cooperation. For example, <u><mark>Trump emphasised the need to improve infrastructure</mark> in the United States, in which Chinese companies could invest</u>. <u><mark>China,</u></mark> for its part, <u><mark>is seeking financial and technological cooperation from industrialised countries in building its “One Belt, One Road” initiative and would certainly welcome American support for this endeavour.</p></u></mark> | 1AC | Contention 3 – Solvency | null | 1,560,937 | 1 | 125,852 | ./documents/hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | 654,882 | A | gonzaga | 1 | ingraham zt | joe leduc | 1ac - obor
1nc - tqpq neolib marx
2nr - marx | hspolicy16/CKMcClatchy/NoMa/CK%20McClatchy-Norton-Martin-Aff-gonzaga-Round1.docx | null | 55,482 | NoMa | CK McClatchy NoMa | null | Ab..... | No..... | Mo..... | Ma..... | 20,054 | CKMcClatchy | CK McClatchy | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,716 | Climate change outweighs any other impact, including nuclear war | Schiller, 16 | Schiller, 16 - M. Econ from the London School of Economics [Ben, 1/19, “Experts Agree: Climate Change Is The Most Serious Of All The Threats Facing The Planet,” Co.Exist, http://www.fastcoexist.com/3055503/experts-agree-climate-change-is-the-most-serious-of-all-the-threats-facing-the-planet ] | null | null | To hear some presidential candidates on the … in agriculture with greater confidence. | 86 | <h4>Climate change outweighs any other impact, including nuclear war </h4><p><strong>Schiller, 16</strong> - M. Econ from the London School of Economics [Ben, 1/19, “Experts Agree: Climate Change Is The Most Serious Of All The Threats Facing The Planet,” Co.Exist<u>, http://www.fastcoexist.com/3055503/experts-agree-climate-change-is-the-most-serious-of-all-the-threats-facing-the-planet ]</p><p></u>To hear some presidential candidates on the … in agriculture with greater confidence.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,938 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,717 | Predictability—no one can predict an aff that has one small shift to the status quo | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Predictability—no one can predict an aff that has one small shift to the status quo</h4> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,939 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,718 | The 1AC is predicated on reject semio capital; however, the performance and form the 1AC embodied the way communication operates in a semiotic world. This prevents the affirmative from resolving the harms of the 1AC and only makes them worse. | Bifo ‘9 /Franco Berardi, Prof, Social History of Comm, University of Milan, Precarious Rhapsody Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation London: c0mp0siti0ns, Pg. 111-113/ | Bifo ‘9 /Franco Berardi, Prof, Social History of Comm, University of Milan, Precarious Rhapsody Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation London: c0mp0siti0ns, Pg. 111-113/ | A semiotic regime is repressive when one, signified is ascribed to each signifier Whoever fails to interpret the signs of power in the right way and breaks the law, is in trouble the semiotic regime we find ourselves in as inhabitants of the semiocapitalist universe is characterized by an excess of speed of the signifiers over-inclusion of schizophrenic interpretation becomes the predominant mode proliferating media Exposed to an overloading of signifying impulses, the human receiver is unable to process the meaning of statements and stimuli in sequence metaphors and things become less and less distinguishable; thing turns into metaphor and metaphor into thing, representation replaces life, and so too life representation. Semiotic flows and commodity circulation juxtapose their codes and become part of the same constellation hyperreality the register of schizophrenia becomes the main mode of interpretation of collective cognition loses its critical competence Amidst the proliferation of fast media, interpretation no longer unfolds along sequential lines; instead, it follows associative spirals and asignifying connections. Interpretation and overload Robin studies the effect of the acceleration of speech on listening comprehension A faster rate, and more syllables per second decrease the level of the listener’s comprehension of meaning: the faster the flow of syllables per second, the less the time for the listener to critically process the message Fast speech intimidates listeners. Evidence suggests that globalization has produced faster speech emission rates in areas of the world where the Western mode of transmission of signs has come to replace traditional and authoritarian ones in the ex-Soviet Union the speed of transmission measured in syllables per second has almost doubled since the fall of the communist from three to almost six syllables per second; similar findings reached the same conclusions in the Middle East and China The implications of Robin’s study are extremely interesting for our understanding of the transition from a form of authoritarian biopolitical power that is persuasive to a form of biopolitical power that is pervasive Persuasive power is founded on consensus: citizens must understand the reasons of the President, General Only one source of information is authorized. Dissident voices are subjected to censorship. Instead the infocratic regime of semio-capital grounds its power on overload, the acceleration of semiotic flows and the proliferation of sources of information to the point of the producing the white noise of indistinctiveness, irrelevance and indecipherability Art has replaced the police in the universal dispositif of mind control the prevailing epidemic pathology of modernity spreading today manifest signs of psychosis and panic. A hyper-stimulation of attention reduces the ability to critically and sequentially interpret the speech of the other who tries and yet fails to be understood. | null | A semiotic regime is repressive when one, and only one, signified is ascribed to each signifier. Whoever fails to interpret the signs of power in the right way, doesn’t wave at the flag or respect their superiors, and breaks the law, is in trouble. However, the semiotic regime we find ourselves in as inhabitants of the semiocapitalist universe is characterized by an excess of speed of the signifiers and stimulates a sort of interpretative hyperkinesis. The typical over-inclusion of schizophrenic interpretation becomes the predominant mode of navigation in the proliferating universe of video-electronic media. In a chapter entitled ‘Toward a theory of schizophrenia,’ Bateson defined schizophrenic interpretation thus: The schizophrenic shows weakness in three fields of the communicative function: a) a difficulty in ascribing the correct mode of communication to messages coming from other people; b) a difficulty in ascribing the correct mode of communication to verbal and non verbal messages; and c) a difficulty in ascribing the right mode of communication to her own thought, sensation and perception (1972: 240). In the video-electronic info-sphere we all inhabit the conditions that describe schizophrenic communication. Exposed to an overloading of signifying impulses, the human receiver is unable to process the meaning of statements and stimuli in sequence and faces the difficulties listed by Bateson. A further peculiar character of the schizophrenic Bateson mentions is that she does not know how to distinguish metaphor from literary expression. The peculiarity of the schizophrenic is not that she uses metaphors, but that she uses them without identifying them (1972: 248). In the domain of digital simulation, metaphors and things become less and less distinguishable; thing turns into metaphor and metaphor into thing, representation replaces life, and so too life representation. Semiotic flows and commodity circulation juxtapose their codes and become part of the same constellation, which Baudrillard calls hyperreality. Thus the register of schizophrenia becomes the main mode of interpretation. The system of collective cognition loses its critical competence; this amounted to the ability to discern truth value in the statements that were submitted in sequences to relatively alert attention. Amidst the proliferation of fast media, interpretation no longer unfolds along sequential lines; instead, it follows associative spirals and asignifying connections. Interpretation and overload In ‘Learner based listening and technological authenticity,’ Richard Robin, a researcher from George Washington University, studies the effect of the acceleration of speech on listening comprehension. Robin’s research is based on a calculation of the number of syllables spoken each second. A faster rate, and more syllables per second decrease the level of the listener’s comprehension of meaning: the faster the flow of syllables per second, the less the time for the listener to critically process the message. The speed of emission and the amount of semiotic impulses sent in a given time unit are functional to the time available to a conscious processing. Fast speech intimidates listeners. Evidence suggests that globalization has produced faster speech emission rates in areas of the world where the Western mode of transmission of signs has come to replace traditional and authoritarian ones. For instance, in the ex-Soviet Union the speed of transmission measured in syllables per second has almost doubled since the fall of the communist regime: from three to almost six syllables per second; similar findings reached the same conclusions in the Middle East and China (1991: 403). The implications of Robin’s study are extremely interesting for our understanding of the transition from a form of authoritarian biopolitical power that is persuasive (like the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century) to a form of biopolitical power that is pervasive (like contemporary infocracy). Persuasive power is founded on consensus: citizens must understand the reasons of the President, General, Secretary or Duce. Only one source of information is authorized. Dissident voices are subjected to censorship. Instead, the infocratic regime of semio-capital grounds its power on overload, the acceleration of semiotic flows and the proliferation of sources of information to the point of the producing the white noise of indistinctiveness, irrelevance and indecipherability. Twentieth century art was conceived as flows of desire and liberating expressions; Surrealism celebrated the expressive power of the subconscious as liberating social and psychic energies. Today, art is also the flow of therapy for mind ecology. Art has replaced the police in the universal dispositif of mind control, but at the same time it looks for inroads into therapy. Whilst the prevailing epidemic pathology of modernity was the neurosis produced by repression, the pathologies spreading epidemically today manifest signs of psychosis and panic. A hyper-stimulation of attention reduces the ability to critically and sequentially interpret the speech of the other who tries and yet fails to be understood. | 5,214 | <h4>The 1AC is predicated on reject semio capital; however, the performance and form the 1AC embodied the way communication operates in a semiotic world. This prevents the affirmative from resolving the harms of the 1AC and only makes them worse.</h4><p><strong>Bifo ‘9<u> /Franco Berardi, Prof, Social History of Comm, University of Milan, Precarious Rhapsody Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation London: c0mp0siti0ns, Pg. 111-113/</p><p></strong>A semiotic regime is repressive when one,</u> and only one, <u>signified is ascribed to each signifier</u>. <u>Whoever fails to interpret the signs of power in the right way</u>, doesn’t wave at the flag or respect their superiors, <u>and</u> <u>breaks the law, is in trouble</u>. However, <u>the semiotic regime we find ourselves in as inhabitants of the semiocapitalist universe is characterized by an excess of speed of the signifiers</u> and stimulates a sort of interpretative hyperkinesis. The typical <u>over-inclusion of schizophrenic interpretation becomes the predominant mode </u>of navigation in the <u>proliferating</u> universe of video-electronic <u>media</u>. In a chapter entitled ‘Toward a theory of schizophrenia,’ Bateson defined schizophrenic interpretation thus: The schizophrenic shows weakness in three fields of the communicative function: a) a difficulty in ascribing the correct mode of communication to messages coming from other people; b) a difficulty in ascribing the correct mode of communication to verbal and non verbal messages; and c) a difficulty in ascribing the right mode of communication to her own thought, sensation and perception (1972: 240). In the video-electronic info-sphere we all inhabit the conditions that describe schizophrenic communication. <u>Exposed to an overloading of signifying impulses, the human receiver is unable to process the meaning of statements and stimuli in sequence</u> and faces the difficulties listed by Bateson. A further peculiar character of the schizophrenic Bateson mentions is that she does not know how to distinguish metaphor from literary expression. The peculiarity of the schizophrenic is not that she uses metaphors, but that she uses them without identifying them (1972: 248). In the domain of digital simulation, <u>metaphors and things become less and less distinguishable; thing turns into metaphor and metaphor into thing, representation replaces life, and so too life representation. Semiotic flows and commodity circulation juxtapose their codes and become part of the same constellation</u>, which Baudrillard calls <u>hyperreality</u>. Thus <u>the register of schizophrenia becomes the main mode of interpretation</u>. The system <u>of collective cognition loses its critical competence</u>; this amounted to the ability to discern truth value in the statements that were submitted in sequences to relatively alert attention. <u>Amidst the proliferation of fast media, interpretation no longer unfolds along sequential lines; instead, it follows associative spirals and asignifying connections. Interpretation and overload</u> In ‘Learner based listening and technological authenticity,’ Richard <u>Robin</u>, a researcher from George Washington University, <u>studies the effect of the acceleration of speech on listening comprehension</u>. Robin’s research is based on a calculation of the number of syllables spoken each second. <u>A faster rate, and more syllables per second decrease the level of the listener’s comprehension of meaning: the faster the flow of syllables per second, the less the time for the listener to critically process the message</u>. The speed of emission and the amount of semiotic impulses sent in a given time unit are functional to the time available to a conscious processing. <u>Fast speech intimidates listeners. Evidence suggests that globalization has produced faster speech emission rates in areas of the world where the Western mode of transmission of signs has come to replace traditional and authoritarian ones</u>. For instance, <u>in the ex-Soviet Union the speed of transmission measured in syllables per second has almost doubled since the fall of the communist </u>regime: <u>from three to almost six syllables per second; similar findings reached the same conclusions in the Middle East and China</u> (1991: 403). <u>The implications of Robin’s study are extremely interesting for our understanding of the transition from a form of authoritarian biopolitical power that is persuasive</u> (like the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century) <u>to a form of biopolitical power that is pervasive</u> (like contemporary infocracy). <u>Persuasive power is founded on consensus: citizens must understand the reasons of the President, General</u>, Secretary or Duce. <u>Only one source of information is authorized. Dissident voices are subjected to censorship. Instead</u>, <u>the infocratic regime of semio-capital grounds its power on overload, the acceleration of semiotic flows and the proliferation of sources of information to the point of the producing the white noise of indistinctiveness, irrelevance and indecipherability</u>. Twentieth century art was conceived as flows of desire and liberating expressions; Surrealism celebrated the expressive power of the subconscious as liberating social and psychic energies. Today, art is also the flow of therapy for mind ecology. <u>Art has replaced the police in the universal dispositif of mind control</u>, but at the same time it looks for inroads into therapy. Whilst <u>the prevailing epidemic pathology of modernity</u> was the neurosis produced by repression, the pathologies <u>spreading</u> epidemically <u>today</u> <u>manifest</u> <u>signs of psychosis and panic.</u> <u>A hyper-stimulation of attention reduces the ability to critically and sequentially interpret the speech of the other who tries and yet fails to be understood.<strong> </p></u></strong> | null | null | 1NC | 756,400 | 6 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,719 | Representations of warming is motivating and spurs individual activism | Veldman 12 | Veldman 12 – PhD Candidate Religion and Nature at U of Florida | null | null | (Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse)
Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As … and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12] | 388 | <h4>Representations of warming is motivating and spurs individual activism</h4><p><strong>Veldman 12</strong> – PhD Candidate Religion and Nature at U of Florida</p><p>(Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse)</p><p>Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As … and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,942 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,720 | Neg ground—they can spike out of our disads saying current cooperation non uniques our disads and the status quo is neg ground
Underlimiting—they justify any small affirmatives that explode the topic | Underlimiting—they justify any small affirmatives that explode the topic | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Neg ground—they can spike out of our disads saying current cooperation non uniques our disads and the status quo is neg ground</h4><p>Underlimiting—they justify any small affirmatives that explode the topic</p></strong> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,940 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,721 | Third is the genealogy … | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Third is the genealogy …</h4> | null | null | 1NC | 1,560,941 | 1 | 125,878 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | 657,240 | N | Loyola | 6 | Polytechnic DN | Marcel Roman | read one card on the case | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Neg-Loyola-Round6.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,722 | Actively engaging and pressuring institutions is necessary to counter climate change | Parenti & Emanuele 15 | Parenti & Emanuele 15
(Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980) | null | null | You mention mutual aid and how it was … am something of a carbon fundamentalist. | 81 | <h4><strong>Actively engaging and pressuring institutions is necessary to counter climate change</h4><p>Parenti & Emanuele 15</p><p></strong>(Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)</p><p>You mention mutual aid and how it was … am something of a carbon fundamentalist.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,944 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,723 | Voter for predictability, advocacy skills, and in depth education | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Voter for predictability, advocacy skills, and in depth education</h4> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,943 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,724 | Simulation and institutional deliberation motivate effective responses to climate risks | Marx et al. 7 | Marx et al. 7 (Sabine M, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) @ Columbia University, Elke U. Weber, Graduate School of Business and Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Benjamin S. Orlovea, Department of Environmental Science and Policy @ University of California Davis, Anthony Leiserowitz, Decision Research, David H. Krantz, Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Carla Roncolia, South East Climate Consortium (SECC), Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering @ University of Georgia and Jennifer Phillips, Bard Centre for Environmental Policy @ Bard College, “Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information”, 2007, http://climate.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Marx_GEC_2007.pdf) | null | null | Based on the observation that experiential … the process of individual and group decision-making. | 98 | <h4>Simulation and institutional deliberation motivate effective responses to climate risks</h4><p><strong>Marx et al. 7</strong> (Sabine M, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) @ Columbia University, Elke U. Weber, Graduate School of Business and Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Benjamin S. Orlovea, Department of Environmental Science and Policy @ University of California Davis, Anthony Leiserowitz, Decision Research, David H. Krantz, Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Carla Roncolia, South East Climate Consortium (SECC), Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering @ University of Georgia and Jennifer Phillips, Bard Centre for Environmental Policy @ Bard College, “Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information”, 2007, http://climate.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Marx_GEC_2007.pdf)</p><p>Based on the observation that experiential … the process of individual and group decision-making.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,945 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,725 | Xi is consolidating power now to change the economy | Madaus 1-20 | Madaus 1-20 | CCP will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals and keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China | Xi may try to use the CCP’s Congress to effect a drastic adjustment China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls the government is falling short on its bargai the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him its “core,” He has cracked down on the media churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers to restore hard authoritarian rule | Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4
China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace. China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals, and the threat of investigation keeps potential adversaries in check. He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world. | 3,744 | <h4><strong>Xi is consolidating power now to change the economy </h4><p>Madaus 1-20</p><p></strong>Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4</p><p>China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (<u>CCP</u>) <u>will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event</u>: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President <u><mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>may try to use the CCP’s</mark> 19th Party <mark>Congress</mark> <mark>to effect a drastic adjustment</mark> in how China is governed</u>. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory</u></strong></mark>. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. <u>The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace</u>. <u>China’s <mark>citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food</u> </mark>in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. <u><mark>If growth stalls</mark> and the population believes <mark>the government is falling short on its bargai</mark>n, the state might face demands for political representation</u> in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President <u>Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s</u>. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, <u><strong><mark>the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability</u></strong></mark>. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. <u><mark>Xi’s zealous anti-corruption</mark> campaign has purged many of his rivals</u>, <u>and</u> the threat of investigation <u><strong><mark>keeps potential adversaries in check</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him</u></strong></mark> – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. <u>Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was <strong><mark>its “core,”</u></strong></mark> a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. <u><strong><mark>He has</mark> also <mark>cracked down on the media</mark>, <mark>churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers</mark> in a drive <mark>to restore hard authoritarian rule</mark> to China</u>. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world.</p></strong> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 2 | 1,099,397 | 5 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,726 | No DAs or Perception Links – Arctic Council had a HUGE meeting IN THE US earlier this week ABOUT Climate Change and Arctic environment | Oliver, 10/7 | Oliver, 10/7 – The Arctic Sounder | The Arctic Council's | The Arctic Council's | Shady Grove, “Arctic Council meets this week to discuss climate change”, October 7th 4:59 pm, http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1640arctic_council_meets_this_week_to_discuss, Accessed 10/8/16, Scott
The Arctic Council's Senior Arctic Officials … Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. | 300 | <h4><strong>No DAs or Perception Links – Arctic Council had a HUGE meeting IN THE US earlier this week ABOUT Climate Change and Arctic environment</h4><p><mark>Oliver, 10/7</strong></mark> – The Arctic Sounder</p><p>Shady Grove, “Arctic Council meets this week to discuss climate change”, October 7th 4:59 pm, http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1640arctic_council_meets_this_week_to_discuss, Accessed 10/8/16, Scott</p><p><u><mark>The Arctic Council's</mark> </u>Senior Arctic Officials … Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North.</p> | null | null | Contention 2: Climate Change | 1,560,947 | 1 | 125,875 | ./documents/hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | 657,206 | A | Notre Dame | 1 | Liberal Arts Sciences MS | Matt Gomez | 1NC
T - uncondo
Elections
UNCLOS Conditioning CP
Appeasement DA
Case Defense
2NR
UNCLOS Conditioning CP | hspolicy16/FullertonUnion/KoGr/Fullerton%20Union-Koh-Gray-Aff-Notre%20Dame-Round1.docx | null | 55,748 | KoGr | Fullerton Union KoGr | null | Ry..... | Ko..... | Da..... | Gr..... | 20,109 | FullertonUnion | Fullerton Union | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,727 | The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.</h4> | null | 1AC | null | 1,560,946 | 1 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,728 | Africa foreign aid detracts attention and funds from domestic reform- Xi faces massive backlash and causes instability | Huang 2/9 | Huang 2/9(Krisitin Huang, Kristin Huang has extensive experience as an author and journalist in Chinese Politics, foreign relations, and ties. 02-09-2017, "China must act more wisely in giving out foreign aid, says Xi Jinping," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/article/2069414/chinas-president-xi-wants-wiser-approach-foreign-aid-donation) | China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of foreign aid, President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week. China must “improve management over foreign aid funds The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly, putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. ”, China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion | China must act more wisely when giving foreign aid, foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion | China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of foreign aid, President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week.Xi’s comments at the meeting of the Communist Party’s leading small group on comprehensively deepening reform reflect his desire to extract greater returns from China’s spending abroad as Beijing seeks to increase its international influence. China must “improve management over foreign aid funds and projects, reform the foreign aid administration system and improve the overall results of foreign aid,” the official Xinhua news agency quoted Xi as telling Monday’s meeting. How China’s development story can be an alternative to the Western model The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly, putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing for overseas spending. The reserves fell below US$3 trillion at the end of January, the lowest level in six years. At the same time, the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments and failing to consider possible returns. China’s ambassador to Syria, Qi Qianjin (second left) signs a memorandum of understanding with Imad al-Azab, head of the National Commission for the Syrian Science Olympiad, in Damascus, Syria, in November. Qi said China was carrying on with providing Syria with humanitarian aid worth US$70 million. Photo: Xinhua “China needs to make sure that foreign assistance is used in the right places,” said Su Ge, president of the China Institute of International Studies, a foreign ministry think tank. A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, Su said. According to a government white paper issued at the end of last year, China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. In the early days, foreign aid when mainly to countries with similar ideologies, such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania. Beijing pledged billions to aid developing country over 15 years, says Xi Jinping A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. China is trying to boost its global clout via programmes such as the ‘One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative and new institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and foreign assistance is also expected to facilitate overseas investment. President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (right) while South African President Jacob Zuma looks on during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015. Photo: Reuters It was “normal” for China to adjust its foreign assistance strategies according to differences in recipients’ levels of development, Liu Naiya, a West Asian and African studies expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said. Improving the way foreign aid worked would help China gain an image as “a responsible country in the world”, Liu said. China’s foreign aid projects have, however, sometimes been criticised as sweeteners offered by Beijing to gain deals abroad. China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion Professor Axel Dreher, an economist at the University of Heidelberg in Germany who specialises in international and development politics, said some aid had been diverted to the tribal homelands of African leaders or members of their tribe. “It thus seems that the aid does not purely finance development,” he said But given that China stressed the principle of non-interference in recipients’ policies, it “should grant its aid as pure budget support, allowing the recipient government to chose what to use the aid for”. | 3,877 | <h4><strong>Africa foreign aid detracts attention and funds from domestic reform- Xi faces massive backlash and causes instability</h4><p>Huang 2/9</strong>(Krisitin Huang, Kristin Huang has extensive experience as an author and journalist in Chinese Politics, foreign relations, and ties. 02-09-2017, "China must act more wisely in giving out foreign aid, says Xi Jinping," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/article/2069414/chinas-president-xi-wants-wiser-approach-foreign-aid-donation)</p><p><u><mark>China must act more wisely when giving</mark> money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of <mark>foreign aid,</mark> President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week.</u>Xi’s comments at the meeting of the Communist Party’s leading small group on comprehensively deepening reform reflect his desire to extract greater returns from China’s spending abroad as Beijing seeks to increase its international influence. <u>China must “improve management over foreign aid funds</u> and projects, reform the foreign aid administration system and improve the overall results of foreign aid,” the official Xinhua news agency quoted Xi as telling Monday’s meeting. How China’s development story can be an alternative to the Western model <u>The country’s <mark>foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly</mark>, <mark>putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing</u></mark> for overseas spending. The reserves fell below US$3 trillion at the end of January, the lowest level in six years. At the same time, <u><strong><mark>the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments</u></strong></mark> and failing to consider possible returns. China’s ambassador to Syria, Qi Qianjin (second left) signs a memorandum of understanding with Imad al-Azab, head of the National Commission for the Syrian Science Olympiad, in Damascus, Syria, in November. Qi said China was carrying on with providing Syria with humanitarian aid worth US$70 million. Photo: Xinhua “China needs to make sure that foreign assistance is used in the right places,” said Su Ge, president of the China Institute of International Studies, a foreign ministry think tank. <u><mark>A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce <strong>“wasteful” </strong>use of Chinese funds,</u></mark> Su said. According to a government white paper issued at the end of last year, <u>China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949</u>. In the early days, foreign aid when mainly to countries with similar ideologies, such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania. Beijing pledged billions to aid developing country over 15 years, says Xi Jinping <u><mark>A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa.</mark> </u>China is trying to boost its global clout via programmes such as the ‘One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative and new institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and foreign assistance is also expected to facilitate overseas investment. President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (right) while South African President Jacob Zuma looks on during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015. Photo: Reuters It was “normal” for China to adjust its foreign assistance strategies according to differences in recipients’ levels of development, Liu Naiya, a West Asian and African studies expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said. Improving the way foreign aid worked would help China gain an image as “a responsible country in the world<u><strong>”,</u></strong> Liu said. China’s foreign aid projects have, however, sometimes been criticised as sweeteners offered by Beijing to gain deals abroad. <u><mark>China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion</mark> </u>Professor Axel Dreher, an economist at the University of Heidelberg in Germany who specialises in international and development politics, said some aid had been diverted to the tribal homelands of African leaders or members of their tribe. “It thus seems that the aid does not purely finance development,” he said But given that China stressed the principle of non-interference in recipients’ policies, it “should grant its aid as pure budget support, allowing the recipient government to chose what to use the aid for”.</p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 2 | 1,560,827 | 2 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,729 | Text: The United States federal government should condition diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should condition diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group</h4> | 1nc | Offcase | CP | 1,560,949 | 1 | 125,896 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | 657,854 | N | Blake | 4 | Harris wilson et al | GOLDBERG | went for sick new conditions cp | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,730 | Contention One: Nuclear War | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Contention One: Nuclear War</h4></u> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 1,560,948 | 1 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,731 | Sustaining Xi’s reform key to solve SCS/ECS lash out | Rachman 6/1/2016 | Rachman, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, 6/1/2016 | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
at the moment China can look relatively stable But that impression is deceptive President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation Xi has essentially abandon the formula that has driven China's rise created by Deng Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach Under Mr Xi, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | China can look stable But that is deceptive Xi is taking his country in risky directions. If his policies succeed Xi will be remembered for the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation China has moved towards a strongman leader a faltering economy could undermine the party's legitimacy. as economic and political tensions within China have risen the country's foreign policy has become nationalistic and willing to risk confrontation with the West and Asian neighbours. Beijing's tough assertion of its territorial claims, epitomised by island-building" in the S C S to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These serve a political purpose the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US liable to stir support | Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula
Politics in the West is so dramatic at the moment that China can look relatively staid and stable by comparison. But that impression is deceptive. Chinese President Xi Jinping is taking his country in radical and risky new directions. If his new policies succeed, then the Xi era will be remembered for the achievement of his often-stated goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his legacy is likely to be political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation. What Mr Xi has done is essentially to abandon the formula that has driven China's rise over the past 30 years. That formula was created by Deng Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". Under Mr Xi, who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader - Mr Xi himself. In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purpose. In harder economic times, the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government. | 5,166 | <h4><strong>Sustaining Xi’s reform key to solve SCS/ECS lash out</h4><p>Rachman</strong>, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, <strong>6/1/2016 </p><p><u>Gideon, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula</p><p></u></strong>Politics in the West is so dramatic <u>at the moment</u> that <u><mark>China can look</mark> relatively</u> staid and <u><mark>stable</u></mark> by comparison. <u><strong><mark>But that</mark> impression <mark>is</mark> <mark>deceptive</u></strong></mark>. Chinese <u>President <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>is taking his country in</mark> radical and <mark>risky</mark> new <mark>directions. If his</mark> new <mark>policies succeed</mark>, then the <mark>Xi</mark> era <mark>will be remembered for</mark> the achievement of his often-stated goal <strong>of <mark>the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation</u></strong>. <u>But if Mr Xi's experiments go wrong, then his</mark> <mark>legacy is</mark> likely to be <strong><mark>political turmoil, economic stagnation and international confrontation</u></strong></mark>. What Mr <u>Xi has</u> done is <u>essentially</u> to <u>abandon the formula that has driven China's rise</u> over the past 30 years. That formula was <u>created by Deng</u> Xiaoping after he came to power in late 1978, and then refined by his successors. It consisted of three key ingredients - political, economic and international. In economics, <u>Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model</u> created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. <u>And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach</u> to the world that became colloquially known in the West as "hide and bide", after Deng's famous advice to his colleagues to "hide your capacities, bide your time". <u>Under Mr Xi,</u> who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the end of 2012, <u>all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed. In politics, <mark>China has moved </mark>back <mark>towards</mark> a model based around <mark>a <strong>strongman leader</mark> - Mr Xi himself</u></strong>. <u>In economics, the years of double-digit growth are over and China is groping towards a new model</u>, driven more by domestic consumption than exports. <u>And in international affairs, the Xi era has seen a move away from hide and bide towards a <strong>foreign policy that challenges United States dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. </u></strong>The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, <u>the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy</u>", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. <u>But <mark>a <strong>faltering economy</strong></mark> - or, worse, a financial crisis - <strong><mark>could</mark> well <mark>undermine the party's legitimacy.</strong></mark> </u>When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr <u>Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing</u> - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. <u>At the same time <mark>as economic and political tensions within China have risen</mark> under Mr Xi, so <mark>the country's foreign policy has <strong>become</mark> more <mark>nationalistic and</mark> more <mark>willing to risk confrontation with the West and</mark> with China's <mark>Asian neighbours. Beijing's</mark> increasingly <mark>tough assertion of its territorial</mark> and maritime <mark>claims, epitomised</mark> <mark>by</mark> its "<mark>island-building" in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea, has led <mark>to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies</strong>. These</mark> near-clashes may <mark>serve a political purpose</mark>. In </u>harder economic times,<u> <strong><mark>the CCP may need new</mark> <mark>sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US</mark> at sea is <mark>liable to stir </mark>patriotic <mark>support</mark> for the government.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 2 | 81,678 | 54 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,732 | China blocks entry now---CP key | Castro 2016 | Bhavani Castro 2016 (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/ | Indian Prime Minister Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG But not all NSG countries are convinced of India’s membership most importantly, China which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition would be a deal breaker Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | endorsement from the U S for India’s bid to enter the NSG not all NSG countries are convinced most importantly, China Chinese opposition would be a deal breaker China’s opposition would undermine Beijing | Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. But not all NSG countries are convinced of the benefits of India’s membership, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, most importantly, China, which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club. The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — would be a deal breaker. Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | 1,574 | <h4>China blocks entry now---CP key</h4><p>Bhavani <strong>Castro 2016</strong> (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, <u>http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/</p><p>Indian Prime Minister</u> Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. <u>Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results</u>, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. <u>Most importantly, Modi obtained <mark>endorsement from the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, Mexico, and Switzerland <mark>for India’s bid to enter the</mark> exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group</u> (<u><mark>NSG</u></mark>), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. <u>But <mark>not all NSG countries are convinced </mark>of</u> the benefits of <u>India’s membership</u>, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, <u><strong><mark>most importantly, China</u></strong></mark>, <u>which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club</u>. <u>The NSG works by consensus, so <mark>Chinese opposition</u></mark> to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — <u><strong><mark>would be a deal breaker</u></strong></mark>. <u>Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why <mark>China’s opposition would undermine Beijing</mark>’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community.</p></u> | 1nc | Offcase | CP | 1,560,020 | 6 | 125,896 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | 657,854 | N | Blake | 4 | Harris wilson et al | GOLDBERG | went for sick new conditions cp | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,733 | First, China is hardening its position on Taiwan. This risks a major crisis. | White 15 | White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016) | It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the E C S and S C S have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture U S -China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949 The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify After President Ma took office in 2008 he sought to build relations with Beijing But Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead to political reunification It is now widely expected that Ma will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Ma That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority China's new leadership under President Xi seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening | It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again it has slipped into the background as tensions in the E and S C S have posed more urgent threats But questions about Taiwan's future could drive Asia into a major crisis Taiwan's status has been highly sensitive since 1949 Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo Ma sought to build relations with Beijing Ma's plans sparked massive demonstrations the new leader will be more assertive That alarms Beijing China's leadership under Xi seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity its stance on Taiwan is hardening | It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again. In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis. Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country. Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify. In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America. These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead sought to build relations with Beijing, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically. And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong. But that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections. It is now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Mr Ma has been. That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority. China's new leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening. | 3,466 | <h4><u>First</u>, China is <u>hardening</u> its position on Taiwan. This risks <u>a major crisis</u>. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p><u><mark>It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again</u></mark>. <u>In the past few years, <mark>it has slipped</mark> quietly <mark>into the background as tensions in the E</u></mark>ast <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea <u><mark>and S</u></mark>outh <u><mark>C</u></mark>hina <u><mark>S</u></mark>ea <u><mark>have posed more urgent threats</mark> to regional peace and stability. <mark>But</mark> now old <mark>questions about Taiwan's</mark> longer-term <mark>future</mark> are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan <mark>could</mark> rupture U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>-China relations and <mark>drive Asia into <strong>a major crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Taiwan's status has been</mark> a <strong><mark>highly sensitive</strong></mark> issue between Washington and Beijing ever <mark>since 1949</u></mark>, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. <u>The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. <mark>Taiwan was left in <strong>an awkward limbo</strong></mark>, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country</u>. <u>Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify</u>. In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America. These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo. <u>After President <mark>Ma</u></mark> Ying-jeou <u>took office in 2008</u>, <u>he</u> stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead <u><mark>sought to build relations with Beijing</u></mark>, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically. And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong. <u>But</u> that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr <u><mark>Ma's plans</mark> for closer economic links with the mainland <mark>sparked massive</mark> "Sunflower" <mark>demonstrations</mark> in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead</u> inexorably <u>to</u> precisely the <u>political reunification</u> that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections. <u>It is now widely expected that</u> when Mr <u>Ma</u>'s term as president ends next year, he <u>will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing</u>. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, <u><mark>the new leader will</mark> almost certainly <mark>be more assertive</mark> than</u> Mr <u>Ma</u> has been. <u><mark>That</mark> naturally <strong><mark>alarms Beijing</strong></mark>, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority</u>. <u><mark>China's</mark> new <mark>leadership under</mark> President <mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping <u><mark>seems <strong>increasingly impatient</strong> to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's <strong>centuries of humiliation</strong> and <strong>increasingly confident</strong> of its growing power to act with impunity</mark>. Already there are signs that <mark>its stance on Taiwan is <strong>hardening</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 66,508 | 151 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,734 | Obamacare repeal won’t pass now without democrats—needs leverage | Dennis 1-23 | Dennis 1-23 | Seeking to bridge the Obamacare divide between Democrats and President Donald Trump, four Republican senators offered a plan Monday to replace the health-care law. proposal could be crucial in the Senate Republicans can’t pass anything without Cassidy, Collins and their co-sponsors Johnny Isakson of Georgia and Shelley Moore Capito A full replacement would need 60 votes, requiring help from Democrats The bill relies on Obamacare’s taxes to offer states a new option that replaces mandates to buy insurance e said Republicans should work with Democrats to improve Obamacare instead of repealing it Republicans’ proposal would let Democrats worried about repeal | Republican senators offered to replace proposal could be crucial in the Senate Republicans can’t pass anything without Cassidy, Collins and Isakson A full replacement would need 60 votes, requiring help from Democrats Republicans should work with Democrats to improve Obamacare Republicans’ proposal would let Democrats worried about repeal | Steven is a writer and editor for Bloomberg Politics, “Republican Senators Appeal to Trump, Democrats in Obamacare Bill”, Bloomberg Politics, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-03/trump-to-halt-obama-fiduciary-rule-order-review-of-dodd-frank, Accessed 2-3
Seeking to bridge the Obamacare divide between Democrats and President Donald Trump, four Republican senators led by Bill Cassidy of Louisiana and Susan Collins of Maine offered a plan Monday to replace the health-care law. The quartet’s proposal could be crucial in the Senate, which Republicans control 52-48. Republicans can’t pass anything without Cassidy, Collins and their co-sponsors Johnny Isakson of Georgia and Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia. A full replacement would need 60 votes, requiring help from Democrats. Republicans have said for years that they want to repeal and replace the 2010 Affordable Care Act. At a news conference at the Capitol, Cassidy said the group’s plan is designed to do everything Trump has said he wants. "He’s been very consistent. He wants a replacement plan. He wants to take care of pre-existing conditions. He wants to make sure we have an equal amount of people covered. And he doesn’t want mandates," Cassidy said. The bill relies on Obamacare’s taxes to offer states a new option that replaces mandates to buy insurance with automatic enrollment in new plans with more choices. Cassidy said that option could lower premiums and cover far more people. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer of New York immediately rejected the plan in a statement that called it “an empty facade that would create chaos – not care – for millions of Americans." He said Republicans should work with Democrats to improve Obamacare instead of repealing it. The four Republicans’ proposal would let states keep Obamacare if they want in an attempt to appeal to Democrats worried about repeal. It also would let states forgo federal assistance for expanded health coverage. | 1,984 | <h4><strong>Obamacare repeal won’t pass now without democrats—needs leverage</h4><p>Dennis 1-23</p><p></strong>Steven is a writer and editor for Bloomberg Politics, “Republican Senators Appeal to Trump, Democrats in Obamacare Bill”, Bloomberg Politics, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-03/trump-to-halt-obama-fiduciary-rule-order-review-of-dodd-frank, Accessed 2-3</p><p><u>Seeking to bridge the Obamacare divide between Democrats and President Donald Trump, four <mark>Republican senators</u></mark> led by Bill Cassidy of Louisiana and Susan Collins of Maine <u><mark>offered</mark> a plan Monday <mark>to replace</mark> the health-care law.</u> The quartet’s <u><strong><mark>proposal could be crucial in the Senate</u></strong></mark>, which Republicans control 52-48. <u><strong><mark>Republicans can’t pass anything without Cassidy, Collins and</mark> their co-sponsors Johnny <mark>Isakson</mark> of Georgia and Shelley Moore Capito</u></strong> of West Virginia. <u><strong><mark>A full replacement would need 60 votes, requiring help from Democrats</u></strong></mark>. Republicans have said for years that they want to repeal and replace the 2010 Affordable Care Act. At a news conference at the Capitol, Cassidy said the group’s plan is designed to do everything Trump has said he wants. "He’s been very consistent. He wants a replacement plan. He wants to take care of pre-existing conditions. He wants to make sure we have an equal amount of people covered. And he doesn’t want mandates," Cassidy said. <u>The bill relies on Obamacare’s taxes to offer states a new option that replaces mandates to buy insurance</u> with automatic enrollment in new plans with more choices. Cassidy said that option could lower premiums and cover far more people. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer of New York immediately rejected the plan in a statement that called it “an empty facade that would create chaos – not care – for millions of Americans." H<u>e said <mark>Republicans should work with Democrats to improve Obamacare</mark> instead of repealing it</u>. The four <u><mark>Republicans’ proposal would let</u></mark> states keep Obamacare if they want in an attempt to appeal to <u><strong><mark>Democrats worried about repeal</u></strong></mark>. It also would let states forgo federal assistance for expanded health coverage.</p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 3 | 1,560,950 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,735 | NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes | WICKER 7/19 | WICKER 7/19 (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036) | India and China are on a collision course China’s move to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants Further competition and even confrontation await. This particular case shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power demonstrated when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG Membership in the prestigious group Indians saw as purely political. Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries China and India clashing on multiple fronts Border issues the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries | India and China are on a collision course China’s move to block Indian membership in the NSG latest sign of tension confrontation await This particular case shows China’s intent to remain the sole power China led the push to exclude India from the NSG China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations China and India clashing on multiple fronts. Border issues | India and China are on a collision course. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, China’s move last week to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants. Further competition and even confrontation await. Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. This particular case, however, shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently demonstrated last week when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG. Membership in the prestigious group, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many Indians saw as purely political. China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous China and a more engaged India now appear to be clashing on multiple fronts. Border issues linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries. | 2,729 | <h4>NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes</h4><p> <strong>WICKER 7/19</strong> (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036)</p><p><u><mark>India and China are on a <strong>collision course</u></strong></mark>. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, <u><strong><mark>China’s move</strong></mark> </u>last week<u> <mark>to <strong>block Indian membership</strong> in the</mark> Nuclear Suppliers Group (<strong><mark>NSG</strong></mark>) is merely the <mark>latest sign of <strong>tension</strong></mark> to emerge between the two Asian giants</u>. <u>Further competition and even <strong><mark>confrontation</strong> await</mark>. </u>Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. <u><mark>This particular case</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>shows China’s intent to remain the <strong>sole</mark> Asian <mark>power</u></strong></mark> stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently <u>demonstrated</u> last week <u>when <mark>China <strong>led the push to exclude India from the NSG</u></strong></mark>. <u>Membership in the prestigious group</u>, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many <u>Indians saw as purely political. </u>China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but <u>Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage</u>. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. <u><mark>China and India have historically maintained <strong>relatively positive relations</strong></mark> for such large, neighboring countries</u>. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous <u><mark>China</u> <u>and</u></mark> a more engaged <u><mark>India</u></mark> now appear to be <u><strong><mark>clashing</strong> on multiple fronts</u>. <u><strong>Border issues</u></strong></mark> linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and <u>the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries</u>.</p> | 1nc | Offcase | CP | 126,334 | 10 | 125,896 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | 657,854 | N | Blake | 4 | Harris wilson et al | GOLDBERG | went for sick new conditions cp | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,736 | Second, political pressure in China will continue to grow — the CCP will be forced to act aggressively toward Taiwan. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | A common counterpoint is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification [P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U S from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses | it is hard to be confident that relations will remain good. Taiwan might elect a pro-independence government or China might ramp up pressures for unification [P]olitical pressures are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U S Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses | A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses.”67 | 1,035 | <h4><u>Second</u>, <u>political pressure in China</u> will continue to grow — the CCP will be <u>forced</u> to act aggressively toward Taiwan. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u>A common counterpoint</u> to the argument above <u>is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low</u>.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. <u>Although this argument has merit, <mark>it is hard to be confident that</mark> cross-strait <mark>relations will remain good. Taiwan might</mark> again <mark>elect a</mark> more <mark>pro-independence government</mark>, <mark>or China might ramp up pressures for unification</u></mark>. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “<u><strong><mark>[P]olitical pressures</mark> </strong>on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan <mark>are <strong>tremendous</strong> and <strong>growing</strong>. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>from selling weapons to Taiwan. <mark>Now, many believe that China should <strong>no longer tolerate</strong> such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP</u></mark> [Chinese Communist Party] <u><mark>is finding it <strong>increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses</u></strong></mark>.”67</p> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 1,651,053 | 456 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,737 | Democrats block Trump releasing sanctions now | RT 1-23 | RT 1-23
RT is a writer and editor for Signs of the Times, “Spineless Democrats propose bill to prevent Trump lifting Russian sanctions”, Signs of the Times, https://www.sott.net/article/340425-Spineless-Democrats-propose-bill-to-prevent-Trump-lifting-Russian-sanctions, Accessed 2-3 | Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation designed to stop President Trump from relaxing US sanctions on Russia Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions We need more sanctions against Russia. We should not relax them Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction deal Allegations that Russia interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely trying to undermine the Trump administration | Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation to stop Trump from relaxing US sanctions a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill We need more sanctions against Russia Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction Russia trying to undermine Trump | A top Senate Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation designed to stop President Trump from relaxing US sanctions on Russia. Critics argue that the bill is a "rabid and short-sighted" move to undermine the new administration. President Donald Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment. Shortly after Trump's inauguration, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer (D-New York) said on Sunday that a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions that Washington imposed on Russia in 2014 after Crimea voted to leave Ukraine and rejoin it in a referendum. The bill would demand that any changes to the restrictions be put to a vote in the US Congress, thus preventing the president from acting unilaterally. "We repeal sanctions, it tells Russia, 'Go ahead and interfere in our elections and do bad things;' it tells China; it tells Iran. That would be terrible," Schumer told ABC's This Week show, adding that he has secured support from GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham. "We need more sanctions against Russia. We should not relax them," McCain said on the same program, adding "if we don't keep those sanctions on and even increase them, it will encourage Vladimir Putin, who is a war criminal." Earlier in January, Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction deal. "For us to repeal sanctions, given what Russia has done in Ukraine and threatened the Baltics, and now they have clearly tried to intervene in our election - whether it had an effect or not - that is something, that's a danger that we have never faced to this extent in American history," Schumer went on. However, Gregory Copley, editor-in-chief of the Defense & Foreign Affairs journal, told RT that the bill was surely designed "as a part of the legacy that the then-president Obama wanted to leave for President Trump." "[Obama] wanted to make sure that he had grave difficulty in maintaining any normal strategic policy at all and particularly with regard to Russia. So he left that time bomb if you like," Copley asserted. Allegations that Russia interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated, the expert continued, while noting that Washington itself has waged "political warfare" against other countries in the past. "There's a lot of material around to show that the Obama administration interfered with the election processes in Ukraine, in Israel and in other countries," he said. "Schumer himself is a rabid, and I use this word advisedly, rabid, political advocate concerned only with domestic political outcomes. He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely trying to undermine the Trump administration,"Copley concluded. | 2,970 | <h4><strong>Democrats block Trump releasing sanctions now</h4><p>RT 1-23</p><p></strong>RT is a writer and editor for Signs of the Times, “Spineless Democrats propose bill to prevent Trump lifting Russian sanctions”, Signs of the Times, https://www.sott.net/article/340425-Spineless-Democrats-propose-bill-to-prevent-Trump-lifting-Russian-sanctions, Accessed 2-3</p><p>A top Senate <u><mark>Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation</mark> designed <mark>to stop </mark>President <mark>Trump from relaxing US sanctions</mark> on Russia</u>. Critics argue that the bill is a "rabid and short-sighted" move to undermine the new administration. President Donald <u>Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment</u>. Shortly after Trump's inauguration, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer (D-New York) said on Sunday that <u><mark>a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill</mark> that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions</u> that Washington imposed on Russia in 2014 after Crimea voted to leave Ukraine and rejoin it in a referendum. The bill would demand that any changes to the restrictions be put to a vote in the US Congress, thus preventing the president from acting unilaterally. "We repeal sanctions, it tells Russia, 'Go ahead and interfere in our elections and do bad things;' it tells China; it tells Iran. That would be terrible," Schumer told ABC's This Week show, adding that he has secured support from GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham. "<u><mark>We need more sanctions against Russia</mark>. We should not relax them</u>," McCain said on the same program, adding "if we don't keep those sanctions on and even increase them, it will encourage Vladimir Putin, who is a war criminal." Earlier in January, <u><mark>Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction</mark> deal</u>. "For us to repeal sanctions, given what Russia has done in Ukraine and threatened the Baltics, and now they have clearly tried to intervene in our election - whether it had an effect or not - that is something, that's a danger that we have never faced to this extent in American history," Schumer went on. However, Gregory Copley, editor-in-chief of the Defense & Foreign Affairs journal, told RT that the bill was surely designed "as a part of the legacy that the then-president Obama wanted to leave for President Trump." "[Obama] wanted to make sure that he had grave difficulty in maintaining any normal strategic policy at all and particularly with regard to Russia. So he left that time bomb if you like," Copley asserted. <u>Allegations that <mark>Russia</mark> interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated</u>, the expert continued, while noting that Washington itself has waged "political warfare" against other countries in the past. "There's a lot of material around to show that the Obama administration interfered with the election processes in Ukraine, in Israel and in other countries," he said. "Schumer himself is a rabid, and I use this word advisedly, rabid, political advocate concerned only with domestic political outcomes. <u>He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely <mark>trying to undermine</mark> the <mark>Trump</mark> administration</u>,"Copley concluded.</p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 3 | 1,559,371 | 3 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,738 | Nuclear war | Goswami ‘13 | Goswami ‘13 | [Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons will fight a future war. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts argued internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity Hence managing the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | China-India border dispute intractable. militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia a nuclear-armed China and India will fight a future war proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations political tensions over land can lead to conflict the border issue in the next five years | [Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, will fight a future war. This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts have argued that internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However, despite such constraints, wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable, both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity. Hence, managing and resolving the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | 4,211 | <h4>Nuclear war<strong> </h4><p>Goswami ‘13</p><p><u>[Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]</p><p></strong><mark>China-India</mark> border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia</u>. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, <u>despite growing bilateral economic relations, <strong>the <mark>border dispute</mark> appears <mark>intractable</u></strong>.</mark> Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. <u>Given this overt <mark>militarization of the China-India border conflict</u>, <u><strong>any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia</mark>. </u></strong>This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. <u>Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario <strong>where <mark>a nuclear-armed China and India</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>with more than 300 nuclear weapons</u></strong>, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, <u><strong><mark>will fight a future war</mark>.</u></strong> This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. <u><strong>The physical <mark>proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations</mark> if war occurs.</u></strong> <u>Security analysts</u> have <u>argued</u> that <u>internal problems within India and China would create large</u> <u>disincentives for conflict. <strong>However</u></strong>, despite such constraints, <u>wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions.</u> Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it <u>is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation,</u> <u><strong><mark>political tensions over land can lead to conflict</u></strong></mark>, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. <u><strong>As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. </strong>While competition at a particular level is inevitable</u>, <u>both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity</u>. <u>Hence</u>, <u>managing</u> and resolving <u><strong><mark>the border issue</mark> peacefully <mark>in the next five years</mark> is something worth seriously working for.</p></u></strong> | 1nc | Offcase | CP | 105,715 | 11 | 125,896 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | 657,854 | N | Blake | 4 | Harris wilson et al | GOLDBERG | went for sick new conditions cp | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,739 | Third, tensions are already rising because Taiwan’s new government refuses to accept the ‘92 consensus. | Reuters 16 | Reuters 16 — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 26th, Available Online at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html, Accessed 06-29-2016) | The Chinese government stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two
China is deeply suspicious of Tsai as they suspect she will push for formal independence
China has insisted she recognise the "1992 consensus"
Because Taiwan has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped | The Chinese stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the new government to recognise the "one China" principle in the latest show of tension
China is deeply suspicious of Tsai as they suspect she will push for formal independence
Because Taiwan has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped | The Chinese government said on Saturday it had stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the self-ruled island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two.
China, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, is deeply suspicious of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office last month, as they suspect she will push for formal independence.
Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.
But China has insisted she recognise something called the "1992 consensus" reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.
In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.
"Because the Taiwan side has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped," spokesman An Fengshan said. | 1,269 | <h4><u>Third</u>, tensions are <u>already rising</u> because Taiwan’s <u>new government</u> refuses to accept the <u>‘92 consensus</u>. </h4><p><strong>Reuters 16</strong> — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 26th, Available Online at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p><u><mark>The Chinese</mark> government</u> said on Saturday it had <u><strong><mark>stopped a communication mechanism</strong> with Taiwan because of the refusal of the</u></mark> self-ruled <u>island's <mark>new government to recognise the "one China" principle</mark>, <mark>in <strong>the latest show of tension</strong></mark> between the two</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China</u></mark>, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, <u><mark>is deeply suspicious of</u></mark> Taiwan President <u><mark>Tsai</u></mark> Ing-wen, who took office last month, <u><mark>as they suspect she will <strong>push for formal independence</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.</p><p>But <u>China has insisted she recognise</u> something called <u>the "1992 consensus"</u> reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.</p><p>In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.</p><p>"<u><mark>Because</u></mark> the <u><mark>Taiwan</u></mark> side <u><mark>has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus</u></mark>, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, <u><mark>the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism <strong>has already stopped</u></strong></mark>," spokesman An Fengshan said.</p> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 1,651,053 | 456 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,740 | African Healthcare Policies – including about Malaria – are empirically Bipartisan | Cooke and Morrison 09 U.S. Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration” pgs. 34-36, 2009) | Cooke and Morrison 09 (Jennifer G. Cooke is director of the CSIS Africa Program, where she leads research and analysis on political, economic, and security dynamics in Africa. J. Stephen Morrison is senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and director of its Global Health Policy Center. CSIS “U.S. Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration” pgs. 34-36, 2009) | The "soft power" success of treating such large numbers of people for AIDS, increasingly manifest from 2005 forward, overcame domestic and international skepticism about the feasibility of such an endeavor, built considerable good will in Africa toward the United States, and helped sustain early bipartisan support within Congress for this expensive and uncertain grand experiment. Sustained progress in AIDS care and treatment has been heavily reliant on White House leadership, strong day-to-day direction from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, sustained bipartisan support, bold action on AIDS opened the space for a subsequent, wider, and more ambitious engagement in malaria, tuberculosis, and the strengthening of African health systems. Passage of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 provided a politically euphoric moment in late summer 2008 President Bush signed the bill into law on July 30, 2008. Senators Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain all voted in favor of the bill, The bill authorizes $48 billion for the second five-year phase (FY 2009- 2013) of PEPFAR, allocating $37 billion to HIV/AIDS, a combined $9 billion to tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, and $2 billion to the Global Fund, which addresses all three diseases. | The "soft power" success of treating large numbers for AIDS overcame skepticism built considerable good will in Africa toward the United States, and helped sustain early bipartisan support within Congress for this expensive and uncertain grand experiment progress has been heavily reliant on , bipartisan support bold action on AIDS opened the space for a subsequent, wider, and more ambitious engagement in malaria, Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 provided a politically euphoric moment . The bill authorizes a combined $9 billion to tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, and $2 billion to the Global Fund, which addresses all three diseases. | The "soft power" success of treating such large numbers of people for AIDS, increasingly manifest from 2005 forward, overcame domestic and international skepticism about the feasibility of such an endeavor, built considerable good will in Africa toward the United States, and helped sustain early bipartisan support within Congress for this expensive and uncertain grand experiment. Sustained progress in AIDS care and treatment has been heavily reliant on White House leadership, strong day-to-day direction from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, sustained bipartisan support, concrete performance targets, reliance on existing U.S. implementing agencies, and a broad U.S. constituency. Demonstrable progress also facilitated action on African HIV/AIDS that transcended what was an otherwise worsening partisan polarization in Washington on most other foreign and domestic policy matters. Momentum soon built upon itself: bold action on AIDS opened the space for a subsequent, wider, and more ambitious engagement in malaria, tuberculosis, and the strengthening of African health systems. This momentum has not been free of controversy. Requirements that one-third of all monies allocated to prevention of HIV transmission be devoted to abstinence-until-marriage and fidelity programs and that recipients of U.S. government HIV/AIDS funds pledge to op- pose prostitution overtly have caused considerable tension. There has also been resistance to integrating HIV/AIDS activities in any serious way into reproductive health and family-planning programs. In addition, although limited data suggest that providing HIV/AIDS-related investments can strengthen non-AIDS programs and overall health systems, criticism that U.S. HIV/AIDS commitments are increasingly weakening budgetary and other commitments in other key health areas such as child survival, reproductive health, and water and sanitation has intensified. A parallel concern is that these same HIV/AIDS commitments are crowding out U.S. foreign assistance for long-term basic non-health needs such as education and agriculture. By this same logic, U.S. commitments to the long-term delivery of mass ART in Africa may have created a de facto foreign aid entitlement with substantial and progressively mounting cost implications that, over the longer term, could further distort U.S. foreign assistance approaches and limit subsequent policy options.' Passage of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 provided a politically euphoric moment in late summer 2008, shortly before the U.S. economic downturn and broader global economic crisis began to accelerate. President Bush signed the bill into law on July 30, 2008. Senators Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain all voted in favor of the bill, which lays out a framework on global health that the Obama administration is likely to adopt, in some modified form, in Africa and elsewhere. The bill authorizes $48 billion for the second five-year phase (FY 2009- 2013) of PEPFAR, allocating $37 billion to HIV/AIDS, a combined $9 billion to tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, and $2 billion to the Global Fund, which addresses all three diseases. | 3,275 | <h4>African Healthcare Policies – including about Malaria – are empirically Bipartisan</h4><p><strong>Cooke and Morrison 09 </strong>(Jennifer G. Cooke is director of the CSIS Africa Program, where she leads research and analysis on political, economic, and security dynamics in Africa. J. Stephen Morrison is senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and director of its Global Health Policy Center. CSIS “<u><strong>U.S. Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration” pgs. 34-36, 2009)</p><p></strong><mark>The "soft power" success of treating </mark>such <mark>large numbers </mark>of people <mark>for AIDS</mark>, increasingly manifest from 2005 forward, <mark>overcame</mark> domestic and international <mark>skepticism </mark>about the feasibility of such an endeavor, <mark>built considerable good will in Africa toward the United States, and <strong>helped sustain early bipartisan support within Congress for this expensive and uncertain grand experiment</mark>.</strong> Sustained <mark>progress</mark> in AIDS care and treatment <mark>has been heavily reliant on</mark> White House leadership, strong day-to-day direction from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator<mark>, </mark>sustained <mark>bipartisan support</mark>,</u> concrete performance targets, reliance on existing U.S. implementing agencies, and a broad U.S. constituency. Demonstrable progress also facilitated action on African HIV/AIDS that transcended what was an otherwise worsening partisan polarization in Washington on most other foreign and domestic policy matters. Momentum soon built upon itself:<u> <mark>bold action on AIDS opened the space for a subsequent, wider, and more ambitious engagement in <strong>malaria</strong>,</mark> tuberculosis, and the strengthening of African health systems.</u> This momentum has not been free of controversy. Requirements that one-third of all monies allocated to prevention of HIV transmission be devoted to abstinence-until-marriage and fidelity programs and that recipients of U.S. government HIV/AIDS funds pledge to op- pose prostitution overtly have caused considerable tension. There has also been resistance to integrating HIV/AIDS activities in any serious way into reproductive health and family-planning programs. In addition, although limited data suggest that providing HIV/AIDS-related investments can strengthen non-AIDS programs and overall health systems, criticism that U.S. HIV/AIDS commitments are increasingly weakening budgetary and other commitments in other key health areas such as child survival, reproductive health, and water and sanitation has intensified. A parallel concern is that these same HIV/AIDS commitments are crowding out U.S. foreign assistance for long-term basic non-health needs such as education and agriculture. By this same logic, U.S. commitments to the long-term delivery of mass ART in Africa may have created a de facto foreign aid entitlement with substantial and progressively mounting cost implications that, over the longer term, could further distort U.S. foreign assistance approaches and limit subsequent policy options.' <u>Passage of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and <strong><mark>Malaria Reauthorization Act</strong> of 2008 provided a politically euphoric moment</mark> in late summer 2008</u>, shortly before the U.S. economic downturn and broader global economic crisis began to accelerate<mark>. <u><strong></mark>President Bush</strong> signed the bill into law on July 30, 2008. <strong>Senators Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain</strong> all voted in favor of the bill,</u> which lays out a framework on global health that the Obama administration is likely to adopt, in some modified form, in Africa and elsewhere. <u><mark>The bill authorizes</mark> $48 billion for the second five-year phase (FY 2009- 2013) of PEPFAR, allocating $37 billion to HIV/AIDS, <strong><mark>a combined $9 billion to tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, and $2 billion to the Global Fund, which addresses all three diseases.</u></mark> </p></strong> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 3 | 1,560,951 | 1 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,741 | Text: The United States federal government should | null | -propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of substantially increasing its diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank | null | null | -encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile. | 218 | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should</h4><p>-propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of substantially increasing its diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank</p><p>-encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and</p><p>-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile.</p> | 1nc | Offcase | CP | 1,559,478 | 8 | 125,896 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | 657,854 | N | Blake | 4 | Harris wilson et al | GOLDBERG | went for sick new conditions cp | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,742 | Fourth, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — nuclear war is likely. | Littlefield and Lowther 15 | Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016) | While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U S and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its A2/AD strategy
If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the U S may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks on China will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon as a means of forcing de-escalation
In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U S an outside aggressor, not China
nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U S China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U S – far more is at stake for China than it is for the U S
the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck Given that MAD is not part of China’s strategic thinking the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U S
China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U S It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood
China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished
Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons
China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis
China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan
China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate | analysts believe a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. intervening China will turn to its A2/AD strategy
If thwarted the U S may resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s weakness and the probability that attacks will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon
In the view of China, a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as aggression
far more is at stake for China than for the U S
the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one
Reunification is necessary for China to reach its goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection
With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished
Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests and the lengths to which China will ultimately go to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons
China is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits
China has not forgotten 96 nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate or capitulate | Possible Scenario
While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.
If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.
In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.
It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.
In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.
China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.
China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.
Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.
Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.
Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.
China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.
Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.
China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. | 5,723 | <h4><u>Fourth</u>, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — <u>nuclear war</u> is likely. </h4><p><strong>Littlefield and Lowther 15</strong> — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Possible Scenario</p><p><u>While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is possible, some <mark>analysts believe</mark> that <mark>a conflict over Taiwan remains <strong>the most likely place</strong> where the PRC and</mark> the <mark>U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action</mark> on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination <mark>could incur the wrath of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u><mark>To prevent the U.S.</mark> from <mark>intervening</mark> in the region, <mark>China will</mark> certainly <mark>turn to its</u></mark> anti-access/area-denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>strategy</u></mark>, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.</p><p><u><mark>If thwarted</mark> in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may</mark> be tempted to <mark>resort to stronger measures and <strong>attack mainland China</u></strong></mark>. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. <u><mark>Given the regime’s</mark> relative <mark>weakness and the probability that</mark> American <mark>attacks</u></mark> (cyber and conventional) <u>on China <mark>will include strikes against PLA command and control</u></mark> (C2) <u><mark>nodes</u></mark>, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, <u><mark>the Chinese may <strong>escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon</u></strong></mark> (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) <u>as a means of forcing de-escalation</u>.</p><p><u><mark>In the view of China,</mark> such <mark>a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy</mark> because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. <mark>Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as</mark> an act of <mark>aggression</mark>. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>an outside aggressor, not China</u>.</p><p>It is also important to remember that <u>nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>– <strong><mark>far more is at stake for China than</mark> it is <mark>for the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates.</p><p>In essence, <u><mark>the <strong>only</strong> effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one</u></mark>. Without making too crude a point, <u>the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck</u>, or yuan. <u>Given that</u> mutually assured destruction (<u>MAD</u>) <u>is not part of China’s strategic thinking</u> – in fact it is explicitly rejected – <u>the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.</p><p><u>China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. <mark>Reunification is necessary for China to reach its</mark> unstated <mark>goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence</mark> of China <mark>it acts as <strong>a literal and symbolic barrier</strong> to China’s power projection</mark> beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood</u>.</p><p><u>China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. <mark>With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is <strong>greatly diminished</u></strong></mark>. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.</p><p>Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.</p><p><u><mark>Central to China’s ability to <strong>guarantee</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>prosperity</strong> is the return of Taiwan</mark>, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies</u>. Unfortunately, <u><mark>too many Americans <strong>underestimate the importance of these core interests</mark> to China</strong> <mark>and the lengths to which China will ultimately go</mark> in order <mark>to guarantee them – <strong>even the use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.</p><p><u><mark>China</mark> sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it <mark>is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely <strong>instigate, control, and conclude</strong> in the Taiwan Straits</mark>. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits</u> in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, <u>ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis</u>. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.</p><p>Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, <u>China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China has not forgotten</mark> the humiliation it faced in 19<mark>96</mark> and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ <mark>nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is <strong>caught off-guard</strong>, <strong>overwhelmed</strong>, and forced to <strong>either escalate</mark> a crisis <mark>or capitulate</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 8,673 | 565 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,743 | Snowball – plan forces democrats to cave to Trump on the plan, which signals his strategies are effective – emboldens the GOP and enables their agenda | Marín and Aristizabal 2016 | Marín and Aristizabal, 2016 12-20
(Adanjesus Marín and Natalia Aristizabal are, respectively, the Pennsylvania State Director and organizer of Make the Road Action, a grassroots immigrant organization, Senate Republicans Were Wrong To Block Obama, But Senate Democrats Are Right To Block Trump, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/center-for-community-change-action/senate-republicans-were-w_b_13745176.html) | while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally there is a strong moral case for obstruction the threats from the incoming Trump administration are qualitatively greater than those of any recent major party nominee there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda Democrats must stand with the most vulnerable people in our society when they are under attack. If Democrats cave on anything they will be handing legitimacy to a Trump administration that will use that political capital to double-down on attacking immigrants Muslims, and people of color. Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration blocking Trump at every turn is sound strategy. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work But if Democrats cede ground and allow Trump to proceed with his agend they will be further vindicating the Republican strategy obstruct long enough Republicans will say and eventually Democrats will fold because they are unwilling to bargain as hard as we are. Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration. Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy | there is a strong case for obstruction threats from Trump are great there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda If Democrats cave on anything they will be handing legitimacy to Trump that will use that p c to double-down on misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals blocking Trump at every turn is sound strategy if Democrats cede ground they will be vindicating the Republican strategy obstruct long enough, and Democrats will fold Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business | Democrats, meanwhile, are presented with a conundrum. As the party that has always believed that government can actually work, some key figures are understandably wondering if they can be justified in mirroring McConnell’s strategy. But, while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally, there is a strong moral case for obstruction in the Trump era. The core reason for Democrats to use the filibuster and every available parliamentary tactic to block the Trump agenda is that the President-elect has pledged to cause grave harm to many different communities in this country, and there is a responsibility to protect them. Trump has pledged to devastate immigrant families through mass deportation, Muslims through surveillance and potential registration, and people of color through stop-and-frisk and other criminalization efforts. His appointments thus far, far from showing “softening,” have included notorious racists Steve Bannon and Jeff Sessions, with more odious people likely to come. In short, the threats from the incoming Trump administration are qualitatively greater than those of any recent major party nominee. And there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda: Democrats must stand with the most vulnerable people in our society when they are under attack. If Democrats cave on anything — for instance, a deeply-flawed infrastructure bill that they fear will appeal to the white working-class — they will be handing legitimacy to a Trump administration that will use that political capital to double-down on attacking immigrants, Muslims, and people of color. After all, Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals. There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration. Beyond the intrinsic case for obstruction, blocking Trump at every turn is also sound strategy. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work — that it can provide public goods like public safety, clean air and drinking water, and an effective social safety net. But if Democrats cede ground and allow Trump to proceed with his agenda, they will be further vindicating the Republican strategy: obstruct long enough, Republicans will say, and eventually Democrats will fold because they are unwilling to bargain as hard as we are. Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business. We all know that Washington is broken. Polarization between the two parties has increased, communication has broken down, and the ability to negotiate fairly and efficiently — without stalemates that take us to the brink of government shut downs and defaulting on our national debt — has fallen by the wayside. But, frankly, this is the fault of Republicans — who have presided over the deterioration of our political norms since Newt Gingrich’s tenure leading the House. With immigrants, Muslims, and communities color facing likely existential threats, Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration. They must prove their mettle by defending vulnerable citizens and residents of this country with every fiber of their being. Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy. After the grave threat to American communities has subsided, the two parties in Washington can engage again in the discussion of how to fix our broken political system. | 3,579 | <h4><strong>Snowball – plan forces democrats to cave to Trump on the plan, which signals his strategies are effective – emboldens the GOP and enables their agenda</h4><p>Marín</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Aristizabal</strong>, <strong>2016</strong> 12-20</p><p>(Adanjesus Marín and Natalia Aristizabal are, respectively, the Pennsylvania State Director and organizer of Make the Road Action, a grassroots immigrant organization, Senate Republicans Were Wrong To Block Obama, But Senate Democrats Are Right To Block Trump, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/center-for-community-change-action/senate-republicans-were-w_b_13745176.html) </p><p>Democrats, meanwhile, are presented with a conundrum. As the party that has always believed that government can actually work, some key figures are understandably wondering if they can be justified in mirroring McConnell’s strategy. But, <u>while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally</u>, <u><mark>there is a <strong>strong </mark>moral <mark>case for obstruction</u></strong></mark> in the Trump era. The core reason for Democrats to use the filibuster and every available parliamentary tactic to block the Trump agenda is that the President-elect has pledged to cause grave harm to many different communities in this country, and there is a responsibility to protect them. Trump has pledged to devastate immigrant families through mass deportation, Muslims through surveillance and potential registration, and people of color through stop-and-frisk and other criminalization efforts. His appointments thus far, far from showing “softening,” have included notorious racists Steve Bannon and Jeff Sessions, with more odious people likely to come. In short, <u>the <mark>threats from</mark> the incoming <mark>Trump</mark> administration <mark>are <strong></mark>qualitatively <mark>great</mark>er</u></strong> <u>than those of any recent major party nominee</u>. And <u><mark>there is a <strong>moral imperative</strong> to stop this</u> <u>reckless agenda</u></mark>: <u>Democrats must stand with <strong>the most vulnerable people</u></strong> <u>in our society when they are under attack<strong>. <mark>If Democrats cave on anything</u></strong></mark> — for instance, a deeply-flawed infrastructure bill that they fear will appeal to the white working-class — <u><strong><mark>they will be handing legitimacy to</mark> a <mark>Trump</mark> administration</u></strong> <u><mark>that will use that <strong>p</strong></mark>olitical <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>apital <strong><mark>to double-down on </mark>attacking immigrants</u></strong>, <u><strong>Muslims, and people of color.</u></strong> After all, <u>Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of <strong><mark>misguided economic populism</u></strong> <u>with</u> <u><strong>white nationalist appeals</u></strong></mark>. <u>There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration</u>. Beyond the intrinsic case for obstruction, <u><mark>blocking Trump at every turn is</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>sound strategy</strong></mark>. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work</u> — that it can provide public goods like public safety, clean air and drinking water, and an effective social safety net. <u>But <mark>if Democrats cede ground</mark> and allow Trump to proceed with his agend</u>a, <u><mark>they will be</mark> further <strong><mark>vindicating the Republican strategy</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>obstruct long enough</u></strong>,</mark> <u>Republicans will say</u>, <u><mark>and</mark> eventually <strong><mark>Democrats will fold</u></strong></mark> <u>because they are unwilling <strong>to bargain as hard as we are.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business</u></strong></mark>. We all know that Washington is broken. Polarization between the two parties has increased, communication has broken down, and the ability to negotiate fairly and efficiently — without stalemates that take us to the brink of government shut downs and defaulting on our national debt — has fallen by the wayside. But, frankly, this is the fault of Republicans — who have presided over the deterioration of our political norms since Newt Gingrich’s tenure leading the House. With immigrants, Muslims, and communities color facing likely existential threats, <u>Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration.</u> They must prove their mettle by defending vulnerable citizens and residents of this country with every fiber of their being. <u>Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy</u>. After the grave threat to American communities has subsided, the two parties in Washington can engage again in the discussion of how to fix our broken political system.</p> | 1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN | Off Case | 3 | 145,704 | 27 | 125,843 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | 655,689 | N | GFCA State But not really JV | 1 | Pace HN | Katie Marshall | 1AC - Health diplomacy
1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP
2NC - CP case
1NR - China ptx Trump PTX
2NR - US PTX Case
2AR - Framing Malaria PTX | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,744 | Fifth, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to full-scale nuclear war. | White 15 | White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016) | this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification | Washington leaders still talk about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster far worse than reunification | Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification, in fact. | 515 | <h4><u>Fifth</u>, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to <u>full-scale nuclear war</u>. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Even more worryingly, <u>this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in <mark>Washington</mark>, where <mark>leaders still talk</mark> boldly <mark>about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without</mark> seriously <mark>considering what that might mean in practice. <strong>Any</strong> US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be <strong>almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war</strong> and</u></mark> quite possibly a <u><strong><mark>nuclear exchange</strong>. That would be a disaster</mark> for everyone, including</u>, of course, <u>the people of Taiwan itself — <strong><mark>far worse than reunification</u></strong></mark>, in fact.</p> | null | 1AC | Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter) | 66,508 | 151 | 125,872 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,309 | A | Damus | 1 | Milpitas BP | Zeppos | 1AC - Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,759 | CaCy | Georgetown Day CaCy | null | Fi..... | Ca..... | Ar..... | Cy..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits